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From Reentry to Results: Performance Measurement in Prisoner Reentry InitiativesAnna R. KohnFinal Capstone, May 2011National Urban Fellows, Inc.Professor Hilary Botein, Capstone Advisor

From Reentry to Results:Performance Measurement in

Prisoner Reentry Initiatives

Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 4

I. Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 5

II. Overview and History....................................................................................................... 9 A. Historical Context 9

B. Statewide Trends 12C. Prison Versus Jail 13D. Pilot Program Evaluation.......................................................................................... 15E. Where We Are Headed............................................................................................... 18

III. Background and Standard Operating Procedures..............................................21A. Individualized Attainment and Measurement 21B. Individualized Treatment 22C. Standard Operating Procedures 23D. A Private Interest? 25

IV. Outstanding Needs of Reentry Programs...............................................................28A. Defining Success 28B. Determining Objectives 30

V. Current Evaluations and What (Currently) Works..............................................34A. Measurement Tools 34B. Reentry Barriers as Performance Indicators 36C. What Do These Indicate? ..........................................................................................44C. Effective Evaluation Models...................................................................................... 47D. Project Greenlight Evaluation.................................................................................48

VI. Performance Measures of Evaluation.....................................................................53A. Office of Justice Programs Audit 53B. Risk Assessments......................................................................................................... 59

VII. Evidence Based Practices, Methodology and Evaluation Suggestions........62A. An Evidence-Based Practice: IPASS 63B. A Best Practice65

IIX. Future of Performance Measurement in Reentry..............................................67A. Performance Measurement as Evaluation 67

IIX. Conclusion 70

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From Reentry to Results:Performance Measurement in

Prisoner Reentry Initiatives

Anna R. Kohn

National Urban Fellows, Class of 2011

Final Capstone

3

From Reentry to Results:

Performance Measurement in Prisoner Reentry Initiatives

-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY-

At the heart of prisoner reentry is people; the overarching theme,

rehabilitation. Yet, since prisoner reentry has taken its present shape --particularly

as a result of the Second Chance Act , which began in 2001 as the Prisoner Reentry

Initiative (PRI) (Holl and Kolovich, 2009)-- and since the Department of Labor

(DOL) began awarding grants to pilot prisoner reentry projects in 2006 and 2007,

there has been little discussion about performance measurement related to the

outcomes of these efforts.

In many scholarly articles and authored works, there is little hard data that

might demonstrate the effectiveness of the techniques being used, the best

practices, and the future sustainability of prisoner reentry. In short, we don’t know

what the best practices are or how to identify them. Additionally, to continue on

a path that reduces these numbers by 0.3 percent when we face a population of 7.3

million currently under some form of correctional supervision (including probation,

parole, AND institutionalization), the progress will be incredibly tedious. The Pew

Center identifies this 7.3 million supervised population in very understandable

terms: 1 in 31 Americans is under supervision, or 3.2 percent of all adults in this

country (Warren, 2009).

Without a proper discussion of prisoner reentry evaluation techniques, it will

become more and more challenging to determine whether these programs are

worth the funding they absorb.

Pressing concerns of evaluation quality in this field should not be taken

lightly—testing has begun, but for all intents and purposes, it is still in the beginning

stages. As the government begins to move more funds into reentry programming

and criminal justice diversion programs, it will be imperative to collect all existing

data from baseline to end results. Without a full continuum of both evaluation and

performance improvements, our execution of reentry practices will not mature in

any consistent or pragmatic way.

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I. INTRODUCTION

“To assert in any case that a man must be absolutely cut off from society because he is absolutely evil amounts to saying that society is absolutely good, and no one in his

right mind will believe this today.” – Albert Camus

Nestled in upper Manhattan, The Fortune Society of New York City is one of

the oldest and best-known reentry programs in the United States today.  Walking

through their facilities in both Manhattan and in Long Island City brings to mind

notions of an educational or vocational training center, equipped with up-to-date

technology, brightly colored walls, expansive and open hallways, and a plethora of

very helpful staff.  Vibrant artwork decorates the walls, and there are no guards,

bars, or divisions in the building despite the challenging population living there.

  Deciding to explore the one facility that, from what I understand, executes

the task of rehabilitation better than anyone else helped me internalize the true

value of facilities like this.  I asked staff and clients what makes the Fortune Society

different from all of the other residential programs they could be at.  The answer

was consistent—the people. 

  New York has never been synonymous with hospitality, and by no stretch is

it one of the more compassionate metro areas in the nation.  However, what New

York does possess is people, experience, practice and history.   

  Some clients are remanded by court authorities to be part of the Fortune

Society’s unique program.  However for each remandee at the Fortune Society, there

are five willing and able participants who have come to the program by their own

volition.  Sitting in on a support group session in upper Manhattan, I was able to

gain a window into the relationships and dealings that the clients have with each

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other.  The discussion of this particular support group ended up being in large part

over a young man who had been robbed for the third time at the Fortune Society,

yet had a hard time coming to terms with the accountability and responsibility of

remembering where he was.  For instance, the young man left his jacket--with his

iPod in the pocket-- on a piano in a common area, only to come back later and find

the item missing from his coat.  The young man discussed the way he would have

dealt with this prior to his incarceration—retribution in some violent or equally

harmful way.  One of the more seasoned community members taking part in the

group was a well-dressed gentleman in his 60’s whose most powerful comment was

“it’s not about what are YOU going to do, but what are WE going to do…” focusing

more heavily on the dynamic of a community-based solution rather than a

singlehanded vindication. 

As it turned out, the older gentleman who provided some invaluable

feedback to the young man was not only one of the Fortune Society’s top

performers, he was a cop killer who spent 35 years in a maximum security

penitentiary.  Much to my surprise, he seemed to imbue the lessons of the Fortune

Society better than anyone in the room: This is a community, you are a part of it, so

you must treat it like your own by nurturing and understanding that the only way to

succeed is to have the community as a whole succeed.

  In Long Island City, the Fortune Society has created personalized

environments in which different clients live and work.  The most striking “it works”

evidence came from the second floor, where my tour guide explained that we would

be entering the most at-risk hallway, largely populated by the youth remanded to

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enter this transitional program in lieu of jail time.  Should a young offender maintain

negative behavior or act out in any detrimental way, the offender will be sentenced

to ‘real’ jail time in a secure facility such as Rikers Island.  The at-risk hallway looks

no different from the other hallways—tables, chairs, artwork on the walls and a

homey—not punitive—feeling.  Adjacent to the at-risk hallway is the Family Unit,

where families live and grow with the proper tools to help them succeed as a whole. 

Taken aback by the proximity of the two very different constituencies, I asked my

tour guide how they can justify having at-risk offenders be so close to kids and

families.

  “The way we see it,” Barry Campbell, Executive Assistant to the CEO said, “99

percent of this young population will end up being a parent at some point in their

lives.  It is crucial for them to have access to the tools, information, and resources

they will need to make the best decisions for their futures and the futures of their

children, so we keep the two close together.”  Amazing, I thought; this organization

understands the full cycle of rehabilitation in truly meaningful and effective ways.

  Despite doing just about everything right, The Fortune Society contends that,

like any nonprofit, there are some operations and practices that would benefit from

better funding.  What is the Fortune Society’s greatest need?  Performance

measurement, process evaluation, and a system for determining and reporting

outcomes.  This pioneer organization, responsible for the rehabilitation of

thousands of formerly incarcerated men and women has no formal method of

quantifying results.  With evaluative measures in place at a relatively reasonable

cost, the Fortune Society could effectively multiply the amount of local, federal, and

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community-based dollars it receives. 

  For organizations that have the ability to procure evaluation systems and

methods, the outcomes both in funding and capacity grow immensely.  Being able to

confidently say that, for instance, “80 percent of our clients successfully complete

the program” creates an incredibly powerful tool for clients, administrators,

funders, and the community at large.  In fact, most funders through grant

opportunities or other corporate/philanthropic donors expect outcomes to be

reported and to be funded through some percentage of the dollars they’ve granted. 

For instance, in a Second Chance Act grant, about 10 percent of the award given by

the federal government is stipulated to be used strictly on evaluation and reporting

outcomes.  The problem is that without a standard model, the evaluation system will

be biased, inconclusive, or untested at best. 

It is our responsibility in the Public Administration field to quantify the

importance of these projects and ways their impact can be effectively measured.

Determining both the best methods for collecting the data, and, as a result,

developing potential solutions to this overwhelming problem should be our

contribution to the organizations who work in direct service—being able to report

in some scholarly manner that yes, our evidence-based practices are not only the

best practices, they will withstand the time-sensitive evolution of programs, people,

and help those who need it most at all stages.

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II. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY

“The fact that so many Americans, including hundreds of thousands who are a threat to no one, are incarcerated means that something is wrong with our criminal justice

system and the way we deal with both dangerous criminals and those whose behavior we simply don’t like.” – David Keene, American Conservative Union (2009)

Corrections is one of the few industries in America that will probably never

experience a depression, an economic downturn, or a recession. So long as there is

crime, so shall there be criminals. The revolving door nature of prisons that have

befuddled lawmakers for the last several decades has finally become unsustainable.

To keep on doing what we have been doing, to build more, invest more, and expect

more, is no longer realistic, yet we only know this because the current state of

corrections is financially and socially untenable. If data had been available to help

drive policy and community-based reentry practices, we might not be in the state

we are in.

A. Historical Context

The most persistent effort to curb criminal behavior in the past decade has

been through the development and implementation of prisoner reentry programs as

a means of helping ex-offenders transition back into life beyond the prison walls.

However, the first attempts at some form of reentry began long before the prison

population reached such an overwhelming level. Parole was in essence the first

form of an institutionalized rehabilitation method. In 1876 in Michigan, a penologist

named Zebulon Brockway (1827-1920) developed the first parole system for the US

with a focus specifically on the idea that criminals could be reformed and that every

prisoner’s treatment should be individualized (Petersilia, 2003). Starting in New

9

York, Brockway’s model and classification standards began spreading around the

country, and by 1942 parole mechanisms were utilized in every state (Ibid.). While

today parole is just another form of a punitive sanction, the initial reasoning began

with a need to rehabilitate ex-offenders rather than disqualify them as active

members of society. The parole system as we understand it has morphed from

Brockway’s discretionary model into today’s commonly observed mandatory parole,

typically the accumulation of “good time” (that is, time incarcerated with no

negative reports, disciplinary actions or sanctions) as reasonable evidence that an

inmate should be released after serving the minimum amount of time legally

necessary for the crime committed (Ibid.).

There has been a constant struggle to determine the effectiveness of parole,

probation, and other pre-release and post-release sanctions on offenders. The

system has undergone many legal and social changes, and in 1974, scholar Robert

Martinson definitively concluded that the US rehabilitation mechanisms were not

positively influencing recidivism (Visher, 2006). In the 1980s and 1990s, a few

events took place to change the course of the rehabilitative model of reintegration.

First, the American public began to believe that corrections was not about

rehabilitation, that it should be more focused around the idea of punitive

supervision than true correction of behavior. Second, trends in sentencing began to

change, and parole was no longer required among federal correctional authorities.

Third, the war on drugs and the crack-cocaine epidemic beginning in the 1980’s

began to undermine belief that repeat drug offenders could be rehabilitated. (Ibid.;

Schlosser, 1999). Combined with the presence of younger criminals, more mature

10

crimes, and more sophisticated law enforcement, the system slowly became

inundated by the need for supervision at every level of criminal punishment and

corrections.

As of January 2010, 1,404,053 individuals were under the jurisdiction of state

prison authorities, and 208,118 were in Federal custody (Pew, 2010). 1925 was the

first year that statistics on prisoners began to be collected, when a mere 82,239

inmates were under correctional supervision. By 1972—nearly five decades later—

the prison population had grown by a relatively modest 112 percent (Ibid.), with the

number of inmates reaching 174,379. Major hikes in the prison population began in

1973, often keeping offenders locked up to serve out an entire sentence rather than

to release them and make room for new offenders. In the past four decades , the

prison population rose by a staggering 705 percent (Ibid.). However, according to

the Pew Center on the States, 2010 was the first time in 38 years that the population

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Figure 1: Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics

actually slightly declined from the prior year, a decrease of 4,777, or 0.3 percent

fewer inmates (Ibid.). While a step in the right direction, one must question the

decline, the overall trends, and the effort of prisoner reentry programs on this

figure. Leading the decline of these numbers were the states of California, Michigan

and New York, who attribute some of this decline to the success they have had in

their statewide prisoner reentry programs.

