FOOD AND THE STATUS QUEST An Interdisciplinary Perspective

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Edited by Polly Wiessner and

Wulf Schiefenhovel, Senior Research Fellows, Forschungsstelle fur Humanethologie,

M ax-P lanck-Gesellschaft

The use of food to negotiate status is found in all

human societies. Here, for the first time, a single

book brings together contributions from different

disciplines to investigate, from ethological and

anthropological perspectives, behaviour that

appears to have biological roots such as the

tendency to seek status through the medium of

food. It explores the limits that our biological

heritage places on cultural expressions of such

behaviour, as well as the multiplicity of ways in

which biologically based tendencies can be

transformed by culture. Finally, it addresses the

impact of status-seeking on nutritional

programmes in developing countries.

90000

Berghahn Books PROVIDENCE ' OXFORD

ISBN 1-57181-871-5 9 781571 818713

FOOD and the

STATUS QUEST An Interdisciplinary Perspective

E DITE D B Y

POLLY WIESSNER and

WULF SCHIEFENHOVEL

,$

FOOD AND THE STATUS QUEST An Interdisciplinary Perspective

edited by Polly Wiessner and Wulf Schiefenhovel

� Berghahn Books

Providence • Oxford

First published in 1996 by Berghahn Books

Editorial offices: 165 Taber Avenue, Providence, RI 02906, USA Bush House, Merewood Avenue, Oxford, OX3 8EF, UK

© Polly Wiessner and Wulf SchiefenhOvel 1996

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means without the written permission of Berghahn Books.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Food and the status quest: an interdisciplinary perspective / edited by Polly Wiessner and Wulf SchiefenhOvel.

p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-57181-871-5 (alk. paper) 1. Food. 2. Food supply. 3. Food consumption. 4. Nutritional

anthropology. 5. Needs, Nutritional--Developing countries. I. Wiessner, Pauline Wilson, 1947- . II. Schiefenhovel, Wulf,

1943-GN407.F657 1995 363.8--dc20

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

95-37304 CIP

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed in the USA on acid-free paper.

CONTENTS

Preface

Wulf SchiefenhOvel

1. Introduction: Food, Status, Culture, and Nature

Polly Wiessner

2. The Ethological Bases of Status Hierarchies

Barbara Hold-Cavell

3. The Evolution of Nurturant Dominance

Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt

4. Dominance Status, Food Sharing, and

Reproductive Success in Chimpanzees

William C. McGrew

5. Food Sharing and Status in Unprovisioned Bonobos

Gottfried Hohmann & Barbara Fruth

6. Systems of Power: The Function and Evolution

of Social Status

Karl Grammer

7. Feasts and Commensal Politics in the

Political Economy: Food, Power, and Status in

Prehistoric Europe

Michael Dietler

8. Feasting in Prehistoric and Traditional Societies

Brian Hayden

vii

1

19

33

39

47

69

87

127

6. SYSTEMS OF POWER THE FUNCTION AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STATUS

Karl Grammer

Dominance, Status, and Hierarchies

Schjelderupp-Ebbe, who discovered and described pecking orders in hens (1922), laid the foundations for a vast body of research on inequality of individuals. Thirty years later, when early ethology rediscovered that behavior could be a product of natural selection, it was a small step to surmise that this principle also could apply to social structures and social sorting processes in humans.

Continuing research in this area developed quite different con­cepts. These concepts range from dominance and hierarchies to visual regard, status, and rank orders. Application of these concepts to observable behavior, however, can be difficult, because of some problems inherent in the definition of these concepts. Dyadic domi­nance, for instance, seems to be a relationship feature that can not be extended to hierarchies, because the members of groups employ a variety of strategies different from those commonly used in dyadic interactions. In contrast to dominance, therefore, social status describes power relations on a group level.

Although we can observe tactics for attaining social status reliably and repeatedly in groups, explanations for their existence are mani­fold. The proximate level, i.e. explanation in terms of the immediate causation and function of a behavior, and the ultimate level, i.e. explanation in terms of inclusive fitness, are best looked at sepa­rately in such an endeavor.

70 Karl Grammer

In this chapter I will propose that status systems have the function of promoting survival of individuals at critical life stages in which food often plays an important role. This function holds for both the powerful individual and the individual who attributes this power to another. The main points of my argument come from studies on children's peer groups and human mate selection; research in both areas is now well developed.

