Exploitation and Disadvantage

Benjamin Ferguson

b.r.ferguson@lse.ac.uk

November 1, 2013 (10841)

(DRAFT: Do not circulate or quote without permission.)

Abstract

Some accounts of exploitation, most notably the degradation-basedaccount provided by Ruth Sample (2003) and Robert Goodin’s (1987)vulnerability-based account, argue that persons are exploited when thebenefit they receive from a transaction falls below a certain thresholdvalue. According to these accounts, the duty of the advantaged partyto constrain their advantage in light of the other party’s disadvantage isindependent from the historical cause of that disadvantage. Rather, it isjustified by a direct appeal to the other party’s disadvantage. They arguethat a failure to discharge these duties amounts to exploitation.

Because the duty of constraint in these accounts does not depend onthe reason for the disadvantage the duty is what I call a ‘come-what-may’duty. I show that come-what-may duties create moral hazards that canbe exploited by the disadvantaged parties. In such cases these accountsof exploitation are either self-frustrating or over-demanding. I concludethat there is a tension between ‘come-what-may’ duties and fairness. Thistension leaves accounts that contain come-what-may duties unable to pro-vide a coherent analysis of exploitation when the concept is understoodto involve taking unfair advantage.

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1 Introduction*

It is widely agreed that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage.1 Ofcourse, as Richard Arneson points out, this is not a particularly helpful analysisof the concept since there will “be as many competing conceptions of exploita-tion as theories of what persons owe to each other by way of fair treatment.”2

Informative analyses must go further. Some accounts do so, in part, by argu-ing that exploitation involves a failure to exercise constraint in light of others’disadvantage—regardless of the cause of disadvantage.3 According to these ac-counts, our duties to protect the disadvantaged and vulnerable are what I willcall ‘come-what-may’ duties. In this article I will argue that this approach ismisguided; accounts of exploitation based on ‘come-what-may’ duties are eitherself-frustrating or over-demanding. I consider two possible solutions to theseproblems and conclude that the most promising is to omit self-caused disadvan-tage from the scope of these duties. That is, we exploit others when we fail toexercise constraint in light of others’ disadvantage only if this disadvantage isthe result of an injustice for which the disadvantaged is not responsible.4

In the following section I outline two accounts that include versions of these‘come-what-may’ duties: Ruth Sample’s degradation-based account and RobertGoodin’s vulnerability-based account. In section three, I present a case thatcreates problems for both accounts. In section four I consider two possiblesolutions to these problems. In the fourth section I argue that omitting self-caused disadvantage from the domain of exploitable disadvantage is the bestsolution to both problems. Finally, I also address a general tension betweenfairness and come-what-may duties.

* Versions of this paper were presented at the LSE; Aarhus University’s Vejle II workshop;the Decisions, Games and Logic workshop at KTH, Stockholm; and the University of Pavia.I thank those present for their comments. I also thank Paul Bou-Habib, Luc Bovens, SusanneBurri, Conrad Heilmann, Sebastian Kohler, Christian List, Mary Morgan, Alice Obrecht, Ser-ena Olsaretti, Mike Otsuka, Thomas Scanlon, Hillel Steiner, Max Steuer, Roberto Veneziani,Alex Voorhoeve, and Nicholas Vrousalis for helpful suggestions.

1See for example, J. Elster, “Roemer versus Roemer: A Comment on ‘New Directions inthe Marxian Theory of Exploitation and Class’ ,” Politics & Society 11 (1982), pp. 363–373; R. Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person,” in Modern Theories ofExploitation, ed. A. Reeve (London: Sage, 1987), pp. 165–197; R. Sample, Exploitation:What it is and Why it’s Wrong, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); H. Steiner, “A Liberal Theoryof Exploitation,” Ethics 94 (1984), pp. 225–241; and A. Wertheimer, Exploitation, (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1996). A dissenting view is proposed in A. Wood, “Exploitation,”Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995), pp. 135–158.

2R. Arneson, “Exploitation,” in The Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. L. Becker (New York:Garland, 1992), p. 350

3Examples here include Sample, Exploitation: What it is and Why it’s Wrong and Goodin,Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person.

4I intend my preferred restriction of the scope of duties to the disadvantaged to be neutralwith respect to accounts of personal responsibility.

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2 Come-what-may Duties

While many of the exploited are also disadvantaged5, the following two accountsof exploitation distinguish themselves from more restrictive accounts throughtheir claims that mere disadvantage can generate exploitation, “regardless ofthe particular source” of disadvantage.6 For these accounts the historical sourceof disadvantage is—to some degree—irrelevant to whether a transaction is ex-ploitative; for some transactions non-historical properties of a transaction itselfmay be sufficient to ground exploitation claims.

2.1 Goodin’s Account

Of the two accounts, Goodin’s implies the widest scope for our duties to the dis-advantaged (as we will see below, Sample’s ‘come-what-may’ duties are alreadyrestricted to a sub-domain of disadvantage). According to Goodin, we exploit aperson when we unfairly take advantage of one their attributes and, he claims,exploitation in general involves “playing for advantage in situations where it isinappropriate to do so . . . [it] consists in playing games of strategy in circum-stances which render them somehow inappropriate.”7 Furthermore, all caseswhere playing for strategy is inappropriate are “manifestations of one particu-lar kind of wrong,” namely, a failure to honour the moral norm of “protecting thevulnerable. . . regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability.”8 Thus,for Goodin exploitation occurs when we use others’ vulnerabilities to secure forourselves some form of benefit in games of strategy, no matter the source ofthese vulnerabilities.

Taken at face value, Goodin’s norm of protecting the vulnerable seems tomake exploitation pervasive. It appears render exploitative any transaction inwhich one transactor uses an advantage for gain. This seems odd, since (i)nearly all economic transactions involve unequal bargaining power and (ii) un-equal bargaining power, ordinarily, seems to be a form of vulnerability. Yet,(iii) many ‘ordinary’ transactions do not appear unfair. It seems that Goodinshould provide an explanation of this oddness. He might either address (iii),showing why we should consider most transactions unfair, or provide a responseto (ii), explaining why the conception of vulnerability that he has in mind isnarrower than our ordinary notion of vulnerability and thus explaining whymere inequality in bargaining power is not sufficient for his notion of vulnera-bility. That is, though he claims that any form of vulnerability is potentiallyexploitable, perhaps Goodin’s account of vulnerability is less inclusive then ourordinary conception.

5Disadvantage may take many forms, but Goodin and Sample are primarily concernedwith disadvantage as impoverishment, vulnerability, and disability. I use ‘disadvantage’ as anumbrella term for these and similar states.

6Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person”, p. 187.7Op. cit., p. 184. Emphasis original.8Op. cit., p. 187.

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Goodin provides an account of vulnerability in his book Protecting the Vul-nerable9, where he writes

Vulnerability is a relational notion: a full specification will tell uswho is vulnerable to whom with respect to what. . . . [Vulnerabilitesare] also relative. A is more vulnerable to B (1) the more control Bhas over outcomes that affect A’s interests and (2) the more heavilyA’s interests are at stake in the outcomes that B controls.