However, it is not due to reentry programs alone that 2010’s number of

detainees was just slightly lower than 2009’s. The Pew Center on the States reports

“Whatever level of crime reduction was achieved is worth applauding. What

cannot be overlooked, however, is that even the statistical models most

generous to prisons find that most of the crime drop was attributable to forces

other than incarceration. These include a strengthening economy, aging drug

epidemics and changes in law enforcement, including the expansion of police

forces and the adoption of new policing strategies.” (Warren, 2009)

B. Statewide Trends

One of the proportionally largest decreases in correctional populations

occurred in the State of Michigan. Michigan has promoted a number of strategies

worth examining for the future of reentry practices in this country. In 2007, when

Michigan’s prison population reached its apex of 51,554, lawmakers began

instituting updated sentencing guidelines and regulations to alleviate the financial

and social burdens incurred. In three years, Michigan was able to bring down the

prison population by close to 6,000 inmates by the institution of three important

aspects: 1) reducing the number of individuals who serve more than the entirety of

their minimum sentences, 2) decreasing the amount of parole revocations, and 3)

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building up a very strong Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative (Solomon, Thompson

and Keegan, 2004). Funding for the pilot MPRI program was provided by both the

state Corrections Department and the federal government in the form of SVORI and

PRI grants.

Two other model states have been Texas and California. Following a similar

operational procedure to Michigan, both states worked to expand nonviolent

offender sanctions within communities, reinvest dollars in post-penal assistance

programs, and offer more appropriate sentencing laws for nonviolent offenders

(Ibid.).

C. Prison Versus Jail

Jail systems are as overwhelmed as prison systems. Prisons and jails differ in a

number of ways, most notably in the kinds of offenders they house. Prisons are

intended for offenders who have already been sentenced, typically, to a sentence of

more than one year. Prisons range in the types of supervision they provide,

including minimum, medium, maximum, and “supermax” security. These

supervision levels are based on both an offender’s crime and an offender’s

likelihood to harm himself or those around him. Should an offender from a

minimum security facility commit further crimes while incarcerated, it is typical for

his supervision level to be heightened accounting for both an increased level of

oversight and a diminished set of liberties during incarceration (which may or may

not include time spent outside of one’s cell, one’s ability to interact with other

offenders, or one’s access the outdoors or “yard”). While prisons are often assumed

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to be more punitive in nature, it is important to note that jails do not offer the types

of programs that prisons do, such as higher education, behavioral adjustment/anger

management instruction, and employment assignments (working in a prison

kitchen, cleaning cell blocks, sewing or fabrication), which can suggest that

individuals who have longer stints in prison may actually have more corrective

opportunities than those in jail.

Jails serve a dual purpose; housing nonviolent offenders who are serving

approximately one year or less, and housing offenders who may have committed

more violent or serious crimes who are awaiting sentencing, trial, or appeals. Due

to the often temporary nature of jail stays (though some individuals can spend years

in a jail awaiting trial or sentencing), there is usually far less corrective

programming based on the amount of time offenders must spend there and the risk

they pose to the outside world upon release. For instance, an individual serving

time for drug use or driving under the influence of alcohol who must only serve 90

days will often argue that he has no need to begin a higher education class or a

behavior recognition course, because in three months, he will return to a life where

he may have a job, a family, and presumably, not that much to correct. Additionally,

the type and amount of traffic that comes in and out of jails is of a much higher

volume than is seen in prisons. Upon any arrest, an offender will always be taken to

jail as his first stop, regardless of the severity of the offense. Due to the temporary

nature of jails, the notion of reentry has been a constant challenge at the jail level.

According to penologist Dr. Gary Christensen,

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“It takes approximately 2 years for our nation’s prison population to cycle

once; while our jail population cycles 20-25 times during the same time

period…Contrary to common understanding, [jail] release[s] 90 percent of

their populations directly back to the local community and their admission

rates are usually over ten times that of their daily population. Given the reality

of shorter, uncertain incarceration periods, the opportunity for immersion

within comprehensive programmatic initiatives within jails is relatively short.

This has led to the assumption that comprehensive correctional programming

is not suited for local correctional populations.” (Christensen, 2008)

In an effort to alleviate the traffic and financial burden of recidivating

criminals, the US government has begun directing its efforts towards prevention,

intervention, and post-release planning. At the heart of prisoner reentry is people;

the overarching theme, rehabilitation. Yet, since prisoner reentry has taken shape

(particularly as a result of the Second Chance Act , which began in 2001 as the

Prisoner Reentry Initiative (PRI) (Holl and Kolovich, 2009) and since the

Department of Labor (DOL) began awarding grants to pilot prisoner reentry

projects in 2006 and 2007, there has been little discussion about performance

measurement related to the outcomes of these efforts. When the few evaluations

conducted for reentry programs were examined, outcomes and successes for

individual ex-offenders varied significantly.

D. Pilot Program Evaluation

The pilot demonstration programs, funded by the DOL and Department of

Justice (DOJ) were first evaluated starting in 2005. The programs that were selected

by the DOJ to conduct these demonstrative initiatives drew upon the strengths of

each awardee organization—well-respected within their communities, experienced

15

in providing social services to at-risk populations, and utilizing vast networks of

volunteers and enthusiastic support (Ibid.). A cumulative total of $19.84 million

grant dollars were to be divided among 30 separate, exemplary grantee programs

across the country including faith-based organizations, state and community service

agencies—which were required to enroll 200 individuals transitioning out of the

justice system into reentry programs in 20 states (Ibid.). Researchers Douglas Holl

and Lisa Kolovich produced a comprehensive report to assess how “community

agencies receiving DOL PRI grant awards successfully developed employment-

centered approaches for ex-offenders that focused on stable jobs and housing in

their neighborhoods and communities.” (Holl and Kolovich, 2009) After

determining the programmatic criteria, the evaluators began determining whether

or not the grantees proceeded in the manner stipulated by the grantor. In 2006, the

DOL determined performance measures for the programs in existence, which would

be specific to each project, including (1) enrollment rate, (2) participation rate, (3)

entered employment rate, (4) employment retention rate, (5) average earnings, (6)

recidivism rate, (7) degree/certificate attainment rate, (8) substance abuse

abstinence rate, and (9) stable housing rate (Ibid.). The best indicator of the success

of these pilot programs and the aforementioned indicators can be exemplified by

noting the substantial decline of recidivism rates among the program participants.

“Between 70 and 82 percent of participants were reported by grantees to have no CJ

[criminal justice] involvement during the first year after release.” This rate is

tremendous evidence that the PRI programs are promising and fruitful, as

recidivism has been the preferred measurement of reentry program success. The

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researchers felt strongly that much of this success was attributable to the sound

structure and operational components of each program, and found that the

mentoring programs had a particularly high success rate. A few findings that

proved particularly interesting included:

Federal prisoners have less extensive criminal histories and more

access to in-penal tools like education and vocational skills.

Participants over the age of 35 did markedly better remaining with

reentry programs for longer periods of time than the younger

participants.

Women were likelier to face challenges securing and maintaining

stable housing than men due to more limited options.

These PRI programs cost less than anticipated, averaging about $4.50

per day per participant.

The approach taken on by grantees for assisting their participants was

largely on a one-by-one basis, including job training and development.

Most sites were able to report that DOL recruitment goals were being

met only by the end of their second operating year.

Poor communication was the root cause of most programmatic

setbacks or failures. Additionally, it was “not possible to collect

consistent information across all 30 programs.” (Ibid.)

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Drawbacks to the evaluation methodology conducted by Holl and Kolovich included

the trivialization of baseline data because it was self-reported by the clients;

recording the receipt of services in different manners from site to site; the

underreporting of “service intensity”- that is, not including the number of hours

spent with each client—only the number of days; and having a wide variety of

experience among program managers and other staff members, therefore breeding

informal, inconsistent data collection practices. (Ibid.) Holl and Kolovich’s

thoughtful evaluation methodology was a remarkable step in the right direction for

measuring the outcomes of prisoner reentry programs. The evaluation pointed to

the importance of reentry efforts, and that if conducted properly, such efforts can

produce favorable results to impact recidivism. However, a significant

consideration that must be made regarding these and any evaluations is their ability

to be repeated and prove similar results. Since this evaluation has yet to be retested

and therefore adjudged scientifically sound, it is hard to confirm that one study

alone can result in desired outcomes from both objective and unbiased viewpoints.

In addition to the importance of retesting these findings, it is imperative to note that

these results still leave present uncertainties about individualized program

outcomes. For instance, while we may be well aware of how some of the DOL’s

initiatives are being executed by community service providers, we have little

evidence to show that they work for any given individual.

E. Where We Are Headed

The Second Chance Act grant will be a significant player in changing the face

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of reentry systems across the nation. It was determined that the 30 pilot programs,

and as a result, the preceding Serious and Violent Offenders Reentry Initiative

(SVORI) and Prisoner Reentry Initiative (PRI) (which operated from 2002-2009)

grant programs were effective in helping ease the reintegration process for ex-

offenders in some ways (which will be discussed in the “Evaluations” section of this

report). However, major shortfalls surrounding both evaluation methodology and

potential means of improving performance are still the most urgent issues and voids

to address in the field.

In many scholarly articles and authored works, there is a lack of hard data

that might demonstrate the effectiveness of the techniques being used, the best

practices, and the future sustainability of prisoner reentry. In short, we don’t know

what the best practices are or how to identify them. Additionally, to continue on

a path that reduces these numbers by 0.3 percent when we face a population of 7.3

million currently under some form of correctional supervision (including probation,

parole, AND institutionalization), the progress will be incredibly tedious. The Pew

Center identifies this 7.3 million supervised population in very understandable

terms: 1 in 31 Americans is under supervision, or 3.2 percent of all adults in this

country (Warren, 2009).

Without a proper discussion of prisoner reentry evaluation techniques, it will

become more and more challenging to determine whether these programs are

worth the funding they absorb. While the collection of data could well indicate the

development and success of each program, performance monitoring and data

collection are not being utilized in an effective or standardized method. Much of the

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research and reports have been trivialized due to a lack of formalized evaluation

methodology. If 200 different programs are measuring their progress in 200

different ways, it is incredibly challenging to determine a uniform response to the

“what works?” question.

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III. BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

“In the realm of psychology [the prison-industrial complex] is an overreaction to some perceived threat. Eisenhower no doubt had that meaning in mind when, during his farewell address, he urged the nation to resist "a recurring temptation to feel that

some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties." – Eric Schlosser, The Atlantic (1998)

      The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that within three years of an inmate’s

release, well over two-thirds of the released population will be rearrested for new

crimes.  That said, a number of components need to be factored into methods of

assessing the success of reentry programs.  The main characteristics of life in prison

from an institutional standpoint involve considerations of work, health, education,

social skills, and most of all punitive restriction.  When an individual transitions out

of an institution where everything from bathroom breaks to sleep schedules is

predetermined, it is hard to adjust to life beyond the walls.  At the jail level, this

transition is complicated by the fact that jails are far more temporary and as a

result, less damaging to a person’s routine and responsibilities, while at the same

time imposing a segregated approach to living life.  The multifaceted system of

reentry therefore must be individualized and rehabilitative.

A. Individualized Attainment and Measurement

As educational attainment levels vary widely with so many individuals under

supervision, it is hard to create a standard practice for dealing with everyone as a

group.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that approximately 40 percent of

state and federal inmates had not completed high school or attained a GED

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(Solomon, Johnson, Travis, and McBride, 2004), compared to 18 percent of the

country’s general 18 and over population.   This discrepancy is further complicated

by the fact that less than half of the inmate population receives some sort of

educational or vocational training while incarcerated (Ibid.). 

