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Public Management Research Association

Governance without Government? Rethinking Public AdministrationAuthor(s): B. Guy Peters and John PierreSource: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr.,1998), pp. 223-243

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GovernanceWithoutGovernment?RethinkingPublicAdministrationB. Guy PetersUniversityof PittsburghJohn PierreUniversityof Strathclyde,Scotland

ABSTRACTTheconceptof governancehas cometo be usedmorecom-monly n thediscussionofpublicadministration, ut the meaningof the termis not alwaysclear. There s a growingbodyof Euro-pean literature hatcan be characterized s "governancewithoutgovernment, stressingas it does the importance f networks,partnerships,and markets especially nternationalmarkets).Thisbodyof literaturecan be relatedto the newpublic management;yet it has a numberof distinctiveelements.Thisarticlediscussesthestrengthsand weaknessesof this literatureand its applic-abilitytopublicadministrationn the UnitedStates.The traditional onceptualizationf the publicsectorhascome under ncreasing trainduring he pastseveraldecades.Theidea thatnationalgovernments re the majoractors in publicpolicy and thatthey are able to influence he economy andsocietythrough heiractionsnow appears o be in doubt.Someof the strainon nationalgovernmentshas beenthe resultof theincreased mportance f the internationalnvironment ndof anarguablydiminished apacityof thosegovernmentso insulate

theireconomiesandsocietiesfromthe globalpressures.Thosepressureson nationalgovernments ome aboutthrough nterna-tionalcapitalmarkets Strange1996; but see HirstandThompson1996; Peters1998) as well as throughsupranationalrganizationssuchas the EuropeanUnion(Scharpf1997).Anotherstrainon the traditional onceptionof governingarisesfromchanges n the relationship etweengovernmentandthe privatesector.At the extreme t is argued hat"governancewithoutgovernment"s becomingthe dominantpatternof man-agement or advanced ndustrialdemocracies Rhodes1997).Othercharacterizationsnclude"hollow" tatesandgovernments

223/Journalof PublicAdministrationResearchand TheoryJ-PART8(1998):2:223-243

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RethinkingPublicAdministration(Peters1993; Rhodes1994) and "negotiated"tatesandecono-mies (Nielsen andPedersen1990). In all thesedepictionsofchangingpatternsof government, t is argued hatsocietalactorshavebecomeinfluentialover policy andadministrationndhavedone so in ways thatwere unimaginablen earliertimes. Govern-ment is seen as weakenedand as incapableof "steering" s it hadin the past. The traditional onceptof governmentas a control-ling andregulatingorganization or society is argued o beoutmoded Bekke,Kickert,and Kooiman1995).

The discussionof governancewithoutgovernmenthas beenlargelyEuropeanand has concentrated rimarily n the UnitedKingdomandthe Netherlands.The European oots of this debateappear o be in parta functionof the preeminent ole of govern-ment in the welfarestatein Europeand of the strengthandestablishedposition of interestgroupsin these societies(Kooiman1993; SchmitterandLembruch1979). In essencegovernmenthasmuch morepowerto lose, moreareas of policy involvement,anda networkstructure lready n placethatcan replaceor supple-mentthepowerof government. ntheUnitedKingdom heemerg-ence of this patternof governing s a directchallengeto theWhitehallmodel of strong,centralizedgovernment.Although he governancedebatehas been largelyEuropean,it is beginning o diffuseto the UnitedStates.Thereis some

objectiveevidence thatthe samechanges-such as contracting,public-private artnerships, nd a varietyof otherinteractionswiththe privatesector-move governmentawayfromits role asthe centralsource of the "authoritativellocationof values"forthe society. Also, in the UnitedStates thereis the beginningof abody of literature hatrelatesthesechangesin the relationshipwithsocietyto broaderquestionsof managing he State(O'Toole1997; Thomas1997).The objectivesandconcretedesign of administrativeeformmirror he historical,political,andsocietalroles of publicadministration s well as its internalculture.Suchreformsarepath-dependent, robably o a muchgreaterextentthanwe gen-erallyrealize. Path-dependencyefersto the range of policychoice available or administrativeeformers;reformstrategiesareembedded n systems of norms andadministrativeracticesandthereforereformstrategiesare shapedmoreby whatalreadyexists thanby the desiredmodelof publicadministration.In this article we will examinethe emerginggovernancedebate n Europeandthe UnitedStates andwill describeboth the

dimensionsof the debateover the capacityof the stateto con-tinueto governas it has in the past andthe developmentof224/J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationalternativemechanisms or exertingcontrolover society. We willalso address he questionof whether his is purelyan academicdebate,the productof developinga theoreticalanguagesuitablefor the analysis,or whethera realchangeis occurring n thenatureof government.WHAT IS THE GOVERNANCEDEBATE?

