feminist liberalism - susan moller okin & martha c. nussbaum · 2011. 10. 6. · susan moller...
TRANSCRIPT
-
b
Feminist Liberalism
Feminist LiberalismSusan Moller Okin & Martha C. Nussbaum
Dr. Clea F. Rees
Centre for Lifelong LearningCardiff University
Autumn 2011
mailto:[email protected]@cardiff.ac.uk
-
b
Feminist LiberalismOutline
Two ProblemsFirst ProblemSecond Problem
Two QuestionsFeminist Challenges to Liberalism
Public & Private DomainsJustice vs. Care
Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on RawlsOkin’s Humanist JusticeHuman Capabilities ApproachObjections & Replies
Glossary WorkshopReferences
-
b
Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems
First Problem
Two ProblemsFirst Problem
I Rawls describes his theory of justice as part of ideal theory:I The real world as one of partial non-compliance with the
principles of justice.I We need non-ideal theory for the real world.
I Nozick’s utopia requires historical justice all the way back:I We need principle of rectification for complete theory of justice
re. holdings.
-
b
Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems
First Problem
Two ProblemsFirst Problem
I How could/should we move from an existing society to onecloser to the ideal?
I Existing societies are unjust.I Various groups are less well situated as a result of past
injustices.I Various groups experience ongoing injustice.
discrimination/persecution on grounds of race, sex, skin colour,age, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, religion,
conscience, caste, class, accent, language, handedness, height, haircolour, citizenship. . .
-
b
Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems
First Problem
Two ProblemsFirst Problem
The United States Supreme Court decided in1976. . . that “an exclusion of pregnancy from adisability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not agender-based discrimination at all.” (Okin 1989, 102)
-
b
Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems
Second Problem
Two ProblemsSecond Problem
-
b
Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems
Second Problem
Two ProblemsSecond Problem
The United States Supreme Court decided in1976. . . that “an exclusion of pregnancy from adisability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not agender-based discrimination at all.” (Okin 1989, 102)
-
b
Feminist LiberalismTwo Problems
Second Problem
Two ProblemsSecond Problem
I What would be ideal?I sex, skin colour, sexual orientation etc. treated like eye colour?
i.e. colour-blind, sex-blind etc.I celebration of differences?
i.e. disability, creed, age etc. treated like musical, sporting orartistic interests and aptitudes?
I toleration of differences?i.e. class, race, gender etc. treated more like different political
ideologies?
-
b
Feminist LiberalismTwo Questions
Two Questions
I Richard A. Wasserstrom asks1:1. What should we aim at?
What would be ideal?2. How should we get there?
What strategies could move us from here to there?Which ones should we implement?
e.g. Affirmative action might not be part of the ideal but it mightbe a justified and effective strategy from achieving the idealgiven our starting point.
1. Wasserstrom 1979
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism
Feminist Challenges to Liberalism
I (An exclusive/primary) focus on justice reflects a masculinebias.
I Liberalism conceives all persons asisolated/separate/self-sufficient individuals.Such individualism reflects the concerns of men, especiallypowerful men in dominant groups.No persons are truly self-sufficient.No person is even largely so throughout life.Many persons never attain even moderate self-sufficiency.
I Liberalism reflects a (masculine) concern with abstractprinciples of justice.
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism
Feminist Challenges to Liberalism
I Competent, able-bodied, mature, healthy, non-pregnanthumans are interdependent.
I Autonomous citizens do not spring forth from the Earth.I All humans are needy and spend their lives in various degrees
of dependence on others.I Newborns, some sick persons, some persons with disabilities
and some elderly persons are absolutely dependent on others.
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism
Public & Private Domains
Feminist Challenges to LiberalismPublic & Private Domains
An Englishman’s home ishis castle. . .
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism
Public & Private Domains
Feminist Challenges to LiberalismPublic & Private Domains
PrivateFemaleUnpaid labourReproductionAffect/feeling/emotionNon-voluntaryMending/repair/careTrust
PublicMalePaid labourProductionReasonVoluntaryRights/justiceContract
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism
Justice vs. Care
Feminist Challenges to LiberalismJustice vs. Care
I Carol Gilligan2:I Men generally think of moral questions in terms of rights,
justice etc.⇒ Justice
I Women generally think of such questions in terms ofrelationships and connectedness over time etc.⇒ Care
e.g. Responses to Heinz’s dilemma
2. Gilligan 1982
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Challenges to Liberalism
Justice vs. Care
Feminist Challenges to LiberalismJustice vs. Care
I Caveats3:I “Generally” means about 2 in 3.I On average, in this class expect:
I approx. 3.3 men to prefer justice;I approx. 1.7 men to prefer care;I approx. 8 women to prefer care;I approx. 4 women to prefer justice.
