Exploitation and Disadvantage

Benjamin Ferguson

July 3, 2014 (10569)

Abstract

Some accounts of exploitation, most notably the degradation-based

account provided by Ruth Sample (2003) and Robert Goodin’s (1987)

vulnerability-based account, argue that persons are exploited when the

benefit they receive from a transaction falls below a certain threshold

value. According to these accounts, the duty of the advantaged party

to constrain their advantage in light of the other party’s disadvantage is

independent from the historical cause of that disadvantage. Rather, it is

justified by a direct appeal to the other party’s disadvantage. They argue

that a failure to discharge these duties amounts to exploitation.

Because the duty of constraint in these accounts does not depend on

the reason for the disadvantage the duty is what I call a ‘come-what-may’

duty. I show that come-what-may duties create moral hazards that can

be exploited by the disadvantaged parties. In such cases these accounts

of exploitation are either self-frustrating or over-demanding. I conclude

that there is a tension between ‘come-what-may’ duties and fairness. This

tension leaves accounts that contain come-what-may duties unable to pro-

vide a coherent analysis of exploitation when the concept is understood

to involve taking unfair advantage.

1

1 Introduction

It is widely agreed that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage.1 Of

course, as Richard Arneson points out, this is not a particularly helpful analysis

of the concept since there will “be as many competing conceptions of exploitation

as theories of what persons owe to each other by way of fair treatment” (Ar-

neson 1992: 350). Informative analyses must go further. Some accounts do so,

in part, by arguing that exploitation involves a failure to exercise constraint in

light of others’ disadvantage—regardless of the cause of disadvantage.2 Accord-

ing to these accounts, our duties to protect the disadvantaged and vulnerable

are what I will call ‘come-what-may’ duties. In this article I will argue that

this approach is misguided; accounts of exploitation based on ‘come-what-may’

duties are either self-frustrating or over-demanding. I consider two possible

solutions to these problems and conclude that the most promising is to omit

self-caused disadvantage from the scope of these duties. That is, we exploit

others when we fail to exercise constraint in light of others’ disadvantage only

if this disadvantage is the result of an injustice for which the disadvantaged is

not responsible.3

*Versions of this paper were presented at the LSE; Aarhus University’s Vejle II work-shop; the Decisions, Games and Logic workshop at KTH, Stockholm; and the University ofPavia. I thank those present for their comments. I also thank Paul Bou-Habib, ConradHeilmann, Sebastian Kohler, Alice Obrecht, Serena Olsaretti, Thomas Scanlon, Hillel Steiner,Roberto Veneziani, Nicholas Vrousalis, my colleagues at the LSE, an an anonymous refereefor Economics & Philosophy for helpful suggestions.

1See for example, Elster (1982), Goodin (1987), Sample (2003), Steiner (1984, 1987), andWertheimer (1996). A dissenting view is proposed in Wood (1995). In addition, in this paperI will focus on exploitation that occurs in transactions between individuals. My argumentsdo not necessarily apply to exploitation understood as a systemic phenomena affecting aparticular class of individuals.

2Examples here include Sample (2003) and Goodin (1987).3I intend my preferred restriction of the scope of duties to the disadvantaged to be neutral

with respect to accounts of personal responsibility. More specifically, there are ordinarilymany conditions necessary for holding an agent responsible for an action. For example, wemight require the agent knows the possible consequences of her action, the likelihoods of theseconsequences, that these consequences are themselves ‘just’ in the sense that the agent wouldaccept them from behind a veil of ignorance, that the agent’s identity remains stable across

2

In the following section I outline two accounts that include versions of these

‘come-what-may’ duties: Ruth Sample’s (2003) degradation-based account and

Robert Goodin’s (1987) vulnerability-based account. In section three, I present

a case that creates problems for both accounts. In section four I consider two

possible solutions to these problems, argue that omitting self-caused disadvan-

tage from the domain of exploitable disadvantage is the best solution, and finally

I address a general tension between fairness and come-what-may duties.

2 Come-what-may Duties

Before outlining two approaches to exploitation that include come-what-may

duties, I want to briefly clarify a potential confusion about the use of the word

‘advantage’. There are three senses of ‘advantage’ implied by the claim that

exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, each of which denotes a different

concept: advantage as use, advantage as lack of vulnerability, and advantage as

gain. When A exploits B, A takes advantage (i.e., uses) B’s disadvantage (i.e.,

vulnerability) to acquire some advantage (i.e., gain) for himself at B’s expense.

Using ‘advantage’ to denote each of these features quickly becomes confusing.

Thus, in the arguments that follow I will use ‘advantage’ and ‘disadvantage’ to

refer only to advantage as lack of vulnerability. I will use ‘gain’ (or occasionally

benefit) to refer to advantage as gain and ‘use’ to refer to advantage as use.4.

Additionally, I will assume that the slogan ‘exploitation involves taking unfair

advantage’ is equivalent to the expanded slogan, ‘exploitation involves unfairly

using another’s disadvantage for gain’.

time, etc. Different accounts of responsibility will include and emphasise different conditions.But in what follows I simply suppose that whatever conditions are necessary to hold the agentsresponsible, these conditions are in fact met.

4Two of these three forms of advantage are noted by Allen Wood. My use of ‘advan-tage’ corresponds to Wood’s ‘advantage exploitation’—our relation to that “which gives usa hold or advantage over the person”. My ‘gain’ or ‘benefit’ corresponds to Wood’s ‘benefitexploitation’—the benefit we receive from advantage exploitation (Wood 1995: 8)

3

While many of the exploited are also disadvantaged5, the following two ac-

counts of exploitation distinguish themselves from more restrictive accounts

through their claims that mere disadvantage can generate exploitation, “re-

gardless of the particular source” of disadvantage (Goodin 1987: 187). For these

accounts, the historical source of disadvantage is—to some degree—irrelevant

to whether a transaction is exploitative; for some transactions non-historical

properties of a transaction itself are sufficient to ground exploitation claims.6

2.1 Goodin’s Account

Of the two accounts, Goodin’s implies the widest scope for our duties to the

disadvantaged (as we will see below, Sample’s ‘come-what-may’ duties are al-

ready restricted to a sub-domain of disadvantage). According to Goodin, we

exploit a person when we unfairly use of one of their attributes and, he claims,

exploitation in general involves “playing for advantage[-as-gain] in situations

where it is inappropriate to do so . . . [it] consists in playing games of strategy

in circumstances which render them somehow inappropriate” (Goodin 1987:

184, emphasis in original). Furthermore, all cases where playing for strategy

is inappropriate are “manifestations of one particular kind of wrong,” namely,

a failure to honour the moral norm of “protecting the vulnerable. . . regardless

of the particular source of their vulnerability” (Goodin 1987: 187). Thus, for

Goodin, exploitation occurs when we use others’ vulnerabilities to secure for

ourselves some form of benefit in games of strategy, no matter the source of

these vulnerabilities.

Taken at face value, Goodin’s norm of protecting the vulnerable seems to

make exploitation pervasive. It appears to render exploitative any transaction

5Disadvantage may take many forms, but Goodin and Sample are primarily concernedwith disadvantage as impoverishment, vulnerability, and disability. As discussed above, I use‘disadvantage’ as an umbrella term for vulnerability and these similar states.