The conceptionof governanceas it has developedover thepast severalyears in the Europeandebatehas severalconstituentelements. As we indicatedabove,however,takentogether heseelementswouldamount o a prescriptionor steeringsocietythrough ess directmeans andweakening he powerof the Stateto controlpolicy. Thesechangeswould, in turn,have implica-tions for the meaningof democracyn the contemporary oliticalsystem.We will not evaluate heseargumentshere;ratherwewill save that for the discussionof how the governanceargu-mentsfit withinthe context of bothEuropean ndAmericanpublic administration.The Importanceof Networks

Perhaps he dominanteatureof the governancemodel is theargumenthatnetworkshave come to dominatepublicpolicy.The assertion s thattheseamorphous ollections of actors-notformalpolicy-making nstitutionsn government-controlpolicy.Stateagenciesmayplace some imprimaturn the policy, so theargument oes, butthe realactionoccurs withinthe privatesector. Further, n the moreextremeversionsof the argument, fgovernments ttempt o imposecontrolover policy, thesenet-workshave sufficientresiliencyandcapacity or self-organiza-tion1 Kooiman1993;MarshandRhodes1992;de BruijnandtenHeuvelhof1997)to evade the controlof govermment.

It long has been argued hat the privatesectorhas realinfluenceover publicpolicy through tructureswithvaryingdegreesof formality,but this conceptioncarriesthe argument othatof dominance.Thisdominance s possiblepartlybecausetheState has becomedelegitimated.The loss of legitimacy s in partbecause state actorsare excessivelyclumsy,bureaucratic, ndpathdependentandin partbecause of the control of informationandimplementationtructures y privateactors. It appears hatwhatever he State does it does poorly, while the privatesector(for profitandnot for profit)is moreeffective.

225/J-PART,April 1998

'Especially within the Dutch and Germnanliterature he term autopoesis is used todescribe this self-organizing natureofnetworks.

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationFrom Control to Influence

In the governanceargumentshe Statedoes not becometotallyimpotent; ather, t loses the capacity or directcontrolandreplaces hatfacultywith a capacity or influence.Govern-ment actors are conceptualized s in a continualprocessof bar-gainingwiththe membersof theirrelevantnetworks.Whathaschanged,however, is thatthesegovernmentactors now bargainas relativeequals rather hanas withthe capacity o resortalwaysto powerif the decision thatis made is not whatthey want.Government rganizations emaina partof the networks ntheseemergingmodels of governance,butthey are conceptual-ized as dependent n the otheractors to the sameextentthatthoseactors aredependent n government.Thismutualresource

dependency Rhodes1988) at firstcharacterizedhe relationshipbetween centralgovermmentsndsubnational overnment,but theargumenthas beenextended o cover the gamutof relationshipsbetweencentralgovernment rganizations ndthe otherorgani-zations withwhichthey interact.Blending Public and Private Resources

Theuse of networksmentionedaboveeasily leadsto ablendingof public-sector ndprivate-sectoresources.Theseresourcesmayblend in a varietyof ways, one of the mostcommonbeingthe creationof moreor less formalpartnershipsbetweenactors in governmentandactors n the privatesector.Thesepartnerships ermiteach side to use resources hatwouldnot be at its disposalwere it to remainon its own side of the(presumed)dividebetweenthe two sectors(Peters1998). Forexample, governmentmaybe able to evade someproceduralrequirementshatmight restrict ts operations,while the privatesectormaygain publicapprovalandfundsfor projects hatmightbe difficultto bringto fruitionwithout hoseresources.In some instances he public andprivatesectors maybeblendedwithina singleorganization.An increasingnumberofnongovernmentalrganizations,quangos, anda host of otherhybridorganizationalormatsappear o have materialized scomponentsof the governance ramework.Theseformatspermitthe mutual everagingof resourcesandthe blendingof public andprivateattributesn ways thatmightnot be possible in moreconventional tructural rrangements.

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationUse of Multiple Instruments

The utilizationof public-private artnershipsor policyindicates he willingnessof a governmentoperatingwithinthegovernance rameworko developalternativemeans of makingandimplementing olicy. This willingnessto innovate n theselectionof policy instruments an be seen as moregeneral,withgovernance mplying he use of a widerrepertoireof instrumentsthanmightbe used by a more traditional ublicsector.

Governments o have a numberof instruments t theirdisposal, butthey tendto focus only on a few familiarones thatinvolve directintervention.The adoptionof the governanceperspectiveon theirroles and theiropportunitiesnablesgovern-ments to see thatthey canuse a numberof less directformsofintervention s the meansto achievetheir ends. These instru-mentsmayappear n the first instanceas less certain hantheolderinstruments, ut in a networkedversionof the publicsectorwith morepowerfulprivate-sector ctorsthey maybe moreeffec-tive.GOVERNANCEVS. NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT:SHOULD THEY BE SEPARATED?

The debateabouttheseemerging orms of governanceoccurredat nearlythe sametime as the diffusionof the newpublicmanagementNPM)in many westerndemocracies,prin-cipally the UnitedKingdomandthe Antipodes Aucoin 1996).For some scholars,the governancedebatewas triggered n partby the management hilosophyadvancedby the NPM experts(see, e.g., Rhodes1997). Certainly, hereare manysimilaritiesbetweenthe mainstream ebateon the emergingformsof govern-ance andthe overarchingphilosophybehindthe NPM (Hood1991).

Developing New Instruments of Control and AccountabilityA commonfeatureof governanceandNPM is a changingview of therole of electedofficials. BothgovernanceandNPMdownplay he role andsignificanceof electedofficials. In thegovernancedebate,politicalleaderships tied less to formalelectedoffice andmoreto mattersof politicalentrepreneurship.Political eaders,in this perspective,have a key responsibilitynthe developmentof networksandthe pooling of public andpri-vate resources.The only traditional ole remaining or electedofficials is that of settinggoals andpriorities.In the NPM vision

of the publicsector,the role of politicalleaders s even lessclear. Here, electedofficialshave a role in definingthe long-term227/J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationgoals of the public sector,but apart rom that they should offerconsiderablediscretion o the operativeagenciesandinstitutions.