I Further caveats:I Gilligan’s later work4:
I Both sexes can use both perspectives.I “Prefer” means “use first/use unprompted”.
I Others have raised doubts about Gilligan’s results, theirinterpretation and implications.
3. Gilligan 19824. Gilligan 1987
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts
Feminist Accounts
Susan Moller Martha C. Virginia ClaudiaOkin Nussbaum Held Card
1946–2004 1747–
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts
Feminist AccountsIdentify problems in liberalism
Problems are fatal?
YesNo
(Traditional) liberalism has adequate resources?
Yes No
e.g. Okin e.g. Nussbaum
e.g. Card? Held?
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts
Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls
Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on Rawls
I Rawls:I Family is part of basic structure.
I Okin & Nussbaum:I Rawls’s theory:
I pays too little attention to family;I is insufficiently critical of existing
family structures;I is too ready to relegate family life to
the “private” sphere.
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts
Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls
Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on Rawls
I Nussbaum:I Rawlls says the family is part of
the basic structure but treats it asa voluntary association.But the family is largely
non-voluntary.I Rawls treats the Western, nuclear
family as “quasi-natural”.But the nuclear family is a local,
contemporary phenomenon.But family structure is significantly
determined by the state.
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts
Okin’s Humanist Justice
Feminist AccountsOkin’s Humanist Justice
I There is a tension between freedom & justice.I Rawls’s position is rich enough to address feminist concerns.I Need to rethink implications of original position & veil.I Need to address implications of past & present injustices.
I Two models for a more just family:1. Genderless family.2. Gendered family with protection for vulnerable members.
I Genderless family as the more just model:1. more just to women;⇒ humanist justice. . .2. increases equality of opportunity for all children;3. better for raising citizens with a sense of justice.
I Genderless family key to genderless society. . .I Genderless family as key to just society. . .I Inappropriate to impose genderless families.
I Protecting vulnerable individuals in gendered families essential.
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts
Human Capabilities Approach
Feminist AccountsHuman Capabilities Approach
I Nussbaum:I There is a tension between freedom & justice.I Existing liberalism as only partially defensible.I Need reconceive liberalism on a new basis.⇒ Human capabilities approach:
I List primary social goods in terms of human capabilities.I Reconceive persons “as both capable and needy” (79).I Abandon contractualism.I Just institutions as those which best facilitate development of
basic capabilities of all citizens.I Proposed account as:
I maintaining “central role for choice and liberty” (79);I abandoning traditional, liberal (“Kantian”) view of persons;I adopting capable/needy (“Aristotelian”) concept of persons.
-
b
Feminist LiberalismFeminist Accounts
Objections & Replies
Feminist AccountsObjections & Replies
Discussion of prompt 5:
-
b
Feminist LiberalismGlossary Workshop
Glossary Workshop
I Handout on writing your entryI Personalised — you need the correct one for your entry!I Check notes regarding inclusion in class glossaryI Note terms available for cross-referencingI Kymlicka/Wolff available to consult
I Find relevant partner(s)I Start:
I DraftingI DiscussingI Asking questions
Remember your audience!
-
b
Feminist Liberalismshrink
ReferencesGilligan, Carol. 1982. In a different voice: psychological theory and
women’s development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: HarvardUniversity Press.
———. 1987. Moral orientation and moral development. InWomen and moral theory, ed. Feder Eva Kittay andDiana Tietjens Meyers, 19–33. New Jersey: Rowman &Littlefield.
Wasserstrom, Richard A. 1977. Racism, sexism, and preferentialtreatment. UCLA Law Review (Feb.): 581–615.
———. 1979. Racism and sexism. In Philosophy and women, ed.Sharon Bishop and Marjorie Weinzweig, 5–20. TheWadsworth Series in Social Philosophy. Belmont, California:Wadsworth. Excerpted from Wasserstrom (1977) withrenumbered footnotes, isbn: 0534006094.
Two ProblemsFirst ProblemSecond Problem
Two QuestionsFeminist Challenges to LiberalismPublic & Private DomainsJustice vs. Care
Feminist AccountsOkin & Nussbaum on RawlsOkin's Humanist JusticeHuman Capabilities ApproachObjections & Replies
Glossary WorkshopReferences
objsreplies: