Localised planning, local sentiment and planning stances: evidence and likely outcomes for housing in England. Glen BRAMLEY(Institute for Housing, Urban and Real Estate Research, School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS UK; email g.bramley@hw.ac.uk )

Paper presented at Policy and Politics 40th Anniversary Conference, Bristol, 18-19 September 2012.

Keywords Planning Localism Housing Housing Markets Affordability

Abstract

After half a decade of strong ‘top down’ policy and planning to promote housing supply and affordability in England, we have from 2010 an abrupt change of policy. Decisions are devolved to local level, with no more government targets and the dismantling of regional planning. At the same time a financial bonus is intended to incentivize local authorities to agree to additional house-building, and national policy emphasizes a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’. It is quite unclear a priori how this system will work, so it may be regarded as a large-scale policy experiment. This paper will draw on recent data from the British Social Attitudes Survey on public attitudes to housing development in their local area, linked to voting patterns, to develop predictions of the pattern of local sentiment. It combines this with a multivariate index of existing local planning ‘stance’ towards housing development to make some predictions about likely patterns of change in planning stance. By linking to other data and models it offers a picture of the potential impacts on housing supply and affordability.

Introduction

This paper is concerned with planning for new housing supply in England, and in particular with the potential impact of a major ‘regime change’ instituted from 2010, following a change of government. After a period of strong ‘top down’ policy and planning to promote housing supply and affordability in England, with an elaborate apparatus of regional planning and target setting, the new watchword is ‘Localism’. Decisions are to be devolved to local level, with no more government targets and the dismantling of regional planning. A financial bonus is intended to incentivize local authorities to agree to additional house-building,

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in part by helping to pay for additional infrastructure to support additional population. As part of a broader reform, planning policy guidance is being simplified and the general priniciple a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’ is emphasized.

It is quite unclear a priori how this new system will work, so it may be regarded as a large-scale policy experiment, the full outcome of which will not be known for some time. However, we can bring evidence to bear on some of the key determinants, in particular local opinion towards the issue of new housing development, which must be a major determinant of planning policies, targets and decisions under localism. This paper reports new evidence of this kind, from a nationally representative survey, and goes on to build a predictive model for the likely pattern of support or opposition to new housing across all the local authorities in England. This (and other related evidence) can then be related to other objective indicators of planning policy stances, just before the regime change, to identify likely areas where stances may change, and to wider economic indicators and models to suggest possible outcomes. Before doing this, we briefly review the preceding policy context and approach, and then also introduce the ‘localisation’ reforms in the context of wider planning reform.

Planning and housing supply in England

Land use planning has been and remains one of the most powerful regulatory interventions in a predominantly market-oriented economic system in the UK. This remains the case despite a prolonged period (since 1979) when governments of all main parties have embraced a neo-liberal approach to economic policy. Essentially all significant development is controlled through a statutory framework implemented primarily through local authorities.

The striking feature of this system is that it is strongly supported across the political spectrum, at local and national levels, even though the motivations for this support may vary. This was most clearly revealed in the early 1980s, at the height of the Thatcher revolution, when the then minister sought to impose a loosening of planning control. This attempt was decisively seen off by the local Conservative grassroots, who were not willing to surrender their control over a system that enabled them to protect their perceived local amenity (Bramley et al 1995, Bramley & Lambert 1998). Since that time, there had been no serious or successful attempt to repeat such a deregulation, and indeed the rhetoric of planning reform gives ever-greater emphasis to the primacy of local community control. The reforms promoted in 2010-11 may be characterized as radical, but it would be hasty to label them as fundamentally about deregulation so much as being about decentralisation.

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The planning system periodically produces Development Plans, known in England after 2004 as ‘Local Development Frameworks’ (LDFs), which set out policy guidelines and specific proposals for land-use development. In Britain there is no ‘right to develop’, even on land which may be ‘allocated’ or ‘zoned’ for housing or other urban uses. The landowner/developer must obtain ‘planning permission’ from the local authority (LA), whose decision is in essence discretionary (Grant 1992), although the LA is expected to have regard to plans, policy guidance, and ‘other material considerations’. If the application is refused, the developer may go to appeal, and the planning inspector will consider the case against the same framework of plans, policies, norms and criteria.

This period around 2004 saw the ‘sudden rediscovery’ of housing supply as a major policy issue, after thirty years’ slumber (Bramley 2007), crystallized in the Barker (2004) Review and the then Government’s quite strong policy response to this. Demand was rising strongly and house prices rose to unprecedented levels which, despite low interest rates, represented a real deterioration in affordability in this period (Figure 1).

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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Kate Barker’s analysis concluded that

‘At the centre of these recommendations is the principal objective that planning should take more account of, and use market information….Central to achieving change is the recommendation to allocate more land for development…..A stronger role for regional planning bodies is recommended, ….charged with setting out advice on market affordability targets, housing numbers, strategic growth areas, and co-ordinating links between the key players’ (Barker, 2004, p.6).

This meant some modification to previous planning policy emphases on urban consolidation, brownfield land and density, as well as the promotion of new growth areas especially in the South, and additional investment in infrastructure and social housing. The planning system was reformed, with ‘Regional Spatial Strategies’ (RSS) replacing previous regional guidance and Structure plans and ‘Local Development Frameworks’ (LDFs) becoming the new format for Local Planning. Housing Land Availability assessment was reintroduced (SHLAAs) with a requirement to consider supply potential over a longer period (5/15 years). A new national body called the National Housing and Planning Advice Unit (NHPAU) was set up to reinforce the analytical basis of regional planning with a new emphasis on ‘affordability’. Planning agreements became more important still in practice, including the delivery of significant shares of affordable housing by the later years (Crook et al 2010). However, endless debate about how to reform this aspect of the system – a ‘tariff’ system, ‘Planning Gain Supplement’, ‘Community Infrastructure Levy’ – was not translated into actual implementation of a general reform until the end of this period.

All of this policy effort produced a relatively small result on the ground. Annual output in this period comprised 170,000 private and 27,000 social completions, making 198,000 in all, a mre 13,000 (7%) more than in the previous nadir period for housing supply (in the best year, 2007, the total was 225,000). Clearly, good intentions alone were not enough! The Credit Crunch after 2007 led to a steep fall in output, dropping to nearer 100,000 in 2009.

Planning Reform

Since May 2010 Britain has had a new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, and this is bringing about a radical change in the approach to planning policy in England. This new approach was foreshadowed in the Conservatives (2010) policy Green Paper, entitled Open Source Planning, although some of the ideas and preferences are shared with the other coalition party. This document made some pretty sweeping claims, for example

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that the then current planning system achieved none of its fundamental goals and was ‘broken’; and that centralised ‘bureaucratic’ planning was the source of local resistance to development. The proposed ‘reboot’ of the system was intended to place decision-making firmly at the local and neighbourhood levels.