6For Sample, the historical source of disadvantage is not always irrelevant. It is onlyirrelevant in cases involving a failure to meet basic needs, as discussed in section 2.2.

4

in which one transactor uses his or her advantage for gain. This seems odd, since

(i) nearly all economic transactions involve unequal bargaining power and (ii)

unequal bargaining power, ordinarily, seems to be a form of vulnerability. Yet,

(iii) many ‘ordinary’ transactions do not appear unfair. It seems that Goodin

should provide an explanation of this oddness. He might either address (iii),

showing why we should consider most transactions unfair, or provide a response

to (ii), explaining why the conception of vulnerability that he has in mind is

narrower than our ordinary notion of vulnerability and thus explaining why

mere inequality in bargaining power is not sufficient for his notion of vulnera-

bility. That is, though he claims that any form of vulnerability is potentially

exploitable, perhaps Goodin’s account of vulnerability is less inclusive then our

ordinary conception.

Goodin provides an account of vulnerability in his book Protecting the Vul-

nerable, where he writes

Vulnerability is a relational notion: a full specification will tell us

who is vulnerable to whom with respect to what. . . . [Vulnerabilites

are] also relative. A is more vulnerable to B (1) the more control B

has over outcomes that affect A’s interests and (2) the more heavily

A’s interests are at stake in the outcomes that B controls (Goodin

1986: 118).

Thus, for Goodin, B is vulnerable to A with respect to x when A has the

ability to control x and x has an impact on B. The scope of this conception

of vulnerability does not appear narrower than the scope of vulnerability in

ordinary use. In lieu of a restriction of the scope of vulnerability, Goodin must

provide a convincing argument for why we should believe most transactions are

exploitative. And indeed, Goodin does provide such an argument, albeit one

that I will argue is not fully convincing. However, before considering Goodin’s

5

defense of his relatively expansive conception of exploitation (in section 4.2) I

want to consider the come-what-may duties that appear in Sample’s account

and an outline of the problems these duties create for both accounts.

2.2 Sample’s Account

According to Sample’s account of ‘exploitation as degradation’, exploitation

involves “interacting with another being for the sake of advantage[-as-gain] in a

way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being” (Sample

2003: 57). She claims these failures of respect take three general forms. We can

fail to show proper respect for—degrade—the value of another by:

D1 “Taking advantage[-as-use] of an injustice done to him.”

D2 “Neglecting what is necessary for that person’s well-being or flourishing.”

D3 “Treating as a fungible object of market exchange, an aspect of that per-

son’s being that ought not to be commodified” (Sample 2003: 57, lettering

added).

The first form of degradation, D1, involves disadvantage caused by historical

injustice: “If a person is in a weaker bargaining position because of a past

injustice, we stand to gain disproportionately in virtue of that injustice” (Sample

2003: 82). For example, if C steals B’s wallet and A uses the disadvantage

created by this theft to gain more than he otherwise would have in a transaction

with B, A exploits B.

The second form of degradation involves a form of disadvantage that is

ahistorical. Here Sample claims that well-being or flourishing are best captured

by what she variously calls ‘basic needs’ and ‘capabilities’.7

7Sample draws on Martha Nussbaum’s extension of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approachto wellbeing. See Nussbaum (2003).

6

She argues that transactions can be degrading when “the [impoverished]

capabilities of our interactors are ignored in the pursuit of our own advantage[-

as-gain]” (Sample 2003: 81).8 Though these first two forms of degradation

often coincide, neither implies the other. While B’s basic needs may be unmet

because of a past injustice committed by another person, D2 implies that failing

to properly consider B’s basic needs may generate exploitation even when the

reason B’s basic needs are not unmet does not involve a past injustice. Note that

the existence of D2 as a separate source of exploitation-generating degradation

requires cases that fall within the scope of D2 and outside the scope of D1.

Finally, Sample’s D3 implies that the exchange of certain goods may be

intrinsically degrading. Here too there may be overlap with the first and second

forms of degradation. Prostitution is often considered a paradigmatic example

of this third form of transaction. When A pays for sex with B, B may transact

only because she has been previously unjustly disadvantaged. A may also fail

to give proper weight to B’s well-being or flourishing. But Sample’s inclusion of

this ‘anti-commodification condition’ as a separate condition implies that even

if D1 and D2 are not satisfied, the transaction may be exploitative. Again, in

order for D3 to operate as a separate source of degradation, there must be cases

of D3 that do not fall within the scope of either of the first two domains.

Like Goodin’s account, Sample’s account faces some ‘face value’ difficulties,

in particular, a version of what Rawls calls the “priority problem” (Rawls 1971:

§8). The presence of separate degradation-generating principles means that

it is theoretically possible for these principles to conflict. If these principles

also conflict in practice, then absent either a single principle to guide action

or a weighting between the three forms of degradation, Sample’s account of

exploitation appears to provide conflicting guides to action. However, unlike the

8Note that Sample does not mean ‘ignored’ in the literal sense, but rather ‘not givenproper weight’. In order to succeessfully extract value from B, A must be aware of B’s (lackof) capabilites, if only to use this disadvantage for his own gain.

7

prima facie problem of scope for Goodin’s account, Sample’s priority problem

is not caused by the presence of a come-what-may duty. Nevertheless, as we will

see the inclusion of a come-what-may duty causes its own problems for Sample.

Come-what-may duties enter Sample’s account through her inclusion of the

basic needs condition, D2. She claims that when A transacts with B and fails to

ensure B’s basic needs are satisfied, he degrades and exploits her. Conditions like

D2 are threshold conditions; conditions that claim exploitation occurs when B’s

post transaction outcome falls below a certain threshold level.9 In Sample’s case,

B is exploited when post-transaction her basic needs remain unmet. Threshold

conditions, when not embedded as a subset of more restrictive conditions like

D1, generate come-what-may duties. When B’s basic needs are unmet pre-

transaction, if A chooses to transact with B, then he must satisfy the constraints

implied by D2 and this is so regardless of the reason that B’s pre-transaction

basic needs were unmet.10

In the next section I present a case that exemplifies the over-demandingness

problem for Goodin’s account and that forces a conflict of duties for Sample’s

account. I show that both problems can be resolved by abandoning the broad

come-what-may duties contained in each account. However, before doing so I

want to briefly comment on Sample’s non-commodification condition, D3.

9This does not mean that exploitation is a binary concept. There may also be degreesof exploitation. Nor does this mean that all levels of exploitation require the same form ofresponse. For example, some exploitation may be strong enough to justify state enforcedprohibition, while weaker forms of exploitation do not. Rather, the claim is that exploitation(caused by a failure to respect D2) begins when we neglect others’ basic needs. Greater neglectof these basic needs may amount to greater exploitation.

10Sample does not specify a criterion for determining the duties that D2 implies for A.One possibility is that if B’s basic needs are unmet pre-transaction A must, ensure they aremet post-transaction. But this is surely too strong. More likely is a criterion according towhich A must forgo the gain he would receive from transacting, either up to the point thatB’s basic needs are met, or up to the point at which he would make a loss from transacting,whichever comes first. This is consistant with Sample’s caveat that “if the only beneficialinteraction possible is one in which [basic] needs cannot be satisfied, then such interaction isnot exploitative” (Sample 2003: 75).

