five ways of reading teilhard

FIVE WAYS OF READING TEILHARDAuthor(s): IAN G. BARBOURSource: Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Summer 1968), pp. 115-145Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41177714 .

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FIVE WAYS OF READING TEILHARD

IAN G. BARBOUR

writings of the Jesuit paleontologist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, have evoked an extraordinary diversity of appraisals

since his death in 1955. His longest and best known work, The Phenomenon of Man, has been described as "the most significant work of the twentieth century," yet it has also been called "sheer nonsense." Much of the controversy can be traced to the unex- amined assumptions of both enthusiasts and critics concerning the criteria by which his ideas should be evaluated. On what basis is the book to be judged? Is it science, theology, philosophy, or poetry? We will consider it successively: 1) as evolutionary science; 2) as poetry and mysticism; 3) as natural theology; 4) as Christian theology; and finally 5) as process philosophy. It will be suggested that the book can be read profitably, though critically, in each of these ways. However, I will stress the role of a partially-developed process metaphysics in Teilhard's synthesis of scientific and religious ideas.

Most of his interpreters have neglected the function of process metaphysics as a "middle term" between his evolutionary and his biblical concepts. Even though Teilhard was not primarily a philosopher, I will suggest that it is in his informal metaphysics that one must seek the unity of his thought, not only within The Phenomenon of Man but among his writings. To be sure, his various works did serve diverse purposes and their methodologies differ. It will be proposed, however, that there is among them a greater coherence than has been generally recognized. Process categories play an important part in the theological writings in which he reinterprets the nature of man and the meaning of creation, redemption, and eschatology in an evolving universe. His Mr. Barbour is in Cambridge, England this year under Guggenheim and Fulbright fellowships. He will be returning as chairman of the Department of Religion and professor of physics at Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.

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temporalistic outlook leads him to emphasize such genuinely biblical themes as continuing creation, the significance of time and history, affirmation of "secular" life, the unity of man as a total being, a living God involved in the world, and the cosmic significance of Christ.

We will start by considering alternative ways of reading The Phenomenon of Man, noting in each case the criteria which might be relevant and the evaluations which might result. We must throughout keep in mind the more fundamental questions: Which of these criteria is most appropriate? How are the several aspects of Teilhard's thought related to each other? Above all, what are the sources and the character of his unifying vision?

I. Teilhard as Evolutionary Scientist

Teilhard's technical papers, some of which are collected in The Appearance of Man, are sound contributions to science. He was offered a chair at the Collège de France and was elected to the French Academy of Sciences. His more general works, such as The Phenomenon of Man and the essays collected in The Vision of the Past, include considerable scientific information which must be judged for its accuracy on strictly scientific grounds. The evolutionary history of the major forms of life, as accepted by most biologists, is described in its broad outlines. Less attention is given to biological theories concerning the mechanisms of evolution, though mutations and natural selection are mentioned at several points. Teilhard shares with most scientists the conviction that man is firmly rooted in nature, an integral part of an interdependent process. In considering the Phenomenon as science, let us first examine a strong challenge: Does it include statements which are unscientific, that is, which conflict with or are rendered improbable by scientific evidence? We will then examine the weaker charge: Does it include statements which are nonscientific, that is, which are neither supported by nor conflicting with scientific evidence?

Teilhard has been accused of adopting the Lamarckian theory which most biologists today do not accept. Lamarck held that characteristics acquired by an organism during its lifetime can be inherited by its descendants. This idea is mentioned in early Teilhard essays, but it is rejected in the Phenomenon and later



FIVE WAYS OF READING TEILHARD 117

writings. However, he does agree with the Lamarckian tradition in assigning a major role to the organism's own efforts and interior life - the rudimentary forms of sentience and mentality which he calls the "within." But he also gives prominence to mutations, chance, randomness, the "billion-fold trial-and-error of mechanical forces" which the Darwinian tradition has stressed. He uses the metaphor of a "groping" evolutionary advance to express his attempted compromise between the two traditions, "the blind fan- tasy of large numbers combined with the precise orientation of a

specific target." In the Phenomenon these internal forces are said to "utilize"

chance variations, but the idea is not elaborated:

an essential part is left to the Darwinian play of external forces and to chance. It is only really through strokes of chance that life pro- ceeds, but strokes of chance which are recognised and grasped - that is to say psychically selected. Properly understood the "anti- chance" of the Neo-Lamarckian is not a mere negation. On the contrary it appears as the utilisation of Darwinian chance.1

In later writings Teilhard leaves open the question of the action of internal forces on the evolution of life in the crucial range between matter and man:

During a first and immensely long period (pre-life) chance alone, so far as we can judge, seems to have governed the formation of the first complexes. Above this (pre-human life) there stretches a wide, disputed area in which, according to some (the neo-Darwinians), the weaving of the biosphere is again to be explained by chance alone (automatically selected chances); according to others (the neo- Lamarckians) still by chance, but in this case chance seized and used by a principle of internal self-organization. Higher still (once the threshold of reflection has been crossed) the psychic power of combination finally emerges in the individual among the effects of large numbers as a specific and normal factor of hominised life.2

Here Teilhard is noncommital about neo-Lamarckian factors be- fore the advent of man; few scientists would dispute the presence of such factors after the advent of man.

Some biologists have objected to Teilhard's defense of ortho- genesis, but it should be noted that he uses the term purely de- scriptively to refer to directionality however it is achieved.3 He sees a trend toward greater improbability, complexity, and consciousness (he assumes that these are always associated together, though one wonders whether consciousness is not associated rather



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with distinctive types of complexity). He acknowledges, moreover, that directionality is not a simple "straight-line" trend, but a "groping advance," and he holds that it is not incompatible with "the play of chance" through mutations.4 It also seems unfair to call Teilhard a vitalist, since he never postulates gaps in the material order through which separate entities or life-principles operate, as earlier vitalists asserted. For him, the "within of things" is another way of looking at the same system whose "without" is matter; its action involves the coordination but not the violation of physico-chemical forces.5

Nor does Teilhard postulate divine intervention as an explanation of gaps in the scientific account - a procedure which in past centuries has proved both scientifically objectionable and theologi- cally short-sighted, since one gap after another has been closed. For Teilhard, divine creativity is immanent in the whole natural order, and is not an occasional interruption from outside. God is not an efficient cause on the same plane as natural causes. We will consider later Teilhard's understanding of God's relation to nature, but we can note here that it does not violate the scientific account. Teleology is displayed in the whole process, not in any particular structures or creatures. Life does not have to be in- troduced by divine intervention, since incipient life is present already in matter.

The Phenomenon of Man is not unscientific, then, in the sense of contradicting established theories. It would hardly have re- ceived enthusiastic endorsement from many prominent biologists if it included central assertions which could be shown to be false or improbable on scientific grounds. Huxley's introduction sup- ports most of the book's ideas (with the exception of the conclud- ing chapters) and Dobzhansky and Waddington are among those who have praised the volume.6 Nevertheless, I would suggest three additions to Teilhard's thought which, without violating his fundamental scheme, might render it more acceptable to most biologists:

(1) The relation between chance and direction in evolution needs clarification. Teilhard frequently identifies neo-Darwinism exclusively with chance, and neo-Lamarckianism with direction. But neo-Darwinism actually involves not only chance mutations but natural selection which exerts a directional or anti-chance influence. Natural selection is a feed-back mechanism whereby, over many generations, information about the species' perform-




ance is recorded in the gene structure which in turn modifies future performance. The direction of change is defined by survival, and very diverse characteristics may contribute under diverse conditions; such direction may therefore be variable, but it is not random. Teilhard could have defended the importance of the "within" without ascribing all directionality to its influence.