For housing, this meant the rejection of ‘top-down targets’ for housing numbers and the complete dismantling of Regional Planning bodies, scrapping of Regional Spatial Strategies, scrapping or curtailing of Regional Development Agencies, scrapping of a number of ‘Quangos’ including NHPAU1, and withdrawal of some elements of existing national planning policy guidance including the minimum density guidelines and the alleged incentive to ‘garden grabbing’ implicit in previous definitions of ‘brownfield’ land. There is a comprehensive Decentralisation Bill to give effect to the broader philosophy of the new regime, including the possibility of local community level plans. There is now also a specific incentive mechanism to encourage new housing (the New Homes Bonus), involving giving LA’s the revenue equivalent to seven years of Council Tax on new dwellings, although this will have to be financed by a general top slice on central government grants to local authorities. Existing arrangements for developer contributions to infrastructure costs and affordable housing through ‘section 106’ planning agreements and a ‘Community Infrastructure Levy’ will continue. The 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review made a sharp reduction in grants for new social housing and regeneration, so the scope for publicly-led housing supply will be reduced.

A further strand to reform came with what was billed as a radical streamlining of National Planning Policy Guidance with as its centrepiece a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’. The 2011 version of this document provoked a furore, particularly among environmentally-oriented pressure groups, who saw it as a potential vehicle for the negation of many carefully accumulated environmental protections enshrined in the planning system, in the name of promoting economic growth (H M Treasury & DBIS, 2011). The revised and operative version of this document (DCLG 2012) was significantly modified in ways doubtless intended to allay these fears.

Where does the 2012 NPPF, with its presumption in favour of sustainable development, leave ‘localist’ determination of housing plans and decisions? ‘Sustainable development’ is defined, as is conventional, in terms of ‘meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’, which is seen as having three dimensions (economic, social 1 The National Housing and Planning Advice Unit was set up in 2007 following the Barker (2004) review of housing supply, with a mission to improve the evidence base to support planning for affordability in the housing market.

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and environmental) (UK Government 2xxx ‘Securing the Future’; DCLG 20012, para 7). A ‘supply of housing’ is explicitly mentioned under the social role. The NPPF emphasizes (in para 1) that planning applications must be determined in accordance with the development plan, unless material considerations indicate otherwise; and that the NPPF must be taken into account in the preparation of local plans and is a material consideration in planning decisions. In a sense, none of this is new – there was always a presumption in favour of development in accordance with the plan. However, there is stronger pro-growth language within some subsequent sections of the NPPF document (e.g. para 14) , although other sections emphasis continuity rather than change – notably for example the continued prominence given to Green Belt protection. Localism, if it is to be effective in controlling and shaping development, has to be expressed through the local plan, and the local plan has to be in conformance with the NPPF (authorities have one year to update their plans to achieve this). If an authority fails to have a ‘sound’ local plan in place then they will be vulnerable to developers successfully appealing refusal of permission on the grounds of the ‘presumption’.

The soundness of a local plan will hinge particularly, in the case of housing, on the assessment of appropriate evidence on future need and demand and on the realistic availability of sites (as contained in SHLAAs). The NPPF spells out (in para 159) the evidence expected: LA’s should demonstrate a clear understanding of housing needs in their area by undertaking a Strategic Housing Market Assessment (SHMA), with neighbourhouring authorities where market areas cross LA boundaries, and this should meet need and demand indicated by household projections, including needs for different types of housing (including affordable housing) for different groups. If a local authority wants to adopt a restrictive stance towards new housing development, it will need to ensure that this is clearly set out in its local plan and justified in terms of an evidence base (including SHMA) that suggests that such low numbers are reasonable and prudent. t. It will be extremely interesting to see how the Planning Inspectorate interpret this in early test cases. Although most authorities have carried out or participated in SHMAs in the preceding period, this was in a different policy context and in particular the existence of top-down targets within Regional Spatial Strategies meant that the SHMA’s were not critically scrutinised in terms of what they might say about total housing numbers, as opposed to affordable numbers which were their main focus in practice. Reviews of SHMAs by NHPAU and others suggested very uneven quality and a fairly widespread weakness in terms of assessment of future demand for market housing. Experience with and observation of this and previous local authority efforts at assessing local housing needs (Bramley et al 1999) suggests also that there are many

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discretionary decisions and judgements along the way, in preparing such an assessment, which can be used to tilt the result towards a larger or smaller number, depending on what the (ultimately political) local authority wants it to say.

Unpacking NIMBYism – Public Attitudes to Local Housing Development

Under this new regime it is clear that the attitude of local elected politicians, and hence of their local residents/voters, will be crucial to what happens to the supply of new housing in different places. In England, there are reasonable grounds for presuming that in many areas existing residents are not well-disposed towards new house-building and the house-building industry. Rather, it is frequently observed that the most prevalent attitude is ‘Not in My Backyard’ (NIMBY). England perceives itself as a relatively crowded and urbanised country and hence has strong instincts to protect the countryside and more attractive amenities around towns from urban incursions. Whether this perception of urban-rural balance is accurate may be debated (Bevan et al 2010, Evans 1991, Cheshire & Sheppard 1997), although clearly England has higher density than some comparator countries (France, Ireland, Spain, USA, Australia). Historically, the 1947 planning system emerged as a direct reaction to perceptions of excessive ‘urban sprawl’ in the 1930s.

We use a range of household and opinion survey evidence on what people say their attitude would be to new house-building in their area or neighbourhood. After referring briefly to a survey carried carried out in five UK cities in 20052, we draw mainly on a general social attitudes survey carried out across UK in 2010.

The 2005 ‘CityForm’ survey was part of a research programme exploring aspects of the sustainability of different urban forms. Respondents were asked how likely they were to accept an increase in the number of houses in their neighbourhood, and whether this would be beneficial in any way. In this instance, with this question wording, the response was fairly strongly negative, with 67% disagreeing with the proposition, 45% strongly, and only 16% agreeing. The majority opposition was markedly greater in ‘outer’ city areas than in inner areas, and much greater in the most affluent neighbourhoods than in the most deprived.

