finnish stakeholder engagement in the restoration of a radioactively contaminated food supply chain

Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 83 (2005) 305e317

www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvrad

Finnish stakeholder engagement in therestoration of a radioactively contaminated

food supply chain

A. Rantavaara a,*, H. Wallin b, K. Hasunen c, K. Harmala d,H. Kulmala e, E. Latvio f, K. Liskola g, I. Mustonen h,

I. Nieminen i, R. Tainio j

a Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, P.O. Box 14, FIN-00881 Helsinki, Finlandb National Food Agency, P.O. Box 28, FIN-00581 Helsinki, Finland

c Health Department, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, P.O. Box 33,

FIN-00023 Valtioneuvosto, Finlandd The Martha Organization, Uudenmaankatu 24 A, FIN-00120 Helsinki, Finland

e National Emergency Supply Agency, Pohjoinen Makasiinikatu 7 A, FIN-00130 Helsinki, Finlandf National Board of Economic Defence, Foodstuffs Industry Pool, P.O. Box 115,

FIN-00241 Helsinki, Finlandg Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, P.O. Box 30,

FIN-00023 Valtioneuvosto, Finlandh Finnish Food and Drink Industries Federation, P.O. Box 115 (Pasilankatu 2),

FIN-00241 Helsinki, Finlandi Finnish Food Marketing Association, Mannerheimintie 76 B, Fin-00250 Helsinki, Finland

j Finnish Consumers Association, Mannerheimintie 15 A, FIN-00260 Helsinki, Finland

Received 10 December 2003; received in revised form 22 March 2004; accepted 16 April 2004

Available online 17 May 2005

Abstract

An expert group was established in 2001 representing various organisations and authoritiesresponsible for primary production, food processing, the distribution and consumption offoodstuffs, food safety and availability, catering and extension services, nature conservation,

research into environmental impacts, and the media. The aim was to strengthen networking

* Corresponding author. Tel.: C358 9 759 881; fax: C358 9 7598 8433.

E-mail address: [email protected] (A. Rantavaara).

0265-931X/$ - see front matter � 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2004.04.013

mailto:[email protected]

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306 A. Rantavaara et al. / J. Environ. Radioactivity 83 (2005) 305e317

and improve the stakeholder response to accidental radioactive contamination of rural areasthrough participation in the FARMING network project. A hypothetical contamination of

a large milk-producing area provided a suitable framework for evaluation of actions ensuringclean feeding of dairy cows during grazing. The following year the group received a compilationof rural countermeasures and waste disposal methods, described by the STRATEGY project.

The robust, uncomplicated approach of the evaluation meetings was fruitful and efficient, andthe multidisciplinary group was capable of taking shared views on various measures afterupdating their knowledge together. High priority was given to measurements of radioactivity

and the provision of information and advice to a wider audience.� 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Food safety; Food supply chain; Consumer; Countermeasure; Dairy farm; Emergency

preparedness; Household; Information; Industry; Logistics; Milk; Network; Stakeholder; Radioactive

contamination

1. Introduction

1.1. Stakeholder engagement in the field of food safety

Food safety is a matter that constantly receives the attention of the public. Anumber of recent food scandals have shown that foods unfit for human consumptionhave often been contaminated at an early stage in the food chain. Therefore, muchattention has been focused on the ‘‘from farm to fork’’ concept, and efforts havebeen made to reduce the contamination of foods by concentrating on source-directedmeasures. It has been recognised that food control measures aimed at preventingcontaminated raw materials from entering the food chain are more efficient tools inensuring safe food than conventional market control. In a radiation situation, theavailability of uncontaminated food and food raw materials to consumers and to theentire production chain is a challenge, especially during the growing season.