8

The arguments that follow pertain to the problems that arise from Sample’s

inclusion of cases that lie in D2, but not D1. D3 is excluded from the criticism

because, without denying that they may be degrading or disrespectful, I am un-

convinced transactions falling only within Sample’s D3 are exploitative. When

A buys sex from B, if the transaction is degrading for only the reason that sex

ought not be commodified, then it seems that both A and B are degraded by

the transaction. Neither is relatively disadvantaged with respect to the other.

Yet, if exploitation involves taking unfair advantage-as-use of another’s vulner-

ability, then it must be the case that one of A or B is relatively disadvantaged.

While it seems natural to say that A—the buyer—is the advantaged party in

cases of prostitution, the belief that A is unfairly advantaged is likely due to

our belief that it is unfair (for reasons stemming from either D1 or D2) that B

is in a position in which she must sell her services as a prostitute. If neither

D1 nor D2 hold and A and B are equals in terms of power, resources, etc, and

B is not disadvantaged through past injustice, it is not clear that either party

is relatively disadvantaged.11 If neither is relatively disadvantaged, there can

be no exploitation. Indeed Sample makes just this point when she writes, “I

reject the idea that a person could be exploited if no vulnerability is made use

of” (Sample 2003: 83). She claims that when D1 and D2 are not violated but a

person “nonetheless chooses to transact in a way that would violate a putative

restriction on exchange, [they are] not exploited. . . however, [they] may be de-

graded if the appropriate case against commodification can be made” (Sample

2003: 83). These arguments, along with Sample’s own claims, indicate that D3

is not a separate source of exploitation, but rather falls within D1 and D2. Its

inclusion as a separate form of degradation plays only a rhetorical role.

11Of course, in addition to this central concern about the inclusion of Sample’s third con-dition, as Sample herself acknowledges, it is difficult to reach a consensus on the objectiveaccount of value that underpins D3. For additional concerns about this case see Wertheimer(2007).

9

3 Two Problems for Come-what-may Duties

In some contexts Goodin’s and Sample’s claims appear plausible. In sweatshops,

labour firms fail to constrain their bargaining advantage when employing the

severely disadvantaged. These are paradigmatic cases of exploitation and their

being so is not, so it seems, dependent on the source of these workers’ disad-

vantage. When workers are extremely vulnerable, using this vulnerability for

self-enrichment seems to be a clear case of exploitation, regardless of how the

workers became vulnerable. Despite this initial plausibility, as we saw above,

both accounts appear to face certain difficulties and these difficulties appear

more clearly in the following case.

3.1 The Sequential Game Case

Consider the following sequential game, Γ1.

Stage 1: Consider the following two lotteries, L1 and L2. Suppose that A is

presented with a choice between the lotteries, but B is (for whatever reason)

committed to L2.

L1 (p = 12 , $100; 1− p, $0)

L2 (p = 1, $50)

Stage 2: A and B face each other in the labour market. The wealthier is the

employer, the less wealthy the employee. If they are equally wealthy they may

work cooperatively, splitting revenue equally. Suppose the values for revenue,

wages, and profit are as follows: R = $11, ω = $5, π = 6. The revenue

from cooperating is $112 , or $5.50. Finally, suppose the following constraint,

embodying Sample’s particular approach to D2, holds:

10

BN If a player chooses to transact with another, then both players’ outcomes

must be ≥ $10. Suppose $10 is what is necessary for an individual’s

well-being.

Constraint BN operationalises Sample’s D2, the claim that we degrade others

when we neglect what is necessary for their well-being. Sample argues that “if

we can interact with persons so that their basic needs are taken into account

through the transaction, we ought to” (Sample 2003: 75). Thus, employers

should pay their employees enough to ensure their basic needs are met. In Γ1,

this amount is set at $10, but the problem that the case presents does not

depend on the particular value given to BN.12

In the strategic form of Γ1 shown in figure 1 below, ‘A’ and ‘B’ denote the

players, ‘0’ a chance node, and ‘C’, ‘W’, and ‘E’ represent the options ‘cooper-

ate’, ‘work for’, and ‘employ’ respectively.

When B is committed to L2, which lottery should A (rationally) choose? We

can answer this question using backward induction. First, consider the bottom

branch of figure 1, supposing A chooses L2. In this case, the players will be

equally wealthy, each receiving $50. They may choose to form a cooperative

venture or refrain from cooperating, but clearly it is in the interest of each to

cooperate, so the outcome of A choosing L2 is ($55.50, $55.50).13

12This is true in the sense that the basic needs level may be set at any point. The case doesdepend on BN being $10 given the other figures in the game. That is, the relative differencesin the values of the payoffs associated with L1, L2 and BN matter.

13I represent outcomes as: (A, B) and action profiles as 〈A,B〉. The presentation anddiscussion that follow assume A and B are risk neutral over monetary outcomes of the lotteries.Though this assumption is admittedly unrealistic, it would be possible to construct cases forwhich the currency was utility rather than money. Risk-neutrality with respect to utilityoutcomes is less controversial. However, I have opted to present the problem in money-spacebecause an example that relied on utilities would sacrifice simplicity for (unnecessary) realism.Finally, note that Γ1 has two odd features. First, the production process—which results ingains of only $11—is such that it is impossible for both individuals to satisfy BN withoutdrawing from their stock of wealth. Second, these small profits mean that satisfying the BNrequirement if A loses the lottery requires B to forgo a large proportion ( 10

11) of the gains from

production. These features do not dissolve the criticism I will outline below, they may raise

11

L2B

L2

L1

A

12Loss

12Win

0

¬E$100, $50

E

A

¬W $100, $50

W $106, $55

B

¬W$0, $50

W

A

¬E $0, $50

E $10, $51

B

¬C

C

B

¬C $50, $50

C $55 12 , $55 1

2

A

¬C $50, $50

C $50, $50

A

Figure 1: �1 (BN Holds)

Figure 1: Γ1 in Extended Form

Suppose A chooses L1. Then, there are two equiprobable possibilities: either

A will win the lottery, or A will lose the lottery. Suppose A loses. Then after the

lottery A will be poorest. He can choose to work for B or to remain unemployed

and B can choose whether to employ A, but it is in the interest of both to

choose employment. Since post-lottery A has $0, BN holds. B must pay A $10

in wages, but she may keep $1 for herself. The outcome of a lottery loss is thus

($10, $51). Suppose A wins the lottery. Here A is the wealthiest player. And

again, it is rational for both players to choose employment. This time A is the

employer and, since both players’ holdings are greater than $10, BN doesn’t

apply. A will pay B $5, keeping $6 for himself in profits. Thus, the outcome

questions about the scope of the criticism. However, the problematic features for Sample’sand Goodin’s accounts that I will identify below remain regardless of whether the productionprocess generates profits of $11 or, say, $111. That is, regardless of the profits generated bythe productive process, come-what-may duties imply that A is able to take unfair advantageof a moral hazard.

