BASIC RIGHTSSubsistence, Affluence, ond

U.5. Foreign Policy

HENRY SHUE

PRINCETON UNIVERSIIY PRESSPRINCETON, NEW JER.SEY

- 1 .

S E C U R I T Y

A N D S U B S I S T E N C E

f u c r r r s

A m o r a l

r i g h t p r o v i d e s

( l )

t h e r a t i o n a l

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s t a n d a r d t h r e a t s .

S i n c e

t h i s

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t

T h e

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t u r n . 2

A r i g h t

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I c o u l d

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B u t t o

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t o e x p l a i n t h e m -

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THREE BASIC RIGHTS

rvithout being able to articulate the principles that apply to theircases and ,",i" ., the reasons for their demands' This book as a*t ot. it intended to express a set of reasons that are good enoughto justifu the demands defended here. Ifthe book is adequate, theprin"ipi", it articulates are at least one specific example of howiome particular demands can be iustified' For norv, I think, anexample rvould be more useful than an abshact characterization'

The significance of being iustified is very clear' Because a rightis the bas"is for a iustified demand, people not only may, but oughtto, insist. Thosi who deny rights do so at their own peril' Thisao.r not mean that effors io secure the fulfillment of the demandconstituting a right ought not to observe certain conshaints' Itdoes mean-thatlhose ivho deny rights can have no complaintrvhen their denial, especially if it is part of a systematic pattern ofdeprivation, is resisted- Exactly which countermeasures are ius-tified by which sorts of deprivations of rights would require a sepa-rate discussion.

A right is the rational basis, then, for a iustified demand' Rightsdo noijustify merely requests, pleas, petitions' It is only becauserights may lead to demands and not something weaker that havingriifrts is tied as closeiy as it is to human dignity' ]oel Feinberg haspit tf,ir eloquently for the case of legal rights, or, in his Hohfeld-ian term inology, claim-rights:

L,egal claim-rights are indispensably valuable possessions'a woild rviihout claim-rights, no matter how full of benevo-Ience and devotion to duty, would suffer an immense moralimpoverishment. Persons rvould no longer-hope for decenttreatment from others on the ground of desert or righdulclaim. Indeed, they would come to think of themselves ashaving no special claim to kindncss or consideration fromothers, so that whenever even minimally decent heatment isforthcoming they would think themselves lucky rather thaninherently ieserving, and their benefrctors exhaordinarilyvirtuous and worthy of great gratitude. The harm to individ-ual self-esteem and character development would be incal-culable.

A claim-right, on the other hand, can be urged, pressed,or rightly demanded against other persons' In appropriate

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SECURITY AND SUESISTENCE

circumstances the right-holder can "tirgcntly, peremptorily,or insistently" call for his rights, or assert them authorita-tively, confidently, unabashedly. Rights are not mere gifts orfavors, motivated by love or pity, for rvhich gratitude is thesole fitting response. A right is something that can be de-manded or insisted upon without embarrassment or shame,When that to which one has a right is not forthcoming, theappropriate reaction is indignation; rvhen it is duly giventhere is no reason for gratitude, since it is simply one's ownor one's due that one received. A world rvith claim-rights isone in which all persons, as actual or potential claimants,are digniEed objects ofrespect, both in their orvn eyes and inthe vierv o[ others. No amount of lovc and compassion, orobedience to higher authorig, or noblesse oblige, can substi-tute for those values.3

At least as much can be said for basic moral rights, includingthose that ought to, but do noi yet, have legal protection,

That a right provides the rational basis for a justified demandfor actual enioyment is the most neglected element of manyriglrts. A right does not yield a demand that it should be said thatpeople are entitled to enjoy something, or that people should bepromised that they rvill enioy something. A proclamation of aright is not the fulfillment of a right, any more than an airplaneschedule is a fight. A proclamation may or may not be an initialstcp torvard the fulfillment of the rights listed. It is frequently thesubstitute of the promise in the place of the fulfillment.

The substance of a right is whatever the right is a right to. Aright is not a right to enjoy a right-it is a right to enjoy somethingelse, Iike food or liberg. We do sornetirnes speak simply of some^one's "enjoying a right," but I take this to be an elliptigal way ofsaying that the person is enioying something or other, rvhich isthc substance ofa right, and, probably, enioying itas a right. En-ioying a right to, for example, liberty normally means enioyingliberty. It may also mean enioying liberg in the consciousnessthat liberty is a right. Being a right is a status that various subjectsof enjoyment have. Simply to enioy the right itself, the shtus,rather than to cnioy the subieit of the right rvould havc to mcansomething like taking satisfaction that there is such a status and

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THREE BASTC RIGHTS

that something has that status' But ordinarily when rvc say some-

"""

it .tl"yitig a right, we mean the person is enioying the sub-stance of the right'

Being sociailly guaranteed is probably the single.most important

,r*Jo'f r rtrna.rd right, because it is the aspect that necessitates;ffi;*; il;r.; Cright is ortlinarilv a iustified demand that,"rn"

"ai"t r.ople make-some arrangemenb so that one rvill still

i* ,if. i" ."i"y the substance of the right even if-actually' espe-Arify'tf-rtll ti"t rvithin one's orvn porver to arrange on one's ownI" .ii"i ti" ,uirtrr,"" of the- right' Suppose people have a right to;i;ri";l security. Some of the"m may-nevertheless choose to hireI;;;;;; il'ric guards, as if thev had no right to social guaran-i.*. S-i,[.y rvou"ld be iustified, and

"'eryon" else is iustified' in

;;;eil ihat somebody somewhcre make some effective ar-;r"g;;ft i"-"Juiiti, and maintain sectrrity' Whcther the ar-;ffiIrnena, should be governmental or non-governmental; local'*ii""rf, or international; participatory or non-participatory' areall difficult questions to which I may or may not be able to give

definitive or conclusive answers her"' Bt't it is essential to a right

tt rt ii it a demand upon others, however dit6cult it is to specifrexactly rvhich others-l;1 , right has been guaranteed.only when arrangemenb haveU."n *ra."f"r people *'iit' tt" right to enioy it' ft is not enoughil;i,h. .no*",.,i it happens thlt no one is violating the right'sIust as a proclamation oi a right is not tlte fulfillment of a right,;:

il',;il;;-;i.l*t a itep toward or awav from actuallvirinffi"g the right, an undertaking to createsocial guarantees foril; .tt"fu"iof urrio',,

''''biectlof rights is by no means itself

iir" "u.rr*..ing and

may or may not lead to real grrarantee-s' But

"'rrlii ill-r"tI..n ntfntt"d until arrangements are in fact in

olr.I. fo, rrople to cnioy whatever it is to which they have the-ffi'ilJrl'i; p"*rpt,'tl't arrangcments will take the form ofi;;;n.,;ki;;iire ,ighi, itg"l

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" moral ones' But in other

.rr"t t "ff-."t ".r.f,.d "u''to*',

backed by taboos' might servebefter than laws---

THNEE BASIC RIGHTS

preserve effective institutions for the fulfillment of rights is aI;;;tty olmuch of what is involved in performing all three ofthe duties correlative to $pical righb, but to discuss duties nowwould be to iumP ahead of the story'

SECURTTY AND SUBSISTENCE

about how to prevent the rest from sinking lower. It is not clearthat rve cannot do both.ro. And it is not surprising that what is in an imporhnt respect the

essentially negative goal ofpreventing or alleviating helplessness isa central purpose of something as important as conceptions ofbasic rights. For everyone healthy adulthood is bordered on eachside by helplessness, and it is vulnerable to interruption byhelplesness, temporary or permanent, at any timc. And many ofthe people in the rvorld now have very little control over theirfates, even over such urgent matters as whether their own chil-dren live through infancy. rr Nor is it surprising that although thegoal is negative, the duties conelative to righ* will furn out toinclude positivc actions. The infant and the agcd do not need tobe assaulted in order to be deprivcd of health, life, or the capacityto enioy activc rights. The classic liberal's main prescription forthe good life--do not interfere with thy neighbor-is the onlypoison they need. To be helpless they need only to be left alone.This is rvhy avoiding the infiction of deprivation will turn out inchapter 2 not to be the only kind of duty correlative to basic righb.

Basic rights, then, are everyone's minimum reasonable de-mands upon the rest of humanity.lz "I'hey are the rational basisfor iustiEed demands the denial of which no self-respecting per-son can reasonably be expected to accept. Why should anythingbe so important? The reason is that rights arc basic in the senseused here only if enjoyment of thcrn is essential to the enjoymentof all other rights. This is rvhat is distinctive about a basic right.When a right is genuinely basic, any attcmpt to enioy any otherright by sacrificing the basic right rvould be quite literally self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath ibelf. Therefore, if aright is basic, other, non-basic rights may be sacrificed, if neces-sary, in ordcr to secure the basic right. But the protection of abasic right may not be sacrificed in order to secure the enjoynrento[ a non-basic right. It may not be sacrificed because it cannot besacrificcd successfully. Ifthe right sacrificed is indeed basic, thenno right for rvhich it might be sacriEced can actually be enjoycdin the abscnce ofthe basic right. Thc sacrifice rvould have provenself-defeating. l 3

In practice, what this prioriiy for basic rights usually means is

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Beslc Rlcsrs

Nietzsche, who holds shong title to being the most misunderstood;;;;;i;;d"."t d philJsopher of the last century' consideredmuch of conventionai morality-and not conceptions o[ rights;;t-i; b. ,.t atte-pt by the powerless to restrain. the powerful:,n .norrnou, net o[ 6ne mCIh |usily woven around the strong bytt"-*rrr"t

"fthe weak.8 And he was disgusted by it' as if fleas

*.* pat*i"S a magnificent leopard -or

ordinary irry rvere weigh-lng dotun

"

sJrring oak- In recoiling from Nietzsche's dssessment.i*"t fiE, mariy h"re dismissed too quickly his insighdul;til;f

-o..liy. Moral systems obviouslv sewe more thanone purPose, and different specific systems serve some PurPoses;;;i"it; better thau others, as of course Niebsche himself"1ro

,."ognir.d. But one of the chief purposes of morality in gen-

"rrf, .rf ."*inly of conceptions of righb,

-and of basic rights

"ior" .tt, is indeed to provide some minimal protection against

utt , t,.tpt".t"ess to those too weak to protect themselves' Basic

ilil ;; -ht.td fot th. defenseless against atleast some of the*?r. J"*tt"ring and more common of life's threats' rvhich in-;ili;,-"tlu" ,h"all see, Ioss of security andloss of subsistencc'nrri" ,ignt are a restraint uPon economic and political forces thatruould

-otherwise be too strong to be resisted' They are socialguarantees against actual and lhreatened deprivations of at leastio.n. b.ri" nleds' Basic rights are an aftempt to give to the Power-Iess a veto over some of-ihe forces that would otherwise harmthcm the most.

