green product market development strategy of mobile

Research ArticleGreen Product Market Development Strategy of Mobile NetworkGroup Buying Community: Based on Three-Party EvolutionaryGame and Simulation Analysis

Zhihong Ai

College of Modern Economics & Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Jiangxi 332020, China

Correspondence should be addressed to Zhihong Ai; [email protected]

Received 29 September 2021; Accepted 1 November 2021; Published 20 November 2021

Academic Editor: Deepak Gupta

Copyright © 2021 Zhihong Ai. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, whichpermits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

With the advent of the 5G era, the mobile network group buying community dominated by focusing on social relations showsgreat development potential. However, in the mobile network group buying community, the mixed information makes theinformation environment of the community more complex. Information asymmetry will lead to “mistakes” in consumers’choice, making it impossible for some important markets to be fully developed. Considering the gains and losses of threeinterest subjects—governments, enterprises, and consumers in the green product market under information symmetry, inthis paper, an evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises, and consumers was built. Numericalexperiments and simulation were performed using SciPy, a scientific computing library of Python, to study the mainfactors influencing the healthy development of the green product market. The research results showed under informationsymmetry, when the governments’ benefit from increased government credibility was higher than the cost of governmentsfor screening the information of enterprises’ products and identifying the green products, the expected fine of enterprisesfor producing high carbon products was higher than the difference between the actual cost increment and the actualincome increment of enterprises for producing green products, and the utility perception of consumers from purchasinggreen products was higher than the cost of consumers for purchasing green products, the three-party game would evolveto a socially ideal stable state. The above conclusions provide useful policy suggestions for governments to vigorouslydevelop the green product market.

1. Introduction

Green economy arouses wide concern among countriesaround the world amid growing environmental pollution,ecological environmental degradation, and global warming.In 2016, the State Council issued the opinions on establish-ing unified green product standards, certification, and iden-tification system, which means that China is substantiallypromoting the certification and identification system of“Chinese green products.” Green product refers to the prod-uct with low toxicity and little harm, health and safety, andgood ecological effects, which can reduce energy consump-tion and pollutant emissions [1]. The development of green

economy boosts people’s demand for green products. How-ever, information asymmetry prevents enterprises fromclearly conveying the attributes of their products and con-sumers from accurately distinguishing the green products.The “profit-driven” producers of high carbon products tendto provide false information for the low production cost ofhigh carbon products, seriously hindering the developmentof the green product market.

Information asymmetry refers to the different productinformation owned by both the buyer and the seller in theincomplete informationmarket, which hinders the buyer frommaking right choices, thus affecting the transaction behaviorand market efficiency [2]. Especially information asymmetry

HindawiWireless Communications and Mobile ComputingVolume 2021, Article ID 4746723, 11 pageshttps://doi.org/10.1155/2021/4746723

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https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/4746723

in the green product market will lead to so many “mistakes” inconsumers’ choice that they will buy so-called “green prod-ucts” damaging their health, such as the fake “green pork”incident of Wal-Mart exposed in 2011. It is difficult for thegreen product market to be formed and fully developed asconsumers cannot accurately identify the key information ofgreen products; so, governments need to control, identify,and disclose the information of green products and standard-ize the development of the green product market.

In the process of formation and development of the greenproduct market, governments, enterprises, and consumersinteract with one another. Enterprises, the supplier of greenproducts, lack the enthusiasm to produce green productsbecause of their high production cost and large number offalse green products in the market. Consumers, the demanderof green products, lose confidence in the green productmarketfor paying high prices for fake green products resulting frominformation asymmetry. As a result, governments shouldidentify and disclose the information of green products as anauthority, which will play a crucial role in the formation anddevelopment of the green product market.

In recent years, scholars have conducted indepthresearch on the behavior of relevant stakeholders in thegreen product market. Liu [2] used the mathematical modelto study the impact of information asymmetry on the greenproduct market based on the relationship between manufac-turers and consumers. Yan and Yu [3] used the imperfectinformation dynamic game theory to study the process ofprice game between producers and consumers in the greenproduct market. Sun and Yu [4] analyzed the role of govern-ment subsidies in the development of green products usingthe two-stage game model. Liu et al. [5] analyzed the impactof environmental regulation and government subsidies onthe production of green products of enterprises using thepanel threshold model. However, there are deficiencies inthe above studies. For example, some scholars studied thebehavior of producers and consumers in the market usinggame models, but they ignored the key role of governmentsin the development of the green product market; somescholars took into account the role of governments by ana-lyzing the impact of government subsidies on the productionof green products of enterprises, but they ignored the impacton consumers. Therefore, in this paper, an evolutionarygame model involving governments, enterprises, and con-sumers was built to discuss the factors of formation anddevelopment of the green product market that influencesthe socially ideal stable state where governments chose thestrategy of information symmetry, enterprises chose thestrategy of producing green products, and consumers chosethe strategy of purchasing green products, with a view toproviding feasible suggestions for cultivating green productsand developing green economy in China.