In bothperspectives,however, accountabilityemainsanunresolved ssue. Governance heoristsarguethat traditionalchannelsof accountability ave been replacedby severaldifferentprocessesof electoralcontrol such as "stakeholderism"nd con-sumerchoice. Thathavingbeen said, it seems clearthataccount-abilityremainsa weak spot in the governance iterature. n theNPM school of thought here is little concern abouttheseissues,since accountabilitys seen as one of the strongestpointsof themodel. By relatingpublicservices moredirectlyto marketdemand nsteadof to politicaldecisions aboutqualityandquan-tity, serviceprovidersreceive immediate nformation bouttheirperformance.Customersarethusgiven an opportunityo influ-ence serviceproducersdirectlywithouthavingto operate hroughtheir electedrepresentatives.

The basic problem n both theories s that the linkagebetweencontrol andaccountability-theheart of democratictheory anda democratic ystemof government-hasbeencon-fused. Both modelsof publicadministrationeek to replacepolitical powerderivedfromlegal mandates r elected officewith an entrepreneurialtyle of leadershipor-with the NPM-aremoteand indirectmodel of leadership.This creates two differ-ent problems,derived from differentperspectiveson governanceandcitizenship.First, if electedpoliticalleadershave suchlimitedcontrol over thepublicadministration,s it reasonable ohold them accountableor the decisionsandactionsof the publicservice, andif electedofficials shouldnotbe held accountable,who then is accountable?

The secondproblemoccurs when we acceptthe notion ofconsumerchoice andstakeholderism s channelsof account-ability. Obviously,consumerchoice andstakeholderismsinstruments f voice andaccountability re availableonly tostakeholders nd consumers.But if services are financedbycollective resources henany model of democraticgovernmentrequires hatinstruments re also available o those who are notpresentlyconsumersor stakeholders f a particular ublicserv-ice. Further, t is oftendifficultto identifythe appropriatecustomersof service-prisons, customs andimmigration, ndperhapseven educationare clearexamples.Downplaying the Public-Private Dichotomy

In theoriesof governanceand also of NPM there are strongnotions thatpublic administration-and enerally, the state-has2281J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationbecomeisolatedfromand out of touch with the rest of society.Whilecorporateactors,underseverepressure rommarketcompetition,have developedsophisticatedmodelsof managementand resourceallocation,the publicbureaucracy as longremained nsulated romeconomicpressures.The result,accord-ing to the criticsof the publicservice, has been organizationalslack;widespreadnefficiency;economiccomplacency;an obses-sion withdueprocess;indifference o clients' needs;andorganizational utopoesis.

The governancedebatetakesa morepositiveview of thepublic service. Here the perspective s not so muchthatthepublicservice is forced to adapt o public-sectorphilosophiesandideals;theprevailingview is rather hatpublicinstitutions-asexpressionsof thepublic interest-can andshouldplay a leadingrole in cross-sectoral esourcemobilizationandconcertedven-tures.The role of politicalinstitutionsn differentmodels ofgovernancemayvaryconsiderably,but as long as there is somesignificantpoliticalinvolvement n governance hereare alsocollectiveobjectivespresent n the process.Bothgovernance heoriesandNPM thus see the public-privatedichotomyas essentiallyobsolete,albeit for differentreasons.The generalargument s that ust as thepublic-privateborderhas protected he publicbureaucracy romextraorganiza-

tionalpressures o modernizeandincreaseefficiencyit has nowbecome an obstacleto public-sector eform. Suchreforms, NPMadvocates nsist, must focus on bringing n private-sectormana-gerial strategiesandobjectives.NPM is essentiallya philosophyof genericmanagement ecause it argues thatall management assimilarchallengesandhenceshouldbe resolved in similarwaysin public- andprivate-sector rganizationsPeters1996).IncreasingEmphasison Competition

The idea of competitionas a means to increasepublic-serviceefficiencyandsensitivity o its clients-or customersis obviouslya good exampleof corporate dealspenetratinghepublicsector.Introducingompetition, urthermore, as far-reachingorganizationalonsequences.Most importantly, trequiresextensiverelaxationof politicalcontrolover the publicservice andsubstantivediscretion or managersat lower levels ofthe organization.Competitionwithinthepublicsectorhas manyobviousadvantages.By creating nternalmarkets,for instance,eachunit

in thepublicorganization an assess its actualcosts moreaccurately hantraditional rganizationalmodelsallow.229IJ-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationFurthermore,ntroducing ompetitionalso providesbenchmarksandother meaningfulbases for comparison.Competition etweenservicesuppliers orces organizations o increasecontactswiththeir customers.None of theseconsequencesof introducingnter-nal markets houldencounteropposition rom even the fiercestcritics of contemporary dministrativeeform.

Bringingcompetitionntothepublicservice is at the heartof NPM. Withoutcompetitionhereis littlepointto changing hemanagerial tyles in the publicsector. The current tyle of gov-ernance,however,is less dependent n the introduction f com-petition,at leastwithingovernment.Governance s generallymore concernedwithblendingpublicandprivateresources hanwithcompetitionn the publicsector. Thatsaid, governancerepresentsan alternativeway to produceand deliverservices, andtherefore t welcomescompetitionamongpublicandprivateinitiatives.