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of a lottery win is ($106, $55). Since a lottery win and a lottery loss are both

equally likely, the expected value of choosing L1 is 12 the outcome of a win and

12 the outcome of a loss, or ($58, $53). Since the expected value of L1 is greater

for A than the expected value of L2, A will rationally choose L1.

(BN) A

B

L2

L1 $58.00, $53.00

L2 $55.50, $55.50

(No BN) A

B

L2

L1 $55.50, $55.50

L2 $55.50, $55.50

Figure 2: Expected values in Γ1 with and without BN

Now consider a variation of Γ1 where BN is absent. Without BN, the out-

come of A choosing L1, losing the lottery, choosing work, and B choosing employ

changes to ($5, $56), making the expected value of L1 ($55.50, $55.50). Thus,

if BN does not hold, the expected value for both A and B of A’s choice of either

L1 and L2 is equivalent. The tables in figure 2 summarise the expected value of

each lottery for A and B with, and without, BN. When BN holds, if A chooses

L1, A does better and B worse. In particular, A gains $2.50 of expected value

at B’s expense. With BN in place, A has an incentive to choose L1 over L2.

Without BN the outcomes for each player are the same regardless of whether A

chooses L1 or L2. With these facts in mind, let us return to the two accounts

of exploitation outlined above, this time beginning with Sample’s account.

3.2 Sample’s Self-Frustration Problem

Consider Γ1 in the context of Sample’s account. According to Sample, if A

chooses L1 and loses, then if B chooses to employ A, but does not respect

BN, B exploits A. When B fails to ensure A’s basic needs are met when she

interacts with him, B engages in the form of degradation specified by D2, and

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thus exploits A.

However, pre-theoretically it also seems natural to say that the reverse is

true, that is, A exploits B. There are two senses in which A extracts benefits

from B in Γ1. First, A gains ex ante from BN—at B’s expense—through the

increase in expected value that BN gives to A’s choice of L1. Second, when A

chooses L1, loses, and then works for B, he receives ex post benefits in the form

of the BN subsidy: his wages increase from $5 without the subsidy to $10 with

the subsidy.

If either of these gains are also unfair, then in a pre-theoretical sense, A

exploits B. Note that because A receives these benefits at separate times, the

locus of the exploitative act (assuming the gains are, in fact, unfair) depends

on whether the ex post or ex ante perspective is adopted. This leaves us with

three questions:

Which perspective on gain–ex post or ex ante—is morally relevant for

exploitation?

Are the gains received in either perspective unfair?

If so, is the resulting exploitation problematic for Sample’s account?

Unfairness. It is easiest to begin with the second question: are either ex

ante or ex post gains unfair. First consider A’s ex ante gains. There are three

features of A’s ex ante gain that, taken together, motivate the claim that it is

unfair.

First, A’s pre-choice feasible set contains the option in B’s (L2), plus the risky

option L1. According to Sample’s own preferred capabilities-based approach to

welfare, A’s pre-choice welfare is greater than B’s.14 Second, the presence of BN

14This is so because B’s choice set is a strict subset of A’s; consequently, the capabilitiesenabled by A’s larger choice set are greater than those enjoyed by B. A’s welfare is, of course,greater than B’s on many other accounts of well-being as well.

14

means that if A chooses L1, regardless of whether he wins or loses the lottery,

B will do worse than she would have done had A chosen L2. If A wins the

lottery, then in the second stage B will work for A and B’s outcome will be $55;

if A loses the lottery, then B will employ A but, because she must respect BN,

her outcome will only be $51. Both outcomes are less than the $55.50 B would

receive if A chose L2. Finally, because BN increases the expected value of L1

it creates a moral hazard that incentivises risk-taking. This occurs because, for

A, BN is costless. Although the constraint requires B to subsidise A’s losses, it

does not require that A share his gains with B. In other words, BN requires B

to provide A with insurance for which A does not pay. When A, who is already

better off than B, chooses L1 he unfairly uses the moral hazard created by BN

in order to (attempt) to enrich himself at B’s (certain) expense. It seems clear

that A’s ex ante gain is unfair to B.15

Now consider ex post gain. Suppose A chooses L1 and loses. Although he

was better off than B before the lottery, he is now worse off. Having lost the

lottery, is his ex post benefit—his actual receipt of the subsidy—really unfair?

Sample clearly thinks not. Respecting other persons should, so the argument

goes, commit us to ensuring that our interactors’ basic needs are in fact met,

not that they might have been met had things gone differently. To claim the

latter offers no consolation to the person who is starving now. Although this

line of reasoning is, perhaps, initially attractive, it should be resisted. If A’s ex

ante gain is unfair, then A’s ex post gain must also be unfair. This is so because

the unfairness of the ex ante gain derives from the fact that A is in a position

in which he could receive a subsidy for which he does not pay. If it is unfair for

A to knowingly to put himself in a position where this might happen, it must

15I should emphasise that the primary motivation for the intuition that A treates B unfairlyis that A takes advantage of a moral hazard, and not that his welfare is, pre-choice, greaterthan B’s. However, this latter point may be a minor contributing factor to the intuition ofunfairness.

15

also be unfair for him to actually accept the subsidy. Therefore, both A’s ex

ante and his ex post gains are unfair.

Two Problems. Consider the third question: when A gains unfairly at B’s

expense—in either the ex ante or ex post sense—does Sample’s account en-

counter problems? The short answer is yes. To see why, let’s start again with

ex ante gain.

A receives unfair ex ante gain of B when he chooses L1. If exploitation in-

volves the impermissible use of others’ disadvantage to gain unfairly from them,

then it is impermissible for A to choose L1. The reason L1 is impermissible

is that it is unfair to B. Further, this obligation to refrain from choosing L1

does not depend on how valuable L1 is to A. Suppose A’s choice is not between

L1 and L2, but between L3, where p = 0.99, $500; 1 − p, $0, and L2. L3 is

a very attractive lottery from which A stands to gain much ($500) with little

risk of calamity (1%). I argued three facts make it unfair for A to receive ex

ante benefits when he chooses L1: (i) pre-choice A is better off than B, and yet

(ii) his choice of L1 harms (the less well-off) B and (iii) the requirement that B

subsidise A with BN means that A receives insurance (BN) at B’s expense for

which he does not pay. These three facts apply also to L3. Indeed, under L3

(i), the inequality in pre-choice welfare, is much greater. Not only is it unfair

for A receive ex ante benefits from B when faced with the L1 lottery, A must

refrain from taking a risk that leads to his being subsidised by B even when this

risk is very prudent. Therefore, if the relevant form of gain for exploitation is

ex ante gain, Sample’s account is over-demanding.

But perhaps ex ante gain is not the form of gain involved in exploitation.

Suppose then, that exploitation involves unfair ex post gain. Here too Sample’s

account faces a problem. If the relevant form of gain is ex post gain and, as

I have already argued, such gain is unfair, then A exploits B when he receives

16

the BN subsidy. However, according to Sample’s own account, B exploits A

if she fails to pay the subsidy: B’s failure to ensure A’s basic needs are met

violates D2. If A exploits B when he receives BN and B exploits A if she fails

to pay BN, then in order for each to avoid exploiting the other, they must allow

themselves to be exploited. And conversely, in order to avoid exploitation,

they each must allow the other to exploit. In this case, Sample’s account is

self-frustrating because it implies conflicting obligations. In a discussion of a

related case, Hillel Steiner writes, both A and B “are each obligated to employ

all available measures necessary to remove the obstacle constituted by the other

person’s [not exploiting]. And this obligation persists until the point where

either (i) one of them has actually prevailed. . . and the other is incapable of

further ‘attempting’, or (ii) both are [so] incapable. . . ” (Steiner 1994: 197–198).