      Many other areas of programming are lacking in prisons, particularly healthcare

(both mental and physical).  According to the Urban Institute, between 30 and 40

percent of survey respondents to their “Returning Home” study from 2006 report

having a chronic physical or mental ailment.  Worse, the Urban Institute reports that

there are few (if any) evidence-based reentry housing programs that target mentally

ill prisoners (Baer, et al, 2006), and therefore this slice of the reentry universe is

increasingly hard to touch.  Additionally, the reentry world concedes major

problems with the riskiest criminogenic factors: antisocial values, criminal peers,

low self-control, dysfunctional family ties, substance abuse, and criminal personality

(Christensen, 2008).

B. Individualized Treatment

      Offenders come from a number of different backgrounds and lifestyles, further

complicating the feasibility of a uniform data collection method.  It is important to

note that just as at any other institution, each attitude and incarcerated individual is

very different from the next.  Because of these differences, any system proposed to

measure outcomes and successes must account for this range of variables among

individual performance. 

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      The treatment needs of the mentally ill with comorbid diagnoses such as

substance abuse or a lack of education may be far different than those of a violent

criminal without a family or network of support to return to.  The process of both

institutionalization and “deinstitutionalization” can be damaging, often with

permanent emotional impacts (Petersilia, 2003).  Due to the vast variation of these

needs and personalities, treatment plans must target an individual’s needs in the

same way that medical care targets specific diseases, disorders or ailments with

post-care planning specific to those conditions.  The wide range of variables and

characteristics include but are not limited to race, ethnicity, length of stay, type of

crime committed, gender, age, education level, marital status, and other

characteristics that may have positive or negative impacts on an offender’s ability to

reenter the outside world successfully (Ibid.).

C. Standard Operating Procedures

      A typical reentry program operates in one of three fashions, often in a phased

approach: I) institutional or in-penal programs, II) structured reentry or transitional

treatment programs (in-penal work-release or specialized programs), and/or III)

community-based reintegration programs (Taxman et al., 2004). In essence, each

phase is designed to help ease the stark transition from structured living in an

institution to societal re-assimilation (See Figure 2).  Phase I usually consists of

institutional assistance, to the degree that it is offered.   This includes intake and

classification, usually to determine risk and recidivism potential, and ideally places

an inmate in a secure, appropriate site or cellblock based on his/her needs.  In many

23

penal institutions, programs are initiated during this phase allowing for either

educational or vocational advancement through classes and programs.    Phase II

usually consists of more directly effective services, such as actual post-release

planning and counseling.  It is typically in Phase II where good time accrued can

mean being put in a less secure facility with more privileges, a translatable (to post-

release) occupation or work assignment, and less concentration on the physical act

of incarceration.  Phase II can carry over to the initial stages of post-penal aftercare

once an offender has been placed in a community-based rehabilitation facility or

program.  Phase III focuses on community integration, making every attempt to help

the ex-offender find permanent housing, employment, and other necessary

resources that must often be sought out rather than simply provided by institutional

administrators.  Much of Phase III, while taking place in a reentry facility, attempts

24

Figure 2

to teach the ex-offender how to procure such items throughout the transition back

into the free world, or “achieve independence from the formal case- management

process.” (Holl and Kolovich, 2009)

D. A Private Interest? 

            Even though there is no doubt that innovative reentry is important, it is worth

noting that just as with most industries in this nation, there are many people who

stand to gain financially by keeping the system the way it is.   These beneficiaries are

content with the current system, and encourage its growth instead of using

evaluations and measurements as an impetus for revolutionizing reentry systems. 

Such beneficiaries sustain the argument that formal methodology of measuring

outcomes may hurt the business they are in.  Complicating the politics of prisoner

reentry, and therefore its evaluative reporting is the fact that corrections is an

incredibly profitable industry.  Referred to as the prison-industrial complex, the

economy of prisons is a multifaceted operation employing billions of dollars worth

of contractors, food services, phone services (a single pay phone in a prison can

generate up to $15,000 annually) (Schlosser, 1999), transportation, medical

providers, security, and in-house industry and education.  The prison-industrial

complex is

“A set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that encourage

increased spending on imprisonment, regardless of the actual need.  The

prison-industrial complex is not a conspiracy, guiding the nation’s criminal

justice policy behind closed doors.  It is a confluence of special interests that

has given prison construction in the United States a seemingly unstoppable

momentum.” (Schlosser, 1999) 

25

      In short, the companies and organizations involved in serving the prison

community will consistently ensure that they have the raw material needed to run

their businesses—inmates; “the poor, the homeless, and the mentally ill; drug

dealers, drug addicts, alcoholics, and a wide assortment of violent sociopaths,”

(Ibid.), and therefore appear to have no financial reason to support or measure the

system’s shrinkage. 

            While perceived as negative, punitive, and at times barbaric, the prison

environment is lucrative to both public and private industries.  In the same manner

that many United States businesses have either been privatized or outsourced, so

have corrections.  Among these private firms is the notion that “government

monopolies such as old-fashioned departments of corrections are inherently

wasteful and inefficient, and the private sector, through competition for contracts,

can provide much better service at a much lower cost.” (Ibid.)  Due to factors such as

non-union labor and working outside of the confines of governmental restrictions

on state and federal facilities, the privatized prison corporations and their partners

are in one of the last recession-proof industries in the nation, complete with trade

shows, conferences, and a field-specific newsletter on the most current

technological and constructional advancements in prisons.  Such an industry is also

therefore held to a different set of standards when it comes to reporting outcomes. 

A private corporation may keep its own set of performance measures, indicating

how effectively it has executed administrative tasks, rather than recording the

number of recidivating inmates.  An increase in recidivism is the financial bread and

butter of the prison-industrial complex. 

26

           The prison-industrial complex points to a few relevant conclusions related to

reentry performance measurement.  First, the privatization, and therefore

unregulated reporting of prison operations is so vast that it is virtually impossible to

estimate or capture the amount of money going in and out of private correctional

firms; second, prisons are too big of a business to be threatened by the existence of a

shrinking population due to effective reentry programs; and third, there is a

national desire to continue building and supporting prisons, especially in rural

areas, as prisons are among the largest employers of otherwise deindustrialized or

economically distressed communities in the nation. It would appear that the large

corporations and those reliant on the capital generated from prisons are certainly in

no rush to see a reentry system that would eliminate a large percentage of their

“raw materials.”

27

IV. OUTSTANDING NEEDS OF REENTRY PROGRAMS

“…There is little evidence that research is driving policy, or that policy is driving research.  Despite good intentions, each of these fields is moving on rather independent tracks and the gulf between them is still wide” – Joan Petersilia, “Federal Probation,” 2005

One of the most astounding features of performance management

methodology of reentry programs is the sheer lack of evidence-based practices.  Dr.

Jeremy Travis of the Urban Institute in New York has mentioned, both in his

research and in a conversation from October of 2010, that the absence of recidivism

alone is an abysmal determiner of success in reentry programs.  Travis asserts that

it would be immeasurably difficult to conclusively say that if an offender is released

and stays out of prison, yet becomes either homeless, drug-addicted, unemployed,

or unhealthy (therefore becoming a burden on taxpayers or community service

agencies), that he or she “successfully” reintegrated into society by the institutional

definition of successful reentry (Travis, 2010).  Criminal conduct through

deterrence and rehabilitation has thus far been measured by recidivism rates, and

has “long been considered the leading statistical indicator of return on correctional

investment,” (Pew, 2011) yet the Pew Center also notes that “a low recidivism rate

does not always reflect the use of sound release preparation and supervision

strategies.” (Ibid.)

While recidivism numbers are an important part of determining the success

in some methods of reentry programming, Travis states, it is far more important to

consider the entire continuum of care as an indication of success. This complex

challenge is the cause of many voids in collecting concrete evidence-based practices.

A. Defining Success

28

The other seemingly simple shortcoming among current reentry programs is

that they have no clear definition of success.  Because each institution or community

service organization has different ways of evaluating what success actually is, paring

down the definition is complicated to the point of being non-existent.  As Dr. Travis

mentions, determining what it means to be corrected in the current corrections

system is a highly objective measure.   One state might use a person’s success to

indicate that he or she has not recidivated within one year, while another state

might use a measurement of no recidivism within three years to determine an

offender’s success.  While one medical clinic might determine that success means a

drug-addicted offender has not returned to drugs, another might determine that a

drug-addicted offender who simply has not violated his parole has been successful,

and therefore “corrected.”  Success therefore must be determined on a complex

basis acknowledging a combination of desired outcomes and baseline outcomes.  

Upon determination of a definition of success in reentry, identifying relevant

performance indicators, measurement and performance management will be

important tools to track the success of reentry programs.  In the COMPAS

(Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, widely used

in many state Departments of Corrections) system used upon offender intake, some

of these performance indicators include quantitative scoring for variables like

substance abuse, financial problems, a history of family crime, antisocial personality,

and criminal attitude, all extremely valid and important indicators in the prediction

of an offender’s ability to succeed in a reentry program.  However, there is little

association of COMPAS scores and results with post-care planning, a crucial step in

29

the endurance of any aftercare plan.  Aftercare performance indicators might

include elements such as housing, employment, family reunification, mental and

physical health developments, and basic needs procurement, which will be

discussed in detail in the “Current Evaluations” section of this report.  Such

performance indicators can help pave the way for individualized reentry plans and

for maintaining some uniformity in the collection of data among those plans.

While the criminal justice system has developed in groundbreaking ways

over the past several decades, the widespread underdevelopment of uniform

performance measurement techniques could potentially threaten the ability to

develop evidence-based practices among reentry programs.  The Pew Center on the

States agrees that “differences in survey methods complicated direct comparisons of

national recidivism rates over time.” (Pew, 2011)  While in-depth analysis is

required to determine what the most appropriate performance measurement tools

may be, monitoring program implementation can effectively “help illuminate the

reasons a program is not achieving desired results.” (de Lancer Julnes, 2006) A

consistent barrier to the performance management processes is often the costly

amount of sophisticated performance measurement systems (Ibid.); however,

funders of reentry programs would be wise to protect their billions of dollars worth

of investments by instituting a data collection method to capture more specific

programmatic results, ensuring the most effective use of their dollars.

B. Determining Objectives

Considering individual evaluative processes will be a significant achievement

for the future of performance measurement of reentry programs as well.  Without

30

some formal methodology that truly captures the wide scope of variables that may

contribute to successful reentry techniques, the determination of what works will

be limited at best.  Every piece of literature that has been collected on the topic of

reentry ends in a similar fashion: we have begun evaluating in some instances, but

the need is so great that often the only useful conclusion has been that more data,

research, evaluation and measurements are a significant necessity in the field.

There appears to be more literature in the field concluding that more evidence is

necessary than literature indicating that the studies conducted thus far have been

accurate, methodologically sound, and agreed upon among scholars.  

The Pew Center on the States has been conducting research on how best to

handle the formerly incarcerated.  In 2008, a public safety policy brief was

distributed entitled “Putting Public Safety First: 13 Strategies for Successful

Supervision and Reentry”.  In this report, different needs and the best way to handle

them were discussed in general terms.  Even modest techniques may help the

nation’s growing correctional population decrease, but implementation of these

techniques is a challenge that aftercare agencies and in-penal planners consistently

confront.  The first technique listed by the Pew Center on the States was clear:

“Define success as recidivism reduction and measure performance.”  The first

technique deviates from Dr. Travis’ poignant observation that recidivism should not

be the absolute indication of effectiveness of reentry programs.  From the get go,

experts appear to have differing opinions of the best ways to define success.

Moving forward, it will become more and more important to have scholars and

evaluators on the same page in clarifying definitive success.  It is significant to note

31

that the Pew Center’s 13 strategies are relevant and critical to the future of reentry,

regardless of whether or not there has been a consensus on the feasibility of their

strategic implementation.  Along with the strategy of ‘defining success as recidivism

reduction and measuring performance’ (Ibid.), two other strategies out of those 13

directly correlate to the importance of reentry evaluation techniques.

One of these strategies is to “Assess Criminal Risk and Need Factors.”  This

would develop a mutually agreeable system of risk assessment, illustrating the

importance of frontloading baseline data to continue developing post-release plans.

In other words, use a risk assessment such as COMPAS not just as an intake tool but

also to help determine a person’s potential success if enrolled in some community-

based diversion or reentry program.  A similar post-assessment system could help

determine where an offender might be placed and under what circumstances upon

release.  The documentation of this sort of process would be an immensely fruitful

starting point for further establishment of standard evaluation techniques.