2. Hypothesis and Construction of the Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model

Evolutionary game theory is to study the evolutionary stablestate (ESS) of game groups in a competitive environment ofsurvival of the fittest based on the hypothesis of bounded

rational man [6, 7]. Referring to the game assumptions ofCheng et al. [8], Xu and Lv [9], and Yu and Hu [10], thispaper built an evolutionary game model involving govern-ments, enterprises, and consumers.

To cultivate green industries, develop green economy,and protect ecological environment, governments need tosearch, identify, and publicly verify the information of greenproducts in the trading market. Their behavior strategyspace was (information symmetry, information asymmetry),with the probability of ðx, 1 − xÞ, respectively. “Informationsymmetry” means governments identify and publicly verifythe information of green products, which can help enter-prises clearly convey the attributes of green products, andconsumers accurately distinguish the green products andpunish the high carbon products. Enterprises gain reputa-tion by producing green products that requires huge costsand faces many uncertainty risks, and their production strat-egy is greatly influenced by the depth and breadth of govern-ments’ information disclosure and consumers’ strategy ofpurchasing green products. Their behavior strategy spacewas producing (green products, high carbon products), withthe probability of ðy, 1 − yÞ, respectively. Consumers choosethe strategy according to the purchase cost of green productsand their utility perception from purchasing green products.Their behavior strategy space was (purchasing, not purchas-ing) green products, with the probability of ðz, 1 − zÞ, respec-tively. Conforming to the hypothesis of bounded rationalman, the three-party game players constantly changed theirown strategy in the game so that the three-party game finallyevolved to an evolutionary stable state (ESS). A game treemodel of behavior strategy spaces of the three-party gameplayers was built, as shown in Figure 1.

When choosing the strategy of information symmetry,governments will pay a cost Cg for screening the informa-tion of enterprises’ products such as R & D and production,transportation and distribution, material procurement, andidentifying the green products, get a fine Fe from illegalenterprises, and gain a benefit Ug from increased govern-ment credibility. When choosing the strategy of informationasymmetry, governments will pay a cost Fg for being pun-ished by higher authorities or losing credibility because ofenterprises producing high carbon products.

When choosing the strategy of producing green prod-ucts, enterprises will pay an additional cost Ce such as R &D cost and uncertainty cost for producing green products,gain a market return Ue1 from producing green products,and get an additional benefit Ue from producing green prod-ucts, such as improved enterprise reputation for gainingconsumer recognition. When choosing the strategy of pro-ducing high carbon products, enterprises will gain a marketreturn Ue2 from producing high carbon products, also thecost of consumers for purchasing high carbon products,and pay a fine Fe for producing high carbon products underinformation symmetry.

When choosing the strategy of purchasing green prod-ucts, consumers will pay a cost Ue1, get the utility percep-tion Uc such as physical health and psychologicalsatisfaction from purchasing green products, and gain anadditional benefit Ugc from improved consumer confidence

2 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

in the market products under information symmetry.Drawing on the views of Xu et al. [11], under the conditionof information asymmetry, consumers are at a disadvantageand lack of understanding whether the purchased productsare green products, which has hit consumers’ purchaseenthusiasm. If choosing green products, consumers canobtain the utility perception At the same time, pay a costUe1. When choosing the strategy of purchasing high carbonproducts, consumers will pay a cost Ue2, an additional costCc such as physical damage and psychological damage frompurchasing high carbon products, and a negative impactCgc such as environmental pollution from enterprises pro-ducing high-carbon products on consumers. The parame-ters of the three-party game players are shown in Table 1.According to the above assumptions and parameter set-tings, a payoff matrix of the three-party game players wasobtained, as shown in Table 2.