Among humans, control structures generated out of assertive behavior were first described by Hanfman (1935). She described a child as dominant over another child when the first child was able to control common play. The results of this work were surprising: she was not able to find a linear hierarchy. Being able to control others depends on the strategy the single child applies for controlling another child. The "little gangster" strategy, for instance, was supe­rior to many others. A child who pursues this strategy permanently tries to demonstrate her or his power, has no interest in common play, and tries to control all the activities of the group. He or she commands other children and also takes toys despite another child's protest. Yet, a strategy can be deployed to control the little gangster. A child using this approach can be called the "destroyer". Such a child simply destroys the game, until the ganster gives up. Then he or she proposes a new game and thus gains control. Unfortunately for the destroyer, his strategy can be controlled by another strategy. The "social leader" strategy pursues the goal of playing and pays any price for doing this. He or she is able to cooperate to a high degree, announcing all of his or her own actions before carrying them out. If there is a conflict he or she complies for a certain time. Although this diplomatic behavior is susceptible to the strategy of the little gang­ster, the social leader is able to control the destroyer strategy. In this approach we find a high degree of circularity, which is incongruous with a hierarchical concept.

These problems were not recognized by later researchers. Esser (1968) tried to generate pecking orders out of attack and flight behav­ior in a group of six-to-ten-year-old boys. He found that territoriality was closely connected to the resulting hierarchy. A dominant child was able to stay in one place and hold this place against all other claims. Dominant children were constantly able to expel other chil­dren from a certain place in a room.

McGrew (1972) used a different approach. He applied the crite­rion of access to resources and observed it by recording acts of los­ing and winning object conflicts among children.

Three types of criteria are used in the different approaches. Hier­archies are the outcome (1) of control strategies, (2) of constant pat-

Systems of Power 71

terns of flight or attack behavior, and (3) of winning or losing conflicts over resources. Hierarchies defined in this way are rarely linear; cir­cularity usually occurs. In addition, it is not clear what is really described. Is it power, status, authority or simply a leadership strategy? All we can assume is that these behavioral traits are not distributed equally in a group, and that some kind of social sorting process must have occurred among the individuals involved. What is needed is a clear definition of hierarchies, power, status, leadership, and, finally, a descriptive system that can grasp at least some of these aspects.

Dominance and the System of Explicit Power

A common outcome of aggressive encounters between two individu­als is that one will flee after a certain time. Sometimes we find that one individual shows submissive behaviors after being attacked. These types of behaviors prevent the attacker from attacking further. The individual who shows the submissive signals is the "loser" in the con­flict. W hen we see this type of episode occurring more often between two individuals, with a stable pattern over time, we are observing a dominance relationship. We then are able to predict the outcome of future aggressive encounters between the two individuals. The exis­tence of such a relationship stems from the experience of the constant loser. The subordinate individual seems to be following the rule: "If I always lose to a particular individual, then in future contests I will show submissive behavior and do not try to fight". A dominance rela­tionship thus is a probability estimate of the likelihood that an indi­vidual will exert power over another individual.

The resulting asymmetry in the power relations between two indi­viduals also provides differential access to scarce resources. Etho­logical research has shown that dominant individuals as a rule have priority in access to food, mates, and social relationships over the subordinate individual (Bernstein 1981). Dominance in this sense describes the relative balance of power in social relationships. The proximate function is that both individuals gain advantage in such a relationship, because it creates predictability for both the dominant and the subordinate individual.

At this stage of our considerations, we have to stress again that dominance is not a personal trait, it is a relationship feature. In addi­tion, there can be a personal tendency to strive for a dominant posi­tion in relationships. Thus we have to separate personal traits from the relationships that an individual negotiates with other individu­als. If dominance describes relationships, and if we want to describe

72

Figure 6.1 Dominance Hierarchy

SU T 1 SY SA AS GR BE FL BN FR PH MIST FA CU SU T1 SY SA AS GR BE FL BN FR PH MI ST FA CU

"" .....

'11r_ "., .....

"., .... -"'"

!"'-I, ....

� .. .. "'" .�

"II" ...

"II" ... .1"'"

.. � ....

.... .....

.. ...... I., • .. ..

...... .... .. 0: "''''1 .. .. .. "'" � .... II" I"., .. IF

I"- .... 1"\ ....

'"I'" 1"'-"

This is a dominance hierarchy generated out of winning and losing object conflicts in a group of preschool children. The children are listed ve�tically and

. verti�al lines

show observed dominance relations with triangles. The dommance relatiOnshIps were observed by using winning and losing of object-conflicts. Downward-pointing trian­gles mean x dominates y, and upward-pointing triangles means y dominates x: For instance, the child BN dominates FL and is dominated by PH and FR. In an Ideal rigid, transitive, and linear hierarchy, all triangles point downward. This is not the case (Schropp 1986).

relationships beyond dyads, we have to establish hierarchies. Domi­nance hierarchies usually are the sum of all dominance relationships in a group (Strayer and Strayer 1978). Such an approach imposes severe constraints on the construction of hierarchies. The first constraint is transitivity. This term describes the following relational mode: B is dominant over C; A is dominant over B; A, therefore, also dominates C. The second constraint is linearity. If linearity in a dominance hier­archy is high, then the percentage of relational reversals is low.

We can assume that if a given hierarchy is transitive and has a low percentage of relational reversals, the group's organization is very hierarchical. As we saw in our kindergarten studies, however, these cases are rare. As a result, the construction of hierarchies out of dom­inance relationships normally allows more than one solution. The one-dimensional concept of dominance, therefore, should be restricted to the description of dyadic relationships. Dominance hier­achies can not emerge from a round-robin contest, because not every group member is able to repeatedly fight with every other member: a group of seven children has forty-two possible relationships! Yet we know that even in larger groups hierarchical or comparable structures exist. Thus, we need a means to describe these phenomena.

Systems of Power 73

Visual Regard and the System of Implicit Power

A possible solution for the description of rank orders on the group level is to employ the concept of status. In contrast to dominance, status describes the relative position of an individual in a group of other status holders. In order to evaluate the status mechanisms, the concept of visual regard was introduced. For detailed discussion of the "attention structure" see the contribution of Barbara Hold-Cavell in this volume .

Figure 6.2 Distribution of Attention

DISTRIBUTION OF ATIENTION DURING THE YEAR 50 o

� 40 iii a 30

� 20 &

TERM 1

� 10

� o�=J!'JJ't#� __ illil 2 SA(fI9JTAPAAS SISTOJMIFAA-lR..EEMAFRBT TI

50 TERM2

Children

This figure shows the distribution of attention in a group of preschool children. Atten­tion is distributed hierarchically, and some children receive more attention than oth­ers. Although there is considerable stability, some children change position. Child BE has position 5 in term 1, position 1 in term 2, and position 2 for the rest of the year. Child TI, who starts at position 1 in term 1, ends up in position 11 at the end of the year. The form of the distribution shows how hierarchical the group is organized: either attention goes primarily to one or two children (term 1) or can be distributed more equally among several children (term 2), whereas in term 3 a Single leader emerges and concentrates attention on himself (Grammer 1992).

Aggression, the main theme of dominance relationships, is almost negligible in attention structure. There is no direct relation between aggression and high rank, except for the fact that at the beginning of the kindergarden year, when the children enter the group, high-rank­ing children are much more aggressive than low-ranking children (Hold-Cavell 1985). Children use assertive behavior to establish the structure, but as soon as the structure is established this type of behav­ior is not necessary any more. From that stage on, high-ranking chil­dren are not more aggressive than low-ranking children, but there is

74 Karl Grammer

an interesting physiological link. High-ranking children (regardless of sex!) have higher saliva testosterone levels. Although the total num­ber of aggressive acts is not higher in high-ranking than in low-rank­ing children, high saliva testosterone levels predict the frequency of aggressive behavior and the time of the first conflict in the morning, when the children arrive at school (Schernthaner 1991). High-ranking children thus seem to concentrate their aggression to critical times of the day in the kindergarten year. Because fights or contests that are won raise testosterone level, there is a positive feedback between testosterone level, aggression, and rank. Attention structure thus does not reflect the total amount of aggressive behavior, but the likelihood that one group member will exert power over others.

The amount of attention a child receives depends on the amount of display behavior he or she performs (Hold-Cavell and Borsutzky 1986), on the child's social skills, i.e., the ability to recruit stable allies in a group (Grammer 1992), and on cooperative tendencies (Atzwanger 1991). Furthermore, unlike dominance hierarchies, which rely solely only on the assertion of power, attention structure is based on different leadership qualities. In an attention structure, an individual can be high ranking because he or she uses power, but this person can also be high ranking due to his or her social skills and cooperation. Thus, the system of explicit power is part of the system of implicit power. In this view social status is an attribution process. The function of attention structure is to provide relevant information for structuring of behavior and goals.

Dynamic Stability of Hierarchies and Rank Orders

Dominance relationships and rank in an attention structure share a feature that is necessary for understanding the concept of status and hierarchies. A dominance relationship or a rank position is stable and unstable at the same time. Both dominance relationships and attention structure show dynamic stability (Hinde and Stevenson­Hinde 1977). This seems paradoxical, because I have stated that one feature of a dominance relationship is that it creates predictability and provides a baseline for the calculation of cost-benefits in strate­gies. This is no longer possible if the relationship changes constantly.

In a preschool group, rank at the beginning of the year was found to correlate positively with rank at the end of the year (Grammer 1992). Thus the attention structure seems to be fairly stable. In a group of twenty-four children we found a maximum of eleven changes in rank position from one month to another. The number of

..

Systems of Power 75

changes in positions decreased during the year, and the rank order became more stable. In addition to increasing stability over the year, however, we also found disrupting events. Even a short interruption of the group life destabilizes the attention structure. It seems that the stabilizing factors need to be present constantly; there is a significant increase of aggression among high-ranking children after holidays (Hold-Cavell 1985).

As soon as stability is reached again, aggression decreases, but this decrease is followed by an increase in aggression on the part of the low-ranking children when explicit power relations ease: status strug­gles brew from below. We can thus conclude that the development of hierarchies causes hierarchic-specific aggression. Hierarchies or sta­tus-dependent rank orders that define status for all other group mem­bers are erected by explicit power. After they stabililize, explicit power disappears and the rank order is governed by implicit power.

Comparable conditions apply to dominance relationships. As soon as the dominance relationship is stable, the relationship itself will become invisible. This is the case because the subordinate indi­vidual will try to avoid conflicts with a dominant individual. This sit­uation also leads to two new strategies: challenge and assertion. It is possible to explain the existence of both strategies in simple terms of cost-benefit calculations. It can be assumed that individuals try to maximize their benefits and to avoid costs (Wilson 1975) and, indeed, on a proximate level we find that children constantly try to maximize their benefits. They want to have an object 2.3 times an hour and to give away an object only 0.9 times an hour (Schropp 1986). Benefit maximation thus will automatically lead to challenging.

Challenging of an existing dominance relationship will therefore occur continually. We can assume that it will depend on the costs and the benefits that are bound to such a strategy. The subordinate child in an object conflict is confronted with high costs, because the dominant individual is very likely to fight harder (Schropp 1986). Thus the actual frequency of such challenges will be reduced. Com­parable considerations apply to the assertion strategy. The dominant individual has to reestablish the relationship from time to time, so that a possible challenger will recognize the real costs of challenging. The dominant individual has to demonstrate the existing relation­ship by defeating the subordinate individual from time to time. This strategy has also a caveat: the dominant individual risks losing the conflict, at which point the relationship will be reversed. This cost­benefit function can be described in terms of rigidity of a dominance relationship. The index of rigidity is derived from the percentage of conflicts won by the higher-ranking individual over the lower-rank-

76 Karl Grammer

ing one. Among children we found a mean rigidity of 84 percent: there is approximately a one-to-five chance of a the challenger reversing the relationship. Some of these reversals occur because an "owner rule" exists: the individual who had an object first and kept it for a longer time will also fight harder. This is true not only for chil­dren, but also for most nonhuman primates (Kummer 1978). Thus the strategies in a dominance relationship rely on a delicate balance of risk and cost-benefit considerations.

The Status Quest

Dynamic stability arises from the fact that individuals seem to strive for dominance and status. Becoming high rank or dominant is an active process. Among preschoolers, display behavior and "showing off" at the beginning of the year correlate with rank at the end of the year (Hold and Borsutzky 1986). Moreover, some children actively prevent others from showing off. Showing off and display behavior among children consists of behaviors that signal physical and psy­chological abilities. How else can a child actively become high rank­ing? In a study on support in conflicts (Grammer 1992), children show a strong tendency to support members of the group who are their friends at this given point in time. The child who is supported does not necessarily stay the friend of the supporter, so there is no bonding effect between the supporter and the supported. If we look at the status of the supporter we find that frequent involvement in supporting episodes is a trait of high rank, and being a frequent win­ner in supporting contests correlates with gain in rank over the year.