This survey is also of some interest for indicating which kinds of impact of new housing would be perceived in more or less negative terms. Although owner occupiers are more negative about new housing, only a minority see house price impacts as clearly negative This survey also suggests that improvements to transport 2 CityForm household survey 2005: see Jenks & Jones (2010) Dimensions of the Sustainable City, Springer, and www.city-form.org

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(e.g. public transport) and to local/urban services can be brought about by new housing (formally, through planning gain/agreements, or informally through more demand), and that the public recognise that as a positive in many cases. The negative perceptions of impact are more to do with the impact on appearance, on green space, and more especially on parking, traffic and pollution. These are understandable, and often realistic, expectations, unless new housing is consciously planned to mitigate these effects.

The more recent survey data presented are based on a representative sample of the whole UK population interviewed in 2010 as part of the British Social Attitudes Survey. The wording of the question is different and on the whole has yielded a somewhat less negative picture than the CityForm survey just referred to.

The general pattern of responses confirms the uphill nature of the task facing government and the house-building industry. Those opposed to local house-building outnumber those supportive of it by a ratio of 3:2 (45% vs 30%). While it is true that nationally those opposed to local building are not a majority of all respondents, they are clearly a majority of those who have a view, and more clearly still a majority of those who have a strong view (15% vs 5%). If local political decisions are driven mainly by those who hold clear or stronger views, then the prospects for house-building would appear to be bleak. However, views on this may be amenable to change conditional on possible linked benefits, discussed further below. Also, if those with no view either way could be persuaded to acquiesce, then proposals for development might stand a better chance of going through. This is where the notion of a presumption in favour of development might be significant, insofar as this implied that a positive political resolution would be needed to stop it.

Opposition to local house-building is stronger among homeowners, (51% vs 24%), with private renters more evenly split and social renters substantially in favour. This pattern is unsurprising and consistent with a rational self-interest model. Home-owners are already housed, and probably in good conditions, and have an investment motive which would caution against anything which might detract from existing amenity and value. Renters are less likely to be so well housed and do not have the investment motive, while social renters are generally less well-off and probably see new house-building as improving their chances of getting a better home, whether through buying or renting.

The housing market in England is very uneven in terms of levels of affordability and relative shortage of housing (Bramley & Karley 2005, NHPAU 2009). Therefore it matters where new housing is built, with the greatest need generally acknowledged as being in the south of the country. With local decision- making, the pattern of support or opposition across regions and types of areas is important. Table 1 shows that there is rather less support and more (strong) opposition in the south, compared with the north and midlands. London is more polarized, with positive support in inner London and quite strong opposition in outer London. Overall, this pattern is not helpful for housing supply, as the areas of greater need show more opposition. This is consistent with experience in the period 2004-2009, when regional planning bodies representing

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local authorities in the southern regions were reluctant to accede to strong urgings to increase housing numbers from central Government and the relevant Quango (NHPAU).

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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Overlaying the regional patterns, there is a general tendency for support for new housing to be high in larger and more central city areas, where there is generally less spare land to build it on, and somewhat more positive in both run-down industrial areas and remoter rural areas. The areas where opposition is strongest are suburban and small town areas in more accessible locations, particularly in the prosperous south of England.

As suggested by the Cityform survey, people’s objections to housebuilding may relate to environmental, infrastructure or service impacts which might be compensated for, through mechanisms such as ‘planning gain’ agreements or levies. Table 2 below suggests that these side benefits of planning gain could indeed change the picture, if they could realistically be promised and delivered. While less than half of those strongly opposed to development could be swayed to a positive stance by any of these, two-thirds of those opposed (less strongly) and nearly four-fifths of those with no clear view could potentially be swayed to take a supportive position. This is a more encouraging pointer to ways of making the localist planning system work in a more positive way. However, different benefits have varying appeal, and it is clear that a package of several benefits would need to be credibly offered to yield overall majority support.

The most persuasive side benefit would be improved employment opportunities, underlining the point that local communities tend to be concerned about economic wellbeing (we show below that localities with weaker economies have more positive planning stances towards new housing; see also Bramley 1996, Bramley & Kirk 2005)). However, it may not be easy to promise to deliver such employment as a by-product of a typical housing development, as this may require independent investment decisions by private businesses. Nevertheless in certain circumstances, including mixed use regeneration schemes and some rural situations, there may be a clear link with employment.

Next most important, interestingly, is greenspace and parks; this is actually relatively easy to provide as a by-product of housing so long as land is set aside for the purpose, although there may be issues about maintenance. Improved transport links is unsurprisingly important; typical housing schemes generally entail road connections but securing adequate public transport can be more costly and difficult. Schools, leisure facilities and shops come next in the ranking. It has become increasingly common to seek contributions to the former from planning gain, but in the

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immediate future with public capital programmes pared to the bone this may become more problematic.

Although ‘Financial incentives to existing residents’ would only sway a small number of respondents (2%)., the New Homes Bonus income can of course be used, along with CIL and planning agreements, to fund more specific beneficial amenities of the kind discussed above, and in this way it should help to increase support for development.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

We can also report on preferences regarding types and tenures of housing to be built. Only one in five respondents believe that no new housing is needed. This suggests that in general appeals to arguments and evidence about local need should be helpful in generating support for appropriate development.

Relatively fewer respondents believe flats /maisonettes are the main type of housing needed – in recent years the share of flats built in England shot up dramatically and it may be argued that, notwithstanding ‘urban renaissance’ and ‘city centre living’, this switch was overdone (Bramley et al, 2010a). There is quite a lot of support for the building of 1-2 bedroom houses, which may be regarded as typical ‘starter homes’ and appropriate for the many small households, as well as 3-bedroom family homes. However, there is very little support indeed for building large 5+ bedroom houses (‘McMansions’), even though this may be a product which some developers favour and see a market for (and which some economists argue for on grounds of recognising rising space demands and releasing other housing).

So far as tenure is concerned, there is considerable support for both opportunities to buy (including assisted opportunities such as shared equity) and for social renting. Private renting attracts little support, even in 2010 following a couple of decades of expansion following deregulation and ‘Buy to Let’

These indicators suggest that greater local support for new development can be achieved where the mix of tenure and housing type is better adapted to perceived local needs and community preferences, rather than determined by developer preferences or architectural fashions. This may imply more interventionist planning stance, as legitimised in the 2006 version of PPS3, rather than a deregulationist approach.

There is also a question in this survey which seeks respondents’ views on what the government should do to make housing more affordable, without assuming that the solution necessarily entails building more new housing. Remarkably in some ways, although consistent with some of the other views reported here, relatively few respondents think that allowing developers to build more homes would be the most useful action for the government to take. This poses something of a challenge to the consensus of economic opinion, that supply is important for affordability in the long term (Barker 2004, Bramley et al 2004 ch.5, ODPM 2005, NHPAU 2009). More emphasis is placed on improving access to mortgages or helping first time buyers. This

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judgement may also colour local planning decisions on new housing land release.