3. Equilibrium Analysis of the EvolutionaryBehaviors of the Three-Party Game Players

3.1. Expected Benefits of the Three-Party Game Players.According to Table 2, the expected benefits of the three-party game players were obtained:

Governments’ expected benefit when choosing the strat-egy of “information symmetry,” expected benefit whenchoosing the strategy of “information asymmetry,” and aver-age expected benefit were expressed as Eg1, Eg2, and Eg,respectively:

Eg1 = yz Ug − Cg

� �+ y 1 − zð Þ Ug − Cg

� �

+ 1 − yð Þz Ug − Cg + Fe

� �

+ 1 − yð Þ 1 − zð Þ Ug − Cg + Fe

� �,

Eg2 = 1 − yð Þz −Fg

� �+ 1 − yð Þ 1 − zð Þ −Fg

� �,

Eg = xEg1 + 1 − xð ÞEg2: ð1Þ

Enterprises’ expected benefit when choosing the strategyof producing “green products,” expected benefit when

choosing the strategy of producing “high carbon products,”and average expected benefit were expressed as Ee1, Ee2,and Ee, respectively:

Ee1 = xz Ue1 +Ue − Ceð Þ + x 1 − zð Þ Ue − Ceð Þ+ 1 − xð Þz Ue1 +Ue − Ceð Þ+ 1 − zð Þ 1 − xð Þ Ue − Ceð Þ,

Ee2 = xz Ue2 − Feð Þ + x 1 − zð Þ −Feð Þ + 1 − xð ÞzUe2,

Ee = yEe1 + 1 − yð ÞEe2: ð2Þ

Consumers’ expected benefit when choosing the strategyof “purchasing” green products, expected benefit whenchoosing the strategy of “not purchasing” green products,and average expected benefit were expressed as Ec1, Ec2,and Ec, respectively:

Ec1 = xy Uc +Ugc −Ue1� �

+ x 1 − yð Þ Ugc −Ue2 − Cc − Cgc

� �

+ 1 − xð Þy Uc −Ue1ð Þ+ 1 − xð Þ 1 − yð Þ −Ue2 − Cc − Cgc

� �,

Ec2 = xyUgc + x 1 − yð Þ Ugc − Cgc

� �

+ 1 − xð Þ 1 − yð Þ −Cgc

� �,

Ec = zEc1 + 1 − zð ÞEc2: ð3Þ

3.2. Replicated Dynamic Analysis of the Three-Party GamePlayers

(1) The replicated dynamic equation for governments tochoose the strategy of information symmetry was

F xð Þ = dx/dt = x Eg1 − Eg

� �

= x x − 1ð Þ y Fg − Fe

� �− Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �� :

ð4Þ

Government

Enterprises Enterprises

Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises

Informationsymmetry

Informationasymmetry

Greenproducts

Greenproducts

High carbonproducts

High carbonproducts

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Purchase Purchase Purchase Purchase

Notpurchase

Notpurchase

Notpurchase

Notpurchase

Figure 1: Game tree model of behavior strategy spaces of the three-party game players.

3Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

According to the stability theorem of replicated dynamicequation and a stable strategy, x should meet FðxÞ = 0,且F ′ðxÞ < 0.

If y = ðFg − Fe − Cg +UgÞ/ðFg − FeÞ, then FðxÞ ≡ 0; thatis, any strategy of governments was a stable strategy.

If y ≠ ðFg − Fe − Cg +UgÞ/ðFg − FeÞ,set FðxÞ = 0, andthen x = 0 and x = 1, two quasievolutionary stability points,were obtained. The following equation was obtained by tak-ing derivative of FðxÞ:

F ′ xð Þ = 2x − 1ð Þ y Fg − Fe

� �− Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �� : ð5Þ

If y > ðFg − Fe − Cg +UgÞ/ðFg − FeÞ, then ðF ′ðxÞjx=0Þ < 0and ðF ′ðxÞjx=1Þ > 0; so, x = 0 was a stable strategy; if y < ðFg

− Fe − Cg +UgÞ/ðFg − FeÞ, then ðF ′ðxÞjx=0Þ > 0 and ðF ′ðxÞjx=1Þ < 0; so, x = 1 was a stable strategy. This showed thatthe strategy selection of governments was closely related to thatof enterprises. When the proportion of enterprises choosing thestrategy of producing green products was higher than ðFg −Fe − Cg +UgÞ/ðFg − FeÞ, governments will choose the strategyof information asymmetry for effective use of social resources;when the proportion was lower than ðFg − Fe − Cg +UgÞ/ðFg − FeÞ, and governments will choose the strategy of informa-tion symmetry.

Figure 2 shows the strategy proportion x of governmentswas only related to that y of enterprises, but not to that z ofconsumers; that is, governments will not decide whether tochoose the strategy of information symmetry based on con-sumers’ willingness to purchase enterprises’ products.