Basi" riglrts are the morali$ of the depths"l'hey specifu thclinebeneaih ,^,'hi.h no one is to be allowed to sink. This is part of the,*ron tf,rt basic rights are tied as closely to self-respcct as Feirl-U"rg irJi.nt t legaiclaitn-righ$ are'e And this helps to explain*t y f.li"t ..t

"

fJund morrl iight t"pugn-"nt' His cye was on thef,.igh,t, and he wanted to talk about how far some mightsoar' not

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THREE EASIC RIGHTS

that basic rights need to be established sccurely before other rightscan be secured. The point is that people should bc able to enioy,orexeTcise, their other rights. The point is simple but vital. It isnot merely that people should "have" their other rights in somemerely legalistic or othenvise abshact sense compatible with beingunable to make any use o[ the substance of the right. For exam-ple, if people have rights to free association, they ought notmerely to "have" the rights to free association but also to enioytheir free association itself. Their freedom oF association ought tobe provided for by the relevant social institutions. This distinctionbetween merely having a right and actually enioying a right mayseem a 6ne point, but it furns out later to be critical.

What is not meant by saying that a right is basic is that thc rightis more valuable or intrinsically more satisfuing to enioy thansomc other rights. For example, I shall soon suggest that rights tophysical security, such as thc right not to be assaulted, are basic,and I shall not include the right to publicly supported educationas basic. But I do not mean by this to deny that enjoyment of theright to education is mucb greater and richer-more distinctivelyhuman, perhaps-than merely going through Iife without everbeing assaulted. I mean only that, if a choice must be made, theprevention of assault ought to supersede the provision o[ educa-tion. Whether a right is basic is independent of whether its en-joyment is aiso valuable in itself. Inhinsicaliy valuable rights mayor may not also be basic rights, but intrinsically valuable rightscan be enioyed only rvhen basic rights are enioyed. Clearly fcwrighis could be basic in this precise sense.

SscuruTY fucsrsOur first project will be to see why people have a basic right tophysical security-a right that is basic not to be subiected to mur-der, torture, mayhcm, rape, or assault. The purpose in raising thequestions why there are rights to physical security and why theyare basic is not that very many people would seriously doubteithcr that there are rights to physical security or that they are bas-ic. Although it is not unusual in practice for members of at leastone ethnic group in a society to be physically insccure-to be, forexample, much more likely than other people to be beaten by the

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SECURITY AND SUBSISTNCE

police if arrested-ferv, if any, people would be prepared to dc-fend in-principle the contention"thai anyon. h;L; basic right tophy.lical security. Neverthcless, it "r; l;;offie to formulateexplicitly the--presuppositions of even on", *orii*ly held be-Iiefs, especially because these presuppositi"rr'*.y'"* out to begeneral.principles that wir prwide gria"".. i, ,i'rrer areas rvhere

convictions are less firm. precisely b].cause *" f,rr. no real doubtthat righb to physical security aie brsi", it c.n-bl ,r.ful to r."rvhy we may properly think so. ra.

If we. had to iusti$ our belief.that.people have a basic right tophysical security to some-one *ho "h"lli.,ged tlil fundr.n"ntaiconviction, we could in fact give , ,trong-rr!,rr*nt that showsthat iflthere are any righh (brsil" o, ,ot brr].i;i;it', ,f,... are basic

rights to physical security:

y :l: :riftrlly enioy any riglrt that is supposedly protecredDy soctety tt someone can credibly threaten him or her with1.urde1,.r_ape, beating, etc., rvhen he

".;;;;;;.nioy rhealleged right. Such threats to ph_ysical r.";;t';;.;,"ong themost serious and_in much of the worldihe most rvide_spread hindrances to the enioyment of ,", ,iriri if any .ight3^,:_!:-:::l",sed. excepr at grea t risk, physi"aT securi g mustDe protected. ln the absence of physical sccurity people areunable.to use any other righh tt"t *"i.ty ."rfiesaid to beprotecting without being liable to encountci many of theyolst da3Sers-they wouli .n"o,,r,t.r-;f ri;;#ie not pro_tccting the rights.l."r,lt!,,^I full physical security bclongs, then, among theDasic nghts_not because the enioyment of it would be i,oreutisfying to someone who.rvas. ,l* .,r;oiing

" ilii .rng" ofother rights, but because its absence ;";d il;'rvailable

extremely effective means for otherr, in"ludi;;;i" govern_ment, to interfere with or prevent the actual .i.r.lrJof

"nyother rights that wcre supposedly pr"t;.i;.'R;grrale", ofrvhcther the enioyment oi ir,yri"rt ;;;;;ill; ,iri'a.ri,nut"tor ils orvn sake, ir is desirabie ,, *n;iih; enilvment or:::7 uth.r. right. No rights other tt rn . .ift ito'piyri"rt ,.-:::,ty ".r" in fa_ct be enioyed.if a right to p"t yri.ri...rrity ;,not protectcd. Being physically sec"ure i, . n...rrnry

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THREE BASIC RTGHTS

tionforthcexerciseofanyotherright,andguaranteeingilil; ,."rriry *.,u be p"t of guaranteeing anything elseas a right.

A person could, of course, always.try to enioy some other right

even i[ no social provisio" n'"'" In'dt to protect his or her physi-cal safe$ during attempts to exercise the right' S-uppose there is

a

't.l'ii^''"r""dl ase*blv but it is not unusual for peaceful as-.:?oul"t1ru;';il ;; and some of the participanh-bcaten'wi..,h.t ;;i*n ,ot*ilv is actually broken up depend-s largelyfi;;,h"r,aifo""

"rt. (in o' ot't olgovernment) is sufficientlv

"r*t.-Ji"'riio both.' to'arrange an aftack' Peo?.le could still trv

tJ'rrr.-Uf", and they might iometimes assemble safely'But itililffi*'tU. rnitt."fing to say that they are protected in-l,.irltt[i," ,r'."*Uf. rf-tr'tv Zlt as vulnerable as ever to one oftr,.'*""r1 .eri"u, ,nd g.n.J threats to enioyment of the right,,"*.i, otrtt"al,ioteitt by other people' Ifthey are as helpless;;:i ;i;'j"al thrcats *i't.' tr'" rilht;protected" as thev wouldhave been rvithout the suppos.d prJtection, socie$ is not actuallyprotecting their excrcise of the right to assemoty' .'- So ,r,y"or," who is entitled to a'nything as a right must

be enti-

tled to physical security as a basic tigLt so that threats to his or her

physical security ".nt'oiit uJ to"tt'*'* the

enioyment of the

other right. This argument has two critical premises' The 6rst is

ffi;;il; t, .ntitr.a ,o enioy something as a righr.ls T!: r:o"J, ,"iri"f, f".tt.r .*plrir,"the

first, is thaieveryone is entitled to

the removal ortr," *ort r"ri*r.rd g.n.rrl conditions that wouldDrevcnt or severely intelert with ttre exercise of rvhatever

righb

ii:"il';;;;;;Uk' tit' second premise to be part of what is*..'.,t-i" ..yi"g that everyone is eniitled to e1i-oy something as a;il;'; *d.i',,ed in tit op""ing section of.this chapter' Sinceili';;;;;* ,pplit' io t'"ryo'i"' it establishes a right that isuniversal.

SusstsrENce Rtcrrrs

The main reason for discusing security rights' which are not very

controvenial, *r, to rntkt e"xplicit U-t b1t': assumptions that;rr* * ;rr"i i"agt*"t that security.rights are basic rights'Now that we have avail"ble an argumcnt that supporb

them' rve

SECUR]W AND SUBSISTENCE

are in a position to consider whether matters other than physicalsecurity should; according to the same argumcnt, also be basicrights. It rvill emerge that subsistence, or minimal economic se-curig, which is morc controversial than physical security, canalso be shorvn to be as well justified for treatment as a basic rightas physical security is-and for the same reasons.

By minimal economic security, or subsistence, I mean unpol-luted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing,adequate sheltcr, and minimal preventive public health care:Many complications about exactly how to specifu the boundariesof rvhat is necessary for subsistence rvould be interesting toexplore. But the basic idea is to have available for consumptionwhat is needed for a decent chance at a reasonably healthy andactive life of more or less normal length, barring tragic interven-tions. This central idea is clear enough to work with, even thoughdisputes can occur over exactly where to drarv its outer botrnd-aries. A right to subsistence would not mcan, at one extreme, thatevery baby born rvith a need for open-heart surgery has a right tohave it, but it also rvould not count as adequate food a diet thatproduces a life expectancy of 35 years of feverJaden, parasite-ridden listlessness.

