“Feelings as the Motor of Perception”? The Essential Role of Interest for Intentionality

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Feelings as the Motor of Perception? The EssentialRole of Interest for IntentionalityMaren Wehrle Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014Abstract Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuseson their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of valueapprehension (Melle 2012). This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings inHusserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserlsearly account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest,which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserlargues here that every specific interest is dependent on an objectifying act of per-ception, he at the same time states that every act of perception necessarily has to beaccompanied by an interest of some sort. In the latter sense, the genuine motiva-tional force and necessity of this feeling aspect, namely interest, is emphasized. Thisambiguity or even contradiction shall be the point of departure for the followingconsiderations. The paper argues that it is possible to interpret the role of feelings inintentionality in a different way, namely not as an effect of current perception but asa cause of further perceptions. This tendency is first indicated in the text from 1898and elaborated further in Husserls genetic approach in Experience and Judgment.In Experience and Judgment Husserl develops a broader notion of interest, definingit as a general perceptual drive. This general drive (as a general interest in per-ceiving) so the paper will argue expresses itself in concrete perception as aspecific preference: it discloses or makes manifest what is relevant for an individualsubject at a given time.M. Wehrle (&)Husserl Archives Leuven, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Phenomenological Research,KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgiume-mail: maren.wehrle@hiw.kuleuven.be123Husserl StudDOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9159-81 IntroductionIn his manuscript on attention as interest from 1898,1 Husserl introduces the notionof interest as an essential part of every act of explicit or focused intentionality, i.e.,attention. Whereas the act of singling out an object for me (i.e., spezielle Meinung,Sonderwahrnehmung) from the circumspection of a general objective context (i.e.,Auffassung/Wahrnehmung) is deemed to be the formal condition for attention, therehas to be a concrete interest involved to describe the full blown phenomenon ofattention, an interest that is caused by or refers to an intended object. This interestcannot be reduced to a theoretical interest (as Carl Stumpf does), but has to beunderstood primarily as a perceptional one (Hua 38, p. 103). At the same time,interest refers to the act of attending itself, in that it is described by Husserl hereusing the words of Stumpf as a pleasure in the very act of noticing (Lust amBemerken) (Hua 38, p. 108). Intentionality is thus not only an epistemic process ofintending and fulfillment, but in its concreteness it is also an expression of tension andresolution of a perceiving subject.2 Although the explicit aim of an intentional act is aclear and adequate perception of an object, to actually achieve this aim one also needsa certain involvement in the act of perception, which can be described in terms of afelt intensity. What Husserl tries to describe here can be called the emotional side ofcognition (Melle 2012, p. 58). Events or objects do not appear to us in a neutral way;they are of interest to us. That means that a certain feeling is linked to each perceptionof an interesting object or part of an object. In turn this feeling, be it good or bad,increases the intensity of the involved interest, which then influences further processesof noticing. In this context, Husserl states that feelings appear to be the actual motorsand sources of interest3 and thus of every specific kind of intentionality (attention).Could one argue from the descriptions above that feelings play the role of amotor for perception (and action) in general? But in what sense then does Husserlrefer here to feelings? Apparently not in the sense of a proper intentional feeling,like joy, that presupposes an objectifying act (Wahrnehmung/Vorstellung). But italso seems to be different from a pure sensual feeling, which is caused by theperceived object. Concerning these questions, the above-quoted text is relevant intwo ways: first, one can see here an early form of a drive-dynamical understandingof cognitive processes (Melle 2012, p. 58). Although Husserl abandons thisapproach in the Logical Investigations (1900-01), it can be interpreted as a precursor1 This text (,,Abhandlung uber Aufmerksamkeit als Interesse) is part of Husserls lectures on attention,which he held in 1904/05 in Gottingen. Cf. Hua 38, pp. 63-123: Uber Aufmerksamkeit, spezielleMeinung.2 With the differentiation between formal and concrete levels of phenomenological analysis I refer toA. Steinbock, who argues that while Husserl in earlier texts used to differentiate between deeper (earlier)and higher (later) levels of foundation time-consciousness is in this sense regarded as earlier incomparison to association from the 1920s onward he no longer speaks of a foundational hierarchy but offormal and concrete conditions of constitution. Time-consciousness as a formal criterion of constitutionthus has to abstract from the content of experience. For the constitution of a concrete object one needsassociation. See Steinbock (1995, 2002).3 ,,[] so erscheinen Gefuhle als die eigentlichen Motoren und Quellen des Interesses (Hua 38,pp. 108-109).Husserl Stud123of his genetic phenomenology, where he describes passive or egoless forms ofintentionality like operative (bodily) intentionality or drive-intentionality. Second,this text on attention nicely exemplifies a general ambivalence in Husserls thoughtbetween a static and a dynamic approach, which also characterizes later attempts todescribe the nature and function of feelings and feeling-acts in the context of aphenomenological critique of axiological reason. Conceptually, Husserl tries tostick with his schema of sensual content and mental apprehension (Auffassung undInhalt) and its hierarchy between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. Butdescriptively the dynamic of the phenomena exceeds the static conceptual frameand thus betrays its own limits (see Melle 2012).In the A-Manuscripts, for example, Husserl defines feelings and feeling-acts assecond order phenomena (non-objectifying acts) that conceptually presuppose aprimary act of objectification (perception).4 Before something can give rise to asensual or more elaborated feeling, this something first has to be apprehended,perceived.5 Object-related perception is thus supposed to be the presupposition ofsensual as well as proper feelings, as argued in Husserls hierarchical order of thefoundation of act categories. Husserl tried to apply the same act-hierarchy to thedescription of attention as interest from 1898: Without perception, i.e.,objectifying acts like apprehension and specific intentionality (spezielle Meinung),he states, there cannot be any form of interest or feelings involved. Feelings in thissense are therefore understood as a mere effect founded in object perception. Butnonetheless, when one reads Husserls descriptions of interest, one suspects thatsomething more is at stake here: interest and its feeling sources not only function asan extra boost of intentionality and cognition, but can be understood also as a cause,in that they motivate concrete processes of perception and action.One can find hints for such an interpretation in the descriptions provided by thisearly text on attention. These descriptions clearly show that there must always be aselective differentiation at work in perception: the perceiving subject prefers oneobject or certain parts of an object over others and so structures the field ofperception according to focus and horizon, foreground and background ofconsciousness. This preferring operates in terms of an explicit selection; forexample, when someone is visually searching for something specific like a lost key,which then comes to be perceptually singled out as an object from its background.But as later Husserlian texts and also current empirical research on attention shows,this preference can also operate in a completely passive, automatic way, which isneither thematic nor willed by the perceiving subject. In both cases certain interestsare in play, whether they operate in an implicit or explicit manner. But these4 For further critical analysis of Husserls concept of objectifying