A stakeholder group representing the food supply chain was invited to participatein the discussions on sustainable restoration of food production systems afterradioactive contamination. Furthermore, the stakeholders were involved inevaluation of the practicability of rural countermeasures. This activity was carriedout under the network project FARMING (Food and Agriculture RestorationManagement Involving Networked Groups) (Nisbet et al., 2002). The approaches tothe involvement of stakeholders are currently under examination in the field of foodsafety in the EU, linked with requirements for openness and transparency of riskassessment and risk communication (EFSA, 2003).

1.2. The stakeholder group

The Finnish stakeholder group for the FARMING project was established in thefirst half of 2001, and consisted of representatives of about 20 organisations by 2003.About half of these were governmental bodies, while the other half represented the

307A. Rantavaara et al. / J. Environ. Radioactivity 83 (2005) 305e317

production chain, advisors and consumers. This group of stakeholders was extendedfrom a previous group acting as a forum for discussion on the radiation safety offood and measures related to intervention, and for co-operation under the NordicNuclear Safety Research (Preuthun et al., 1997). The stakeholder group was invitedto contribute to the project with the concept ‘‘from farm to fork’’ in mind. Themembers of the stakeholder group for the FARMING project were formally invitedthrough their organisations, which all answered affirmatively. The motivating factorsincluded commonly shared interests, such as the management of environmentalrisks, food safety and quality issues. A special Finnish aspect was the radicalstructural changes in agriculture at the beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, it wasrealised that the generation involved in dealing with the effects of the Chernobylaccident on the food chain is beginning to withdraw from working life with the resultthat younger persons have a need for networking and possibly also for technical andinformation support.

The new stakeholder group formulated its terms of reference, which comprisedworking as an interactive group to provide expert views, information andrecommendations on intervention with practicable measures. The exchange ofinformation and provision of true, credible and consistent information to all interestgroups of the food chain was emphasised. The group considered ethical, socio-economic, environmental, nutritional and cultural values, northern circumstancesand the conservation of nature. The group supported stakeholder views in localdecision making, while networking and continuous development of competence wereits current and future goals. The group also aimed at highlighting northernconditions, such as sub-zero temperatures, the effects of snow, sparsely inhabitedareas, and the costs of transportation over long distances. Finland is thenorthernmost self-supporting country for agricultural products, which demandsspecial skills from the producers. The results of the work performed by the groupillustrated these northern aspects very well, as reviewed by Root et al. (2005).

The aim of this review is to highlight the findings and features of thecountermeasure evaluation, in which the Finnish stakeholder group was involvedin 2001 and 2002.

2. Working material and methods

2.1. Evaluation context

The stakeholder group completed two countermeasure evaluation tasks duringtwo national seminars. The production systems of farming and the influence ofcountermeasures on food supply as a whole were observed. In the first yeara regional and timed contamination scenario provided the context for stakeholderresponse. In the following year, countermeasures described by the projectSTRATEGY (Howard et al., 2002) were evaluated for practicability. The criteriaof practicability used in both seminars were suggested by the FARMING project:radiological effectiveness, technical feasibility, capacity (workers, machinery, time


available etc.), costs (working time, use of machines, materials), environmentalimpact and acceptability. Secondary costs (wastes etc.) and social and economicimpacts were also considered. However, no actual cost estimation was made forevaluation.

A rather dense monitoring network for external radiation provides a source ofearly information on the radiation situation in Finland. In the evaluation process thegroup assumed that potential indoor shielding of people living in the contaminatedarea would not restrict or complicate the implementation of rural countermeasures.The significance of the ingestion pathway after environmental contamination wasappreciated, and the group understood that even without any restrictions on living inand entering the fallout area, countermeasures for ensuring acceptable foodstuffscould be necessary. This approach allowed focusing of stakeholder views on theissues that interested them. However, the group was reminded of the need forregional and temporal changes in intervention due to changes in contamination offoodstuffs over time.