However,marketsare themselves nstitutions hat constrainour rangeof choice (Whitleyand Kristensen1997;MarchandOlsen 1989). Creating nternalmarketsaltersintraorganizationalbehavior ntonew practices hat can developnew potentialsourcesof resourcewaste at the sametimethey eliminateotherproblems.Some internalmarkets nduceorganizationso over-supply services, since demand s defined not by the customerbutby the supplier.The medicalcare sectorin several western Euro-peancountries s a good exampleof theseproblems.

One substantive roblem hat ariseswhencompetitivedimensionsare introducedn the area of publicservices is thatpublic-sectororganizationswere neverdesignedwiththatobjec-tive, butrather o ensure egalityandequality.Althoughstructural rganizationalhanges-such as decentralization ndmovingdecisionmakingon operative ssues downward n theorganization-arevery common oday,the problemsassociatedwithchanging he cultureof the organization re often muchmoredifficultthanare the structuralhanges.Increasing Emphasis on Output ControlRather Than on Input Control

BothNPM andgovernancehave a primary nterest nresults.Inputcontrol,thepreferred ontrolmechanismn thetraditional ublic administration,s argued o be inadequatebecauseit concealsorganizationallack andinefficiencyand doesnot relateperformanceo demandandcustomersatisfaction.Out-putcontrol can manifest tself eitherthroughcustomersatis-faction and otherperformancendicators ssentialto the NPM230/J-PART,Apr`l 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationschool of thoughtor throughgenerating omplianceandcus-tomer-attuningf publicservicesby bringingprivateandvolun-tarysector actors and interests ntopublicserviceproduction nddelivery. It also can be assessedmorebroadlyby organizationalaccomplishments elativeto its objectives.Devising New Instruments and Techniquesfor Steering

In both NPM andgovernance, teeringis a key concept(Rhodes1997, 49). Osborneand Gaebler 1992) coinedtheseductivesloganthatgovernmentshould focus more on steeringandless on rowing,andthis managerial erspectiveplays aprominent ole in bothgovernanceandNPM. Muchof this steer-ing refers to organizationsuttingbackwhile they simultaneouslyface increasingexpectationson diversifiedandcustomer-drivenservices. Governance, o a muchgreaterextentthanNPM, isconcernedwithenhancinggovernment's apacity o act by forg-ing strategic nterorganizationaloalitionswith actors in theexternalenvironment.Steering, n thisperspective, s largelyaboutsettingprioritiesanddefininggoals. In the NPM, steeringis primarilyan intraorganizationaltrategyaimedat unleashingproductive lements of thepublic service.

The question s why we shouldexpectarms-lengthmodelsof steering eanerorganizationso workanybetterthan theWeberian,hierarchical teeringof traditional, omparativelyresourcefulpublicorganizations. s it realistic o believe thatyoucan steer the moderndiversifiedandtransparentublicorgani-zations moreeffectivelywithmoresubtlemethods hanthosethatwere available o the managerswho steeredhierarchicallynte-gratedbureaucracies?f the previousmodel of steeringfailed,why shouldwe expectthe new ones to be any moreeffective?

As these few examplesshow, emergingformsof governancesharemanyfeaturesof the NPMphilosophy.However, severalsignificantdifferencesalso exist betweengovernanceandNPM.Indeed,thesedifferencesare so fundamentalhat the two modelsof publicserviceshouldbe separated.The similarities eem to beprimarilyat the operative evel of administrativeeform,whereasthe differencesare located at a theoreticalevel.First, governancealways has been a centralelementof ademocraticpolity; indeedgovernance,albeitin a wide rangeofmanifestations,s as old as government.The emerging orms ofgovernance n westernEurope-networks,partnerships, ublic-private oint ventures,the inclusionof the voluntary ector in

servicedelivery,andso on-should be assessed in relation otraditionalmodelsof governance uchas hierarchiesas well as231/J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationstatestrategies o compensate or diminishing xternalcontrolresulting rom decreasingresourcesandless relianceon legalcontrol.The NPM campaign,on the otherhand,is moreideolog-ically driven; it denies anypolitical or culturalspecificity of thepublic service andarguesthat by emulatingcorporateorganza-tions manyproblemsof the publicservice-inefficiency, indiffer-ence toward he needs of its clients, andso forth-should beameliorated.While new forms of governanceultimatelymaintainsome degree of political control over the publicservice since it isseen as an extensionof the publicinterest,NPM seeks to trans-form the publicbureaucracyo a set of organizationswhose onlydifferencefromprivate, for-profitorganizationss the natureofthe product hat is delivered.

Second, governance s aboutprocess, NPM is primarilyabout outcomes.Understanding overnance-its direction,prac-tices, andoutcomes-is largelya matterof observingandinter-preting he process throughwhich it evolves andwhatis therelative clout of the actors involved therein. NPM says very littleaboutthe process;it is focusedalmostexclusivelyon developingintraorganizationalanagementechniques hat ensurecustomersatisfactionandefficiency. This difference s all the moreimpor-tant since publicadministrationo a significantextent is centeredaroundprocedural ulesandregulations.Traditionalmodelsofpublic administrationrovidedetailedrulesconcerning he delib-erationprocess,partlybecauseregulatinghe processis theWeberianmethodof outputcontrol;a legallycorrectdeliberationprocess was believedto implya correctoutcome.A relatedprob-lem is thatNPM says very little aboutthoseaspectsof the publicsector that are not involveddirectly n production f goods orservices, and its application f those sectors of the publicbureaucracy emainsuncertain.