Another strategy is to “Balance Surveillance and Treatment in Case Plans.”

This strategy points to customizing aftercare programs while tailoring plans to

appropriately address individual risk factors.  In order to base post-release plans on

the various needs of ex-offenders, tracking progress from beginning to end will be

imperative, yet tracking mechanisms have not been uniformly identified.

Identifying these mechanisms will help set the tone for collecting performance data

upon an offender’s reintegration.  Along with defining these objectives, performance

indicators must be identified and systematically monitored.  

32

Still, the Pew Center’s techniques are valuable tools for decreasing

recidivism.  It would appear that while answers (like the techniques listed above)

exist to some of the questions regarding programmatic and provisional resources or

evidence, the question still exists: What actually works?

33

V. CURRENT EVALUATIONS AND “WHAT (CURRENTLY) WORKS”

“One might ask how offenders can be expected to return to society and make a successful life for themselves without being rehabilitated or appropriately prepared

for reentry.” – Lior Gideon and Hung-En Sung, “Rethinking Corrections,” 2011

Although several studies have been made to determine which variables are

most important in community reintegration, they have been undertaken

independently and largely unrelated to each other.  It is interesting to note that

while, particularly in the case of Holl and Kolovich, programs have been evaluated in

the realm of performance measurement and management, studies to determine how

programmatic elements of reentry programs play a role in the reentry process are

inconclusive.  Such elements should be treated as performance indicators, helping to

identify the positives and negatives of reentry programming.  For example, while we

know that reentry programs have a higher likelihood of keeping an individual from

recidivating, we have little concept of the benefits a technical training program has

versus a GED or high school equivalency program, and in what specific ways these

programs help or hinder the reentry process.     

A. Measurement Tools

Identifying best practices and best tools has yet to occur, largely because

experts in this field have not agreed upon a mechanism for formulating outcomes.

In other words, many of the individuals tasked with judging the progress of reentry

programs have lacked the ability to turn the qualitative data into quantitative data.

Determination of these qualitative-to-quantitative mechanisms will help ensure that

data is being captured and examined in some uniform manner.

34

Authors Stephen J. Bahr, Lish Harris, James K. Fisher and Anita Harker

Armstrong wrote a piece titled “Successful Reentry: What Differentiates Successful

and Unsuccessful Parolees?” in the International Journal of Offender Therapy and

Comparative Criminology in 2010, which got to the heart of many effective

measurement tools in the industry. The authors examined 51 parolees upon their

release from prison to determine what are the most helpful variables to consider in

effective reentry programs.

“Using the life course perspective as a guide, we chose to examine how

structured activities and associations were associated with reentry success.

Specifically, we hypothesized that drug treatment, peer associations,

employment, age, marriage or cohabitation, and parenthood would be

associated with parole success.” (Bahr et al. p. 674).

The authors checked in with their test group intermittently for three years post-

release. The one-, three- and six-month interviews comprised quantitative

questions regarding criminal, drug, work, and social history, as well as background

and future plans. Each measure was tracked throughout the reentry process, and

the findings reported that 55 percent of the test group completed parole and was

discharged, whereas 20 percent went back to prison, and 25 percent remained on

parole. The authors’ rigorous analysis included binary logistic regression models

including different impactful indicators like number of times incarcerated, gender,

substance abuse education attainment, family ties etc. The evidence suggested that

family connections are beneficial in the outcomes of ex-offenders, as are

friendship/personal connections, and drug treatment or substance abuse classes,

which simultaneously provide skills, motivation, and support when utilized. More

35

studies like this one are crucial to the development of standard evaluation

techniques to determine under what circumstances the different variables are most

effective, and what makes the variables so different based on the individual in

question.

B. Reentry Barriers as Performance Indicators

In the reentry field, there are several elements or variables (often observed

in post-release planning) that are generally agreed upon as risk factors or

performance indicators.  Each of these elements has a unique impact on the success

or failure of reentry programs and on the individuals taking part in them. As the

study of reentry evaluation methods moves forward, it will become increasingly

important to evaluate each aspect of reentry programming in order to determine

which elements affect reentry in positive, measurable ways.  

Employment.  Possibly the most damaging or opportune element of reentry is

having a job.  The critical need for both financial stability and a routine has a large

impact on a person’s motivation to stay out of detention.  Two of the most well

respected clearinghouses of information on reentry practices and models, the Urban

Institute and the Pew Center on the States, agree that a lack of gainful employment

is the largest barrier to successful community reintegration.  The Urban Institute’s

comprehensive study entitled “Returning Home” examined state-by-state the impact

of both governmental and community-based reentry strategies on an individual’s

progress reintegrating back into his or her neighborhood.  The Urban Institute

noted that “levels of employment was a predictor of reductions in drug dealing,

36

violent crime, and property crime.”  (Baer, et al., 2006)  Also, while each respondent

felt that the employment component of reentry planning was one of the most

crucial, only one in five of the respondents had a job lined up upon release (Ibid.).

Studies show that while finding and maintaining a job is important, a 10-hour-a-

week minimum-wage job provides only a minor impetus to stay out of prison.  In

discussing these employment-based barriers, researcher Mindy S. Tarlow (citing

Mukamal, 2000) notes that

“[T]he absence of employment is a consistent factor in recidivism and parole or

probation violations…In New York State, labor statistics show that 89percent

of formerly incarcerated people who violate the terms of their probation or

parole are unemployed at the time of violation.  Further research suggests that

one year after release, up to 60percent of former inmates are not employed.”

(Tarlow, 2011).  

History of employment is another complicated topic among the offender

population.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 21 and 38 percent

of the incarcerated population reported having no job prior to their arrests (Harlow,

2003).   Inmates in this category also report personal income at less than $1,000 in

the month prior to their arrest (Solomon, Johnson, Travis & McBride, 2004).  While

few employers hire individuals with criminal records (especially in any skilled

labor capacity), it is also worthwhile to note that while the necessity for financial

stability is one of the most significant reasons to be gainfully employed, many

individuals coming out of detention require a reliable daily routine as well which

functions as a transitional coping mechanism for going from a super-structured and

predictable environment to the free world.  An unstable adjustment can lead to the

threatening notion that life was easier on the inside.    

37

Education.  The incarcerated population is collectively the least educated segment

of society, with GED attainment of less than 32 percent for state inmates upon

imprisonment (Gideon and Sung, 2011).  It would appear that generally, the higher

the educational attainment is per individual, the lower the chances are of a

correctional commitment (Ibid.).  Because of the resounding need for both

educational and vocational training programs in-house, such programs are amongst

the most important opportunities offered.  While the field still lacks data on the

elements of reentry planning and how best to handle the prerelease population,

there is encouraging evidence to determine that education programs in prison do

have positive effects on reentry results (Gaes, 2008).  Education not only plays a role

in the professional development of ex-offenders, it also is a morale-boosting

mechanism of personal growth.  Every state and federal detention institution in the

country has some kind of educational program, even if it is only a GED or high

school equivalency program.  However, as scholar Georgen Guerrero notes (citing

Cecil, Drapkin, MacKenzie & Hickman, 2000) in “Rethinking Corrections,” “it has

been questioned whether GEDs reduce recidivism after release.  As society becomes

more educated, the GED may not help inmates reach the level of achievement they

desire.” Additionally, prisoners who have been able to complete at least one year of

college-level educational instruction are less likely to both recommit crimes and

violate parole than those who do not participate in post-GED education (Ross &

Richards, 2002).

38

Family Reunification. A widely agreed-upon notion regarding the release of

inmates from detention is the importance that families and loved ones have on

successful reentry.  The Urban Institute reports that family support is positively

influential in predicting post-release employment and recidivism.    Those scoring

high on family support scales pre-release were less likely to be reconvicted

(LaVigne, Visher and Castro, 2004).  Having a sibling, parent or spouse to return to

once an inmate is released can improve the chances of the individual staying out of

prison immensely due to both prosocial interactions and having an effective

network of supporters.  More than 55 percent of the incarcerated population has at

least one minor child (Baer et al., 2006).  As the number of parents in detention

increases, so does the number of children left without a mother or father on the

outside.  One in every 14 African American children, or roughly 7 percent of the

African American youth population has a parent in state or federal prison.  As a

whole, incarcerated males are fathers to 1.2 million children (Travis, Solomon and

Waul, 2001).  Having an incarcerated relative can be damaging to all family

members involved.   A number of studies have conclusively determine that children

of offenders are far more likely than other children to be arrested or incarcerated

(Ibid.). The parental presence in the lives of children is further complicated by the

legal obstacles that occur, particularly with women, upon incarceration.  For

instance, in 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act was passed, mandating that

the termination of parental rights shall take place once a child has been under foster

care supervision for 15 of the past 22 months.  According to the Urban Institute,

women convicted of a crime serve on average 18 months in prison, which often

39

results in their children being placed elsewhere and in many cases makes it

impossible for a mother to reunite with her child or children upon release (Ibid.).

There is also a fairly large detrimental effect on the spouses, parents, siblings

and/or children, including financial, emotional, and social challenges, when a loved

one is imprisoned.  

Many ex-offenders would simply not get the support they need upon release

by returning to certain loved ones.  For example, an offender’s chances of a healthy

reintegration could be weakened by moving back in with a brother or sister who

may have a substance abuse problem or criminal tendencies.  The delicate balance

of needing both support and a fresh start are often complicated by returning to the

environment where criminal behavior may have been cultivated, posing a legitimate

threat of recidivism.

Housing.  A disproportionately high rate of homelessness among ex-offenders has

been one of the most critical factors in determining the success of releasees.  The

Bureau of Justice Statistics has collected a wide range of information on how ex-

offenders fare in securing post-release housing.   A key finding indicates that among

the prisoners released by the end of 1999, 12 percent had reported being homeless

at the time of their incarceration (Roman and Travis, 2004).  Additionally, while

nine percent of state prison inmates reported being homeless within the year prior

to their arrest, 20 percent of mentally ill inmates reported being homeless in the

year prior to their arrest (Ibid.).  The Urban Institute reports that roughly a tenth of

the population becoming incarcerated has been recently homeless and likely will

40

end up homeless upon release. Among the complications that must be considered

regarding ex-offender housing are the stringent regulations posed by correctional

departments that limit many offender housing options.  For instance, conditions of

parole often prohibit cohabitation of an ex-offender with any other ex-offender on

parole, probation, or with a criminal background (Ibid.).  Considering that many ex-

offenders are returning to neighborhoods where the environment or community

members may have facilitated some of their criminal behaviors, such a challenge has

been an overwhelming cause of homelessness among released offenders.  As a

microcosmic sample of the relationship ex-offenders have with homelessness, the

California Department of Corrections has stated that at any given time 10 percent of

the state’s parolees are classifiably homeless (Travis, Solomon and Waul, 2001).    

Substance Abuse.  Many health issues that come about in prison are due to the

wide range of illegal or addictive substance abuse both in and out of detention.

While one in eight state prisoners is involved in substance abuse counseling, this

represents only 80 percent of those inmates who truly need it (Petersilia, 2005).

More than half of state prisoners committed the crime that resulted in their

incarceration while on drugs or alcohol (Travis, Solomon and Waul, 2001).

However, while there have been mixed results in research to determine whether or

not in-penal drug treatment programs are effective, the consensus is that drug users

who complete comprehensive drug treatment programs are significantly less likely

to recidivate (Travis, Solomon and Waul, 2001; Seiter and Kadela 2003), particularly

41

when paired with aftercare in a community setting.  Interestingly enough, Joan

Petersilia mentions that

“[the] gap between need and active substance abuse treatment is explained in

part by the courts’ repeated rejection of a constitutional right to substance

abuse treatment or rehabilitation in correctional settings, so long as prison

officials are not deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”

(Petersilia, 2005).

Mental and Physical Health Challenges.  There is an overwhelming disconnect

between the treatment needed and the treatment provided in correctional settings,

and in turn, community-based programs.  While the general public believes that

inmates are in a good situation as far as medical care is concerned, since inmates

have a constitutional right to medical care, the health disparities between the penal

population and the general population are staggering.  The Urban Institute reports

that

“The overall rate of confirmed AIDS cases among inmates was five times the

rate found in the general population (0.55 percent versus 0.10 percent,

respectively).  In 1997, 2.2 percent of state prisoners tested HIV positive, a rate

five to seven times greater than that in general population.  And 18 percent of

the inmate population were infected with hepatitis C, nine to ten times the rate

of the general population.” (Travis, Solomon and Waul, 2001).