Thus, for Goodin, B is vulnerable to A with respect to x when A has the abilityto control x and x has an impact on B. The scope of this conception of vul-nerability does not appear narrower than the scope of vulnerability in ordinaryuse. In lieu of a restriction of the scope of vulnerability, Goodin must provide aconvincing argument for why we should consider many ordinary transactions toinvolve taking unfair advantage, that is, why we should think that most trans-actions are exploitative. And indeed, Goodin does provide such an argument,albeit one that I will argue is not fully convincing. However, before consideringGoodin’s defense of his relative expansive conception of exploitation, I want toconsider the come-what-may duties that appear in Sample’s account and anoutline of the problems these duties create for both accounts.

2.2 Sample’s Account

According to Sample’s account of ‘exploitation as degradation’, exploitationinvolves “interacting with another being for the sake of advantage in a way thatdegrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being.”10 She claims thesefailures of respect take three general forms. We can fail to show proper respectfor—degrade—the value of another by:

D1 “Taking advantage of an injustice done to him.”

D2 “Neglecting what is necessary for that person’s well-being or flourishing.”

D3 “Treating as a fungible object of market exchange, an aspect of that per-son’s being that ought not to be commodified.”11

The first form of degradation, D1, involves disadvantage caused by historicalinjustice: “If a person is in a weaker bargaining position because of a pastinjustice, we stand to gain disproportionately in virtue of that injustice.”12 Forexample, if C steals B’s wallet and A uses the disadvantage created by this theftto gain more than he otherwise would have in a transaction with B, A exploitsB.

The second form of degradation involves a form of disadvantage that is ahis-torical. Here Sample claims that well-being or flourishing are best captured

9R. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.118.

10Sample, Exploitation: What it is and Why it’s Wrong, p. 57.11Ibid.12Op. cit., p. 82.

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by what she variously calls ‘basic needs’ and ‘capabilities’.13 She argues thattransactions can be degrading when “the [impoverished] capabilities of our in-teractors are ignored in the pursuit of our own advantage.”14 Though thesefirst two forms of degradation often coincide, neither implies the other. WhileB’s basic needs may be unmet because of a past injustice committed by anotherperson, D2 implies that failing to properly consider B’s basic needs may gener-ate exploitation even when the reason B’s basic needs are not unmet does notinvolve a past injustice. Note that if it were false that neither D1 nor D2 impliedthe other, then D2 would be a subset of D1 and Sample’s distinction betweenD1 and D2 would merely play a rhetorical role in her account. The existenceof D2 as a separate source of exploitation-generating degradation requires casesthat fall within the scope of D2 and outside the scope of D1.

Finally, Sample’s D3 implies that the exchange of certain goods may beintrinsically degrading. Here too there may be overlap with the first and secondforms of degradation. Prostitution is often considered a paradigmatic exampleof this third form of transaction. When A pays for sex with B, B may transactonly because she has been previously unjustly disadvantaged. A may also failto give proper weight to B’s well-being or flourishing. But Sample’s inclusion ofthis ‘anti-commodification condition’ as a separate condition implies that evenif D1 and D2 are not satisfied, the transaction may be exploitative. Again, inorder for D3 to operate as a separate source of degradation, there must be casesof D3 that do not fall within the scope of either of the first two domains.

Like Goodin’s account, Sample’s account faces some ‘face value’ difficul-ties, in particular, a version of what Rawls calls the “priority problem”15 Thepresence of separate degradation-generating principles means that it is theoret-ically possible for these principles to conflict. If these principles also conflictin practice, then absent either a single principle to guide action or a weightingbetween the three forms of degradation, Sample’s account of exploitation ap-pears to provide conflicting guides to action. However, unlike the prima facieproblem for Goodin’s account, Sample’s priority problem is not caused by thepresence of a come-what-may duty. Nevertheless, as we will see the inclusion ofa come-what-may duty causes its own problems for Sample.

Come-what-may duties enter Sample’s account through her inclusion of thebasic needs condition, D2. She claims that when A transacts with B and fails toensure B’s basic needs are satisfied, he degrades and exploits her. Conditions likeD2 are threshold conditions; conditions that claim exploitation occurs when B’spost transaction outcome falls below a certain threshold level. In Sample’s case,B is exploited when post-transaction her basic needs remain unmet. Thresholdconditions, when not embedded as a subset of more restrictive conditions like

13Sample draws on Martha Nussbaum’s extension of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approachto wellbeing. See for example, M. Nussbaum “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Senand Social Justice,” Feminist Economics 9 (2003), pp. 33–59.

14Sample, Exploitation: What it is and Why it’s Wrong, p. 81. Note that Sample doesnot mean ‘ignored’ in the literal sense, but rather ‘not given proper weight’. In order tosucceessfully extract value from B, A must be aware of B’s (lack of) capabilites, if only to usethis disadvantage for his own gain.

15J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard, 1971).

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D1, generate come-what-may duties. When B’s basic needs are unmet pre-transaction, if A chooses to transact with B then he must ensure B’s basicneeds are met post-transaction and this is so regardless of the reason that B’spre-transaction basic needs were unmet.16

In the next section I present a case that exemplifies the over-demandingnessproblem for Goodin’s account and that forces a conflict of duties for Sample’saccount. I show that both problems can be resolved by abandoning the broadcome-what-may duties contained in each account. However, before doing so Iwant to briefly comment on Sample’s non-commodification condition, D3.

The arguments that follow pertain to the problems that arise from Sample’sinclusion of cases that lie in D2, but not D1. D3 is excluded from the criticismbecause, without denying that they may be degrading or disrespectful, I amunconvinced transactions falling only within Sample’s D3 are exploitative. WhenA buys sex from B, if the transaction is degrading for only the reason that sexought not be commodified, then it seems that both A and B are degraded bythe transaction. Neither is relatively disadvantaged with respect to the other.Yet, if exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, then it must be the casethat one of A or B is relatively disadvantaged. While it seems natural to saythat A—the buyer—is the advantaged party in cases of prostitution, the beliefthat A is unfairly advantaged is likely due to our belief that it is unfair (forreasons stemming from either D1 or D2) that B is in a position in which shemust sell her services as a prostitute. If neither D1 nor D2 hold and A and B areequals in terms of power, resources, etc, and B is not disadvantaged through pastinjustice, it is not clear that either party is relatively disadvantaged.17 If neitheris relatively disadvantaged, there can be no exploitation. Indeed Sample makesjust this point when she writes, “I reject the idea that a person could be exploitedif no vulnerability is made use of.”18 She claims that when D1 and D2 are notviolated but a person “nonetheless chooses to transact in a way that wouldviolate a putative restriction on exchange, [they are] not exploited. . . however,[they] may be degraded if the appropriate case against commodification can bemade.”19 These arguments, along with Sample’s own claims, indicate that D3is not a separate source of exploitation, but rather falls within D1 and D2. Itsinclusion as a separate form of degradation plays only a rhetorical role.

16Sample does provide one restriction on D2. She claims that “if the only beneficial inter-action possible is one in which [basic] needs cannot be satisfied, then such interaction is notexploitative.” Sample, Exploitation, p. 75.

