eus3900_stephanie harfensteller_i6000983_does the eu mind the gap.pdf

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Does the EU Mind the Gap?normative expectations vs. self interests in Belarus and Morocco

Supervisor: Giselle Bosse Stephanie Harfensteller

ID: I6000983

Pigeon Hole: 288

Date: 22-06-2012

Bachelor Paper II

EUS3900

Final Version

(http://officialconfusion.com/77/)


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Table of Content

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 12. A new Response to a Changing Neighbourhood -A review of the ENP......................... 43. Double Standards in EU foreign policy: liberal idealism vs. structural realism ................. 74. Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 105. The good pupil and the unwilling: Morocco and Belarus as examples of double standardsin the ENP ................................................................................................................................ 12

5.1. Morocco, a country in transition? .............................................................................. 135.1.1. The EUs normative expectations .......................................................................... 145.1.2. Measuring the capabilities- expectations gap ........................................................ 145.2. Belarus ....................................................................................................................... 175.2.1. The EUs normative expectations .......................................................................... 185.2.2. Measuring the Capabilities-Expectations gap ........................................................ 18

6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 217. References ......................................................................................................................... 23


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Illustrations

Table 1: Capabilities and expectations of the EU in Morocco and Belarus ............................. 20


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1

1. Introduction

Business as usual is no longer an option if we want to make our neighbourhood a safer placeand protect our interests (European Commission, 2011a,p.5).

Recent events in the European neighbourhood had a strong influence on rethinking the

European Unions (EU) position and policy towards its neighbors. The Arab Spring was a

wake-up call for the EU to realize that the acquaintances with its neighbors where shaped

by cozy relationships with authoritarian regimes and a lackof supporting political reforms.

The EUs bilateral engagement with its 16 closest neighbors is conducted under the

framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The strategy set out for this policyproclaims how the EU proposes to work more closely with these countries. So far, the main

interest of the EU was to focus on economic cooperation and maintaining stability and

security in the region (Emerson, 2011, p. 51). Following the Arab Spring events, a new

response to a changing neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011a) was proposed with

new incentives how to strengthen the EUs relationship with its neighbors. This new approach

has an influence on the internal expectations of the EU towards the character of its

neighbourhood relations. They focus on so called deep democracy, promotion of the rule of

law, the support of civil society initiatives and economic development (ibid). These represent

some of the core values of the European Union. Setting focus on a stronger promotion of

these values in the neighbourhood means that the EU wants to choose a more normative

approach. Normative is explained as the EUs wish to promote its ideas to its neighbors

because it thinks that their values are good for other countries, too. The aim of this research is

to analyze whether the EU is able and willing to implement the new normative expectations

towards all its neighbors of the ENP.

The uniqueness in the way the EU conducts its relations with its neighbors, both East

and South, rests in the fact that the Union included normative approaches in action plans

designed with third countries. These action plans are not only based on trade relations and

economic cooperation but also on democracy promotion, respect for human rights and the rule

of law. This approach is commonly referred to the use of soft power or the normative

approach of the EU in its foreign policy. The promotion of democracy is of particular

interest to the EU because most of its neighboring states are non-democratic, or in transition.

These countries are often accused by the international community of human rights violations,

suppression of civil society, lack of personal freedoms, state-control and violations of the rule


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of law. However, the EU faces the challenge that the leaders of these countries are often not

willing to change their behavior. Complying with international standards and promoting

political reform to transform into a democracy would mean for these leader to cut off their

own power. The EUs power to influence its neighboring countries is limited since it does not

really offer a strong incentive for the regimes to comply with the normative framework.

Moreover, the EU faces its own internal dilemma to focus on both, self-interests and

normative value-promotion. Richard Youngs (2004) argues that the normative approach of the

EU is often used as a strategic tool to build interest-based relations with its neighbors. This

can lead to double standards. Double standards mean that the EUs idea to promote values can

conflict with its self-interests towards a neighboring country. This can bring about a lack of

effectiveness and capabilities. Thus the key research question of this thesis is:Is the EU able

to introduce a more normative approach in foreign policy or do double standards hamper EU

capabilities? Further on, does the EU act like a normative or realist actor, or both and does

that create conflicts? And is there a difference between discourse and action? Drawing on

structural realist and liberal idealist theories, how can we explain the EU's normative/realist

behavior towards the neighbourhood?

The central claim of this paper is that if double standards in the policy of the EU

towards third countries apply, namely self interests versus value promotion, this can lead to a

loss of capabilities to influence a country in general. The research question will be answered

by drawing on the concept of capability-expectations gap as defined by Christopher Hill

(1993). In order to define the gap between the capabilities, which the EU has in its

neighbourhood, in contrast to the new expectations of the European Neighbourhood Policy

review (ENPR) this paper uses a comparative case study analysis of the non-democratic

countries Morocco and Belarus. This analysis shows not only that there is a gap between

capabilities and normative expectations but it also shows how large it is and examines if it is

shaped by an interest-driven or normative driven approach or both which explains if double

standards apply.

In the first section, the new European approach towards the neighbourhood is

explained both, in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. Of particular importance is the

stronger normative orientation of the review which leads to more normative expectations. In

the second section, realism and liberalism as international relations theories explain when

double-standards affect the policy of the EU towards its neighbourhood. This theoretical

background provides the basis for the analysis. In the third section, the rationale behind thecase studies is explained, the capability-expectations gap concept by Hill is defined as the


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method used in this paper, the analytical proceedings are classified and the scope of the

content analysis including potential limitations is explained. This is followed by the

comparative case study analysis in the fourth section, which examines the size of the

capability-expectations gap in both case study examples, Morocco and Belarus. It is then

evaluated on the size of the gap, if the EU uses a more normative or interest-driven approach

in the neighbourhood after the ENP-review and if double standards apply.

In conclusion, the analysis of the capabilities-expectations gap shows that the EU is

not able to meet its normative expectations and double standards apply due to the fact that the

EU has unbalanced normative and self-interested policies towards its neighbors. Further, the

EU has no means to influence the willingness of its neighbors to implement the norms.


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2. A new Response to a Changing Neighbourhood -A review of the ENPThe first section of this paper deals with the European Neighbourhood Policy Review (ENPR)

in order to explain the more normative approach introduced by the EU in response to the

recent revolutions (Arab Spring) it faced in its Southern neighbourhood. This more normative

approach mentioned in the ENPR is changing the expectations of the EU towards its

neighbourhood. Since the ENPR is valid for both, the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, it

is necessary to look at the implications of the ENPR on both regions. Critics already raised

concerns that the ENPR majorly focuses on the southern neighbourhood, particularly on the

countries which are currently in transition, after their regimes have been replaced following

the Arab uprisings (Preiherman, 2011, p.1). However, there are more states involved in the

neighbourhood for which this new response to a changing neighbourhood applies.

The review of the ENP has been published by the European Commission and the High

Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) on May

25, 2011. The ENP has been fully operational since 2006 and therefore, the review assesses

five years of experience (Emerson, 2011a, p.1). The document states that a new approach is

needed to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the countries and societies of the

neighbourhood (ibid). Furthermore, the EU aims to build and consolidate healthy

democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links (ibid).

Additionally, the EU notes in the same document that it does not seek to impose a model or a

ready-made recipe for political reform and that the initiative lies with the partner (ibid).

There are three underpinning important principles for the new neighbourhood policy. First,

the principle ofdeep democracy was introduced to support progress in the neighbourhood.

The EU states that a functional democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law arefundamental pillars of the EU partnership with its neighbours (European Union, 2011, p.1).

The EU sets a list of prerequisites common to build deep and sustainable democracy, which

include:

free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the

establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.


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If governments of neighboring countries are conforming to these elements and apply them

accordingly, the EU promises spillover effects on economic growth, stimulating trade and

investment.

Furthermore, the EU wants to complement engagement at state level with an

additional program which focuses on supporting non-governmental organizations and

building partnerships with societies (ibid). The EU expects civil societies organizations are

key actors in promoting democratic and market-oriented reforms based on shared values, and

a thriving civil society is a barrier against authoritarianism (ibid). Therefore the EU aims to:

establish partnerships in each neighboring country and make EU support moreaccessible to civil society organizations through a dedicated Civil Society Facility

support the establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy to help politicalparties and non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partners

promote media freedom by supporting civil society organizations unhindered accessto the internet and the use of electronic communications technologies

reinforce human rights dialoguesMoreover, the EU is determined to support sustainable economic and social development

through fighting unemployment, improving social protection and promoting sustainable

economic growth. The EU sees it as essential to establish with each neighboring country

mutually beneficial and ambitious trade arrangements matching their needs and their

economic capacities (ibid). Among others, the EU wants to:

support partner countries' adoption of policies conducive to stronger sustainable andmore inclusive growth, to the development of micro, small and medium-sized

companies and to job creation

enhance dialogue on employment and social policies negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with willing and able partners further develop trade concessions, especially in those sectors most likely to offer an

immediate boost to partners economies

The EU also plans to enhance mobility and people-to-people contacts to increase labor

mobility and to balance out the aging of the Western European population. The mobility

aspect goes hand in hand with migration, capacity-building on border management, asylum

and effective law-enforcement. The EU wants to improve visa facilitations and visa

liberalization for the most advanced selected ENP partners.

To summarize the main aspects which are new in the ENPR, the EU puts emphasis on

deeper democracy which implies stronger support the democratic development in its

neighboring countries by means of promoting civil society, fundamental freedoms, free and

fair elections, and condemning all the countries which do not comply with these principles.


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Further, the EU tries to increase economic integration and cooperation, socio-economic

development and mobility.

We, the EU, recognized that we had to change the approach completely and follow the

aspirations of the population towards democratization and socio-economicdevelopment. And when you read the communications, the focus is mainly put on

these two aspects.1

In the next section of this paper, the theoretical framework is given to explain the double

standards of the EU in its neighbourhood policy and identify the tools used to a more

normative or interest-based approach.

1Interview by the author with European External Action Service official, Brussels, April 2012


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3. Double Standards in EU foreign policy: liberal idealism vs. structuralrealism

Double standards of the EU in the ENP can best be described by the different approaches

provided by liberal idealism and structural realism. On the one hand, structural realism, with

its emphasis on hard power politics, focuses on the EUs own interests on economic clout,

streamlining member-states interests, security and stability of its neighbourhood and gaining

international importance. On the other hand, liberalism, with its emphasis on trade and

economics as twin pillars of interdependence and soft power offers useful interpretations of

the deepened cooperation within the Union and the role of the EU as a normative power

(Persson, 2010, p.3). The double standards derive from the diverging implications of both

theories. For example if the Union trades with a non-democratic country with obvious human

rights violations, self-interests collide with normative value promotion, which leads to double-

standards.

The two theories are not excluding each other since they are both rationalist

approaches (Lamy, 2011, p.127) but have different assumptions on how to view policy

actions. Moreover, the character of the European Union cannot be identified by one

international relations theory only because it is neither a state nor a traditional organization

or alliance, and it therefore represents a very odd unit of analysis in many respects as no other

regional body in the world plays the same role as the EU does (Persson, 2010,p.3).

However, the two theories act here as toolkits to help determine the new approach of the EU

towards its neighbourhood. Since the EU claims to promote a stronger normative approach,

the analysis will show if this is actually reflected in practice. If the EU indeed follows a more

normative approach in the neighbourhood, a more liberal framework has established itself in

the ENP policy. If the EU cannot transfer its normative expectations into practice, this means

that a more interest-driven approach drives EU action. If both theories contradict each other, it

will then be a subject of analysis in how far these double standards create conflicts in the

EUs policy.

The liberal approach, with its emphasis on trade and economics and soft power tools,

offers a useful explanation for the more normative approach of the EU towards its neighbors.

The EU ops for a liberal approach towards its neighbors because it wants to stress the benefitsof international cooperation in a globalizing world, the importance of international


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organizations like the EU which leads to more prosperity, security and peace. In fact, several

scholars have demonstrated that the EU pursues a normative agenda in its foreign relations

(Persson, 2010; Duchne 1972; Hill 1990; Manners 2002). Ian Manners (2008) identified five

core values the EU is promoting: peace, liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Hence, democracy promotion in itself is arguably a liberal, normative approach, namely the

interest of western liberal democracies to spread their values and enhance the community of

liberal democracies (Dunne, 2011, p. 110). Another example of the normative agenda of the

EU in its neighbourhood policy is the principle of positive conditionality which can be found

in agreements with its partner countries. Explicitly after the success of the enlargement, the

transfer ofvalues seems to be an implicit goal of the EU, stating that what was good for the

EU would also be good for its neighbors (Persson, 2010, p.5).

In contrast, structural realism in European foreign policy is an approach which is

rather difficult to apply since authors of the realist school only aim for states; however the

core principles of realist theory can be transferred to the EU-level. Even though realists are

skeptical about international cooperation in a system of anarchy, they acknowledge that states

can have an interest to cooperate in order to either keep their sovereignty or balance out other

states (Andreatta, 2011, p.28; Hyde-Price, 2006). Particularly in foreign policy, capabilities

through cooperation strengthened the position of the EU and its member states. The strongest

rationalist explanation for cooperation was the increased need of European states to achieve

stability and security in Europe after World War II. This need for security has been extended

to the ring of countries which are the neighbors of the EU. The focal point of the EU in its

external policies was to establish security and stability amongst its borders to prevent streams

of migration, ensure trade relations and prevent security threats. This is also reconsidered in

the ENPR: EU geopolitical, economic and security interests are directly affected by

continuing instability in the European Neighborhood (European Commission, 2011a, p. 5).

The EU serves its member states in the ENP as an instrument to promote the collective

economic interests, ensure stability and security and fight against terrorism and illegal

immigration. Economic agreements in the ENP framework, such as agreements on trade,

agriculture, fishery or export and import, are primary representative of national economic

interests. Further, EU member states fear mass migration from its neighboring countries, thus

the ENP framework also contains sections to fight illegal immigration.

The ENP, from a structural realist perspective allows member states, using the EU as a

tool, to pursue their own interests. This means that the EU is acting in a self-interest (realist)way towards its neighbors. This can also mean that the EU promotes its values in order to


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secure interests like the status quo. Hyde-Price argues that the EU only introduced the

normative agenda to hide its own interests towards its neighbors because the EUs influence

on third states does not derive from what it is, but from what it does (Persson, p.6). This

paper does not aim to separate both theories from one another, since both influences are

always present in EU foreign policy. Instead it aims to explore whether the EU chooses to

give more importance to either self-interests (realism), as it did in the past, or value-

promotion (liberal idealism) as it promises now. The double standard applies if the two

theories are conflicting, which ultimately leads to inconsistencies in the framework of the

Unions foreign policy and asks for a clearer evaluation of the major interests the EU has in

relations with its neighbors.


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4. MethodologyThe capabilities-expectations gap is defined by Hill (1998) as the difference [] between the

myriad hopes for and demands of the EU as an international actor, and its relatively limited

ability to deliver (p.24). The capabilities of the EU are shaped by its ability to agree, its

resources and instruments at its disposal (Hill, 1993, p. 315). Expectations of the EU are the

objectives and anticipations on the European foreign policy behavior which are raised by

internal and external players. These can be in the scope of membership aspirations, conflict

management and promoting the European framework on the international sphere (Hill, 1998).