By a "right to subsistence" I shall always mean a right to at leastsubsistence. People may or may not have economic rights that gobeyond subsistence rights, and I do not want to preiudge thatquestion here. But people may have rights to subsistencc even ifthcy do not have any shict rights to economic well-being extend-ing beyond subsistence. Subsistence rights and broader economicrighb are separate questions, and I rvant to focus here on sub-sistence.

I also do not rvant to preiudge the issue o[ rvhether healthyadults are entitled to be provided with subsistence only if theycannot provide subsistence for themselves. Most of the rvorld'smalnourished, for exampie, arc probably also diseased, sincemalnutrition lowers resistance to disease, and hunger and infesta-tion normally form a tight.vicious circle. Hundreds o[millions ofthe malnourished are vcry young children. A large percentage ofthe adults, besides being ill and hungry, are also chronically un-employed, so the issue of policy toward healthy adults who refuseto rvork is largely irrelevant. By a "right to subsistence," then, I

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THREE SASIC RIGHTS

shall mean a right to subsistence that includes the provision ofsubsistence at le-ast to those wlro cannot provide for themselves. Ido not assume that'no one else is also entitled to receive sub-sistence-l simply do not discuss cases of healthy adults

-rvhocould support themselves but refuse to do so' If therc is a right tosubsisterrce in the sense discussed hcre, at least the people whocannot provide for themselves, including the children, are enti-tled to receive at least subsistcnce. Nothing follows one way or theother about anyone else.

It makes no difference whether the legally enforced system ofproper$ where a given penon lives is private, state, communal,o, or" tf tn. ,n"ny *or. $pical mixtures and varianh' Under allsystems of property people'are prohibited from simply taking evenwhat they n..d to, survival. Wratever the proper$ instihrtionsand the economic system are, the question about righb to subsist-ence remains: if persons are forbidden by law ftom taking whatthey need to survive and they are unable within existing economicinsiitutio.,s and policies to provide for their own survival (and thesuwiral ofdependents for rvhose welfare they are responsible), arethey entitled, as a last resort, to receive the essentials for suwivaliroi the remainder of humanity whose lives are not threatened?

The samc considerations that support the conclusion that phys-

ical securig is a basic right support the conclusion that subsist-ence is a basic right. Sinci the argument is now familiar, it can begiven fairly briefly.

It is quite obvious why, if we still assume that there are somerights that society ought to protect and still mean by this the re-m-oval of the most serious and general hindrances to the actualenjoyment of the rights, subsistence ought to be protected as abasic right:

No one can fully, if at all, enioy any right that is supposedlyprotected by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a rea-sonably t erttf,y and active life. Deficiencies in the means o[subsistlnce can be iust as fatal, incapacitating, or painful asviolations of physical security. The resulting damage ordeath can at leasi as decisively Prevent the enioyment of anyright as can the effccts of security violations' Any form ofmalnutrition, or fever due to exposure, that causes severe

SECURITY AND SUBSISTENCE

and irreversible brain_damage, for example, can effectivelyprevent the exercise o[any right requirin! clear thought andmay, like brain iniuries caused by aisault,-profoundly"disturbpersonality. And, obviously, any fatal deficiencies end allposibility of the enioyment of righs as firmly as an arbiharyexecution,

Indeed, prevention of deficiencies in the essentials for sur-vival is, if anything, more basic than prevention of violationsof physicalsecurig. people rvho Iack protection against vio_lations of their physical security can, if they are -free, 6ghtback against their attackers o, fi.e, but peoile rvho lack"eyse-ntials, such as food, because offorces U"yo"a tfieir control,often can do nothing and are on their orvn uHerly helpless. rdThe scope ofsubsistence rights nrust not be taken to be broader

than it is. In particular, this stcp of the argument does not makethe follorving absurd claim: since death anJ serious illness preventor.interfere with the cnjoyment of rights, everyone has a basicright not to be allowed to die or to be seriously ili. Many causes ofdeath and illness are orrtside the control oi society, ,nd mrrrydeaths and illnesses are the resurt ofvery particurar conjunctionsofcircumstances that general social policies cannot conhol. But itis not impractical to expect some level of social organization toprotect the minimal cleanliness of air and water and to oversee theadequate production, or import, and the proper distribution ofminimal food, clothing, shclter, and elementaiy health care. It isnot impractical, in short, to expect effective management, whennece.ssary, ofthe supplies of the essentials of life. SJthe argumentis: rvhen death and serious illness could be prevented by dlfferentsocial polic.ies regarding the-essentials oflife, the proteciion ofanyhuman right involves avoidance of fatal or debiiitating de6cien_cies in thcse essential commodities. And this *erns fulflling sui_sistcnce rights as basic rights. This is society,s business becauie theproblems are serious and general. This is a basic right becausefailure to deal with it woJrl hinder the enjoyment of all otherrights.

Thus, the same considerations that estabiish that security rightsare basic for everyone also support the conclusion that subsistenceIlghts arc basic flor everyone. It is not being claimed or assumed

.25..24.

THREE BASIC RIGHTS

that security and subsistence are parallel in all' or even very*r"y, t"tp."ts. The only parallel being relied upon is that guar-.nt..t oft"""rity and guatantees ofsubsistence are equally essen-;i;i1;il li;g for thJactual exercise of anv other rights' As longas ,..urity anisubsistcnce ate parallel in this respect' the argu-**i"pif.t .q*tly to both case', and other respects in whichsec,rrity and subsistence are not parallel are irrelevant'"-ltl;;i.;ugh

that people *Lrely happen to be secure or hap-p.; ; ;;;tirf;r,g- rh.y -ust have a right to security and a rigtrtio subsistence-thi continued enioyment of the security and the

,ubrir*.r.. must be socially guaranteed' Otherwise a person-is;;;Jiiy 6* to coercion and Intimidation through threats of thea-.p.it1",ii, ,fone or the other, and credible threats can paralyze;;;t;; and prevent the exercise of any-other right as surely as;.fi;i d;.d;,i;"a r"t rt p-t"in/caloriede6ciencies can' 17 Cred-ibt. tl,r."ts Jrn b" ,.duc"d only by the actual establishment of;ri;;g.ments that will bring assistance to those confrontedby forces that they themsclves cannot handle'-'Conr.qrr.ntly

ihe guaranteed security and guaranteed subsist-ence are rvhat rve might initially be tempted to call "simultaneousnecessities,' for the eiercise of any other right. 1'hey must be pres-

.na "t ,ny time

that any other right is to be exercised' or peopleca., be picve.,ted from enioying the other {ght by deprivations orthreatened deprivations oi t""*ity or of subsistence' But to thinkin terms of simultanei$ would be largely to miss the point' A bet-ter label, if any is need'.d, would be "inhcrcnt necessities"' For it;;';;iiil.at;.;rity from beatings, for instance, is separate ftomfreedom of peaceiul assembly but that it always needs to accom-

frny it. Being secure from beatings if one chooses to hold a meet-i"g lt prtt

"f 6eing free to asemble' I[ one cannot safely assemble'

o.,"e is^not free to issemble. One is, on the conhary, being coercednot to assemble by the threat of the beatings'

Tie sa*e is hue i[ taLing part in the meeting would lead.todir*inri by the only availablcimfloyer when-employment islhe;;t t;;t"; of income for the purchase of food' Guarantees of se-curity ,.d subsistence ire no[ added advantages over and above

""i"rt*., of the right to assemble' They are essential parts of it'

Fo. ihis reason it would be misleading to conshue security or,uu,i,n"...-or the substance of any other basic right-merely as

SECURIIY AND SUBSISIENCE

"means" to the enioyment o[ all other rights, The enjoyment ofsecurity and subsistence is an essential part of the enioyment of allother rights. Part of rvhat it means to enloy any other right is to beablc to exercise that right rvithout, as a consequence, suffering theactual or threatened loss oIone's physical security or one's subsist-ence. And part ofwhat it means to be able to enioy any other rightis not to bc prevented ftom exercising it by lack of security or ofsubsistence. To claim to guarantee people a right that thcy ate infact unable to exercisc is fraudulent, like fumishing people withmeal tickets but providing no food.

What is being described as an "inherent necessity" needs to bedistinguished carefully from a mere mcans to an cnd. If A is ameans to end B and it is impossible to reach the end B rvithoutusing the means A, it is perfectly correct to say that A is necessaryfor B. But when I describe the enioyment of physical security, forexample, as necessary for the enioyment of a right to assemble, ido not intend to say merely that enjoying security is a rneans toen joying assembly. I intend to say that part of the meaning of theenjoyment of a right ofassembly is that one can assemb]e in phys-ical security. Being secure is an essential component of enioying aright of assembly, so that there is no such thiog as a situation inrvhich peoplc do havc social guarantees for assembly and do nothave social guarantees for security. If they do not have guaranteesthat they can asemble in sccurity, they have not been providedrvith assembly as a right. They must assemble and merely hope forthe best, because a standard threat to assembling securely has notbeen dealt with. The fundamental argument is that rvhen onefully grasps what an ordinary right is, and espccially rvhich dutiesare correlative to a right, one can see that the guarantee of certainthings (as basic rights) is part of-is a constituent of-is an essen-tial componcnt of-the establishment of the conditions in whichthe right can actually be enioyed. These conditions include theprevention of the thrvarting of thc enioyment of the right by any"standard threat," at the explanation of rvhich rve must soon look.

A final observation about the idea of subsistence rights is, horv-ever, worth making here: subsistence rights are in no rvay an orig-inal, new, or advanced idea.,lfsubsistence rights scem strange,this is more than likely because Western liberalism has had ablind spot for severe economic need. lE Far from being ncw or ad-

.27,.26.