Predicting Local Attitudes

The data just reported, and other descriptive findings from the survey, suggest that it should be possible to provide a more generalised model of how attitudes towards local housing development line up, not just for different groups in the population but also for different geographical areas. We have therefore developed a two-step procedure to predict the local balance of opinion, conditional on various assumptions.

The first step is to develop and test a multivariate logistic regression model to predict the odds of being a supporter or opponent of development, within the micro BSAS dataset. Explanatory variables include a standard range of socio-demographic attributes of individuals and households, politicial affiliation and/or other general attitudinal/value proxies, and area type categories including some banded environmental characteristics of neighbourhoods or local authorities specially attached to the BSAS dataset for this purpose. Support for development may be unconditional or conditional, with four levels compared

1. Support development – no conditions

2. Support development assuming public open/greenspace and/or leisure facilities are provided/improved (but not if otherwise opposed)

3. Support development assuming public open/greenspace and/or leisure facilities and/or education and or healthcare and or transport facilities are provided/improved (but not if otherwise opposed)

4. Support development assuming public open/greenspace and/or leisure facilities and/or education and or healthcare and or transport facilities are provided/improved (but not if otherwise strongly opposed)

We also predict opposition to development, and opposition adjusted for those switching preference under 4. above.

Variables tested in these models include most of the available socio-demographic attributes in the survey, as well as the political affiliation and area characteristics (for which local data sources like the Census, IMD, voting figures and planning and land data could provide approximate equivalents). Variables which were not significant for either support or opposition at the different levels were discarded (although we retain all of the political variables).

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The resulting reduced models for support (1. above, unconditional) and opposition to development are shown in Table 4 below.

Support for local housing development is greater, and opposition less, among families with children, private and social renters, flat dwellers and households on low incomes. Support is less and opposition greater for older (retirement age) households and those in social class 3. In terms of political affiliation, Labour supporters are more likely to support development, and the same is true to a lesser extent for Liberal Democrats, whereas Green supporters are much less supportive of development. All of these are in comparison with the default category of Conservative. The effects for other party supporters (BNP & UKIP) are less clear but tending toward negative.

Looking at types of geographical area, big city residents are more supportive whilst those in villages are less supportive of development, with some offsetting positive effects from low density (perhaps picking up a deeper rural situation). The key regional effect is that the South and Outer London are more negative about development. People who are very satisfied with their area as a place to live are significantly more positive about development, whereas there appears to be more opposition among those who are unsatisfied. Those living in less deprived neighbourhoods (higher banding value) are less supportive of development. Those living in areas which have been granting more planning permissions for housing and in areas with a lot of greenspace (undeveloped land) are more supportive of development, but those living in areas with a lot of designated Green Belt are less supportive.

These effects are mainly in line with expectations. However, it is not claimed that this is necessarily a causal model – we are simply trying to obtain a forecasting model to predict current levels of support and opposition. Similar models were developed for the indicators of conditional support at the levels 2.-4. above and the equivalent adjusted opposition indicator where this differs. These are not reported here to save space.

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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The second step in this exercise is to move to the local authority (district) level of analysis and to apply the coefficients from these models to an equivalent set of variables compiled at that area level. It is necessary to do this because of course the BSAS is a sample survey and its sample size is not sufficient to take values directly from the survey at the district level (n=354 districts in England). Data on socio-demographics and land and planning factors are taken a district-level panel dataset developed to support the development of a sub-regional market model model (Andrew et al 2010), derived from the 2001 Census and other sources (e.g. DCLG planning statistics) but in some cases updated to 2007. The political affiliation variables are mapped across to voting in the2010 General Election, reapportioned from Constituencies to LA districts. Satisfaction with areas scores are derived from pooled data from the Survey of English Housing 1997-2007.

The resulting predicted levels of support and opposition at different levels of conditionality are shown in Table 4, for regions and two area typologies. The overall levels of support (unconditional) and opposition shown in the first two columns are similar to those found within the BSAS as reported in Table 2, giving a majority against development of -16.5% of all (including those without a view), or 23% of those with a view. This is the figure across the whole of England. At regional level the majority against development ranges from -7.5% in the North East to -24.4% in the South East. However, the most rural areas show a small majority in favour of development (2.0%), compared with -18% in both urban and slightly rural areas. There is also a slight majority for development in Central London (2%), with stronger opposition in London suburbs (-31.5%) and Prospering areas (-20.6%).

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Assuming a moderate level of delivery of public green/open space and leisure facilities accompanying new housing, the figures move towards near neutrality or in some cases positive support for development (level 2, column 4). Regions with majority support, albeit small, would include North East, Yorkshire & Humber, and East Midlands. Support would be more clearcut (9.5% majority) in the most rural areas. It would also show up in Cities and Services and Central London. Increasing the planning gain ‘offer’ to include education, health and transport would see only a modest further move towards majority support, so long as we assume no actual opponents of development switch sides (i.e. we are only recruiting the undecideds) (Level 3, column 5). The only other area type to switch is ‘quite rural’.

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However, if we assumed that this broad planning gain offer in terms of public facilities was generally deliverable and that previous moderate opponents of development might thereby switch their view, then the picture is transformed, and you would then have clear majorities for development in all cases.

In the author’s view, levels 1. and 4. are probably less realistic outcomes. It is commonplace now to obtain some planning gain benefits from larger scale new housing developments, and open space and leisure facilities are often more practical and economically feasible to provide. However, with tightening public spending restrictions on local government and with the weaker economic viability of many developments following the economic crisis, the full range of desirable public facility enhancements may be less achieveable in many cases. It also seems less likely that people with a clear view opposed to development will be persuaded to switch, particularly since many do not believe that more housing is needed or that building more housing will help much with affordability. Therefore probably the predictions at level 2 (column 4) may be perhaps the most likely outcome, based on this analysis.

Planning Stances and Likely Changes

The analysis to this point has focussed on trying to predict the balance of opinion towards new housing development at local authority district level around 2010. It is expected that this will influence actual planning policy and land supply decisions in the coming period. However, exactly how it will influence them is not entirely clear, partly because of uncertainties about how the new regime will operate in practice following the issuing of the revised NPPF. It does seem reasonable to argue, though, that local planning is not starting with a completely clean slate, but rather it has inherited a set of commitments and policies and it is likely to move incrementally forward from the existing position. This argument is reinforced by the nature of the revisions made to the NPPF following consultation, which make this more in the nature of an incremental change in policy rather than starting again with a clean sheet. The existing position may be characterized as a ‘planning stance’ towards housing, which will have emerged from the interaction of local politics, environmental constraints, market pressures and the previous top-down RSS target system.