(2) The replicated dynamic equation for enterprises tochoose the strategy of producing green products was

F yð Þ = dy/dt = y Ee1 − Ee

� �= y 1 − yð Þ z Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ − Ce − xFe −Ueð Þ½ �:

ð6Þ

If z = ðCe − xFe −UeÞ/ðUe1 −Ue2Þ, then FðyÞ ≡ 0; that is,any strategy of enterprises was a stable strategy.

If z ≠ ðCe − xFe −UeÞ/ðUe1 −Ue2Þ, set FðyÞ = 0, and theny = 0 and y = 1, two quasievolutionary stability points, wereobtained. The following equation was obtained by takingderivative of FðyÞ:

F ′ yð Þ = 1 − 2yð Þ z Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ − Ce − xFe −Ueð Þ½ �: ð7Þ

With Ue1 >Ue2, that is, enterprises can obtain higherbenefit from producing green products, and Ce −Ue consid-ered as the actual production cost of enterprises for greenproducts, there were two different situations:

If xFe > Ce −Ue or zðUe1 −Ue2Þ > ðCe −UeÞ, then ðF ′ðyÞjy=0Þ > 0, ðF ′ðyÞjy=1Þ < 0, y = 1, was a stable strategy.This showed that if the fine of enterprises for producing highcarbon products was higher than the actual production costof enterprises for green products, enterprises will choose thestrategy of producing green products.

If the above conditions were not met, there were two sit-uations: if z > ðCe − xFe −UeÞ/ðUe1 −Ue2Þ, then ðF ′ðyÞjy=0Þ > 0, ðF ′ðyÞjy=1Þ < 0; so, y = 1 was a stable strategy; that is,enterprises will choose the strategy of producing green prod-ucts; if z < ðCe − xFe −UeÞ/ðUe1 −Ue2Þ, then ðF ′ðyÞjy=0Þ >0, ðF ′ðyÞjy=1Þ < 0, y = 0, was a stable strategy; that is, enter-prises will choose the strategy of producing high carbonproducts. This showed the strategy selection of enterpriseswas related to that of both governments and consumers.

Table 1: Parameters and their meanings of the three-party game players.

Parameters Meanings

CgCost of governments for screening the information of enterprises’ products and identifying the green products under

information symmetry

Ug Benefit of governments from increased government credibility under information symmetry

FgCost of governments for being punished by higher authorities or losing credibility because of enterprises producing high

carbon products under information asymmetry

Ce Additional cost of enterprises such as R & D cost and uncertainty cost for producing green products

Ue1 Market return of enterprises from producing green products, also the cost of consumers for purchasing green products

UeAdditional benefit of enterprises from producing green products (such as improved enterprise reputation for gaining

consumer recognition)

Ue2Market return of enterprises from producing high carbon products, also the cost of consumers for purchasing high carbon

products

Fe Fine of enterprises for producing high carbon products under information symmetry

Uc Utility perception (physical health, psychological satisfaction) of consumers from purchasing green products

Ugc Additional benefit of consumers from improved consumer confidence in the market products under information symmetry

Cc Additional cost (physical damage, psychological damage) of consumers from purchasing high carbon products

Cgc Negative impact (environmental pollution) of enterprises producing high-carbon products on consumers


Table2:

Payoff

matrixof

thethree-partygameplayers.

Gam

eplayers

Con

sumers

Purchasing

Not

purchasing

Governm

ents

Inform

ationsymmetry

Enterprises

Green

prod

uct

Ug−Cg

Ue1+U

e−Ce

Uc+U

gc−U

e1U

g−Cg

Ue−Ce

Ugc

Highcarbon

prod

ucts

Ug−Cg+Fe

Ue2−Fe

Ugc−U

e2−Cc−Cgc

Ug−Cg+Fe

−Fe

Ugc−Cgc

Inform

ationasym

metry

Enterprises

Green

prod

uct

0U

e1+U

e−Ce

Uc−U

e10

Ue−Ce

0

Highcarbon

prod

ucts

−Fg

Ue2

−Ue2−Cc−Cgc

−Fg

0−C

gc


Figure 2 shows the strategy proportion x of governmentswas only related to that y of enterprises, but not to that z ofconsumers, t.

Figure 3 shows the strategy proportion y of enterpriseswas related to both x of governments and z of consumers.In other words, the factors affecting enterprises’ strategywere complex and multifaceted, which further showed theinteraction among governments, enterprises, and consumersshould be comprehensively taken into account in the forma-tion and development of the green product market.

(3) The replicated dynamic equation for consumers tochoose the strategy of purchasing green productswas

F zð Þ = dz/dt = z Ec1 − Ec

� �

= z 1 − zð Þ y Uc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Ccð Þ − Ue2 + Ccð Þ½ �:ð8Þ

If y = ðUe2 + CcÞ/ðUc −Ue1 +Ue2 + CcÞ, then FðzÞ ≡ 0;that is, any strategy of consumers was a stable strategy.

