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Feminist Liberalism

Feminist LiberalismSusan Moller Okin & Martha C. Nussbaum

Dr. Clea F. Rees

ReesC17@cardiff.ac.uk

Centre for Lifelong LearningCardiff University

Spring 2014

mailto:ReesC17@cardiff.ac.ukReesC17@cardiff.ac.uk

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Feminist LiberalismOutline

Two ProblemsFirst ProblemSecond Problem

Two Questions

Feminist Challenges to LiberalismPublic & Private DomainsJustice vs. Care

Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on RawlsOkin’s Humanist JusticeHuman Capabilities ApproachObjections & Replies

References

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Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems

First Problem

Two ProblemsFirst Problem

I Rawls describes his theory of justice as part of ideal theory:I The real world as one of partial non-compliance with the

principles of justice.I We need non-ideal theory for the real world.

I Nozick’s utopia requires historical justice all the way back:I We need principle of rectification for complete theory of justice

re. holdings.

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Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems

First Problem

Two ProblemsFirst Problem

I How could/should we move from an existing society to onecloser to the ideal?

I Existing societies are unjust.I Various groups are less well situated as a result of past

injustices.I Various groups experience ongoing injustice.

discrimination/persecution on grounds of race, sex, skin colour,age, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, religion,

conscience, caste, class, accent, language, handedness, height, haircolour, citizenship. . .

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Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems

First Problem

Two ProblemsFirst Problem

The United States Supreme Court decided in1976. . . that ‘an exclusion of pregnancy from adisability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not agender-based discrimination at all.’ (Okin 1989, 102)

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Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems

Second Problem

Two ProblemsSecond Problem

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Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems

Second Problem

Two ProblemsSecond Problem

The United States Supreme Court decided in1976. . . that ‘an exclusion of pregnancy from adisability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not agender-based discrimination at all.’ (Okin 1989, 102)

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Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems

Second Problem

Two ProblemsSecond Problem

I What would be ideal?I sex, skin colour, sexual orientation etc. treated like eye colour?

i.e. colour-blind, sex-blind etc.I celebration of differences?

i.e. disability, creed, age etc. treated like musical, sporting orartistic interests and aptitudes?

I toleration of differences?i.e. class, race, gender etc. treated more like different political

ideologies?

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Feminist LiberalismTwo Questions

Two Questions

I Richard A. Wasserstrom asks1:1. What should we aim at?

What would be ideal?2. How should we get there?

What strategies could move us from here to there?Which ones should we implement?

e.g. Affirmative action might not be part of the ideal but it mightbe a justified and effective strategy from achieving the idealgiven our starting point.

1Wasserstrom 1979

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism

Feminist Challenges to Liberalism

I (An exclusive/primary) focus on justice reflects a masculinebias.

I Liberalism conceives all persons asisolated/separate/self-sufficient individuals.Such individualism reflects the concerns of men, especiallypowerful men in dominant groups.No persons are truly self-sufficient.No person is even largely so throughout life.Many persons never attain even moderate self-sufficiency.

I Liberalism reflects a (masculine) concern with abstractprinciples of justice.

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism

Feminist Challenges to Liberalism

I Competent, able-bodied, mature, healthy, non-pregnanthumans are interdependent.

I Autonomous citizens do not spring forth from the Earth.I All humans are needy and spend their lives in various degrees

of dependence on others.I Newborns, some sick persons, some persons with disabilities

and some elderly persons are absolutely dependent on others.

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism

Public & Private Domains

Feminist Challenges to LiberalismPublic & Private Domains

An Englishman’s home ishis castle. . .

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism

Public & Private Domains

Feminist Challenges to LiberalismPublic & Private Domains

PrivateFemaleUnpaid labourReproductionAffect/feeling/emotionNon-voluntaryMending/repair/careTrust

PublicMalePaid labourProductionReasonVoluntaryRights/justiceContract

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism

Justice vs. Care

Feminist Challenges to LiberalismJustice vs. Care

I Carol Gilligan2:I Men generally think of moral questions in terms of rights,

justice etc.⇒ Justice

I Women generally think of such questions in terms ofrelationships and connectedness over time etc.⇒ Care

e.g. Responses to Heinz’s dilemma

2Gilligan 1982

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism

Justice vs. Care

Feminist Challenges to LiberalismJustice vs. Care

I Caveats3:I ‘Generally’ means about 2 in 3.I On average, in this class expect:

I approx. 4 men to prefer justice;I approx. 2 men to prefer care;I approx. 5.3 women to prefer care;I approx. 2.7 women to prefer justice.