Sample’s account provides no way of determining who should concede. There is

no way to adjudicate between either party’s attempt to not exploit. If ex post

gain is unfair, then Sample’s account implies a self-frustrating moral code that,

again quoting Steiner “makes [non-exploitative] performances obligatory and, at

the same time, . . . requires (in certain circumstances) the deliberate frustration

of any [non-exploitative] performance for the sake of no other principle or value”

(Steiner 1994: 199, emphasis in original).16 Note that self-frustration is not the

same as mutual exploitation. The claim is not that both A and B exploit

the other. Rather, A’s exploiting B and B’s exploiting A in Γ1 are mutually

exclusive actions. The performance of one action precludes the other.

So, Sample’s account encounters problems regardless of whether the form

of gain relevant to exploitation is ex ante gain or ex post gain. In the case of

16Note that in one sense, this conflict can be avoided: A and B can simply avoid any kindof economic interaction. Because the obligation to transact non-exploitatively is a conditionalobligation that arises only if one chooses to transact avoiding transactions also entails avoidingexploitations. But this does not dissolve the self-frustration problem for Sample’s account, forwe want to know what transactors’ obligations are, should they choose to transact. Sampleclaims that she is And here Sample’s account implies conditional obligations to both φ and¬φ.

17

the former, her account is over-demanding; in the case of the latter it is self-

frustrating. Before I address the problem that Γ1 creates for Goodin’s account,

I will consider the final question: which form of gain is relevant to exploitation.

Moral Relevance. Suppose A chooses L1 and receives unfair ex ante gain at

B’s expense. If exploitation involves unfair ex ante gain, then having chosen L1,

a uses the disadvantage BN creates for B to extract unfair gain at B’s expense.

That is, A has exploited B. But now suppose that though A initially intends

to accept BN, upon losing the lottery he has a change of heart and rejects the

subsidy. Though A has received unfair ex ante gain, it does not seem that any

exploitation has occurred because A has not received any actual benefit. A’s

choice of L1 is akin to attempted exploitation.17 Although his disregard for the

unfair effects of his choice of L1 on B likely makes this choice wrongful, the

choice of L1 is not itself exploitation. The issue here is not one of permissibility,

but of classification. Since (actual) maldistribution is necessary for exploitation

and this only occurs when A accepts BN, the form of gain morally relevant for

exploitation is ex post gain. And, this, along with my arguments above, means

that the problem Sample’s account faces is one of self-frustration.

Revisiting the Priority Problem. In my outline of Sample’s account I

indicated that absent either a metaprinciple or a weighting of the three forms of

degradation Sample’s principles could conflict. While I trust the self-frustration

problem I have identified is itself straightforward, it is, perhaps less clear how

self-frustration is related to the priority problem. There are two possible sources

of confusion.

The first concerns the way the priority problem is related to self-frustration.

17But note that A’s choice of L1 is only akin to attempted exploitation. It cannot actuallybe described as attempted exploitation since in choosing L1, A does not intend to receiveBN. Rather, he hopes to win the lottery; his receipt of BN is only a possible (and forseeable)outcome of his pursuit of the welfare maximising outcome.

18

The self-frustration problem involves the following conflicting claims:

F1 B exploits A if she fails to provide A with the BN subsidy.

F2 When A chooses the risky option, loses, but nevertheless accepts the sub-

sidy from B, A exploits B.

While D2 implies F1, it is not clear that any of Sample’s existing three forms

of disrespect imply F2. In this case, Sample’s account cannot suffer from an

internal self-frustration problem. The conflict would instead involve D2 and an

external principle. If this claim is true it does not spell the end for Sample’s

problems. A’s actions in F2 are a paradigmatic form of exploitation that Sample

should want to capture. If her account cannot account for F2, then it seems that

it is incomplete because it fails to capture a case of taking unfair advantage:

free-riding on moral hazards. Regardless of whether the problem is an internal

problem of self-frustration or an external problem of scope the case presented

in Γ1 is problematic for Sample’s account.

However, of these two possibilities, I believe the internal conflict is a more

accurate, and indeed, more charitable description of the problem that Sample’s

account faces. While F2 may not be prohibited by any of the existing three

forms of disrespect, it does appear to be implied by Sample’s general claim from

which she derives these three forms of disrespect. Sample writes “exploitation

involves interacting with another being for advantage[-as-gain] in a way that

degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being” (Sample 2003: 57).

Surely using others’ commitment to obligations like BN for self-enrichment at

the others’ expense involves a serious failure of respect both for their person

and for the spirit of the moral commitment. If this is so, then a fourth form

of disrespect is implied by Sample’s general claim that exploitation involves

disrespect or degradation and in this case, her account faces a problem of self-

19

frustration: D2 implies F1 and the fourth form of disrespect, D4, implies F2.18

The second possible source of confusion concerns the way Sample’s princi-

ples conflict. Initially it might seem that conflict is not possible. Perhaps, D1,

D2, and D3 are all (along with some structural conditions) sufficient for exploi-

tation. If multiple forms of degradation were present in a transaction, then the

exploitation would simply be over determined; if A were guilty of D1 and B of

D2, then they would mutually exploit each other.

It is true that D1–D3 need not conflict, but it is not true that they cannot

conflict. If B desperately sells a kidney to A because all of her possessions were

stolen and after the sale her basic needs remain unmet, all three forms of degra-

dation are satisfied. However, the problem presented by the conflicting claims

F1 and F2 is different. Cases like that just described, all forms of degradation

coincide with one person. But in cases like Γ1 one person is degraded by one of

Sample’s domains of disrespect and the other by another domain. It is in this

type of case that potential conflicts can arise. In order to avoid exploiting B, A

must ensure he does not disrespect her and vice versa. But if these avoidances

of disrespect require mutually exclusive actions, then exploitation cannot be

avoided and the account is self-frustrating.

3.3 Goodin’s Over-demandingness Problem

I now turn my attention to the problems Γ1 creates for Goodin’s account. Recall

that for Goodin exploitation involves a failure to respect the duty to protect the

vulnerable, “regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability” (Goodin

1987: 187). We exploit others when we use their vulnerabilities to secure for

ourselves some form of benefit in a game of strategy. The vulnerable are “those

whose interests are strongly affected by our actions and choices” (Goodin 1987:

18Of course, as mentioned above, Sample can attempt deny F2 involves any form of disre-spect, but in this case faces the incompleteness problem.

20

191). Further, Goodin argues that the responsibility to protect the vulnerable

falls upon “whoever has the ‘last clear chance’ to prevent harm. . . regardless of

the causal history up to that point” (Goodin 1986: 129).