If y ≠ ðUe2 + CcÞ/ðUc −Ue1 +Ue2 + CcÞ, set FðzÞ = 0, andthen z = 0 and z = 1, two quasievolutionary stability points,were obtained. The following equation was obtained by tak-ing derivative of FðzÞ:

F ′ zð Þ = 1 − 2zð Þ y Uc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Ccð Þ − Ue2 + Ccð Þ½ �: ð9Þ

With Ue2 + Cc > 0, ðUc −Ue1 +Ue2 + CcÞ = ½Uc − ðUe1 −Ue2− CcÞ�, considered as the difference between the utility per-ception of consumers from purchasing green products andthe additional cost, there were two different situations:

If ½Uc − ðUe1 −Ue2 − CcÞ� < 0 and yðUc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Cc

Þ − ðUe2 + CcÞ < 0, then ðF ′ðzÞjz=0Þ < 0, ðF ′ðzÞjz=1Þ > 0; so, z= 0 was a stable strategy. This showed if the utility percep-tion of consumers from purchasing green products waslower than the additional cost, consumers will choose thestrategy of not purchasing green products.

If ½Uc − ðUe1 −Ue2 − CcÞ� > 0 and y > ðUe2 + CcÞ/ðUc −Ue1 +Ue2 + CcÞ, then ðF ′ðzÞjz=0Þ > 0, ðF ′ðzÞjz=1Þ < 0; so, z =1; that is, purchasing green products was a stable strategy; if ½Uc − ðUe1 −Ue2 − CcÞ� > 0 and y < ðUe2 + CcÞ/ðUc −Ue1 +Ue2 + CcÞ, then ðF ′ðzÞjz=0Þ < 0, ðF ′ðzÞjz=1Þ > 0; so, z = 0; thatis, not purchasing green products was a stable strategy. It indi-cated when the utility perception of consumers from purchas-ing green products was large enough, the behavior strategy ofconsumers will depend on the probability of enterpriseschoosing to produce green products, that is, whether it washigher than ðUe2 + CcÞ/ðUc −Ue1 +Ue2 + CcÞ.

Figure 4 shows the strategy proportion z of consumerswas only related to that y of enterprises, but not to that xof governments.

3.3. Evolutionary Stability Analysis of the Three-Party Game.According to the evolutionary stability analysis of Friedman[6], the evolutionary stable strategy of the three-party gameplayers can be judged by DetJ > 0 and TrJ < 0. The Jacobianmatrix was obtained by taking partial derivatives of (4), (6),and (8) about x, y, and z, respectively:

1

1

1

y

x

y⁎

1,1

0

0y⁎ > (Fg–Fe–Cg+Ug) / (Fg–Fe), x

y⁎ < (Fg–Fe–Cg+Ug) / (Fg–Fe), x

Figure 2: Schematic diagram of the dynamic evolution ofgovernments’ strategy.

0

1

1 x

y

1

0

1z > (Ce–xFe–Ue) / (Ue1–Ue2), y

z < (Ce–xFe–Ue) / (Ue1–Ue2), y

Figure 3: Schematic diagram of the dynamic evolution ofenterprises’ strategy

1

1

z

yy⁎

1,1

0

z 1Ue2+Cc

(Uc–Ue1+Ue2+Cc)[Uc –(Ue1–Ue2–Cc)]>0 and y⁎>

z 0Ue2+Cc

(Uc–Ue1+Ue2+Cc)[Uc –(Ue1–Ue2–Cc)]>0 and y⁎>

Figure 4: Schematic diagram of the dynamic evolution ofconsumers’ strategy.


J =

∂F xð Þ∂x

∂F xð Þ∂y

∂F xð Þ∂z

∂F yð Þ∂x

∂F yð Þ∂y

∂F yð Þ∂z

∂F zð Þ∂x

∂F zð Þ∂y

∂F zð Þ∂z

2666666664

3777777775=

J11 J12 J13

J21 J22 J23

J31 J32 J33

2664

3775,

ð10Þ

where

J11 = 2x − 1ð Þ y½ Fg − Fe

� �− Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �,

J12 = x x − 1ð Þ Fg − Fe

� �,

J13 = 0,

J21 = 0,

J22 = 1 − 2yð Þ z Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ − Ce − xFe −Ueð Þ½ �,J23 = y 1 − yð Þ Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ,

