european study into the fire risk to european cultural ... · joão ventura . 1. introduction 2....

FiRE-TECH/WG2/28/IST/YY/YY/2003

FIRE-TECH Fi R E T E C Hre isk valuation o uropean ultural eritage

European study into the Fire Risk to European Cultural Heritage

WG2 Analysis of significant fires

and Statistical analysis of fire occurrence

3rd Draft final report

I.Cabrita Neves Joaquim Valente João Ventura

1. Introduction

2. Identification of interesting fires

3. Analysis of significant fires

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Summary of the data collected

3.3 Overview of the main characteristics of each fire

3.3.1 Schloss Philippsruhe, Germany (Bavaria), 1994

A. Characterization of the fire scenario

B. Consequences of the fire

C. Relevant aspects

3.3.2 Altstadt Lauterbach, Germany (Hessen), 1992



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.3 Kurhaus, Baden-Baden, Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz), 1987



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.4 Maltesergebäude, Amberg, Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz), 1987



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.5 Chiado (Historical center), Portugal, 1988



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.6 Town Hall of Lisbon, Portugal, 1996



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.7 Ancient District of Chambéry, France, 2002



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.8 Parliament of Britany in Rennes, France, 1994

2



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.9 Museum of "Familistère Godin", France, 1997



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.10 Royal Palace/ Guarini’s chapel (Turin), Italy, 1997



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.11 Fenice theatre in Venice, Italy, 1996



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.12 Petruzzelli Theatre in Bari, Italy, 1991



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.13 Windsor Castle, England, 1992



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.14 Redoutensäle Hofburg Wien, Austria, 1992



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.15 Hollands Spoor, Holland, 1989



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.16 Windmill "De Walvisch", Schiedam, Holland, 1996



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.17 Sint Petruskerk, Oisterwijk, Holland, 1998



C. Relevant aspects

3.3.18 Oude Brug - Kartuizerinnestraat "Gallerijen De Jonckheere, Belgium, 1992

3



C. Relevant aspects 3.3.19 Miskolk "Tetemvar Planked Church", Hungary, 1997



C. Relevant aspects 3.3.20 Esztergom Roman Catholic Cathedral, Hungary, 1993



C. Relevant aspects 3.3.21 Mount Athos monastery of Simonopetra, Greece, 1990



C. Relevant aspects 3.3.22 Historic library of the National Technical University of Athens, Greece,1991



C. Relevant aspects

3.4 Conclusions

3.4.1 Causes for fire ignition

3.4.2 Fire propagation/ development

3.4.3 Fire fighting/ suppression

3.4.4 Nature and extent of fire damage

3.4.5 Mitigation means used and their efficiency

4. Summary

Annex 1: Questionnaire for bodies dealing with Cultural Heritage in member states - Part B: Identification of interesting fires

Annex 2: Replies to part B of the Questionnaire for bodies dealing with Cultural Heritage in member states

Annex 3: Guidelines for the data gathering on a selection of fires involving Cultural Heritage

Annex 4: Information on the selected fires collected by means of the Guidelines

Annex 5: Guidelines-Clarification

Annex 6: Additional information on the selected fires collected by means of the Guidelines-Clarification

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1. Introduction

The scope of Work Package 2 (WP2) of the FiRE-TECH project is to draw as much knowledge as possible from significant fires affecting Cultural Heritage occurred in the last decades, in order to identify their human, cultural and economical consequences and the measures susceptible to reduce their probability of occurrence as well as the importance of their consequences.

In a first step, data on fires affecting Cultural Heritage occurred in the last 15 to 20 years has been collected by means of part B of the questionnaire distributed by WG1. The results and conclusions of this task are reported in section 2. Based on this information a selection of 22 fires has been made for collection of detailed information and further analysis. This is reported in section 3.

2. Identification of interesting fires

For the data collection on fires affecting Cultural Heritage FiRE-TECH Working Group 2 has prepared part B of the Questionnaire distributed by FiRE-TECH Working Group 1 (See Annex 1).

Data on fires affecting Cultural Heritage occurred in the last 15 to 20 years has been collected (See Annex 2). The objective was to gather general information on the most significant fires in each country, rather than to have information on every fire occurred within a given period to perform statistical studies. A summary of the 76 answers received to part B of the Questionnaire can be seen in Table 1 and in Figs. 1 to 6. From these fires, a selection of 22 has been made for collection of detailed information and further analysis. In this choice the following criteria have been taken into consideration: 1) As far as possible, to have samples of each of the four types of fires: A – Fires causing great damage to an historic building B – Fires causing great damage to several historic buildings C – Fires occurring in buildings with no special historic meaning, but affecting items with great artistic/ historic value D – Fires causing great damage both to the building and to the contents with historic value 2) To reasonably cover the different types of use and causes of fire. 3) The availability of data for detailed analysis. 4) The importance of the available information in the context of this study. 5) The possibility of comparing two identical cases in different countries. 6) As far as possible, to chose cases from different countries. 7) To limit the total number of cases for the detailed analysis as a consequence of a tight time schedule. The fires chosen for detailed analysis are highlighted in Table 1, and they include 10 fires of the type A, 7 of the type B, 1 of the type C and 4 of the type D. Although not having statistical value, the information collected by means of part B of the Questionnaire and summarized in Figs 1 to 6 shows some relevant aspects which deserve some comments and further consideration. The most common type of construction includes by far masonry and wood, which is no surprise, since this is the most common type of construction of ancient buildings.

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Table 1 – Summary of the data collected by means of part B of the questionnaire and fires selected for detailed analysis

Building use Country

Fire identification Type of construction Year Original At fire occurrence Causes of the fire Nature of damage Fire type

Schloss Langenburg

Wood/ masonry 1963 Palace Commercial Chimney Art objects / building D

Baden-Württenberg

Benediktiner Kloster_St.

Blasien

Wood/ masonry 1977 Monastery School Renovation works Building A

Burg Trausnitz Half timbering 1961 Castle Museum Immersion coil Art objects/ building/ people D

Schloss Eurasburg

Wood/ masonry 1975 Palace Heaters Building A

Kloster Benediktbeuern

Wood/ masonry 1979 Monastery Hotel Renovation works Building A

Church-Kirchdorf am Inn

Wood/ masonry 1960 Church Church Old electrical circuits Art objects / building D

Rathaus Schweinfurt

Wood/ masonry 1959 Office Office Renovation works Building A

Augustiner-Chorherrnstift-Kirche- Au am

Inn

Wood/ masonry 1969 Church Church Renovation works Art objects / building D

Altstadt-Straubing Half timbering 1975 Commercial Commercial Arson Building B

Glaspalast Munich Steel 1931 Museum Self ignition of millinery Art objects / building D

Schloss Philippsruhe

Wood/ masonry 1984 Palace Museum/office/librar

y Negligence Building A

Rathaus Kitzingen

Wood/ masonry 1984 Office Office Fireworks Building A

Löwenbräu-Keller Munich

Wood/ masonry 1986 Restaurant/bar Restaurant/bar Arson Building A

Herz-Jezu-Kirche. Munich

Wood/ masonry 1994 Church Church Malfunctioning device Art objects / building D

Bavaria

Salvator-Keller, Munich

Wood/ masonry 1999 Brewery/

Restaurant Brewery/ Restaurant Arson Building A

Berlin Deutscher Dom, Berlin

Wood/ masonry 1994 Church Church Renovation works Building A

Ger

man

y

Hamburg Alster-Arkaden, Hamburg

Wood/ masonry 1989 Commercial Commercial Restaurant? Building A

Table 1 – Summary of the data collected by means of part B of the questionnaire and fires selected for detailed analysis (cont.)



