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Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a PersonAuthor(s): Harry G. FrankfurtSource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan. 14, 1971), pp. 5-20Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHYVOLUME LXVIII, NO. I, JANUARY I4, I97I

FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND THE CONCEPTOF A PERSON

HAT philosophershave lately come to accept as analy-W sis oftheconcept fa persons notactuallynalysis fthatconceptat all. Strawson,whoseusage representshe

current tandard, dentifies he concept of a person as the con-ceptof a typeofentity uch thatbothpredicates scribing tatesofconsciousness nd predicates scribing orporealcharacteristics..are equally applicable to a single ndividualolf hatsingle type.

But thereare manyentitiesbesidespersonsthat have bothmentaland physicalproperties.As it happens-though it seemsextraordi-narythat thisshould be so-there is no commonEnglishword forthe typeof entity trawsonhas in mind, a typethat includesnotonly human beings but animals of various lesserspecies as well.Still,thishardly ustifies hemisappropriation f a valuable philo-sophicalterm.

Whether hemembers f some animalspeciesarepersons s surely

not to be settledmerelybydetermining hethert is correct o ap-ply to them, n additionto predicates scribing orporealcharacter-istics,predicatesthat ascribe states of consciousness. t does vio-lence to our language to endorsethe applicationof the term per-son' to thosenumerouscreatureswhichdo have bothpsychologicaland materialpropertiesbut which are manifestly ot personsinany normalsenseof theword.This misuseoflanguage is doubtlessinnocent fanytheoretical rror.But although heoffenses merely

' P. F. Strawson, ndividuals (London: Methuen, 1959),pp.

101-102.Ayer'susage of 'person' is similar: it is characteristic f persons in this sense that be-

sides having various physicalproperties . . they are also creditedwith variousformsof consciousness [A. J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person (New York: St.Martin's, 1963), p. 82]. What concerns Strawson and Ayer is the problem ofunderstandingthe relation between mind and body, rather than the quite dif-ferentproblem of understandingwhat it is to be a creature that not only hasa mind and a body but is also a person.

5








6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

verbal, t does significant arm. For it gratuitously iminishes urphilosophicalvocabulary, nd it increasesthe likelihood thatwe

will overlookthe important rea of inquirywith which the term'person' is mostnaturally ssociated. t might have been expectedthatno problemwould be ofmorecentral nd persistent oncern ophilosophers han that of understandingwhat we ourselvesessen-tially re. Yet thisproblem s so generally eglected hat thas beenpossible to make offwith its veryname almostwithoutbeing no-ticedand,evidently, ithout voking nywidespread eeling floss.

There is a sense in whichtheword person'is merely he singu-

lar form f people' and in whichbothterms onnoteno morethanmembership n a certainbiological species. In thosesenses of thewordwhichare of greaterphilosophicalinterest, owever, he cri-teria forbeing a persondo not serveprimarily o distinguish hemembersof our own species fromthe membersof other species.Rather, they re designed to capture thoseattributeswhichare thesubject of our mosthumane concernwithourselves nd thesourceof what we regardas most important nd mostproblematical nour lives. Now theseattributeswould be ofequal significanceo useven if theywerenot in factpeculiar and commonto themembersofour own species.What interests s most n thehumanconditionwould not interest s less if it were also a feature f the conditionofother reatures swell.

Our conceptof ourselves s persons s not tobe understood,here-fore, s a concept of attributes hat are necessarilypecies-specific.It is conceptuallypossible that membersof novel or even of fa-miliar nonhuman species should be persons; and it is also con-

ceptuallypossible thatsomemembers f the human speciesare notpersons.We do in factassume,on the otherhand, thatno memberof another pecies s a person.Accordingly,here s a presumptionthatwhat is essentialto persons s a set of characteristicshat wegenerallysuppose-whether rightlyor wrongly-to be uniquelyhuman.

It is myview thatone essential differenceetweenpersonsandothercreatures s to be found in the structure f a person'swill.Human beingsare not alone in

havingdesires and

motives,r

inmakingchoices.They share thesethingswiththemembers f cer-tain otherspecies, ome of whom even appear to engage in delib-erationand to make decisionsbased upon priorthought. t seemsto be peculiarlycharacteristic f humans,however,that theyareable to formwhat I shall call second-order esires or desiresofthesecondorder.