(2) Internal forces can influence evolution even if acquired characteristics are not inherited. In other words, the neo-Lamarck- ian idea of the importance of the mental life of the organism can be incorporated within a basically neo-Darwinian framework. One way in which organisms influence their own evolution is by selecting their environment, as M. Baldwin and C. Lloyd Morgan pointed out early in the century. Waddington's idea of "genetic assimilation" depends upon the organism's behavior.7 Hardy de- scribes an effect whose long-term results are similar to those of Lamarckianism. Suppose that during a time of food scarcity one species of birds adopts a new habit of probing for insects under the bark of trees. Thereafter, those mutations or variations associated with longer beaks will survive better and be perpetuated. In this fashion an internal drive producing a novel activity can lead to evolutionary change. The random mutation was not the source of the novelty, but served rather to "fix" a change intro- duced originally by the initiative of the organism itself. Hardy concludes: "Internal behavioral selection due to the 'pyschic life* of the animal, whatever we think about its nature, is now seen to be a most powerful creative element in evolution."8 The contribution of the "within" can thus be defended without invoking the discredited thesis that acquired characteristics are directly inherited.

(3) The power of the physico-chemical approach in biology needs explicit acknowledgment. Since Teilhard's death, the DNA molecule has been shown to have a key role in the genetic trans- mission of the coded "instructions" governing the growth of each organism. There have also been important advances in brain neuro-physiology, and computer research has begun to throw light on some of the brain's modes of operation. Such knowledge of the mechanisms of life is not imcompatible with Teilhard's thesis about the "within," provided the latter is not assumed to require a gap in the physico-chemical account. The "within" should perhaps be taken as another way of looking at the same system, espe-



120 SOUNDINGS

daily in its higher levels of organization and activity. Further clarification of such questions would help to support the scientific integrity of Teilhard's ideas. But even without them, I suggest, his work should not be labeled unscientific, that is, contradicted by science.

Let us turn now to the charge that much of the Phenomenon is rzonscientific, that is, neither supported by nor conflicting with science. The opening sentence of Teilhard's Preface states: "If this book is to be properly understood, it must be read not as a work on metaphysics, still less as a sort of theological essay, but

purely and simply as a scientific treatise." Yet the very nature of Teilhard's concern for "the totality of the phenomenon of man" takes him far beyond the specialized sciences; he attempts to view very diverse data within a comprehensive framework. To be sure, there is never any absolute line between fact and interpretation, and all experimental data are already "theory laden."9 But the role of creative imagination in interpreting the data is greater when more inclusive schemes are projected. Teilhard himself was ap- parently aware of this, for later in the same Preface he states:

During the last fifty years or so the investigations of science have proved beyond all doubt that there is no fact which exists in pure isolation, but that every experience, however objective it may seem, inevitably becomes enveloped in a complex of assumptions as soon as the scientist attempts to explain it. But while this aura of subjective interpretation may remain imperceptible where the field of observation is limited, it is bound to be practically dominant as soon as the field of vision extends to the whole.10

Apart from the non-scientific character of the task he attempts, there is much in its execution which could not be included in even the broadest definition of science. Scientific words are frequently used metaphorically (for example, "radial energy," "psychic temperature," spatial metaphors of "axis" and "convergence"). Often .the analogies are vague, the terms not clearly defined, the comparisons not carefully analyzed. The "within of things," which will be discussed later, is only very indirectly related to observable evidence. The extrapolation of the apparent direction of evolution to the global convergence of mankind to form an inter-thinking unity (the "noosphere") is highly speculative. Teilhard himself grants that the point of ultimate convergence, the Omega Point, which turns out to resemble the Christian




concept of God, is "strictly undemonstrable to science." His fre- quent use of superlatives is irritating (for example, a plethora of terms beginning with "hyper-," "ultra-," and "super-"). Many scientists are put off by his neologisms and rhetorical style. If the book claims to be "purely scientific" one cannot but be critical of such features. One can even understand Medawar's reaction (though not his intemperate expression of it) in saying that Teil- hard "cheats with words" and "the greater part of the book is nonsense tricked out in a variety of metaphysical conceits."11

It would indeed have been helpful if Teilhard had differen- tiated more clearly between accepted scientific data, testable hy- potheses, and more speculative philosophical proposals. He presents the most tenuous extrapolation from debatable premises with as much certainty as a description of the skull of Sinanthropus. He treats ambiguous analogies as if they were arguments from which conclusions follow "inescapably," "inevitably," and "infallibly." If, as I will suggest, the sources of his conviction on a number of issues lay outside science, these sources might have been more explicitly indicated. In his desire to communicate to an age influenced by science, he seems to have over-emphasized the scientific character of his writing; his humility and his training - and perhaps his desire to minimize difficulties with his ecclesiastical superiors - may have led him to play down its theological assumptions. In any case, I must take exception to Teilhard's statement that the book should be read "purely and simply as a scientific treatise."

II. Teilhard as Poet and Mystic

Because much of the book is not scientific by even the broadest definition, some interpreters have gone to the opposite extreme, viewing it as a poetic epic inspired by evolutionary science. It does employ a vivid imagery drawn in part from biology and physics; analogies and metaphors are used with great imagination. The writing has an evocative and persuasive quality; Teilhard's response to the grandeur of a dynamic and coherent cosmos calls forth a similar reaction in the reader. Here is the power of an in- tuitive vision of a unified and interdependent world, a vision of magnificent sweep. Each of us is part of the immense river of time. Perhaps our own interiority and that of other beings is



122 SOUNDINGS

grasped in an immediate awareness more like the poet's insight than the scientist's objective analysis. Here also is a lyric love of nature, an ecstatic affirmation of life. Should we not conclude that Teilhard has given a poetic response to the world disclosed by science rather than a scientific argument? A poet can juxtapose the concrete imagery from several fields without limiting himself to the criteria of any of them. Again, might we find a clue in the references to ' 'seeing'

' and 'Vision" in his Foreword to the volume? Is it not by basically aesthetic criteria that we must judge the way Teilhard brings the various aspects of human experience into a harmonious whole?

Reading the Phenomenon in the light of The Divine Milieu and Hymn of the Universe one can also see in it signs of Teilhard the mystic. He confesses to a life-long "passion for the Absolute" and a "pervasive sense of cosmic unity." There is in him some- thing of the spirit of St. Francis, moved by a vision of God's presence in nature. For him, as for Gerard Manley Hopkins, "the world is charged with the grandeur of God." The divine is uni- versally present, pervading the created order as a sacramental presence in the world. Where Western religious life has centered in the moral and historical dimensions, Teilhard recovers the spiritual significance of the natural and the cosmic. This is no mysticism of escape from the world, no Manichean condemnation of matter as evil, but an affirmation of the sacred within the world, of spirit within matter. On this reading, the clue to Teilhard's thought would be his profound life of prayer and devotion, God as experienced rather than God as the conclusion of an argument. The Phenomenon would then be a kind of religious meditation on evolution, a vision of a world process under God.12

Those who call Teilhard a poet or a mystic often intend thereby to deny the cognitive content or truth-value of his ideas. Thus G. G. Simpson holds that

Teilhard was primarily a Christian mystic and only secondarily a scientist. . . . There is no possible way of validating or testing Teil- hard's mystic vision of Omega. Any assurance about it must itself be an unsupported act of mystic faith.13

Usually such critics assume that only scientific assertions have cognitive content. Poetry is thought of as a purely personal response which has nothing to do with objective truth, and the mystic's vision is assumed to be private and incommunicable.