Maria-Magdalenen-

Kirche

Wood/ masonry 1975 Church Church Lightning Art objects / building D

Schloss Weilburg an der

Lahn

Wood/ masonry 1972 Palace Arson Building B

Schloss Friedrichshof

Wood/ masonry 1967 Palace Hotel Arson Art objects / building D

Hessen

Altstadt Lauterbach Half timbering 1992 Commercial Commercial Arson Building B

St-Martin-Kirche Wood/ masonry 1999 Church Church Malfunctioning device Building A

Niedersachsen Altstadt

Osterode am Harz

Half timbering 1979 Commercial Commercial Unknown Building A

Nordrhein-Westfalen

St-Laurentius Kirche - Erwitte

Wood/ masonry 1971 Church Church Renovation works Building A

Lagerhaus, Worms Wood 1986 Industry ? Old electrical circuits Building A

Kurhaus, Baden-baden 1987 Hotel Hotel Oven

Art objects / building D Rheinland-Pfalz

Maltesergebäude, Amberg

Wood/ masonry 1993 ? Library/ School/

Restaurant/ brewery Malfunctioning device Building A

Ger

man

y

Thüringen Schloss Wilhelmshöhe

Wood/ masonry 1975 Palace Museum Renovation works Art objects / building D

Austria Redoutensäle Hofburg Wien

Wood/ masonry 1992 Castle Hall for festival

events Old electrical circuits Art objects / building B

Gebouw van K&W, Den Haag Masonry 1964 Theatre Theatre Old electrical circuits Building A

Hollands Spoor Wood/cast iron 1989 Train station Train station Arson Building A Koepel Kerk, Amsterdam

Wood/ masonry 1993 Church Congress/ concert

centre Unknown Building A

Windmill "De Walvisch", Schiedam

Wood/ masonry 1996 Windmill Windmill Electrical circuits Building A

Holland

Sint Petruskerk, Oisterwijk

Wood/ masonry 1998 Church Church Renovation works Building A(?)

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Teatro D. Maria Wood/ masonry/ iron 1964 Theatre Theatre Old electrical circuits Building/ historic

information/ business D

Chiado( Historical center)

Wood/ masonry/ reinforced

concrete/ steel/ iron

1988 Multiple Multiple Renovation works Building / people B

Igreja de Cortes, Leiria

Wood/ masonry 1996 Church Church Arson/ Candle ? Art objects / building D

Town Hall of Lisbon


concrete/ steel/ iron

1999 Monument City Hall Renovation works Art objects / building/ historic information D

Convento de Santa Clara Masonry 1995 Monastery Monastery Unknown Building A

Passo da Rua do Esquível Masonry 1996 Palace Palace Unknown Building A

Palácio do Freixo Masonry 1987 Palace Palace Unknown Building A

Palacete dos Viscondes de Almeidinha

Masonry 1988 Palace Palace Unknown Building A

Mosteiro de São Paulo de Alferrara

Masonry 2000 Monastery Monastery Forest fire Building A

Igreja Matriz de São Sebastião Masonry 1995 Church Church Unknown Building A

Igreja Matriz de Velosa Masonry 2002 Church Church Unknown Building A

Igreja da Misericórdia de

Viseu Masonry 1994 Church Church Unknown Building A

Fábrica de Lanifícios de

Chemina Masonry 1998 Industry Industry Unknown Building A

Portugal

Convento de Santa Maria de

Semide

Masonry 1990 Monastery Monastery Unknown Building A

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Building use Country Fire identification Type of

construction Year Original At fire occurrence Causes of the fire Nature of damage Fire type

Convento de São Bernardino Masonry 1994 Monastery Monastery Unknown Building A

Chalé da Condessa de

Edla Masonry 1999 Palace Palace Unknown Building A

Casa do Marquês de

Pombal Masonry 1991 Housing Housing Unknown Building A

Capela de Santo Amaro Masonry 1989 Church Church Arson Building A

Capela de Nossa Senhora

do Monte do Carmo

Masonry 1992 Church Church Arson Building A

Portugal

Capela de Nossa Senhora

do Socorro Masonry 1996 Church Church Candle Building A

Fenice theatre in Venice

Wood/ masonry 1996 Theatre Theatre Arson Art objects / building A

Petruzzelli Theatre in Bari

Wood/ masonry/ steel 1991 Theatre Theatre Arson Art objects / building A

Italy Royal Palace /

Guarini’s chapel in Turin

Wood/ masonry 1992 Palace/ Church Church/ Museum Malfunctioning device Art objects / building D

England Windsor Castle Wood/

masonry 1992 Castle Castle Electrical spotlights Archaeological items/ Art objects / building(

people A

Bank Street, Alexandria

Wood/ masonry 2002 Club hall Unoccupied Arson Building A

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Scotland

University Avenue, Glasgow

Wood/ masonry/ reinforced concrete

2001 School School UnknownBuilding/ historic information/ early

scientific equipment D

Oude Brug - Kartuizerinnestraat "Gallerijen De

Jonckheere


concrete/ steel

1992 Market/ Dwelling Market/ Dwelling Renovation works Archaeological items B

Belgium Fire in the town

party hall in Antwerp

Masonry/ steel 2000 Theatre Theatre/ Market/ exposition

Malfunctioning device Building A

9


Building use Country Fire identification Type of

construction Year Original At fire occurrence Causes of the fire Nature of damage Fire type

Chateau d'Agimont

Wood/ masonry 2001 Castle Hotel Unknown Building A

Belgium Church of Waarschoot

Wood/ masonry 2001 Church Church Arson (by playing children) Art objects / building B

Thetrum Oeconomicum Wood/ steel 1990 Bath Office/ Bath Renovation works Building B

Arkadien, Jonkoping Wood 2001 Market/

Dwellings Market/ Dwellings Malfunctioning device Art objects / building B Sweden

Katarina Church Wood 1990 Church Church Old electrical circuits Art objects / building/ historic information A

Parliament of Britany in Rennes

Wood/ masonry 1994 Palace Monument/ Law

courts Unknown Art objects / building/ historic information/

people D

Ancient District of Chambéry

Wood/ masonry

2002 Housing Housing/attics Christmas tree Building/ People/

Business B

France Fire in the

primary school of Guise which

hosted the Museum of "Familistère

Godin" and a library

Wood/ masonry 1997 Library/ Archive/

Museum/ Scholl Library/ Archive/ Museum/ School Arson Art objects C

Luxembourg Saint Mary Cathedral Wood 1985 Church Church Welding Art objects / building B

Esztergom Roman Catholic

Cathedral

Wood

1993

Church

Church

Unknown

Building

A

Hungary Miskolc “Tetemvar

Planked Church”

Wood

1997

Church

Church

Arson

Building

A

Mount Athos monastery of Simonopetra

Wood/ masonry/ concrete

1990 Monastery Monastery Vegetation fire Art objects / building B

Greece Historic library of the National Technical

University of Athens

Masonry 1991 Library/ Archive Library/ Archive Accident Art objects / building/ historic information B

Norway Several stave churches Wood 1992-95 Church Monument Arson Art objects / building B