This analysis only explores internal expectations of the EU towards its neighbors, as defined

by the ENPR.2

Ginsberg (1999) argues that there is a theoretical gap between the expectations and

capabilities in European foreign policy behavior (p.430). The capabilities-expectations gap

framework provides a useful tool to identify the size of the gap between the new expectations

raised by the ENPR and the capabilities provided to fulfill them. While the new expectations

are shaped by a more normative agenda, the capabilities of the EU to implement this agenda

reflect the willingness and the means of the EU and its member-states to do so. If the gap

between capabilities and expectations is larger, this implies that there is on the one hand an

unwillingness of the EU to implement these expectations, but also on the other hand, lack of

capabilities to actually do so. A large gap thus indicates a more self-interested approach,

while a narrow gap shows that the EU is willing and able to implement the normative

approach. If the latter applies, this means that the EU truly follows a more normative

approach in its neighbourhood.

In order to assess the impact of the ENP review on the gap between expectations andcapabilities, a comparative case study is presented. Since the expectations are applicable to all

countries of the neighbourhood, also the ones which did not face a revolution, are not in

transition and still have a (semi-) authoritarian regime in place, the two cases chosen for this

analysis are Morocco and Belarus. Morocco and Belarus have similar government features.

The case selection is based on a most-similar case study approach. The similarities between

the cases are multiple. First, both countries are part of the ENP, while Belarus is considered a

partner in the East; Morocco is part of the Southern Neighbourhood. Second, both countries

2It is acknowledged that Hills concept also takes external expectations into account. However, this is beyond

the scope of this paper.


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are non-democratic, while Morocco is a semi-authoritarian regime; Belarus is considered the

last dictatorship in Europe. Third,both countries did not face a revolutionary uprising.

Moroccos monarch was not overthrown by an extensive Arab Spring revolution and also

Belaruss authoritarian regime did not fall due to the Color Revolutions in neighboring

countries. Fourth, the EU tries to promote democracy in both countries with limited success

due to the lack of interest of the government to democratization. Fifth, economic relations

with both countries are important to the EU. While Belarus is a significant transit country for

Russian oil, Moroccan trade relations are based on agriculture products. Sixth, since both

countries are direct neighbors to the EU, it has a large interest to secure and stabilize relations

with both countries. Still, a different ENP outcome can be observed: Whereas Morocco is

seen by the EU as a good pupil and cooperates well with the EU, Belarus is seen as the

unwilling with almost no cooperation, no action plan and no integration in the ENP

framework. Moreover, while the EU is rewarding Morocco with an advanced status, Belarus

is punished with a broad array of targeted sanctions.3 The capabilities-expectations gap in

the two cases is calculated considering Hills analytical framework by performing a

qualitative content analysis.

To assess the capability-expectations gap of the EU in case studies, the content

analysis is focused on official statements, the wording in the official ENPR documents,

newspaper articles and secondary literature. The country-specific expectations are further

assessed by two high official interviews which were conducted in Brussels in April 2012. The

capabilities are assessed in terms of resources, financial programs, secondary literature and

information derived from the before mentioned elite interviews. After calculating the size of

the capabilities-expectations gap in the respective cases, the result is regarded towards its

conflict potential between the respective theories, liberal idealism and structural realism, and

whether double standards apply.

3Interview by the author with European External Action Service official, Brussels, April 2012.


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5. The good pupil and the unwilling: Morocco and Belarus as examples ofdouble standards in the ENP

This section of the thesis will deal with the comparative case study analysis of Morocco and

Belarus. The major attention after the Arab Spring is on countries which had a regime change

such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Still, these are only three countries of the sixteen enlisted

countries in the ENP frame. When we look at countries which did not face a revolution, both

in the South and East, two examples are clearly evident.

On the one hand we have the good pupil Morocco, known for its cooperative

approach towards the Union and the rewards it got for advancing a wide range of reforms

even before the Arab Spring4. The Kingdom of Morocco, whose King had for a long time

most executive powers, is currently claiming to be a country in transition (Tocci, 2008). The

EUs relations with Morocco were mainly based on economic cooperation, in which the

Union had a clear advantage of being the most important trading partner. In 2000, an

Association Agreement was signed, an Action plan under the ENP framework followed in

20055. The main interest here was to preserve the status quo of asymmetric balance of the

EUs trade relations (Darbouche in Tocci, 2008, p.22). Since Morocco was well

implementing the action plan, it was the first country to receive an advanced status with the

EU in 2008. Despite the fact that the EU also provided a political and cultural partnership in

the broader policy framework, reality shows that the EU failed to promote democratic

practices and showed unwillingness to dialogue with all political actors (ibid). These are

identified by Tocci (2008) as non-normative goals. However, the Union used normative

means to implement its policy which still included aims based on democracy, inter-cultural

dialogue, stability and human rights (p.23). We can explain this behavior by the EU by the

(realist) desire to shape its milieu according to its self-interests while using a normative

framework to cover-up its own interests (Hyde-Price, 2006).