FREEDOM OF WILL AND CONCEPT OF A PERSON 7

Besideswanting nd choosing nd beingmoved to do thisor that,men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desiresand

motives.They are capable ofwantingto be different,n theirpref-erences nd purposes,fromwhat they re. Manyanimals appear tohave the capacityfor what I shall call first-orderesires or de-sires of the first rder, which are simplydesiresto do or not todo one thingor another.No animal otherthanman,however, p-pearsto have the capacityforreflectiveelf-evaluationhat s mani-festedn theformation fsecond-orderesires.2

I

The concept designatedby the verb 'to want' is extraordinarilyelusive. A statement f the form A wantsto X -taken by itself,apartfrom contextthat servesto amplify r to specifytsmean-ing-conveys remarkablyittle nformation. uch a statementmaybe consistent, or example,witheach of the following tatements:(a) the prospectof doing X elicitsno sensationor introspectibleemotional response n A; (b) A is unaware that he wants to X;(c) A believesthathe does not want to X; (d) A wantsto refrainfromX-ing; (e) A wantsto Y and believesthat t is impossiblefor

him both to Y and to X; (f) A does not really want to X; (g) Awould ratherdie than X; and so on. It is therefore ardly ufficientto formulate he distinctionbetween first-ordernd second-orderdesires, s I have done, by suggestingmerelythat someonehas afirst-orderesirewhenhe wants to do or not to do such-and-such,and thathe has a second-order esire when he wants to have ornotto have a certaindesireof thefirst rder.

As I shall understand hem, tatementsf the form A wants to

X covera ratherbroad rangeof possibilities.3 hey maybe trueevenwhen statementsike (a) throughg) are true: whenA is un-aware of any feelings oncerningX-ing,when he is unaware thathe wants to X, when he deceiveshimself bout what he wants and

2 For the sake of simplicity, shall deal only with what someone wants ordesires, neglecting related phenomena such as choices and decisions. I pro-pose to use the verbs 'to want' and 'to desire' interchangeably, lthough theyare by no means perfect synonyms.My motive in forsakingthe establishednuances of these words arises from the fact that the verb 'to want',which suitsmy purposes better so far as its meaning is concerned, does not lend itself soreadily to the formationof nouns as does the verb 'to desire'. It is perhaps ac-ceptable, albeit graceless,to speak in the plural of someone's wants. But tospeak in the singular of someone's want would be an abomination.

3What I say in thisparagraph applies not only to cases in which to X' refersto a possible action or inaction. It also applies to cases in which to X' refers oa first-order esire and in which the statement hat A wants to X' is thereforea shortenedversion of a statement- A wants to want to X --that identifiesdesire of thesecond order.









believesfalsely hathe does notwant to X, whenhe also has otherdesiresthatconflictwithhis desire toX, orwhenhe is ambivalent.

The desires n questionmaybe consciousor unconscious, heyneednot be univocal, and A may be mistaken bout them.There is afurtherource of uncertaintywithregardto statementshat iden-tifyomeone'sdesires, owever, nd here t is important ormypur-posestobe lesspermissive.

Considerfirsthose tatementsf theform A wants to X whichidentify irst-orderesires-that is,statementsn which the termtoX' refers o an action. A statement f thiskind does not, by itself,indicate the relativestrength f A's desire to X. It does not makeit clearwhether hisdesire s at all likelyto play a decisiverole inwhat A actuallydoes or tries to do. For it may correctly e saidthatA wants toX evenwhenhis desiretoX is onlyone amonghisdesires ndwhen t is farfrom eingparamount mongthem.Thus,it may be true thatA wantsto X whenhe strongly refers o dosomething lse instead; and it maybe truethathe wantsto X de-spitethefactthat,whenhe acts, t is not thedesiretoX thatmoti-vateshim to do what he does. On the otherhand, someonewho

statesthat A wantsto X maymean to conveythat t is thisdesirethat s motivating r movingA to do what he is actuallydoingorthatA will in factbe movedby thisdesire unlesshe changes hismind)whenhe acts.

It is onlywhen it is used in thesecondof thesewaysthat,giventhe special usage of 'will' that I propose to adopt, the statementidentifies 's will. To identify n agent'swill is eitherto identifythe desire or desires)by whichhe is motivated n some action he

performs r to identify he desire or desires) by which he will orwould be motivatedwhen or if he acts.An agent'swill, then, sidenticalwithone or more ofhis first-orderesires.But the notionof thewill, as I am employing t, is not coextensivewith the no-tion of first-orderesires. t is not the notion odfomething hatmerely nclines an agent in some degreeto act in a certainway.Rather, t is thenotionof an effectiveesire-one thatmoves (orwill or would move) a personall theway to action.Thus theno-tionofthe will is not coextensivewiththe notionofwhatan agent

intendsto do. For even thoughsomeonemay have a settled nten-tion to do X, he maynonetheless o something lse instead of do-ing X because,despitehis intention, is desireto do X provestobe weakeror less effectivehansomeconflicting esire.