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Regarding the use of the building, both the original use and the use at the time of the fire, it can be seen that churches are the most frequent category, which may indicate either a greater fire frequency in this type of buildings or a reflection of the social impact of such fires on those who have made the selection in each country of the fires to be reported. The second and third most frequent use categories at the time of the fire are Other and Market/ Commercial. The Other category includes brewery/ restaurant, dwellings, windmill, train station, bath, law courts and exposition/ conference centre. Some of these correspond to changes in the original use. As to the causes of the fires, human causes are the main causes, with arson at the top, followed by renovation works. This may be significant and shall deserve further attention and consideration. Another important aspect is that a great number of fires have unknown causes (included in the category Other), which states the need for future systematic data collection. The best represented type of fire is the fire causing great damage to an historic building (type A), followed by the fire causing great damage both to the building and to the contents with historic value (type D). Only one fire from type C (Fire occurring in a building with no special historic meaning, but affecting items with great artistic/ historic value) was reported. This may have one of two interpretations. Either such fires are much less frequent due to the fact that they belong to the category of new buildings where modern fire safety engineering can be and has been applied and was much more efficient, or those who collected the information did not consider this type of fires as important as the other 3 categories. As a consequence, the most frequent type of damage reported is the damage to the building.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Wood

Masonry

Reinforced concrete

Steel

Composite steel/concrete

Other

Type

of c

onst

ruct

ion

Number of cases70

Fig. 1 – Distribution of fires by type of construction

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0 5 10 15 20 25

Castle

Church/ Temple

Hospital

Hotel

Industry

Library/ Archive

Market/ Commercial

Monastery

Monument

Museum

Office

Palace

School

Theatre

OtherO

rigin

al u

se o

f the

bui

ldin

g

Number of cases

Fig. 2 – Distribution of fires by original use of the building

0 5 10 15 20 25

Castle

Church/ Temple

Hospital

Hotel

Industry

Library/ Archive

Market/ Commercial

Monastery

Monument

Museum

Office

Palace

School

Theatre

Other

Use

at t

he ti

me

of th

e fir

e

Number of cases

Fig. 3 – Distribution of fires by use of the building at the time of the fire

12

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 2

Malfunctioning device/ installation

Old electrical circuits

Old gas ducts

Other

Arson

Candle

Cigarette

Fireplace

Fireworks

Heaters

Welding (renovation works)

Other

Lightning

Earthquake

Other

Cau

ses

of th

e fir

e

Number of cases0

Faulty installations

Human causes (undue human action)

Natural causes

Fig. 4 – Distribution of fires by cause of the fire

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Fire causing great damage to anhistoric building

Fire causing great damage to severalhistoric buildings (conflagration)

Fire occurring in a building with nospecial historic meaning, but affectingitems with great artistic/ historic value

Fire causing great damage both to thebuilding and to the contents with

historic value

Type

of f

ire

Number of cases

A

B

C

D

Fig. 5 – Distribution of fires by type of fire

13

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 8

Damage to archaeological items

Damage to art objects

Damage to the building

Damage to written historic information

Injury to people

Other

Nat

ure

of d

amag

e

Number of cases0

Fig. 6 – Distribution of fires by type of damage

3. Analysis of significant fires

3.1 Introduction

The collection of the detailed information on the 22 fires selected by means of part B of the Questionnaire was made with the help of the Guidelines prepared by FiRE-TECH Working Group 2 (see Annex 3). For the clarification of some of the Guidelines’ questions and to obtain additional relevant information, the questionnaire Guidelines-Clarification was used (see Annex 5). The replies to the Guidelines and to the Guidelines-Clarification can be found in Annexes 4 and 6, respectively.

In each country, this information was obtained by each partner of the consortium, in direct contact with the organizations, identified in part B of the “Questionnaire for bodies dealing with Cultural Heritage in member states” as having the requested data stored and available.

The Guidelines aimed to guarantee that the data gathering was done in a harmonized way, to facilitate the subsequent treatment and interpretation. Significant aspects not explicitly covered in the Guidelines have been included in those fields where comments or further specification were asked for. From these comments and from additional available information on some of the fires, together with the set of answers from the Guidelines, the most relevant aspects of each fire could be summarized. This is done in Sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.20. A global analysis is then made in Section 3.2, together with the main conclusions.

3.2 Summary of the data collected

Tables 2 and 3 show a summary of the information collected by means of the Guidelines and the Guidelines-Clarification. A graphic overview is given in Figs. 7 to 58. The complete answers can be found in Annexes 4 and 6.

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Table 3 – Summary of the information collected by means of the Guidelines-Clarification

Country Germany Bavaria

Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz Portugal Portugal France France France Italy ItalyFire identification Schloss

Philippsruhe Altstadt

Lauterbach Kurhaus, Baden-baden

Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon


Parliament of Britany in

Rennes

Museum of “Familistère

Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

Year of occurrence 1994 1992 1987 1993 1988 1999 2002 1994 1997 1992 1992A. Characterization of the fire scenario A.1 Characterization of the building A.1.1 Original use of the building 1. Castle 2. Church/ Temple X 3. Hospital 4. Hotel x 5. Industry 6. Library/ Archive x 7. Market/Commerce x x 8. Monastery x x 9. Monument 10. Museum x 11. Office x x 12. Palace x x x 13. School x 14. Theatre 15. Other x x x A.1.2 Type of structure 1. Composite steel/concrete 2. Masonry x x x x x x x x x x3. Reinforced concrete x 4. Steel x 5. Wood x x x x x x x x x6. Other x x x A.1.3 Building contents 1. Archaeological objects x x 2. Art objects x x x x 3. Films/ Photographs 4. Historic documentation x x x x x 5. Other x x x A.2 Characterization of the occupants/ activity

A.2.1 Use at the time of the fire

1. Castle 2. Church/ Temple x 3. Hospital 4. Hotel x x x

Table 3 – Summary of the information collected by means of the Guidelines-Clarification (cont.)


Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

5. Industry 6. Library/ Archive x x 7. Market/ Commercial x x x 8. Monastery 9. Monument x 10. Museum x x x 11. Office x x 12. Palace x 13. School x x 14. Theatre 15. Other x x x x x 16. If the use of the building at the time of the fire was different (…)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Not applicable

(5)

(6)

A.2.2 Type of occupants (was the building normally used by people familiar with the building or was it open to visitors as well) 1. Familiar with the building x x x x x x x x X

2. Visitors x x x x x X x A.2.3 Age of the occupants (did the building include schools for children, kindergarten or elderly homes?) 1. Adults x x x x x x x x x x2. Aged x x x x x x x 3. Children x x x x x x x x A.2.4 Physical condition of the occupants (did the building include health care services or homes for disabled people?) 1. Limited x x 2. Normal x x x x x x x x x x 1 Along the years partition or even load bearing walls had been removed to obtain open spaces, more adequate to the commercial use, without alternative fire safety measures, thus facilitating the potential fire spread. Load bearing walls were replaced in some cases by steel beams, without adequate fire protection. For administration/ commercial purposes, unauthorized unprotected communication openings had been made by the owner/ user in the fire walls separating two or more adjacent buildings, thus drastically changing the fire safety of those buildings. 2 At the level of the top floor new constructions (like a restaurant for the personnel of the Town Hall) had been added. Significant parts of the building had been adapted for the use of the Administrative Services of the Town Hall, adding new light weight combustible partitions. The use of the whole space was very intensive and included the misuse of the evacuation paths to store documentation and archives. 3 Ancient buildings adapted to modern housing (space distribution, equipment and materials). 4 Night fire. No problems with occupants. 5 When the fire stated in the building there were none. Usually the occupants were visitors. 6 At the time the fire started in the building there were none. Usually the occupants were visitors, mostly adults, awake.

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Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

A.2.5 State (did the building include sleeping facilities?) 1. Asleep x x x 2. Awake x x x x x x x x A.3 Type and amount of fire load

A.3.1 Type of fire load in the initial fire cell?

1. Easily ignitable x x x x x 2. Normal x x x x x x x xA.3.2 Fire load density qf in the initial fire cell

1. qf < 15 kg wood/m2 floor area

2. 15 < qf < 50 kg wood/m2 floor area x x x x x x

3. qf > 50 kg wood/m2 floor area x x x x A.4 Detection A.4.1 (…) automatic detection system?