17Of course, in addition to this central concern about the inclusion of Sample’s thirdcondition, as Sample herself acknowledges, it is difficult to reach a consensus on the ob-jective account of value that underpins D3. For additional concerns about this case see AlanWertheimer, “Review: Ruth J. Sample, ‘Expoitation: What it is and why it’s wrong’ ” Utilitas19 (2007), pp. 259–261.

18Sample, Exploitation, p. 83.19Ibid.

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3 Two Problems for Come-what-may Duties

For some cases Goodin’s and Sample’s claims appear plausible. In sweatshops,labour firms fail to constrain their bargaining advantage when employing theseverely disadvantaged. These are paradigmatic cases of exploitation and theirbeing so is not, so it seems, dependent on the source of these workers’ dis-advantage. When workers are extremely vulnerable, taking advantage of thisvulnerability for self-enrichment seems to be a clear case of exploitation, re-gardless of how the workers became vulnerable. Despite this initial plausibility,as we saw above, both accounts appear to face certain difficulties and thesedifficulties appear more clearly in the following case.

3.1 The Sequential Game Case

Consider the following sequential game, Γ1.

Stage 1: Consider the following two lotteries, L1 and L2. Suppose that A ispresented with a choice between the lotteries, but B is (for whatever reason)committed to L2.

L1 (p = 12 , $100; 1− p, $0)

L2 (p = 1, $50)

Stage 2: A and B face each other in the labour market. The wealthier is theemployer, the less wealthy the employee. If they are equally wealthy they maywork cooperatively, splitting revenue equally. Suppose the values for revenue,wages, and profit are as follow: R = $11, ω = $5, π = 6. The revenue from co-operating is $11

2 , or $5.50. Finally, suppose the following constraint, embodyingSample’s particular approach to D2, holds:

BN If a player chooses to transact with another, then both players’ outcomesmust be ≥ $10. Suppose $10 is what is necessary for an individual’swell-being.

Constraint BN operationalises Sample’s D2, the claim that we degrade otherswhen we neglect what is necessary for their well-being. Sample argues that “ifwe can interact with persons so that their basic needs are taken into accountthrough the transaction, we ought to.”20 Thus, employers should pay theiremployees enough to ensure their basic needs are met. In Γ1, this amount is setat $10, but the problem that the case presents does not depend on the particularvalue given to BN.21

20Sample, Exploitation: What it is and Why it’s wrong, p. 75.21This is true in the sense that the basic needs level may be set at any point. The case does

depend on BN being $10 given the other figures in the game. That is, the relative values ofL1, L2 and BN matter.

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In the strategic form of Γ1 shown in figure 1 below, ‘A’ and ‘B’ denote theplayers, ‘0’ a chance node, and ‘C’, ‘W’, and ‘E’ represent the options ‘cooper-ate’, ‘work for’, and ‘employ’ respectively.

L2B

L2

L1

A

12Loss

12Win

0

¬E$100, $50

E

A

¬W $100, $50

W $106, $55

B

¬W$0, $50

W

A

¬E $0, $50

E $10, $51

B

¬C

C

B

¬C $50, $50

C $55 12 , $55 1

2

A

¬C $50, $50

C $50, $50

A

Figure 1: �1 (BN Holds)

Figure 1: Γ1 in Extended Form

When B is committed to L2, which lottery should A (rationally) choose? Wecan answer this question using backward induction. First, consider the bottombranch of figure 1, supposing A chooses L2. In this case, the players will beequally wealthy, each receiving $50. They may choose to form a cooperativeventure or refrain from cooperating, but clearly it is in the interest of each tocooperate, so the outcome of A choosing L2 is ($55.50, $55.50).22

Suppose A chooses L1. Then, there are two equiprobable possibilities: eitherA will win the lottery, or A will lose the lottery. Suppose A loses. Then after thelottery A will be poorest. He can choose to work for B or to remain unemployedand B can choose whether to employ A, but it is in the interest of both tochoose employment. Since post-lottery A has $0, BN holds. B must pay A $10in wages, but she may keep $1 for herself. The outcome of a lottery loss is thus($10, $51). Suppose A wins the lottery. Here A is the wealthiest player. Andagain, it is rational for both players to choose employment. This time A is theemployer and, since both players’ holdings are greater than $10, BN doesn’tapply. A will pay B $5, keeping $6 for himself in profits. Thus, the outcome

22I represent outcomes as: (A, B) and strategy profiles as 〈A,B〉.

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of a lottery win is ($106, $55). Since a lottery win and a lottery loss are bothequally likely, the expected value of choosing L1 is 1

2 the outcome of a win and12 the outcome of a loss, or ($58, $53). Since the expected value of L1 is greaterfor A than the expected value of L2, A will rationally choose L1.

(BN) A

B

L2

L1 $58.00, $53.00

L2 $55.50, $55.50

(No BN) A

B

L2

L1 $55.50, $55.50

L2 $55.50, $55.50

Figure 2: Γ1 Variation in Expected Values

Now consider a variation of Γ1 where BN is absent. Without BN, the out-come of A choosing L1, losing the lottery, choosing work, and B choosing employchanges to ($5, $56), making the expected value of L1 ($55.50, $55.50). Thus,if BN does not hold, the expected value for both A and B of A’s choice of eitherL1 and L2 is equivalent. The tables in figure 2 summarise the expected value ofeach lottery for A and B with, and without, BN. When BN holds, if A choosesL1, A does better and B worse. In particular, A gains $2.50 of expected valueat B’s expense. With BN in place, A has an incentive to choose L1 over L2.Without BN the outcomes for each player are the same regardless of whether Achooses L1 or L2. With these facts in mind, let us return to the two accountsof exploitation outlined above, this time beginning with Sample’s account.

3.2 Sample’s Self-Frustration Problem

Consider Γ1 in the context of Sample’s account. According to Sample, if Achooses L1 and loses, then if B chooses to employ A, but does not respectBN, B exploits A. When B fails to ensure A’s basic needs are met when sheinteracts with him, B engages in the form of degradation specified by D2, andthus exploits A..

However, pre-theoretically it also seems natural to say that the reverse istrue, that is, A exploits B. There are two senses in which A gains advantagefrom B in Γ1. First, A gains ‘ex ante advantage’—at B’s expense—from BNthrough the increase in expected value that BN gives to L1. Second, when Achooses L1, loses, and then works for B he receives ‘ex post advantage’ in theform of the subsidy: his wages increase from $5 without the subsidy to $10with the subsidy.23 If these advantages are also unfair, then, at least in a pre-theoretical sense, A exploits B. Note that because A receives these advantages

23These forms of advantage are similar to, but distinct from, what Allen Wood has called‘advantage exploitation’—our relation to that “which gives us a hold or advantage over theperson”—and ‘benefit exploitation’—the benefit we receive from advantage exploitation. A.Wood, “Exploitation”, pp. 8.

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at separate times, the locus of the exploitative act (assuming the advantagesare, in fact, unfair) depends on which sense of advantage we adopt. This leavesus with three questions:

Which sense of advantage is morally relevant for exploitation?

Are either senses of advantage unfair?

If so, is the resulting exploitation problematic for Sample’s account?

Unfairness. It is easiest to begin with the second question: are either ex anteor ex post advantage unfair. First consider A’s ex ante advantage. There arethree features of A’s ex ante advantage that, taken together, motivate the claimthat it is unfair.