Now consider hosestatementsfthe form A wants toX whichidentify econd-order esires-that is,statementsn whichthe term









'to X' refers o a desireof thefirst rder. There are also two kindsof situation n which tmay be true thatA wantsto want to X. In

the first lace, it mightbe true ofA thathe wants to have a desireto X despite the fact that he has a univocal desire, ltogether reeof conflict nd ambivalence, o refrain romX-ing.Someonemightwant to have a certaindesire, n other words,but univocallywantthatdesireto be unsatisfied.

Suppose that a physician ngaged n psychotherapyithnarcoticsaddicts believes that his ability to help his patientswould be en-hanced if he understood etterwhatit is likeforthemto desirethe

drug to which they re addicted. Suppose that he is led in thiswayto want to have a desire for thedrug. f it is a genuinedesire thathe wants, then what he wants is not merely o feel the sensationsthat addicts characteristicallyeelwhen they are gripped by theirdesiresfor the drug. What thephysicianwants, nsofar s he wantsto have a desire, s to be inclined or moved to some extentto takethedrug.

It is entirelypossible, however,that, although he wants to bemoved by a desire to take the drug,he does not want this desire to

be effective. e may not want it tomove him all the way to action.He need not be interested n finding ut what it is like to take thedrug. And insofar s he now wantsonly to want to take it, and notto take it, there s nothing n what he now wants that would besatisfied y the drug itself.He may now have, n fact, n altogetherunivocal desire not to take the drug; and he may prudently rrangetomake it impossibleforhim to satisfy he desirehe would have ifhis desire to want the drug should in time be satisfied.

It would thusbe incorrect o infer, rom he factthatthephysi-cian now wantsto desireto take thedrug,that he alreadydoes de-sireto take t. His second-orderesire to be movedto takethedrugdoes not entail that he has a first-orderesire to take t. If thedrugwerenow to be administered o him, this might satisfy o desirethat is implicit n his desire to want to take it. While he wants towant to take the drug,he may have no desire to take it; it maybethat all he wants is to taste the desire for t. That is, his desire tohave a certaindesire that he does not have may notbe a desire that

hiswill shouldbe at all differenthan t is.Someone who wants only in this truncatedway to want to X

stands at the marginof preciosity,nd the fact that he wants towant to X is not pertinent o the identification f his will. Thereis, however, secondkind of situationthatmaybe describedby Awantsto want to X'; and when thestatements used to describe








IO THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

situationof thissecond kind,then t does pertain to whatA wantshis will to be. In such cases thestatementmeans thatA wants thedesireto X to be thedesire thatmoveshimeffectivelyo act. It isnot merely hat he wantsthe desire to X to be among thedesiresbywhich,to one degree or another,he is moved or inclinedto act.He wantsthisdesire to be effective-that s, to provide themotivein what he actuallydoes. Now when thestatement hat A wants towant to X is used in thisway, tdoes entail thatA alreadyhas a de-sireto X. It could not be true both thatA wants the desire toX tomove him into action and that he does not want to X. It is only f

he does want to X that he can coherentlywantthedesire to X notmerely o be one ofhis desiresbut, moredecisively, o be hiswill.4

Suppose a man wants to be motivated n what he does by thedesireto concentrate n his work. t is necessarilyrue, f thissup-position s correct,hathe alreadywantsto concentraten hiswork.This desire s now amonghis desires.But the questionofwhetheror not his second-order esire is fulfilled oes not turn merely nwhether hedesirehewants s one of his desires. t turns n whether

thisdesire is, as he wants it to be, his effective esire or will. If,whenthe chips are down, t is his desireto concentrate n his workthatmoveshim to do whathe does, thenwhathe wants at thattimeis indeed (in therelevant ense) what he wantsto want. f it is someotherdesire that actuallymoveshim when he acts,on the otherhand, thenwhat he wantsat thattime s not (in therelevant ense)what he wants to want. This will be so despite the factthat thedesireto concentraten hisworkcontinues o be among hisdesires.