We have explored ways of trying to measure the existing planning stance based on a range of proxy indicators derived from various sources, influenced in part by a similar exercise undertaken in the 1990s (Bramley 1998). . Data on these have been assembled as part of the process of building a panel-based model of subregional housing markets to be used for simulation of market outcomes (as described further below). Eleven candidate indicators of planning stance were considered.

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In analysis reported in detail elsewhere (Bramley & Watkins forthcoming), a composite index was derived by seeing which combination of these variables, together with other likely determinants, gave the best parsimonious prediction of the most obvious key output indicator, namely the flow of new permissions. This regression-based composite measure of planning stance incorporates five variables: the log of outstanding permissions per 100 households; total capacity of allocated land plus permissions; the share of small sites; social completions rate; and the proportion of planning applications for housing granted. The potential candidates omitted from this final composite are planning permissions flow itself, PDL (brownfield land), Green Belt, percent granted in last 4 years and average decision time, and the five year requirement percentage.

The actual pattern of planning stances of local authorities at the end of the 2000s, immediately prior to the localisation reform, is summarized in terms of regions and two area typologies in Table 5. This table also shows the official ‘top down’ Regional Spatial Strategy housing target (units pa /100 households) averaged for the same local authority groups.

The pattern of planning stances will probably not on the whole come as a surprise to those familiar with the English planning scene. Planning stances are more positive in the northern regions and in the East Midlands than in the West Midlands, the South East and London. However, perhaps slightly more surprising is the apparently positive stance of the South West and East of England. This is almost certainly explained by the next block of figures, relating to rurality. While urban authorities are more positive than those with ‘some rural’ parts or ‘quite rural’ areas, in the most rural areas the stance is actually more positive. Recent debates about rural planning and housing shed some light on this (Taylor 2008, Satsangi et al 2010), but broadly in deeper rural areas new housing is seen as a way to promote economic and community development rather than an intrusion on valued peri-urban amenity.

The ONS supergroup classification shows that major cities which function as service centres tend to be positive, as do the central and more cosmopolitan parts of London, with mining and manufacturing slightly positive, whereas ‘coastal and countryside’ areas, ‘prospering UK’ and (most especially) London suburbs are most negative.

This table shows the pattern in existing RSS targets, which will have been influenced by these stances but also by more top down pressures for example to respond to demographic or economic growth or to exploit what are perceived as strategic opportunities for development from a regional perspective. The high targets for

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the South West and East reflect demographic projections driven by decades of counterurbanising migration as well as relatively buoyant economies, while London’s high figure reflects aspirations for urban renaissance and high density brownfield development. While the low figures for NE and NW regions reflect low economic and demographic growth, the low figure for West Midlands may also reflect strong arguments about containment of the conurbation.

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[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

In order to explore how the regime change might impact differentially in different localities, we now combine the pre-existing planning stance derived as just described with the local attitude to development predictions derived indirectly from the BSAS analysis. We divide districts into four groups, according to (a) whether their existing planning stance is relatively positive (high output) or negative (low output) towards housing and (b) whether they would have a predicted majority for development or not, based on the level 2 conditionality on planning gain benefits. The simple proposition is that authorities with a negative (low) stance and with a majority against development will remain in the low output camp; those with a positive (high) stance and a majority for development will remain in the high output camp; those with a high stance but a majority against development will change to a lower output position; while those with a low stance but a majority for development will change to a higher output position. Thus, the impact of the change of regime will be seen mainly in the two latter categories, where we predict a switch of stance and of actual output of planning permissions, either down or up. The question is, how many local authorities will be in each category, and where will they be located?

Table 6 presents the results of this simple discrete change model for local authority districts in England, broken down by region, urban-rural type and local authority ‘supergroup’ classification (ONS).

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

The first point to note is that this model suggests that nearly 60% of local authorities would not change their stance. Secondly, it appears that the number likely to reduce their housing land supply is nearly double the number likely to increase it, 95 versus 44. Thirdly, there are considerable differences between the regions and the types of area in the balance between changes to high and changes to low. In the North, North West and both Midland regions, the number changing to high exceeds the number changing to low. By contrast, in Yorkshire and Humber, and all of the southern regions including London, the changes to low exceed the changes to high by a wide margin. In the South East, 29 would change to low and none would change to high. In the three southern regions outside London, only three would change to high while 62 would change to low.

It is noticeable that quite a lot of the upward changers are ‘quite rural’ (20) or ‘most rural’ (3) and also that upward changers are a

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majority for ‘Cities and Services’ and ‘London Centre’. In ‘prospering UK’ areas in England, downward changers outnumber upward changers by 50:16.

A similar analysis using the slightly more optimistic Level 3 conditionality presents a similar picture, except that the balance between changing down and changing up is 87:53 and there are notably more upward changers in the South West region (7 instead of 1).

Simply presented in this way the picture of how housing supply might change under localism is very pessimistic in its general implications. The part of the country which most analysts and commentators recognise as having the greatest need for additional housing, reflecting its stronger economic growth, is the south, yet here the overwhelming pattern is one of predicted reductions. Furthermore, when we look at the list of individual authorities it appears to include a roll call of many districts which have acted as major growth areas for new housing in the recent past: examples include Ashford, Aylesbury Vale, Basingstoke, Bedford, Bracknell Forest, Cambridge, Colchester, Crawley, Dartford, Eastleigh, Fareham, Harlow, Ipswich, Maidstone, Newbury, North Herts, North Wilts, Northampton, Peterborough, Reading, Rugby, Swindon, Winchester and Wokingham. Conversely, when we look at the list of authorities which might seek to increase output, we find a mixture of constrained central city areas, low demand areas, and areas in National Parks which would not be allowed to build much. The number of plausible candidates for expansion within this list is quite limited.

It may be argued that this discrete change analysis is too simplistic. There may be changes within the groups classified here as no change, although the balance of these may also be adverse overall. It is not just the number of authorities but the actual scale of potential development which they can influence. We may have been too pessimistic about the prospects for persuading people opposed to development to accept it given a range of side benefits.

The more important uncertainty, however, is how the ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’ impacts on the system. Authorities have a strong incentive to review and agree core strategies and targets, and there is a clear expectation that these should be evidence-based. However, what will be judged by the planning inspectorate to constitute a sound evidence base is far from clear.