THREE BASIC RICHTS

vanced, subsistence rights are found in tradition-al societies that;;il1;;;..i bv tiodem societics as ge,erallv backward ornrimitive.""ir'*.r-C. Scott has shown that some of the haditional eco-,J*i" ,"rrg"ients in Southeast Asia that were- in other respectshiehlv exploitative nevertheless rvere understood by both patrons

;ili#:i;ur. S.ott', terminologv-to include rights to sub'il;:;;; the part of clients and duties on the part of patrons not;;i;;r*. iro* dep,iuing clients of subsistence but to provide;;;i1;"" to any clients t'hoiuert for any rcason deprived:

If the need for a guaranteed nrinimum is a powerful motivein f."r*t life, Jne would expect to- fiid institutionalizedpattems in peasant

"o**unitit' which provide for this

'n..i. ,Cna, in fact, it is above all rvithin the village-in the

;;il;;; "it".ial

conhol and reciprocitv -that

struchrre dailv

I"ta".t-*t.re the subsistence ethic finds social expres-;i"* TIr. principle which appears to unifi. a wide array off"ir"rt it this: "All village iamilies will be guaranteed aminimal subsistence niche insofar as the resources con-iolled by villagers make this possible'" Village egalitarian-isminthissenseisconservativenotradical;itclaimsthatall.-houta tr.r. a place, a living, rrot that all should be equal' ' -' 'F.* ,illrg. studies of Souii'east Asia fail to remark on theinformal social conhols which act to provide-for the minimal

"."at "f the viliage poor' The position of the.better-off ap-

p."" t" be legitimlzed only to the extent thatlheir resourcesur"

"*ptoy.iin ways which meet the broadly defined rvel-

fare needs of villagers. le

As Benedict ). Kerkvliet, also writing about an Asian society' putii, a ti."g'patron-client relationship was a kind of all-encom';;tti;;'iffi;;poli.v

'uhot" tou"'ngt' although not total and

itn"itZfy reliable,'."r, "

to-p'ehensiue as a poor family couldget'"20

Many reasons wergh in favor of the elimination of the kind of

priron-.ii..,t relatioi-rships that Scott and Kerkvliet have de'scribed-no one is suggesting that they should be' or could be'pt"t1..a' The point ttt it""tfy that the institutionalization of

SECURITY AND SUBSTSTiNCE

subsistence rights is in no way tied to some utopian fuhrre "ad-vanced" society, On the contrary, the real question is whethermodern nations can be as humane as, in tftis regard, many tradi-tional villages are, If we manage' rve may to a considerable extentmerely have restored something of lulue that has for some timebeen lost in our theory and our practice.

Sr,ri.lpeno THREers

Bcfore we turn over the coin of basic rights and consider the sidewith the duties, we need to establish two interrelated points aboutthe rights side, One point concerns the 6nal element in the ac-counlofthe generai structure ofall rights, basic and non-basic,rvhich is the notion ofstandard threab as the targets ofthe socialguarantees for the enioymcnt of thc substance of a right. Theother point specifically concerns basic rights and the questionrvhether the reasoning in Favor of treating sccurity and subsistenceas the substances of basic rights does not generate an impracticallyand implausibly long list of things to which people rvill be said tohave basic rights. The hvo points are interrelated bccausc theclearest manner by which to establish that the list o[basic rightsmust, on the contrary, be quite short is to invoke the fact that thcsocial guarantees required by the structure of a right are guaran-tees, not against all possible threats, but only against rvhat I willcall standard threats. In the end rve will find a supportive coher-ence between the account of basic righh and ihe account of thegeneral str-ucture of most moral rights. We may begin by revierv-Ing the ,6rron, for taking security and subsistence to be basicrights and considering whether the same reasons would supportheating many other things as basic righb. Answering that ques-tion rvill lead us to sce the role and importance of a conception ofstandard threats.

Why, then, according to the argtrment so far, are security andsubsistcnce basic rights? Each is essential to a normal healthy life'Because the actual deprivation of either can be so very serious-potentially incapacitating, crippling, or fatal----even the threat-encd deprivation ofeither can be a powerful weaPon against any-one rvhose security or subsistence is not in fact socially guaran-teed. People rvho cannot provide for their own securi$ and sub-

.24' .29.

THR,EE BASIC RIGHTS

sistence and who lack social guarantees for both are very weak,and possibly helpless, againstany individual or institution in a po-sition to deprive thcm of anything else they value by means ofthreatening their security or subsistence. A fundamental purposeof acknowledging any basic rights at all is to prevent, or to elimi-nate, iqsofar as possible the degree of vulnerability that leavespeople at the mercy of others. Social guarantees of security andsubsistence would go a long way toward accomplishing this pur-posc.

Security and subsistence are basic righb, then, because of theroles they play in both the enioyment and the protection of allother rights. Other righs could not be enioyed in the absence o[security or subsistence, even if the other rights were somehowmiraculously protected in such a situation. And other rights couldin any case not be protected if security or subsistence couldcredibly be threatened. The enioyment of the other rights requiresa certain degree o[ physical integrity, rvhich is temporarily un-dermined, or eliminated, by deprivations of securi$ or of subsist-ence. Someone who has suffered exposure or a beating is incapa-ble of enjoying the substances of other righb, although onlytemporarily, provided he or she receives good enough care torecover the use ofall essential faculties.

But as our earlier discussion of helplessnes made clear, eitherthe actual or the credibly threatened loss ofsecurity or subsistenceleaves a person vulnerable to any other deprivations the source ofthe threat has in mind. Without security or subsistence one ishelpless, and consequently one may also be helpless

-to protect,vhaterer

"rn be prolected only at the risk o[ security 3r subsist-

ence. Therefore, security and subsistence must be sociallyguaranteed, if any rights are to be enioyed. This makcs them basicrights.

In the construction of any philosophical argument, a principalchallenge is to establish what needs to be established without slip-ping into the assertion of too much. By "too much" I mean aconclusion so inflated that, even ifit is not a reduction to absurd-ity in the strict sense, it nevertheless shains credulity. The argu'ment for security rights and subsistence rights may seem to sufferthis malady, which might be callcd the weakness of too muchstrength. Specifically, the argument may be feared to have im-

SECURITY AND SUESISTENCE

plicit implications that people have rights to an unlimited numberofthings, in addition to securig and subsistence, that it is difficultto believe that people actually could iustifiably demand of others.

Norv it is true that we have no reason to believe that securi$and subsistence are the only basic rights, and chapter 3 is devotedto the question of rvhether some kinds of liberties are also basicrighS. But as rve shall see in that chapter, it is quite difficult toextend the list of basic righb, and we face little danger that thecatalogue of basic rights will turn out to be excessively long. Be-flore it becomes perhaps painfully obvious from the case of liberty,it may be helpful to see why in the abstract the iist of basic rights issharply limited even if it may have some members not considercdhere.

The shucture of the argument that a specific right is basic maybe outlined as follows, provided we are careful about rvhat ismeant by "necessary":

l. Everyone has a right to something.2. Some other things are necessary for enjoying the 6rst

thing as a right, whatever the first thing is.3. Therefore, everyone also has right to the other things

that are necessary for cnioying the first as a right.Since this argument abstracts from the substance of the right as-sumed in the 6rst premise, it is based upon what it normallymeans for anything to bc a right or, in other rvords, upon the con-cept of a right. So, if the argument to establish the substances ofbasic rights is summarized by saying that these substances are the"othcr things . necessary" for enjoying any other right, it isessential to interpret "necessary" in the restricted sense of "madeessential by the very concept of a right." The "other things" in-clude not rvhateverwould be convenient or useful, butonly whatis indispensable to anything else's being enioyed as a right. Noth-ing rvill tum out to be necesury, in this sense, for the inioymentof any right uniess it is also necessary for the enioyment oieveryrightand is, for precisely this reason, qualified to'be the substanceofa basic right.

Since the concept ofa right is a profoundly Janus-faced con-c.e$, lhis conceptual necessity can be cxplained both from theside of the bearer of the righf and, as we will see more fully in

.30-.31 .

lrlfIrlirHREE BASIC RIGHTS

SECURITY AND SUBS]STTNCE

right must be protected against the typical maior threab. If peopleare as helpless against ordinary threats as they would be on theirown, duties conelative to a right are not being performed. Prc-cisely what those threats are, and which it is feasible to counter,ar of course largely empirical questions, and the answers to bothquestions will change as the sifuation changes.22 In the argumentfor acknowledging security and subsistence as basic rights I havetaken it to be fairly evident that the erosion of thc enjoyment ofany asumed right by deficiencies in subsistence is as common, asserious, and as remediable at present as the destruction of thc cn-joymcnt of any assumed right by assaults upon security.

What is, for example, eradicable changes, of course, over time.Today, we have very littie excuse for allorving so many poorpeople to die of malaria and more excuse probably for allorvingpeople to die of cancer. Later perhaps we rvill have equally Iittleexcuse to allow deaths by many kinds ofcancer, or perhaps not.In any case, the measure is a realistic, not a utopian, one, andrvhat is realistic can change. Chapter 4 returns to the question ofwhai is realistic now in the realm ofsubsistence, and considera-tion of this concrete case will probably also provide the clearestunderstanding ofwhat constitutes an ordinary and serious but re-mediable threat.

We noticed in an earliei section that one fundamental purposeserved by acknowledging basic rights at all is, in Camus' phrase,that rve "take the victim's side," and the side of the potential vic-tims, The honoring of basic rights is an active alliance with thoservho would otherwise be helpless against natural and social forcestoo strong for them. A basic right has, accordingly, not been hon-ored until people have been provided rather firm protection-rvhat I am calling "social guarantees"-for enjoying the substanceof their basic rights. What I am now stressing is that this protec-tion need neither be ironclad nor include the prevention of evcryimaginable ihreat.