II

Someone has a desireofthe secondordereitherwhenhe wants im-ply tohave a certaindesire or whenhe wants a certaindesire to behiswill. In situations f the atterkind, shall call his second-orderdesires second-order olitions or volitionsof the second order.Now it is having econd-orderolitions, nd nothaving econd-orderdesiresgenerally, hatI regardas essentialto being a person. t is

4 It is not so clear that the entailment relation described here holds in cer-tain kinds of cases,which I thinkmay fairlybe regardedas nonstandard,where

the essential difference etween the standard and the nonstandard cases lies inthe kind of descriptionby which the first-orderesire in question is identified.Thus, suppose that A admires B so fulsomely hat, even though he does notknow what B wants to do, he wants to be effectively oved by whateverdesireeffectively oves B; withoutknowingwhat B's will is, in otherwords,A wantshis own will to be the same. It certainlydoes not follow that A already has,among his desires, a desire like the one that constitutesB's will. I shall notpursue here the questions of whether there are genuine counterexamples tothe claim made in the text or of how, if thereare, that claim should be altered.








FREEDOM OF WILL AND CONCEPT OF A PERSON I I

logicallypossible,howeverunlikely, hat there should be an agentwith second-order esiresbut with no volitionsof the secondorder.Such a creature,n my view,would not be a person. shall use theterm wanton' to referto agentswho have first-orderesiresbutwho are not personsbecause,whether r not theyhave desiresofthe second order,heyhaveno second-order olitions.5

The essentialcharacteristic f a wantonis that he does not careabout his will. His desiresmove him to do certainthings,withoutits being true ofhim eitherthat he wantsto be movedbythosede-siresor thathe prefers o be moved by other desires.The class ofwantons ncludes all nonhumananimals that have desiresand all

veryyoungchildren.Perhaps it also includes some adult humanbeings as well. In anycase, adult humansmaybe moreor less wan-ton; they may act wantonly, n response to first-orderesires con-cerningwhichtheyhave no volitionsof thesecondorder,more orlessfrequently.

The fact that a wantonhas no second-order olitionsdoes notmean thateach ofhis first-orderesires s translatedheedlessly ndat once into action.He mayhave no opportunityo act in accord-ance with some of his desires.Moreover, he translation f his de-sires nto actionmaybe delayedor precludedeitherby conflictingdesiresof the first rderor by the interventionfdeliberation.Fora wantonmay possess nd employrationalfaculties f a high order.Nothing n theconceptof a wanton mpliesthat he cannot reasonor thathe cannot deliberateconcerninghow to do what he wantsto do. What distinguishes he rationalwanton fromother rationalagents s that he is not concernedwith the desirability f his de-sires themselves. e ignoresthe question of what his will is to be.

Not only does he pursue whatever course of action he is moststrongly nclined to pursue, but he does not care whichof his in-clinations s thestrongest.

Thus a rationalcreature,who reflectspon thesuitability o hisdesires of one course of action or another,may nonethelessbe awanton. n maintaining hat theessenceof being a person ies notin reasonbut in will,I am farfrom uggestinghat a creaturewith-out reasonmaybe a person.For it is only in virtueof his rational

5 Creatureswith second-orderdesires but no second-ordervolitions differ ig-nificantly rombrute animals, and, forsome purposes,it would be desirable toregard them as persons. My usage, which withholds the designation 'person'fromthem,is thus somewhat arbitrary. adopt it largelybecause it facilitatesthe formulationof some of the points I wish to make. Hereafter,whenever Iconsiderstatements f the form A wants to want to X, I shall have in mindstatements identifyingsecond-order volitions and not statements identifyingsecond-order esiresthatare not second-order olitions.









capacitiesthata person s capable of becomingcritically ware ofhis own will and of formingvolitionsof the second order.The

structure f a person'swill presupposes, ccordingly, hathe is arationalbeing.

The distinctionbetween a person and a wantonmay be illus-tratedby the differenceetweentwonarcotics ddicts.Let us sup-pose thatthephysiological onditionaccountingforthe addictionis the same in bothmen,and thatboth succumb nevitably o theirperiodicdesiresfor thedrug towhich they re addicted.One of theaddicts hates his addiction and always strugglesdesperately, l-

thoughto no avail, against its thrust.He trieseverythinghathethinksmightenable him to overcomehis desiresfor thedrug.Butthesedesires re too powerful orhimtowithstand,nd invariably,in the end, they onquerhim.He is an unwilling ddict,helplesslyviolatedby hisowndesires.