From the wording of the NPPF (para 159) and from general observation of the planning inspectorate in action, it is reasonable to expect that one test likely to be applied is whether the targets adopted by local authorities match or exceed the official household

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projections. We can apply this test on our local authority database by comparing our prediction of the likely flow of new planning permissions, given predicted local sentiment and the removal of the RSS targets, with the average rate of household growth contained in the 2008-based projections. On this basis we would expect an average compliance rate of 71%, but with wide variation between types of area, ranging from 96% in the North East to 52-55% in the East and South East and 39% in London; or from 100% in mining and manufacturing districts too 64% in ‘prospering UK’ and only 25% in London suburbs. In terms of our 4-way typology of change, compliance with household growth projections would be particularly low in the ‘no change low’ group (40%).

On the face of it this would suggest that planning inspectors might reject quite a lot of core strategies based on local preferences and existing planning stances, particularly in the south of England (where other indicators relating to affordability are also likely to support the case for more provision). This suggests a tantalising possibility that the new system might be a stronger lever for increased supply than the previous ‘top down’ RSS+NHPAU system, but only at the cost of significant conflict with ‘localism’. In practice, the inspectors may also pay attention to other criteria, relating to environmental capacity and infrastructure adequacy for example, so that challenges of this kind may be less common in reality. They may also feel obliged to defer to the policy priority assigned to ‘localism’ and reinforced by the Decentralisation legislation.

Initial Responses to Localism

Even before the Coalition Government assumed office, and in the few months following, there was considerable publicity about a number of authorities immediately withdrawing some proposals for development from their plans and reducing their target housing numbers. Informal surveys were carried out by certain organisations during 2010, particularly Tetlow King on behalf of the National Housing Federation and the House Builders Federation, and a further analysis by BNP-Paribas in May 2011.

The first of these studies, which focused on the southern regions, suggested that slight majority of all authorities in the region (81/152) would reduce provision, giving a grossed-up reduction of 240,000, equivalent to 13.7% of the total former regional planning target expressed over 20 years, or equivalent of 2.74 years’ worth of building at that target level. This study suggested that a number of the larger reductions involved the deletion or scaling down of major urban extensions previously planned associated with certain cities and towns: Bournemouth, Bristol, Bath, Taunton, Stevenage, Luton, Bracknell, Eastleigh and Horsham.

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The study by BNP Paribas reported in May 2011 covered a survey of 291 (out of c.340) local authorities in England. This suggested that half of authorities would maintain provision levels, but an overall reduction of about 9.5% from the previous regional targets might result from decisions to change targets. This study also showed greater reductions in the southern regions, especially in the South West.

These findings are in line with our expectations based on the argument and evidence presented in the previous sections. Typically major urban extensions are being deleted because they have been unpopular locally. Concerns about the costs and quality of transport infrastructure and congestion levels on current infrastructure are a significant factor in attitudes to development proposals such as these. Equally important, however, is an emotive view about the need to protect/preserve the ‘Green Belt’, an iconic feature of British planning.

Also underlying these decisions are considerable doubts and debates about the arguments around the need, or demand, for these higher levels of housing provision. The plunge of the housing market since 2007, with output now not much above half of its peak level of that year, gives some comfort to those denying the need for greater housing supply, notwithstanding the arguments of the former NHPAU (2009) and others. We reported above the low proportion of households in BSA Survey who saw building more private housing as the key solution to affordability problems.

Forecasting Market and Social Impacts of Localised Planning

Most local authorities or sub-regional partnerships do not have sophisticated economic forecasting models to assist them in making decisions about future plans for housing. However, the author has developed various models of this kind, in work for groups of local authorities and broader national studies (Bramley & Leishman 2005, Bramley & Watkins 2008a & b).. The most recent of these for a group of authorities in the South West of England constitutes modelling system to simulate the whole national system of 102 HMAs in England and derives from a feasibility study carried out for the former NHPAU (Andrew et al 2010; Bramley 2011a and forthcoming). No attempt is made here to describe and justify the model design and implementation. To summarize, it is a simulation built on a number of functions which are estimated econometrically, mainly on panel data for the period 1997-2007; these functions predict housebuilding output, house prices, migration, household formation, incomes and affordability, and various housing needs on the basis of assumed (exogenous) trends in economic growth, national population totals, financial conditions and other factors.

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It is of particular interest to use this model’s ability to trace the impact of ‘what if?’ questions about housing supply in the context of the potential impact of localism in planning. We have described in a series of steps the derivation of an attempt at forecasting what local authorities might do in response to their new ‘freedom’, having regard to evidence on public attitudes to housing development. This yields a set of discrete predictions for individual local authorities as to whether they may be expected to increase their provision for housing, reduce it, or continue as before. We can feed this into the simulation model, by making a further assumption about the magnitude of any change. For the purpose of this test we apply an arbitrary factor of 0.5. So, if an authority is predicted to reduce provision, we reduce the flow of new permissions by 0.5 times the previous rate; and similarly, for an increase we raise to 1.5 times the previous rate. However, it is a property of this model that actual new completions will not change so much as this, based on the predictive functions for new supply.

Table 7 shows the predicted impact of the planning stance changes predicted in Table 6, applying the above factor, by region . The top part of the table shows impacts on new completions by year and region. Overall, and as predicted, the impact for England is negative, although it is noteworthy that the size of the national impact is rather smaller than might have been expected on the basis of the previous discussion. Output falls by 5.5% initially, and this proportion falls gently to settle at around 3.9% in the later part of the forecast. There is of course significant regional variation. Two of the three northern regions and both midland regions see a rise in output, in the range 3-7%. The remaining five regions see falls in output for most years, although this is less consistent in the South West. The region which really stands out is the South East, with a fall in output initially of over 20% and persisting at the level of around 16% lower even by the end of the period.

The table also shows the consequential impacts on affordability of house purchase for younger households, again in proportional terms. Here the impact tends to build up progressively over time. There is a net negative impact at national level but it looks quite small overall, peaking at -0.8% in 2026. Affordability improves in the four regions which increase supply, although only in the West Midlands is the impact of noticeable scale (3.7% by 2031). For the regions adversely affected, the impacts tend to be more noticeable. The East of England sees a 3-4% deterioration while the South East sees a 6-7% worsening. Greater London also sees a 4-5% worsening.

It would be spurious to claim any scientific precision for the magnitude of these numbers, but there is a compelling logic and substantial evidence for the direction of the effects, and the orders of magnitude are probably reasonable in ballpark terms.

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[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

Conclusion

The regime for the planning of new housing in England has gone through a dramatic and abrupt change following the change of government in 2010. At issue is the strong proposition that a localised decision-making basis accompanied by financial incentives and a streamlined national planning policy framework will deliver new housing more effectively than the previous national and regional target-oriented approach.