Third,NPM is an intraorganizationalrogramof administra-tive reformwhereasgovernance s interorganizationaln perspec-tive (Rhodes1997, 55). Furthermore, he emergingforms ofgovernancewe see in several of the advancedwesterndemoc-racies should be conceived of as alternativemodelsof the pursuitof collectiveinterests Peters1996). Thusgovernance s essen-tiallya politicaltheory-insofar as it describesa certain ype ofexchangebetweenthe state andthe society-whereas NPM is anorganizationalheory.

Fourth,governance s aboutmaintaining ublic-sectorresourcesundersome degree of political controland developingstrategies o sustain he government's apacity o act; NPM isessentiallyabouttransforminghe publicsector. Governancerefers to something hatdeliberatelyranscends he bordersof232/J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationgovernmentandwheregovernmentaltructures oordinateandgive direction o collaborative,public-privatefforts(Kooiman1993; Rhodes1997). The perspectiveof the NPM strategy smore introverted ndaims at alteringstate-societyrelationshipsonly insofar as public-sectormanagementmodelsmightreplacetraditionalmodels of organizationalmanagementn the publicadministrationndin the exchangebetweenserviceprovidersandpublic-sector ustomers.

Finally,governancedoes not come withthe sameideologicalluggage or distinctive dealsas the NPM does. The introductionof new forms of governance anbe implementedwithoutpro-found cultureshiftsin the publicservice;suchchanges,however,are at the heart of NPM. Indeed,as we havepointedout, manyof the most importanteaturesof the governancemodelhavebeen in place for years;some of the discussionof theirimpor-tance is thatthey are now beingimplementedn Westminstersystemswitha traditionof stronger,morecentralized,govern-ment.DifferencesbetweengovernanceandNPM becomemoreapparentwhen we look at a few cases where bothof thesephilos-ophieshavecaughthold, or one of them,or noneof them.Thediffusionof NPM seems in some ways to be related o statestrength.Strong stateshistoricallyhavenot hadto rely on the

inclusionof private-or third-sector ctorsin the politicalprocessin orderto increase heircapacity o imposetheir will on civilsociety. The institutionalapacityof strongstatescoupledwithastrong egalistic traditionhas guaranteed he state'sability toaccomplish ts intentionsandgoals. For weakerstates (or cities),joining forces withprivate-sector ctorshas been an establishedstrategy o increase heirgoverningcapacity Stone 1989).The obviousexception o this pattern s Britain.Mrs.Thatcherntroduced n NPM style in bothcentralandsub-nationalgovernments,usingthe full thrustof a strong,central-ized government. ndeed,the transformationf the Britishcivilservice was partandparcelof thegrandThatcherite roject oallow market orcesto penetratehe publicservice, which wasseen as an obstacleto economicgrowth.The fact thatthe Anglo-Saxoncountrieswere among the first to embrace he NPM idealsmightalso be explainedon culturalgroundsandthe inclination oheraldfree enterprisen thesecountries Peters1996).Governance,as are all models of publicservice, is derivedfromthepoliticalculturewithinwhichit is embedded.The

emergenceof governance hereforewill appear n different nsti-tutional ormsin differentnationalcontexts.NPM is much less233/J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationcontextualand less sensitivetowarddifferencesbetween uris-dictions;it is moregenericand moredirectedat changingpublic-sector valuesandpractices.Since governance s a blendingofprivateandpublic values andNPM can be describedas a uni-lateral nfusionof corporate-sector aluesandobjectives ntothepublicsectorandpublic-service roductionanddelivery,thereisnot very muchinterdependenceetweengovernanceandtheNPM. Some states have embracedone philosophy,but not both.

ThisbriefdiscussionaboutNPM andemergingmodels ofgovernanceultimatelybegs the normativessue aboutthe speci-ficity of the publicservice andthe politicalprocess. This issuerelatesto our perceptionof the publicinterestandwhatstructuresin society sustainanddefendthatinterest.If we maintain hatthepublicsector has a highdegreeof specificity,thenthatshouldlead us to acknowledge hatefficiencyin the public serviceneedsto be assessedby differentstandardshanthoseof the corporatesector. To assessprocessesguidedby primaryreference o legal-ity, equality, andlegal security n termsof theirorganizationalefficiencyis to some extent to underestimatehe consequencesofthe political andsocietalspecificityof the publicservice.GOVERNANCEAND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONTRADITIONS IN EUROPE

The emergenceof governance n the west European ontextmust be viewed against he historicalnatureof the publicadmin-istrationandstate-societyrelationshipshere.While it isobviouslyfarbeyond the scopeof this articleto offer a fullaccountof thesedevelopmentsandhow governance its intothesetraditions,we will focus on two aspects of the issue. Oneimportant imensionof the issue of how governance its Euro-peanpublicadministrations the historicalpatternsof state-societyexchanges.Anothercrucialaspect of thisproblem s theExhibitThe Emergenceof GovernanceandNew Public Management:Four Cases