The unwillingaddict has conflictingirst-orderesires:he wantsto take the drug,and he also wants to refrainfromtaking t. Inaddition to thesefirst-orderesires,however,he has a volitionofthe second order.He is not a neutralwithregardto the conflict

between his desire to take thedrugand his desireto refrain romtaking t. It is the latter desire, nd not theformer,hat he wantsto constitute is will; it is the latterdesire,rather hantheformer,thathe wantstobe effectivend to providethepurposethathewillseektorealize n whathe actuallydoes.

The otheraddict is a wanton.His actionsreflect heeconomy fhis first-orderesires,withouthis being concernedwhether hede-sires thatmove him to act are desires by whichhe wants to be

moved to act. If he encounters roblems n obtainingthe drugorin administeringt to himself, is responses o his urgesto take itmay involvedeliberation.But it neveroccursto him to considerwhetherhe wantsthe relations among his desires to result n hishavingthewill he has. The wantonaddict maybe an animal,andthus ncapable ofbeing concernedabout his will. In any eventheis, in respectof his wantonlack of concern,no differentromananimal.

The secondof theseaddictsmaysuffer first-orderonflict imi-

lar to the first-orderonflict uffered y the first.Whetherhe ishumanor not,the wanton may perhapsdue to conditioning) othwant to take the drugand want to refrain romtaking t. Unlikethe unwillingaddict,however,he does not prefer hat one of hisconflictingesires houldbe paramountoverthe other;he does notprefer hatone first-orderesire ratherthan theother should con-









stitutehis will. It would be misleadingto saythat he is neutralasto the conflict etweenhis desires, ince this would suggest hatheregards hemas equally acceptable.Since he has no identity part

fromhis first-orderesires, t is trueneither hathe prefers ne totheothernor thathe prefers ot totake sides.

It makes a differenceo the unwillingaddict, who is a person,which ofhis conflictingirst-orderesireswinsout. Bothdesires rehis, to be sure; and whetherhe finally akes the drug or finallysucceeds n refrainingrom aking t, he acts to satisfywhat is in aliteral sense his own desire. In eithercase he does somethinghehimselfwantsto do, and he does it not because of some external

influencewhoseaim happens to coincidewithhis own but becauseofhis desireto do it. The unwilling ddict identifies imself, ow-ever, throughthe formation f a second-order olition,with oneratherthan withthe other of his conflictingirst-orderesires.Hemakes one of themmore trulyhis own and, in so doing,he with-drawshimselffromthe other. t is in virtueof this identificationand withdrawal, ccomplishedthrough he formation f a second-order volition,that the unwillingaddict maymeaningfullymakethe analytically uzzlingstatementshat the forcemovinghim totake the drug is a forceother thanhis own, and thatit is not ofhis own free will but rather gainst his will that this forcemoveshimto take t.

The wantonaddict cannotor does not carewhich of his conflict-ingfirst-orderesireswins out. His lack of concern s not due to hisinabilityto find convincingbasis forpreference.t is due eitherto his lack of thecapacityfor reflectionr to his mindless ndiffer-ence to the enterprise f evaluating his own desires and motives.6

There is onlyone issue in thestruggle o whichhis first-orderon-flictmaylead: whether he one or the other of his conflicting e-sires s thestronger. ince he is movedbyboth desires,he will notbe altogether atisfied ywhat he does no matterwhich of them seffective.ut it makesno differenceo himwhetherhis cravingorhis aversiongets the upper hand. He has no stake in the conflictbetweenthemand so, unlike theunwillingaddict,he can neither

6 In speakingof the evaluation of his own desires and motives as being char-

acteristicof a person, I do not mean to suggest that a person's second-ordervolitions necessarilymanifest a moral stance on his part toward his first-orderdesires. It may not be fromthe point of view of moralitythat the person eval-uates his first-order esires. Moreover, a person may be capricious and irre-sponsible in forminghis second-ordervolitions and give no serious considera-tion to what is at stake. Second-ordervolitions express evaluations only in thesense that they are preferences.There is no essential restriction n the kindofbasis, fany, upon whichthey re formed.









win nor lose the strugglen whichhe is engaged.When a personacts,thedesirebywhichhe is moved s eitherthewill he wants or

a will he wantsto be without.When a wantonacts, t is neither.III

There is a veryclose relationshipbetweenthe capacityforform-ing second-orderolitionsand anothercapacitythat s essentialtopersons-one that has oftenbeen considered distinguishingmarkof thehuman condition. t is onlybecause a personhas volitionsofthesecondorderthathe is capable bothofenjoying nd of lack-ing freedom f thewill. The conceptof a person s not only,then,

theconceptof a typeof entity hathas bothfirst-orderesiresandvolitionsof the secondorder. t can also be construed s the con-ceptof a typeof entity orwhomthefreedom f itswill maybe aproblem.This conceptexcludesall wantons,both infrahuman ndhuman,since theyfail to satisfyn essentialconditionforthe en-joyment ffreedom f thewill.And it excludesthosesuprahumanbeings,f any,whosewillsarenecessarilyree.