J31 = 0,

J32 = z 1 − zð Þ Uc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Ccð Þ,J33 = 1 − 2zð Þ y Uc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Ccð Þ − Ue2 + Ccð Þ½ �,

ð11Þ

so that

DetJ = 2x − 1ð Þ y Fg − Fe

� �Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� ��

� 1 − 2yð Þ z Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ − Ce − xFe −Ueð Þ½ �f� 1 − 2zð Þ y Uc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Ccð Þ − Ue2 + Ccð Þ½ �− z 1 − zð Þ Uc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Ccð Þy 1 − yð Þ Ue1 −Ue2ð Þg,

TrJ = 2x − 1ð Þ y Fg − Fe

� �− Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� ��

� 1 − 2yð Þ z Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ − Ce − xFe −Ueð Þ½ �� 1 − 2zð Þ y Uc −Ue1 +Ue2 + Ccð Þ − Ue2 + Ccð Þ½ �:

ð12Þ

The evolutionary stability of the three-party game sys-tem is shown in Table 3.

4. Model Simulation and Sensitivity Analysis

4.1. Case Simulation. This paper is aimed at promoting theevolution of the three-party game to an ideal stable state.According to Equations (4), (6), (8), and Table 3, Ug > Cg

can make x show a trend of monotonic increasing and evolv-ing to x⟶ 1. Thus, the evolutionary conditions can bemaintained by limiting the initial threshold of x, makingthe three-party game evolve to (1,1,1). If x = 0:4, that is,the superior government required 40% of governments inthe region to choose the strategy of information symmetryas the lower limit, the three-party game will eventuallyevolve to a socially ideal stable state, as shown in Table 4.

Because the python scientific computing library SciPy has amore convenient 3D drawing toolkit and computing ecology,numerical experiments and simulation were performed usingSciPy, a scientific computing library of Python, to verify theabove inferences. If the initial parameter setting met Ug > Cg,xFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc >Ue1, then the gamemay eventually evolve to a socially ideal stable state where allthe three parties chose an active strategy. So, the following initialvalues were set: Fg = 70, Fe = 60, Cg = 40, Ug = 80, Ce = 70,Ue = 65, Ue1 = 100, Ue2 = 40, Cc = 40, and Uc = 200.Thispaper verified the strategy selection of the three-party gameplayers under the premise that the lower limit of proportionof governments choosing the strategy of information symmetrywas x = 0:4. In Figure 5, the initial values x = 0:4, y = 0:6, andz = 0:7, and x = 0:5, y = 0:5, and z = 0:3 were taken for anexample, respectively. The simulation results showed thethree-party game eventually evolved to a socially ideal stablestate of (1, 1, 1), verifying the inference.

Evolutionary results are as follows: x⟶ 1, y⟶ 1, andz⟶ 1.

Restrictive conditions are as follows: Ug > Cg, xFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc >Ue1.

Figure 5 shows under information symmetry, when thebenefit of governments from increased government credibil-ity was higher than the cost of governments for screening theinformation of enterprises’ products and identifying thegreen products Ug > Cg, the expected fine of enterprisesfor producing high carbon products was higher than the dif-ference between the actual cost increment and the actualincome increment of enterprises for producing green prod-ucts xFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and the utility percep-tion of consumers from table purchasing green productswas higher than the cost of consumers for purchasing greenproducts Uc >Ue1, the three-party game would evolve to asocially ideal stable state where governments chose the strat-egy of information symmetry, enterprises chose the strategyof producing green products, and consumers chose the strat-egy of purchasing green products.

4.2. Sensitivity Analysis. In order to explore the influence ofdifferent parameters on the formation and healthy develop-ment of the green product market, this paper analyzed thesensitivity of some parameters to study the influence ofchange in restrictive conditions on the evolution trajectoryof the three-party game players.

Situation 1: set Cg = 65 and Ug = 60, and parameter set-ting met the evolution conditions of Ug < Cg, xFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc >Ue1. In Figure 6, the three-party game eventually evolved to a stable state of (0, 1, 1),verifying the inference.


Restrictive conditions are as follows: Ug < Cg, xFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc >Ue1.Figure 6 shows whenparameter conditions changed, that is, when the benefit ofgovernments from increased government credibility waslower than the cost of governments for screening the infor-mation of enterprises’ products and identifying the green


Table 3: Local stability analysis of the equilibrium points.