and non-objectifying acts, see Melle(1990).5 The same holds true for the axiological role of feelings, as value-apprehension and value-judgments.Value-perception also presupposes a neutral perception, the presentation of an object as object. In aparallel or even simultaneous manner this perception is accompanied by a sensual feeling, caused by theobject. Sensual feelings then give rise to value-apprehensions and value judgments, which lead to properfeelings like joy, disgust or happiness as their effects. Proper feelings like joy or disgust are thus foundedin value-apprehensive consciousness (,,im werterfassenden Bewusstsein Husserl, Ms. A VI 12 II/132a).Husserl Stud123interests and their feeling basis indeed go beyond an actual encounter with anobject.In Experience and Judgment Husserl tries to integrate the notion of interest into amore genetic perspective, although not in the habitual sense described above.Interest is here presented as a general perceptional drive or a kind of universaldrive-feeling. In this regard perception and cognition not only have an emotionalside, but rather have to be emotionally structured from the beginning: to initiate theprocess of perceiving and to keep it going, a certain kind of striving towards theworld and objects is needed. Striving, in turn, would imply feelings of deficit orcuriosity that establish a tension between actual intentions and the potentialfulfillment of these intentions in ongoing perception. I will argue that this generalstriving inherent in perception manifests itself in concrete perception in terms ofspecific interests of the experiencing subject (be they implicit or explicit, bodily orpersonal). This individual style of experiencing is to be considered as the typicalway a subject relates to the world (see Merleau-Ponty 1963), which in turn is anemotional relating towards the world.6This personalized and emotional form of being in or towards the worlddefines the threshold and saliency criteria for stimuli and things in our surroundingenvironment that are able to affect us at a given time. In this sense, it provides thegenetic impetus for any further objectifying process. Rather than understandingfeelings as secondary phenomena, as presupposing objectifying acts, one could inthis sense argue the other way around: already in sensation and receptive perception,an implicit valuing, a structuring of the experiential field, takes place in the form ofpassive differentiations and preferences within the field of perception. Feeling, as ageneral striving and expression of concrete preferences (habits), can thus beinterpreted as a concrete motivational necessity for every object constitution, that is,for full-blown object perception. Although proper intentional feelings are founded inobjectifying consciousness in a static-conceptual or abstract sense, feelings(understood as intentional striving or habitual profile) can also count as foundingin a genetic or concrete sense, as described above.7 While in the first caseobjectifying acts are essentially or conceptually necessary for proper intentionalfeelings and further acts of valuing, in the second case feelings are a concrete oreven existential8 necessity for object perception. They motivate or even allow for a6 Jan Slaby (2008) would define this as affective intentionality.7 For a similar differentiation between abstract and concrete foundational orders, see Steinbock (2002,p. 250). Steinbock describes the static foundation as a formal way of founding that goes from simple tocomplex states of consciousness, while the concrete genetic foundational order is dealing with thecomplex interrelations of the genetic layers. Steinbock argues that Husserl, in his later works, no longerdifferentiates between lower or more fundamental stages of constitution and less fundamental stages, butinstead speaks of formal and concrete constitution. Time consciousness is thus no longer morefundamental but considered only as abstract or formal necessity for genetic constitution, while for aconcrete constitution the synthesis of association is needed (Hua 11, p. 128; Steinbock 2002, p. 246.).8 For an analogous argument, see Merleau-Pontys interpretation of Descartes cogito ergo sum, whichhe turns on its head in saying that existence includes the I-think and not vice versa (Merleau-Ponty 2012,p. 403). In the same way as the movement and situatedness of existing comes first, one could argue thatfeeling or drives are more fundamental than higher forms of cognition like objectifying acts. Descartesargued instead from an epistemological point of view: only in and through thinking do we know that weHusserl Stud123(selective) sensitivity towards (certain) outer stimuli, which then affect us andmotivate a further turning towards these stimuli, which can lead to a fully developedobject perception (objectifying acts).In the first section of this paper, I will analyze the relation between intentionalityand feelings in the context of explicit perceptual intentionality that is, focused,attentive perception. According to Husserls definition, attention is comprised ofand defined by a formal component, i.e., the structure of intentionality, and aqualitative component, interest. Interest as the emotional aspect of attentionseems in this context to serve the common cognitive goal of intentionality: theclear and distinct perception of things. In this sense, it motivates and stabilizes theprogress of ongoing perception. In the second section, I turn to the relation betweenoperative intentionality and feelings. In Experience and Judgment Husserldifferentiates between a narrow and a broad notion of interest and includes passiveor bodily forms of interest. Interest in the broad sense is characterized as expressionof a general perceptual drive and, therefore, as a necessary motivational conditionfor all higher forms of intentionality. The third and concluding section describes thedifferent interplays between feeling-based subjective dispositions such as moods,interests or habitualized feelings, which motivate and shape lifeworldly experience.Based on the findings of section one and two it aims to present a different view offoundation, where feeling dispositions form a primary layer founding higherprocesses of objectivation and intentionality. In this sense, habitual feelings canindeed be interpreted as a psychological motor of concrete perception. The overallthesis I present here is that intentionality understood from a concrete perspectivemust always be an affective-intentionality (Slaby 2008). The way we emotionallyrelate to the world influences how and if we experience things in a given time andplace.92 Explicit Intentionality and Feelings: Thematic Intention (Meinung)and InterestThe expression that feelings might function as a motor for perception comes fromHusserls lecture on perception and attention from 1904/05, as quoted above. Thisstatement does not refer to a mere receptive perception, but rather to the cognitiveacts which might determine a concrete perceptual object more closely. These actsare realized in a process of intention and fulfillment and can be interpreted asFootnote 8 continuedexist. In Husserl one can see both tendencies an epistemological or static approach, which has to startwith what is given, and a genetic approach, which goes back to pre-predicative and objective levels ofconsciousness. In the latter, egoless activities like passive syntheses presuppose the I-perceive or I-think.These genetic ideas can be also interpreted in an existential (Merleau-Ponty), developmental-psycholo-gical or even evolutionary way (see Thompson 2007).9 In radical cases this may also influence the operation of the passive syntheses such as time-consciousness and association, as can be seen in psychopathologies. In research on patients with mooddisorders and schizophrenia, for example, it was shown that the structure of time consciousness isderanged and fragmented (Gallagher 2005, Fuchs 2007, Bovet and Parnas 1993).Husserl Stud123preliminary forms of theoretical knowledge. In this context, the feeling aspect ofintentionality here expressed as an interest, which has to accompany every kind ofattention serves a striving for knowledge: It is the motor of my desire forknowledge, it leads me to a closer examination of the object, to occupy myself withnew perceptions, which bring new parts of the same object to actual perception.10What is the role played by interest, then, in the context of attention? Why doesHusserl insist (against Carl Stumpf) that interest is not merely theoretical but isrooted in feeling?In the 1904/05 lectures, Husserl defines attention primarily as a specific form ofintentionality, namely spezielle Meinung, which I would translate as thematic orspecial perceptional intentionality. In