The prevalence of many sexually transmitted diseases in prisons has been a major

cause of concern, which can often be attributed to in-penal sexual relations, violence

or conduct among inmates.  Crowded living situations and intravenous drug usage

can compound the communication of STDs as well (Petersilia, 2003).  Complicating

these illnesses further is the fact that while three-quarters of correctional

42

institutions make recommendations for HIV-related aftercare, less than one-third of

these institutions actually help set up an appointment for releasees with community

providers (Travis, Solomon and Waul, 2001).  

In addition to physical ailments among inmates, mental and emotional

ailments pose an even more challenging problem. One in ten prisoners is receiving

psychotropic medications to treat their conditions, which represents only 60

percent of those who truly need them (Petersilia, 2005).  It is reported that inmates

have mental disabilities two to four times higher than the general population, and

that between 8 and 16 percent of the prison population has a single or comorbid

diagnosis requiring psychiatric services (Ibid.).  It is important to note that while

medical care is required within detention centers, incarceration effectively

disqualifies inmates from Medicaid eligibility for several months after release (Baer

et al., 2006).  Upon release, up to three-quarters of the Urban Institute’s “Returning

Home” study participants maintained that they would need help securing health

care (Ibid.).

Transportation.  Commonly cited as one of the largest barriers to gainful

employment is the lack of transportation in both major metropolitan areas and in

rural communities.  Either public or private transportation is not unreliable,

inconvenient, or simply too expensive.  Ex-offenders have noted that beyond the

difficulties experienced finding and keeping a job, a lack of transportation can also

result in a lack of access to much needed, oftentimes prescribed, social and

community services (Baer, et al., 2006).  In the “Returning Home” survey, “more

43

than a third of the respondents reported having difficulty obtaining a car for work

or emergencies and nearly a quarter reported various difficulties accessing public

transportation.” (Ibid.)  Unreliable transportation can cause an ex-offender to miss

doctor’s or parole appointments, limit contact with friends and loved ones, or miss

classes and training opportunities.  Access and proximity to necessary resources is

also a common problem, and there appears to be a considerable disparity among the

geographical distribution of many of these resources (Mellow, Schlager and Caplan,

2008).  

Basic Needs Procurement.  One of the smaller but still considerable challenges to

reentry is the lack of identification: a driver’s license, social security card, or other

form of identification.  In fact, the evaluation by Holl and Kolovich of the 30 pilot

programs indicated that a “lack of formal identification was among the top three

challenges noted by case managers.” (Holl and Kolovich, 2009).  Legal assistance has

been integrated into some reentry programs, and it appears that many ex-offenders

would benefit from further legal counsel in regards to their current situations.

(Ibid.)  

C. What Do These Indicate?

        With positive, effective reentry models in place, “prisoners who return to the

community with support systems in place can become productive members of

society, thus saving resources, strengthening family and community ties, and

expanding the labor force and economy.” (Solomon, Johnson, Travis and McBride,

44

2004)  Programs that integrate the elements listed above into reentry planning have

had a perceived improvement on the success of individuals participating in reentry

programs.  While the limited research conducted has shown that the effective

facilitation of these elements can help an ex-offender into a safe reintegration, there

is still little evidence that any of these elements have been examined as they relate

to program outcomes for the individual or that any of these elements were studied

on the same scale as each other or in the same scope of definitive success.  For

instance, reporting that substance abuse treatment can potentially keep someone

out of incarceration is little more than speculation due to the lack of statistical

evidence in the majority of studies (Seiter and Kadela, 2003).  Additionally, since

many of these elements are evaluated in separate environments and under quite

different circumstances, it is a major challenge to determine which performance

measurement tool, based on which particular element, has been the most successful

or productive in the measurement of potential recidivism rates.

An important distinction to make is the existence of self-reporting in much of

the reentry literature and research, especially the research conducted based on

qualitative or narrative questioning.  A significant issue in much of the research on

reentry programs is the lack of reliability of self-reports.  A common challenge with

issues such as substance abuse or mental health treatment, researchers Holl and

Kolovich attest, is that much of the data on both in-penal and post-penal drug use is

likely not properly captured and therefore invalid.  Many individuals tend to

underreport negative behaviors and habits, particularly in the presence of reentry

program representatives for fear of repercussion, criminal sanctions, or other

45

negative outcomes.   Without accurate testing and retesting, it is difficult to

determine not only what works, but what might be a potential best practice.

The indicators discussed here can determine a variety of outcomes and

performance measures.  If each indicator were considered to be either beneficial or

detrimental to an ex-offender’s safe and sustained ability to stay out of criminal

supervision, evaluators might have a simpler method for determining where to

concentrate resources and gather information.  For instance, if a testing module

could conclude that an individual has a higher chance of sustaining post-release life

through a confluence of employment and education upon release rather than a

confluence of family reunification and housing, individualized plans might result in

more definitive evaluations and measurements (Figure 3).  Each indicator should be

scored based on its ability to be a positive, effective influence in the reentry process,

and of course, determining potential risk factors throughout the collection of data.

46

Figure 3

D. Effective Evaluation Models

In 2003, Richard Seiter and Karen Kadela wrote for The Journal of Crime and

Delinquency an article entitled “Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and

What Is Promising” as a discussion of the current best practices of a variety of

reentry programs.  Using the Maryland Scale of Scientific Method, the authors

discussed their data collection from reentry programs by determining the

effectiveness of various programmatic elements. Upon determination of the criteria

qualifying a reentry program, the authors decided that any of the studies to be

included in a “what works” or “what does not work” frame had to show a statistical

significance indicating either that the intervention was or was not successful by a

tangible variation.  Statistical significance serves as a valid delineation of

effectiveness and importance.   Seiter and Kadela found the lack of statistical

significance in many of the testing modules examined was discouraging.

    Of three sampled studies, which compared offenders who completed a work-

release program against offenders who served their time exclusively under penal

detention, there was no statistically significant difference in their likelihood of being

rearrested, though the work-release participants were noted to be “somewhat” less

likely to recidivate. (Seiter and Kadela, 2003)  While this appears to qualify as

“promising” in the field of reentry according to Seiter and Kadela, these are

“programs for which the level of certainty from available evidence is too low to

support generalizable conclusions.  However, there is some empirical basis for

predicting that further research could support such conclusions, such as

programs that are found effective in at least one…evaluation and the

preponderance of the remaining evidence supports that conclusion.” (Ibid.)

47

It is crucial to determine which factors of a work-release program are most

effective.  For instance, it is unclear whether success is achieved by way of

experience, education, or the moral support received throughout work-release

assignments.  Many of these factors need individual consideration and evaluation to

determine their effectiveness, just as the specific performance indicators require.

E. Project Greenlight Evaluation

An experimental program called “Project Greenlight” was expertly evaluated

by scholars James A. Wilson and Robert C. Davis.  Developed in New York City, the

program model of Project Greenlight was analyzed in detail.

“[Project Greenlight] was designed to provide participants with intensive

transitional services of relatively short duration in the eight-week period

immediately before they were released. The program largely attempted to

improve post-release outcomes by (1) incorporating an intensive multimodal

treatment regimen during incarceration and (2) providing links to families,

community-based service providers, and parole officers after release (although

there was no actual community follow-up).  A short, intensive intervention like

[Project Greenlight] is likely to be attractive to corrections officials and policy

makers because of the potential to serve greater numbers of people at a lower

cost.” (Wilson and Davis, 2006)     

Incorporating everything from a step-by-step post-release continuum plan to

personal behavior modifications, Project Greenlight was ideal—on paper.  Using the

only “best practice” information available to the researchers, Wilson and Davis

utilized the Urban Institute’s instruments for client interviews focusing on the

different variables of reentry elements, such as housing, employment, and health,

among many others.  This evaluation was truly a model in its field.  The evaluation

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captured one of the most comprehensive ranges of data available on individual

program design. Once the data was collected, the researchers concluded that

“both self-report data and parole officer interviews suggest that despite an

emphasis on employment, housing, and parole supervision requirements, the

intervention failed to significantly impact in any discernable way these key

elements of the program’s focus.” (Ibid., 2006)

    Raising an extremely vital question on the elements or characteristics missing

from its program design, Project Greenlight set the stage for a new discussion on the

efficiency of reentry programs.  Due to the results, and because Wilson and Davis’

research methods were extremely solid, there are data to show that “[Project

Greenlight] participants did worse than both [comparison groups], and these

differences sometimes rise to a level of statistical significance within the relatively

short follow-up period. Thus, any positive impact of the intervention did not seem to

translate to positive outcomes.”  (Ibid.) In short, despite the time, energy and

dedication that may have been directed towards Project Greenlight, this particular

reentry program had adverse effects.

Researchers Porporino and Fabiano (2000) note that “with higher risk

offenders, programming may initially engender more resistance, creating anger,

resentment, and frustration at being forced to participate in such programming.”

(Ibid., 2006).  Porporino and Fabiano also note that the operation of the program is

“a significant source of variability in outcome, and a possibility is that [program]

integrity increases the effectiveness of appropriate treatment but renders

inappropriate treatment even more criminogenic.” (Porporino and Fabiano, 2000).  

49

  As it relates to the outcomes reported by Wilson and Davis, the researchers

argue that the puzzling results of the Project Greenlight study are most likely

attributable to poor planning—either poor conceptualization, poor implementation,

or poor execution of the actual program.  During a time when research showing the

fairly large discrepancy between hopeful expectations and realistic outcomes was

somewhat disheartening, the researchers valuably note that “when new programs

are implemented, alongside the implicit assumption that the program is going to do

“good,” should be an equally strong assumption that the program may be doing

harm.” (Wilson and Davis, 2006).  Through the continuous life cycle of the reentry

field, it will be important to consider studies that successfully determine both what

works and what truly does not.  Additionally, Wilson and Davis’s study indicates

that determination of the value of different elements of reentry (housing,

employment and so on) would help to create more personalized plans of post-penal

care and identify more appropriately customized methods of successful

reintegration.

Seiter and Kadela measure a few of these reentry elements throughout their

study, determining outcomes such as the statistical significance of drug treatment

programs reducing recidivism only for men.  The authors were unable to make a

statistically significant determination of program effectiveness for women, citing no

difference in recidivism figures between those who participated and those who

abstained from treatment.  Additionally, in-prison therapeutic communities had a

statistically significant impact on recidivism from the six months prior to and the six

months after incarceration.

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The study also concluded that in the test cases, educational programs “did

not seem to have an effect on the recidivism rates when [graduates were] compared

to nongraduates.” (Seiter and Kadela, 2003).  However, for those individuals who

participated in 200 hours or more of educational programs, recidivism rates did

seem to be somewhat positively affected.  “From the evidence presented here, we

can state that education programs increase educational achievement scores but do

not decrease recidivism,” note the authors (Ibid.), and that educational programs

are “promising at best.” (Ibid.)

In evaluating effectiveness of SVORI and sex-offender programs, the authors

were able to determine that cognitive behavioral therapy positively impacted

recidivism rates by an improvement of 11percent in one program, (Ibid.) whereas in

another slightly different program, the results did not demonstrate statistical

significance.   The authors conclude that it is likely additional research needs to be

performed.

Halfway houses, if run effectively, were one of the few areas the authors

found to have a positive impact on reentry, “easing the transition from prison to the

community”. (Ibid.)

The last variable examined by Seiter and Kadela was the effectiveness of

prison prerelease programs.  Finding only two programs that fit the criteria, the

authors were unable to determine that the findings were statistically different;

however, the programs did appear to show signs of effectiveness in reentry without

being statistically significant.

While all of Seiter and Kadela’s findings were an extremely important step in

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the right direction for reentry evaluation and program assessments, they are by no

means complete, and are nearly a decade old.  If multiple and similar evaluations

could be performed with more rigor, detail and variable examination, such reports

would be extremely helpful in filling the information void of reentry program

evaluation.