First, A’s pre-choice feasible set contains the option in B’s (L2), plus the riskyoption L1. According to Sample’s own preferred capabilities-based approach towelfare24 A’s pre-choice welfare is greater than B’s. Second, the presence of BNmeans that if A chooses L1, regardless of whether he wins or loses the lottery,B will do worse than she would have done had A chosen L2. If A wins thelottery, then in the second stage B will work for A and B’s outcome will be $55;if A loses the lottery, then B will employ A but, because she must respect BN,her outcome will only be $51. Both outcomes are less than the $55.50 B wouldreceive if A chose L2. Finally, because BN increases the expected value of L1

it creates a moral hazard that incentivises risk-taking. This occurs because, forA, BN is costless. Although the constraint requires B to subsidise A’s losses, itdoes not require that A share his gains with B. In other words, BN requires Bto provide A with insurance for which A does not pay. When A, who is alreadybetter off than B, chooses L1 he takes unfair advantage of the moral hazardcreated by BN in order to (attempt) to enrich himself at B’s (certain) expense.It seems clear that A’s ex ante advantage is unfair to B.

Now consider ex post advantage. Suppose A chooses L1 and loses. Althoughhe was better off than B before the lottery, he is now worse off. Having lostthe lottery, is his taking ex post advantage—his actual receipt of the subsidy—really unfair? Sample clearly thinks not. Respecting other persons should, sothe argument goes, commit us to ensuring that our interactors’ basic needs arein fact met, not that they might have been met had things gone differently.To claim the latter offers no consolation to the person who is starving now.Although this line of reasoning is, perhaps, initially attractive, it should beresisted. If A’s ex ante advantage is unfair, then A’s ex post advantage mustalso be unfair because much of the unfairness of the ex ante advantage derivesfrom the fact that A is in a position in which he could receive a subsidy forwhich he does not pay. If it is unfair for A to choose to put himself in a positionwhere this might happen, it must also be unfair for him to actually accept thesubsidy. Therefore, both A’s ex ante and his ex post advantage are unfair.

24A’s welfare is, of course, greater than B’s on many other accounts of well-being as well.

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Two Problems. Consider the third question: when A takes unfair advantageof B—in either the ex ante or ex post sense—does Sample’s account encounterproblems? The short answer is yes. To see why, let’s start again with ex anteadvantage.

A takes unfair ex ante advantage of B when he chooses L1. If exploitationinvolves taking unfair advantage and is impermissible, then it is impermissiblefor A to choose L1. The reason L1 is impermissible is that it is unfair to B.Further, this obligation to refrain from choosing L1 does not depend on howvaluable L1 is to A. Suppose A’s choice is not between L1 and L2, but betweenL3, where p = 0.99, $500; 1−p, $0, and L2. L3 is a very attractive lottery fromwhich A stands to gain much ($500) with little risk of calamity (1%). I arguedthree facts make it unfair for A to take ex ante advantage when he chooses L1:(i) pre-choice A is better off than B, and yet (ii) his choice of L1 harms (the lesswell-off) B and (iii) the requirement that B subsidise A with BN means thatA receives insurance (BN) for which he does not pay at B’s expense. Thesethree facts apply also to L3. Indeed, under L3 (i), the inequality in pre-choicewelfare, is much greater. Not only is it unfair for A to take ex ante advantage ofB when faced with the L1 lottery, A must refrain from taking a risk that leadsto his being subsidised by B even when this risk is very prudent. Therefore, ifthe relevant form of advantage for exploitation is ex ante advantage, Sample’saccount is over-demanding.

But perhaps ex ante advantage is not the form of advantage taking involvedin exploitation. Suppose then, that exploitation involves taking unfair ex postadvantage. Here too Sample’s account faces a problem. If the relevant formof advantage is ex post advantage and, as I have already argued, this form ofadvantage is unfair, then A exploits B when he receives the BN subsidy. How-ever, according to Sample’s own account, B exploits A if she fails to pay thesubsidy since B’s failure to ensure A’s basic needs are met violates D2. If Aexploits B when he receives BN and B exploits A if she fails to pay BN, then inorder for each to avoid exploiting the other, they must allow themselves to beexploited. And conversely, in order to avoid exploitation, they each must allowthe other to exploit. Here Sample’s account is self-frustrating because it impliesconflicting obligations. In a discussion of a related case, Hillel Steiner writes,both A and B “are each obligated to employ all available measures necessary toremove the obstacle constituted by the other person’s [not exploiting]. And thisobligation persists until the point where either (i) one of them has actually pre-vailed. . . and the other is incapable of further ‘attempting’, or (ii) both are [so]incapable. . . ”25 Sample’s account provides no way of determining who shouldconcede. There is no way to adjudicate between either party’s attempt to notexploit. If ex post advantage taking is unfair, then Sample’s account implies aself-frustrating moral code that, again quoting Steiner “makes [non-exploitative]performances obligatory and, at the same time, . . . requires (in certain circum-stances) the deliberate frustration of any [non-exploitative] performance for the

25H. Steiner, An Essay on Rights, (Blackwell, 1994), pp. 197–198.

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sake of no other principle or value.”26 Note that self-frustration is not the sameas mutual exploitation. The claim is not that both A and B exploit the other.Rather, A’s exploiting B and B’s exploiting A in Γ1 are mutually exclusiveactions. The performance of one action precludes the other.

So, Sample’s account encounters problems regardless of whether the form ofadvantage relevant to exploitation is ex ante advantage or ex post advantage. Inthe case of the former, her account is over-demanding; in the case of the latterit is self-frustrating. Before I address the problem that Γ1 creates for Goodin’saccount, consider the final question: which form of advantage is relevant toexploitation.

Moral Relevance. Suppose A chooses L1 and takes unfair ex ante advantageof B. If exploitation involves taking unfair ex ante advantage, then having chosenL1 A has exploited B. But now suppose that though A initially intends to acceptBN, upon losing the lottery he has a change of heart and rejects the subsidy.Though A has taken unfair ex ante advantage of B, it does not seem that anyexploitation has occurred because A has not received any actual benefit. A’schoice of L1 is akin to attempted exploitation.27 Although his disregard for theunfair effects of his choice of L1 on B likely makes this choice wrongful, the choiceof L1 is not itself exploitation. The issue here is not one of permissibility, butof classification. Since (actual) maldistribution is necessary for exploitation andthis only occurs when A accepts BN, the form of advantage morally relevant forexploitation is ex post advantage. And, this, along with my arguments above,means that the problem Sample’s account faces is one of self-frustration.

Revisiting the Priority Problem. In my outline of Sample’s account Iindicated that absent either a metaprinciple or a weighting of the three forms ofdegradation Sample’s principles could conflict. While I trust the self-frustrationproblem I have identified is itself straightforward, it is, perhaps less clear howself-frustration is related to the priority problem. There are two possible sourcesof confusion.

The first concerns the way the priority problem is related to self-frustration.The self-frustration problem involves the following conflicting claims:

(F1) B exploits A if she fails to provide A with the BN subsidy.

(F2) When A chooses the risky option, loses, but nevertheless accepts the sub-sidy from B, A exploits B.