contrast to the underlying intentionality ofAuffassung, with its primary objectifying function, this thematic intentionality ischaracterized as a distinguishing (selective) force in reference to a perceivedobject, which in the multiplicity of all present objects favors certain objects overothers (Hua 38, p. 86). Through this preferential treatment, perceivable items withan objective structure turn into explicitly and distinctly perceived objects.11 But thisthematic intentionality, with its highlighting and further objectifying function,represents only the formal aspect of attention. To describe a full event of attentionone also has to add an aspect of feeling, expressed here as interest, that has tocorrespond to every act of perceptual intentionality. This aspect may be describedby criteria of attention with respect to motivation and content.12Parallel to, though distinct from, the process of intention and fulfillment,evidence and clarity, Husserl characterizes the so-called interest as a rhythm oftension and release and an intensity which is generated through this tension. Interestis thus no theoretical phenomenon but more a Gemutsphanomen. This qualitativeemotional aspect has to accompany every formal aspect of Meinung (thematicintentionality) and provide it with a certain quality or intensity. The purely selectivesingling out of an item knows no gradation an object is either explicitly singledout or not: Often we do speak of a burning interest, but to speak of a burningintention makes no sense.13 With interest Husserl seems to refer to the fact thatintentional acts are not neutral but involve a certain motivation and intensity thathelps us to take notice. Husserl characterizes this in the words of Stumpf as a10 ,,Es ist ein Motor fur mein Begehren nach Erkenntnis, es veranlasst mich zur naherenInbetrachtnahme des Gegenstandes, zur Beschaftigung neuer Wahrnehmung, die neue Teilseitendesselben zur eigentlichen Wahrnehmung bringen. (Hua 38, p. 118).11 Cf. (Hua 38, p. 86): ,,Aufmerksamkeit [ist] etwas Auszeichnendes in Beziehung auf einenwahrgenommenen Gegenstand, [es ist] ihre Eigenheit, unter der jeweiligen Mannigfaltigkeit prasenterObjekte gewissen einen Vorzug zu erteilen, wodurch sie aus wahrnehmbaren zu fur sich wahrgenomme-nen Objekten werden.12 B. Begout (2007) makes a similar distinction, but in relation to other passages on attention (e.g., Hua24, pp. 249-252 and Hua 26, pp. 18-22). Begout differentiates here between a structural aspect(intentionality) and a thematical aspect (interest) of attention. Even though there are no systematicanalyses of perception and attention in the texts discussed by Begout in contrast to the lectures onperception and attention, which he unfortunately does not take into account his differentiation holdsalso true for this later edited text.13 ,,[V]on einem brennenden Interesse sprechen wir oft genug, von einer brennenden Meinung zu reden,gibt keinen Sinn (Hua 38, p. 118).Husserl Stud123delight in noticing (Lust am Bemerken; Hua 38, pp. 110, 118). Against Stumpf,however, he emphasizes that this delight is not to be described as a theoreticalinterest in an object but has its main sources in feelings (Hua 38, p. 108).Husserl starts his description of interest by comparing it to similar acts like awish, expectation or desire (Hua 38, p. 104). In this sense, interest is different fromperceptional or thetic acts: the structure of intentions and fulfillment is not related tothe identification of the intended object through the intentions. The fulfillment of awish, desire, or will is thus not characterized as an intuition but more as a relaxationof tension, a satisfaction. Interest, in contrast to other intentions, is thus connectedwith a feeling of lack that leads to a tension that wants to be satisfied in furtherperceptions. Although interest mostly appears as one of these acts (e.g., expectation,wishing, willing) or as a component thereof, it has to be differentiated from themdescriptively, since it represents a necessary condition of these acts. There can beintentionality without an involved expectation or wish, but there can be no(thematic) intentionality without any form of interest, even if it is only a fleeting andminimal intensity (Hua 38, p. 106).So on the one side, Husserl tries to integrate interest into the same hierarchical schemaof foundation that he provided in the Logical Investigations. Interest that is expressed inacts like wishing and desiring has to be founded by acts of perception or belief(Vorstellungsakte). In contrast to the mere formal aspect of thematic intentionality, therespective interest (expressed as wish, desire or will) is described in terms of intensity.But this satisfaction presupposes in turn an intuition, an objectifying act: the wished orwilled object has to be first presented or given, to then be able to cause a satisfaction. Interms of phenomenological descriptions, the function of the formal aspect of thematicintentionality proves to be prior in relation to the role played by interest. For interest to beeffective, it logically presupposes the possibility of a representation of an item foritself (Hua 38, p. 118). The formal structure of this specific (thematic) intentionalityensures that something can be the object of attention at all, while interest only relates tothe how, the quality or intensity, of the current perception.On the other side, Husserl emphasizes the emotional dimension of our cognitivenature and argues for feelings as the motor of interest, the motor of further noticingand therefore of intuitive fulfillment. In this sense feelings, as interest, act as ageneral motor for the operation of perceptual processes and at the same time as astabilizer for specific intentions, which demand lasting concentration on a thing overa long time period.14 In this context Husserl highlights the fact that our mentalnature (geistige Natur) has two sides, an intellectual and an emotional side. Bothsides manifest themselves in acts that alternate, replace or permeate each other.15The same hold true for concrete acts of attention; only in theoretical description is itpossible to make a strict functional separation of thematic intentionality (Meinung,Wahrnehmung) from interest. In lifeworldly experience these two aspects go hand14 In psychology this form of attention is called vigilance. Cf. Goldhammer and Moosbrugger (2006,pp. 16-33; here p. 24).15 ,,Unsere geistige Natur hat zwei Seiten, eine intellektuelle und eine emotionelle, die in mannigfachwechselnden, bald einander ablosenden, bald einander durchdringenden Akten sich auert. (Hua 38,p. 163)Husserl Stud123in hand (Hua 38, p. 119) and are similarly constitutive of the phenomenon ofattention.16 Both establish a practical unity by combining that which appearstogether in experience [erfahrungsmaig gemeinsam auftritt] (Hua 38, p. 119).In concrete experience the more familiar descriptive hierarchy does not seem soclear anymore. Which comes first, the intellectual or the emotional aspect of themental? Or are they interchangeable? In the same sense as the two souls ofintentionality the mental and the emotional permeate or penetrate each other, itseems that feeling here means both something that can be caused by an object andthen turn into a specific interest, and an essential emotional aspect of intentionality,here defined as a general interest, that always accompanies a feeling, be it negativeor positive. Interest could in this sense be conceived as a striving towards the furtherexamination of an object, a general drive (feeling) that in its concrete manifestationaccompanies a specific feeling. Concrete perception without an interest is thus notconceivable, since for Husserl motives for preferences always have to be in place(cf. Hua 38, p. 108). Still, the purpose that Husserl gives for supplementingintentionality with an emotional aspect is quite clear: it is supposed to support theprocess of noticing and therefore the clear and distinct perception of things (cf. Hua38, pp. 110, 118). But what is new here is that Husserl ascribes a genetic dynamic aswell as an aspect of urge or desire (Lust) to intentionality, which points towards thelater-developed concept of drive-intentionality.17How then can we come to understand the relation between interest and feelings?Husserl seems to talk about feeling in this context in quite a nave way. He does notdifferentiate explicitly between different senses in which he refers to feelings. Insome contexts it seems that the feelings he talks about cause a specific interest(mediated by the perception of an object) and in others he seems to refer to a generalform of interest that is in play in every intentionality. Does this general interest thenonly tag along with changing feelings, or is it even to be considered