I Further caveats:I Gilligan’s later work4:

I Both sexes can use both perspectives.I ‘Prefer’ means ‘use first/use unprompted’.

I Others have raised doubts about Gilligan’s results, theirinterpretation and implications.

3Gilligan 19824Gilligan 1987

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts

Feminist Accounts

Susan Moller Martha C. Virginia ClaudiaOkin Nussbaum Held Card

1946–2004 1947–

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts

Feminist Accounts

Identify problems in liberalism

Problems are fatal?

YesNo

(Traditional) liberalism has adequate resources?

Yes No

e.g. Okin e.g. Nussbaum

e.g. Card? Held?

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts

Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls

Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on Rawls

I Rawls:I Family is part of basic structure.

I Okin & Nussbaum:I Rawls’s theory:

I pays too little attention to family;I is insufficiently critical of existing

family structures;I is too ready to relegate family life to

the ‘private’ sphere.

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts

Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls

Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on Rawls

I Nussbaum:I Rawls says the family is part of the

basic structure but treats it as avoluntary association.But the family is largely

non-voluntary.I Rawls treats the Western, nuclear

family as ‘quasi-natural’.But the nuclear family is a local,

contemporary phenomenon.But family structure is significantly

determined by the state.

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts

Okin’s Humanist Justice

Feminist AccountsOkin’s Humanist Justice

I There is a tension between freedom & justice.I Rawls’s position is rich enough to address feminist concerns.I Need to rethink implications of original position & veil.I Need to address implications of past & present injustices.

I Two models for a more just family:1. Genderless family.2. Gendered family with protection for vulnerable members.

I Genderless family as the more just model:1. more just to women;⇒ humanist justice. . .2. increases equality of opportunity for all children;3. better for raising citizens with a sense of justice.

I Genderless family key to genderless society. . .I Genderless family as key to just society. . .I Inappropriate to impose genderless families.

I Protecting vulnerable individuals in gendered families essential.

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts

Human Capabilities Approach

Feminist AccountsHuman Capabilities Approach

I Nussbaum:I There is a tension between freedom & justice.I Existing liberalism as only partially defensible.I Need reconceive liberalism on a new basis.⇒ Human capabilities approach:

I List primary social goods in terms of human capabilities.I Reconceive persons ‘as both capable and needy’ (79).I Abandon contractarianism.I Just institutions as those which best facilitate development of

basic capabilities of all citizens.I Proposed account as:

I maintaining ‘central role for choice and liberty’ (79);I abandoning traditional, liberal (‘Kantian’) view of persons;I adopting capable/needy (‘Aristotelian’) concept of persons.

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Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts

Objections & Replies

Feminist AccountsObjections & Replies

Discussion of prompt 5:

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Feminist Liberalismshrink

ReferencesGilligan, Carol (1982). In A Different Voice: Psychological Theoryand Women’s Development. Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.

– (1987). ‘Moral Orientation and Moral Development’. Womenand Moral Theory. Ed. by Eva Feder Kittay andDiana Tietjens Meyers. New Jersey: Rowman &Littlefield, 19–33.

Wasserstrom, Richard A. (1977). ‘Racism, Sexism, and PreferentialTreatment: An Approach to the Topics’. UCLA Law Review 24(Feb. 1977), 581–622. Hein: 595 [uclalr24].

– (1979). ‘Racism and Sexism’. Philosophy and Women. Ed. bySharon Bishop and Marjorie Weinzweig. The Wadsworth Seriesin Social Philosophy. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 5–20.excerpted from Wasserstrom (1977) with renumbered footnotes.

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclalr24&g_sent=1&collection=journals&id=595

Two ProblemsFirst ProblemSecond Problem

Two QuestionsFeminist Challenges to LiberalismPublic & Private DomainsJustice vs. Care

Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on RawlsOkin's Humanist JusticeHuman Capabilities ApproachObjections & Replies

References

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