While D2 implies (F1), it is not clear that any of Sample’s forms of disrespectimply (F2). In this case Sample’s account cannot suffer from an internal priorityproblem. The conflict must instead involve D2 and an external principle. If

26Op. cit., p. 199, emphasis original.27But note that A’s choice of L1 is only akin to attempted exploitation. It cannot actually

be described as attempted exploitation since in choosing L1, A does not intend to receive BN.Rather, he hopes to win the lottery; his receipt of BN is only a possible outcome of his pursuitof the welfare maximising outcome.

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this claim is true it does not spell the end for Sample’s problems. A’s actionsin (F2) are a paridigmatic form of exploitation that Sample should want tocapture. If her account cannot account for (F2) it is incomplete. So thoughthe self-frustration problem involves a conflict between an external principle aninternal principle (D2) this external principle underpinning the claim in (F2)is, so I argue, intuitively comeplling. On the other hand, if the account is notincomplete, i.e. it can capture (F2), then the self-frustration problem is a morestandard form of the priority problem, involving a conflict between two internalobligations.

The second possible source of confusion concerns the way Sample’s princi-ples conflict. Initially it might seem that conflict is not possible. Perhaps, D1,D2, and D3 are all (along with some structural conditions) sufficient for exploi-tation. If multiple forms of degradation were present in a transaction, then theexploitation would simply be over determined; if A were guilty of D1 and B ofD2, then they would mutually exploit each other.

It is true that D1–D3 need not conflict, but it is not true that they cannotconflict. When B desperately sells a kidney to A because all of her assets werestolen and after the sale her basic needs are unmet, all three forms of degradationare satisfied. However the problem presented by the conflicting claims (F1) and(F2) is that by (F1) when B fails to φ she exploits A and by (F2) when A ψ’she exploits B and φ = ψ. It is worth noting that although this problem isillustrated with D2 similar conflicts can also be generated with D3.

3.3 Goodin’s Over-demandingness Problem

I now turn my attention to the problems Γ1 creates for Goodin’s account. Recallthat for Goodin exploitation involves a failure to respect the duty to protectthe vulnerable, “regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability.”28 Weexploit others when we use their vulnerabilities to secure for ourselves someform of benefit in a game of strategy. The vulnerable are “those whose interestsare strongly affected by our actions and choices.”29 Further, Goodin arguesthat the responsibility to protect the vulnerable falls upon “whoever has the‘last clear chance’ to prevent harm. . . regardless of the causal history up to thatpoint.”30

According to Goodin then, if A chooses L1, loses, and decides to work for B,A is vulnerable to B. If B fails to protect A when she transacts with him, sheexploits him by failing to honour the moral norm of protecting the vulnerable.On Goodin’s account determining whether B has protected A is less straightfor-ward because, unlike Sample, Goodin does not appeal to a particular baseline(such as basic needs) by which we can judge whether B has discharged her dutyto protect A. Nevertheless, Goodin is clear that A’s vulnerability places someconstraints on B; she cannot simply ignore A’s plight. In the absence of anexplicit protection criteria, I will, for the time being, assume these constrains

28Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person,” p. 187.29Op. cit., p. 191.30Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, p. 129.

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are captured by the level stipulated by the BN condition, though in sectionfour I will consider alternative operationalisations what it means for persons to‘protect’ others. Using the BN constraint as a baseline for B’s protection ofthe vulnerable A, it follows that when B does not respect the BN constraint, Bexploits A.

This will strike those who are convinced by my prior claims about the fairnessof A’s advantage as the wrong result. Rather than B exploiting A, it seems thatA exploits B. A case involving a spiteful A who hoped to lose the lottery inorder to worsen B’s outcome makes an even stronger case for the claim that it isA who exploits B. However, Goodin’s position not only entails that B exploitsA when she fails to subsidise him, it also entails that A exploits B in Γ1 whenhe chooses L1. If, as Goodin claims, the vulnerable are those who’s interests areaffected by our choices, then B is vulnerable to A with respect to A’s choice ofL1, since A’s potential loss will negatively affect B’s interests. Goodin’s accountallows us to claim that when A chooses L1, A exploits B.31

Though it is possible to conclude from Goodin’s account that A exploits Band that B exploits A, his account is not self-frustrating. The account impliesonly that A exploits B when he chooses L1 and that B exploits A at a later time,when she fails to subsidise him. Since these acts are temporally distinct andnot mutually exclusive, Goodin’s account avoids the self-frustration problem.

Nevertheless, there is something odd about the application of Goodin’s ac-count to the case. When A loses the lottery and works for B, A is vulnerable toB because he is now impoverished—this kind of vulnerability is fairly ‘typical’in cases of exploitation. However, B’s vulnerability to A’s choice of L1 is anodder sort. It is a vulnerability that is itself created by Goodin’s come-what-may duty to protect the vulnerable. Since B must constrain his actions towardsA if A loses the lottery, this obligation makes him vulnerable to A’s choice ofthe risky lottery. And were A to choose the certain option (L2), B would notbe required to constrain his actions towards A because A would not be vulner-able to B. Thus, it is the presence of the unconditional duty to protect (hereoperationalised as BN) that generates B’s vulnerability. So, although Goodin’saccount is not strictly self-frustrating, it is self-undermining. It prohibits an act(A’s choosing L1) because a possible outcome of this act (A’s loss) implies anobligation (BN) that the theory, at an earlier stage, repudiates. That a the-ory is self-undermining is not necessarily a reason for abandoning it, though inGoodin’s case it erodes support for an obligation that is already suspect.

Setting this issue aside though, the primary problem for Goodin’s accountis that it is over-demandingin the way that Sample’s account would have been,had it implied A’s choice of L1 was impermissible. As with Sample’s account,the features of Goodin’s account that make A’s choice of L1 exploitation applyalso to any case in which A faces a gamble between a choice that offers himan attractive outcome and one that leaves him vulnerable to B. For even in

31Although in my discussion of Sample’s account I concluded that A’s choice of L1 cannotitself be exploitation, this result is not supported by Goodin’s vulnerability account. If ex-ploitation involves a failure to protect the vulnerable, then since A fails to protect B whenchoosing L1 he exploits her under Goodin’s conception.

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the case of the prudent lottery L3, B is vulnerable to A’s choice. If A choosesL3 and looses, then Goodin’s duty to protect the vulnerable regardless of thesource of their vulnerabilities requires that B constrain herself when transactingwith A. Since B is vulnerable to A, then according to Goodin, A has a dutyto do “whatever [he] can to prevent anyone (ourselves or others) from takingunfair advantage of [B’s] vulnerabilities.”32 Thus, A must refrain from choos-ing the (very prudential) lottery L3. Indeed, in many cases quite reasonableand morally uncontroversial actions (driving, hunting, playing sport) carry verysmall probabilities of catastrophic vulnerable outcomes that oblige others to dowhatever they can to help us and thus, make these others’ vulnerable to ourchoices. Not only is the prohibition of these prudent risks over-demanding, theself-undermining property of the account means that this prohibition is moti-vated by the obligation to avoid a consequence that Goodin’s own theory obliges.