According to Goodin then, if A chooses L1, loses, and decides to work for

B, A is vulnerable to B. If B fails to protect A when she transacts with him,

she exploits him by failing to honour the moral norm of protecting the vul-

nerable. On Goodin’s account, determining whether B has protected A is less

straightforward because, unlike Sample, Goodin does not appeal to a particular

baseline (such as basic needs) by which we can judge whether B has discharged

her duty to protect A. Nevertheless, Goodin is clear that A’s vulnerability places

some constraints on B; she cannot simply ignore A’s plight. In the absence of

an explicit protection criteria, I will assume these constraints are captured by

the level stipulated by the BN condition, though in section four I will consider

alternative operationalisations of what it means for persons to ‘protect’ others.

Using the BN constraint as a baseline for B’s protection of the vulnerable A, it

follows that when B does not respect the BN constraint, B exploits A.

This will strike those who are convinced by my prior claims about the fairness

of A’s gains as the wrong result. Rather than B exploiting A, it seems that A

exploits B. A case involving a spiteful A who hoped to lose the lottery in order

to worsen B’s outcome makes an even stronger case for the claim that it is A

who exploits B. However, Goodin’s position not only entails that B exploits A

when she fails to subsidise him, it also entails that A exploits B in Γ1 when he

chooses L1. If, as Goodin claims, the vulnerable are those whose interests are

affected by our choices, then B is vulnerable to A with respect to A’s choice of

L1, since A’s potential loss will negatively affect B’s interests. Goodin’s account

allows us to claim that when A chooses L1, A exploits B.19

19Although in my discussion of Sample’s account I concluded that A’s choice of L1 cannotitself be exploitation, this result is not supported by Goodin’s vulnerability account. If ex-ploitation involves a failure to protect the vulnerable, then since A fails to protect B when

21

Though it is possible to conclude from Goodin’s account that A exploits B

and that B exploits A, his account is not self-frustrating. The account implies

only that A exploits B when he chooses L1 and that B exploits A at a later time,

when she fails to subsidise him. Since these acts are temporally distinct and

not mutually exclusive, Goodin’s account avoids the self-frustration problem.

Nevertheless, there is something odd about the application of Goodin’s ac-

count to the case. When A loses the lottery and works for B, A is vulnerable to

B because he is now impoverished—this kind of vulnerability is fairly ‘typical’

in cases of exploitation. However, B’s vulnerability to A’s choice of L1 is an

odder sort. It is a vulnerability that is itself created by Goodin’s come-what-

may duty to protect the vulnerable. Since B must constrain his actions towards

A if A loses the lottery, this obligation makes him vulnerable to A’s choice of

the risky lottery. And were A to choose the certain option (L2), B would not

be required to constrain his actions towards A because A would not be vulner-

able to B. Thus, it is the presence of the unconditional duty to protect (here

operationalised as BN) that generates B’s vulnerability. So, although Goodin’s

account is not strictly self-frustrating, it is self-undermining. It prohibits an act

(A’s choosing L1) because a possible outcome of this act (A’s loss) implies an

obligation (BN) that the theory, at an earlier stage, repudiates. That a the-

ory is self-undermining is not necessarily a reason for abandoning it, though in

Goodin’s case it erodes support for an obligation that is already suspect.

Setting this issue aside though, the primary problem for Goodin’s account

is that it is over-demanding in the way that Sample’s account would have been,

had it implied A’s choice of L1 was impermissible. As with Sample’s account,

the features of Goodin’s account that make A’s choice of L1 exploitation apply

also to any case in which A faces a gamble between a choice that offers him

an attractive outcome and one that leaves him vulnerable to B. For even in

choosing L1 he exploits her under Goodin’s conception.

22

the case of the prudent lottery L3, B is vulnerable to A’s choice. If A chooses

L3 and looses, then Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable regardless of the

source of their vulnerabilities requires that B constrain herself when transacting

with A. Since B is vulnerable to A, then according to Goodin, A has a duty

to do “whatever [he] can to prevent anyone (ourselves or others) from taking

unfair advantage of [B’s] vulnerabilities” (Goodin 1987: 189). Thus, A must

refrain from choosing the (very prudential) lottery L3. Indeed, in many cases

quite reasonable and morally uncontroversial actions (driving, hunting, playing

sport) carry very small probabilities of catastrophic vulnerable outcomes that

oblige others to do whatever they can to help us and thus, make these others’

vulnerable to our choices. Not only is the prohibition of these prudent risks

over-demanding, the self-undermining property of the account means that this

prohibition is motivated by the obligation to avoid a consequence that Goodin’s

own theory obliges.

4 Solutions and Responses

Both the over-demandingness of Goodin’s account and the self-frustration of

Sample’s are caused by the approaches’ come-what-may duties. Broadly speak-

ing, both Sample’s and Goodin’s accounts claim:

S1 certain states of disadvantage generate duties20 to aid and

S2 exploitation involves a failure to discharge these duties.

When the states of disadvantage in S1 are unconstrained and imply obliga-

tions like BN, then the claim in S2 that a failure to discharge these obligations

amounts to exploitation encounters either the self-frustration problem or the

over-demandingness objection. These two problems can be solved by altering

20In Sample’s case these duties are conditional on A’s choosing to transact with B.

23

either S1 or S2. We might abandon Goodin’s claim that any source of vul-

nerability can generate duties by limiting the states in S1 or the duties they

imply. Or we might accept the accounts’ claims about the obligating states

and the reach of come-what-may duties, but deny S2’s claim that a failure to

discharge these duties amounts to exploitation. In this section I will consider

these possibilities alongside Goodin’s defence of come-what-may duties.

4.1 Abandoning Self-caused Disadvantage

If exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, then in order for A to exploit B,

A must have some kind of relative advantage over B; that is, B must be relatively

disadvantaged compared to A. In a broad sense, there are three possible sources

of disadvantage. B may be disadvantaged because of her own actions (self-caused

disadvantage), the actions of others (other-caused disadvantage), or a natural

event involving no human action (natural disadvantage). Though there are

three historical sources of disadvantage, there are many different manifestations

of disadvantage. B may be disadvantaged because she lacks material goods,

because she is malnourished, because she has stronger (or weaker) preferences

than A, and so on. The states of disadvantage in S1 that generate duties to

others can be limited by restricting the historical sources of disadvantage, by

restricting the manifestations of disadvantage, or by restricting both.

Goodin’s account limits neither the sources, nor the manifestations of disad-

vantage. His claim that exploitation involves a failure to protect the vulnerable

“regardless of the particular source” of their vulnerability is an explicit rejection

of limits on the sources of vulnerability (Goodin 1987: 187). That Goodin also

places no limits on vulnerability’s manifestations follows from his account of

vulnerability. As we saw above, Goodin claims that B is vulnerable to A with

respect to x when A has the ability to control x and x has an impact on B.

Goodin’s account of exploitation places no explicit limits on x. Exploitation in-

24

volves a failure to protect others from any manifestation of vulnerability. Unlike

Goodin, Sample does provide a restriction on the manifestations of disadvan-

tage. Her D2 condition restricts the exploitable manifestations of disadvantage

to cases in which persons’ basic needs are unmet. However, Sample does not

limit the sources of disadvantage and her restriction on the manifestations of

disadvantage does not succeed in avoiding the self-frustration problem.