The positivist holds that metaphysics and theology are meaningless; if these disciplines are eliminated, and if the Phenomenon is not science, then the only remaining classification is the expression of subjective emotion.

Some authors, however, have acknowledged that even poetry makes ontological claims. Moreover, scholars in the history of religions (e.g., Eliade) have pointed to the importance of myths in articulating the way men respond to the world. Men in all cultures celebrate life in terms of dramatic images. Modern man has not escaped this necessity, though his myths may be drawn from science. James Reilly suggests that the Phenomenon em- bodies a myth, "a way of speaking of reality symbolically in an account which gives unity to a vision of life." He compares it with Plato's creation myth in the Timaeus, which likewise reflects social, cultural, and scientific assumptions.14 Here myth is not a derogatory term for an untrue story, but a descriptive term for a type of imaginative literature which continues to serve an important function in human life by expressing a kind of truth different from the statements of science.

Now it is clear that intuition, imagination, and mystical experience were indeed prominent in Teilhard's life and find expression throughout his writings. A strong case can be made for assigning to them the predominant role in the unification of the various strands of his thought. His own most impressive gifts were surely those of personal witness and profound spirituality rather than linguistic precision and philosophical abstraction. Perhaps we should be inspired by the unity of a person and not seek for coherence in the realm of systematic ideas. Was not his synthesis achieved in experience rather than in concepts? Did he not distrust metaphysical speculation?

The present author would reply: Yes, let us recognize the power of Teilhard the poet and mystic but not neglect the significance of his ideas. He differs from a St. Francis precisely in his concern for conceptual synthesis. We must examine his categories of thought, which are indebted to scientific as well as religious understanding and are subject to rational discussion. Even if we insist that myth, poetry, and mysticism can express distinctive forms of truth and not merely subjective feelings, we cannot assign Teilhard's writing primarily to these literary genres. In The Phenomenon of Man, evolutionary science does more than



124 SOUNDINGS

simply provide the images for poetic reflection or the occasions for mystic awareness; it provides a conceptual framework for interpreting events. In particular, Teilhard's analysis of God's relation to the world is indebted to science as well as to personal experience. The logical connections between the scientific data and Teilhard's central assertions are not close enough to call his writing "science," but neither are all logical connections absent, as the categories of "poetry" or "mysticism" might imply. The remaining three interpretations lie between the two extremes thus far considered.

III. Teilhard as Natural Theologian

The tradition of natural theology has maintained that theological conclusions which are not either scientific or poetic can be drawn from the character of the natural order. In the classical argument from design the coordinated structure of particular creatures - and of such organs as the eye - was taken as evidence of an intelligent designer. From Aquinas to Paley, proponents of the argument assumed a static universe with fixed species created in their present forms. This assumption was, of course, under- mined by Darwin, who showed that each species and each organ is the end-product of a long and gradual evolutionary process. But the argument was reformulated after Darwin by ascribing design not to specific organisms but to the various conditions, properties, and laws through which the evolution of higher forms could occur in a universe which is dynamic. Design was then said to be built into and expressed in the whole law-abiding process through which life and mind were brought into being.15

The Phenomenon of Man can be read as a reformulated argument from design in which the directionality of evolution is taken as evidence for the existence of God. In a dynamic universe, beginnings are less significant than directions of movement. We have seen that while Teilhard acknowledges much waste, chance, and "trial and error," he insists that there is a "privileged axis," a trend toward complexity, consciousness, individualization, and "personalization." The direction is toward more improbable combinations, against the trend of entropy in matter. In some passages the existence of God (Omega) seems to be inferred from such directionality: "In Omega we have in the first place the




principle we needed to explain both the persistent march of things toward greater consciousness, and the paradoxical solidity of what is most fragile/'16

A number of Teilhard's supporters have insisted that his writing is indeed a form of natural theology. After conservative critics attacked the Phenomenon as presenting inadequate concepts of God and religious faith, his defenders replied that one should not expect a full Christian theology in such a work. The whole point of natural theology is that it does not make use of historical revelation; it takes the unbeliever where he is and leads him to whatever can be known about God from the created order alone. De Lubac, for example, feels that it is unfair to criticize Teilhard for not stressing the transcendence of God or the supernatural character of faith and grace; these would have been out of place in an apologetic aimed at the agnostic and based only on what the latter could accept.17

In a similar fashion, Teilhard's attempt to derive ethical guidance for man's future by extrapolating the trends of the past might be taken as a new version of natural ethics. The traditional "natural law" ethics tried to derive ethical norms from the given structures of existence (family interdependence, the need for political order, the capacities of man). The newer version starts less from ordained structures than from directions of development, which for Teilhard point toward the global convergence of mankind into an in ter thinking social organism (the "noosphere"). Much of the appeal of the Phenomenon lies in its mes- sage of hope derived, it would seem, by projecting into the future the long ascent of the past. In a day when many authors portray despair, meaninglessness, and estrangement from nature, here is a scientist who sees in the world-process a basis for faith in progress, cosmic optimism, and a sense of kinship with nature.

We recall that the new form of the argument from design does not invoke divine intervention in gaps in the scientific account. Teilhard writes:

For the Christian transformist, God's creative action is no longer conceived as an intrusive thrusting of His works into the midst of pre-existent beings, but as a bringing to birth of the successive stages of His work in the heart of things. . . . The property of divine action is precisely not to be observed either here or there (except to some degree in the mystical relationship of spirit with Spirit) but to be spread throughout the sustained, completed and to some extent



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super-animated complex of secondary activities. ... A creation of evolutionary type (God making things make themselves) has for long seemed to some very great minds the most beautiful form imaginable in which God could act in the universe.18

In a few passages Teilhard implies that the directionality is inexplicable unless some guiding force controls mutations. In general, however, he seems to hold that there are natural (secondary) causes, including the "within," which can explain the directionality; design would then be expressed in the very operation of these causes. Unfortunately he does not give any detailed discussion of the relation of primary and secondary causality, or of teleology and mechanism. It would appear that he did not usually think of God as an efficient cause operating on the same plane as natural forces, though he was not altogether unambiguous on this point.

If design is expressed in the whole process, the argument is an indirect and philosophical one. It does not depend on showing that directionality is "scientifically inexplicable"; the naturalistic humanist who treats the universe as a "given" can continue to do so. Of course, the defense of the integrity of natural causes might yield a deistic view of a God who built design into the structures of the world but has no continuing relationship to it. In the Thomistic scheme, however, God is said to act as "primary cause" working through "secondary causes"; he continually sus- tains and preserves the world. Teilhard seems to picture God in a more active relationship to nature, but he does not indicate the character of God's action in a law-abiding world.

Is such a reformulated argument from design convincing? Natural theology has always had a respected place as a preamble to revealed theology in Thomistic thought, and many Catholic commentators (such as de Lubac) urge us to read Teilhard in this way. Others are more dubious. Rabut, in a volume which combines appreciation with careful criticism,19 concludes: "I do not believe the proofs of God proposed by Teilhard." Clearly the argument is not a "proof"; at most it might lead one to conclude that the hypothesis of an intelligent designer is more reasonable than other explanations of the direction-producing order of nature (though Teilhard does little to examine alternative hy- potheses). Such an argument might be rejected, however, for one of three reasons:




(1) All metaphysical interpretations of evolution might be challenged. Some authors reject on methodological grounds all attempts to derive metaphysical or ethical conclusions - whether theistic or naturalistic - from science. Thus Toulmin classifies Teilhard's work as "the current installment in the tradition of natural theology"20 which is to be dismissed because it is not scientific. In an earlier volume Toulmin was equally critical of Julian Huxley's attempt to derive a naturalistic world-view and ethical norms from evolution.21 Science can disclose no truths about "the universe," no Main Road of Cosmic History. Accord- ing to positivistic and instrumentalist interpreters, science yields only technical knowledge which is useful for controlling nature; one must not expect it to provide a philosophy of life or a set of ethical principles. I would question this sharp division of statements into scientific and non-scientific, with cognitive content ascribed only to the former. One cannot rule out Teilhard's argument simply because it goes beyond science.