3.4 The Simultaneous Game Case

Before moving on to more serious responses in the following section, I want tobriefly address an errant objection that might be raised against structure of Γ1.It might be argued that the problems I have identified are merely a product of theasymmetry between the A’s choice (of either L1 and L2) and B’s commitment(to L2). According to this objection, self-frustration and over-demandingnessarise only because B is forced to choose L2.

Though true, this response is not well motivated. If exploitation involves tak-ing unfair advantage, then one transactor must receive more than they shouldfrom the other. If there are only two transactors, then it cannot be the case thatthey both receive more than they should. Yet, if A and B are in strategicallyequivalent situations, neither can take unfair advantage of the other. Unequaladvantage, in some form, is necessary for the existence of exploitation. Never-theless, it is worth showing that problems for disadvantage simpliciter accountspersist when both A and B are permitted to choose between L1 and L2.

Consider a simultaneous game, Γ2. Suppose that, unlike in Γ1, in the firststage of Γ2 both A and B face a simultaneous choice between L1 and L2. Neitherplayer knows the other’s lottery choice beforehand. The remaining elements ofΓ2 remain identical to those of Γ1. The second stage is sequential and thewealthy player may decide to employ the poor player unless both are equallywealthy, then the players may work cooperatively. The revenues, wages, andprofits remain the same and BN still holds.

In order to determine the rational choice of lottery for A and B in Γ2 we mustdetermine the outcomes of the four strategy combinations: 〈L1, L1〉, 〈L1, L2〉,〈L2, L1〉, and 〈L2, L2〉. From Γ1 we know that the outcome of 〈L2, L2〉 is ($55.50,$55.50), and that the outcomes of 〈L1, L2〉, 〈L2, L1〉 are ($58, $53) and ($53,$58) respectively. To find the overall outcome of 〈L1, L1〉 we must find theoutcomes of four equiprobable possibilities: A wins and B wins, A wins and Bloses, A loses and B wins, or both lose.

32Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person,” p. 189.

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From Γ1 we already know that it is rational for A and B to work for eachother, employ each other, and cooperate. If both win then, the the outcomefor each is $100 from the lottery, plus $5.50 from their cooperative venture, i.e.$105.50. If A wins and B loses the outcome for A is $100 from the lottery and$1 from employing B, i.e. $101. The outcome for B is $10 in wages. The thirdpossibility is the same as the second, except the positions are reversed. HereA’s outcome is $10 and B’s is $101. In the final possibility both lose L1. Here,since neither has any capital, neither can work for the other and a cooperativeventure is not possible. The outcome is $0 for both. Thus, the expected value

of choosing L1 for each player is (105.50+101+10+0)4 = $54.125.

The payoff table for Γ2, can now be completed, as shown on the left side offigure 3 below. In Γ2, the Nash equilibrium (in blue) is 〈L1, L1〉. Thus, if bothplayers were to choose simultaneously without knowing the other’s choice, eachwould rationally choose L1. Structurally, Γ2 is a prisoner’s dilemma. However,if we consider a version of Γ2 where BN does not hold, we obtain the outcomesshown in the table on the right.

Figure 3: Γ2 Variation in Expected Values

When BN does not hold, there are three Nash equilibria. Although bothlotteries are ‘rationalisable’ for the players (in the sense that there are possibleNash equilibria for a choice of either L1 or L2), 〈L2, L2〉 weakly dominates allother strategy profiles. So, when A and B are in equivalent situations, that is,when the game they play is a simultaneous game (in stage one), the presenceof BN generates a game with a Prisoner’s dilemma structure. When BN isnot present, all Nash equilibria are strict Pareto improvements over the Nashequilibrium that occurs when BN is present. This means that the presenceof BN leads to outcomes that are worse for both A and B. Although neitherplayer exploits the other in Γ2 because neither is at a relative disadvantage,a comparison of versions of the game with, and without BN shows that thepresence of BN leads to a worse outcome for everyone. In this sense, we maysay that BN is non-universalisable—neither player can rationally will that BNapply. Therefore, though the over-demandingness and self-frustration problemsrequire an asymmetry between A’s choice of L1 or L2 and B’s commitment to L2,problems for the accounts do not disappear when this asymmetry is removed.Indeed, the non-universalisability of BN raises additional questions.

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4 Solutions and Responses

Both the over-demandingness of Goodin’s account and the self-frustration ofSample’s are caused by the approaches’ come-what-may duties. Broadly speak-ing, both Sample’s and Goodin’s accounts claim:

(S1) certain states of disadvantage generate duties33 to aid and

(S2) exploitation involves a failure to discharge these duties.

When the states of disadvantage in (S1) are unconstrained and imply obliga-tions like BN then the claim in (S2) that a failure to discharge these obliga-tions is exploitation encounters either the self-frustration problem or the over-demandingness objection. These two problems can be solved by altering either(S1) or (S2). We might abandon Goodin’s claim that any source of vulnerabilitycan generate duties by limiting the states in (S1) or the duties they imply. Orwe might accept the accounts’ claims about the obligating states and the reachof come-what-may duties, but deny (S2)’s claim that a failure to discharge theseduties amounts to exploitation. In this section I will consider these possibilitiesalongside Goodin’s defence of come-what-may duties.

4.1 Abandoning Self-caused Disadvantage

If exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, then in order for A to exploit B,A must have some kind of relative advantage over B; that is, B must be relativelydisadvantaged compared to A. In a broad sense, there are three possible sourcesof disadvantage. B may be disadvantaged because of her own actions (self-causeddisadvantage), the actions of others (other-caused disadvantage), or a naturalevent involving no human action (natural disadvantage). Though there arethree historical sources of disadvantage, there are many different manifestationsof disadvantage. B may be disadvantaged because she lacks material goods,because she is malnourished, because she has stronger (or weaker) preferencesthan A, and so on. The states of disadvantage in (S1) that generate duties toothers can be limited by restricting the historical sources of disadvantage, byrestricting the manifestations of disadvantage, or by restricting both.

Goodin’s account limits neither the sources, nor the manifestations of disad-vantage. His claim that exploitation involves a failure to protect the vulnerable“regardless of the particular source” of their vulnerability is an explicit rejectionof limits on the sources of vulnerability.34 That Goodin also places no limitson vulnerability’s manifestations follows from his account of vulnerability. Aswe saw above, Goodin claims that B is vulnerable to A with respect to x whenA has the ability to control x and x has an impact on B. Goodin’s account ofexploitation places no explicit limits on x. Exploitation involves a failure toprotect others from any manifestation of vulnerability. Unlike Goodin, Sample

33In Sample’s case these duties are conditional on A’s choosing to transact with B.34Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person”, p. 187.

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does provide a restriction on the manifestations of disadvantage. Her D2 con-dition restricts the exploitable manifestations of disadvantage to cases in whichpersons’ basic needs are unmet. However, Sample does not limit the sources ofdisadvantage and her restriction on the manifestations of disadvantage does notsucceed in avoiding the self-frustration problem.

Perhaps the most obvious solution to both self-frustration and over-demand-ingness is to omit self-caused disadvantage as a possible source of exploitation.If self-caused disadvantage did not generate obligations, then in Γ1 B wouldnot be required to provide A with some form of subsidy and would thus not bevulnerable to A’s choice of L1. If B is not vulnerable to A’s choice of L1, thenon Goodin’s account A is no longer obliged to refrain from choosing the riskyoption. And when A is no longer obliged to refrain from choosing the riskyoption, the over-demandingness objection disappears.