2.1.1. Hypothetical contamination of a large milk production areaA large milk-producing area was initially at risk of contamination, and was

contaminated by radioactive deposition late in June, i.e. some weeks after grazing hadstarted. An area in the north of Finland corresponding to only 6% of milk productionremained uncontaminated, while the slightly contaminated area covered 71% and theseriously contaminated area 20% of production. Very high contamination withradioactive iodine and caesium occurred over an area corresponding to less than 3%of production. The stakeholder group agreed on the content of measures to be appliedon dairy farms during the threat phase, before deposition, and later after thecontamination of a large rural area. Primary actions were to:

- Collect and stockpile fresh roughage (grass) throughout the country during thethreat phase

- Shelter and feed all dairy cattle indoors, both before and after the contamination- Provide clean feed and water to dairy cattle following the contamination- Organise and carry out milk measurements prior to delivery from farms, andbased on the results, proceed to sorting and arranging for processing or disposalof milk

- Ensure exchange of information between stakeholders and the provision ofinformation through the media.

2.1.2. Datasheets for countermeasures and waste disposal methodsThe stakeholder groups from five countries participating in the FARMING

project received a compilation of datasheets containing descriptions of 29countermeasure options and 12 waste disposal methods, all related to interventionin the food production chain following radiological accidents (Nisbet et al., 2004).The datasheets included not only technical and radiological data, but also


constraints that can reduce the practicability and, in some conditions, even thejustification of a measure.

2.2. Evaluation process

The stakeholders’’ contribution to an iterative evaluation process was facilitatedby providing in advance of the meetings information on, for instance, theradioecology of the food chain, emergency preparedness in Finland, principles ofintervention, and working material from the STRATEGY project. In the first yearthe measures on farms and their influence on the food supply chain were evaluatedafter a one-day introduction to related topics. In the second year the ruralcountermeasures and waste disposal methods were considered over two days.

The agreed agenda of evaluation meetings included presentation of the criteria forpracticability and the main concepts of optimised intervention. The content and aimof each countermeasure was discussed. Scientific background was clarified, and therelated assumptions concerning the production system were determined, besidesdiscussion of other issues raised by the group. Participants were divided intosubgroups according to their stakeholder roles for more detailed discussion anddocumentation of the evaluation results. The primary response received on thepracticability of countermeasures was compiled and the need for further discussionappraised. More detailed technical or other feasibility data were collected for certainmeasures whose applicability under local conditions was unclear. Stakeholders in thefields of food processing, environmental research and radiation protection werecontacted and their comments communicated to the group. The evaluation reportwas thus prepared in several steps.

3. Response of stakeholders at different stages of the food supply chain

3.1. Common perspectives

An exercise with a large-scale contamination scenario was considered very useful.The influence of sudden changes on the food supply and the response to these changesmade the situation very challenging, for instance, for logistics and food controlauthorities. The group also recognised basic functions in the food supply chains thatshould be sustained. In the first days and weeks after contaminating deposition,changes in the radionuclide contents of agricultural products are rapid. It is thereforeimportant to maintain a continuously updated view of the general situation. Thefunctioning of the food supply chain demands definitions of the actual content ofprotective actions, management, responsibilities, and the urgency of decisions. Thesupply of acceptable foodstuffs has to be maintained in a credible manner.

Information and advice are essential parts in well-planned and well-managedintervention for the safety of food. In the FARMING project, the Finnish stake-holder group emphasised this in all seminars. Following the contamination of ruralareas, farmers urgently need information and advice on how to start and apply the


early protective actions on farms. Frequent communication between stakeholderscannot be overemphasised. The information strategy employed may ensure thesuccess of an intervention or be the reason for its failure. It was seen as especiallyimportant to give advice to consumers and households, especially young families, onhow to cope with a radiation situation.

3.2. Farms

Several clear constraints on farms were identified and the need for supportiveactions was understood. Deposition early in the season complicates the suddenharvesting of clean feed during the threat phase. The stage of growth varies by regionin the early summer and could cause variation in the effect of the measure.Independent of the season, the manpower may be lacking. The use of harvesters onwet grasslands may reduce subsequent growth by compacting the soil structure.