itself a sort ofdrive-feeling? Unfortunately Husserl does not further elaborate on the differentnotions of feelings in use here and leaves us in uncertainty. On the one hand,Husserl argues that interest is accompanied by a feeling regardless of whether thisis delight or any other sort of feeling like fear or disgust that increases the intensity16 Husserl speaks in this context of a reciprocal influence or an operating circle (Wirkkreis). Cf. Hua 38,p. 119.17 But this has consequences for the ideal aim of perception, namely the distinct and clear givenness ofan object, i.e., adequate perception. This is because interest does not reach its peak when the intendedobjective moments are fulfilled or saturated (gesattigt, Hua 38, p. 107) as in cognitive intentionality,but rather reaches its peak when something is absent or the experiencing subject is literally missingsomething. Interest is thus drawn especially to new and potential upcoming things, and this is why interestwanes before well-known objects, for example after an all-sided and exhaustive inspection (Hua 38,p. 108): When the contexts of perception are passed through several times and every detail is familiar tous, we lose interest in the perceived thing, it becomes boring. (Hua 38, p. 108: ,,Sind dieWahrnehmungszusammenhange ofters durchlaufen und uns jede Einzelheit vertraut geworden, so verliertdie Sache an Interesse, sie wird langweilig). Interest is indeed a force that facilitates noticing and thussupports a better perception, but at the same time it opposes itself to this teleological alignment, becausethe all-too-familiar weakens interest and in this sense makes room for new impressions. The adequategivenness of things as a general ideal of phenomenology turns, in this practical sense, into a relativeoptimum, which defines itself in relation to current actions and interests of the experiencing subject (cf.also Hua 39, p. 204; Hua 11, pp. 23f).Husserl Stud123of the interest involved (cf. Hua 38, p. 107). According to this description, feelingsseem to be attached or interwoven with the process of interest and thus perception.But on the other hand Husserl defines feelings in the same paragraph as the actualsources of interest. In this sense the expression to have an interest in somethingreceives a meaning that goes far beyond its actual definition, as Husserl points out(Hua 38, p. 108).So it seems that we have to differentiate between a narrow and a broadconception of interest in the text. In the narrow sense, interest is caused by aperceived object and accompanied by a sensory feeling (caused by the same object).In the broad sense, interest is a motivating function within perception and thus anecessary component of every intentionality. Interest in the broad sense (as generalfunction and dynamical process of tension and relaxation) is then always followedby a drive-feeling, i.e., pleasure. In concrete perception this general delight innoticing can be taken over or even eliminated by a stronger feeling that istied to the perceived thing (Hua 38, p. 107). So in the broad sense, interest seems tobe tied to feelings in an even more direct and dynamic way. It is the rhythm oftension and release in a temporally continuous act of interest that causes delight orpleasure, i.e., that is experienced as delightful.18 But interest is not itself to beidentified with pleasure or delight. Although both are interwoven and cannot beseparated in the process of perception, Husserl insists that pleasure, as a kind ofdrive-feeling, is only secondarily attached to the dynamical act of interest (Hua 38,p. 107). While interest as a functional term is more fundamental than the feltdimension that accompanies it, interest both in the narrow and broad sense inturn presupposes for Husserl the objectifying function of perception.In what sense, then, does Husserl speak of interest as a motor of perception? Husserladmits that although interest presupposes an object as presented for itself (fur-sich-Vorgestelltes), which entails the objectifying function that provides such a singled outobject, one could also argue that the interest which causes the very same process(singling out) in the first place is prior (Hua 38, p. 118). In the second sense we refer,according to Husserl, to the psychological (concrete) achievements of interest, i.e., itsstatus as a motor of (further) perceptions, while in the first sense interest is described as acurrent and static state of attention, i.e., the interest that is attention. This static interestpresupposes an objectifying act that separates an object from its mere surroundings tobring it into focus. In the second sense, we refer to interest as something that makes usnotice or pay attention and thus motivates the specific singling out of an object or part ofan object in ongoing perception (Hua 38, p. 118). Only in this dynamic and concretesense can we call interest a motor for further perceptions.Yet should there not always be a concrete interest or a general existential interestto motivate something as the distinguished act of attention, i.e., focused perception?In reducing the phenomenon of attention to the current state of concentration orbeing busy with something (Hua 38, p. 118), Husserl leaves out the dynamic and18 ,,[D]elight in the rhythmic processes of interest, which is characterized likewise through processes oftension and release [], a delight in (the progress of) attending. (Lust an dem Rhythmus des sichspannenden und zugleich losenden Interesses [], eine Lust (an dem Fortgang) des Aufmerkens. Hua38, p. 108).Husserl Stud123habitual dimension of attention and perception. He does, however, emphasize theimportance of the inherent dynamism in perception, the tension and relaxation in thevery act of noticing. This dynamical aspect not only accompanies feelings but seemsto be itself the expression of a feeling of lack or even the desire to perceive. Indeed,these interests and their feeling-bases go beyond an actual encounter with an object.3 The Genetic Notion of InterestApproaches to such a genetic-motivational extension of the notions of interest andfeeling can be found, for example, in Experience and Judgment. Here, one can findan extension of the concept of intentionality. It is an extension in the sense thatintentionality now also includes passive and receptive forms of orientation towardsthe world, which Husserl calls tendencies of the ego. Similar descriptions of sucha differentiated model of intentionality, which is comprised of passive (tendencies)and active dimensions, can already be found in earlier manuscripts from the time ofthe Logical Investigations. These manuscripts deal with the different structures andvarious forms of intentionality (intellectual, feeling and willing acts) and can beinterpreted as Husserls attempt to develop a phenomenological psychology.19In Experience and Judgment similar ideas become explicitly connected to thegenetic concept of the ego as embodied and personal. One can even find indicationsto support a dynamic stage-model of intentionality,20 where intellectual intention-ality is always embedded and grounded in passive forms of intentionality. Husserlhere describes different stages of receptivity and perception, ranging from a sphereof passive pregivenness and mere tendencies of the ego to an active and explicitengagement of the ego. In this genetic theory, the foundation for every other sphereof intentionality (not only perceptive intentionality but also the realm of feelings)lies in an original passivity. Here we see a shift towards a more dynamicdescription of perception that also tries to grasp its passive dimensions. Instead ofbeing an objectifying act, the precondition for higher acts of feeling and perceptionis now defined as the pregivenness of ones objective surroundings andenvironment. This field of pregivenness is thereby not neutral but already afield of prominences characterized by qualitative differences, such that one thingwill excite us while other parts of the field will not. Affection has thus a geneticor concrete priority over more elaborated forms of intentionality. The given19 See the ongoing edition of the three volumes on the structures of consciousness (Studien zur Strukturdes Bewusstseins), edited by U. Melle and T. Vongehr at the Husserl Archives Leuven.20 One could define this dynamic model of intentionality as a stage-model in the sense that it can becompared to developmental stages. The primary passive stages of temporality, drive-intentionality, andperception in this sense could be characteristic for early developmental stages in humans or the waycertain vertebrates relate to their environment. More explicit and thematic forms of intentionality likethinking and judging are then special kinds of developed human