(2) Directionality might be challenged. Simpson asserts that evolution is "opportunistic" and "without foresight," since a species adapts to a particular environment even if such adaptation leads to extinction when the environment changes. He grants that in addition to a diversity of short-term trends there are long-term trends which do appear directional, but he attributes these to statistical laws in the operation of natural selection.22 Simpson assumes that the acknowledgment of such laws is incompatible with the idea of design. I have suggested, however, that recognition of natural causes is not incompatible with the idea that design is expressed through the total evolutionary process, even if it manifests waste and short-term variability.

(3) The theistic conclusion might be challenged. Some of the criticisms of the traditional version of the argument which have been in circulation since the time of Hume are less damaging to an evolutionary version. For example, the existence of evil in a once-for-all creation formerly constituted a serious difficulty in arguing for a benevolent designer, whereas evil which is an inescapable by-product of a slow creative process seems less problematic. However, other criticisms are as applicable to the new version as to the old. Hume maintained that from a finite world one can infer at most only a finite God - or an organizing force and internal principle within nature rather than transcen-



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dent to it. He also questioned the inference that God is the "cause" of design in the world; he held that we ascribe causality only when there has been a recurrence of effects, whereas with our universe we have only one instance from which to judge and there are no valid analogies which can be drawn. Teilhard's writing, if interpreted as an argument from design, is subject to such criticisms. Even if the argument cannot be excluded in principle, it rests on reasoning which most philosophers do not find convincing. At most it leads to some kind of natural force, not to theism.

But beyond the limitations of the argument itself, there is the more fundamental question: Should the book really be evaluated primarily as natural theology? There is much to support the affirmative answer given by most interpreters. Teilhard often does seem to be using evolutionary science as the basis for a reformulated "argument from design/' His own prefatory remarks on methodology assert that the book reasons only from "the phenomena," avoiding traditional theology and metaphysics. References to Christian thought are restricted to an Epilogue and a few footnotes. Of all his works, this one in particular seems to be an argument aimed at the unbelieving scientist or the modern skeptic who takes science seriously. Teilhard undoubtedly saw this new evolutionary version as a promising apologetic.

I would submit, however, that whatever his intentions he has not in practice limited himself to the phenomena and has raised what would classically have been called metaphysical questions. Moreover, his outlook was deeply influenced by his theological assumptions, even where they are not explicitly mentioned; his ideas represent a genuine synthesis of scientific and religious insights rather than an inference from science alone. Teilhard's writing was surely aimed not only at the scientific unbeliever who might be brought to belief in God, but at the believer who con- fronts the world of science. Was Teilhard not also concerned to reconcile scientific and religious aspects of his own life, quite apart from his desire to address others? We must somehow give more explicit recognition to his Christian commitment than the previous methodologies provide.

IV. Teilhard as Christian Theologian

Instead of reading the Phenomenon as a natural theology - an argument from nature to God - one could read it as an attempt to




view nature from a theological perspective. Here the main source of religious ideas would lie outside science; the starting point would be biblical revelation and the Christian heritage by which Teilhard's thought was profoundly molded. In the Epilogue of the Phenomenon he confesses:

God, the Centre of centres. In that final vision the Christian dogma culminates. And so exactly, so perfectly does this coincide with the Omega Point that doubtless I should never have ventured to en- visage the latter or formulate the hypothesis rationally if, in my consciousness as a believer, I had not found not only its speculative model, but also its living reality.23 Such a classification of his thought as a "theology of nature"

rather than a "natural theology" is advocated by Bernard Wall:

There is no "logical" sequence between the scientific statements made by Teilhard and the statements that flow from his faith. There is no "proving** the idea of an Omega point from the present and future evolution of man. . . . His vision of the Pleroma was a statement of the way in which he, imaginatively, as a man of intense faith, saw the assertions of the Christian revelation working out in the sort of cosmos science now knows we inhabit.24

Similarly, Ernan McMullin suggests that the centrality of time, history, man, and the "within" in Teilhard's thought were derived from their importance in biblical thought. He proposes that "this would be the first authentic case of a 'Christian Science'."25 On this reading, Teilhard's convictions concerning the directionality of history and the significance of personality came from his religious beliefs, and his optimism for the future was basically an expression of the Christian eschatological hope rather than an inference from evolution. McMullin holds that the justification for Teilhard's extension of human and teleological categories to the cosmos comes really from his faith as a Christian.

Much of Teilhard's writing can be thought of as the articulation of classical Christian doctrines within an evolutionary universe. The Phenomenon contains a rendition of doctrines of creation, providence, and eschatology. Let us therefore take a moment to summarize some of Teilhard's theological convictions developed more fully in other writings26 and then note how these may have affected the conclusions of the Phenomenon. One of his recurrent themes is a "cosmic Christology." Where the Western tradition has usually stressed the juridical and moral significance of Christ,



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Teilhard stresses his ontological significance. Christ is not a foreign intruder sent arbitrarily to an alien realm to rescue individuals from it; he is the world's true fulfilment, integrally related to whatever is creative in it. Here we have an idea reminiscent of the Greek Fathers' "Universal Lord," John's "Logos/' and Paul's "Christ in whom all things cohere." Here we have the conviction that grace does not supersede nature but uses and completes it. Redemption is the continuation of creation, and continuing creation is an expression of redemption.

Thus for Teilhard as theologian, redemption is integral to "cosmogenesis" and the maturation of the world. The purpose of the incarnation is not simply the "remedial" work of making satisfaction for man's sin, but the "constructive" work of uniting all reality and bringing it to union with God. He agrees with Scotus that the incarnation was intended not primarily to make reparation for an accident that had befallen God's original plan but to elevate created reality to its fulfilment; the incarnation would have taken place even if Adam's fall had not occurred.27 Grace is not so much an antidote for moral evil as a creative force in human life. Teilhard thus upholds the unity of creation, incarnation, and redemption. He emphasizes Christ's function in cosmic and social salvation, rather than in the personal salvation of individuals. In Teilhard's eschatology the activity of man and the world contribute to the actualization of the final Kingdom. Cosmic progress and the maturation of man are "a condition (not indeed sufficient and determinative but necessary) for the Parousia of Christ."28 Man and nature collaborate with God in bringing the cosmos to completion; they cooperate in the unifying and creative divine action. Evolutionary development and human endeavor prepare for the ultimate Pleroma. Teilhard envisages salvation not as an escape from the world but as its completion and sanctification. Such an eschatological vision provides a back- ground for interpreting the Phenomenon, especially in its later chapters.

Teilhard's "theology of nature" can also be understood as an expression of his theology of the secular. We have mentioned his affirmation of the creative potentialities of the world and his rejection of the dualistic tendency to view matter as evil. He reacts against any uncritical condemnation of the world and any mistrust of progress which would undercut responsible action. Teilhard's




thought is incarnational and sacramental throughout; divine involvement in history in the Christ-event shows the value of the world in God's eyes, and the Christian life likewise should lead to involvement in the world. Teilhard's appreciation of the positive values in secularity is not unlike that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Harvey Cox, and other recent exponents of "worldly Christian- ity." On a number of occasions he spoke of the significance of science as a religious activity.