Similarly, Sample’s claim that disrespect may be caused by a failure to ensurea transactor’s basic needs are met, regardless of the reason that they are unmet,includes self-caused disadvantage as a form of exploitable disadvantage. Inthe context of Sample’s account, B’s failure to subsidise A in Γ1 is a case ofexploitation because B degrades A by failing to ensure his basic needs are metwhen she transacts with him. Recall that self-frustration involves the followingconflicting claims:

(F1) B exploits A if she fails to provide A with the BN subsidy.

(F2) When A chooses the risky option, loses, but nevertheless accepts the sub-sidy from B, A exploits B.

If self-caused disadvantage is excluded as a form of exploitable disadvan-tage, then (F1) is false. B is not obliged to respect the BN constraint whenA is responsible for his basic needs going unmet. In this case, B does not ex-ploit A when she fails to subsidise him and the conflict between (F1) and (F2)disappears.

4.2 Defending Come-what-may Duties

Goodin acknowledges that the “main alternative to assigning responsibility forprotecting the vulnerable to those people to whom they are vulnerable” is tomodify (S1) by omitting self-caused disadvantage, that is, in Goodin’s ownwords, “to assign responsibility for the task of getting people out of a jam tothose who were causally responsible for getting them into that jam in the firstplace.”35 Thus, if people are vulnerable to themselves, then they are responsiblefor protecting themselves.

However, Goodin raises two interrelated objections to this solution, whichprovide a defense, not only of the come-what-may duties in his account, butalso of Sample’s D2. First, he notes, that “ ‘causal responsibility’ is not theunambiguous, technical term it seems. The ascription of causal responsibilityfor an outcome represents. . . the conclusion of a moral argument, not the premise

35Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, p. 125.

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of one.”36 Second, he argues that “causal responsibility and task responsibility[the substantive responsibility to aid] really are quite distinct notions. Theymerge in their practical implications only in those (possibly rare) circumstanceswherein those who were, in the past, in a position to cause harm will, in thefuture, remain in a position to provide help.”37 As an illustration Goodin offersthe following case: “a speedboat racing past two sailboats produces a wake that,after a minute or two, causes one to capsize. The responsibility for helping thecapsized crew surely rests with the crew of the other sailboat still afloat, ratherthan with the speedboat that is by now long gone.”38

Though these claims are (mostly) unobjectionable, they do not establish theconclusion Goodin wishes to defend. Consider the first. It is true that estab-lishing causal responsibility difficult and depends on moral claims about thescope of responsibility, but it is not true that it is never clear which partiesare causally responsible for others’ vulnerabilities—indeed, an implication ofthe boating case is that the motorboat is causally responsible for the capsizing.Goodin’s second claim is also largely true. Suppose that B is disadvantagedbecause of a past theft and that the thief is now dead. Clearly the thief, thoughcausally responsible, cannot be responsible for protecting B’s vulnerability whenshe transacts with A. This responsibility devolves, presumably, to A. However,can object to Goodin’s claim that responsibility to aid varies directly with abil-ity to aid. Of course, at the limit—when the causally responsible has, one wayor another, departed—they cannot be responsible for the task of aiding. Butwhen both the causally responsible and a third party are able to aid, it seemsobjectionable to claim that the responsibility for aiding falls on the third partyif they are better able to aid. This brings us to the primary problem withGoodin’s argument. The difficulty of establishing causal responsibility and theseparateness of task responsibility do not entail that when causal responsibilitiescan be established and those causally responsible are present they are not re-sponsible for the task of aid, even if others are better able to aid. I doubt manywould argue with Goodin’s claims in cases where causally responsible cannotbe determined, or where they are unavailable to provide aid. If anyone shouldaid in these cases, who else could aid the vulnerable but the person they arenow interacting? However, though Goodin’s principle might provide a heuristicthat tells us what we already know about cases involving the two difficultieshe outlines, he does not provide an argument for the general adoption of hisprinciple in uncomplicated cases.

Nevertheless, this does not establish that A must bear responsibility for hischoice of L1 in Γ1. In Γ1 though he is causally responsible for his condition,A is unable to aid himself. While the difficulty involved in finding the causallyresponsible party does not apply, to Γ1, Goodin’s second difficulty does apply.In Γ1 the causally responsible is not in a position to provide aid. So whileGoodin’s principle may be objectionable when neither of these problems arises,it may still be attractive in the case of Γ1; over-demandingness notwithstand-

36Op. cit., p. 126.37Op. cit., p. 127.38Op. cit., p. 126.

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ing. Marc Fleurbaey writes about a similar case of Bert the motorcyclist whois fully responsible for head injuries he sustains while riding his motorbike reck-lessly. Bert’s life can be saved only through a costly operation that Bert, who isuninsured, cannot afford. Like A, Bert is causally responsible for his situation,but he is unable to aid himself.39 Though Fleurbaey grants that Bert bears fullresponsibility for his injury, he argues few “would agree with the ‘no transfer’verdict” that holding Bert responsible would mandate.40 Goodin agrees, ar-guing “[o]nce all their opportunities for self-help have passed. . . the situation isbeyond their control. Others, however, may still be able to act so as to avertharm to them. To suggest that those others should (or even that they may)stand idly by and watch people reap the bitter fruits of their own improvidenceis surely absurd.”41

These objections to the ‘no transfer verdict’ in the cases where vulnerabili-ties are self-caused and where the vulnerable cannot aid themselves are versionsof what Zofia Stemplowska has called the “unacceptable outcomes objection”to luck (i.e., responsibility-sensitive) egalitarianism which claims “the luck egal-itarian embrace of responsibility implausibly justifies leaving people withoutassistance in thoroughly bad situations if they are responsible for bringing themabout.”42 Stemplowska believes the objection should be resisted. She remindsus that it “applies only to situations in which a person is responsible for his orher disadvantage due to his or her conduct unreasonably privileging his or herinterests over those of others . . . and there are enough resources equally to assistothers who find themselves in similar situations.”43 Stemplowska notes thatin such cases, the resources used to rescue Bert (or A) could also be “used byothers on their own pursuits.”44 She concludes that to say the disadvantaged’sclaim on resources always wins is to endorse the implausible view that they havea claim of justice even in spiteful cases, where they become disadvantaged “onpurpose”.45

With a number of positions in the air, it is perhaps best to pause for a mo-ment to take stock. In section three I outlined two problems for Sample’s andGoodin’s come-what-may duties. So far in the present section I have suggestedthat modifying (S1) by eliminating self-caused disadvantage from the sourcesof disadvantage that generate exploitation can solve both of these problems. Ihave also outlined Goodin’s response that, since ascribing causal responsibilitycan be difficult, and since the causally responsible party cannot always aid thedisadvantaged, the duty of aid should fall on those to whom the disadvantagedare vulnerable. I argued that Goodin’s principle seems incorrect for many cases.

39The case appears in M. Fleurbaey, “Equal Opportunity for Equal Social Outcome,” Eco-nomics and Philosophy 11 (1995), p. 40. See also M. Fleurbaey, Fairness, Responsibility, andWelfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 153–198.