On the other hand, the relations to Belarus in the East are guided by a totally different

perspective. Since the authoritarian regime of President Lukashenka has been in place, the EU

froze its neighbourhood negotiations with Belarus. Particular attention is given to the strongly

normative approach of the European Union when introducing restrictive measures and

sanctions against Belarus after the presidential elections of 2006 due to violations of




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international electoral standards and the crackdown on civil society and democratic

opposition (Tocci, 2008, p. 5). In the same year, the EU also wrote a non-paper for Belarus,

written in the same style as intended for the Action plans of the ENP (Bosse, 2012, p. 373). In

this non-paper, the EU stated that it cannot offer to deepen its relations with a regime which

denies its citizens their fundamental rights and demands political, economic and

administrative reforms (Bosse, 2009, p. 220). The reaction of the government towards this

hard approach by the EU was almost non-existent. Even though, a normative agenda

towards Belarus in promoting civil society has been in place since 2004, the support of civil

society projects and NGOs is lacking effective measures (ibid, p. 221). The approach of the

EU towards Belarus changed in 2008, when the Commission recognized a significant

positive development. This was triggered by the relative small political step towards de-

escalation, when Belarusian authorities released three political prisoners (ibid, p. 222). As a

response, the EU lifted the sanctions against Belarus and advanced a critical engagement

with a focus on cooperation particularly in energy security instead of value promotion.

Further, Belarus joined the newly established Eastern Partnership in 2009 to foster regional

co-operation. Bosse (2009) critically analyzed that the EU clearly followed a realpolitik

engagement with Belarus with almost no engagement with civil society to promote

democratic change (p. 224). This goes in line with the realist way that member state interests

are placed before soft power mechanisms and with Hyde-Prices theory that the normative

agenda is only used to overshadow self-interests.

With the new response to a changing neighbourhood the EU promises a more

normative approach towards its neighbourhood. In the next sections, it is examined, by

measuring the capabilities-expectations gap of new expectations in contrast to capabilities in

both, Belarus and Morocco, to find out if the EUs approach towards its neighbors has really

changed.

5.1.Morocco, a country in transition?The Arab Spring did not trigger a revolution in Morocco. Instead of radical reforms, the

country is rather facing an evolution with steady reforms which have been already initiated

by the king before the Arab revolutions6. Still the Arab Spring was present in Morocco. The

movement of February 20th, an alliance of students, left-wing activists and non-parliamentary

Islamists demanded dignity democracy and an end to corruption (Dennison, Popescu&

Torreblanca, 2011, p.1). Further, the king was well aware of the changes in his neighboring



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countries7. In contrast to his counterparts in the other North-African countries, the king is

loved by its people and shares a divine-right to rule. His people do not want to overthrow

their king but simply proclaim a democratic constitutional monarchy, comparable to the ones

in Europe and want a king who reigns, but does not govern (ibid). In response, the king

initiated a reform of the constitution, with the invitation to civil society to participate. This

new constitution is not revolutionary in terms, since a separation of power is still not

achieved. This was a tactical step to show that the king was responding towards the demands

of his people, but he and the ruling elite do not seem highly motivated to make significant

changes towards a democratic government in the near future (ibid).

5.1.1. The EUs normative expectations towards MoroccoThe ENPRstates in the first paragraph that the encouraging progress made by [] Morocco

and Jordan in their announcement of constitutional reform, need also to be supported

(European Commission, 2011a, p. 1). The EU has a wide array of normative expectations

towards its southern neighbors after the Arab Spring. For Morocco, the EUs main aim is to

support the implementation of the constitutional reform from which the EU hopes it will open

the way to major democratic reforms (enpi-info, 2012). Of particular importance to the EU

are the dialogues to improve human rights, press freedom and strengthen gender equality and

the freedom of expression and assembly. Another key expectation which the EU stresses is

focused on the reform of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and impunity8. The main

problem the EU identifies in Morocco is the socio-economic development: unemployment

amongst young people, analphabetism, socio-economic disparities, repartition of resources

and education. Since the EU considers Morocco as the good pupil, it has high expectations

on almost every sector of cooperation with Morocco. For the EU, Morocco portrays the role

model and is supposed to send a signal to the other countries what they have to do in order to

improve their relations with the EU.

5.1.2. Measuring the capabilities- expectations gap in MoroccoThe EU has a specific interest to present Morocco as a role model of EU neighbourhood

cooperation to the other countries in the region which actually contributes to the legitimacy of

the regime (Dennison, Popescu& Torreblanca, 2011, p. 4). Therefore, Morocco receives a big

share of funds which have been allocated to the southern region by the SPRING program. On

the EuropeAid website of the European Commission it is stated that Morocco is today the




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greatest recipient of European Union funds under the European Neighbourhood Policy with

a total amount allocated for 2011-2013 of EUR 580.5million. This money is allocated to

support 1. the development of social policies; 2. economic modernisation; 3. institutional

support; 4. good governance and human rights; and 5. environmental protection9. Bilateral co-

operation is implemented 100% by budget support. As part of the new approach towards a

changing neighbourhood, the EU set up a new action plan with Morocco. This is the main

instrument to monitor the implementation of the constitutional reform, since the changes

promised with the constitutional reform towards human rights and democracy are also

incorporated in the action plan10. Morocco has a specific interest to economic cooperation

with the European Union, since the EU is its main trading partner and makes up 60% of

Moroccos total trade with the main traded goods being textiles and agriculture11. Therefore,

the started negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) are of

major interest to Morocco in order to increase its attractiveness to the EU to import Moroccan

products. Economic integration is one of the main leverages the EU has in Morocco, and its

carrot to trigger cooperation in other sectors (ibid).