Clearly it is too early to reach definitive conclusions on the likely outcomes of this new regime. However, there are several strands of indirect evidence which can be considered in making a provisional prediction and assessment. The first strand is public attitude survey evidence on attitudes to new housing in people’s own locality. This evidence shows clear majorities opposed to new development, particularly in more pressured areas where the need for housing is greater, among those with stronger views, and among people of higher social status living in suburban areas, not least supporters of the Coalition parties.. For some people opposition might soften given appropriate forms of development – more affordable housing, less flats or mcmansions – or good packages of side benefits in terms of infrastructure or services.

It is possible, making a range of assumptions, to map this national sample survey evidence to a local level and thereby predict likely majorities for or against development. Making cautiously optimistic assumptions about the extent to which support may be bolstered by the likelihood of planning gain benefits from new housing, one can see majorities for development in some but not all areas. From this, in conjunction with evidence on existing planning stances, one may make some predictions of where localism might lead to changes in planned provision, both positive and negative. The main finding is that the negatives outweigh the positives, notably in the south and suburban areas, with some signs of more positive approaches in more rural areas. The latter might lead to a further concern about sprawl on a broader spatial scale.

A third strand of evidence lies in the actual decisions made by local authorities since the Election, which indicate a significant reduction in planned numbers for new housing (of the order of 14% in the south).

Overall planning stances, based on a range of indicators, can be shown to be more positive in the (mainly) northern which have less pressured housing markets, as well as in deeper rural areas, and more negative around the suburbs and surrounding areas of London and the south more generally. Planning stance is inversely

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correlated with affordability problems, suggesting that planning continues to be ‘part of the problem rather than part of the solution’. Furthermore, simulations based on predicted changes in stance post-localisation suggest a further worsening of affordability in the pressured south.

How the system operates in practice will depend in part on the evidence of need and supply used by local authorities to justify their plans, and how this is interpreted by the Planning Inspectorate. Current practice has significant shortcomings, but the new Presumption in favour of Sustainable Development puts additional pressure on authorities to have a plan and a justification for it.

If planning inspectors adopted an interventionist approach based strongly on evidence of need and demand – household projections, affordability, job growth – they might reject many local plans as ‘unsound’. However, concerns about infrastructure and environmental capacity, and/or a deference to the government’s overriding decentralisation agenda, might make this a rarer occurrence. Overall, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the likely outcome of the localised planning regime in England will be a failure to increase the supply of housing and improve affordability and other housing need outcomes for society, particularly in the more pressured regions.

8752 words excl Abstract, 37 refs, 7 tables, 1 Figure.

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Bramley, G. (2011) ‘Housing supply and affordability outcomes under ‘localised’ land-use planning: exploring prospects using a new sub-regional model of housing markets in England’, Paper presented in Special Session on ‘Housing Markets:The web of housing supply: markets, finance, development and infrastructures. European Regional Science Association Congress, Barcelona, August/September 2011.

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Jenks, M. & Jones, C. (2010) Dimensions of the Sustainable City. Springer.

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Table 1: Support for or Opposition to More Homes being Built in Local Area by Broad Region

Support new homes built in local area

North & Mids South London

Scotland & Wales

Gt Britain

Support strongly 4.3% 3.8% 7.5% 6.4% 4.9%Support 24.6% 22.7% 26.7% 32.4% 24.8%Neither support nor oppose 24.9% 21.4% 17.6% 21.1% 22.5%Oppose 31.3% 31.8% 27.3% 25.8% 30.3%Oppose strongly 11.9% 17.6% 19.8% 12.4% 15.1% It depends 2.2% 2.7% .9% 1.5% 2.0%Don't know .9% 0.0% .2% .4% .4%Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%Majority for Development -14.3% -22.8% -13.0% 0.6% -15.6%

Sample number 1432 1057 306 502 3297Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2010: see Bramley ‘Housing Attitudes and Changing Policies’ in Park et al (2011)

Table 2: Advantages which would be main thing making people support new homes

Advantages

Neither support

nor oppose Oppose

Oppose strongly All

 More employment oppor's 21 18 9 11More/improved green spaces/parks 15 9 9 7Transport links improved 11 12 7 7More/improved schools 9 9 7 6More/improved leisure facilities 7 7 5 4More/improved shops/supermarkets 6 5 3 3More/improved medical facilities 4 5 4 3Financial incentives to existing residents 2 2 2 1Other 2 1 0 1Support+it depends 0 0 0 32New/improved library 0 1 0 0None of these 22 31 54 23 It Depends/don't know 1 1 0 1 Total

100 100 100 100Base       3297

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2010: see Bramley ‘Housing Attitudes and Changing Policies’ in Park et al (2011)

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Table 3: Logistic Regression Models for Support and Oppose Development(British Social Attitudes Survey, 2010)

Support OpposeVariable Coeffic B Signif Exp(B) Coeffic B Signif Exp(B)Retirement age -0.212 0.063 0.870 0.189 0.057 1.208Family with children 0.337 0.001 1.430 -0.137 0.137 0.872Private renter 0.291 0.030 1.238 -0.506 0.000 0.603Social renter 0.653 0.000 1.563 -0.494 0.000 0.610Live in flat 0.447 0.001 1.368 -0.228 0.083 0.796Social class 3 -0.312 0.006 0.776 0.353 0.000 1.423Low income 0.212 0.052 1.206 -0.042 0.679 0.959 Political affiliationLabour 0.279 0.006 1.340 -0.348 0.000 0.706Liberal Democrat 0.083 0.550 1.196 -0.192 0.116 0.825Other (BNP & UKIP) -0.201 0.504 1.036 0.278 0.274 1.321Green -0.585 0.117 0.636 0.336 0.256 1.399 Area attributesBig city 0.069 0.700 1.224 -0.295 0.089 0.745Village -0.234 0.111 0.676 0.404 0.002 1.498Low density 0.064 0.668 1.001 -0.232 0.081 0.793South/Outer London -0.096 0.331 0.891 0.319 0.000 1.376Very satisfied area 0.407 0.000 1.290 -0.329 0.000 0.720Very unsatisfied area 0.184 0.501 0.869 0.407 0.117 1.503Deprivation banding -0.177 0.000 0.878 0.123 0.002 1.130Planning Perm's band 0.016 0.039 1.016 -0.007 0.296 0.993Greenspace band 0.078 0.006 1.057 -0.110 0.000 0.896Green Belt band -0.062 0.003 0.965 0.077 0.000 1.080

Constant -1.218 0.000 0.447 0.068 0.759 1.071Chi-sq d f signif Chi-sq d f signif

Overall model 208.39 21 0.000 213.7 21 0.000-2 Log Likelihood 3051.7 3599.6

Pseudo R SqCox&Snell Nagelkerke

Cox&Snell Nagelkerke

0.073 0.105 0.075 0.100% correct predictions 73.1     61.0    

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Table 4: Predicted Support, Opposition and Majorities for Development Under Different Conditional Assumptions by Region and Type of Locality