If the Phenomenon is viewed in this fashion as a "theology of nature" dependent on biblical sources, it is of course more vulnerable to some kinds of theological criticism. In reply, Teil- hard's defenders in this arena must try to show that he is not really very unorthodox. Although he stresses God's immanence, for example, the allegation that he is a pantheist is surely unfair, since he repeatedly asserts that God is transcendent and that each person maintains his individuality over against God. Another common criticism is that he portrays the consummation of history as the natural climax of an ascending process rather than as the supernatural action of God's grace. But Teilhard himself states that the maturation of the world process is only the preparation for a consummation which comes from God; moreover, it must be recalled that for him there is no absolute dichotomy between "natural" and "supernatural" events.29 The critics who ascribe to Teilhard the belief that "the natural world on its own and without God has redemptive capabilities" have neglected his conviction that the world never is on its own, since God is always at work. As we will see later, the inadequacy of his treatment of evil is perhaps more serious, for he does minimize the tragic and ambiguous character of man's freedom.30 In each case Teilhard's views would have to be judged primarily in terms of their fidelity to the biblical tradition.

Now this classification of the Phenomenon as a Christian theology of nature has much to commend it; the pervasiveness of Teilhard's biblical assumptions cannot be denied. But this interpretation, taken alone, fails to provide any clear rationale for the impact of evolutionary science on his theological ideas. Teilhard was not simply recovering neglected aspects of an historic tradition. Somehow we must allow for his indebtedness to both religious and scientific sources and must show how there could be interaction between scientific and religious concepts - which, I



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will argue, occurs through the metaphysical categories he employs. Let us assume that the primary sources of Teilhard's theologi-

cal ideas were religious experience and historical revelation. Like those who see Teilhard as a mystic, we can recognize the im-

portance of his own devotional life; but religious experience is

always interpreted in terms of a particular historical tradition. Like the "natural theology" school, we can allow for the influence of science on Teilhard's thought. But science was not the primary source of his understanding of God; his evolutionary outlook influenced his theological views more indirectly through his meta-

physics. Like those who see his writing as Christian theology, we can acknowledge his dependence on historical revelation. But

theology is not itself revealed; it always involves the human inter-

pretation of events in which God is understood to have acted. Both Protestant and Catholic writers have maintained that revelation occurs not in a fixed set of theological propositions but in historical events - events which elicit man's ever-new response and which are understood only in the changing categories of his

thought.31 In Teilhard's case these categories reflect a metaphysics of process.

V. Teilhard as Process Philosopher

If Teilhard was indeed attempting a synthesis of ideas drawn from both his scientific and his religious backgrounds, as he

explicitly maintained in some of his writings,* one would expect that his metaphysics would reflect this double origin. Classically, metaphysics was the search for the most general categories for

interpreting experience and for analyzing the basic structures of

reality - e.g., space and time, cause and effect, mind and matter.

Every metaphysical system deals with a variety of types of experience and uses interpretive ideas influenced by a variety of sources.32 It is well known that the categories used by St. Augustine show indebtedness to both Platonic and biblical traditions. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, drew upon Aristotelian

* For example, in the foreword to "Comment je crois" (1934, scheduled for publication in Oeuvres, Vol. X), whose structure is similar to "Phenom- enon," he mentions his scientific and religious training and states that "after thirty years consecrated to the pursuit of an interior unity, I have the impression that a synthesis has naturally formed between these two currents which solicited me."




philosophy and biblical theology; his familiarity with each modi- fied his understanding of the other. Thus Aristotelian assumptions made Aquinas more sensitive to some aspects of biblical thought than to others; for example, his concept of God merged Aristotle's First Cause and the Bible's personal Father and Savior. Again, Newtonian science in its day contributed to the emergence of a mechanistic metaphysics33 - a picture of reality as matter-in- motion whose future could be predicted from knowledge of the position and velocity of each particle. The correlate of the Newton- ian world-machine was the deistic view of God, the cosmic watch- maker who designed the mechanism and left it to run by itself. Of course Augustine, Aquinas, and Newton - along with almost everyone until the nineteenth century - assumed that the world had been created in essentially its present form.

Teilhard, by contrast, was dominated by an evolutionary understanding of a world as yet incomplete. Where Aquinas' basic categories were those of being and substance, Teilhard's were those of becoming and process. Time, change, and interaction acquire new significance in his scheme. The world is not a set of self-contained entities related only externally to each other but a network of mutual relationships spread through time and space. This evolutionary perspective led Teilhard to stress the dynamic aspects of the biblical picture of a God involved in history and the world and participating in a work of continuing creation. Teilhard's view of reality as temporal process was thus the "middle term" through which scientific ideas indirectly affected theological ones and vice versa. Teilhard was not a systematic philosopher; he had considerable training in science and theology, but little in philosophy. But his partially-developed metaphysics shows the same kind of double origin and two-way influence that is evident in Aquinas; specifically, we can trace the interaction of evolutionary science and biblical theology in his thought.34

Teilhard's metaphysics can be illuminated by comparing it with the more fully elaborated process philosophy of Whitehead, which it strikingly resembles.35 There is no evidence that either man knew the work of the other, though each acknowledges the importance of Bergson in his own development.36 Reflection on modern science led both Teilhard and Whitehead to emphasize the temporality and organic interdependence of the world. They



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see time, change, development, and growth as pervasive characteristics of reality. Every entity is constituted by its relationships; as Teilhard puts it, "each element of the cosmos is woven from all others/' The "web of life" is a network of mutual interactions forming one integral process. In words similar to Whitehead's, Teilhard writes: "The distribution, succession and solidarity of objects are born from their concrescence in a common genesis. Time and space are organically joined again so as to weave together the stuff of the universe."37 Not isolated and self- contained substances but dynamically interdependent events within the unity of a single world-process are the constituents of reality.

Both men stress the continuity of evolutionary history. The capacities of higher organisms were present in rudimentary form in lower ones; each new level represents the flowering of what was potentially present all along. There are no sharp lines between the "living" and the "non-living," or between "mental" and "non- mental" life. Yet there are important "thresholds" or "critical points," as Teilhard calls them, which mark crucial breakthroughs to new levels of organization. Despite their common emphasis on the unity and continuity of the total world-process, neither author ends with a monism in which the parts are swallowed up in the whole; each defends a pluralism of entities with individual initiative. Of the two men, Whitehead is the more insistently pluralistic, however. He pictures every being as a unique synthesis, a center of spontaneity and self-creation contributing distinctively to the future. He wants us to look at the world from the point of view of each entity itself, considered as a moment of experience that takes account of other events, responds to them, and makes a creative selection from among alternative potentialities. White- head's "subjective pole" of all events resembles Teilhard's "within of things," an elementary kind of responsiveness and sensitivity in even the simplest creatures, a forerunner of man's mental life. Neither author, of course, imputes self-consciousness or reflection to lower organisms, whose "psychic life" is infinitesimal and represents only the beginnings of perception, spontaneity, and anticipation in "extremely attenuated versions." Teilhard holds that "interiority" of an elementary kind reaches all the way down the scale of life, though it becomes imperceptible and "lost in darkness" as we trace it back.38




Why do Teilhard and Whitehead take man's consciousness to be an important clue to the interpretation of the world? Their reasons appear to be similar. First, consciousness is the only aspect of reality which we know directly. Second, it is a product of the evolutionary process and is therefore indicative of the potentialities of that process. Third, the various levels of reality are assumed to be continuous; even man is not discontinuous from the rest of nature. As Teilhard puts it: "Since the stuff of the universe has an inner aspect at one point of itself, there is necessarily a double aspect to its structure, that is to say in every region of space and time."39 If there is a continuous spectrum of complexity from man down to the amoeba and beyond, one can set no absolute limits at which any of the basic features of human experience - or some- thing remotely akin to them - may be present. Man's experience is an extreme instance of an event in nature, and hence is taken to exhibit the generic features of all events. Whitehead maintains that metaphysical categories must have maximum generality and applicability to all events including our awareness as experiencing subjects. Perhaps Teilhard's viewpoint here reflects also the biblical outlook concerning the value of personality and the unity of man as a whole being.

Teilhard's temporalistic metaphysics is also evident in his theological formulations. Greek thought was obsessed with the timeless, and it disparaged temporality and change as hallmarks of an inferior realm; truth was said to be outside time and salvation was liberation from time. Hebrew thought, by contrast, looked on history as the sphere of God's redemptive purposes; it was more concerned with truth-in-action than with the contempla- tion of eternal forms or unchanging essences.40 Scholastic thought attempted to combine these two traditions, but as many authors have noted it tended to exalt static over dynamic categories. Teilhard's understanding of God has more in common with the Bible's living Person than with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. His insistence on the evolutionary and historical character of reality is in accord with the biblical conviction of the importance of time and history and is one of the grounds for his positive evaluation of "secular" life. Most of the distinctive theological ideas mentioned in the preceding section express Teilhard's metaphysics of process.

Detailed discussion of Teilhard's process theology would take



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us far beyond the Phenomenon. I have described elsewhere* some parallels between Teilhard and Whitehead in their treatments of continuing creation, God's relation to the world, and the problem of evil. Some major differences in their views of Christ and eschatology are also pointed out there. In the "cosmic Christ" theme, for example, Teilhard's conviction of the organic interdependence of the world is combined with a conviction of the centrality of Christ which is lacking in Whitehead; Teilhard develops the meaning of biblical concepts of redemption and eschatology for an evolving cosmos. In the article cited I conclude that on its theological side Teilhard's thought represents a combination of process philosophy and Christian theology into what one might call a process theology.

I have stressed the role of process metaphysics in the Phenom- enon partly because it seems to have been ignored by most commentators. De Lubac, for example, in one of the most careful and sympathetic examinations of the book, accepts at its face value Teilhard's prefatory disclaimers, and he concludes:

The synthesis represented by The Phenomenon of Man does not in any degree belong to the order of metaphysics - at any rate if we allow the word its now classical meaning; nor, a fortiori, does it belong to the order of theology. This it utterly rules out. It is built up on the jealously preserved ground of objective scientific observation.41

De Lubac insists repeatedly that Teilhard deals "only with the phenomena." He concedes that there are two exceptions: the por- trayal of the "within" and the task of synthesis, both of which, he admits, take one beyond science into metaphysics. But surely these are two of the most pervasive and distinctive ideas of the book; they are not minor themes which could be bracketed and treated as exceptions. (De Lubac barely mentions the "within" until one of his last chapters in which he takes up those aspects of Teilhard's thought with which he disagrees.) Now it may well be that Teil- hard's metaphysics is controversial, but it is by no means clear that it is peripheral. Observing that Teilhard had seen resemblances between the Aristotelian concept of nature and his own, de Lubac comments: "He sought to instil new life into the old theory of matter and form by adding to it a further dimension, that of

* Ian G. Barbour, "Teilhard's Process Metaphysics," Journal of Religion (in press).




duration, though without feeling obliged to retain the actual words.'*42 I would maintain that this "further dimension of duration" led to an extensive departure from Thomistic metaphysics which went far beyond expressing it in new words. Because dis- satisfaction with scholasticism among Catholic philosophers has been widespread and outspoken since Vatican II,43 one may anti-

cipate that in the future Teilhard's metaphysics will receive greater explicit attention.

We cannot embark here on a detailed evaluation of Teilhard's

metaphysics but we can give an example of the kind of criticism to which it might be subject. In any metaphysics, clues taken from one area of experience provide the models for interpreting other areas. The criteria of evaluation are coherence, compre- hensiveness, and adequacy to the data of experience. One wonders whether Teilhard's thought allows adequately for the diversity of entities in the world or the distinctiveness of man. Despite his references to "thresholds," the idea of continuity predominates; man's experience provides the central analogy for interpreting all entities, and, conversely, biological categories are extrapolated into the human sphere. The difference between biological (genetic) evolution in the past and cultural (psycho-social) evolution in the future are mentioned but tend to be forgotten in practice. The extrapolation from evolutionary history to man's future course seems particularly risky when used to derive ethical norms for social policies. Such questions of content are analyzed in the article mentioned above.

Conclusion

We have examined five ways of reading The Phenomenon of Man: as evolutionary science, as poetry and mysticism, as natural theology, as Christian theology, and as process philosophy. The volume is indeed multi-faceted; it cannot be neatly pigeon-holed into any one specialized discipline. Moreover, Teilhard gives only the briefest discussion of methodology, and many of his key terms are ambiguous. It is thus peculiarly vulnerable to one-sided in-

terpretations by both critics and supporters. In any book - but especially in one that crosses lines between fields - the reader tends to see what he is looking for and to use what he finds for his own purposes; the present author is presumably no exception. I have



138 SOUNDINGS

proposed that the unity of Teilhard's outlook - both within the Phenomenon and among all his works - can be found at two levels. On the one hand there is the level of personal experience, in which his passionate mysticism is central. Here one must acknowledge an intense conviction of cosmic unity and a powerful imaginative expression of it. But if we are interested in the structure of his thought we must also give attention to the con- ceptualities in which this vision is presented. At this level we have argued that an undeveloped process metaphysics is the key to the unity of the Teilhardian synthesis.

Most interpreters have sharply contrasted Teilhard's various works, classifying the Phenomenon as a natural theology aimed at the "unbeliever," and The Divine Milieu as a Christian theology intended for the "believer"; they have then discussed the volumes in virtual isolation from each other. To be sure, the differences among his writings must not be overlooked. But we have proposed that there is more unity among them than has usually been noted. Perhaps the separation of intended audiences into "believers" and "unbelievers" is not so clear-cut - especially if there is in most of us a mixture of faith and doubt. Perhaps Teil- hard was also concerned to reconcile scientific and religious in- terests in his own thought, seeking a unified truth regardless of the "audience." I have maintained, moreover, that both evolutionary and biblical assumptions are present in all his writings, though obviously in varying degrees. A common process metaphysics runs through all his works. He has, in short, given us a genuine synthesis of scientific and religious insights, rather than a natural theology derived from science alone and a separate Christian theology derived from revelation alone.

I conclude, then, that Teilhard's most significant intellectual contribution is a process theology which combines the fourth and fifth classifications, Christian theology and process philosophy. His more strongly theological writings represent explorations of the doctrines of man, creation, and redemption in an evolutionary universe. The Phenomenon of Man represents a "theology of nature" rather than a natural theology; it is an attempt to view nature, as understood by modern science, from a perspective which is both evolutionary and biblical. This conclusion enables us to see Teilhard's total thought as a synthesis of scientific and religious ideas, and it provides a rationale for the interaction which is so evident among the components of his thought.