1 None x x x x x x x 2. Flame 3. Heat 4. Smoke x x x x 5. Other x A.4.2 Did the automatic detection system work? N N Y

Y

A.4.3 Was there a night watcher in the building? N N Y N ? Y N N A.4.4 Did the night watcher detect the fire at an early stage? N N N A.5 Fire fighting/ containment 1. Was there any safety management system (…) Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N2. Did the building have an on-site fire brigade? N N N N N N N N N N N3. Did the on-site fire brigade act in due time? N Y Y

17



Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

4. (…) first attack fire fighting equipment? N N Y N N Y Y Y N Y5. Was it available? Y N N Y 6. Was the alert to the fire brigade transmitted? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y7. How long after detection? ? ? immediately ? ? immediately ? ~1.5 hours? ?

Almost immediately

Almost immediately

8. How long did the fire brigade take to arrive? 7 min 7 min 5-15 min 5 min 3 min 5 min 5-15 min A few min. ?

A few minutes

A few minutes

9. (…) portable extinguishers? (…) Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y10. (…) fixed suppression system? (…) N N N N N N N N N Y N11. Did it function as expected? 12. (…) enough extinguishing agent (…)? Y Y Y ? 13. Was the building divided into fire cells? N N Y N N N NA N Y14. (…) compartmentation effective (…)? N Y N N N N N N15. Did the fire propagate to other floors? If yes, how? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N16. Did the fire propagate to other buildings? If yes, how? N Y N N Y N Y N

N

N N17. Additional comments (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) A.6 Evacuation 7 Grandella building: Due to the various communication openings (unprotected wooden stairs, mechanical stairs, lift) between all the 8 storeys of the building (some of them interconnected) and to the easily ignitable character of the fire load, the fire and the fire effluents could propagate very quickly to all the floors. Other buildings: All the affected buildings had unprotected vertical communication openings and wooden floors, which contributed to the quick fire spread inside them. 8 The interior space of the building was intensively used by the Administrative Services of the Town Hall with a high fire load density, mostly consisting in paper, without adequate fire compartmentation. 9 Tens of dwellings in close ancient buildings (XIV to XVII century). Attics transformed into dwellings. Floors with limited fire resistance. 10 A large volume under the roof with a wooden framework (XVII century), no compartmentation. 11 Large amount of books / archives / cassettes = items with a large fire load density. Self-ignition of the linseed oil of the paintings is probably the origin of the destruction of the canvas, the frames where nearly intact after the fire.

18


Country Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

1. Was there an alarm system? N N Y N N N N Y N N Y2. Was it operational? N Y Y 3. Was it activated? Y Y Y 4. Was the building provided with safe evacuation paths (…)? Y N Y Y N N N Y 5. Were the number and size of the evacuation paths adequate and effective? Y N Y Y N 6. Was the building provided with adequate evacuation signs? Y N Y Y N N N Y 7. Was the building provided with emergency illumination? N N ? ? N N N Y 8. Did it work? ? ? 9. Additional comments (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) A.7 Smoke management A.7.1 (…) type of smoke extraction system (…)? 1 Mechanical x 2. Natural x 3. None x x x x x x x 1. Did it work? N Y 2. Was it effective? N Y 3. Additional comments (18) (19) (20) (21)

Germany Bavaria

12 One of the three involved buildings had a stair-case and an evacuation path that lead through the entrance of the restaurant in ground floor. 13 The fire developed during the night. Only one resident and one fireman lost their lives. Had it been however during shopping hours and the number of casualties would certainly have been much greater, as a consequence of the quick fire development and the inexistence of adequate protected evacuation paths. 14 The vertical evacuation paths consisted in non enclosed wooden stairs. The most critical was the evacuation through one single wooden stair from the upper level where the restaurant for the personnel was located. 15 Housing in close ancient buildings of a few levels. 16 Night fire. Alarm signal seems to have been ignored during a long time. No reference is made to problems with people having to leave the building. 17 Comments to 4-8: This items are not described in the comments of the fires because they were not important in this case because at the time of the fire (night) there was nobody inside. BUT the fire spread so easily because there was no compartmentation in the building even not between the different parts with different uses. This is because our national regulation allow compartments of 2500m

19



Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

A.8 Causes of the fire A.8.1 Faulty installations 1. Old electrical circuits x x 2. Old gas ducts 3. Malfunctioning device/ installation (specify) x x A.8.2 Human causes (undue human action) 1. Cigarette 2. Candle 3. Fireplace 4. Heaters 5. Welding (refurbishment works) x x 6. Fireworks 7. Arson x x ? x A.8.3 Natural causes 1. Lightning 2. Earthquake 3. Vegetation fire A.8.4 Other x x A.8.5 Additional comments

(22)

(23)

(24)

Arson in the school

18 Grandella building: Due to the various communication openings (unprotected wooden stairs, mechanical stairs, lift) between all the 8 storeys of the building (some of them interconnected) and to the easily ignitable character of the fire load, the fire and the fire effluents could propagate very quickly to all the floors. 19 It was not effective because the gasses of combustion escaped via the system of the smoke evacuation 20 The dome of the church worked as a chimney: the result was that the church was not damaged by the fire. 21 We can consider a smoke extraction system the windows, once the glass were broken by heat. 22 Grandella building - At the time of the fire, renovation works were underway in the 3rd floor of the building and the plaster protection/ decoration of the wooden ceiling had been totally removed. Although the causes of the fire were never exactly clarified, welding work was pointed as a possible cause at that time. This brings to evidence the need to implement and enforce regulations to be applied at construction sites, here including renovation works in existing buildings, especially when the fire protection of Cultural Heritage is the objective, either the protection of an historic/ classified building or the fire protection of its contents with particular historic/ artistic value. 23 The fire occurred during renovation works inside the building. Due to the historic character of the building and to the high fire frequency during renovation works, special fire precaution measures should be foreseen to be applied, also and especially by the State departments during such intervention works. 24 The level of fire extension observed when the firemen arrived seems to have been largely facilitated by the long time taken to take the alarm signal into account. A large wood framework. No fire cells.

20



Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

B. Consequences of the fire B.1 Consequences on people B.1.1 Could the occupants be evacuated without injury to people or casualties? Y Y Y Y N Y N

No occupants at

fire level Y

B.1.2 Number of casualties 2 0 2 0 - 0 0 B.1.3 Number of injured people 73 0 1-4?

Several firemen -

Nobody in the building 0

B.1.4 Causes of deaths 1. Smoke x 2. Heat x x 3. Structural collapse 4. Trample crush A fall B.2 Consequences on the building

B.2.1 Non-structural elements 1. Soot damage to wall paintings x x x x 2. Heat damage to bas-relief x x x x 3. Burnt woodwork x x x x 4. Other: x B.2.2 Structural elements Please describe the type of structural damage by filling in the table below and using the following symbols D – damage HD – Heavy damage C – Collapse Beams Masonry Reinforced concrete C Steel C C Composite steel/ concrete Wood HD HD HD HD C C D C HDSlabs Masonry Reinforced concrete C

21



Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood HD HD HD HD C C D DWalls Masonry D D D HD/C D D D D DReinforced concrete HD D Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood D C Stairs Masonry HD Reinforced concrete Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood HD C C/HD D D Roof structure Masonry Reinforced concrete D Steel C Composite steel/ concrete Wood C HD HD C C C HD C HD - C D B.2.3 Additional comments

(25)

(26)

Ceiling of library collapsed

(27)

B.3 Nature of damage

(28) 1. Damage by burning x x x x x x x x x x 2. Damage by heat x x x x x x x 3. Damage by extinguishing water x x x x x x x x x x4. Damage by soot x x x x x x x x

25 The severity of the fire caused the complete destruction of several buildings or parts of them. Most of the main load bearing walls in these buildings were very thick (over 1 m) masonry walls that withstand well the action of heat. Many of them however collapsed or had to be demolished immediately after the fire as a consequence of heavy damage caused by the thermal elongations of the horizontal construction elements. 26 Important damage caused by extinguishing water was reported 27 The masonry was damaged by heat, the floors were heavily damaged although they didn't collapse, the roof structure was less damaged. Also the pictures contained in the gallery were damaged by the fire. 28 The masonry was damaged by the heat, the damage of the dome was due to the collapse of the iron tie-beams inserted in the masonry.