But the opposite exkeme is to offer such rveak social guaranteesthat people are virtually as vulncrablc rvith thcir basic rights"fulfilled" as they are without them. The social guarantees thatare part of any typical right ireed not providc imprcgnablc protcc-tion against every imaginable threat, but they must provide effec-tive defenses against predictable remediable threats. To try to

,lr'lr.il,tl,i,lrll'

iifilli

ril,iltt

lil'lliIr,it*'

i'iril

ltrtiri

il{lL;

chaptcr 2, from the side of the bearers of the couelative duties'ihe

"onte"t ofthe basic rights is such that for the bearer ofany

rfgtttiUrtL or non-basic) tolursue its fulfillment by means of thet iJ"-"f

"f the fulfillment of a basic right is self-defeating' and

sufi that for the bearer ofduties to claim to be fulfilling the duties;;;;.ir;"; to any right in spite of not fulfilling the duties correla-*. ; ; basic right- is fraudulent' But both perspectives can be.rptr*a ,nor" .i,.r"t ly by the notion of comTol, o' ordinary';;'J;.;t, but remediable threats or "standard threatS"' which*., irtroar".d earlier as the 6nal element in the explanatio-n o[th. ,i*.tur" of a right.2l Certainly from the viewpoint of the;;;;

"i. right it Jould be false or misleading to assert that a

fgttr f,.a b""i futnlted unless in the enioyment of the substanceoiif,ri rigttt, a person also enioyed protection against the threatsit

"t "oul[ ordinarily be expected to prevent, or hinder to a malor

degree, the enjoymlnt of tire initial right assumed' And certainlyi"?" ,fr. viervpoint of the bearers of the correlative duties it wouldU. irft" or misleading to asert that a right had been honored un-i*r r".irf grr*nteeJhad been established that would prevent the.ori .o*rion and serious threats from prevcnting or acutely hin-J.ring tt . enioyment of the substancc of the right' On the side ofdutiei this piace, especially heavy emphasis upon preventingstandard threats, which, as we will see in chapter 2' is the iointirr.ii",, of the hrlfillmcnt of duties to avoid depriving and dutiesto protect against dePrivation.*

iliih.;.;rur" if ,u...rstul prevention of thwarting by ordi-nary and serious but remediable threats is not utopian' People are

neilhe, entitled to social guarantees against every conceivableit,r..t, no, entitled to guarantees against ineradicable threats likeeventr-ral serious illness, acciclent, or death. Another rvay to indi-cate thc restricted scope of the argument, then' is as follows' The,Lurn.nt rests uDon ivhat mighibe called a transitivity principleil;;ii;, ii;;".y"". hus ,

'i!ht to v, and the eniovment of x is

,,...irry for the enioymeni of y, then everyone also has a right to,. gut it. necessity'in question is analytic' People also-have,igit

-r..oraing to this arglment-only to thc additional sub-

,tin.es ,rrd" .,.""rsary by ihe paired concepts of a right and itscorrelatir,e duties. It is analytically necessary that if people are.toi.'pt*ra.Attith a right, their enloyment of the substance of the

.33.

THREE BASIC R]GHTS

count a situation ofunrelieved vulnerability to standard threats asthe cnioyment of basic rights by their bearers or the fulfillment ofthese rights by the bearers ofthe conelative duties is to engage indouble-speak, or to try to behave as ifconcepts have no bound-aries at all. To allorv such practices io continue is to acquiesce innot only the violation of rights but also the destruction of the con-cept o[ rights.

Insofar as it is true that moral rights generally, and not basicrights only, include justified demands for social guaranteesagainst standard threats, rve havc an interesting theoretical result'The fulfillment of both basic and non-basic moral rights consistsof effcctive, but not infallible, social arrangements to guardagainst standard threats like threats to physical security and threatsto economic security or subsistence. One way to characterize thesubstances ofbasic rights, rvhich ties the account ofbasic rightstightly to the account of the structure of moral rights generaily, isthis: the substance of a basic right is something the deprivation ofwhich is one shndard threat to rights generally. The fulfillment ofa basic right is a successful defense against a sbndard threat torights generally. This is precisely rvhy basic rights are basic' Thatto rvhich tlrey are rights is needed for the fulfillmcnt of all otherrights. Ifthe subsiance ofa basic right is not socially guaranteed,aftempts actually to enioy the substance of other rights remainopen to a standard threat like the deprivation ofsecurity or sub-sistence. The social guarantees against standard threats that arepart of moral rights generally are the sdme ds the fulfillment ofbasic rights.23 This is rvhy giving less priori$ to any basic rightthan to normal non-basic righs is literally impossible,

CORRETATIVE DUTIES

"NEcATrw" fucHrs euo "Posrtrvr" fucsrsMany Americans would probably be initially inclined to thinkthat rights to subsistence arc at least slightly less imporhnt thanrights to physical security, even though subsistence is at lcast asessential to survival as security is and even though questions ofsecurity do not even arise when subsistence fails. Much of6cialU.S. governmcnt rhetoric routinely treats all "economic rights,"among which basic subsistence rights are buricd arnidst manynon-basic rights, as secondary and deferrable, although the fun-damental enunciation of policy concerning human right by thethen Secrebry of Sbtc did appear to represent an attempt tocorrect the habifual imbalance.l Now that the same argument infavor of basic rights to both aspects of personal suwival, subsist-ence and security, is before us, we can examine criticaliy some ofthe reasons rvhy it sometimes appears that although people havebasic securig rights, thc right, ifany, to even the physical neces-sities of existence like minimal health care, food, clothing, shel-ter, unpolluted water, and unpolluted air is somehow less urgentor less basic.

Frcquently it is asserted or assumed that a highly significant ditference between rights to physical security and righb to subsist-ence is that they are respectively "negative" rights and "positive"rights.2 This position, which,l rvill now ky to refute, is considera-bly more complex than it at first appears. I will sometimes refer toit as the position that subsistence righb are positive and thuefore

. 35.

.2-

THREE BASIC R,IGHTS

of not threatening others, but primarily upon human com-*uniti", that can-work cooperatively to design institutions thatavoid situations in which people are conftonted by subsistence-,frr..1*irg forces they

"a.rnoithemselves handle' In spite of the

sometimes useful terminology of third parties helping first parties

"g"intt second parties, etc., ii is worth noting, rvhile assessing the

U'uta.n of subsistence duties, that the third-parly bearers of duties

"rn ,tto become the Erst-party bearers of rights rvhen situations

change. No one is assu.ed' of iiuing permanently on one side o[the rights/duties coin. LIBERTY

Not only is this book not a comprehensive theory of rights, it isalso not an exhaustive discussion of basic rights. Is primary pur-pose is to iry to rescue from systematic neglect within rvealthyNorth Atlantic nations a kind of right that, as we have alreadyseen, deserves as much priority as any righl rights to subsistence.But it is essential to consider briefly the right conventionally mosiemphatically endorsed in North Atlantic theory: rights to liberties.Some liberties merit our attention for many reasons, not the leastofwhich is a shange convergence between supposed "friends" ofliberty in the North Atlantic and rulers in the poorer counkiesrvho rvould share my emphasis on the priority o[ subsistencerights. Both groups have converged upon the "kade-off" thesis:subsistence can probably be enioyed in poor countries only bymeans of "hade-offs" with liberties.l The only discernible differ-ence between these friends of liberty and these particular friendsof subsistence is the professed reluctance with which the fricnds ofIiberty advocate that the poor in other people's counhies shouldbe subiected to the "hade-off." The two versions might well becalled the theory of rcluctanily repressive development and thetheory of not so reluctantly repressive development.

The Shah of Iran and his spokesmen, for example, wereclumsy advbcates of not so relucbntly repressive development. Inan article by the Shah's represbntative at the Intemational Mone-hry Fund and World Bank published prominently by the NewYork Times in the Sunday edition of its Op-Ed page we find thenecessity of exchanging liberty for subsistence readily assumed:

.64 ' .65.

i., : :1

.3.

I,l

;liI

I

I

i

THREE EASIC RIGHTS

In the third world countries suffering from poverty, wide-spread illiteracy and a yawning gap in domestic distributionof incomes and wealth, a constibutionally guaranteed free-dom of opposition and dissent may not be as significant asfreedom from deqpair, disease and deprivation. The massesmight indeed be much happier if they could put more intotheir mouths than empty words; if they could have a health-care center instead of Hyde Park corner; if they rvere assuredgainful employment instead of the right to march on thecapitol. The trade-offs may be disheartening and obiection-able to a Western purist, but they may be necessary or un-avoidable for a majority of nation states.2The opposite view was put with eloquent clarity by martial-rule

opponent and former Senator Diokno of the Philippines:

Trvo justifications for authoritarianism in fuian developingcounhies are currently fashionable.

One is that Asian societies are authoritarian and pater-nalistic and so need govemments that are also authoritarianand paternalistic; that Asia's hungry masses are too con-cerned with prot iding their families with food, clothing, andshelter, to concem themselves with civil liberties and politi-cal freedoms; that the Asian conception of freedom differsfrom tlrat of the West; that, in short, fuians are not fit fordemocracy.

Another is that developing countries must sacrifice free-dom temporarily to achieve the rapid economic develop-ment that their exploding populations and rising expecta-tions demand; that, in short, government must be authoritar-ian to promote development.

The first justification is racist nonsense. The second is alie: authoritarianism is not needed for developing; it isneeded to perpetuate the status quo.