The possibilities of farms to cope with early protective measures that might becontinued for several weeks or even longer will certainly vary. Advice fromconsultants who are known to farmers and who are aware of special features of thelocal production systems would improve the implementation of countermeasures onfarms. These consultants should have a realistic view of the contamination and howit changes with time, for instance to avoid unnecessary disposal of farm productsthat are not contaminated in excess of the intervention levels.

The insufficient supply of roughage in June caused most concern, whichnecessitated a recommendation on the use of other options in addition to cleanfeeding. During a serious lack of clean feed, the use of feed additives to bind caesiumin the rumen of cows was seen as relevant and acceptable. Drinking water wouldcause hardly any problems for animal products, as most farms use ground water.

Before the full implementation of clean feeding is achieved, milk must be bannedand disposed of in some parts of the production area. Finnish farming conditionsfavour the land-spreading of milk, but it has to be carried out before the ground frost.

It was seen as important to focus the measurements of radioactivity on the earliestpossible stage of the production chain, i.e. on the products on farms, before delivery.If clean feeding cannot be organised from the very beginning of a radiation situation,measures to reduce the production of contaminated milk should be considered.

The group realised the usefulness of actions to be carried out prior to theradioactive deposition, in order to ensure the supply of clean feed for the first daysafter the contamination of grasslands. The group gave this measure high priority. Tofarmers, early protective actions mean a tight time schedule. The stress amongfarmers due to the implementation of countermeasures was well understood.Additional work, the delay of other seasonal tasks, sudden changes in the milkdelivery system, as well as concern over the risks to the welfare of animals and to theprofitability of production have to be coped with. The rights of farmers to contributeto decisions on locally applied countermeasures should be respected. The centralauthorities should train experts and advisors on how to act in radiation situationsand how to evaluate the practicability of countermeasures.


Environmental issues were recognised in connection with large scale clean feedingin the contaminated area. If fresh grass harvested before radioactive contaminationwere conserved by making maximum quantities of silage in a short time, insufficientcapacity for collecting fluids would mean the production of effluents. Extensiveharvesting of grass for clean feeding would temporarily cause reduced biodiversity.Additional use of fuel to transport clean roughage to areas under intervention wouldincrease discharges of exhaust gas.

3.3. Food industry

The food processing industry has its own demands concerning the safety offoodstuffs it receives from primary production. Production on farms should be thefirst target of countermeasures for the safety of food. Farms and industry needreliable information on the contamination level in milk, based on measurements, inorder to decide whether milk should be used in dairy production or be disposed of aswaste. Dilution should never be used as a tool to make some batches acceptable fordistribution.

The aim is to deliver safe foodstuffs to the food market, and the Finnish foodindustry will not distribute any products contaminated in excess of interventionlevels. Transparency of the food supply chain is assured through overall qualitymanagement, and no labelling systems under an intervention situation would beneeded, or accepted.

A previous project, CESER (Salt et al., 1999), suggested that people living undernormal conditions in Scandinavia thought they would be prepared to pay more forentirely uncontaminated foodstuffs during a radiation situation. However, theFinnish food industry would not accept delivery of foodstuffs of various safetycategories. The industry also sees the offering of more contaminated foodstuffs ata reduced price as socially unacceptable. There would be pressure to increase pricesanyway, due to additional production costs.

Preparedness for adjusting processes in the food industry towards the reduction ofradioactive elements in foodstuffs can depend on the available technology and implyinvestments. They become justified during large-scale emergencies or at other times,when options for purchasing clean raw materials are poor. The risk of insufficientfood supply could then motivate industry to modify its processing techniques. Thiswould also depend on the information given in advance concerning useful methodsfor reducing the radionuclide content of foodstuffs. If the methods are known to besafe and acceptable, decisions on additional investments become relevant.

Intervention can cause unforeseeable or probable secondary costs to foodindustry in several ways, for instance through prioritisation of the milk supply fordaily distribution. At the same time, other production lines in dairies are under-productive. Reorganisation of logistics also implies an additional need forequipment, containers and transport capacity. A temporary shortage of milk wouldcause losses in the processing industry.