Reform progress on democratization is majorly supported through the newly

introduced Civil Society Facility and the Endowment for Democracy. Since civil society has

been well organized already before the Arab Spring, allocation of funds is not as difficult as in

other countries of the region. To improve the judicial system, a total amount of EUR

50million is allocated to Morocco for the time period 2012-13 (European Commission, 2012a,

p. 7). Further, Morocco invited an Election Observer Mission to monitor the elections held in

2011.The new dialogue on a mobility partnership which focuses on migration, mobility and

security has been launched in October 2011. This is one of the key areas of self-interest of the

EU towards Morocco, thus when Morocco blocked the dialogue on mobility partnership

because the European Parliament (EP) voted against the implementation of a new fishery

agreement, and was only willing to negotiate again after the EP approved to the agreement12 it

is clear that the mobility partnership is of major importance to the EU13.

These are some of the most important capabilities the EU has in Morocco. Given that

there is a huge amount of capabilities, both in resources and instruments, one could expect a

narrow capability-expectations gap in Morocco. The EU is willing to use a normative

approach towards Morocco by using positive conditionality. This means if a project is not

9http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htm

10 Interview by the author with European External Action Service official, Brussels, April 201211

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htm12

Interview by the author with European External Action Service official, Brussels, April 201213

Interview by the author with European External Action Service official, Brussels, April 2012
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/index_en.htm


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implemented the EU will simply not give funding for another project in this sector.14 Since the

EU almost only provides budget support towards Morocco, it is difficult to monitor all the

programs which are implemented. This is complimented by a lack of implementation which is

detected by EU officials working on relations with Morocco. This is because the EU does not

see itself in the role to impose things on Morocco to extend its political reform process; hence,

implementation majorly depends on the capabilities of the Moroccan authorities.

Very important is the criticism on Moroccos constitutional reform process. Protesters

in Morocco complain that the king continues to hold exorbitant powers and that the

changes are purely cosmetic and designed to avoid trouble rather than to bring change

(Rettman, 2011).This is more than understandable from the kings perspective, since he

would cut off his own power by introducing concrete reform measures towards

democratization (Dennison, Popescu& Torreblanca, 2011, p. 2). In contrast, it is rather

surprising that the EU is supporting the constitutional reform and takes the kings side in his

reform efforts. Both HR Ashton and commissioner Fle called the reform a significant step

[which] signals a clear commitment to democracy and respect for human rights (Rettman,

2011). This is clearly a signal for unwillingness to criticize the limited progress of the

constitutional reform towards human rights issues and democratization and rather procure

stability and security as promised by the king. Dennison, Popescu and Torreblanca (2011)

argue that If the EU made clear that the future of Moroccos advanced status depended on

large strides towards democracy, rather than baby steps on limited areas of human rights as it

has accepted so far, the Moroccan government would listen (p. 2). However, the EUs own

principles of positive conditionality hamper this opportunity to react. This is a clear sign for

double standards, since the EU could actually do more, but is not willing to do so. Moreover,

the EUs approach to improve socio-economic development and guarantee that all Moroccans

benefit of its trade relations with the EU is not fulfilled. While the middle class and the elites

have benefited from Moroccos increasing international trade, the average population does not

benefit much (ibid). This is also due to the fact that the king and his entourage own important

businesses in the country with a total value of EUR 6 billion (ibid, p.4).

There are also significant reasons to challenge particularly the human rights approach

of the Moroccan government due to the fact that the acknowledged fisheries agreement allows

European fisherman to fish illegally in Western Saharan waters. This territory belongs to the

Saharwian people who are murdered by Morocco continuously and yet, the EU is not

reconsidering its position when dealing with the regime in Morocco (EU chronicle, 2011).



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The serious human rights violations are also subject to the UN Security Council due to public

pressure. Here, the interests of the European fishing lobby prevail over human rights

violations (ibid). According to Van Hllen (2012), Morocco is only willing to do the next step

in the EUs agenda on democracy promotion if the EU makes further concessions in sectors

important to Morocco (p. 122) and for the EU, economic, stability and security interests play

also an important role which is why they agree to this agreement. To conclude, it can be said

that although the EU is willing to use a liberal idealist approach in its relations with Morocco

and has a wide array of capabilities,progress is highly dependent on the kings willingness to

reform. Therefore, the normative approach by the EU fails to deliver the wanted success,

since it is only effective in sectors interesting for Morocco. The EU has not leverage to push

forward the reform process, which means that its capabilities are not effective to fulfill the

normative goals. Therefore, a large capability-expectations gap and an imbalance leading to

double standards can be detected.