40Fleurbaey, “Equal Opportunity for Equal Social Outcome”, p. 40.41Op. cit., p. 129, emphasis original.42Z. Stemplowska, “Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility,” Political Studies 57 (2009),

pp. 251.43Op. cit., p. 252.44Op. cit., p. 25345Op. cit., p. 253.

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When we can locate the causally responsible and they can aid, they, and notthe person to whom the disadvantaged are vulnerable, should be responsiblefor aiding the disadvantaged. Nevertheless, this is not the case for Γ1. Therethe causally responsible are the vulnerable and as such, they are unable to pro-vide themselves with aid. The final paragraphs of this section have consideredwhether persons in B’s position are, as Goodin and Fleurbaey claim, or are not,as Stemplowska argues, obliged to aid A. If Stemplowska is correct that thereis no duty to aid in cases of self-caused disadvantage, then both self-frustrationand over-demandingness can be avoided by excluding self-caused disadvantagefrom (S1). However, there is another solution that does not require an answerto the unacceptable outcomes objection.

4.3 Abandoning Exploitation Ascriptions

We can accept Goodin’s principle that those best able to aid the disadvantagedare obliged to do so and avoid over-demandingness and self-frustration if wereject the claim in (S2) that a failure to discharge duties to the disadvantagedamounts to exploitation. Suppose that though A chose L1, lost the lottery, andhis basic needs are now unmet. Let us also grant Fleurbaey and Goodin theclaim that B is obliged to provide A with some form of subsidy (BN) as aid.Though this concession means that B must aid A, it does not also entail that theproper classification of his failure to do so is appropriately called ‘exploitation’.We may claim that B is obliged to subsidise A despite the fact that when shesubsidises A she allows him to treat her unfairly. We do not need to abandonthe intuition that what A does is unfair in order to claim that B is obliged toprovide aid. B’s helping A may be grounded in something other than a concernfor fairness.

However, if B’s obligations to A are grounded in something other than fair-ness, then Goodin’s and Sample’s obligations of aid cannot based on concernsabout exploitation—at least insofar as exploitation is a matter of ‘taking unfairadvantage’ (as both they and I presuppose). To put the point another way, if wewant to maintain unconstrained forms of the claim in (S1) that certain statesof disadvantage generate duties to aid, then we must abandon the claim in (S2)that a failure to discharge these duties involves unfairness, and by extension,exploitation. B may be obliged to aid A, but not in the name of exploitation.

Applying this insight to Goodin’s account, we may say B is obliged to provideA with BN, not because BN is owed to A as a matter of fairness. Rather, if weagree with Goodin that there is such an obligation, this obligation is justified byan appeal to a concern for A’s welfare. Similarly, for Sample, we no longer needto maintain the counterintuitive claim in (F1) that B takes unfair advantageof A if she fails to ensure his basic needs are met when she transacts with him.Instead we can claim that if B fails to meet A’s basic needs, she fails to treathim with respect, even though, in so respecting A, she allows A to take unfairadvantage of her. Since both accounts’ obligations to aid can be grounded inconcerns other than fairness, there is no need to use the concept of exploitationto explain the obligation, especially since there is a cost to each theory for doing

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so: self-frustration and over-demandingness.Nevertheless, this solution has its own problems. The most serious is that if

the goal is to provide an analysis of the concept of exploitation, then (S2) is nosolution at all. (S2) involves abandoning the claim that a failure to dischargeduties to the vulnerable in cases like Γ1 is exploitation. If this failure does notamount to exploitation, then the attempt to analyse the concept in these termsfails. However, if the goal is instead to give an account of our duties to otherswhen we engage in mutually beneficial transactions with them, the (S2) solutionmay be attractive (though the wrongdoing must be relabelled).

Note that even if the goal is the latter, there are reasons to be scepticalabout abandoning (S2). If Goodin and Sample’s obligations to aid are intendedto fall within the domain of justice, then, since performing the just act in Γ1

would require B to allow A to take unfair advantage of her, exploitation (astaking unfair advantage) must be only pro tanto unjust. It cannot be unjustfrom an all-things-considered perspective. In this case exploitation (and byextension fairness) are values that can be traded off against considerations suchas welfare, and this, in turn, implies that justice for Sample and Goodin involvesmore than—and sometimes even undermines—fairness.46 On the other hand, ifthe obligation is not intended to fall within some other domain of morality, theneither the obligation trumps the obligations of justice, which is also undesirable,or it is trumped by the obligations justice, and as such, is impotent.

5 Exploitation, Disadvantage, and Responsibility

The analysis of Γ1 and the two solutions outlined above, provide concrete ar-guments for a conflict that, perhaps, in a more general form we have knownall along: there is a tension between unconditional, ‘come-what-may’ dutiesand fairness. When a moral principle specifies duties of aid to others that arebehaviour-insensitive, these duties create moral hazards. Of course, in manycases—e.g., the welfare state—the cost of these moral hazards is outweighed bythe benefits that the baselines installed by such duties bring. But this is merelya practical point. Even if the number of those who free ride undermine thepracticality of implementing unconditional ‘safety nets’, this does not erode thetheoretical entitlement to aid of those who do not.

However, Goodin and Sample would go further. They would extend thetheoretical entitlement to all disadvantaged (or, for Sample, all persons whosebasic needs are unmet) by arguing that those who are in a position to aidhave a duty to aid the disadvantaged even if their disadvantage is self-caused.Goodin’s response to the claim that this imposes unfair burdens on those whowould aid is that “duties and responsibilities are not necessarily. . . things thatyou deserve. More often than not, they are things that just happen to you.”47

46This consideration seems to be behind Stemplowska’s suggestion that the claim A hasagainst B is a claim of charity, not of justice in Z. Stemplowska, “Making Justice Sensitive toResponsibility,” p. 253.

47Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, p. 133.

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Perhaps this is true of some cases, but in Γ1 these duties do not ‘just happen’to B, they are caused by A’s taking advantage of the moral hazard BN creates.Nevertheless, as I claimed in the discussion of the (S2) solution, we may acceptGoodin’s arguments about a duty to aid all forms of vulnerability without alsoclaiming that a failure to aid is unfair. When disadvantage is self-caused it isnot the failure to aid that is unfair, but the duty to aid. We may agree thatother concerns override the unfairness, but to claim the unfairness runs in theopposite direction is absurd. Indeed, neither Goodin nor Sample provide anyargument against the claim that A takes unfair advantage of B. If B does nottreat A unfairly by failing to give him BN in Γ1, she does not exploit him becauseshe does not take unfair advantage of him. So, while Sample’s D2 and Goodin’sduty to protect the vulnerable may be plausible accounts of the duties of aidwe have to vulnerable others, they cannot provide the basis for an account ofexploitation.

In fact, a second general lesson of the preceding analysis is that quite theopposite is true. If we accept Goodin’s and Sample’s claims we must tolerate thepossibility of unfairness, and, by extension, exploitation—at least as we ordi-narily understand the term. Come-what-may obligations to aid the vulnerable,whether in the domain of justice or personal morality, conflict with, and provideincentives for, exploitation.

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