Area TypePro-devel

Pro-devel Pro-devel

Pro-devel

 Support 1 Oppose 1

Majority 1 Major 2 Major 3 Major 4

G O RegionNORTH 0.311 0.386 -0.075 0.030 0.045 0.350YORKS & HUMB 0.283 0.407 -0.124 0.002 0.003 0.345NORTH WEST 0.278 0.421 -0.144 -0.026 -0.021 0.320EAST MIDLANDS 0.311 0.368 -0.056 0.053 0.070 0.365WEST MIDLANDS 0.276 0.416 -0.141 -0.027 -0.021 0.310SOUTH WEST 0.287 0.459 -0.172 -0.080 -0.054 0.292EAST 0.267 0.491 -0.224 -0.131 -0.111 0.239SOUTH EAST 0.257 0.501 -0.244 -0.151 -0.132 0.235LONDON 0.285 0.472 -0.188 -0.085 -0.072 0.316Total 0.280 0.445 -0.165 -0.060 -0.046 0.301 Urban-RuralUrban 0.274 0.454 -0.179 -0.064 -0.057 0.311Some Rural 0.273 0.455 -0.183 -0.081 -0.067 0.278Quite Rural 0.305 0.409 -0.104 -0.021 0.008 0.303Most Rural 0.350 0.330 0.020 0.095 0.131 0.380 LA SupergroupCities and Services 0.285 0.401 -0.117 0.021 0.022 0.381Coastal and Country 0.304 0.420 -0.116 -0.035 -0.005 0.294London Centre 0.357 0.338 0.019 0.136 0.145 0.487London Cosmop 0.318 0.491 -0.173 -0.089 -0.061 0.342London Suburbs 0.241 0.556 -0.315 -0.222 -0.207 0.204Mining and Manufact 0.285 0.426 -0.141 -0.034 -0.024 0.302Prospering UK 0.266 0.472 -0.206 -0.113 -0.095 0.250Total 0.280 0.445 -0.165 -0.060 -0.046 0.301

Note on levels of conditionality: 1. no conditions; 2 support if open space & leisure provision; 3. support if wider range of public facilities including transport, education & health; 4. as 3. but allowing previous moderate opponents to switch to support.

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Table 5: Planni.ng Stance and Former RSS Housing Target by Region and Type of Locality

G O RegionPlanning Stance

RSS Target

North East 0.029 0.668Yorks & Humber 0.156 0.987North West 0.037 0.749East Midlands 0.108 1.019West Midlands -0.120 0.641South West 0.091 1.219East England 0.053 1.107South East -0.052 0.911London -0.050 1.028

England 0.019 0.936Rural CategoryUrban 0.029 0.888Some Rural 0.003 0.985Quite Rural 0.009 0.992Most Rural 0.101 0.969ONS LA SupergroupCities and Services 0.076 0.873Coastal and Countryside -0.011 0.955London Centre 0.199 1.148London Cosmopolitan 0.267 1.305London Suburbs -0.121 0.952Mining and Manufact 0.008 0.743Prospering UK -0.022 0.993

Total England 0.019 0.936Note: Planning stance expressed as net differences from national position; RSS targets as units pa/100 households.

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Table 6: Predicted Change in Planning Stance towards New Housing by Region and Type of Locality (number of LA districts in England)

Area Category

Unclass -ified

No change Low

Change to Low

Change to High

No Change High Total

NORTH 0 3 3 6 11 23YORKS & HUMBER 3 3 6 1 8 21NORTH WEST 0 15 10 11 7 43EAST MIDLANDS 1 6 2 8 23 40WEST MIDLANDS 0 15 3 10 6 34SOUTH WEST 1 19 13 1 11 45EAST 0 19 20 2 7 48SOUTH EAST 1 36 29 0 1 67LONDON 1 14 9 5 4 33Total 7 130 95 44 78 354

Urban 0 55 45 13 21 134Some Rural 3 48 31 8 25 115Quite Rural 2 27 19 20 29 97Most Rural 2 0 0 3 3 8

Unclassified 2 0 0 0 0 2Cities and Services 1 13 9 10 16 49Coastal and Countryside 2 15 9 6 12 44London Centre 0 0 0 4 3 7London Cosmopolitan 0 1 6 0 0 7London Suburbs 0 7 5 0 0 12Mining and Manufact 0 17 16 8 13 54Prospering UK 2 77 50 16 34 179Total 7 130 95 44 78 354

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Table 7: Simulation of Impacts of ‘Localism’ on New Housing Supply and Affordability by Region (differences from baseline of previous regime, using discrete LA adjustment model and moderate conditional support assumptions)

Region 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031CompletionsNE 4.6% 4.6% 5.1% 4.2% 4.3%YH -6.7% -7.8% -7.1% -6.3% -6.7%NW 4.1% 4.7% 4.2% 3.8% 3.6%EM 3.8% 3.3% 3.6% 3.5% 3.2%WM 7.0% 7.1% 6.6% 6.8% 6.9%SW -8.6% -2.2% 0.6% -1.1% -1.4%EE -6.3% -5.5% -5.1% -5.3% -5.5%

SE-

20.8%-

19.8%-

17.5%-

16.6%-

15.9%GL -6.2% -5.8% -4.4% -3.4% -3.1%ENG -5.5% -5.1% -4.0% -3.9% -3.9%AffordabilityNE 0.2% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0%YH -0.3% -1.6% -2.1% -1.8%NW 0.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9%EM 0.3% 1.0% 1.1% 1.5%WM 0.4% 2.9% 3.3% 3.7%SW -0.5% -1.2% -2.1% -1.2%EE -0.5% -3.1% -3.4% -3.9%SE -1.1% -6.9% -8.1% -8.1%GL -0.3% -4.6% -4.9% -4.5%ENG   -0.1% -0.5% -0.8% -0.6%

Note: Completions includes both private and social; ‘affordability’ is proportion of under 40 households able to afford 2-bedroom home on basis of income.

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34

Figure 1: Affordability by Region 1997-2008

Source: Pawson & Wilcox, UK Housing Review 2011/12, Table 2.3.2.

35

FTB Mortgage-Cost-to-Income Ratios by Region & Country 1994-2010

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Year

Perc

ent o

f Hhd

Inco

me

United Kingdom

North EastNorth WestYorkshire & Humb

East MidlandsWest MidlandsEast

LondonSouth EastSouth West

WalesScotlandNorthern Ireland