In addition to winning status by giving and receiving support in conflicts, we find that reciprocal supporting can reliably predict even­tual rank. Reciprocity seems to be the key for high status. Atzwanger (1991) found that aggressive and cooperative behaviors are highly reciprocal, but there is no relation between aggressive behavior and rank. On the other hand, reciprocal cooperation correlates with high rank at the end of the year. This could mean that cooperation is at the heart of the status quest, and high rank in peer groups is the result of being able to recruit a group of stable and reliable allies. In other words, status must be in part agreed upon by the others.

As we move away from the level of small groups we find other pathways for the pursuit of status. In more complex societies this concept has to be extended (Congleton 1989). One possible way to measure status in complex societies is in the "quest for status goods." Accordingly, individuals strive for status goods and obtain satisfac-

Systems of Power 77

tion by acquiring them. The level of satisfaction reached does not come from the inherent properties of the goods and from the absolute level of consumption, but from the prestige value, and peo­ple tend to over-invest in high-status goods. Congleton (1989) refers to such behavior as "status-games." If somebody is pursuing status, this will generate costs for others who are doing the same. The ben­efit for the initiator of such strategy will be the costs that other indi­vidual incur. Status goods are redefined from time to time, because as they spread through a population they lose their value. Thus they are usually either expensive or rare goods. This situation leads to a new development in the status quest: people then tend to restrict sta­tus games to a smaller circle of people, for instance stamp collectors, beauty pageant contenders, and so on. The latter can be called micro-status in comparison to macro-status, which applies for the society as a whole.

Everyday Behavior: The Proximate Level

On a proximate level, i.e. their everyday behavior, individuals must gain satisfaction or other forms of payoff from high status or from being dominant in a relationship, otherwise they would not strive for it. Furthermore, the low-status person or the subordinate also must reap advantages, because a dominance relationship depends also on the behavior of the subordinate. In preschool classes, low-ranking children (or subdominant individuals in dyadic relationships) may indeed benefit from their position in hierarchical structures. The main advantage for the subordinate or low-status group member is, as mentioned above, predictability. Predictions are useful not only so that an individual knows how a high-ranking or dominant group member will react, but it is also possible to use this information for structuring one's own behavior and goals. A low-status individual knows that he cannot gain scarce resources easily, and thus develops alternative strategies, such as deceit. In addition, high-ranking indi­viduals are also a source of information for a low-ranking individual, from which he or she can learn. There are also costs related to high status. High status can be challenged, and thus has to be demon­strated and reaffirmed. It seems that low-ranking children in the peer groups we studied have more free time to play than high-ranking children, who have to put a great deal of energy in stabilizing their positions, leading group activities, and so on.

The most widely recognized advantages of hierarchies is the over­all reduction of aggression, but we have clearly demonstrated that

78 Karl Grammer

Figure 6.3 Human Life Cycles And Critical Stages

I!: W D.. > I-::i < l­I!: o ::E

HUMAN LIFE-CYCLES AND CRITICAL STAGES: MORTALITY RATES IN GERMANY 1972175

o 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60

AGE IN YEARS

Human life cycles are marked by three stages of high mortality: birth, weaning, and first mate selection. These stages demand special adaptions. Status might be of advan­tage in surving all of the three critical stages (Grammer and Atzwanger 1992).

hierarchies also produce their own patterns of aggression. The re­duction of aggression thus can not be the only function of hierarchies.

Another possible proximate function is that a high-status group member has the priority of access to scarce resources. In preschool groups, high-ranking children do not get more objects than low-rank­ing children, but they are more likely to attack if a low-ranking child tries to get an object from them (Schropp 1986). High-ranking chil­dren are not more efficient in conflicts than low-ranking children. By contrast, we find clear advantages in the field of social relationships. High-ranking children have a higher likelihood of getting access to play partners than low-ranking children (Shibasaka 1988), and high­ranking children receive support in conflicts. For preschool children, social relations and friends seem to be the desired resources.

Dominance, Status, and the Life Cycle

Direct benefits on the proximate level must pay off in the evolutionary currency of reproductive success on an ultimate level. If this is so, a ten­dency for being dominant or attaining high status will become prevalent.

Systems of Power 79

High status for children between the ages of three and six has an immediate effect on the quality and quantity of their social relation­ships. Yet it seems unclear how social status could affect the children's later reproductive success. For an explanation of the evolutionary effects of status on the reproductive success of an individual, we have to introduce the concept of life-cycle dependent strategies, for on the ultimate level behavioral and personal traits are critical for survival and reproduction.

There are different critical periods in the human life cycle that are marked by high mortality rates. These stages are critical, because they can mean the promotion or loss of the individual's genetic rep­resentation in the future gene pool of the population. The first criti­cal stage is birth, where we find the highest mortality rates. The next critical stage is weaning, and at this stage mortality rates are rising again even in our modern society. Directly after puberty young males reach another critical stage when they begin to search for their first mates. The first two critical stages, birth and weaning, are a sim­ple question of survival; the search for mates is a question of both survival and reproductive success (Grammer and Atzwanger 1992). If social status or dominance have any evolutionary causation, we should find positive effects for high social status on survival rates at these stages and on reproductive success. Moreover, different critical survival periods demand different adaptations. If dominance and status are critical for survival, then they will have different functions at different stages of the life cycle. With this theoretical background we can formulate a prediction: the attribution of high status to an individual at any one of the critical stages has an effect on the prob­ability of surviving this stage and increasing the reproductive fitness.

Critical Stages and Social Networks in the Peer Group

Social status of the mother has a direct effect on the child's chances to survive the first year of life. In 1986, 8.5 children per 1,000 chil­dren born by married females in Germany did not survive their first year of life, in contrast to 13.5 per 1,000 children born to single mothers. (Schwarz 1989). Most of the single females giving birth to a child were of lower socio-economic status. Even in modern societies status can influence morbidity and mortality. This correlation will become clear when we take a look at human mate selection.

The next stage in a child's development is weaning. In traditional societies this period also marks the transition from the protective home environment to the peer group, i.e. from the relatively pre-

80 Karl Grammer

dictable relationships with parents and siblings to the less structured and less predictable world of peers. In this stage we can hypothesize that social status of the child in the peer group could promote sur­vival when resources become scarce.

In a peer group, friends tend to be of similar rank, and high-rank­ing children have reciprocal friendships (Grammer 1992). In addi­tion, high-ranking children are chosen more often as best friends than low-ranking children are; they are more popular. The role of the best friend is important, because best friends are more likely to share objects and best friends are more likely to accept invitations to play. If play serves learning, then even play is a critical resource. High-ranking children have a more reliable and reciprocal social network. Reliable social networks can promote survival in critical stages. It is therefore likely that children who have high status in their peer groups enjoy advantages at this critical stage for survival.

Critical Stages and Mate Choice

Asymmetric investment in offspring leads to sex specific mate-selec­tion strategies (Trivers 1972). Females, who have an overall higher investment than males, will pursue different strategies. Internal fer­tilization with a limited total amount of ova present at birth and replenishable sperm leads to the potential for a higher reproductive success in individual males. Since their reproductive costs are small, their selection criteria could thus simply be the "quality" of the female. Males seem to select females according to the "good-genes" theorem. By contrast, females can reduce their reproductive costs by eliciting male investment in the offspring. In our species women select their reproductive partners accordingly. This situation leads to male-male competition over resources that are necessary for invest­ment. Males, then, will tend to strive for high status to promote their "partner market value." A male tendency for overt status competi­tion is the evolutionary result of female mate selection.

These differences in mate-selection criteria have been demon­strated by Buss (1989) in 36 cultures. Male status is the main selec­tion criterion for females, whereas males value female physical attractiveness. In many societies fatness is connected to social status, and in those societies where resources are not predictable, relative fatness is the beauty standard for women (Anderson et al. 1992). Additionally, the amount of body fat correlates with free estrogen levels and a normal ovulatory cycle (Frisch 1975). Other studies have shown that fatter females have more children and fewer birth com-

Systems of Power 81

plications (Caro and Sellen 1989). Yet, this is an optimization process. Females seem to reach an optimum of fertility and have fewer health problems with a waist-to-hip ratio of 0.7. Extremes in both directions are critical for female health (Singh 1993). These facts relate food intake, social status, and critical stages directly to each other: status and, in addition, beauty of the mother (as defined above) means survival for the child. In this domain, then, food and status are causally directly connected to the passing of one's genes into the generation.