intentionality. Since lower and higherstages of intentionality are interwoven with each other in the daily life and behavior of adult humanbeings, the different stages do not act separately but always in relation with the other forms ofintentionality. The perceptual intentionality of an adult is thus always influenced and informed by moreintellectual forms of intentionality (and habitual forms of knowledge and memory) and therefore cannotbe compared with the perception of animals or children.Husserl Stud123(the objective surroundings) must first exert some allure on the ego. But, at the sametime, there has to be a tendency to give way (Husserl 1973, p. 78) from thesubjective side of the ego. Affection is therefore to be seen as the lowest level ofactivity of the ego, which is based on the passive syntheses of association andinternal-time consciousness.In Experience and Judgment the notion of interest is therefore seen as the actualand practical expression of the tendency of the ego in experience (Husserl 1973,p. 81). What Husserl especially emphasizes is the character of striving involvedhere, which points to the motivational function of interest. This striving is describednot only as the motor of further perceptions but also as a motor for the doings(1973, p. 85) of the subject (i.e., its actions). It leads to practical, kinaesthetic,realizations of noematic horizons of the perceived object (1973, p. 84). Interestunderstood as a practical tendency or striving of the ego not only relates to aspecific, thematic intentional object, but also contributes to the constitution of anintentional object itself, in that it is continuously uncovering and realizing horizonsof the given, and hence motivating new perceptions and actions. Interest hereappears to be an integral part of intentionality, which integrates concepts of bodilymovement and the horizons of perception.Here Husserl explicitly differentiates between a narrow and a broad concept ofinterest. While the narrow concept of interest is quite similar to Carl Stumpfsnotion of theoretic interest, as a thematic interest one has for an object or subject-matter over a course of time for example, during a scientific study the broadnotion of interest is described by Husserl more as a general perceptional drive. ForHusserl, the narrow notion of interest refers to acts in which I am thematicallyturned toward an object, i.e., perceiving it, perhaps, and then examining itthoroughly, while the broader notion of interest refers to every act of turning-towards of the ego, whether transitory or continuous, every act of the egos beingwith (inter-esse) (Husserl 1973, p. 86). Beyond Husserl, I would interpret this in amore Merleau-Pontian way. Interest expresses itself in a narrower sense in acts ofconcentration on specific topics as well as in a broader sense of being-with andtoward the world, i.e., in every form of subjective (bodily and ego-like) engagementwith the world.This general interest (perceptional striving) then manifests or expresses itself asconcrete forms of interest (of an individual subject) on different levels of activities.In these concrete forms, interests are either caused from the bottom up, by sensuousstimuli or objects, or from the top down by habitual interests that precede and gobeyond the current acts of perception.As described above, affectivity has to be considered as the lowest level ofactivity. The next higher level of activity would then be a striving towards akinaesthetic realization (cf. Husserl 1973, p. 84), which could be defined as a bodilyform of interest. The interest in an object that has been awakened by affection leadsthen to practical possibilities to see that object in different appearances. This bodilyrealization of interest can take the form of a will to knowledge in higher stages ofintentionality, such as in intellectual acts like thinking. A specific bodily turningtowards, however, must be characterized as an active process that does notnecessarily include the involvement of an ego and thus can take place without aHusserl Stud123thematic consciousness of an object. Husserl distinguishes in this sense between anactive process or doing that includes an ego, the I do, and active processes whichhappen without a thematic consciousness, a doing that precedes the turning-towards (Husserl 1973, p. 85).21 According to this genetic hierarchy, one coulddefine bodily interest as a doing that precedes the explicit turning-towards of theego, in that it is merely a bodily-kinaesthetic turning-towards.Even if Husserls argumentation is not clear about the sense in which one canspeak of a bodily stage of turning-towards, one can still argue with and beyondHusserl for such an active but not (yet) ego-like intentionality of the bodily self(Legrand 2006), which is implicit and operative in nature. Although this operativeform of intentionality does not involve an ego in the strong sense as Husserlunderstood it, it can still be regarded as a turning-towards of the subject and thus as aconsciousness to some degree.22 A purely bodily-kinaesthetic turning-towards can bedescribed as a passive running through (Durchlaufen) of kinaestethic move-ments and apprehensionsfor example the direction of eye movements (cf. Husserl1973, pp. 83f.). Although these courses of movements operate rather automatically,one could still say that there is some bodily involvement at play, in terms of animplicit reaction to an outer stimulus which bears some relevance to former bodilyexperiences (body memory). If these operative movements become objects of athematic intentionality, they turn from movements that just accompany other explicitactions into my movements. Such a thematic turning-towards with the participationof the ego is explicitly conscious, but nonetheless it cannot be the case that it is totallyarbitrary. For there are cases where one is attentively turned toward an object and stillmoves ones eyes involuntarily due to the attraction of something else.What is new here is that Husserl recognizes that the theme of intentionalitycannot be equated with the current perceptual focus of attention. The act of attentionitself, beginning with a turning toward as the starting point of the realization of theact (Husserl 1973, p. 80), then proceeds motivated by the interest beyond thegiven and its momentary mode of givenness and tends toward a progressive ultra(Husserl 1973, p. 82), toward its noematic horizon (cf. also Gurwitsch 1929, 1964).Because theme and focus are not one and the same, the notion of interest has to beextended, otherwise the changes and dynamics of perception and attention could notbe described. It can happen, for instance, that a sudden affection in the form of adisturbing noise temporarily becomes the object of the turning-towards of the ego,but the scientific study with which one was occupied before still remains the overalltheme. At the same time, it can be that the noise changes the course of interests and21 This kind of operative intentionality in Husserl is also analysed and emphasized by Lotz (2002,p. 25).22 Therefore it is not adequate to describe all movements and bodily processes as zombie-like behavioror complete unconsciousness, which is stated in most approaches in the analytical debate onconsciousness and attention (Koch and Crick 2001, Frith and Rees 2007). If we argue for a stage-model of intentionality, these operative forms of intentionality could also be characteristic of the waychildren relate to the world before they acquire higher intellectual capacities such as speech, and it couldalso be characteristic of certain higher animals. Infants as well as children experience theirenvironment and themselves in a certain way; therefore consciousness, in a phenomenological definition,should be ascribed to both of them.Husserl Stud123turns into the actual theme of attention. In this context Husserl must alsodifferentiate between different levels of interest as levels of turning towards theworld and/or objects. Not only can we relate to the world in different ways, but wecan distinguish different grades of activity or passivity in this turning towards.These activities lead to objectivations and objective givenness, which in turnprovide and enrich the field of the pregivenness (original passivity) and motivatefurther activities. Closely intertwined with this idea of different levels of activity orengagement is the concept of horizon. In this sense not only the noematic aspect ofhorizons are of importance i.e., the inner and outer horizon of the perceived object but also the noetic aspects, i.e., the foreground and background experiences andtheir subjective (habitual) motivations.Prior to the selection of foreground and background by the engagement of theego, there must be a tendency in place that