Equilibrium points DetJ TrJ0, 0, 0ð Þ − Ue2 + Ccð Þ Ue − Ceð Þ Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �− Ue2 + Ccð Þ + Ue − Ceð Þ + Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �

0, 0, 1ð Þ Ue2 + Ccð Þ Ue − Ce +Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �Cc + Ue − Ce +Ue1ð Þ + Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �

0, 1, 0ð Þ − Ce −Ueð Þ Cg −Ug

� �Uc −Ue1ð Þ Ce −Ueð Þ − Cg −Ug

� �+ Uc −Ue1ð Þ

0, 1, 1ð Þ − Cg −Ug

� �Uc −Ue1ð Þ Ue − Ce +Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ − Cg −Ug

� �−Uc − Ue − Ce −Ue2ð Þ

1, 0, 0ð Þ − Ue2 + Ccð Þ Ce − Fe −Ueð Þ Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �− Ue2 + Ccð Þ − Ce − Fe −Ueð Þ − Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �

1, 0, 1ð Þ Ue2 + Ccð Þ Ce − Fe −Ue −Ue1 +Ue2ð Þ Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �Cc − Ce − Fe −Ue −Ue1ð Þ − Fg − Fe − Cg +Ug

� �

1, 1, 0ð Þ − Cg −Ug

� �Uc −Ue1ð Þ Fe +Ue − Ceð Þ Cg −Ug

� �+ Uc −Ue1ð Þ − Fe +Ue − Ceð Þ

1, 1, 1ð Þ Cg −Ug

� �Uc −Ue1ð Þ Ce − Fe −Ue −Ue1 +Ue2ð Þ Cg −Ug

� �−Uc + Ce − Fe −Ue +Ue2ð Þ

Table 4: Socially ideal stable state of the three-party game model for enterprises’ green product innovation.

Strategy behaviors of game players Parameter conditions Trends of probability change

Governments choosing the strategy of information symmetry Ug > Cg x⟶ 1

Enterprises choosing the strategy of producing green products xFe > Ce −Ueð Þ − Ue1 −Ue2ð Þ½ � y⟶ 1

Consumers choosing the strategy of purchasing green products Uc >Ue1 z⟶ 1

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6x

x = 0.4, y = 0.6, z = 0.7 x = 0.5, y = 0.5, z = 0.3

0.8

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

x

0.81.0 1.00.00.2

0.40.6

0.8

Y

1.0

0.00.2

0.40.6

0.8

Y

1.00.700.750.800.850.900.951.00 1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

Figure 5: Evolutionary path diagram of the three-party game system.

0.00.2

0.40.6

x

x = 0.4, y = 0.6, z = 0.7 x = 0.5, y = 0.5, z = 0.3

0.8

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6x

0.81.0 1.00.0

0.20.4

0.60.8

Y

1.0

0.00.2

0.40.6

0.8

Y

1.00.700.750.800.850.900.951.00 1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4



products Ug < Cg, the expected fine of enterprises for pro-ducing high carbon products was higher than the differencebetween the actual cost increment and the actual incomeincrement of enterprises for producing green products xFe> ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and the utility perception ofconsumers from purchasing green products was higher thanthe cost of consumers for purchasing green products Uc >Ue1, the three-party game would evolve to a stable statewhere governments chose the strategy of information asym-metry, enterprises chose the strategy of producing greenproducts, and consumers chose the strategy of purchasinggreen products.

Situation 2: set Ue1 = 150,Uc = 100, and parameter set-ting met the evolution conditions of Ug > Cg, xFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc <Ue1. In Figure 7, the three-party game eventually evolved to a stable state of (1, 1, 0),verifying the inference.

Evolutionary results are as follows: x⟶ 1, y⟶ 1, andz⟶ 0..

Restrictive conditions are as follows: Ug > Cg, xFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc <Ue1.

Figure 7 shows when parameter conditions changed, thatis, when the benefit of governments from increased govern-

ment credibility was higher than the cost of governments forscreening the information of enterprises’ products and identi-fying the green products Ug > Cg, the expected fine of enter-prises for producing high carbon products was higher thanthe difference between the actual cost increment and the actualincome increment of enterprises for producing green productsxFe > ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, the utility perception of con-sumers from purchasing green products was lower than thecost of consumers for purchasing green products Uc <Ue1,the three-party game would evolve to a stable state where gov-ernments chose the strategy of information symmetry, enter-prises chose the strategy of producing green products, andconsumers chose the strategy of not purchasing green prod-ucts. This also showed consumers pay more attention to thegains and losses of their own interests than green consumptionin the spotlight when choosing to purchase green products,and consumers with higher green value perception are morewilling to purchase green products.

Situation 3: set Fe = 20, Ce = 100, Ue = 30, Ue1 = 60, andUe2 = 50, and parameter setting met the evolution condi-tions of Ug > Cg, xFe < ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc >Ue1. In Figure 8, the three-party game eventually evolvedto a stable state of (1, 0, 0), verifying the inference.

0.00.2

0.4 0.6x

0.81.0 0.0

0.20.4

0.60.8

Y

1.00.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

x = 0.4, y = 0.6, z = 0.7 x = 0.5, y = 0.5, z = 0.3

0.00.2

0.4 0.6x

0.81.0 0.0

0.20.4

0.60.8

Y

1.00.000.050.100.150.200.250.30


0.00.2

0.40.6

x

x = 0.5, y = 0.5, z = 0.3 x = 0.4, y = 0.6, z = 0.7

0.8

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

x

0.81.0 1.00.0

0.20.4

0.60.8

Y

1.00.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.00.2

0.40.6

0.8

Y

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.40.20.0




Restrictive conditions are as follows: Ug > Cg, xFe < ½ðCe −UeÞ − ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, and Uc >Ue1.

Figure 8 shows when parameter conditions changed, thatis, when the expected fine of enterprises for producing highcarbon products was lower than the difference between theactual cost increment and the actual income increment ofenterprises for producing green products xFe < ½ðCe −UeÞ− ðUe1 −Ue2Þ�, no matter whether the utility perception ofconsumers from purchasing green products was higher thanthe cost of consumers for purchasing green products, con-sumers will chose the strategy of not purchasing green prod-ucts, suggesting a long-term production of high carbonproducts by enterprises is unrealistic.

5. Conclusions and Suggestions

In view of the difficulties in the formation and healthy devel-opment of Chinese green product market, in this paper, anevolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises,and consumers was built. And numerical experiments andsimulation were performed. The research results showed therelation between the governments’ benefit from increased gov-ernment credibility and the cost of governments for screeningthe information of enterprises’ products and identifying thegreen products, between the expected fine of enterprises forproducing high carbon products and the difference betweenthe actual cost increment and the actual income incrementof enterprises for producing green products, as well as thegains and losses of consumers from purchasing green productsplayed a decisive role in the healthy development of the greenproduct market. The above conclusions provide useful policysuggestions for governments to vigorously develop the greenproduct market. In order to promote the healthy developmentof Chinese green product market, the following suggestionswere drawn:

(1) Take measures to reduce the cost of governments foridentifying the green products. Through extensiveparticipation of all kinds of nongovernmental orga-nizations such as the public and media in supervis-ing the production process of green products ofenterprises, establish and improve the mechanismsof industry collection, information disclosure, andsocial supervision and reduce the identification andcertification fees of governments. Through theindepth cooperation among governments, indus-tries, universities, and research institutes, establish aunified green product information platform for useand collection by the whole society

(2) Strengthen policy support for the R & D and produc-tion, transportation and distribution, consumption,and procurement of green products of enterprises,increase subsidies for green manufacturing, andgreen procurement to effectively reduce the burdenof enterprises producing green products. Strictlyimplement the main responsibility of producers for

product quality, establish a joint punishment mech-anism for those who are serious trust breaking, andestablish a blacklist system for enterprises violatinglaws and regulations

(3) Vigorously carry out the public welfare publicity ofgreen products through the media, network and socialpublicity, spread the theory of green development,guide the green lifestyle, and improve the utility per-ception of consumers from purchasing green prod-ucts. Affect consumers’ negative attitude towardsenvironmental crisis by truly reporting the harm ofproduction of high carbon products. Reduce the pur-chase cost of green products through various means(such as guidance and support) and popularize thegreen consumption pattern

Data Availability

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current studyare available from the corresponding author on reasonablerequest.

Conflicts of Interest

It is declared by the author that this article is free of conflictof interest.

Acknowledgments

This study was supported by the Science and Technology Pro-ject of the Education Department of Jiangxi Province“Research on the Improvement of Absorption Capacity ofLatecomer Enterprises from the Perspective of Global-LocalInnovation Network” (GJJ209201), Humanities and SocialScience Project of Universities in Jiangxi Province “Influenceand Action Mechanism of Innovative Network TechnologyDiversification on Enterprise Innovation under the Back-ground of High-quality Development” (GL20155), Preferen-tial Funding of Postdoctoral Research Projects in JiangxiProvince “Double Embedding of Knowledge Network andEnterprise Transformation and Upgrading” (2019KY37),and Daily Funding for Postdoctoral Researchers in JiangxiProvince “Cross-border Search, Absorption Capacity andInnovation Performance Research of Technological Smalland Medium-sized Enterprises” (2018RC28).

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