Recently Grammer and Thornhill (1993) have demonstrated that there might be a link between female beauty and parasite resistance. If this is so, female attractiveness should contribute to female repro­ductive status. Moreover female attractiveness also contributes to the social status of her mate. Observers contribute higher status to a male seen with an attractive female; an attractive male with an unat­tractive female is seen as a loser (Sigall and Landy 1973).

Figure 6.4 Mate Selection and Status

PREFERENCES FOR ATTRACTIVENESS AND SOCIAL STATUS

-.-- M LES - -0--- FE ALES

" .

1.00 2.00

.' ". "

NET·INCOME

PREFERENCES FOR SOCIAL STATUS AND FINANCIAL STATUS

---.- MALES ( =1590)

w l00+-�"��_--�F E=MA=L E�(=N=1=OOO�I�-+ __ �� � / S 9O+-r--1---+--�--�--� w � � 80 +-r-�� . . �. �--�--+---� o � � 70 +-r-�---+--�--+---� o � � I .......... 60 +-r-�.---+-= __ -vI-::,.4="""�

50 -1-4-_1--.-+_--1-_-+-_+--1 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 NET·INCOME

The figure on the left shows the attractiveness of a potential mate and net income. We see that males with high net income want to have very attractive partners. This is not the case for females. The figure on the right shows the status of the potential partner and net-income. Here we see that females' expectations of their partners' status varies with net income: the higher the female status, the higher the financial status of a prospective partner has to be (Grammer 1993).

Male aspirations concerning a potential female partner reflect this. The higher the male's status, the younger and the more physi­cally attractive is the female partner (Grammer 1993). We also find the corresponding element: the more attractive the female evaluates herself, the higher she assesses her "partner market value": she seeks a potential mate in the high-status tier of society.

These facts of mate selection criteria lead us to the ultimate evo-

82 Karl Grammer

lutionary function of status. Do higher-status individuals really have more offspring?

Irons (1979) showed that men in the wealthier half of a group of Persian Yomut Turkmen had significantly higher fertility than poorer men. Correlations between status (wealth) and fertility have been found also for the Venezuelan Yanomami (Chagnon 1980) and for the rural Trinidadians (Flinn 1986). Among the Paraguayan Ache, better hunters have been found to have more surviving children (Kaplan and Hill 1985). In the Kenyan Kipsigisis, there is a strong relationship between wealth (in number of cows or acres of land) and reproductive success (Borgerhoff Mulder 1988). Salaried men on the Micronesian Island Haluk were found to have started repro­ducing younger, had wives who started reproducing younger, and produced children in shorter birth intervals (Turke and Betzig 1985). Essock-V itale (1984) showed that differential reproduction coupled to status is even true for modern societies: high status females men­tioned in the Forbes magazine had a reproduction rate that was 38 percent higher than the average reproduction rate of white Ameri­can females. In addition to this, the children of high-society females had a survival rate of 99 percent as compared to a mean survival rate of 97 percent. Thus we find a strong correlation between status and reproductive success.

Explicit and Implicit Systems of Power

The system of explicit power with its components of submission and dominance and the system of implicit power comprised of social skills and cooperation are a direct result of the fact that individuals constantly try to maximize their benefits in social encounters, and that other individuals attribute this ability to them. The problem with this argument is an unproved assumption: tendencies for status­seeking behavior lead to high status and thus wealth.

Explicit power can be a part of the status system of implicit power. A dominance relationship is the likelihood of winning - it represents a cost/benefit function in a relationship that can be used to predict behavior. Dominance relationships and social status also serve to assess costs and benefits for conditional strategies. Dominant and submissive behaviors are conditional strategies used whenever the benefit of acting dominant is higher than the possible costs of being submissive.

These systems, once established, are not rigid; they are systems with dynamic stability. Both systems are likely to function on an ulti­mate level to enhance individual survival at critical stages. Dominant

..

Systems of Power 83

behavior, status, and wealth are positively associated with a variety of mechanisms that promote reproductive success, and hence should be expected to characterize all societies to some degree. We can also expect that food will be used universally in this quest for status.

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