GovernanceLimited Extensive

Limited Japan SwedenNPM Intermediate United States The Netherlands

Extensive New Zealand Britain


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RethinkingPublic Administrationsignificanceof legality,hierarchy,andpoliticalcontrol n thewest Europeanpublicadministrationradition.State-SocietyRelationshipsand Public Administration

In several west European tates,but mostpredominantlynsmaller ndustrialized emocracies uch as Austria,Belgium,theNetherlands, nd the Scandinavianountries,state-society ela-tionshipshistoricallyhave been shapedby a varietyof corporatistarrangements.Organizednterests, abor marketorganizations,andvoluntaryorganizationsmediated he state-societydistinctionby exercisingconsiderablepoliticalclout andinfluenceat allstagesof the policy-makingprocess(Katzenstein1984 and 1985;SchmitterandLehmbruch 979). Similar-if less pronounced-patternsof organizationalnvolvementn thepoliticalprocessarealso present n GermanyandFrance.In addition o theircorporatist-stylef policy makingandimplementation,hesecountriesalso builtcomprehensive nduniversalwelfare statesduring he postwarperiod(Esping-Andersen1990). Thesewere distinctlypoliticalprojects hatencounterediercepoliticaloppositionas theyevolved andweretoleratedby the middle class due to the universalnatureof theirprograms.Thuspublic administrationas beenchallenged hroughoutmost of thiscenturyon two fronts.One has been the inclusionoforganized nterests n the implementationf publicpolicy, whichconfronted he publicbureaucracywithpowerfulsocietalactorswithintheirorganizational omain.Managing he built-inclashbetweenthepublicinterestas it is embodied n the due processof thepublicbureaucracyn the one hand andmorenarrowlydefined societalinterestson the other has required onsiderablenegotiating kills andmutualrespect.The otherchallengehasbeentheblendingof publicadminis-tration dealsof impartiality ndlegalitywiththe implementationof welfarestateprograms.Here, theproblemhasbeennot somuchthat the welfarestateprogramspresuppose ompromisesonthose core publicadministrativealues andnormsbutrather hetask of musteringbureaucraticnthusiasm-or at leastpassivesupportor tolerance-for the welfarestate(Rothstein1996).Mainly as a resultof the exacerbatediscal crisis of the westEuropeandemocracies,market-drivendministrativeeformshave reshapedmany of the traditionaleaturesof public bureau-

cracies(Cassese1995; Derlien 1993;Pierre1993; Rouban1993;PeterssonandSoderlind1994). Thus therehas been an235/J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublic Administrationintroduction f internalmarkets,diversifiedsalary schemes,customerchoice, performancendicators,and so on. However,most of the west European tates-with Britain he significantexception-have not embracedNPMwholeheartedly.Theincreasedemphasison efficiency, and reforms mplemented othat effect, has not changed he overall structure f the publicservice or its management tyle but ratherhas been largelyimplementedwithin the existing organizationalrameworks.

Instead,several stateshave showna growinginterest nexploringnew models of cooperationbetween the state andorganized nterests.The Scandinavian ountrieshavehadincreas-ing cooperation t the local level between authorities ndvolun-taryassociationsn publicservicedelivery.The long traditionofcorporatist nvolvement n policy implementation robablyhashelped pave the way for emerging orms of governance.Suchexchangehas meantgivingthese new networksnew objectivesandroles rather handevelopingnew networksacrossthe public-privateborder.Franceappears o be an important xception o the patternof governancen west Europewe have describedabove. Themoretechnocratic, op-downstyle of policy making n Franceimpliesthat the emerginggovernance ormatmightnot be com-patible (Hayward1983; Cohen1996). There is a strongelement

of networkingwithingovernment tself, and thatcan link variouselementsof state andsocietybutcertainlynot withthe societyasa dominant lement.The long-standing ebateover the existenceof corporatismn France s one indicationof the questionablecompatibility f governancemodelsin this setting.The RechtstaatModel of Public Administrationand Governance

If the corporatist oliticalculturehas been an importantfoundation n whichgovernancehas been builtduring he 1990s,the strongtraditionof legalityand deliberation n west Europeanpublicadministration as beenan obstacleto administrativereformalongsimilar ines. Rechtstaatdeals of a highly regulatedprocess, a vertically ntegrated rganization, xtensive delibera-tion, and fair andequaltreatment re not amenable o generatingeconomiesof scale or increasing fficiency.Morethananything lse, the trade-offbetween egalityandlegal securityon the one hand andefficiencyon the otherhasbeen a complexissue. Whatmostgovernments eem to have

done is, interestingly, o simply ignore the trade-off,or alter-nativelyto displace t fromthepolicy makingto the bureaucratic236/J-PART, April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationsphere of government.Thus most of westernEuropehas seenrelaxationof budgetary input)control,growingpoliticalempha-sis on efficiencyin the publicservice, decentralizationromthestate to subnational overnment withGermanyas a slightexcep-tion), andstrongpoliticalpressureson thebureaucracyo providemore choice in theirservice. Very few of thesepolicieshaveexplicitly addressed he issue, To whatextentshouldthesereformsbe accompanied y a relaxationof traditionalRechtstaatstandards?