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VI. PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF EVALUATION

“Social programs deserve to be treated as serious attempts at intervention, with possibly toxic effects, so that a science of intervention can prosper.” – Joan McCord,

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (2003)

As performance management expert Patria de Lancer Julnes explains, “It is

important to recognize that every evaluation method, including performance

management, has its limitations which can only be overcome through use of a

combination of methods.” (de Lancer Julnes, 2006) The notion of combining

different characteristics of performance measurement models is complicated due to

a lack of overall performance standards of reentry. With the minimal amount of

performance management techniques in the reentry universe, it has been difficult to

gauge success in any meaningful way, let alone try to determine a definition for

“success” for such programs.

However, certain applications of measuring performance are often called for

by a program’s grantor with the expectation of receiving some data to support or

deny future funding. While grantee programs started without reporting progress,

successes or failures, the federal government should have been responsible for

incenting the program managers with some sense of urgency behind collecting

progress data. Due to this void, the federal government’s audit and evaluation of

their reentry programs has produced less than desirable results.

A. Office of Justice Programs Audit

It seems deplorable that a government entity entrusted with such a large

investment would have so little oversight over its actual efficiency. The usage

among grantees of reentry program dollars begs the question of “why?” Why has so

53

much money and time been put into an effort we know nothing about? Interestingly

enough, the US Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General released an

audit report in July, 2010 to address that very question. The findings of their audit

were somewhat astonishing. As grant dollars were disseminated on the Second

Chance Act’s two precursor programs, the Serious and Violent Offenders Reentry

Initiative (SVORI) and the Prisoner Reentry Initiative (PRI) (see Holl and Kolovich,

2009) by the Office of Justice Programs, it was found that the grantor’s data

collection methods were lacking.

Both SVORI and PRI programs were developed with common objectives in

mind: “to reduce recidivism by helping released inmates find work and to provide

them access to other critical services in their communities.” ("Office of Justice

Programs’ Management of Its Offender Reentry Initiatives” 1-67). By design, the

two programs were meant to target slightly different populations, distinguished by

the types of crimes which led to their arrests— violent offenses (SVORI) and non-

violent offenses (PRI). From 2002-2004, 69 SVORI programs were awarded a

collective $116,812,182. From 2006-2008, 63 PRI programs were awarded a

collective $33,721,539. While the SVORI evaluations showed overall negative

results in the realm of performance measurement, the PRI programs were either

inadequately monitored or lacked supervisory signoff. The grantor determined that

only “3 of the 10 PRI grants reviewed were likely to continue to receive funding.”

(Ibid.) For example, of the selected PRI programs for further evaluation, the

following conclusions were made as of December, 2009:

A Florida program in 2006 and 2007 planned to facilitate the

54

successful rehabilitation/reentry of 200 clients per year. Of an

initially admitted 3,874 participants, only 6 remained in the program

for 12 months after release, a 0.2 percent success rate.

A Colorado program in 2007 and 2008 planned to facilitate the

successful rehabilitation/reentry of at least 200 clients per year. Of

an initially admitted 180 participants, only 5 remained in the

program for 12 months after release in 2007—a 3 percent success

rates-- and there was apparently no tracking system in place for 2008.

A Texas program in 2006 also planned to facilitate the successful

rehabilitation/reentry of 200 clients per year. After admitting only

189 participants, the program had just 10 individuals remaining 12

months after release, a 5 percent success rate.

Illinois and Washington, DC programs over the course of two years

did not track their participants in any way.

New York reported that the participant tracking/success rates were

“n/a”.

“OJP did not establish an effective system for monitoring the SVORI and PRI

grantees to assess whether they were meeting program goals. Our review of

OJP’s official SVORI grant files identified little to no documentation of grant

monitoring activities. Monitoring activities are crucial in identifying

grantee progress toward achieving program goals.” (Ibid.)

It would appear that while programs have not done an adequate job

establishing performance measurement methodologies, neither has their grantor.

Without specifying clear desired outcomes, goals, or at least some direction,

55

grantees will see no reason to expend the extra time and money on gathering data

that is actually crucial to the future funding of these government and community-

based programs. It will be just as important for grantors to value such information

in order to make future funding decisions as it is for the programs, who must in turn

determine their own effectiveness.

“We found that OJP did not adequately define key terms essential for

determining whether program goals were met, did not require grantees to

identify baseline recidivism rates needed to calculate changes in recidivism,

and did not analyze performance measurement data. As a result of these

design flaws, neither OJP nor the OIG [Office of the Inspector General] could

definitively determine the effectiveness of OJP’s grant programs in reducing

recidivism. Additionally, an independent national evaluation of the SVORI

grant program’s effectiveness concluded that the program had no significant

impact on participant recidivism.” (Ibid.)

Of the 69 programs that received SVORI grants between 2002 and 2004, ten

(awarded $17.9 million collectively) were chosen for evaluation (Ibid.). The

auditors of OJP found that about $5.2 million of that award—about 29 percent--was

spent in a questionable manner. Additionally, the level at which both the SVORI and

the PRI respondents reported progress was minimal at best. On top of that,

deficiencies noted by the auditors on both SVORI and PRI programs included 1) an

inconsistent definition for the term “recidivism”, 2) no stipulation regarding the

capturing of baseline recidivism data prior to the start of the program, and 3) a

significant delay in both establishing evaluative measures and in receiving

completed reports back from the grantees (Ibid.).

With such evidence of poor grant dollar usage, it is difficult to determine

how the OJP intends to resolve the overwhelming problems cited by this report, or

56

whether OJP has exercised any grant revocation or sanctions among their grantees.

The auditor clearly indicates that while the grantees did not properly report their

outcomes, the reporting systems were not particularly reliable. For example, OJP

created a system of reporting progress through a mechanism called the Grants

Management System; yet, the OJP stated in the audit report that the Grants

Management System “was an inadequate performance measurement collection

system.” (Ibid.) and also noted that the system “cannot perform data analysis

functions.” (Ibid.). Perhaps such observations about the Grant Management

System’s inability to perform the necessary tasks should have been considered prior

to the decision to use it.

One might assume that while the abysmal collection of data on reentry

program performance lies at the feet of program managers and grantees, it is just as

important for the grantor, especially in the cases where the grantor is the US

government, to imbue a sense of importance and urgency behind the collection of

this crucial information. Unless the systems are properly set up to begin with, it is

difficult to pinpoint where to place blame for a plethora of failings . The audit

report notes a number of very significant programmatic and evaluative shortfalls,

including the fact that no performance measures were documented by either the

Bureau of Justice OR the grantees for both the 2007 and 2008 PRI programs. Also,

“The OJP continued to collect grantee data through the Grants Management System

with no process in place to assess the performance measurement data being

collected.” (Ibid.)

While the system was revised in April 2008 to stipulate that programmatic

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and financial reviews should take place roughly every six months, it is important to

note that “prior to this revision, OJP did not have a policy that stated how often…

reviews should be conducted.” (Ibid.). By June, 2009, a mere 45 reviews out of a

possible 264 were submitted by grantees. Of the reviews submitted, 40 percent

were deemed incomplete or improperly submitted.

As evidenced by the OJP Auditor’s report, it seems apparent that neither the

government nor the grant recipients felt a significant need to collect and report data

or outcomes. One example of this shortfall is the absence of any baseline data to

support the need for recidivist interventions. Since the OJP did not require

grantees to report any recidivism baseline measurements, it was impossible to

measure progress. “An accurate assessment of reductions in recidivism cannot be

conducted without a baseline recidivism rate.” (Ibid.) The auditor recommended

that OJP update this policy. The auditor also notes that while it can be difficult to

collect baseline data, “it is possible to do so.” (Ibid.)

Fortunately, it would appear that OJP has updated some of these standards of

evaluative reporting just in time for the Second Chance Act grant. However, it will

be a challenge to gather effective data when “no SCA measures relate to pre- and

post-release services and transition plans,” (Ibid.) once again posing a threat to

reporting true programmatic outcomes. Furthermore, it will be imperative to

institute one single method of data collection rather than periodically picking a

suggested methodology or system which may not hold any weight in determining

what qualifies as an evidence-based practice (EBP).

B. Risk Assessments

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The most effective way of measuring the performance or potential risk

factors of a reentry program thus far has been regular surveying of individuals—but

the survey technique is inherently flawed as the population of ex-offenders has a

habit of disappearing upon release or soon after community-based transitional

assistance. Just like the evaluation techniques, many performance indicators are

based on data from administrative capacities—the justice system itself, community

service providers, halfway houses and drug treatment centers (LaVigne, Davies,

Palmer, and Halberstadt, Appendix A). A new practice is one developed by Dutchess

County, New York, which has provided one of the more comprehensive models of

performance measurement for the new generation of reentry programs. While the

question still exists as to what is being done with the information and/or how it’s

being evaluated, Dutchess County’s survey system gets at the heart of many

qualitative issues relating to successful reentry and reintegration into free society

(McGahan, Rowland, and Wohr, 2010).

In an effort to standardize risk assessments (most commonly used upon

inmate intake), a number of different tools have been created to measure risk

across the board. Dutchess County administrators make the very crucial point that,

if nothing else, states should at least use a formulaic tool that can be adopted

statewide. Since state agencies in New York transitioned to using the 4th Generation

COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions)

tool, one of the goals in Dutchess County is to transition to this system. However,

many of these COMPAS-like tools exist for “criminal mapping” and are associated

with different advancement generations (similar to wireless networks, 3G/4G),

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including COMPSTAT (comparative statistics, created in the New York Police

Department) ICAM (Information Collection And Mapping system, widely used in the

City of Chicago), LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory Revised, widely used in Canada),

and LS/CMI (Level of Service Case Management Inventory, also developed by the

LSI-R scholars), and a number of other less-popular measurement tools (Illinois

Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2010). One of the problems noted with

many of these tools is that their efficiency for determining risk is either in-penal or

upon release to a halfway house. Rarely are tools identified to determine the needs

once an offender has been released to the community besides those tools developed

case-by-case or that may be facility- or geographically-specific. If the risk is not

assessed, it is increasingly difficult to determine what course of action should be

taken to help decrease the documented risk.

Dutchess County has helped to cultivate the solution to the community

reintegration challenge by developing a great collaborative model for community

reentry called the Dutchess County Jail Transition Program (DCJTP). The model was

initiated specifically to help define post-penal supervisory assistance and behavioral

improvement for released offenders (See Appendix I). Many questions in the DCJTP

form address the formation of individualized strategies, living accommodations and

needs, relational associations, educational/vocational planning, clinical/behavioral

treatment, and attitude adjustment (McGahan, Rowland, and Wohr, 2010). Asking

these behavioral questions about three different periods (before crime, during

crime, after crime) helps to identify how the offender feels currently about the

above factors, and helps to transition into the kind of thinking that is beneficial for

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future planning.

Moving forward, it will also be important to establish the baseline data called

for in the OJP audit. This will involve demonstrating which quantitative variables

should be measured, and then determining a system to track the proper data. These

quantitative variables should demonstrate the desired benchmarks each

participant is expected to achieve. Benchmarking is defined as the process of

improving performance by continuously identifying, understanding (studying and

analyzing), and adapting outstanding practices and process found inside and outside

the organization and implementing the results (Kelessidis, 2000). In the criminal

justice system, benchmarking will help facilitate the determination of tangible

progress in reentry.

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VII. EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES, METHODOLOGY & EVALUATION

SUGGESTIONS

“…Evidence-based evaluations are central to understanding reintegration issues and the potential of an intensive transitional services intervention for sound correctional

policy.” – Wilson and Davis, ‘Project Greenlight’ Evaluators

Featured in the Evaluation of the Prisoner Reentry Initiative (Holl and

Kolovich, 2009) is a prisoner reentry framework that clearly outlines the steps

necessary to get an offender into appropriate therapeutic communities. In short,

the framework demonstrates that reentry starts at the institution with a structured

risk and needs assessment, resulting in individualized services in prison.