5.2.Belarus, fighting repression against civil society?We cannot become involved in aid to Belarus without seeing clear progress in respect

for human rights in that country, and that means the immediate release and

rehabilitation of all political prisoners as well as the start of genuine political dialogue

with the opposition (Van Rompoy, 2011).

The defining moment that triggered a change in EUs relations towards Belarus was the unrest

after the elections on December 10, 2010. 15 In response to the uprisings, which were followed

by a crackdown of civil society, political opposition and the media, the EU reactivated and

broadened sanctions against Belarus with the Council resolution on January 30, 2011. Still,

the European External Action Service (EEAS) states on its website that the Union is ready to

strive towards deeper relations with Belarus, in the light of further developments towards the

fundamental European values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Yet, this

strongly depends on the willingness of Belarus to take the next steps. Since the introduction of

the ENPR, the Council further strengthened restrictive measures in March, May, June and

October 2011, as well as in January, February and March 2012 (European Commission, 2012,

p. 5).



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5.2.1. The EUs normative expectations towards BelarusThe ENPRreads: the continued repression in Belarus and the lingering protracted conflicts

in the region [] require us to look afresh at the EUs relationship with our neighbours

(European Commission, 2011a, p. 1). Within the new normative framework of the ENPR, it is

not mentioned how the EU wants to fight repression. Moreover, Belarus is not mentioned in

the document specifically again. Only a closer look into a memo, which was published on

May 15th, 2012, explains which normative expectations are considered for Belarus. Since

Belarus is not a full participant to the ENP, because it neither agreed to an Association

Agreement, nor an Action Plan, no official country progress report is prepared (European

Commission, 2012, p. 1). The EU focuses its expectations towards Belarus on repeatedly

expressing its grave concern regarding the lack of respect for human rights, the rule of law

and democratic principles. Further, the EU is demanding the unconditional release and

rehabilitation of all political prisoners in order to repeal repressive policies (European

Commission 2012 p. 1). From the principle of deep democracy only the civil society

dimension has been strengthened towards Belarus. The EU wants to engage more with civil

society, the political opposition and the public at large. Hitherto, the EU wants to enhance

people-to-people contact with the negotiations on visa facilitation and a readmission

agreement and started a European Dialogue on Modernisation with Belarusian society in

March 2012 (European Commission, 2012, p. 3).

5.2.2. Measuring the Capabilities-Expectations gap in BelarusThe EUs capabilities are limited towards Belarus, since the Belarusian regime is unwilling to

cooperate with or react to most EU diplomatic efforts. Therefore, the EU feels not obliged to

introduce wide ranging measures, since it clearly states that it is in the hand of Belarus to take

the next step. Consequently, the EUs capabilities towards Belarus are more unilateral.

According to an EU official, the sanctions against Belarus, which were reactivated and

broadened in January 2011, are the stick the EU uses to express its discontent with the

repression of civil society towards the Belarusian regime16. Further, he states that it is the

EUs way of showing that they care about the developments in Belarus and are thus a political

imperative of the EU to do something. He also acknowledges that the Arab Spring indirectly

had an impact on EU foreign policy imperatives which are now stronger visible than they

were before. One of the new imperatives is to show that the EU is not having cozy

relationships with autocratic leaders in its neighbourhood. In Belarus, the EU reacted by



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introducing more restrictive measures against the regime. Moreover, the EU tries to influence

behavior of the Belarusian regime with the sanctions. The sanctions introduced by the EU are

targeted towards specific actors and companies who are close to the Belarusian regime. This

means that the EU did not introduce restrictive measures, like trade barriers, against the

Belarusian economy in general but tries to harm the regime more specifically. The restrictive

measures are directly linked with the internal expectations of the EU: in order to loosen up the

restrictive measures, the EU clearly states that all political prisoners have to be released.17

In contrast to the stick of the EU to punish the regime, the EU also introduced

measures to strengthen its relationship towards civil society, the political opposition and the

media. The Commission quadrupled assistance to civil society and victims of repression with

a special assistance package which is worth over EUR 20 million. In total the amount of more

than EUR 40 million is allocated towards Belarus (European Commission, 2012) . This

money is funded under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and is

expected to be used for the needs of the population and democratization (ibid). Therefore, this

capability is supposed to directly respond to the normative expectations of the EU towards

Belarus. According to the memo, the money is aimed towards supporting cooperation in

sectors of mutual interest such as environment, energy efficiency and food security (ibid).

Additionally, the EU also wants to support the civil society by negotiating on visa facilitation

and readmission agreements to benefit the population at large. So far, the Belarusian

government did not respond towards this proposal by the EU (ibid).

These are the main capabilities allocated to Belarus in order to meet the internal

normative expectations of the EU. However, there is huge criticism towards the measures

taken by the EU. First, the sanctions introduced by the EU lack efficiency since they do not

have a strong impact on the power of the regime. It is questionable if the EU would introduce

economic sanctions which are actually effective and would hurt the regime, like trade barriers,

since it largely benefits from the low prices, due to the economic crisis and the devaluation of

the Belarusian currency. Moreover, the EU is not really interested to offer carrots in

economic sectors which are sensitive for Belarus such as agriculture. The EUs normative

condition towards Belarus in order to lift the sanctions is also highly questionable. This

condition is comparable to the reaction of the EU in 2008, when Belarus released several

political prisoners and the EU directly responded with an increased engagement with Belarus.