precedes the ego, the tendency asstimulus (Husserl 1973, p. 78). This stimulus first has to attract the ego tochange its engagement from the background to the foreground of subjectiveexperience. But why is one stimulus or one pre-objective unity more prominent thanothers? I would argue that this is because of a habitual dimension of interestinfluencing every subjective experience that selectively structures the field ofpregivenness into more and less relevant parts. This subjective-habitual profile canalso be described in terms of a noetic horizon, which guides perception in a passiveand implicit way and structures the field of perception for a subject into foregroundand background. While the noematic horizon refers to the structure of the objectivefield of a current perception (inner and outer horizon of a perceived object), thenoetic horizon motivates further perceiving, it makes us perceive in that itdetermines our sensitivity towards certain stimuli or situations.It is in this sense that one could argue that before a specific tending-towardsand its further realization (Husserl 1973, p. 80) can take place, there has to be ageneral tendency to give way, a special or individual sensitivity and alertness ofthe subject towards the environment.23 Interest can thus not only be understood assomething that is caused by an affection or proper object perception (and thus withthe sensual feeling that goes along with it), but could also be interpreted assomething that was already there before a concrete affection took place. If one isinterested in the question why we are affected or awakened by certain stimuli andnot by others, one has to consider the notion of interest in an habitual way, assomething that makes us take notice and even on a deeper level makes us sensitiveand open for special environmental factors. Only then could one explain the specificor typical structure of a field of pregivenness and givenness (noematic horizon) andget a hint as to why some parts have a special affective force for that same subject(or a group of subjects), while others do not.23 Lotz is heading in a similar direction when he argues that there need not always be an affection toawake the ego. Already on the side of the ego there has to be a certain specified directedness towards theperceptional field. According to Lotz, every consciousness has a certain attitude toward the things thataffect it. Contrary to Lotz, I would not go so far as to argue that the directedness (Gerichtetheit) ordetermination of the subject must already be considered a form of value attitude (Werthaltung) (cf. Lotz2002, p. 26).Husserl Stud123The individual sensitivity or even selectivity of a subject refers to a noetichorizon, which is comprised of innate24 dispositions, long term habitualities andinterests, former perceptions and actions, as well as current desires and implicit andexplicit operating interests. Thus affection, as the first level of attention, is neithertotally caused by subjective conditions (noetic horizon), nor by objectivecharacteristics of the environment (noematic horizon), but must rather beunderstood as an interaction between the subject and the given environment, whichgenerates a mutual situation of perception. In this sense, it is hardly possible todefine the actual point of crossover between a passive affection and an activeturning-towards of the ego. One can describe it only gradually as ranging from apassive affection due to a saliency caused by the given for example a loud noise over the current subjective state of being affected, to an explicit allocation andturning-towards of the ego.In what ways then are feelings involved in these processes and Husserls dynamicnotion of interest? Husserl says that there is a field of pregivenness on the one side,which not only includes what is sensually given but also involves a feeling that comeswith it, while on the other side there are different levels of activity and objectiveorientations, not only in perception but also in evaluation and pleasure: there is anoriginal passivity not only of sensuous givens, of sense data, but also of feeling and,in contrast to this passivity, there is an active, objectivating orientation, not only inperception but also in evaluation and in pleasure (Husserl 1973, p. 71). FurthermoreHusserl states that the turning towards of the subject can be described or evaluated interms of intensity, and intensity is in turn provided by the interwoven feelings. Aforeground experience is thus characterized as having a greater feeling intensity than abackground experience, in that the ego here actually lives in the experience(Husserl 1973, p. 81) and is actively occupied with its intentional object.Again Husserl is not clear about the status of the feelings he is describing. Itseems again as though that, in the current state of engagement (as attention or lessexplicit activity), feelings and thus the perceived objects that in turn lead to thesespecific feelings cause interests. Although feelings do not presuppose perception(as objectifying act) or a given object, they still seem to depend on what Husserlnow calls the tendency as stimulus that causes a sensory feeling, affection,intensity and thus motivates further act-realization. In the sense of a staticunderstanding of perception i.e., only in relation to the current act of perception feelings are accompanying or are caused by sensual perception. In the sense of adynamic understanding of perception (as action, or here as doing), a generaldrive-feeling seems to be the motor of every form of intentionality. This general24 One has to be careful with the use of the term innate. Recent studies in developmental psychologyand genetics point out that this static category of innateness still involves a development, one that eithertakes place in the relation of the respective organism to its environment (the womb) before being born, orcan be seen as a long-term development beyond the limits of one generation. If this article focuses on thegenetic-practical aspects, i.e., bodily aspects, of affects and feelings, that does not mean that these aspectsare seen to be innate as, for example, Johnstone presents them in his article on the bodily roots of emotion(Johnstone 2012, pp. 179-200). In discussing the passive and bodily nature of feeling and perception, thisarticle rather wants to point out that the relativity and historicity of these affects and feelings areinscribed, developed and stabilized in and through the body.Husserl Stud123existential or transcendental drive then expresses itself in concrete perception inspecific subjective aims and needs or habitual interests prior to and beyond thecurrent act of perception and its objects. This concrete emotional-perceptionalprofile (noetic horizon) is thus what makes us perceive or be sensitive toward certainsense-data in ongoing perception.In this way we could also understand feeling in the sense of a general drive-feeling that motivates every form of a turning-toward. In the concrete sense, thisperceptional striving would express itself in concrete interests, caused by currentperception (bottom-up/noematic horizon) or by a subjects typical interest profile(top-down/noetic horizon). This habitual dimension of interest could then also beconsidered as a form emotionally colored turning towards, or in terms of feelingsthat go beyond the current state of perception (habitualized feelings).4 Habitual Feelings as a Psychological Motor of Concrete PerceptionAs shown above, the concept of interest can neither be reduced to the actualoperating interest in perception nor to the intellectual state of consciousness, wherethe content or the mere existence of such an interest is explicitly present to theperceiving subject. Beyond Husserls considerations on the role of interest inrelation to current perceptual events, it must be added that every intentional act notonly needs an accompanying interest, but moreover, the intentional act or betterthe subject of intention needs to have an habitual horizon of interests whichmotivates such acts in the first place. In the latter case, interest as a factor ofmotivational reason (Rang 1973, p. 127) precedes every actual act of attention andeven every passive event of affection. Hence one has to differentiate between acurrently operating interest and the habitual interest, which implicitly influences theopenness of affection, attention and changes of attention a priori.Experience leaves not only permanent traces like habits or bodily skills, but alsotemporary after-effects in the form of a certain general mood (Stimmung), which caninfluence further perceptions. In the A-manuscripts Husserl speaks in this case of arosy light which permeates all further perceptions. The rosy light may be caused,for