It must be granted that Teilhard's competence and training were not in philosophy but in science and to some extent in theology. His style is lyric and poetic rather than strictly logical. Be- cause he was forbidden to publish his ideas, there was little op- portunity for him to benefit from the wider discussion which might have contributed to their clarification and refinement. Teil- hard had greater gifts of poetic imagination and spiritual intensity than of technical skill in philosophical reasoning. Yet I have urged that he had many valuable insights susceptible of systematic elaboration. It is no disparagement of the profundity of his mystical experience to insist on the potential importance of his interpretive concepts.

Let us close by considering several possible objections to this proposal. One can in general ask three kinds of question about method, referring respectively to (1) an author's stated methodological intentions, (2) an author's methodology in practice, and (3) possible methodologies within which a reader might use an author's main ideas. An immediate objection to our proposal on the first score is that Teilhard explicitly disavows any interest in "metaphysics." It must be recalled, however, that he used the term to refer to "abstract a priori deduction from first principles" - a conception of metaphysics which I would also reject. He pre- ferred to call his book a "hyperphysics," but he seems to have had in mind the same kind of relevance to the coherent interpretation of diverse types of empirical evidence which classical metaphysics (and Whitehead* in this century) sought. One might prefer to call it an "evolutionary philosophy," a "world-view," or a "cosmology," but these terms beg the question of methodological classification.

On the second score, we have seen that, whatever his intentions, Teilhard has not in practice limited himself to the phenomena. He deals with problems which have historically been the province of metaphysics, such as mind and matter, purpose and mechanism, actuality and potentiality, the relationships between nature, man, and God. Because of the character of these issues, he was, in the words of the title of Grenet's book, "Teilhard de Chardin, or the Philosopher in Spite of Himself."44 As Smulders

* Whitehead proposes that "metaphysics" should deal with the structure of all possible universes, while "cosmology" or "speculative philosophy" should deal with the structure of our present cosmic epoch. However, we have used the term in its traditional sense.



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indicates, "Teilhard's phenomenological articulation is thus much more philosophical in scope than he is willing to concede. Now philosophical principles require philosophical justification."45 He may have wanted to form a synthesis by a direct confrontation of science and religion. But I have maintained that in this confrontation metaphysical assumptions are inescapable even when they are unacknowledged and not rigorously developed.

Hence, even if metaphysics played an insignificant part in both his intentions and his practice, I would, at the third level of en- quiry, urge that a sound methodology requires analysis of his metaphysics. It is legitimate to appropriate an author's insights within an alternative methodological framework, provided one makes it clear that one is doing so and does not misrepresent their content. Thus my fundamental thesis must be that this is a fruit- ful way to read Teilhard's work if one wants to do justice to all its facets. Such a recommendation depends in part on what one considers to be a defensible view in general of the relation between scientific and religious statements. I have explored elsewhere46 some limitations of natural theology, and have defended a "theology of nature" which tries to be faithful to both biblical revelation and the scientific understanding of the world.

There are, of course, objections which might be raised from the theological side. Is not metaphysics supposed to be a ' 'secular" discipline based on reason alone, while theology is said to be based on revelation accepted in faith? I have questioned such an absolute separation, on the grounds that theology involves the interpretation of revelatory events using human categories of thought; in particular, any understanding of God's relation to the world must take into account the character of that world. Conversely, Teilhard's metaphysics itself reflects biblical assumptions. No theologian or metaphysician escapes historical condi- tioning. Hence the intellectual life of the community of faith must be the context of process theology; this is no neutral and pre- suppositionless exercise in pure reason. There is some sign in Protestant circles of new interest in such a theistic metaphysics along Whiteheadian lines.47

One must of course avoid the danger of reducing Christianity to a metaphysical system; Teilhard was always aware that the context of theology is the worshiping community. Many metaphysical systems are highly abstract and nonhistorical; but process thought




has some built-in protection from this danger, for like biblical theology it defends a historical view of reality. In the metaphysician's work there is a tendency for the goals of coherence and generality to take precedence over adequacy to experience in all its variety and particularity. The theologian rightly demurs if a particular set of concepts is unable to express adequately the experience of the religious community in which he stands. Let us recall, however, that Teilhard repeatedly states that there are two sources of his thought. He insists that one cannot deduce the person of Christ or God's plan of salvation from purely natural reasoning; nor can one use Christian revelation to fill gaps in the scientific account, taking the place of a scientific explanation, as concordism had tried to do. Teilhard writes:

Concordism must not be confused with coherence. Religion and science obviously represent two different meridians on the sphere of our minds, and it would be wrong not to keep them separate (which is the concordist error). But these meridians must necessarily meet somewhere at a pole of common vision (which is the meaning of coherence). Otherwise our whole intellectual and cognitive enter- prise collapses.48 The philosopher, finally, may raise several types of objections:

criticisms of Teilhard's vagueness and disinterest in epistemology, criticisms of his process metaphysics, and more general criticisms of the possibility of any metaphysics. The logical positivist considers science to be the norm of all discourse and dismisses religious assertions as cognitively meaningless. Convinced that the Phenomenon is not science, and having already eliminated all theology and metaphysics, he can only classify the book as "poetry" - understood as a purely subjective and emotive expression. Such positivism is now less common than it was a generation ago. Today the linguistic philosophers recognize that language serves a diversity of legitimate functions, though they contend that religious statements have uses very unlike those of scientific ones. The functions of religious language, it is said, are to recommend a way of life, to express a set of attitudes, to evoke self-commitment, and to propose a characteristic self-understanding and life-orientation.

The linguistic philosopher would insist that the scientific statements in the Phenomenon be clearly distinguished from other statements whose real function is to recommend certain attitudes



142 SOUNDINGS

toward the world. For example, the book encourages confidence in the future and it engenders a life-orientation conducive to ethical action in furtherance of the unity of mankind. Teilhard states that in order to survive man must choose an outlook of hope rather than despair. Many of his statements which seem to be extensions of science are, according to linguistic philosophy, doing a quite different job; for example, they function as ethical or religious exhortations. The "alternative languages" approach may be usefully applied to a number of particular problems in the Phenomenon. At several points Teilhard suggests - as many linguistic analysts do - that mind and brain are simply "two ways of regarding the same system/' One might go on to show that various pairs of concepts, which at first appear to be conflicting or mutually exclusive, represent instead alternative or comple- mentary languages each of which is valid in its own frame of reference, e.g., purpose and mechanism, creation and evolution. Both Teilhard and Whitehead do recognize the abstractive and symbolic character of language and would accept many of the insights of contemporary analysts. However, both are convinced of the unity of human experience and both are epistemological realists; they would insist that if alternative languages refer to a single world, they must ultimately be seen in relation to each other and incorporated into a single system of thought.

There are some indications that philosophers today are beginning to reconsider questions of metaphysics. A few have argued that, in addition to the non-cognitive functions mentioned above, religious language has cognitive functions; it makes claims about the nature of reality and provides a perspective for seeing the world. If this is the case, religion as well as science can contribute to the coherent interpretation of all experience. Moreover, philosophers are again discussing questions which were once dismissed as metaphysical: mind and body, freedom and determinism, and even God and the world.49 Perhaps Teilhard did not always ob- serve the differences in the functions of scientific and religious language. But he did allow for one task which, apart from White- head, has been largely ignored by twentieth-century philosophers: the construction of a unified world-view using a consistent set of interpretive categories. In a time when many men have abandoned the quest for synthesis, Teilhard's attempt, even where it only partially succeeded, provides a standing criticism of complacency




in settling too readily for a plurality of totally unrelated languages. Perhaps our generation should not expect to achieve any grand, all-inclusive synthesis and must accept tentative and limited schemes using a variety of models under diverse circumstances. Perhaps metaphysics must be regarded as one among several historically-conditioned ways of symbolizing reality. But even the more modest goal of significant dialogue between the disciplines can be furthered by the inspiration of the passion for unity which dominated Teilhard's life and thought.