Competitiontrictusensu is alien to the traditionalEuropeanmodel of publicadministration,othwithinthe publicserviceandbetweenpublic- andprivate-service roviders.Allowingforsuchcompetition hereforehas causedconsiderableorganizationalproblems. In mostjurisdictions, he outcomehas been thatthestate has retaineda fairlyrigorousqualitycontrolover servicesthat havebeencontracted ut; suchcontrolhas beenbelievedtobe the most importantafeguardagainstdecliningservicestan-dards.

As we have noted, NPM has been introducedmost exten-sively in Britain.However,almost all countrieshave at leastconsideredsomemodifications n the samedirection.The patternof reformoftenhasbeen similarto thatof allowinggovernanceto replacetightgovernment ontrol;changeshavebeen morede factooperativechanges thanchangesin the normativeandlegal framework f thepublicadministration.The historyof publicadministrationn westernEurope o alarge extenthas been shapedby tensionsbetweenpoliticizationandRechtstaatdealsandbetweenuniversalismandcorporatism.Unleashing ocal governments n orderto providethe discretionnecessaryfor themto engagein partnerships, etworks,andjointventureswith key societalactorshas been an important lementof governance.Here, publicbureaucraciesn the Europeanwel-farestates can drawon considerable xpertiseandorganizational

memory;most of these stateshave seen the vast majorityofwelfarestateprograms mplementedmoreby local andregionalgovernmentshanby the state(Pierre1994; Sharpe1988).HOW DOES THE GOVERNANCEDEBATE FIT WITHPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONIN THE UNITED STATES?

The concept of governancewithoutgovernmentmay appearto fit well withthe traditionsof Americanpublicadministration.The UnitedStateshas beendescribedas a statelesssociety, lack-ing in any of the traditionsof European tates. In this typificationof the UnitedStates its government s morepoliticalthanit is a237/J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublic Administrationmanifestation f a virtuallymetaphysicalStateentity. In thatviewof Americangovernment he movement roma state-centricon-ceptionof government o a moresocietalcenteredview shouldbean easy shift of emphasis.

In addition o the apparentweaknessof Americangovern-ment, the traditionof a strongcivil societybearssome of thebruntof governing.Evenbeforeit becamefashionable,govern-mentin the UnitedStatesutilized the privatesector(bothfor-profit andnot-for-profitlements) o help make andimplementpolicy (Salamon1981; Kettl 1987). The privatesectormayhavebecomesomewhatmoreprominentn recentyears, butthe shifthas been less startling han in Europe.Indeed,the historyofresistance o andskepticismof governmentn the UnitedStatesmakes the conceptof governancewithoutgovernment oundper-fectly normal n the UnitedStates.On the otherhand,thereis a good deal of evidence thatpublicadministrationn the UnitedStates has changed ess thanithas in manyothersystems(Peters1998). The NPM philosophyhas been adopted o a lesserextentthan n Europeor the Antipo-des. This is especiallytrue of the competitivedimensionofNPM. Any modificationof administrationas been in the direc-tion of enhancedparticipationespeciallyfor memberswithingovernmentorganizations) ndinternalderegulationDiIulio

1994). The NationalPerformanceReviewemphasized he needtoreduce the degree of hierarchywithinfederalorganizations ndto"letthe managersmanage."The very absence of a strongstatetradition n the UnitedStatesappears o makemovingto the fully networkedmodelofgovernance ess likely. The generaldenigration f government,especiallythebureaucracy,makes it less likely thatthe bureau-cracywill be given the latitude o negotiateso freelywiththeprivate sector.There are somecontrary xamples, suchas theuse of negotiated ulemaking,but the generalpractice s forCongressandthe presidency o exercisesubstantial versightofthebureaucracy.The AmericanState(yes, thereis one) is somewhatpara-doxical in thecontinuedemphasison the separation f stateandsociety. The private sectoris extolledas the model of efficiencyandgood management.The recentemphasison the privatesectorin welfarereform s an indicationof the homagepaid to thatsector. Government ppearsquitewilling andoftenanxioustodivest itself of functionswheneverpossibleand to permitthe

privatesectorto do whatit cando better-almost everything nthis view. The difference rommuchof Europe s thatthereare2381J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationmanymorethingsthatAmericans onsiderappropriateor theprivatesector.

Despitethe emphasison thevirtue of private-sectormanage-mentthere is morepoliticizedcontrol andmorelegalisticcontrolover thebureaucracyhancurrentlys found in otherAnglo-Americandemocracies.Organizations re not permittedo gointocompetition or themselves; nstead,theyremainunderpolit-ical control.The assumption ppears o be thatbureaucracies renot to be trusted,andanyarrangementshey mightmakeforgovernanceare not to be trustedeither.Politicalcontrol s espe-cially importantor Congress,given thatit dependson constitu-ency serviceandparticularisticontrolover bureaucracyormuch of its politicalappeal.The one majorexceptionto thisgeneralizations the GovernmentPerformance ndResultsAct of1994, whichis beginning o implement esults-basedmanagementat the federal evel.

Although he U.S. federalgovernmentdoes not appearcom-patiblewiththe governancemodel, American ocal governmenthas adoptedmanyof its concepts. For example,the use ofpublic-private artnershipsas beenwell establishedat this levelof government Beauregard 998), andthereare well-developednetworkswithgreater nfluenceover-and even in controlof-policy thanis encountered t the national evel. There is also asensethatAmerican ocal governmenthas been morecreative nthe selectionandimplementation f policy instrumentshanistrue at the national evel.