22



Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

B.4 Damage value x

1. Estimated value of damage to the building DB (Euros) 80 million €

(29)

? 40 million €

45 million € (Guarinis Chapel +

Royal Palace)

2. Estimated value of damage to the contents DC (…) (Euros)

(30)

? 20 million € NA


Royal Palace)


Royal Palace)

3. Estimated value of damage to the business (Euros)

(31)

? ? NA 4. Damage ratio R = DC/DB ?? 0.1 - 0.15 0.1 - 0.15

5. Declared loss (DB + DC) (Euros) 5 million € 1 million € 2.5 million € 4 million € ?? NA


Royal Palace)


Royal Palace)

6. (…) socio-economic impact of the fire (…)

(32)

(33)

(34)

(35)

29 25.000.000 euros were spent in the reconstruction, which included the repair of wall paintings damaged by water and the repair of wood carved ceilings 30 Original ancient 78 rpm music records made by “Valentim de Carvalho” as well as the old archives were lost in the fire, with a value difficult to estimate. 31 Difficult to quantify. Some of the commerce moved to other zones in the meanwhile. Other closed the doors. 5 700 000 euros was the amount paid to the workers of the shops and offices affected by the fire that lost their jobs. 12 years were needed to rebuild and normalize the activity in affected area. 32 The fire occurred in the old city centre, one of the appreciated shopping areas of Lisbon, where some of the oldest and more famous shops were located. The fact that so many buildings were involved and the fear that the area would lose its character after rebuilding produced a great social impact and heavy discussions in the media. The socio economic consequences of the fire developed over the 12 year-period of the reconstruction, with the loss of their jobs for the workers of the directly affected commerce and offices, and the negative consequences of the rebuilding activity on the commerce in the nearby unaffected buildings. The complex decision process after the fire was the main cause for the delayed reconstruction period. The heavy public pressure to rebuild respecting as much as possible the original architecture restrained the impetus to increase the volume of construction, and the final outcome resulted in a renewed zone, that locals and foreigners visit with renewed pleasure. 33 Besides affecting an historical building, the fire had an increased social impact mainly due to the fact that it occurred in a State Building, administered by one of the entities that are supposed to enforce the fire safety regulations in Lisbon. Public opinion has difficulty in accepting the State Departments as exceptions in what concerns the application of the regulations. 34 Two dead persons. About 27 dwellings more or less destroyed. About sixty persons out of dwellings. Several shops in the vicinity closed. About 18 months needed for restoration. 35 Ancient framework and roof fully destroyed. 2/3 of the surface of the building damaged.

23



Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-




Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

B.5 Environmental damage

Describe briefly

No environmental damage

None None

C. Additional information (…) aspects not covered above (…)

(36)

(37)

(38)

(39)

(40)

(41)

36 After the fire - during the renovation - fire walls, an alarm system and natural smoke extraction in the stair cases were installed. 37 The main reasons why the initial fire became a conflagration can be summarized as follows: 1) Deliberate criminal human action or; 2) Human negligence / unqualified workmanship + lack of adequate fire safety regulations for construction sites + corresponding enforcing measures; 3) Inefficient / late fire detection; 4) Presence of easily combustible + big fire load; 5) Big opening factor + big radiation area of openings in the facades; 6) Lack of horizontal and vertical fire compartmentation in the building of fire origin, leading to great heat radiation rates simultaneously through all the big openings in the façade of the building of fire origin to the facing buildings; 7) Very reduced distance between facing openings in a shaft common to the building of fire origin and to another one; 8) Combustible materials used in advertising elements placed outside the facades and in the windows; 9) Lack of horizontal and vertical fire compartmentation in the additional buildings involved in the fire; 10) The existence of illegal unauthorized communication openings between different adjacent buildings; 11) The existence of illegal combustible constructions + stored goods / waste in inner yards common to several buildings (common situation in old urban areas). Horizontal loads developed by thermally restrained heated elements were the main cause for the collapse of vertical elements (columns and walls) or of the entire structure. Evidence of this type of action could be found in several locations. This was particularly evident in steel elements. Some of them were commonly used to replace the function of masonry walls removed to create wider spaces. 38 Developed fire in a dwelling. Vertical fire propagation to upper levels; Quick horizontal propagation from the first building to adjoining buildings, at the highest levels (3-4); The fire resistance degree of floors and walls was not sufficient to prevent the vertical and horizontal spreads; Wooden stairs, wooden roof structures, fuel load in attics transformed into dwellings; The firemen encountered different difficulties: a narrow street, a complex configuration of the buildings block, main doors closed... 39 Developed fire under the roof when the brigade arrived. Quick horizontal propagation; no compartmentation. Large wooden framework. 40 The fire interested the Guarini’s chapel in the church and a floor of the royal palace used as a picture gallery. There were probably two initial fire cell: one in Guarini's Chapel of the Church, the other in the picture gallery of the Royal Palace: this supposition is due to the fact the door that connects the Chapel to the Royal Palace after the fire was found still closed. Even if the alarm system worked and the fire brigade arrived in a few minutes, the fire caused a lot of damages: in fact the fire spread in very short time because of the high fire load density and of the starting of a flash over, probably in the chapel. The dome of the chapel was surrounded by the wooden scaffoldings because of the works of repair. The investigations are still in progress, so many informations are missing. 41 The fire interested the Guarini’s chapel in the church and a floor of the royal palace used as a picture gallery. There were probably two initial fire cell: one in Guarini's Chapel of the Church, the other in the picture gallery of the Royal Palace: this supposition is due to the fact the door that connects the Chapel to the Royal Palace after the fire was found still closed. Even if the alarm system worked and the fire brigade arrived in a few minutes, the fire caused a lot of damages: in fact the fire spread in very short time because of the high fire load density and of the starting of a flash over, probaly in the chapel. The dome of the chapel was surrounded by the wooden scaffoldings because of the works of repair. The investigations are still in progress, so many informations are missing.