Teilhard himself never considered his ideas to be a closed and final system. As he himself wrote near the end of the Phenomenon, "It is up to others to try to do better/'50 His thought is suggestive but incomplete. He was not an Aquinas articulating a systematic Summa which could stand for centuries and serve to integrate a whole cultural period. Though Teilhard shared Aquinas' breadth of outlook and dedication to synthesis, his ideas were exploratory; further elaboration - especially at the philosophical level - re- mains for others to carry out. His thought will be a challenge and stimulus to thinkers in many disciplines, though we have seen that his work as it stands is subject to criticism by the criteria of almost every discipline. In a day of specialization and fragmenta- tion, his concern for the totality of man and his vision of a unified world may themselves be his most enduring contribution.

NOTES

1. The Phenomenon of Man (New York, 1959), p. 149, n. 1. 2. Man's Place in Nature (New York, 1966), p. 108; see also The Vision of

the Past (New York, 1967), p. 254. 3. See The Vision of the Past, p. 270; Phenomenon, p. 108, n. 1. 4. The Appearance of Man (New York, 1966), p. 140. 5. E.g., The Vision of the Past, p. 96. 6. Theodosius Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving (New Haven, 1962), pp. 347f.;

also The Biology of Ultimate Concern (New York, 1967), pp. 114-137; C. H. Waddington, The Nature of Life (London, 1961).

7. C. H. Waddington, The Strategy of the Genes (New York, 1957), pp. 171ff. 8. Alister Hardy, The Living Stream (London, 1955), p. 208. y. See N. K. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery Ramonage, îys»;, ̂n. i.

1U. Phenomenon, p. 3U. 11. P. B. Medawar, Mind, LXX (1961), 99. 12. Such an interpretation is given by D. M. MacKinnon, 1 eunarü s Acnieve-

ment," in Teilhard de Chardin: Pilgrim of the Future, ed. Neville Bray- brooke (New York, 1964).

13. G. G. Simpson, This View of Life (New York, 1964), pp. 225, 232.



144 SOUNDINGS

14. James P. Reilly, Jr., "A Student of the 'Phenomena/ " in The World of Teilhard, ed. R. T. Francoeur (Baltimore, 1961).

15. E.g., F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology (Cambridge, 1930), Vol. II; Peter Bertocci, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York, 1951), Chs. 13-15.

16. Phenomenon, p. 271. 17. Henri de Lubac, Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and his Meaning (New

York, 1965). The second half of the book (pp. 133ff.) defends Teilhard's essay, "Comment je crois," against its critics - largely on the grounds that it is a form of "natural theolosry."

18. The Vision of the Past, pp. 102 (n. 1), 134, 154. 19. Oliver Rabut, Teilhard de Chardin (New York, 1961). 20. Stephen Toulmin, Commentary, March, 1965, p. 54. Zi. Stephen loulmin, in Metaphysical Beliefs, ed. Alisdair Maclntyre (Lon-

don, 1957). 22. Simpson, View of Life, pp. 207-212. 23. Phenomenon, p. 294 (italics added). Z4. JBernard Wall, Introduction to 1 eilnard s Mans riace in ¡Mature, p. D. Zb. ¿man McMullin, I eilhard as a Philosopher, Chicago 1 heological

Seminary Register, LV, No. 4 (1964), 26. 26. See, e.g., "Le Christique" (1955) and "Le Coeur de la matière" (1950),

scheduled for publication in Oeuvres, Vol. X; The Divine Milieu, pp. 99 if. See also Christopher Mooney, Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ (New York, 1966); Charles E. Raven, Teilhard de Chardin: Scientist and Seer (New York, 1963), Ch. 10.

27. See Robert North, Teilhard and the Creation of the Soul (Milwaukee, 1967), Ch. 5.

Zö. Irois choses que je vois (ly^ö;, p. %, scneauiea tor puoncation in Oeuvres, Vol. X. Cf. The Future of Man, p. 237. An analysis of Teilhard's eschatology is given in Piet Smulders, The Design of Teilhard de Chardin (Westminster, Md., 1967), Ch. 6.

29. See Eulalio Baltazar, Teilhard and the Supernatural (Baltimore, 1966), Ch. 10.

30. Claude Tresmontant, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: His Thought (Balti- more, 1959), Ch. 12.

31. E.g., H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York, 1941); Karl Rahner, Inspiration in the Bible (New York, 1961), or "The Development of Dogma," in Theological Investigations (Baltimore, 1961), Vol. I.

32. Dorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (London, 1949). 33. Cf. Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science,

rev. ed. (New York, 1957). 34. Some aspects of Teilhard's metaphysics are discussed in Peter Schoonen-

berg, God's World in the Making (Pittsburgh, 1964), Ch. 1. There is an extended treatment in Baltazar, Teilhard and the Supernatural, Chs. 5-7; ' however, Baltazar includes little discussion of specific writings of Teil- hard, refers only once to Bergson or Whitehead, and develops his own process metaphysics rather sketchily.

35. Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York, 1929) and Science and the Modern World (New York, 1925). Among secondary sources are Ivor Ledere, Whitehead' s Metaphysics (New York, 1958); William Chris-




tian, An Interpretation of Whit ehe ad* s Metaphysics (New Haven, 1959). 36. M. Barthelemy-Maudale, Bergson et Teilhard de Chardin (Paris: Editions

du Seuil, 1963). 37. Phenomenon, p. 217. 38. The "within" is discussed in many writings, including Phenomenon, pp.

53-66, 71 f., 88, 149-152; Vision of the Past, pp. 227 f.; Man's Place in Nature, pp. 32 f.; "La Centrologie" in Oeuvres, Vol. VII, 107 f., etc.

39. Phenomenon, p. 56. 40. Claude Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought (New York, 1960);

Walter Ong in Darwin* s Vision and Christian Perspectives, ed. Ong (New York, 1960); Charles Hartshorne and William Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago, 1953).

41. De Lubac, The Religion of Teilhard, p. 71. 42. Ibid. p. 169. 43. E.g., Notre Dame Conference (1966), "Philosophy in an Age ol cnnstian

Renewal" (to be published). 44. P. Grenet, Teilhard de Chardin, ou le philosophe maigre Lui (Fans:

Beauchesne, 1960). 45. Smulders, Design of Teilhard, p. 18; ct. Michael Stock review ot rnenom-

enon in The Thomist, Vol. XXIII (1960), 267. 46. Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (JLnglewood units, in. j.,

1966). 47. E.g., John Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia, l')bö);

Schubert Ogden, The Reality of God (New York, 1966); Daniel Williams, "How Does God Act?" in Process and Divinity, eds. W. L. Reese and E. Freeman (LaSalle, 111., 1964); L. Charles Birch, Nature and God (London, 1965); Peter Hamilton, The Living God and the Modern World (Lon- don,1967V

48. "Ma position intellectuelle" (1948), to be published in Oeuvres, Vol. X; quoted in Mooney, Teilhard and the Mystery of Christ, p. 60. The same metaphor of science and religion as meridians on a globe is used in the Preface to Phenomenon, p. 30.

49. P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London, 1959); Ian Ramsey, ed., Prospect for Metaphysics (London, 1961); Huston Smith, "The Death and Rebirth of Metaphysics," in Process and Divinity, eds. Reese and Freeman.

50. Phenomenon, p. 290.



five ways of reading teilhard

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