State andlocal government lso has been morelikely toadoptthe ideas of the NPM. Indeed,OsborneandGaebler 1992)developed heirideasaboutreinventing overnmentprimarilyfromthe experienceof Californiaocal government.Manymarket-baseddeasassociatedwithNPMhavebeeneschewed atthe national evel butare already n place at the local level, andsubnational overnmentn the UnitedStates is the moremodemof the two levels of government.The federalgovernmenthas tosome extentenabled he reformof stateandlocal governmentwiththe use of blockgrants hatprovided hemwithresourcesandthe latitude o developmorecreativemeans to provideserv-ices to thepublic.Whyare local andstategovernmentsn the UnitedStatescapableof greater atitude n governingandmanagementhanisthe nationalgovernment?Oneanswer s thatlocal governmentsless delegitimatedhannationalgovernment;most surveysdemon-

strate hat ocal governments moretrusted hanis the federalgovernment.The publicis therefore ikely to concedeto this2391J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationlevel of governmenthe latitudeneeded to manageandimplementeffectivepartnerships.Further, ocal governments likely to haveclose andcontinuingnteractionswith the privatesectorin itsown area, so that theserelationshipsmayemergenaturally.Localgovernmentn the UnitedStates is thereforeoftena morepowerful actorthanis the federalgovernment,given that it isable to governboththrough raditional ommandandcontroltechniquesandthrough he less conventional ormatsassociatedwithgovernance.CONCLUSIONS:BREAKINGTHE PATH?

The debate over governancemay simplybe the academiccommunity atchingup withthe realityof the publicsector in thecontemporaryworld. Justas theremaybe for institutions,heremaybe a pathdependencyn academia.We are often so lockedinto ourtheoreticalandempiricalpathsthat it is difficult for usto recognizethe subtlechangesthatoccurover time. The archi-tects of reformhave been forcedto address hese changesmorecarefullyandmoredirectly.

Architectsof administrativeeformhave faceda complexdilemmaconcerning he degree of changethey can achieveon theone handandthe likelihoodof successfulreformon the other.Reformsthat aimat altering he normative rameworkandmodusoperandiof publicadministration,ndthusprofoundly hallengeestablishednorms andpractices,mayat best accomplishminorchanges and at worstbringto thepublicserviceconfusion,con-flict, anddiscrepanciesbetweenorganizationalultureandexternalrole expectations, huscausingstalemate.Moremoderatereforms-for example,a sequenceof incremental utconsistentchanges-are likely to bringabout ess dramatic hangebutwith-out majordysfunctional onsequences.Most importantly, eformers ncounter he pathdependencyof administrativeystemsthat we notedearlier.For example,the

emergenceof governance n westernEurope s to someextentembedded n the corporatistraditionof this politicalculture.Similarly, the hesitancy owardsNPM in most of westernEuropeis explainedby the strong egalistictraditionof thepublicadministrationhere.Suchcontrolalwayshas beenextensiveinthe UnitedStates,andyet market-baseddministrativeeformhasencounteredmuchless oppositionhere, at least in stateandlocalgovernments.Muchof this strategyof administrativeeformhasbeen the subjectof intensedebateat the federal evel. Mean-while, local governments re seemingly ess botheredby theideologicaldimensionof principlesas they forgepublic-privatecoalitions n differentareasof public-servicedelivery.Local2401J-PART,April 1998

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RethinkingPublicAdministrationgovermnents lwayshavebeen more resultsoriented n theirmodusoperandi hanhave state or federal nstitutions.

Strongstates seem to be muchless inclinedto compromisetheRechtstaatmodel of publicadministration nd seemto havemanyfewerproblemsparticipatingn governance hando weakerstates such as the UnitedStates.Thatbeing said, there is much inthe governancedebate n Europe hatspeaksto the currentdebateaboutadministrative eform n the UnitedStates. One suchthemeis the growing importance f networks,whichassumea powerfulpositionin publicpolicy makingandimplementation. or Euro-peans with theirstrongeretatisttradition, tates can entersuchcoalitionswithouthavingto fearthatthey will haveto com-promisecore political andadministrativealues. In the UnitedStates,on the otherhand,weak federalor local institutions un amuchbigger risk of cooptationor marginalizationy private-sectoractorsandinterests.

Thus,governanceandthe NPMhaveencountered ppositionin bothEuropeand the UnitedStates,although or differentreasons.In neithercase are thesereformsfully compatiblewiththe administrativeraditions f the countries hatare advisedtoimplementhesereforms. Evenwithinthe two areasthere aremarkeddifferences n the compatibility f the reforms. In theUnitedStatesthe changestendto be morecompatiblewith theethos found in local governmentshan withthat of the federalgovernment. n Europe,the Scandinavianountriesandthe lowcountrieshave hadmanyof the ideas of governancen operationfor decades,while the largerEuropean ountrieshave hadsome-what moredifficultyabsorbing heseideas andconcepts.Thus wecan see againthatno reform s likely to be universal; nsteadreformmust be matchedcarefullywith the needsand the tradi-tions of the largerpoliticalsystem.

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