24


Country Italy Italy UK

England Austria Holland Holland

Fire identification Fenice theatre in Venice

Petruzzelli Theatre in

Bari

Windsor Castle

Redoutensäle Hofburg

Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

Year of occurrence 1996 1991 1992 1992 1998 1996A. Characterization of the fire scenario

A.1 Characterization of the building

A.1.1 Original use of the building 1. Castle X x 2. Church/ Temple x 3. Hospital 4. Hotel 5. Industry 6. Library/ Archive 7. Market/Commerce 8. Monastery 9. Monument 10. Museum 11. Office 12. Palace 13. School 14. Theatre x x 15. Other x (wind mill) A.1.2 Type of structure 1. Composite steel/concrete 2. Masonry x x X x x x3. Reinforced concrete 4. Steel X (42) 5. Wood x x X x x x6. Other x A.1.3 Building contents 1. Archaeological objects X 2. Art objects X x 3. Films/ Photographs 4. Historic documentation x

42 The dome structure, made of steel, covered the stalls, while the trusses roof covered the stage

25


Country Italy Italy UK England Austria Holland Holland



Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

5. Other

Church items x (43)

A.2 Characterization of the occupants/ activity A.2.1 Use at the time of the fire 1. Castle X 2. Church/ Temple x 3. Hospital 4. Hotel 5. Industry 6. Library/ Archive 7. Market/ Commercial 8. Monastery 9. Monument 10. Museum 11. Office 12. Palace 13. School 14. Theatre x x 15. Other Conference x 16. If the use of the building at the time of the fire was different (…)

(44)

A.2.2 Type of occupants (was the building normally used by people familiar with the building or was it open to visitors as well) (45) (46)

43 Traditional windmill equipment such as grinding wheels 44 At the time of the fire in the theatre there were works of repair of the floors, false ceiling, of adjusting the lighting plant as laid down by law, of carrying out anti-fire water system. The theatre was closed for the audience, but the administration still worked. When the fire started in the theatre (about at 20.40) there were: two workmen, the watcher and the photographer in charge to document the stages of the works; so they were all familiar with the building. 45 The origin of the fire was in private apartments but other parts of the castle are open to the public. The members of the household and staff range in ages with a number of elderly staff. The fire occurred during the day and it is expected that most people in the building were awake and familiar with the building. 46 No occupants in the building at the time of the fire

26





Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

1. Familiar with the building x X x 2. Visitors x x A.2.3 Age of the occupants (did the building include schools for children, kindergarten or elderly homes?) 1. Adults x x X 2. Aged x x X x 3. Children x A.2.4 Physical condition of the occupants (did the building include health care services or homes for disabled people?) 1. Limited x x 2. Normal x x x A.2.5 State (did the building include sleeping facilities?) 1. Asleep 2. Awake x x x x A.3 Type and amount of fire load A.3.1 Type of fire load in the initial fire cell? 1. Easily ignitable x x x (47) 2. Normal x x A.3.2 Fire load density qf in the initial fire cell 1. qf < 15 kg wood/m2 floor area 2. 15 < qf < 50 kg wood/m2 floor area x x 3. qf > 50 kg wood/m2 floor area A.4 Detection

47 Wooden construction, wooden separating floors

27





Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

A.4.1 (…) automatic detection system? 1 None x x x 2. Flame 3. Heat x 4. Smoke x x x 5. Other A.4.2 Did the automatic detection system work? N48 NA Y Y (too late) NA A.4.3 Was there a night watcher in the building? Y Y N Y N A.4.4 Did the night watcher detect the fire at an early stage? Y N N N NA A.5 Fire fighting/ containment 1. Was there any safety management system (…) N N Y N N N2. Did the building have an on-site fire brigade? N N Y Y N N3. Did the on-site fire brigade act in due time? Y Y N NA 4. (…) first attack fire fighting equipment? Y Y Y Y N5. Was it available? Y Y Y Y NA 6. Was the alert to the fire brigade transmitted? Y Y Y Y Y7. How long after detection? immediately 5 min minutes minutes Around 1 h 8. How long did the fire brigade take to arrive? 4-5 min < 5 min 8 min 7 min (49) NA9. (…) portable extinguishers? (…) Y N Y Y Y (Powder) NA10. (…) fixed suppression system? (…) Y N N N N N

48 The smoke detection system had been disconnected in the initial fire cell, where repair works were under way. 49 High ladder available after 20 minutes.

28





Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

11. Did it function as expected? N NA 12. (…) enough extinguishing agent (…)? Y N N (50) 13. Was the building divided into fire cells? Y N N N N N14. (…) compartmentation effective (…)? N N (51) N N NA15. Did the fire propagate to other floors? If yes, how? Y Y Y Y

Y (Wooden floor

separations)

Y(Wooden floor

separations) 16. Did the fire propagate to other buildings? If yes, how? N N ( 52) N N N17. Additional comments (53) (54) (55) (56) A.6 Evacuation 1. Was there an alarm system? Y Y Y N N2. Was it operational? Y Y Y NA 3. Was it activated? Y Y Y NA 4. Was the building provided with safe evacuation paths (…)? Y Y Y NA 5. Were the number and size of the evacuation paths adequate and effective? Y Y Y Y NA

50 the channel beside the windmill was frozen and therefore the water supply was difficult 51 The compartmentation between the stage and the side rooms was inefficient 52 There aren't other buildings around 53 The Rio della Fenice (the near canal), to whom one of the fixed suppression system was connected, was lacking of water because of the works of cleaning. Moreover the anti-fire openings were too distant (22 m) from the initial fire cell: so the water pressure was too low to reach it. 54 .The fire probably broke out on 1992 11 26 (on 1992 11 27 at 01:05 a.m. an employee of the security detected the fire, at the same time a ionization alarm released fire alarm in the air condition fo the interpreters’ rooms) and at 08:15 a.m. on 1992 11 28 the fire fighters reported “end of fire”. 55 The firemen were familiar with the site, how to reach it and where extinguishing equipment was and had held excercises there. The fire fighting had to be done very high. The church was 63m high. 56 A large problem with many flying brands. Large grinding stones in building threatening to fall, and windmill wings threatening to fall made the fire fighters work difficult.

29





Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

6. Was the building provided with adequate evacuation signs? Y Y Y Y NA 7. Was the building provided with emergency illumination? Y Y Y NA8. Did it work? Y (57) Y Y NA

(58) (59) A.7 Smoke management A.7.1 (…) type of smoke extraction system (…)? 1 Mechanical x 2. Natural 3. None x x x x 1. Did it work? Y NA 2. Was it effective? Y NA 3. Additional comments A.8 Causes of the fire A.8.1 Faulty installations 1. Old electrical circuits x 2. Old gas ducts 3. Malfunctioning device/ installation (specify) x A.8.2 Human causes (undue human action) 1. Cigarette 2. Candle 3. Fireplace 4. Heaters 5. Welding (refurbishment works) x 6. Fireworks 7. Arson x x (60) A.8.3 Natural causes

9. Additional comments

57 All the time of the fire there weren't people 58 There were two alarm systems: a siren and a luminous alarm. 59 The evacuation took time and was the main issue of the fire fighters upon arrival. The persons in the church were elderly and not very mobile and had to be helped out of the church. 60 The cause of the fire has been identified in the (unjustified) presence of hydrocarbons and polyethylene.

30





Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

1. Lightning 2. Earthquake 3. Vegetation fire A.8.4 Other x A.8.5 Additional comments

(61)

(62)

B. Consequences of the fire B.1 Consequences on people B.1.1 Could the occupants be evacuated without injury to people or casualties? N

No one inside

during the fire Y Y Y (63) NA

B.1.2 Number of casualties 0 0 NA B.1.3 Number of injured people 0 10 0 NAB.1.4 Causes of deaths 1. Smoke 2. Heat 3. Structural collapse 4. Trample crush B.2 Consequences on the building B.2.1 Non-structural elements 1. Soot damage to wall paintings x x ( 64) x

X (destroyed)

2. Heat damage to bas-relief x x x

X (destroyed)

3. Burnt woodwork x x X

(destroyed) x x

61 The fire was set by two workmen; it's not clear if there were one or two initial fire cells: without any doubt one fire was set in the foyer of the gallery. 62 The fire had spread under the tower without any visible exterior signs. 63 An almost incident happened when the welder ran up back into the church tower to try and extinguish the beginning fire before the fire brigade had arrived. He was then trapped up in the tower by the fire and had to be rescued by firemen with breathing apparatus. 64 due not only to the soot, but also to the collapse of the structural elements below