instance, by a beautiful experience with a loved one. This puts the experiencingsubject in a residual positive mood which is then automatically transferred to his/herenvironment and the things in it: For instance I take a book into my hand and gazearound into the room: Everything has gained worth and attraction from her [former]presence; or in another passage, How beautiful the world is! The whole world isilluminated and receives light from the beloved (Ms. A VI 12 II/134b).If we stick to the logical-theoretical explanation that Husserl offers, one wouldhave to argue that the mood only influences the how, i.e., the valuing of theperceived objects, and therefore presupposes an apprehension, an objectifying act.Yet let us try to switch our perspective away from different act-classificationstoward a view that encompasses the whole of the experiencing subject. From such adynamic perspective one can argue that the mood or the habitual interest profile alsoinfluences what, in a given moment, is able to affect me, i.e., what is able to wakeme because of its standing out from the background of my (former) experience.Husserl Stud123What wakes me may thus stand out from the background because it is similar oropposed to the former experience of the subject. This is what Husserl describes asthe passive synthesis of association, which follows the criteria of similarity andcontrast. This passive standing-out from a background is not yet a proper object butgenerates a pre-objective unity, which is the foundation of any further objectifyingacts or achievements of consciousness. The mood is in this sense not only able toinfluence the constitution of an object but can also influence the habitual and bodilyprofile of interests, which integrate former sensations, experiences, and theirassociated feelings of the subject. This profile not only influences each and everyfuture perception but is also concurrently constituted and changed by this veryexperience itself.Although Husserl himself does not mention such an habitual dimension ofinterests explicitly neither in his early text about attention nor in Experience andJudgment his descriptions of moods and steadier feelings like love can indicatesuch a motivational dimension. Actual feelings (caused by an object or stimulus)can turn into moods and thus not only motivate the current interests in an intentionalact but also help to turn these interests into habits that guide further perceptions. Incontrast to moods, which Husserl understands as after-effects of a current experienceof value like the perception of a loved one that bathes all subsequent experiencesin a rosy light we could also talk of something like a habitualized feeling (one thatleads to habitual interests). To love someone, for example, cannot be reduced to anactual value-perception of a lovable object but must be characterized as an attitudeor habitualized feeling. Habitual feelings would then manifest themselves in a moresustainable way than an elusive mood, which goes together with a typical style ofperceiving. Thus this love will not only influence further perceptions of the lovedone, but also the perceptional style of a subject in general, in that we focus or evenonly come to notice things because we associate them with, or they remind us of, theloved one. We then see the world with the eyes of the loved one; this love becomespart of our habitual style of perception and thus motivates specific objectperceptions and actions. The noetic horizon, which we defined above as the sum ofcurrent and habitual motivational factors of an individual subject, must alsotherefore be considered an affective horizon.In this sense it would go along with an intentionality that can be characterized asaffective intentionality, as proposed by Jan Slaby. With his notion of affectiveintentionality, Slaby wants to point out that intentionality is in the most centralcases not a cold, detached, purely cognitive affair, but is rather constitutivelyfeelings-involving (Slaby 2008, p. 429). Intentionality understood in a broad senseas world-directedness and world enclosing must therefore include emotionalaspects, because this turning towards a world is never detached from current desiresor habitual interests and feelings. Concrete experience then must be considered asemotional experience: Emotional experience discloses or makes manifest what iscurrently of relevance to us (Slaby 2008, p. 443). It is thus the emotional side ofcognition and experience which personalizes intentionality, in that it reveals to usnot only what is significant, but also informs us (implicitly) about the position/condition of ourselves in relation to what we experience: how things are going forus, how things stand with regard to our well-being (Slaby 2008, p. 438).Husserl Stud123Illustrations and examples of how an affective horizon influences experience andmotivates further intentions can be found in Husserls descriptions of the interrelationbetween personal interests and perception. Everyone has in this sense a certain frameof personal interests and accompanying habitual feelings that forms our typicalexperiential horizon. One popular example of this at least in Husserl is the so-calledvocational interest (Berufsinteresse), the way in which our experience is guided byour profession. The affective horizon of a vocational interest broadens throughoutones vocational life. New criteria of relevance are added or substituted for old onesand can then bring forth other forms of affective arousals. What is now relevant for thecurrent vocational interest owes its power of arousal (Weckungskraft) to the currentlyvocationally engaged ego and its motives (Hua 39, p. 594).At the same time, it is also possible that sudden changes in the course of attentionmay occur due to an awakening caused by factors in the environment which are notdirectly relevant for the vocational interest. Even this kind of bottom-up affection,which is supposed to be externally caused, necessarily stands in relation to ahabitual context of experience and interests. The job interest now loses itsactuality and is displaced by another interest when a perceptional givenness(Wahrnehmungsgegebenheit) breaks into the ongoing experience with a greataffective power (Hua 39, p. 594). This affective power should not be interpreted asa mere characteristic of the object or the given, however, as it derives its power inturn from another interest. Husserl describes this interrelation of bottom-upaffection (or salience) and top-down interests by the following example. One ofHusserls children catches his attention with great affective power while he isdeeply concentrated on his research work. His attention then changes and a newpersonal sphere of interests, another experiential horizon, takes over:It [the great affective power] wakes me as someone who is not only aprofessional, but also for example a father. But before the moment ofawakening my fatherly interest was not actual. Therefore the child did nothave the affective power to catch my attention at the time I saw her enteringthe room, and it therefore did not have the power to motivate fatherly actionsby then. My fatherly interest now becomes activated.25In addition to such a change of thematic attention, there are cases where both linesof interest stay active or awake in different forms of attention and with differentlevels of intensity. In these cases of divided attention, the explicit and thematicintentionality is focused on the research work while, at the same time, a bodily-sensual readiness or practical interest is operating, in that one has ones bodyimplicitly turned towards the sleeping child and has ones ears directed towards it.As we have seen in the examples and descriptions above, the currently activestages of interest are characterized through their flexible horizons of relevance(bewegliche Relevanzhorizonte, Hua 39, p. 596). A subjective, i.e., bodily-sensoryor personal, experience without any form of operating interest is thus not25 ,,Sie weckt mich als der ich nicht nur Berufsmensch, sondern zum Beispiel Vater bin. Aber meinvaterliches Interesse war nicht aktuell, von ihm ging daher nicht die Kraft der Affektion aus, die michbeim Anblick des eintretenden Kindes alsbald aufmerken lasst und mich zu vaterlicher Betatigungmotiviert. Mein vaterliches Interesse wird nun allererst aktiviert. (Hua 39, p. 594)Husserl Stud123conceivable. Subjective experience is selective in nature, and this is practicallyexpressed by a certain preference profile. This profile is not totally deterministic orstatic but flexible and constantly changing, in that interests compete and changeaccording to current environmental demands. Specific interests thus develop andalso change within experience, in the interaction between subjects