Development is not iust providing people with adequatefood, clothing, and shelter; many prisons do as much. De-velopment is also people deciding rvhat food, clothing andshelter are adcquate, and how they are to be provided.3

Even the theory of iustice of John Rarvls, the depth and sincer-ity of rvhose commitrnent to liberty is in no rvay in doubt, some-

I.IBERTY

times easily assumes both the possibility and the necessity of ex-changing-liberty for economic growth. a, nou.rt E. Goodin hasnoted, "When, as an exception to his g"n.rri .ut", n.*1, lSec82) allows,thata desperatily poor nati"on mighi lustly sacrificesome civil liberties for somc increase in econoriic *at-f.ing, it.whole.discussion presupposes that a nation can purchase one atthe pnce ot the other.,'a What is the place of Iiberty in a frame_wo-rk that acknowledges the importance of suiristencerI want to show that although the advocates o[ repressive de_velopment profess, as I do,.a strong commitment to ihe provisionof subsistence, those theories of re-pressive a"u"loprn"nt must besharply distinguished frg- $9 thcory of brsic ,ights presentedhere. One of several maior djfferences is the flace asslgned hereto at least some liberties, and.it is the purpose of th;s ihapter toindicate how fundamentally the ,rr. ,rgurn.ni that cstablishessecurity rights and subsistence rights as b-asic rights also justifiesthe acknorvlcdgement ofat least c-ertain politicaliilerties and cer_tain freedom of movement as equally basic.

EN;orrNc LrseRry FoR Irs Oruv Saxe

Lsjndiclted .rrll il ch.qpter l, rights are basic..only if enjoymentot them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rigits,,, i.r"rp*_tive of rvhether their enioyment is also valuable in ilelf. j A libe;yis usually valuable in itself, and liberties are usually discussed intermsof the satisfaction, if not exhilaration, trrat their exercise candirectly and immediately bring. But the suistance of a basic rightcan have its status only because, and so only if, its enioyment is aconstituent part of the enioyment of every other righi, as_to useourstandard example---enioying not being asaultld i, ; .;;;_l._"1

pi :l Se enioymenr of anything else, such as assemblingtor a. meeting.. Consequently, in this chapter libertie.s that arI

candidates for the status of substance of a basic right rvill be exam_ined solely from the admittedly restricted pri"1;i;;r, of whethcrthey are constituints of the enjoym.nt of .*f other right. t *illl!:r,fttr section simply,et aside the consideiatlon of any directand rmmediate satisflaction that comes from enioying the liUerfyin itself. But this conscious. omission in no \vay implies any denialof any other value that liberties ;ry h;r;l th'"*relres. And

.66,.67 -

THREE BAS]C RIGHTS

even the enioyment of liberty for its own sake has an important

implication conceming basic rights''-- &i"inly there are many liberties the exercise and enioyment.f ;h-i"h;. valuable in thlmselvcs-and are for that reason veryvaluable indeed, irr.,ptcti'" of whether these liberties are alsovaluable as constifuents of the enioyment o[ some larger activity'ffi; itt tiU".tl., that are valuabie in themselves are especiallyffi;H;;.;J"* ,r rivti"al movement' not being fiorced tostand still (a common rc# of torture) or being kept locked inan overcrorvded prison ..it, uut being allowed. simply to w.al\around, may strike *ott ptopft, who hive never been deprived

o[n,

^, iil*i, providing i'ihl' *inot satisfaction-bv itself' And to

some degree it may not b-tih" p"tt""e of the,liberty but the ab-sence of its deprivation-tf't tUtt""t of walls and enforceablethrcats against *orr*.nJhat rve value' At leasi the intensity ofiir. aittl?Jfr.,ron from being deprived may be much geater than

;i; ilililthe satisfactiJn from enioying the liberlv. But then;;;;';il";m"ilv

'alue thinss onlv for the intensi$ of the satis-

faction they bring. Ro' tl'ougf it may not be especially exhilarat-irg'irtt i"in.ll"o,rt and

"Jif tht blueiays are still angry at the

rr"rrir"i ;d-th; ",oottJ

Lii, it t'n be very imPortant and satisfv-;;;i; ktr"t; that if one wants to, one mav (and if one doesn't wantto, one need not).'"?;;; ;ft.sto walk around, one's freedom of physical move-;;i'; o1

"o,rrr. also valuable as a mere means-of visiting

fricnds, obtaining exercise, buying groceries' etc' It is valuable as

a means in addition to itt i"dtpl"aent value,in ibelf' and thisvalue as a means .,n it cnlletl its instrumental value' But its di-rect satisfaction ,"*ai''t it' t t'utnt"t prison' one's friends could,]rir,

"r. ""rld run in pl'ce or perhapi in the exercise yard' and

ah"';;;ri;, ,rould ut'noi o"lv suppiitd .but.prepared' None ofthis would lessen the at'itt U bt

''bt" simply to go for a

-walk,"n"" ,"J iirre wishJ' for the sake of the walk itself and notbecause one needed to get somewhere'Til;;irnr"v uUJ*itt, of course' that thev are valuable notbecause one will be constantly-or',

-evlr--eT:rcising them but

il;; tir"y rr.,,'ittiit ir **tta' Having a libertv can be valu-,ii" l" nr.rr even if o"" ao., not actually.exercise it. But what-ry t.L*i" U., nnt ii'ti""tion here is vitally important' For

the

USERTY

people who do not in fact exercise their liberties, it must neverdre"less be true that they actually could exercise them. It must notmerely bc the case that they comfortingly believe they could,when they could not if they were to try, because they would beprevented or hindered by common and serious but remediablethreats. This provides a connection in one direction rvith the hvobasic righs already established.

People can obtain real satisfaction from false belieB. If I am op-timistic about the next few years because I believe that I am essen-tially healthy, my optimism is,no less real if my confidence ismisplaced and I har,e undiagnosed cancer. But ihe correct expla-nation of my confidence, then, is not my health. It is my mis-taken belief that I am healthy when I am not. Similarly, peoplemay feel content because they bclieve that opportunities for polit-ical participation, for example, are guaranteed to them, rvhen infact if they try to vote, or vote the "rvrong way," they rvill bebeaten up, arrested or Ered. Ifso, they are not deriving satidactionfrom a liberty they have but are not exercising. They are living ina fool's paradise quite different from their real situation. Illusionsare not liberties.

So, it is hue that people can derive satisfaction from libertiesthat they do not exercise but could exercise. But in order for it tobe correct to athibute their satisfaction to their liberties, not to il-lusions about liberties, it must be tnre that the liberties can in factbe exercised, if the people try to exercise them, without subiectionto standard threats. The belief in the usability of the liberty, onrvhich the peoplc's satisfaction rests, must be correct, if it is to bethe liberg that is beneficial to them. Thus, it is fraudulent tocomfort people with promises of liberties that they cannot actuhllyenioy because necessa{y constifuenis of the enioyment, Iike pro-tection for physical safety, are lacking. It is fraudulent, in otherrvords, to promise liberties in the absence of sccurity, subsistence,and any other basic rights.

When arguing against an imbalance in one direction (torvardpromised rights to liberties and arvay from needed constituents ofthe exercise not only of rights to liberties but of all other rights), itis extremely difficult not to strike a position that is unbalanced inthe opposite direction.6 Insofar as the enioyment of rights to liber-ties depends upon the enioyment of securig and subsistence, the

.69.lr'tl:llltll:,llrllrir

. 68.

THREE EASIC RIGHTS

rights to security and subsistence appear to need to be establishedfirst. And it does seem to follow that if there are rights to libertiesthet cannot be enioyed in the absence ofsecurity and susbistence,rights to security and rights to subsistence must be more basic thanrights to liberties.

But this does not foliow. It is also possible-and, i will now tryto shorv, is actually the case-that not only does the enioyment ofrights to some liberties depend upon the enioyment of securityand subsistence, but the enjoyment of rights to security and sub-sistence depends upon the enjoyment of some libcrties, A mutualdependence holds both between enioyment of rights to someliberties and enjoyment of security and subsistence and, in theother direction, between enioyment of rights to security and sub-sistence and enioyment of some liberties. And, of course, if theenioyment of security and subsistence is an essential componentof enioying liberties as rights, then one has a basic right to theenjoyment o[ security and subsistence, as we have already seen.And it as I rvill noiv try to show, the enioyment ofsome libertiesis an essential component of enioying securig and subsistence asrights, then one also has equally basic rights to those liberties.

An unrvclcome complication, however, is that the dependenceis not completely symmetricalr the enioyment of rights to everyliberty is dependent upon the enioyment of security and subsist-ence, but the enioyment of rights to security and rights to subsist-ence is dependent upon the enioyment of. only some liberties.These are the libertics that, whatever the satisfaction they give inthemselves (it may be considerable), are a constitunt part of theenjoyment of other rights. To single out at least some of theseliberties as among the basic libcrties, or more properly the liber-ties that are the substances of basic rights, is the purpose of thischapter.

To avoid misunderstanding it is vibl to keep in sharp focus thequestion to which I am hereafter in this chapter seeking the an-swer, I am not asking which are the richest or most elevated formsof liberty, iudged by moral ideals of the good life or the good soci-ety.7 Undoubtedly there are kinds of liberty that are necessary for,say, the cultural and artistic expression invaluable to the highestforms of society. But if the exercise o[ those liberties is not neces-sary for the exercise of all rights, those liberties are not basic

IIBERTY

n'ghts, however important thgf qe for other reasons. My concernnow is to determine not the highest, Urii-lr.r"rt basic, kinds ofIibcrty. I am here, as .ts.,rhe're-l; ;il;;;il, working on thcfoundations, not thc spircq of th; J;'fi.;;'righr. The basicliberties rvill rurn out to incfude,f,. fii._y "iparticipation.

Is peRrtcparroN UNIVERSALTy Drsrnro?Much more might rvell, be.said in order to tighten up the over_used. concept of participatio-n than

".n b.-iria here.r Threepoints, however, are cssentiat to -.ntion, i.l"i',rr. focus of theparticipation I rvill be discussing ir,-ii; fu;d.*cntal choicesamong thc social institutions

.nain. ,".Li *il"i., that conholsecurig and subsistence.and, where the pe"rij, ii*"fy affected,the operation of instirutions il ,hi;iil;*il,,on of policy.Without genuine influence _oue. fund"mentai structur.s ,ndstrategies, influence over impleme"t ti* ;;;;e to little effect.But without infuence or.r.j.trti, offirrl[,,", and opera-tion where one,s own case is affected, *i;;;;;;rer tundamen_tals may be to litrle effect. On th.

"ti;;;;;]ltis unreatistic tosay thar everyone is entitled to i;Crd;;;;'riidetails. .rhus, rarrive at the characterization of th" f;*'r-;i;;;ficipation iustgiven: all the tundamentats and th;;;;;1,

.n5",,r, one,s orvnSecond, for a right to the libcrty of participation to be of anyconsequence, the oarticipation must u. .r..ti". ,nd exert someinfluence ,pon out.or"i. mc.partlcifrU", rn*ir" be merelywhat Carote pateman tr,

"rri.ll1ffi il;;il,"r,,and ,.par_tial participation. "e Obviously-it cannot be ,.qu'ir.a that genuineparticipation wijt ahvavs yieid the ;ji;;;;: but it is notenough, at the other .*tr.*., that peopie be iJrd but not hs-tened to. I can combine ti,.r..nrrr ino "0","o 'iljrr,ng that wew_ill be discux ing ffi ctiv e pa rtici p ation,'rn., ning gen u i ne i n fl u_ence upon the fundamenral choiees r;ililesi"il| institurionsand the social policies that control_se"rri; ;;;;sistence and,wherc the person is directty.affecred,;.;;l;;';;d;nce

upon theoperation o[institutions and thc i",pfI.*t ii"n'iipofi"y.Third, participation as dir"r*;i;;l;;;;;;rr.d in a nar_rowly political sinse. onc,s;"drr;;ilffiil::, and the re-I

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.77 .

THREE BASIC RIGHTS

mainderofone,sli[e,areatleastasdeeplyin.fluencedbyeco-#;;';il;;,il"t, irtt a"tt"'tit totpo'"tt oligopolies and gar-santuan transnational to-tpo*io"t' as by- governments and:i,.iffi

';"id;i'",'gt*"ti"'it' Whethe r broad Partic ipation in the.constraint of corporate

'"tiuity can be direct or must be by way ot

political institutions, *'ny of rvhich are in any case deeply in-terhvined, is a question "i'*t'"t that can be

pursued after settle-

ment of the question 'u"'i-i"lt rights

to be considered now'r0

Trvo chief conria"r.tioi, ,r. broight against the iudgment that

effective participation it ;;ti; tiei't] F'ittt' it is sometirnes notedffi;;;;;*d"1," i" i"i*t iiterested in participation in fun-damental choices about social institutions or-social

policies' even

if the fulfillmcnt of their orvn rights is affected' From this observa-

't"" ,i" ii""'i"i"*a tr"i-ptJtip'tion cannot' therefore' be a

;;"*l-;i;it' Cha'les Fr""kel maintained: "To be so charac-terized a right must -".i *o tests, First, do people everywherethink of it as a right ' '-' i"t' In quite a few traditional peasantsocieties, in fact, the social structrre was sharply

hierarchical in

eaclt communitv, and il;;;;;;;"runity the maior landlordmade the fundamental it"itio" even about the basic right of se-curitv and subsistence' Mo"o"" in at least some of these com-il#ffi.tt.,"-;;;;ii;;"'il;; "d' aid actuallv provide both

se-

curity and subsistence' ii" i""if"'a sarv to it that his workersrvere safe from rvant

'na-'tt"tu' and th-ef were content to enioy

;.t; il;it;"Jt"utittt*t and to be free ordinarilv of concemwith necessary rr,,ngt*tit''r2 And one can try to imagine a be-,,*;i;"il-;;t.indiltit' aittatorship over a. modern societv inwhich people are free n"* a"p1*4on or' when protection

fails'

are assisted l, ou"r"onritf their lack oI security.or subsistence; in-stitutions and policies

"t."a.titr.a entirely by the dicutor and his

"cxperts"; and the p"";;;;;;ii as the dictator' are satisfied rviththe results of the anangemcnts- - i

But although tr,. p?"-ir. (that many people are jn. fact not

usually interested it P;;l;;' even in fundamental choices) ishue, the con"lusion ffiparticipation cannot be a universal

ilb ;;t ;;t follow' It is not a necessary condition of some-thing's being a ,ni"'oi'igiiti't it it univirsally believed to be arieht. PeoPle can c"dai;i;";"t iigr's that thev do not know

thev

ffi;. i;;;,i;;", f*;;Pie' i''"v expect and accept beatings

LIBERTY

from their masters. They may believe that masters have a right-aduty, even- to "discipline" their slaves. Ifso, the slaves' beliefsare mishken: there is no right to possess, or to violate the physicalsecurity of, another human being. Beliefs about righb can be in-conect, iust as beliefs about almost all other subiects can.l3

Which righb people have is independent of which righe thcybelieve they have. This is a perfectly general point, appiicable toany right. People's rights may be more numerous---{r ferver-than they think. The same is true o[ duties, of course. People donot have only the duties they believe themselves to have. If thatrvere ttue, no master rvho belicved otherwise could have a dugnot to "punish arrogance" with physical assaults upon his slaves.It is not "OK as long as you are sincere," and nciiher rights norduties are determined subiectively.

Which rights, 6nd conelative dutics, people have is determinedby weight of reasons. I[ the reasons for according everyone aparticular right are strong enough, everyone has that right, andeveryone else and all organizations and institutions ought at leastto avoid violating it and some others ought to protect it and toassist those deprived of it. If the reasons for according it are toorveak, there is no such general right. In order to decide whichrights there are one must assess the quality of reasoning, notmeasure the quantig of belief.

Saying that people can have rights regardless of rvhether theybelieve they have them, needs to be sharply distinguished fromsaying that people must exercise the rights they have regardless ofrvhether they want to exercise them. The latter is ridiculous as ageneral thesis and has no connection with the former. That I havea right to freedom of movement, for instance, docs not mean thati must constantly or, for that matter, ever move, if I do not wishto. Probably some rights actually ought to be exercised-forexample, a right to a public education probably ought to be exer-cised, at least by everyone who cannot afford to pay for a privateone that is better than the public one available. Perhaps a right tofteedom of movement ought to be enioyed by anyone able toenioy it, because of some such consideration as the allegedbroadening effects oftravel. But any duty, if*rere is one, to takeadvantage of a right you have would not be a duty conelative tothe right, but the quite different kind of duty that flows from a'

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.73.

THREE BASIC RICHTS

moral ideal of a rich or fulElled life. Such ideals and their associ-ated duties may well be irnportant, but they are simply not part ofa theory of rights. Whether people ought, as part of an ideally fulllife, to want to participate in the institutions and policies that con-hol the fulfillment of their rights is an important question, But itis a different question from whether they have a basic right to par-ticipate if they do want to-and even if they choose not to.

Is PaRrrcrpeuoN UNrvERsAr.Lv Nesoeo?

A second consideration against acknowledging effective participa-tion as a basic right is much more difficult to handle than was thefact that some people do not want to participate, and it raisesmuch more fundamental issues. This second contention is that atieast some people do not need to participate in order to receive thesubstance of some of their rights, including even the basic rightsalready established: security and subsistence. Since, by definition,something can be the substance of a basic right only if enjoymcntof it is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights, participationcannot be a basic right ifany other rights can be enioyed even inthe absence of participation. If even only one other right can beenjoyed in the absence of participation, then the enjoyment ofparticipation is not an essential component of enioying somethingas a right and does not, strictly speaking, quaiiS to be the sub-stance of a basic right. Some despotisrns, rvhich allorv liftle or noparticipation, do provide security, srrbsistence, and somc othersubstances of rights to their populations. Is participation actuallynecessary, then, for receiving other righh? Does the example ofan enlightened despotism that provides security and subsistencenot shorv that participation is not shictly necessary?

These are hard questions to answer. In order to decide aboutthem rve need a firm and sharply de6ned conception of rvhat itmeans to enioy a right. Clearly a paternalistic dictatorship canprovide both security and subsistence. But can a dictatorshipwithout participation provide for the enioyment of a rigfrt hc secu-rity and ol a ight to subsistence? We must recall exactly whatsome features of a right are, as inhoduced in the first chapter.

A right provides (l) the rational basis for a justified demand (2)that the achral enjoyment ofa substancc be (3) socially guaranteed

,74..75.

tISERTY

against standard threats. That the enioyment ought to be sociallyguaranteed means that arrangements ;;ghf ;irr"" been madeby, or with (if partlcipation iJestabtlsheJ"rr', i^i. right), otherslor situations in rvhich a person otherwise "oula .rot"rrrrng" fo,his or, her own enjoyment o[wh+ +; ;;;ia, a ,ight to enjoy.An alleged right that did not include ,'d.;;;;, sociat guaran_

tees, in the sense of anangements madc ly, o, *iin , .or. iio,lifth.e, rest o[ humanig, *oul-d b. , .ighi;t ;; cone]ative duties,

Ylh nottrjlg required of others, ,"a *,i, *"Jj not U. a normalright at all but something more iiL" . *irt, "

ilrrn, o, a plea. raEnjoyment of the substance of the ,igl,t l, ,""i.f fy guaranteed,as our analysis of duties in, thepreviols Jf,.pe.,il*.a, only if allsocial institutions, as welt-as individ;;i ilil:';void deprivingpeople of the substance of the right, ;;j;;t'tir"me sociat in-stitutions (local, national, or int"ematiorrii-prol"t people fromdeprivation of the substance of the ,ighi;;;;,re provide, i[Il"jiilll_1! ]:,?nro.n: who has neue".rhel"ss Leen depri,ed ofrnc suDstanc_e.oi the right. Enioyment is socially guaranteed, inshort, only if the three correlative duties constitrtu" ota right areprovided for, as necesary, by-social irrtitrtl-rrr.'A penon is ac-fu1l.l.r gnioying a right *ty ir th";.;;il;g among socialinstitutions that are well d.csigned to'pr"u.ni ,ioiaii'o^ of th. ,ightand, where prevention fails, to ,.rtore th. .n;Jiinent of th" .ightinsofar as possible. Is it, then, true thrr; il;;;r, in ract errloy,mo.st notably, rights to se_curity ,nd to ,uloirien."'in tr," absenceof right to genuine influence 6; ;; i;;i."r.nt r choicesamong institutions and policies controlling ,".uri,y and subsist_ence and, where the person,is directly rf.j.C

"froi"es about theoperation of institutions and the irnpi.rn*Jtion"oipoli"yz ---AII things considered, th" rnr*"r'i, fi il;;g; somc qualifi_

cations must be added before we are finis'hed. lrli'r* possible toenioy full rights to security or to subsisten".*iatlout also havingrighh to participate effectively- i, th; ;;;;;l ,ir..rr,,, and sub-sistence. A right is the basis ro, , "..tiin t-iJ oii.*rna,

"

d"_mand the fulfillment of which ougr,t to U. ,iJliy gurrrnt .d.

Yl,!:rl channcls. through *rr"rr"-ii. ;;;ff';r" be madexnown to those who ought,to be guaranteeing its rutfllment,-Til,",:::_tt being igiored, o.,"l*noi

.r.,?ir. tt. rigl,t.r ne apparent counter_example of the benevolent dict"fi i, a

,t

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THREE BASIC RIGHTS

case of the enioyment only of security and subsistence, not a caseof the enioyment of a right to security and a right to subsistence. Itis the enioyment of things that are the subsbnces of rights (secu-rity and subsistence), but notas substances of rights. What is miss-ing that keeps people under the ideally enlightened despot we areimagining from enioying rights, and that would be supplied byrighs to participate in the conhol ofthe substances ofother rights,is social institutions for demanding the fulfillment of the correla-tive duties, especially the duty to provide one vital form of protec-tion: protection against deprivation by the government itself, if itshould become less enlightened and less benevolent, in the formof channels for protest, levers for resistance, and other Vpes ofprotective action by the deprived or potentially deprived them-selves. Such action is ofcourse to some degrec self-protection, notprotection by others acting out of a dug to protect, but whatothers rvill have done in fulfillmcnt o[their duties in this casc is tohave cooperated in providing and maintaining in advance of theneed for them the institutional means of self-protection througheffective participation. And participation is a component not onlyoF the prevention o[ deprivations of rights but also of the arrange-ments for securing aid rvhen violations have occurred.

To see why the benevolent dictator cannot provide rights to se-curity or rights to subsistence rve need to look at the case moreclosely. The dictator may of course provide securi$, subsistence,or both at any given time, but simply to provide something is notthe same as to provide it as a right. T

iII

THREE BASTC RIGHTS

What the abscncc of provisions for participation that rvouldallorv protest and mobilization o[ opposition against any depriva-tion undertaken means is, quite simply, that people who didenioy securig and subsistence would be enioying it entirely at thediscretion of the dictator. And to enioy something only at the dis-cretion of someone else, especially someone powerful enough todeprive you of it at will, is precisely nof to enioy a n'gl?t to it. Inthe absencc of participatory instituiions that allow for the forcefulraising of protest against the depredations o[ the authorities andallow flor the at least sometimcr successful requesting of assistancein resisting the authorities, the authorities become the authorita-tive iudge of which rights thcrc arc and rvhat it means to fulfillthem, rvhich is to say that there are no rights to anything, onlybenevolent or malevolent discretion, including the discretion todecide rvhat counts as benevolcnt.

. OrHnn Lrgenrrcs: Fneeoorvr oF PHysrcAL MovrvpvrMy discussion has concentrated so far upon a kind of liberty thatis normally thought of as an economic and poiitical liberty: par-ticipation in the control o[ the economic and political policiesand instituiions that determine ihe fulfillment of security, subsist-ence, and other rights. I have left aside many other liberties, someof which will tum out to be basic rights upon thorough examina-tion. This is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of thevarieties ofliberg, important as that task is. But it is worthrvhilefor contrast to loo[< briefly at one very different gpe of liberty,freedom of physical movement, rvhich rvas our initial example ofa libcrg that is itself very satisfying. Does freedom of physicalmovement also serve as a component of every other right in a waythat would makc it a basic right?

Most notably, freedom of physical movement is the abscnce ofarbitrary conskaints upon parts of one's body, such as ropes,chains, and straitiackets on one's limbs, and the absence of arbi-trary conshaints upon the movemcnt from place to place of one'srvhole body, such as imprisonment, house arrest, and passJaws(as in South Africa), at least rvithin regional boundaries.l6 Onemight have hopcd that something as apparently straighfonvard asphysical movement and its prevention by others could be simple.

LISERTY

Of course it is not and I.cannot pursue many of the conrplicationsherc. But hvo comp)ications netd to U" ,riJin"a.F-irst, some qualificatiol iike ,.arbitrary,;1,

"..orro because ofcases of physical constraint thrt ,r. "o'nr"n,iorrlfy accepted as

ffi *l,f fl 'jT,'.p;,Tl"ii j:?:'f :f.jTfi ,,,:ff tr,.;:Jlil,,:,ooiime to take_ effect, and imprisonirg ;;_;;; criminals afterprompt and flair triars. But the use "r..p;y;t;;;* terror,, in theUSSR, for example, means,that

"r,* i#-c;ion of ,.heatingpsychotics for their orvn .good', mrrr b. fr."a'i.j *irn care. r 7 Andpractically. every repressii,e regime in th. ,ro.ld holds that thosewhose rights to freedom of lhysical .;r;;;;,, among otherjhjnes,

.it is violating arc common criminals, terrorisb, traitors,subversives, etc. But since. these probl.*, ,r.'*ii.ly ,..ognl"J,I rvill not prrrsue them and wilt,i;piy;r;";;.i.,

*" have somerough. but workable notion of au. i..o, in ti.lo*rit**nt ofthe allegedly psychotic or criminar t, rn.rt i'r"ri*r,orr, prisons,or house arrest, r8.

Second, the qualification ,.at Ieast within regional boundaries,,is nceded simply to reserve for oth., dl;;;;;:; two extremelyimportant matters that_th.is is th. onl1foi.,if,.r._or. notsim_p/7 matters offrecdom of physical -or...ri".i'rrould thereforercquire exten.sive, separate analysis. On" i, il; ;;;scription, usu-ally of youths, for puUllc service in places they would not them_selvcs choose to go. Thts ir"lrd;; irr.ii.., i,il'rtrc tradirionalU.S. system of military conscription that sends youths outsidetheir own cou.ntry to 6!ht ,rd rh. e;;;*"rrri.. of peacetime

l1s1iqhon that sent yo.uths to ott., ,.jion, *i,t,in U"i, o*r,":unp to.serve in agriculture, etc. re,t,heithcr _rtt., i, the rightol emigration and the relatively-negl..t a Urt'n...ssarily rclatedright of immigrarion. r wt, simply rio;;;;;;;;ions about thestatus of these further liberties here, b;i;ti iol-t'r..y briefly atthe sirnplest case: freedom. of phyricar mo".rr.ri *iarrr, the gen_eral area in which on" is alreadyitri;s;;;;;;itrarity imposedchains and walls.20., Tr....{o* of physical movement is so clearly satisfiing in itsclfthat it is initially somervhat dif6.rtii;'i;;J, ,r' ,r,. questionrvhether it has the kind of value a,

";;;;;;iiother r"tiritiesthatqualifies it to be the,,t;;;;i;ffi;;;il:bb,iously fr.e

I

i

tillllri

I

ljltirl

.79 .

THREE BASIC RIGHTS

movement has great value as a part of many- kinds of enterprises'

il,ffi;il;ilv'iir. tt"i t" t'"iov*tnt of ireedom of phvsical;;;;; t'...,,"y r"t

-

tttt enioyment. o[ every other'right?Examples readily come tomind of other rights that one could

evi-

i.tiit".ti", *hil", fo' t*"iplt' in prison' For instance' at least;#J #;";;,-' .o'ra, p'o'iala tirev *ere supplied with thenecessary equipment, tnioy t"'' a particularly.valuable otherilffiiifr;ar,'nr*"iy fre"f,om of expression, and perhaps createffi;iffi; *rri."ff"r.r. Ar long'rs the length and severity ofthe prison sentence *t' u"ttt't"a ti the content and style of the;;;;;ti t.. ,na tlt

"o*poscr did not need contacb unavailable

;;'"*;;;;; h;;v '".i;;;'ld-ind"d'

some have-let their

imaginations soar rn spite of the imprisonment'of their bodies'

The follorvers of ,t le^st '-ome

ieligions' e-ven if they rvere denied

"o"io*""a,fl.y might p"fo

"

haie (books' altars' etc')' could-;lle"rrrt;,

"fien io-still believe as thev rvish' meditate' prav'

and sing, provided tt''tiitit sentences are not based upon or a[-fected by their religion' ;;L;c as people are not being tortured';;;,;;pilted f6r labor, or o"therwise harrased' thev can eniovquitc a ferv activities,

"tpt"i'tty rvhat.might be called the solitary

intellectual liberties, r'ittt- indiuiau'l creativity requiring- only

*"i.ti ",."tial

needs 'na

t*" the individual aspects of religion'^J.""""rprr,ion.2r We have an entire genre of prison litera-ture, much of it n"t anJ i-'"t' oi it "ty free in spirit'

Indeed' the

t"lpt}ir, ,rr; tr,*nJi'av is a recunent theme of poetry andfolklore'22

Yet, these examples are, I hope' notverycompelling' Certainly

the aspiring .o,npo'"t "'n

L suppli"d with pen and ink' with air*lr[i" ,i..a ,""o'd' * ottr"*-Put he or she can as well so,"" .*ri,