Perhaps the most obvious solution to both self-frustration and over-demand-

ingness is to omit self-caused disadvantage as a possible source of exploitation.

If self-caused disadvantage did not generate obligations, then in Γ1 B would

not be required to provide A with some form of subsidy and would thus not be

vulnerable to A’s choice of L1. If B is not vulnerable to A’s choice of L1, then

on Goodin’s account A is no longer obliged to refrain from choosing the risky

option. And when A is no longer obliged to refrain from choosing the risky

option, the over-demandingness objection disappears.

Similarly, Sample’s claim that disrespect may be caused by a failure to ensure

a transactor’s basic needs are met, regardless of the reason that they are unmet,

includes self-caused disadvantage as a form of exploitable disadvantage. In

the context of Sample’s account, B’s failure to subsidise A in Γ1 is a case of

exploitation because B degrades A by failing to ensure his basic needs are met

when she transacts with him. Recall that self-frustration involves the following

conflicting claims:

F1 B exploits A if she fails to provide A with the BN subsidy.

F2 When A chooses the risky option, loses, but nevertheless accepts the sub-

sidy from B, A exploits B.

If self-caused disadvantage is excluded as a form of exploitable disadvantage,

then F1 is false. B is not obliged to respect the BN constraint when A is

responsible for his basic needs going unmet. In this case, B does not exploit A

25

when she fails to subsidise him and the conflict between F1 and F2 disappears.

4.2 Defending Come-what-may Duties

Goodin acknowledges that the “main alternative to assigning responsibility for

protecting the vulnerable to those people to whom they are vulnerable” is to

modify S1 by omitting self-caused disadvantage, that is, in Goodin’s own words,

“to assign responsibility for the task of getting people out of a jam to those who

were causally responsible for getting them into that jam in the first place”

(Goodin 1986: 125). Thus, if people are vulnerable to themselves, then they

are responsible for protecting themselves.

However, Goodin raises two interrelated objections to this solution, which

provide a defense, not only of the come-what-may duties in his account, but

also of Sample’s D2. First, he notes, that “ ‘causal responsibility’ is not the

unambiguous, technical term it seems. The ascription of causal responsibility

for an outcome represents. . . the conclusion of a moral argument, not the premise

of one” (Goodin 1986: 126). Second, he argues that “causal responsibility and

task responsibility [the substantive responsibility to aid] really are quite distinct

notions. They merge in their practical implications only in those (possibly rare)

circumstances wherein those who were, in the past, in a position to cause harm

will, in the future, remain in a position to provide help” (Goodin 1986: 127). As

an illustration Goodin offers the following case: “a speedboat racing past two

sailboats produces a wake that, after a minute or two, causes one to capsize.

The responsibility for helping the capsized crew surely rests with the crew of

the other sailboat still afloat, rather than with the speedboat that is by now

long gone” (Goodin 1986: 126).

Though these claims are (mostly) unobjectionable, they do not establish the

conclusion Goodin wishes to defend. Consider the first. It is true that estab-

lishing causal responsibility is difficult and depends on moral claims about the

26

scope of responsibility, but it is not true that it is never clear which parties

are causally responsible for others’ vulnerabilities—indeed, an implication of

the boating case is that the motorboat is causally responsible for the capsizing.

Goodin’s second claim is also largely true. Suppose that B is disadvantaged

because of a past theft and that the thief is now dead. Clearly the thief, though

causally responsible, cannot be responsible for protecting B’s vulnerability when

she transacts with A. This responsibility devolves, presumably, to A. However,

one can object to Goodin’s claim that responsibility to aid varies directly with

ability to aid. Of course, at the limit—when the causally responsible has, one

way or another, departed—they cannot be responsible for the task of aiding.

But when both the causally responsible and a third party are able to aid, it

seems objectionable to claim that the responsibility for aiding falls on the third

party if they are better able to aid. This brings us to the primary problem with

Goodin’s argument. The difficulty of establishing causal responsibility and the

separateness of task responsibility do not entail that when causal responsibilities

can be established and those causally responsible are present they are not re-

sponsible for the task of aid, even if others are better able to aid. I doubt many

would argue with Goodin’s claims in cases where causal responsiblity cannot be

determined, or where they are unavailable to provide aid. If anyone should aid

in these cases, who else could aid the vulnerable but the person they are now

interacting with? However, though Goodin’s principle might provide a heuristic

that tells us what we already know about cases involving the two difficulties

he outlines, he does not provide an argument for the general adoption of his

principle in uncomplicated cases.

Nevertheless, this does not establish that A must bear responsibility for his

choice of L1 in Γ1. In Γ1 though he is causally responsible for his condition,

A is unable to aid himself. While the difficulty involved in finding the causally

27

responsible party does not apply, to Γ1, Goodin’s second difficulty does apply.

In Γ1 the causally responsible is not in a position to provide aid. So while

Goodin’s principle may be objectionable when neither of these problems arises,

it may still be attractive in the case of Γ1; over-demandingness notwithstanding.

Marc Fleurbaey writes about a similar case of Bert the motorcyclist who is fully

responsible for head injuries he sustains while riding his motorbike recklessly.

Bert’s life can be saved only through a costly operation that Bert, who is unin-

sured, cannot afford. Like A, Bert is causally responsible for his situation, but

he is unable to aid himself. (Fleurbaey 1995: 40).21 Though Fleurbaey grants

that Bert bears full responsibility for his injury, he argues few “would agree

with the ‘no transfer’ verdict” that holding Bert responsible would mandate

(Fleurbaey 1995: 40). Goodin agrees, arguing “[o]nce all their opportunities for

self-help have passed. . . the situation is beyond their control. Others, however,

may still be able to act so as to avert harm to them. To suggest that those

others should (or even that they may) stand idly by and watch people reap the

bitter fruits of their own improvidence is surely absurd” (Goodin 1986: 129,

emphasis in original).

These objections to the ‘no transfer verdict’ in the cases where vulnerabili-

ties are self-caused and where the vulnerable cannot aid themselves are versions

of what Zofia Stemplowska has called the “unacceptable outcomes objection”

to luck (i.e., responsibility-sensitive) egalitarianism which claims “the luck egal-

itarian embrace of responsibility implausibly justifies leaving people without

assistance in thoroughly bad situations if they are responsible for bringing them

about” (Stemplowska 2009: 251). Stemplowska believes the objection should

be resisted. She reminds us that it “applies only to situations in which a person

is responsible for his or her disadvantage due to his or her conduct unreason-

ably privileging his or her interests over those of others . . . and there are enough

21See also Fleurbaey (2008: 153–198).

28

resources equally to assist others who find themselves in similar situations”

(Stemplowska 2009: 252). Stemplowska notes that in such cases, the resources

used to rescue Bert (or A) could also be “used by others on their own pursuits”

(Stemplowska 2009: 253). She concludes that to say the disadvantaged’s claim

on resources always wins is to endorse the implausible view that they have a

claim of justice even in spiteful cases, where they become disadvantaged “on

purpose” (Stemplowska 2009: 253).