3.4. Logistics operators, retailers and food market

Logistics operators in Finland are companies responsible for supplies to groceryoutlets. Their contribution in radioactive contamination situations is essential fora successful risk management and the re-establishment of a country’s food logisticssystem. In their day-to-day business these companies compete with one another, butin a radioactive contamination situation they must organise efficient cooperation forthe common good. The transport capacity may be scarce or the network of servicedoutlets may have to be temporarily limited. All this calls for organisation, co-ordination and planning between logistics operators. In Finland this preparation isexecuted under the guidance of National Emergency Supply Agency.

Retail chains in Finland operate large networks of grocery outlets. Self-checksystems drafted in retail chains are the cornerstone of general food safety in outlets.These systems specify definitive daily work practices that ensure a high level of foodsafety. In a radioactive contamination situation, self-control systems or othermanuals should contain clear guidelines for maintaining efficient operation of theoutlets and, when necessary, guidelines for their temporary closure. In addition tofood safety, the safety of employees and protection of property also need to be takeninto consideration. Operators in the field of foodstuff logistics need special adviceconcerning safe transport routes, the strategy of foodstuff distribution, and thepersonal safety of drivers and logistics workers in the contaminated area.

The food marketing sector has a goal to maintain the normal distribution ofacceptable foodstuffs as long as possible after contamination of the food chain. Thisimplies a need for supporting measurement strategies to ensure the safety offoodstuffs at an early stage of the production chain. The effect of countermeasuresapplied on farms also has to be demonstrated with quality assured measurements forthe interest of farmers involved in intervention. Transparency is important inproduction, intervention and distribution, to facilitate the provision of informationon the quality of foodstuffs. Customers expect the food market to be able to giveaccurate and understandable information on the safety of food.

3.5. Consumers, households and catering services

Consumers like to be assured of the safety of food and to learn why the health riskof foodstuffs marketed normally is acceptable. The need for information andconsumer education derives from the fact that households and actors in the cateringsector have not normally been considered too much in training for emergencypreparedness. Young people are in particular need of advice and information as theyoften have very little experience in living under exceptional conditions. The newsituation as such, with or without intervention, may cause concern and reducedconfidence in the safety of food products, potentially also implying changes inconsumer habits and disturbance in the food market. Secondary costs will therebyincrease throughout the food supply chain.

People should have access to reliable data on the actual contamination status offoodstuffs, together with background information for interpreting the data and


understanding the potential risk. Logical information on the contamination patternand temporary changes in the contamination of the food chain is in great demand.Consumers would also like to learn of the health risks connected with productsgrown in their own gardens, and wild food obtained outside the food market, andhow to reduce these risks. People cooking at home would certainly like to learn ofnormal cooking methods that reduce the content of radioactive elements in theedible fraction of food.

Consumers expect the information about intervention to be reliable, accurate, andtimed in a relevant way. The sources of information should be public, available toeverybody, and the content briefly described in introductory messages. Investigationsrelated to the actual radiation situation are also of interest to the public. Of primaryimportance is the information provided via the media. Extension services (i.e.existing support, educational and counselling organisations many of which may becharities and rely largely on volunteers) and consumer networks need to be organisedfor the distribution of advice and data on the current situation to a wide audience.Sufficient capacity should be provided for individual consultancies through official orother reliable channels. People also need advice on how they should cope with theradiation situation and how to act. A reasonable attitude is necessary not just onissues related to food, but on everyday life as a whole. Preparedness for crisissituations or less serious events varies among groups of people, and is generally notvery good (Enqvist, 2005). Instructions are needed, for instance, on indoor shelteringand on foodstuffs reserved at home for exceptional situations.