with othersubjects and the world. Despite their flexibility and mutability, a typical core orstyle that is recognizable, even by other subjects, remains. Furthermore, theaffective horizon has an integrating function in that it integrates every futureexperience into the life and experiential history of an individual bodily subject. Inthis sense every subject (group of subjects, culture etc.) has a typical way of turningtowards the world or engaging in it, comparable with typical ways of addressing andtackling things, be it in a skeptical, curious, joyful, pessimistic etc. manner.This habitual profile can be said to have its source in feelings insofar as it is theconcrete manifestation of acquired habitual interests and feelings. In a generaltranscendental or even existential sense one could argue that intentionality itself,according to its structure of intending and fulfillment and its tendency to go beyond theactual given, can be characterized as essentially including a (drive)-feeling dimension.In concrete perception this general drive will then be taken over by specific feelingsthat are caused by current experiences and then turn into a mood or habitual feelingstate that guides further perception. Perception and intentionality in general are thusnot neutral or detached cognitive processes but can be characterized as an affectiveway of relating to the world (Slaby 2008) that includes general drives, as well as bodilyand personal feelings. To have interest in something thus always refers to a subjectsemotional involvement with her lifeworld and goes along with changing degrees ofintensity that vary according to the amount of engagement and invested feelings.What we prefer or what is of relevance for us is therefore closely tied to what we callfeelings. In this sense feelings seem not only to be an effect that we expect to havewhen we experience this or that as caused by and object; they can also be interpreted inan habitual sense as what motivates or structures what we come to see and how we seeit. Feelings understood in this sense are conceptually not dependent on the perceptionof a specific object but instead seem to represent a concrete motivational force ofperception. Here a typical style of emotionalized perception selects what actuallycan affect an individual subject and therefore what she perceives. Feeling, understoodas a general emotional drive that manifests itself in concrete feeling profiles, can thusbe defined as the concrete (or psychological) motivational necessity of everyindividual perception; or, in transcendental-phenomenological terms, it is not a formalbut a concrete genetic condition of every (new) object constitution.As Husserl argues in his late texts on the lifeworld, one cannot talk about a totalabsence of interest but only of different levels of relevance and intensity: In thestate of being awake (as a correlate of sleep) there can be no absolute lack ofinterest, and even what we call operating without interest is still a phenomenon ofrelevance, one of the lowest level of relevance.26 From a subjective-practical26 ,,Es gibt in der Wachheit (als Korrelat des Schlafes) uberhaupt keine absolute Interessenlosigkeit, undwas das interesselos verlaufend heit, ist selbst ein Relevanzphanomen niederster Stufe. (Hua 39,p. 596)Husserl Stud123phenomenological viewpoint, the experiencing subject is therefore always embed-ded in an affective horizon. The perceived and experienced lifeworld displays itselfnot as something objective but as a subjective and moreover an intersubjectivephenomenon of relevance. What is correlatively experienced has the character of acalling, something that exerts an allure on the I [], but this call dies away if it isnot tackling the current interests of the I.27 The experienced world is therefore aworld of interests from the start. Everything that is perceived is perceived in relationto a certain interest, even though this operating interest can have a low level ofrelevance. The lifeworld is a world of interests, both subjective and intersubjective:The world that is there for me, appearing as itself, originally, and in its first stageas field of perception, is there for me as a world of interests [Interessenwelt], and theway the world appears to me is the way in which I am interested in this world.28And so we can now add: the world not only appears to us in the light of our interest;it is only disclosed to us because we are emotionally engaged in it.ReferencesBegout, B. (2007). Husserl and the phenomenology of attention. In L. Boi, P. Kerszberg, & F. Patras(Eds.), Rediscovering phenomenology. Phenomenological essays on mathematical beings, physicalreality, perception and consciousness (pp. 1333). Dordrecht: Springer.Bovet, J., & Parnas, J. (1993). Schizophrenic delusions: A phenomenological approach. SchizophreniaBulletin, 19, 579597.Frith, C., & Rees, G. (2007). A brief history of the scientific approach to the study of consciousness. In M.Velmans & S. Schneider (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to consciousness (pp. 923). Malden:Blackwell Publishing.Fuchs, T. (2007). The temporal structure of intentionality and its disturbance in schizophrenia.Psychopathology, 40, 229235.Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Goldhammer, F., & Moosbrugger, H. (2006). Aufmerksamkeit. In K. Schweizer (Ed.), Leistung undLeistungsdiagnostik (pp. 1633). Heidelberg: Springer.Gurwitsch, A. (1929). Phanomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich. Studien uber Beziehungen vonGestalttheorie und Phanomenologie. Psychologische Forschung, 12, 279381.Gurwitsch, A. (1964). The field of consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and judgment. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Husserl, E. Manuskripte, A VI 12II/132a ,,54.Husserl, E. Manuskripte, A VI 12 II/134b ,,56.Hua 11. Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten19181926. M. Fleischer (Ed.). Den Haag: Nijhoff.Hua 15. Husserl, E. (1973). Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat. Dritter Teil (19291935). I. Kern(Ed.). Den Haag: Nijhoff.Hua 38. Husserl, E. (2004). Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (18931912).T. Vongehr and R. Giuliani (Eds.). Dordrecht: Springer.27 ,,Das jeweils Erfahrene hat den Charakter des Anrufenden, des Reize auf das Ich Ubenden [], aberder Anruf verhallt als das nicht im aktuellen Interesse stehende Ich bzw. nicht sein Interesseangehend(Hua 15, p. 462).28 ,,Die Welt, die jeweils fur mich da ist, originaliter, selbst erscheinend, und in erster Originalitat in derWeise des Wahrnehmungsfeldes, ist fur mich da als Interessenwelt, und die Weise ihres Fur-mich-seinsist jeweils Weise, wie sie mich interessiert [](Hua 39, p. 597).Husserl Stud123Hua 39. Husserl, E. (2008). Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution.Texte aus dem Nachlass (19161937). R. Sowa (Ed.). Dordrecht: Springer.Johnstone, A. A. (2012). The bodily roots of emotion. Husserl Studies, 28, 179200.Koch, C., & Crick, F. (2001). The zombie within. Nature, 411, 893.Legrand, D. (2006). The bodily self: The sensori-motor roots of pre-reflective self- consciousness.Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5, 89118.Lotz, C. (2002). Husserls Genuss. Uber den Zusammenhang von Leib, Affektion, Fuhlen undWerthaftigkeit. Husserl Studies, 18, 1939.Melle, U. (1990). Objektivierende und nicht-objektivierende Akte. In S. IJsseling (Ed.), Husserl Ausgabeund Forschung (pp. 3549). Dordrecht: Kluwer.Melle, U. (2012). Husserls deskriptive Erforschung der Gefuhlserlebnisse. In R. Breeur & U. Melle(Eds.), Life, subjectivity and art. Essays in honor of Rudolf Bernet (pp. 5199). Dordrecht: Springer.Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). The structure of behavior. Boston: Beacon Press.Rang, B. (1973). Kausalitat und Motivation. Untersuchungen zum Verhaltnis von Perspektivitat undObjektivitat in der Phanomenologie Edmund Husserls. Den Haag: Nijhoff.Slaby, J. (2008). Affective intentionality and the feeling body. Phenomenology and the CognitiveSciences, 7, 429444.Steinbock, A. J. (1995). Phenomenological concepts of normality and abnormality. Man and World, 28,241260.Steinbock, A. J. (2002). Affektion und Aufmerksamkeit. In H. Huni & P. Trawny (Eds.), Dieerscheinende Welt. Festschrift fur Klaus Held (pp. 241275). Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt.Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Husserl Stud123Feelings as the Motor of Perception? The Essential Role of Interest for IntentionalityAbstractIntroductionExplicit Intentionality and Feelings: Thematic Intention (Meinung) and InterestThe Genetic Notion of InterestHabitual Feelings as a Psychological Motor of Concrete PerceptionReferences

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