Justwhatkind offreedoms thefreedom f thewill?This ques-tion calls foran identificationf the special area of human expe-rience towhich theconceptoffreedom f thewill,as distinct romthe conceptsof othersortsof freedom, s particularly ermane. ndealing with it, my aim will be primarily o locate the problemwith which a person is most immediately oncernedwhen he isconcernedwiththefreedom fhiswill.

According to one familiarphilosophical tradition, eing free sfundamentally matterof doing what one wantsto do. Now thenotion of an agent who does whathe wants to do is by no means

an altogether lear one: both the doing and thewanting, nd theappropriaterelationbetweenthem s well,requireelucidation.Butalthough tsfocusneeds to be sharpened nd its formulationefined,I believe thatthis notiondoes captureat leastpart ofwhat is im-plicit n the dea ofan agent who actsfreely.t misses ntirely, ow-ever, the peculiar contentof the quite differentdea of an agentwhose will sfree.

We do not suppose that animals enjoy freedom f thewill, al-

thoughwe

recognizethatan animal

maybe free to run in what-everdirection t wants.Thus, havingthe freedom o do what onewantsto do is not a sufficientonditionofhavinga freewill. It isnot a necessary ondition either. For to deprive someone of hisfreedom f action is not necessarily o undermine he freedomofhis will. When an agent is aware that there are certainthingsheis not free to do, this doubtlessaffects is desiresand limitsthe









range of choiceshe can make. But suppose that someone,withoutbeing aware of it,has in fact ost or been deprivedof his freedomof action. Even thoughhe is no longerfreeto do what he wantstodo, his will may remain as free as it was before.Despite the factthat he is not freeto translatehis desires nto actions or to act ac-cording to the determinations f his will, he may still formthosedesires and make those determinations s freely s if his freedomof actionhad not been impaired.

When we ask whether person's will is free we are not askingwhetherhe is in a position to translatehis first-orderesires ntoactions.That is the question of whether e is free o do as he pleases.

The question of thefreedom f his will does not concerntherela-tion between what he does and what he wants to do. Rather, itconcernshis desires hemselves. ut whatquestion about them s it?

It seemsto me both natural and usefulto construe he questionof whether person'swill is free n closeanalogyto thequestionofwhether n agentenjoysfreedom f action. Now freedom f actionis (roughly, t least)thefreedom odo whatone wantstodo. Analo-gously, then, the statement hat a person enjoys freedomof the

will means (also roughly) hathe is freeto want whathe wantstowant. More precisely,t means that he is freeto will what he wantsto will, or to have the will he wants.Just s thequestionabout thefreedom f an agent'saction has to do with whether t is the actionhe wants to perform, o thequestion about thefreedom fhis willhas to do with whether t is the will he wantsto have.

It is in securingthe conformityf his will to his second-ordervolitions, hen,that a personexercisesfreedom f the will. And itis in thediscrepancy etweenhiswill and his second-orderolitions,

or in his awareness hat theircoincidence s not his own doingbutonlya happychance,thata personwho does nothave this freedomfeels ts lack.The unwillingaddict's will is not free.This is shownby the fact thatit is not the will he wants. t is also true,thoughin a different ay,that the will of thewantonaddict is not free.The wanton addict neitherhas the will he wants nor has a willthat differs romthe will he wants. Since he has no volitions ofthe second order,the freedom fhis will cannot be a problem for

him. He lacks t, so tospeak,bydefault.People are generallyfar more complicatedthan mysketchy c-count of the structure f a person'swill may suggest.There is asmuchopportunityor mbivalence, onflict,nd self-deception ithregardto desiresof the secondorder,forexample,as there s withregardto first-orderesires. f there s an unresolved onflictmong








i6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

someone'ssecond-order esires, hen he is in danger of having nosecond-order olition;for unless this conflict s resolved,he has no

preference oncerningwhich of his first-orderesires s to be hiswill. This condition, f it is so severe that it preventshim fromidentifying imself n a sufficientlyecisiveway with any of hisconflicting irst-orderesires, estroys im as a person.For it eithertends to paralyzehiswill and to keep him from cting at all, or ittends to removehimfromhis will so that hiswill operateswithouthis participation. n both cases he becomes, ike the unwillingad-dict though n a different ay, a helplessbystander o the forces

thatmovehim.Anothercomplexitys that a person mayhave, especially f hissecond-order esires re in conflict, esires nd volitions f a higherorder than the second. There is no theoretical imit to the lengthof theseriesofdesiresofhigher nd higherorders;nothingexceptcommonsense and, perhaps, a saving fatigueprevents n individ-ual fromobsessively efusing o identifyhimselfwith any of hisdesiresuntil he forms desireof the nexthigherorder.The tend-ency to generate such a series of acts of formingdesires,whichwould be a case of humanizationrun wild, also leads toward thedestructionf a person.

It is possible,however, o terminateucha seriesof actswithoutcuttingt off rbitrarily.When a person dentifies imself ecisivelywith one of his first-orderesires, this commitment resoundsthroughout hepotentially ndlessarrayofhigherorders.Considera personwho, withoutreservation r conflict,wants to be moti-vated by the desire to concentrate n his work.The fact thathis

second-order olition to be movedby this desire is a decisiveonemeans that there is no room for questions concerningthe perti-nence of desiresor volitionsof higherorders.Suppose the personis asked whetherhe wants to want to want to concentrate n hiswork.He can properlynsistthat thisquestionconcerning third-orderdesiredoes not arise. It would be a mistaketo claim that,because he has not consideredwhetherhe wants the second-ordervolition he has formed, e is indifferento thequestionofwhether

it is with thisvolition orwithsome otherthat he wantshiswill toaccord. The decisiveness f the commitment e has made meansthat he has decided that no further uestion about his second-ordervolition, t any higherorder,remainsto be asked. It is rela-tivelyunimportantwhetherwe explain this by saying that thiscommitmentmplicitly enerates n endless eriesofconfirminge-siresof higherorders,or by sayingthat the commitments tanta-









mount to a dissolutionof thepointedness f all questionsconcern-ing higher rders f desire.

Examples such as the one concerning he unwillingaddictmaysuggest hatvolitionsof the second order, r of higherorders,mustbe formed eliberatelynd that a person characteristicallytrugglesto ensure that theyare satisfied. ut the conformityf a person'swill to his higher-order olitions maybe far more thoughtlessndspontaneous than this. Some people are naturallymoved by kind-ness when theywant to be kind, and bynastinesswhen theywantto be nasty, without any explicit forethoughtnd without anyneed for energetic elf-control. thersare moved by nastinesswhen

theywantto be kind and by kindnesswhen they ntend to be nasty,equally withoutforethought nd without ctive resistance o theseviolationsof their higher-order esires.The enjoyment f freedomcomes easily to some.Othersmust struggle o achieve it.

IV

My theory oncerning he freedomof the will accounts easilyforour disinclinationto allow that this freedom s enjoyed by themembers f any species nferior o our own. It also satisfiesnother

conditionthatmust be met by any such theory, y making t ap-parent why thefreedom f the will shouldbe regarded s desirable.The enjoyment f a free will means the satisfaction f certainde-sires-desiresofthe second or of higherorders-whereas ts absencemeans theirfrustration.he satisfactions t stake are thosewhichaccrue to a person of whom t may be said that his will is his own.The corresponding rustrationsre those suffered y a personofwhom it may be said that he is estranged romhimself, r thathefindshimself helpless or a passive bystander o the forces thatmove him.

A personwho is free to do whathe wantsto do may yetnot bein a positionto have thewill he wants.Suppose, however, hat heenjoys both freedomof action and freedomof the will. Then heis not only free to do what he wants to do; he is also free to wantwhathe wantsto want. It seemstome that he has,in thatcase, allthefreedomt is possible to desireor to conceive.There are othergood things n life, nd he may not possess ome of them.But there

isnothingn thewayoffreedom hathe lacks.It is farfrom lear that certainother theories f the freedom f

thewill meet theseelementary ut essentialconditions: that it beunderstandablewhywe desire this freedom nd whywe refusetoascribe t to animals.Consider,forexample,RoderickChisholm'squaint versionof the doctrinethathuman freedom ntails an ab-








FREEDOM OF WILL AND CONCEPT OF A PERSON I 9

order desire his will instead. Whatever his will, then, the will ofthe person whose will is free could have been otherwise;he couldhave done otherwise han to constitutehis will as he did. It is a

vexed question just how 'he could have done otherwise' s to beunderstood n contexts uch as this one. But although this ques-tion is important o the theory f freedom,t has no bearingon thetheory f moral responsibility. or the assumption hat a person smorallyresponsiblefor what he has done does not entail that thepersonwas in a position to have whateverwill he wanted.

This assumption does entail that the person did what he didfreely, r that he did it of his own freewill. It is a mistake,how-

ever,to believe that someone acts freely nly when he is freeto dowhateverhe wants or that he acts of his own freewill only if hiswill is free.Suppose that a person has done what he wanted to do,thathe did it because he wanted to do it, and that thewill bywhichhe was moved when he did it was his will because it was the will hewanted. Then he did it freely nd of his own freewill. Even sup-posing that he could have done otherwise, e would not have doneotherwise; nd even supposing that he could have had a differentwill, he would not have wanted his will to differ romwhat it was.

Moreover, ince the will that moved him when he acted was hiswillbecause he wanted t to be, he cannot claim thathis will was forcedupon him or that he was a passive bystander o its constitution.Under these conditions, t is quite irrelevant o the evaluationofhis moral responsibility o inquire whether he alternatives hatheopted againstwereactually vailable to him.9

In illustration, onsider a thirdkindof addict. Suppose thathisaddictionhas the same physiological asis and the same irresistible

thrust s the addictions of the unwilling and wanton addicts,butthat he is altogether elighted with his condition.He is a willingaddict,whowould nothave things ny otherway. f thegripof hisaddictionshould somehowweaken,he would do whateverhe couldto reinstate t; if his desire for the drug should begin to fade,hewould takesteps o renew ts ntensity.

The willing addict's will is not free,for his desire to take thedrug will be effectiveegardless f whetheror not he wants thisdesire to constitute is will. But whenhe takesthedrug,he takesit freely nd of his own freewill. I am inclinedto understandhissituationas involvingthe overdeterminationf his first-ordere-

9For another discussion of the considerationsthat cast doubt on the prin-ciple that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if hecould have done otherwise, ee my AlternatePossibilities and Moral Responsi-bility, hisJOURNAL, LxvI, 23 (Dec. 4, 1969): 829-839.









sire to take the drug. This desire s his effectiveesirebecause he isphysiologically ddicted. But it is his effectiveesire also because

he wants t to be. His will is outside his control, ut, byhis second-order desire that his desirefor the drugshould be effective, e hasmade thiswill his own. Given that t is therefore ot onlybecauseof his addictionthat his desire for the drugis effective,e may bemorally esponsible or aking he drug.

My conceptionof the freedom f the will appears to be neutralwith regardto the problemof determinism.t seemsconceivablethat t shouldbe causallydetermined hata person s freeto want

what he wantsto want. f this s conceivable, hen t mightbe caus-ally determined hat a personenjoys a freewill. There is no morethan an innocuousappearanceof paradox in the propositionthatit is determined,neluctably and by forcesbeyond theircontrol,that certainpeople have free wills and that others do not. Thereis no incoherence n the proposition hatsome agencyother than aperson's own is responsible even morallyresponsible)for the factthat he enjoysor fails to enjoy freedom f the will. It is possiblethat a personshould be morallyresponsible orwhat he does of his

own freewill and that some otherpersonshould also be morally e-sponsibleforhis havingdone it.10

On the other hand, it seems conceivable that it should comeabout bychance thata person s freeto have the will he wants. fthis s conceivable, hen tmightbe a matter f chancethat certainpeople enjoy freedomof the will and that certain othersdo not.Perhaps t is also conceivable, s a numberof philosophers elieve,forstatesof affairs o come about in a way otherthan by chance

or as the outcome of a sequence of natural causes. If it is indeedconceivableforthe relevant tatesof affairs o come about in somethirdway,then t is also possiblethat a personshould in thatthirdway come to enjoy the freedom fthewill.

HARRY G. FRANKFURT

The Rockefeller niversity10There is a difference etween being fully responsibleand being solely re-

sponsible. Suppose that the willing addict has been made an addict by the de-liberate and calculated work of another. Then it may be that both the addict

and this other person are fully responsible for the addict's taking the drug,while neither of them is solely responsible for it. That there is a distinctionbetween full moral responsibility nd sole moral responsibility s apparent inthe following xample. A certain ight can be turnedon or offby flicking itherof two switches, nd each of these switches s simultaneously lickedto the onposition by a different erson,neitherof whom is aware of the other. Neitherperson is solely responsible for the light's going on, nor do they share the re-sponsibility n the sense that each is partiallyresponsible; rather,each of themis fullyresponsible.

frankfurt-freedom of will and conc of person

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