4. Acceptability of countermeasures and waste disposal options

The countermeasures and methods for disposal of waste were divided into threecategories according to the stakeholder response: (1) acceptable in most situations;(2) acceptable in special circumstances; and (3) not acceptable in most circumstances.Most of the factors explaining the non-acceptability of certain measures wereconnected with the northern circumstances, reviewed by Root et al. (2005). It isnoteworthy that no realistic cost estimates were prepared for evaluation meetings,and where costs are a crucial criterion for practicability, this reservation needsconsideration.

4.1. Countermeasures

Food and feed banning were acceptable in most circumstances, as were also cleanfeeding and the use of feed additives to bind caesium in the gastrointestinal tract afteringestion by ruminants. As to the management of arable land, shallow ploughing wasacceptable in most cases. It was especially recommended after the removal orharvesting of crops contaminated directly by deposited radioactive material.

The stakeholder group did not approve in most circumstances of the following:deep ploughing of cultivated soils; substantial removal of topsoil; application ofpotassium fertilisers on grasslands; a selective grazing regime; feeding of animals in


production with crops or milk exceeding the intervention levels; manipulationof slaughter times or hunting times; slaughter of dairy cows to reduce the quantitiesof milk needing to be disposed; suppression of lactation using hormones; the use ofdecontamination techniques for milk; and dilution. Selective grazing and de-contamination of milk were seen as impracticable due to the lack of capacity. Othermeasures not accepted were considered to cause some basic ethical, metabolic,environmental or ecological disturbance in the production system.

Only in special circumstances would the Finnish stakeholder group accept thefollowing: careful removal of the topsoil surface (with a special plough to adjust thethickness of the removed soil layer); skim and burial ploughing (capacity notcurrently available); live monitoring of animals in production (considerablemeasurement uncertainty involved); early removal of crops for decontamination(should be based on a priori knowledge of sufficient radiological effect that variesaccording to the conditions); suppression of lactation (by natural means, throughreduced feeding); processing of crops or milk for subsequent human consumption(using normal, known processing techniques); and light salting of meat forsubsequent consumption (acceptability varies depending on alternative sources ofmeat for consumption). Feeding animals with unacceptable crops or milk, exceedingthe intervention levels, would be considered as an option for animals not linked withthe human food chain. This is also true when there is an excess of crops or milkunacceptable for human consumption, during a lack of normally used feed. Underspecial circumstances the group also suggested the acceptance of: increasedapplication of potassium fertilisers to arable soils (not for grasslands); theapplication of lime to arable soils and grassland (depending on the nutrient statusof soils); ploughing (not deeper than to the normal depth); fertilising and reseedingof unimproved pastures (normally regular rotation; permanent pastures areexceptional); selection of alternative land use (profitability will be weakened);distribution of salt licks containing AFCF (during grazing, if the prioritisedadministration with feed is not applicable); and administration of clay minerals tofeed.

4.2. Waste disposal options

For the disposal of waste arising from intervention measures, twelve methodswere evaluated for practicability. In most circumstances, composting and landfill ofcrops and other vegetation, land-spreading of milk and slurry, and rendering ofanimal waste were acceptable. Only in special circumstances would the following beaccepted: ploughing in of a standing crop (feasibility varies by species and stage ofgrowth); incineration of vegetation to be in energy production plants; and processingand storage of milk products for disposal. Hardly ever would the burial or burningof carcasses (risk material) on farms, disposal of contaminated milk to sea, andbiological treatment (digestion) of milk or crops (lack of capacity) be accepted.

Evaluation of countermeasures and waste disposal options in an actual radiationsituation, considering the costs and secondary effects, would probably result ina somewhat different division of methods into categories of acceptability. The main


aim of intervention should be to ensure the availability of good and sufficientnutrition to all inhabitants. This principle is always valid, and the sometimes varyingassumptions on the acceptability of methods for maintaining adequate supply of safefood need to be seen from the standpoint of the actual situation.