31





Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

4. Other: B.2.2 Structural elements Please describe the type of structural damage by filling in the table below and using the following symbols D – damage HD – Heavy damage C – Collapse Beams Masonry Reinforced concrete Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood C C D Slabs Masonry Reinforced concrete Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood Walls Masonry HD D D Reinforced concrete Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood C Stairs Masonry D Reinforced concrete Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood HD D C Roof structure Masonry D Reinforced concrete Steel C C (dome) Composite steel/ concrete

32





Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

Wood C HD (truss

roof) C D C CB.2.3 Additional comments

(65)

(66) (67)

B.3 Nature of damage 1. Damage by burning x x x x x x2. Damage by heat x x x x x 3. Damage by extinguishing water x x 4. Damage by soot x x B.4 Damage value

95 million €

54.5 million €

(reconstruction costs) + 1.5 million € for furniture 1 million €

2. Estimated value of damage to the contents DC (with artistic/historical interest) (Euros) ? 3. Estimated value of damage to the business (Euros) ? 4. Damage ratio R = DC/DB DB>DC DB>DC 5. Declared loss (DB + DC) (Euros)

48 million €

6. (…) socio-economic impact of the fire (…)

(68) (69)

(70) (71) (72)

65 The fire destroyed all the entire building: only the perimeter walls still stand. 66 The fire destroyed almost all the interiors of the building, only the perimeter and load bearing walls survived 67 Damage due to collapse of church tower on interior of church. Damage due to falling church clocks. 68 This estimate is based on the reconstruction costs. It's difficult to value the loss of the theatre for the city because it was considered such a symbol. 69 The Theatre, dating from 1903, was a symbol for the history of Bari and a meeting place for the residents of the city. 70 As a result of the fire, estimations for the repair were circa £60m. The issue as to whether public money should be used to repair the castle was discussed in the House of Commons and in the national media. 71 The fire was considered of importance because the church was newly renovated and the church tower was very high. The fire was also spectacular.

1. Estimated value of damage to the building DB (Euros)

33



England Austria Holland Holland



Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

B.5 Environmental damage

Describe briefly

Not important environmental damage. None

C. Additional information (…) aspects not covered above (…)

(73)

(74)

72 This windmill is one of the highest in the world situated in the centre of a city and thus a "landmark" 73 Even if the fire had been signaled about 15-20 minutes after its beginning (about 20.40) and the local fire brigade arrived in 4-5 minutes, the fire destroyed the building: the hight propagation speed of the fire, maybe due to the use of accelerants, prevented the fire brigades from getting into the building. Moreover a flash over started. Because of the dimension of the fire and the impossibility to get into, also the firemen helicopters were used, with a technique usually utilized for diurnal wooded fires. 74 The former manager of the Theatre was convicted as the fire instigator; moreover, he hadn't carried out the adjustments as laid down by law (in fact, the building was without any fire safety systems). The investigations still go on.

34


Country Holland Hungary Hungary Belgium Greece GreeceFire identification Hollands

Spoor Miskolk

"Tetemvar Planked Church"


Cathedral

Oude Brug - Kartuizerinn

estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra

Historic library of the

National Technical


Year of occurrence 1989 1997 1993 1992 1990 1991A. Characterization of the fire scenario


A.1.1 Original use of the building 1. Castle 2. Church/ Temple x x 3. Hospital 4. Hotel 5. Industry 6. Library/ Archive X 7. Market/Commerce x 8. Monastery x 9. Monument 10. Museum 11. Office 12. Palace 13. School 14. Theatre 15. Other x (railway

station X (75) x XA.1.2 Type of structure 1. Composite steel/concrete 2. Masonry x x x X 3. Reinforced concrete x 4. Steel 5. Wood x x 6. Other x (cast iron

roof structure x

A.1.3 Building contents

75 Core : empty furniture shop surrounded by dwelling houses, restaurants, souvenirs shops…

35



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


1. Archaeological objects 2. Art objects x X 3. Films/ Photographs X 4. Historic documentation x X 5. Other x (76) x x X (77) A.2 Characterization of the occupants/ activity A.2.1 Use at the time of the fire 1. Castle 2. Church/ Temple x x 3. Hospital 4. Hotel 5. Industry 6. Library/ Archive X 7. Market/ Commercial 8. Monastery x 9. Monument 10. Museum 11. Office 12. Palace 13. School 14. Theatre 15. Other x X (78) x X16. If the use of the building at the time of the fire was different (…) ( ) 79 (80)

76 Modern restaurant in station between two rails where fire started. In main building (that was undamaged) art objects were present. 77 Was empty at the time of the fire. The furniture shop was moved. Only some partitions of the shops remained. 78 No function anymore, the entire space of the shop was going to be demolished. It was during this demolition works that the fire started. Surrounding buildings: shops, restaurants, dwelling houses, garages… 79 The fire started when the workmen where burning off the roofing (bituminous roof covering) 80 Some old wooden balconies had been pulled out for replacement sometime before the fire occurred. This increased the spread of fire inside through the external walls.(See below the description of the fire and figures)

36


Country Hungary Holland Hungary Belgium Greece GreeceFire identification Hollands

Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


A.2.2 Type of occupants (was the building normally used by people familiar with the building or was it open to visitors as well) (81) 1. Familiar with the building x x x X 2. Visitors x x A.2.3 Age of the occupants (did the building include schools for children, kindergarten or elderly homes?) 1. Adults x x x X 2. Aged x 3. Children x A.2.4 Physical condition of the occupants (did the building include health care services or homes for disabled people?) 1. Limited x 2. Normal x x x X A.2.5 State (did the building include sleeping facilities?) 1. Asleep 2. Awake x x x X A.3 Type and amount of fire load A.3.1 Type of fire load in the initial fire cell? 1. Easily ignitable x X (82) x2. Normal x (83) x x X

81 No occupants in the building at the time of the fire 82 pile framing; store & warehouse was empty 83 Tablecloths, napkins, and typical restaurant interior.

37



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


A.3.2 Fire load density qf in the initial fire cell 1. qf < 15 kg wood/m2 floor area x x 2. 15 < qf < 50 kg wood/m2 floor area 3. qf > 50 kg wood/m2 floor area x x X A.4 Detection A.4.1 (…) automatic detection system? 1 None x x x X (84) X2. Flame 3. Heat x 4. Smoke x 5. Other A.4.2 Did the automatic detection system work? NA NA NA NA Y NAA.4.3 Was there a night watcher in the building? Y N Y NA N NAA.4.4 Did the night watcher detect the fire at an early stage? Y (85) NA N NA NA NAA.5 Fire fighting/ containment 1. Was there any safety management system (…) N N N N N N2. Did the building have an on-site fire brigade? N N N N N N3. Did the on-site fire brigade act in due time? NA NA NA NA NA NA4. (…) first attack fire fighting equipment? Y N N N Y Y5. Was it available? Y NA NA NA Y N 6. Was the alert to the fire brigade transmitted? Y Y Y Y Y NA

84 It didn’t function anymore 85 The night watcher detected the fire when the window of the restaurant was broken because of the fire.