The next phase involves a structured approach towards reentry, including

transition planning and confirmation, followed by transition reassessment and

updates. Once those conditions have been satisfied, the offender moves on to the

most crucial step of reentry—community reintegration. The third phase consists of

employment, monitoring, and service provisions within the community (Taxman,

Young, and Byrne, 2004). While this has been the most widely implemented system

of reentry programs, the monitoring aspect of step three should somehow integrate

evaluative techniques into its standard operations. For ex-offenders, the continuum

of care must also integrate very specific and individualized measures to ensure

success. For instance, an ex-offender who has no familial connections should not

rely on a family reunification variable to have any impact on recidivism;, in the

same sense, an ex-offender with a bachelor’s degree should not have the same

career attainment variable as someone at a 4th grade reading level. Key

components and release activities must be looked at differently on a case-by-case

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and sometimes an even geographically-tied basis (Conley, Appendix A, 2005).

Few systems exist that have truly mastered the qualitative-to-quantitative

transitions necessary to disseminate information on what is mathematically a best

practice. For the systems that have, the reporting is often very focused around one

idea or one variable among the pool of variables that can affect an offender’s ability

to remain out of custody.

A. An Evidence-Based Practice

A system called IPASS (Inmate Prerelease Assessment) was developed

specifically to monitor the progress of drug-dependent (or those with a history of

drug dependence) inmates and how they would fare post-release based on common

risk factors. Examining the psychometric properties of the IPASS system,

researchers David Farabee, Kevin Knight, Bryan Garner and Stacy Calhoun describe

different chunks of assessment modules and how they may help predict recidivism

outcomes by gathering data from both counselors and clients. The study examined

over 200 male inmates from two different treatment programs who were within 90

days of release through simple unit scoring. Weighting different characteristics in a

statistical relevance format, certain variables such as “how easy is it to talk to your

counselor” and “how liked by staff is the client” helped develop baseline scores to

more fully determine risk assessments and outcomes, such as how an ex-offender

might fare on the outside. The IPASS system shows promising progress, but the

system is very specific and leaves much to still be determined about offender who

may not fit the IPASS profile.

“Referrals that do not rely on more systematic clinical or actuarial information

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can dilute the treatment milieu and displace substance abusers who might

have derived benefit from treatment had they been correctly identified and

referred. As reported elsewhere, providing an intensive level of treatment to

offenders with low levels of substance-use and criminal-severity background is

an ineffective use of resources.” (Farabee et. al, 2007)

While IPASS may be promising, its limited approach fails to capture the range

of variables that can help or hinder success on the outside for individuals who did

not participate in IPASS and individuals whose most threatening risk factors are

factors other than substance abuse. Institutional tools like COMPAS, COMPSTAT,

IPASS, and LSI-R can effectively determine a person’s likelihood to recidivate to

criminal behavior. However, once the risk has been assessed, it should be doubly

important to assure that the risks identified have plausible solutions.

The tools necessary to foster a successful reentry are very widespread and

usually their effectiveness can be determined through qualitative rather than

quantitative measurements. However, if a system could be devised that simply

quantified instead of qualified these variables, it may be easier to create

personalized continuums of post-penal care (Figure 3). Such a tool could also prove

useful in identifying what the greatest risk to rehabilitation may be for any given

individual.

When tests conducted are not repeatable, or are repeatable but with very

different results, the significance of such tests is highly questionable. Since there

has been little consideration for retesting many of the current hypotheses, the

validity of the existing tests is unclear. However, it is important to note that

replicability and statistical significance in this type of test can be challenging to

address, as the “human experience is too complex to be meaningfully reduced to a

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simple measure of program quality.” (de Lancer Julnes, 2006)

B. A Best Practice

An example of a jurisdiction that has instituted a potential best practice

model is Oregon, the state that documented the lowest overall recidivism rate

between 1999 and 2004 (Pew, 2011). One of the reasons Oregon has been able to

tout this best practice is because the numbers, documented efficiently and

effectively, speak for themselves.

A key piece of state legislation, passed with bipartisan support in 2003,

affirms the importance of documenting and evaluating practices. Oregon’s bill, SB

267, required all correctional programs receiving state money to be evidence-based

in both design and execution (Ibid.).

“In prison, Oregon inmates receive risk and needs assessments at intake, and

targeted case management during incarceration, along with detailed

transition planning that begins six months before release. In the community,

probation officers use a sanctioning grid to impose swift, certain consequences

for violations, creating consistency across offenders and from county to county.

In both settings, offender programs are anchored in research and

continually monitored and updated to optimize their effectiveness. The

change in the handling of offenders who violate terms of their supervision was

striking…Results of the Pew/ASCA survey confirmed this—only 5.9 percent of

offenders released in 1999 and 3.3 percent of the 2004 cohort were returned to

prison on technical violations.” (Pew, 2011)

While Oregon’s model is a promising advancement in reentry evaluative

studies, it is still in the beginning stages of development. As the continual

monitoring and updates occur to Oregon’s plan, the programs utilizing this

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operational procedure will be examined until 2013, when the Senate bill will sunset

after careful observation by legislators. At that time, it will be imperative to look at

Oregon’s pioneering of a best practice and determine whether the model should be

replicated.

With process improvements and performance measurements becoming

more common in both the public and private sectors, evaluations are clearly a

tremendous benefit to federally funded initiatives. While many of the process

improvement mechanisms are costly and complicated, they can demonstrate

significant programmatic results. By identifying performance indicators, baseline

recidivism, post-reentry recidivism rates, stakeholder interests and best practices,

the field could potentially institute a highly robust schema of the most efficient post-

release plans of action.

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IIX. FUTURE OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN REENTRY

“Because few programs are available in prison settings and because the demand for effective programming for inmates remains high, there remain tremendous

opportunities for correctional researchers and policy makers alike to explore and test various treatment strategies.” – Sheldon Zhang et al., Crime and Delinquency (2011)

In addition to evaluation models, the accountability tied to each assessment

will be one of the most important considerations in performance management

moving forward. It has not been evident that any organization or individual would

consider itself accountable for the overall progress of reentry programs. It seems

only natural that the funder of this wide range of initiatives would bear the brunt of

accountability, but the import of accountability has not been captured in full by any

grantor. Once accountability is assigned or determined, there will be a significant

need to develop and monitor quantitative results that would effectively make the

case for a true best practice. Upon determining that best practice, or one

recommended system of evaluation based on a hybrid of best practices,

implementation and sustainability of the proposed measures will be crucial to the

future of performance measurement of reentry programs.

A. Performance Measurement as Evaluation

An overarching challenge in this process is inevitable bureaucratic pushback,

and the notion that things are fine the way they are. With respect to performance

measures, it is said that while they “do not drive decisions, [performance measures]

are important and somehow influence action.” (de Lancer Julnes, 2006). However,

agencies have become fearful of accountability for outcomes of programs.

“Managers at all levels have fears that they set nice goals but [cannot] achieve them.

The fears about performance measurement and accountability…are real.” (Ibid.) In

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the reentry universe, this fear of accountability is further compounded by the good

intentions of an overwhelmed system.

So what is there to do? The bleak outlook of current reentry progress is

complicated by a lack of support, a lack of awareness, and the lack of foresight to

value and measure outcomes. Communities themselves play a very significant role

with respect to community-based rehabilitation reentry models and are a very

significant factor in successful, stable, healthy reentry. Perhaps reentry evaluation

techniques might be most appropriately administered in communities to which

offenders return upon release. Community transitions must be evaluated with the

same import as a government-funded system, as community and social programs

“deserve to be treated as serious attempts at intervention, with possibly toxic

effects, so that a science of intervention can prosper.” (McCord, 2003)

“There is some research evidence that suggests that the frequent removal and

reentry of offenders to and from…disadvantaged communities further weakens

social capital and informal social controls, resulting in less community safety.”

(Braga, Piehl and Hureau, 2009)

Since community characteristics can play a large role in the success or failure

of reentry programs (LaVigne and Mamalian, 2005), must be considered vis a vis the

previously mentioned plethora of issues attached to reentry.. Location obviously

has a large impact on many ex-offenders, and should be examined during the critical

3-month period of post-release reentry efforts.

A 2008 study was conducted by Emory University in partnership with the

Urban Institute and the Annie E. Casey Foundation focusing on reentry. “Prisoner

Reentry in Atlanta: Understanding the Challenges of Transition from Prison to

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Community” articulates the importance, at least in this location, of following a 3-

pronged course of action to further determine the efficiency of reentry programs:

1. Understanding the ecology of reentry, that is, to “explore in more detail how

the dynamics of the prisoner reentry issue in the greater Atlanta area has

changed over time”, (Rich et al. 2008)

2. Mapping assets for reentry, that is, to compile “a comprehensive listing of

reentry service providers” (Ibid.) which is helpful to all geographic areas,

and

3. Assisting policymakers and service providers, that is, to engage the

community and its leaders in changing the face of reentry to create a greater

impetus for the evaluation and assessment/improvement of the existing

programs (Ibid.).

Any successful reentry program must prepare ex-offenders to deal with the

most pressing issues of housing, jobs, education, health, familial relationships and

interpersonal relationships, obtaining the proper ID/paperwork to move up and out

of the system, substance abuse, negative behavior, procuring food, furniture, and

transportation along with many other basic needs customized toward each

individual continuum of care and safety (Travis, Solomon, and Waul, 2001).

Moreover, these models must document and measure their outcomes and progress

in an evaluative format to ensure a productive return on investment.

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IX. CONCLUSION

“The aim of any prison should be its own elimination.” Jose Solis Jordan, Former Puerto Rican Political Prisoner

When a person dabbling in up-and-coming investments decides to put his or

her money behind a company, project, initiative, or cause, the person will usually do

research to determine the best way to proceed—do I buy because of the history of

the organization, my connection with the organization, or because of what the

organization says it will do? Regardless of the reason, a smart investor at least

tenuously tracks his or her investment, making sure that what he or she agreed to

fund is in fact being funded properly and should result in the outcomes the investor

expected to see. If the investment was in excess of $33 billion, it seems only natural

that a funder would track the progress in very standardized and effective ways,

particularly if it involved taxpayer dollars.

Strangely enough, this does not appear to be the attitude that the federal

government has taken towards prisoner reentry. What the public sees are quick

fixes, an inexorable cycle of throwing money at processes that are not working in

the hopes that enough investment will fill in the mysterious holes outsiders cannot

see. If officials only viewed reentry as an investment—and as nothing else—this

system would be in better shape than it is presently. If we had only measured

trends of recidivating criminal populations and incarceration over the last five

decades, our current programs would not be so cursory. They would be securely

beneficial, tried and true, changing this system for the better, illuminating evidence-

based practices that help people change their lives.

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From what has been examined in this report, there is a clear indication that

performance measurement has a ways to go in reentry programming. However,

also evident in this report is that there have been attempts to measure progress

thus far, yet there is no other professional competency that would be willing to

accept a single study on a single element as fact without rigorous retesting. Pressing

concerns of evaluation quality in this field should not be taken lightly—testing has

begun, but for all intents and purposes, it is still in the beginning stages. As the

government begins to move more funds into reentry programming and criminal

justice diversion programs, it will be imperative to collect all existing data from

baseline to end results. Without a full continuum of both evaluation and

performance improvements, the stagnant progress of determining best practices in

reentry will be as elusive as the population being targeted.

In any other industry, investment accountability is not taken lightly. If we,

the taxpayers, are the financial support that the government requires to continue

providing reentry services to at-risk populations, we as funders deserve a

transparent reporting mechanism to ensure that we are doing more good than

harm. As public administrators, we have the right to hold the funders of such

massive initiatives accountable for their progress. In order to gauge this progress,

performance measurement must be instituted more effectively. Since “performance

measurement, so defined, came to be the tool for addressing accountability” (de

Lancer Julnes, 2006), it is only reasonable that data collection be a mechanism

through which progress, and therefore accountability can be determined.

Holding the government accountable for the uncontrolled spending of

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reentry dollars is an administrative task that requires leadership, courage, and

willingness to transition from qualitative generalizations to quantitative results.

When this tremendous problem is translated into human results, it is imperative to

note that over 95 percent of individuals incarcerated will be released to the

communities from where they came (Travis, Solomon and Waul, 2001). As Dr.

Travis explains, reentry is inevitable—“successful” reentry is simply an afterthought

(Travis, 2010). Since this population will be released, many with no legal

responsibility to check back in with parole or probation officers, we must ensure for

the safety and security of our neighborhoods that, at the very least, reentry

programs do more good than harm. Until we have empirically and statistically

proven this hypothesis, our execution of reentry practices will not mature in any

consistent or pragmatic way.