4.3. Measurements of radioactivity in the food production chain

Measurements of radioactivity in foodstuffs were ranked high among the measuresto improve the effect of intervention. For official food control the measurementsshould fulfil the formal requirements on the competence of the laboratories, which isa topical issue concerning almost fifty municipal laboratories. All of these locallaboratories have been accredited, i.e. a third party has assessed their competenceaccording to an international standard and found that the laboratory complies withthe requirements. However, none of the laboratories has accredited a method for thedetermination of radioactivity, even if they have the necessary measurementequipment provided to them free of charge by the Radiation and Nuclear SafetyAuthority. The Authority also provides quality assurance services, such as referencematerial and calibration services, which partly compensates for the current lack offormal recognition of competence.

The scope of measurement strategies is rather wide, and the technical difficultiesassociated with the full control of the food supply chain must be recognised. Keydevelopment targets could be ensuring the competence of the laboratories(equipment, calibrations, and sampling at various stages) and measurementstrategies in various conditions and contexts. Active dissemination of results andinterpretation of their significance to different stakeholders is also important, but ismore a task of central authorities than the laboratories. Other important issues to betaken into account when discussing measurements include timing, seasonal changesand changes in the intervention strategy.

5. Conclusions

Stakeholders actively participated in the two evaluation exercises, because all thestages of the food supply chain were influenced by intervention and by many ofthe measures. Of value to everybody was the efficient exchange of information withinthe group. An important update of knowledge about new legislation, environmentaleffects, the consumer response, human resources and production systems in farmingand the technologies in food processing industries was received and shared by thegroup members. Production strategies and dependencies in the food supply chainwere considered. During the seminars the roles and possibilities of variousstakeholder organisations became clear to the members. A common language,conceptual clarity, areas of high priority and also practical tools for improvingemergency preparedness were found.

The international network project has provided an important basis for working asa group, not least for continuity and the facilitated update of information. The basis


for evaluating the practicability of countermeasures was determined in earlier studiesin the United Kingdom (Nisbet and Mondon, 2001) and in northern Europe(Preuthun et al., 1997). Coordination through the FARMING project wasimportant in keeping the work efficient and targeted. The FARMING stakeholdergroup and its working methods differ from decision conferences also organised inFinland for dealing with the contamination of foodstuffs (Ammann et al., 2001).

In a situation where there is a need to take action to restore the food productionchain after a radiation emergency the decision makers need extensive support. It isimportant that all interested parties are heard, that the intervention is ethicallysustainable and that each independent view is respected. The Finnish stakeholdergroup established for the network project FARMING has potential for acting assuch a supportive group. The group could contribute with advice and prioritisationon strategies and plans for long-term restoration actions. The group could issuerecommendations on how different operators should act in a radiation situation andprovide estimates of the resources required for the implementation of counter-measures, such as labour, equipment, materials and time. The group could also givestatements on the technical feasibility of alternative countermeasures. A small nationlike Finland has obvious advantages through simple and functioning connectionsbetween organisations, which certainly also facilitates collaboration in a stakeholdergroup. However, the members of the group should follow the field internationallyand always take home with them, and disseminate, the new know-how learntinternationally.

Identifying the significance of multidisciplinary stakeholder panels in improvingand maintaining preparedness to implement practicable countermeasures in the foodsupply chain was one of the main achievements of the network project. The targetsof development towards better preparedness include increased capacity for theimplementation of countermeasures, appropriate guidance to all parties, andensuring that the countermeasures applicable to northern conditions are well knownto the actual stakeholders. Communication and information are highly significant inthe management of a situation related to food safety.

Acknowledgements

The stakeholder seminars in 2001e2003 were organised under the network projectFARMING, which was part of the 5th Framework Programme of the EuropeanAtomic Energy Community and was funded by the CEC (Contract No. FIKR-CT-2000-20064). The support of the project coordinator, Dr Anne Nisbet from theNational Radiological Protection Board, UK, is highly appreciated.

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finnish stakeholder engagement in the restoration of a radioactively contaminated food supply chain

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