With a number of positions in the air, it is perhaps best to pause for a mo-

ment to take stock. In section three I outlined two problems for Sample’s and

Goodin’s come-what-may duties. So far in the present section I have suggested

that modifying S1 by eliminating self-caused disadvantage from the sources of

disadvantage that generate exploitation can solve both of these problems. I

have also outlined Goodin’s response that, since ascribing causal responsibility

can be difficult, and since the causally responsible party cannot always aid the

disadvantaged, the duty of aid should fall on those to whom the disadvantaged

are vulnerable. I argued that Goodin’s principle seems incorrect for many cases.

When we can locate the causally responsible and they can aid, they, and not

the person to whom the disadvantaged are vulnerable, should be responsible

for aiding the disadvantaged. Nevertheless, this is not the case for Γ1. There

the causally responsible are the vulnerable and as such, they are unable to pro-

vide themselves with aid. The final paragraphs of this section have considered

whether persons in B’s position are, as Goodin and Fleurbaey claim, or are not,

as Stemplowska argues, obliged to aid A. If Stemplowska is correct that there

is no duty to aid in cases of self-caused disadvantage, then both self-frustration

and over-demandingness can be avoided by excluding self-caused disadvantage

from S1. However, there is another solution that does not require an answer to

the unacceptable outcomes objection.

29

4.3 Abandoning Exploitation Ascriptions

We can accept Goodin’s principle that those best able to aid the disadvantaged

are obliged to do so and avoid over-demandingness and self-frustration if we

reject the claim in S2 that a failure to discharge duties to the disadvantaged

amounts to exploitation. Suppose that though A chose L1, lost the lottery, and

his basic needs are now unmet. Let us also grant Fleurbaey and Goodin the

claim that B is obliged to provide A with some form of subsidy (BN) as aid.

Though this concession means that B must aid A, it does not also entail that the

proper classification of his failure to do so is appropriately called ‘exploitation’.

We may claim that B is obliged to subsidise A despite the fact that when she

subsidises A she allows him to treat her unfairly. We do not need to abandon

the intuition that what A does is unfair in order to claim that B is obliged to

provide aid. B’s helping A may be grounded in something other than a concern

for fairness.

However, if B’s obligations to A are grounded in something other than fair-

ness, then Goodin’s and Sample’s obligations of aid cannot be based on concerns

about exploitation—at least insofar as exploitation is a matter of ‘taking unfair

advantage’ (as both they and I presuppose). To put the point another way, if

we want to maintain unconstrained forms of the claim in S1 that certain states

of disadvantage generate duties to aid, then we must abandon the claim in S2

that a failure to discharge these duties involves unfairness, and by extension,

exploitation. B may be obliged to aid A, but not in the name of exploitation.

Applying this insight to Goodin’s account, we may say B is obliged to provide

A with BN, not because BN is owed to A as a matter of fairness. Rather, if we

agree with Goodin that there is such an obligation, this obligation is justified by

an appeal to a concern for A’s welfare. Similarly, for Sample, we no longer need

to maintain the counterintuitive claim in F1 that B takes unfair advantage of A

30

if she fails to ensure his basic needs are met when she transacts with him. Instead

we can claim that if B fails to meet A’s basic needs, she fails to treat him with

respect, even though, in so respecting A, she allows A to exploit her. Since both

accounts’ obligations to aid can be grounded in concerns other than fairness,

there is no need to use the concept of exploitation to explain the obligation,

especially since there is a cost to each theory for doing so: self-frustration and

over-demandingness.

Nevertheless, this solution has its own problems. The most serious is that if

the goal is to provide an analysis of the concept of exploitation, then abandoning

S2 is no solution at all. Abandoning S2 involves abandoning the claim that a

failure to discharge duties to the vulnerable in cases like Γ1 is exploitation. If this

failure does not amount to exploitation, then the attempt to analyse the concept

in these terms fails. However, if the goal is instead to give an account of our

duties to others when we engage in mutually beneficial transactions with them,

the S2 solution may be attractive (though the wrongdoing must be relabelled).

Note that even if the goal is the latter, there are reasons to be sceptical

about abandoning S2. If Goodin and Sample’s obligations to aid are intended

to fall within the domain of justice, then, since performing the just act in Γ1

would require B to allow A to take unfair advantage of her, exploitation (as

taking unfair advantage) must be only pro tanto unjust. It cannot be unjust

from an all-things-considered perspective. In this case exploitation (and by

extension fairness) are values that can be traded off against considerations such

as welfare, and this, in turn, implies that justice for Sample and Goodin involves

more than—and sometimes even undermines—fairness.22 On the other hand, if

the obligation is not intended to fall within some other domain of morality, then

either the obligation trumps the obligations of justice, which is also undesirable,

22This consideration seems to be behind Stemplowska’s suggestion that the claim A hasagainst B is a claim of charity, not of justice. (Stemplowska 2009: 253).

31

or it is trumped by the obligations of justice, and as such, is impotent.

5 Exploitation, Disadvantage, and Responsibility

The analysis of Γ1 and the two solutions outlined above, provide concrete ar-

guments for a conflict that, perhaps, in a more general form we have known

all along: there is a tension between unconditional, ‘come-what-may’ duties

and fairness. When a moral principle specifies duties of aid to others that are

behaviour-insensitive, these duties create moral hazards. Of course, in many

cases—e.g., the welfare state—the cost of these moral hazards is outweighed by

the benefits that the baselines installed by such duties bring. But this is merely

a practical point. Even if the number of those who free ride undermine the

practicality of implementing unconditional ‘safety nets’, this does not erode the

theoretical entitlement to aid of those who do not.

However, Goodin and Sample would go further. They would extend the

theoretical entitlement to all disadvantaged (or, for Sample, all persons whose

basic needs are unmet) by arguing that those who are in a position to aid

have a duty to aid the disadvantaged even if their disadvantage is self-caused.

Goodin’s response to the claim that this imposes unfair burdens on those who

would aid is that “duties and responsibilities are not necessarily. . . things that

you deserve. More often than not, they are things that just happen to you”

(Goodin 1987: 133). Perhaps this is true of some cases, but in Γ1 these duties

do not ‘just happen’ to B, they are caused by A’s use of the moral hazard

BN creates. Nevertheless, as I claimed in the discussion of the S2 solution, we

may accept Goodin’s arguments about a duty to aid all forms of vulnerability

without also claiming that a failure to aid is unfair. When disadvantage is self-

caused it is not the failure to aid that is unfair, but the duty to aid. We may

agree that other concerns override the unfairness, but to claim the unfairness

32

runs in the opposite direction is absurd. Indeed, neither Goodin nor Sample

provide any argument against the claim that A takes unfair advantage of B. If

B does not treat A unfairly by failing to give him BN in Γ1, she does not exploit

him because she does not take unfair advantage of him. So, while Sample’s D2

and Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable may be plausible accounts of the

duties of aid we have to vulnerable others, they cannot provide the basis for an

account of exploitation.

In fact, a second general lesson of the preceding analysis is that quite the

opposite is true. If we accept Goodin’s and Sample’s claims we must tolerate the

possibility of unfairness, and, by extension, exploitation—at least as we ordi-

narily understand the term. Come-what-may obligations to aid the vulnerable,

whether in the domain of justice or personal morality, conflict with, and provide

incentives for, exploitation.

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