Bosse (2009) criticized this behavior of the EU, since it was majorly focused on co-operation



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in self-interest domains such as energy security. It remains to be seen how the EU will react

towards Belarus this time, when the conditions are met.

In light of the instruments and financial resources employed to support civil society

and democratization, the normative intentions of the EU are also questionable since the

ENPI is not considered a useful tool, by neither scholars nor the European Commission

itself, to fund bottom-up/ civil society projects, especially in countries that do not welcome

such support (Bosse, 2009, p. 221). This is due to the complex bureaucratic application

progress to get funding for civil society programs and the fact that only registered NGOs can

apply. In a country, where regime-critic NGOs are erased by the government from the list of

fundable NGOs, it is rather difficult to support them (ibid). Moreover, the allocated money is

supposed to be used for a wide array of projects, EUR 40 million is probably not enough

money to trigger wide ranging change in civil society18. Particularly, the proposal to negotiate

on visa-facilitations and readmission agreements and its benefits for Belarusian society are

lacking explanation. The EU has a huge benefit of a readmission agreement, which means that

unwanted migrants and people in Diaspora are send back to their country of origin. It is of the

EUs own interest to push for such an agreement. This means that the few capabilities of the

EU towards Belarus, unwillingly and willingly do not meet the internal expectations to fight

repression of the regime. It implies that the expectations-capabilities gap in Belarus is large,

thus the EU is not complying with its aim to follow a more normative approach towards

Belarus, since it lacks the capabilities to implement it (Tocci, 2008). This clearly implies an

unbalance between a normative and self-interested approach of the EU towards Belarus. Since

the low amount of capabilities do not suffice the normative expectations, double standards

also apply in the case of Belarus, clearly leading to a loss of capabilities in general.

Morocco Belarus

InternalExpectations

Almost on all aspects of cooperation sinceMorocco serves as a role model for EU

neighbourhood relations.

- Engage more with Civil Society,political opposition and

- Repeatedly condemn the lack ofrespect on human rights, rule oflaw, democratic principles

Instruments - New action plan- Association Agreement- Positive conditionality- Union for the Mediterranean

- ENPI- Sanctions,visa bans- Eastern Partnership framework- Restrictive measures

Resources - SPRING Programme- Election Observation Mission - Small amount of financialresources

Table 1: Capabilities and expectations of the EU in Morocco and Belarus

18Comparable to EUR 580.5million allocated to Morocco.


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6. ConclusionThe aim of this paper was to analyze if the EU is able and willing to approach a more

normative agenda in its neighbourhood policy or if double standards hamper capabilities. This

was achieved by measuring the capability-expectations gap in Morocco and Belarus by a

qualitative content analysis of official EU documents, interviews with members of the EEAS,

newspaper articles and secondary literature.

The main finding of the analysis is that the EU does not have the capabilities to fulfill

its high normative expectations in both cases. Of particular interest is that both cases are non-

democratic, yet the approach of the EU has been completely different. In Belarus the

capability-expectations gap is quite big, since the EU has almost no capabilities, neither

willingly nor unwillingly to fulfill them. In Morocco, a huge apparatus of capabilities is

available and a normative approach is widely used by positive conditionality and budget

support. Still the EU is not able to fulfill its really high expectations towards Morocco

because of a lack of interest and of cooperation by the Moroccan government. This means that

although the EU has a strongly normative driven agenda, as lined out by the ENPR, in

practice, self-interests and a lack of leverage to implement the agenda can be detected.

It is arguable that the EU will never be able to be a completely normative actor since

self-interests for example to protect its own citizens, markets and security will always matter

more to the EU. The analysis of the capabilities-expectations gap showed that there is an

imbalance between normative or liberal idealist policies and self interest or structural realist

policies. Only if there is a balance between self interests and normative values, the EU could

overcome its double-standards and its lack of effectiveness.

Other authors, like Bosse (2012) argue that democracy promotion as a Europeanprinciple in foreign policy might have come to an end and that there is a paradigm shift

towards functional cooperation. An indicator that this is true is the amount of countries in the

neighbourhood policy which are non-democratic and where the EU is not able to trigger

change by using its normative capabilities. The limits of this research are the very short-term

perspective, and therefore further research has to be done, to see if the capabilities-

expectations gap in the long-term might change due to external events influencing

neighboring states to integrate or turn away from the EU or a different approach of the EU

towards its neighbors (for example the less for less principle). It needs to be seen if the EU

increases effectiveness and its capabilities in the next years, but in the case of Belarus, this is


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not evoked by the EU but rather by external events, same in Morocco, only if civil society can

increase its leverage on the regime, democratic change will be possible. At least then the EU

is present to provide its good pupil and the unwilling technical assistance to support its

reform processes, out of a normative or self-interested or both driven approach will then be

seen.


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