“Prison only works in the crude sense that criminals cannot commit crimes – against the rest of us, at least – while they are in jail. When they come out, they are more likely to commit crimes than they were before they went in. So, unless sentences are so long

that they cancel out the effect of prison in preparing criminals for a life of crime, prison does the opposite of working.” – John Rentoul, The Independent (2006)

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Baer, Demelza, Avinash Bhati, Lisa Brooks, Jennifer Castro, Nancy LaVigne, Kamala Mallik-Kane, Rebecca Naser, Jenny Osborne, Caterina Roman, John Roman, Shelli Rossman, Amy Solomon, Christy Visher, Laura Winterfield. “Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry: Research findings from the Urban Institute’s Prisoner Reentry Portfolio.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, January 2006.

Bahr, Stephen J., Lish Harris, James K. Fisher, and Anita Harker Armstrong. “Successful Reentry: What Differentiates Successful and Unsuccessful Parolees?.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. 54. (2009): 667-692.

Braga, Anthony, Anne M. Piehl, and David Hureau. “Controlling Violent Offenders Released to the Community: An Evaluation of the Boston Reentry Initiative.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. 46. (2009): 411-438. Print.

Byrne, James M., and Albert R. Roberts. “New directions in offender typology design, development, and implementation: Can we balance risk, treatment and control?.” Aggression and Violent Behavior. 12. (2007): 483-491. Print.

Christensen, Gary E. “Our System of Corrections: Do Jails Play a Role in Improving Offender Outcomes?” Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, August 2008.

Conley, Catherine. “Helping Inmates Obtain Federal Disability Benefits.” Serious Medical and Mental Illness, Incarceration, and Federal Disability Entitlement Programs. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., 2005.

Farabee, David, Kevin Knight, Bryan Garner and Stacy Calhoun. “The Inmate Prerelease Assessment for Reentry Planning.” Criminal Justice and Behavior. 34. (2007): 1188-1195.

Gaes, Gerald G. “The Impact of Prison Education Programs on Post-Release Outcomes.” New York, NY: Florida State University & John Jay College of Criminal Justice, April 2008.

Holl, Douglas B., and Lisa Kolovich. Final Report: Evaluation of the Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative. Bethesda, MD: Coffey Consulting, 2009.

Keless idis , Vass i l i s . "Benchm arking ."   U r ban and Re gio nal Inno vat io n (U RENIO) . Urenio , 2000. Web. 1 Apr 2011. <http ://www.urenio .org /tools/en/benchm arking .pdf>

Kisker, Ellen Eliason, Diane Paulsell, John M. Love, and Helen Raikes. “Early Head Start Research: Pathways to Quality and Full Implementation in Early Head Start Programs.” Mathematica Policy Research. (2002): 1-332.

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Langan, Patrick and Daniel Levin. 2002. Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994. Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice.

LaVigne, Nancy, Elizabeth Davies, Tobi Palmer, Robin Halberstadt. “Release Planning for Successful Reentry; A Guide for Corrections, Service Providers, and Community Groups.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, September 2008.

LaVigne, Nancy, Cynthia Mamalian. “Prisoner Reentry in Georgia.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, November 2004

Makarios, Matthew, Benajmin Steiner, and Lawrence F. Travis. “Examining the Predictors of Recidivism Among Men and Women Released From Prison in Ohio.” Criminal Justice and Behavior. 37.1377 (2010): 1378-1393

McCord, Joan. “Cures that harm: Unanticipated outcomes of crime prevention programs.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 587 (May 2003): 16-30

McGahan, Jennifer L., Siobhan Rowland, Wayne Wohr. “ A Collaborative Model for Effective Community Reentry and Systems Coordination.” Poughkeepsie, NY: Office of Community Research, Inc. and Dutchess County Reentry Task Force, 2008.

Mellow, Jeff, Steven K. Hoge, Joshua D. Lee, Mangai Natarajan, Sung-suk Violet Yu, Robert B. Greifinger, Gary Belkin. “Mapping the Innovation in Correctional Health Care Service Delivery in New York City.” New York, NY: John Jay College, CUNY, 2008

Mellow, Jeff, Melinda D. Schlader, Joel M. Caplan. Using GIS to evaluate post-release prisoner services in Newark, New Jersey.” Journal of Criminal Justice. 36 (2008) 416-425. Meyers-Peeples, Roberta and April L. Frazier. “National Blueprint for Reentry.” Washington, DC: H.I.R.E. Network and National Reentry Consortium, October 2008.

Muhlhausen, David. ""The Second Chance Act: More Evaluations of Effectiveness Needed"." Senate Judiciary Committee. United States Senate. Washington, DC, July 21, 2010. Speech.

Office of the Inspector General Audit Division. Office of Justice Programs Management of Its Offender Reentry Initiatives. Washington, DC: , 2010. Print.

Petersilia, Joan. When Prisoners come Home: Parole and Prisoner Reentry. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2003. Print.

Porporino, Frank and Elizabeth Fabiano. “Reasoning and Rehabilitation Revised: Theory and Application.” Ottawa, ONT., Canada: T3 Associates

Rich, Michael, Michael Leo Owens, Moshe Haspel, Sam Marie Engle. “Prisoner Reentry in Atlanta: Understanding the Challenges of Transition from Prison to Community.” Atlanta, GA: Emory University Office of University-Community Partnerships, December 2008.

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Seiter, Richard P., and Karen R. Kadela. “Prisoner Reentry: What Works, What Does Not, and What Is Promising.” Crime and Delinquency. 49. (2003): 360-388.

Solomon, Amy, Jesse Jannetta, Brian Elderbroom, Laura Winterfield, and Jenny W.L. Osborne. “Putting Public safety First: 13 Strategies for Successful Supervision and Reentry.” Public Safety Policy Brief 7, Pew Center on the States. (2008): 1-4. Web. 10 November 2010. <http://www.pewpublicsafety.org >.

Solomon, Amy L., Gillian L. Thomson, Sinead Keegan. “Prisoner Reentry in Michigan.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, October 2004.

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“statistical significance.” The American Heritage® New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005. 19 Feb. 2011. <Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/statistical significance>.

Taxman, Faye, Doug Young and James Byrne. “With Eyes Wide Open: Formalizing Community and Social Control Intervention in Offender Reintegration Programs” After Crime and Punishment: Pathways to Offender Reintegration (2004), eds., S Maruna and R. Immarigeon, 233-260. Portland, OR: Willand Publishing

Taxman, Faye S., Douglas W. Young, Brian Wiersema, Anne Rhodes, and Suzanne Mitchell. “The National Criminal Justice Treatment Practices survey: Multilevel survey methods and procedures.” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment. 32. (2007): 225-238.

Travis, Jeremy. Telephone Interview by Anna R. Kohn. 26 October 2010. 15 Dec 2010.

Travis, Jeremy, Amy L. Solomon, Michelle Waul. “From Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, June 2001.

Walsh, Tamara. “Is Corrections Correcting? An Examination of Prisoner Rehabilitation Policy and Practice in Queensland.” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology. 39.109 (2006): 109-133. Print.

Warren, Jenifer,”One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections.” Pew Center on the States (2009): Web. 12 November 2010. <http://www.pewcenteronthestates .org/publicsafety >.

Willis, Gwenda M., and Randolph C. Grace. “Assessment of Community Reintegration Planning for Sex Offenders: Poor Planning Predicts Recidivism.” Criminal Justice and Behavior. 36. (2009): 494-511

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Print

”Justice Reinvestment at the Local Level.” Urban Institute Justice Policy Center. Web. 15 Dec 2010. <http://www.urban.org/center/jpc/justice%2Dreinvestment/ >.

“Virginia Community Reentry Program.” Office of Community Partnerships. Virginia Department of Social Services. Web. 15 Dec 2010. <http://www.dss .virginia .gov/community/prisoner_reentry/ >.

“Prison Count 2010, State Population Declines for the First Time in 38 Years” Pew Center on the States (2010) 1-9 Web 10 November 2010 <http://www.pewcenteronthestates .org/publicsafety >

“State of Recidivism, The Revolving Door of America’s Prisons” Pew Center on the States (2011) 1-40 Web 15 April 2011

<http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Pew_State_of_Recidivism.pdf>

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Administrative Segregation: the placement of prisoners in an isolated unit for the

safety and security of the institution; solitary confinement. (Dictionary.com)

Aftercare: the care, treatment, help, or supervision given to persons discharged

from an institution (as a hospital or prison) (Merriam Webster Medical Dictionary)

ALOS: Average Length of Stay. By diagnostic categories, ALOS is calculated by

dividing the number of days stayed (from the date of admission in an in-patient

institution) by the number of discharges (including deaths). (European Union Public

Health Information System EUphix)

Comorbid/Comorbidity: existing simultaneously with and usually independently

of another medical condition (Merriam Webster)

Chronic/Habitual Offender: A person who is convicted and sentenced for crimes

over a period of time and even after serving sentences of incarceration,

demonstrates a propensity towards future criminal conduct. (Duhaime.org)

Earliest Possible Release Date: This date applies to offenders on the basis of the

prescribed sentence and good time credits. EPRD is based on the assumption that 1.

A prisoner never loses any other day of credit, 2. A prisoner never has any more

credits restored, 3. A prisoner stays in the same credit earning status, and 4. A

prisoner keeps the same legal status (eg. picks up no new charges or offenses during

his or her term). (Ball, Weisberg, and Dansky, Stanford Law School, 9/12/2008,

“The First 72 Hours of Reentry: Seizing the Moment of Release”)

Evidence Based Practice: Professional practice based upon the results of previous

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research; or professional practice based upon known outcomes. (International

Dictionary of Adult and Continuing Education)

Exonerate/Exoneration: to relieve of a responsibility, obligation, or hardship; to

clear from accusation or blame (Merriam Webster)

“Good Time”: A reward that affords inmates the opportunity to reduce the time

until their eligibility for release by good behavior in prison.

Graduated Sanctions: A graduated sanctions system is a set of integrated

intervention strategies designed to operate in unison to enhance accountability,

ensure public safety, and reduce recidivism by preventing future delinquent

behavior. The term ‘graduated sanctions’ implies that the penalties for delinquent

activity should move from limited interventions to more restrictive (i.e., graduated)

penalties according to the severity and nature of the crime. In other words, youth

who commit serious and violent offenses should receive more restrictive sentences

than youth who commit less serious offenses. (Babylon Dictionary)

Jail: a place of confinement for persons held in lawful custody; specifically: such a

place under the jurisdiction of a local government (as a county) for the confinement

of persons awaiting trial or those convicted of minor crimes. (Merriam Webster)

Prison: a place of confinement especially for lawbreakers; specifically: an

institution (as one under state jurisdiction) for confinement of persons convicted of

serious crimes. (Merriam Webster)

Performance Management: Regular and careful monitoring of program

implementation and outcomes (de Lancer Julnes)

Prisoner Reentry: the return of inmates back to society; the inevitable

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consequence of incarceration (The Urban Institute)

Recidivism: the act of reengaging in criminal offending despite having been

punished (Pew Center on the States)

Reintegration: repeated or renewed integration (for instance, an offender

readjusting to a noncriminal pattern or community) (Merriam Webster)

Supervision: a critical watching and directing (as of activities or a course of action)

(Merriam Webster)

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

BJS – Bureau of Justice Statistics

CJ – Criminal Justice

COMPAS Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions

COMPSTAT – Comparative Statistics

DCJTP – Dutchess County Jail Transition Program

DOJ – Department of Justice

DOL – Department of Labor

EBP – Evidence-Based Practice

GED – General Education Development

ICAM - Information Collection And Mapping

IPASS - Inmate Prerelease Assessment

LS/CMI - Level of Service Case Management Inventory

LSI-R - Level of Service Inventory Revised

MPRI – Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative

OIG – Office of Inspector General

OJP – Office of Justice Programs

PRI – Prisoner Reentry Initiative

SOP – Standard Operating Procedure(s)

SCA – Second Chance Act

STD – Sexually Transmitted Disease(s)

SVORI – Serious and Violent Offenders Reentry Initiative

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(DUTCHESS COUNTY AFTERCARE PLAN)

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