38



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


7. How long after detection? few min 8-9min 2 min immediatly NA NA 8. How long did the fire brigade take to arrive? NA 2 min 5 min 5 to 6 min > 15 min 30 min 9. (…) portable extinguishers? (…) NA Y Y NA (86) Y Y10. (…) fixed suppression system? (…) N N N N Y N11. Did it function as expected? NA NA NA NA N NA12. (…) enough extinguishing agent (…)? N (87) NA NA NA N NA13. Was the building divided into fire cells? NA N Y N (88) N N14. (…) compartmentation effective (…)? NA N Y N N N 15. Did the fire propagate to other floors? If yes, how? N N N Y Y Y16. Did the fire propagate to other buildings? If yes, how? N N N Y N Y17. Additional comments

(89) (90)

Fire-fighting on a place difficult of access from height (91)

See the description of the fire

Very high fire load density

A.6 Evacuation

86 Maybe the workmen had portable extinguishers but where not used 87 the fire was in the roof and the water supply was not sufficient to reach it 88 There was no compartmentation. Not even between warehouse and store. Only the natural compartmentation between “Gallerijen de Jonckheere” and the other buildings/shops of the “Wollestraat” stayed intact (see figure 1). The fire brigade managed to cool this walls. 89 A very large roof in the building. Glass from the roof was falling down on the fire fighters equipment decreasing the available water supply. 90 The church was located 10 m far from the public road on the middle of hillside, but it was difficult to approach (it can be done from only one direction). Because of high quantity of combustible building structure the need for water-intensity was high, the fire spread widely on the roof very quickly, and it was impossible to go inside the church. 91 The furniture store and its warehouse were completely surrounded by other building along 3 sides (see figure 1). The streets where very narrow. The main firefighting problem was the access to the complex (narrow streets, in old city centre and surrounded by other buildings).

39



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


1. Was there an alarm system? N N N Y N N2. Was it operational? NA NA NA N NA NA 3. Was it activated? NA NA NA N NA NA 4. Was the building provided with safe evacuation paths (…)? NA Y Y NA (92) N Y5. Were the number and size of the evacuation paths adequate and effective? NA Y Y NA (92) N Y6. Was the building provided with adequate evacuation signs? NA N Y NA (92) N Y7. Was the building provided with emergency illumination? NA N Y NA (92) Y N8. Did it work? NA NA Y NA (92) Y NA9. Additional comments

(93)

Evacuation was not a significant problem for that case.

Evacuation was not a significant problem for that low rise building.

A.7 Smoke management A.7.1 (…) type of smoke extraction system (…)? 1 Mechanical 2. Natural 3. None N x x x x X1. Did it work? NA NA NA NA NA NA2. Was it effective? NA NA NA NA NA NA3. Additional comments A.8 Causes of the fire A.8.1 Faulty installations 1. Old electrical circuits

92 Not applicable anymore since the building was empty 93 At the moment the fire started nobody was staying in the church (at about 2.20 a.m.)

40



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


2. Old gas ducts 3. Malfunctioning device/ installation (specify) A.8.2 Human causes (undue human action) 1. Cigarette 2. Candle 3. Fireplace 4. Heaters 5. Welding (refurbishment works) x 6. Fireworks 7. Arson x x x A.8.3 Natural causes 1. Lightning 2. Earthquake 3. Vegetation fire x A.8.4 Other X A.8.5 Additional comments (94) See belowB. Consequences of the fire B.1 Consequences on people B.1.1 Could the occupants be evacuated without injury to people or casualties? NA NA NA Y (95) Y YB.1.2 Number of casualties 0 NA NA NA B.1.3 Number of injured people 0 NA NA NA B.1.4 Causes of deaths 1. Smoke 2. Heat 3. Structural collapse

94 The fire started whilst workmen were busy burning off the bituminous roof covering (see figure 1) 95 None of the workmen was injured. People in the surrounding buildings were evacuated in time.

41



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


4. Trample crush B.2 Consequences on the building B.2.1 Non-structural elements 1. Soot damage to wall paintings x x 2. Heat damage to bas-relief 3. Burnt woodwork x x x X 4. Other: B.2.2 Structural elements Please describe the type of structural damage by filling in the table below and using the following symbols D – damage HD – Heavy damage C – Collapse Beams Masonry Reinforced concrete Steel C Composite steel/ concrete Wood C C C Slabs Masonry D Reinforced concrete D Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood Walls Masonry D D D D Reinforced concrete Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood C C Stairs Masonry

42



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


Reinforced concrete Steel Composite steel/ concrete Wood C Roof structure Masonry Reinforced concrete

Steel HD (cast

iron) Composite steel/ concrete Wood C C C D CB.2.3 Additional comments

The roof where the fire started collapsed completely

Serious damage to

marble beams, columns and other structural elements.

B.3 Nature of damage 1. Damage by burning x x x x X2. Damage by heat x x x x X 3. Damage by extinguishing water x X 4. Damage by soot x x X B.4 Damage value 1. Estimated value of damage to the building DB (Euros)

5 to 7 million €

0.28 million € 0.4 million € NA 2000000 5000000

2. Estimated value of damage to the contents DC (with artistic/historical interest) (Euros) 0.1 million € NA NA 100000 1500000 3. Estimated value of damage to the business (Euros) NA NA NA NA NA4. Damage ratio R = DC/DB DB>DC 0.35 NA 0.05 0.3

x

43



Spoor Miskolk



Cathedral


estraat "Gallerijen

De Jonckheere

Mount Athos

monastery of

Simonopetra


National Technical


5. Declared loss (DB + DC) (Euros)

0.38 million € NA NA 2100000 6500000

6. (…) socio-economic impact of the fire (…) (96) (97)

(98)

(99)

B.5 Environmental damage Describe briefly (100) See belowC. Additional information (…) aspects not covered above (…) (101)

(102)

(103)

96 It was a large and spectacular fire in a well-known building. 97 One hundred year old protestant church was a unique value 98 Monastery is 5 centuries old building, one of the 20 monasteries established in Mount Athos. This is a special area, included in the UNESCO World Heritage List. 99 Library and rector’s office consist a symbol of Athens city 100 Water/soot damage in the shops at the Wollestraat. Damage by burning in the Kartuizerinnenstraat. Garages with dwelling houses above were burned down (only facade kept upright) (see foto). Soot damage in the Kartuizerinnenstraat: walls/facades were covered by the soot. 101 Some years before this case of fire the Local Fire Authority has already suggested to built in a fixed fire extinguishing equipment. (There are a fire alarm and a simple sprinkler system existing in the reconstructed church. Sorry to say, they were established only after the fire.) 102 Monastery of Simonopetra was founded in the late Byzantine period on the top of a huge precipitous rock. The monastery complex consists of three main wings.(see photo). Most of the external walls consist of wide stone masonry (1-2m thick). Inside, there is a variety of brickwork, masonry and light-weight traditional walls. The floors and the ceilings are timber, domes, “Russian technique” and concrete floors.Timber roofing is covered by slate tiles. The main large fires in Simonopetra took place on December 1580, June 1622,May 1891 (conflagration) and the last one on August 1990. At that time, one of the largest forest fires in the peninsula of Mt Athos has broken out. Although many fire fighting forces took part in the fire suppression (forest firemen, army, fire trucks CL-125 aircrafts, helicopters etc), the fire burned for almost two weeks, due to the strong winds blowing at that time; 2230 hectares,of which1350 of chestnut and oak trees and 880hectares of shrub land have been destroyed. The fire caused serious damage to the land property and the watering and irrigation systems of Simonopetra, ruined nine outlying buildings belonging to the monastery and seriously threatened the main complex of the monastery. The fire approach the monastery from the east. Although the monks with the help of the firemen turned it away, the fire came back more threatening two days later and surrounded the monastery. Dry evergreen oaks and bay trees on the south in the root of the rock were ignited, and a turbulence of flying brands attacked the southeast side of the buildings. Some old wooden balconies were pulled out for replacement at that time. The fire spread inside through some old timber beams and window frames and through the holes and the cavities of the external walls. The monks then had the idea to cut the burnt timber elements in order to avoid the spread of fire into the building. At the same time , they used the existing hose reel system to extinguish the fire. The self-denial of the monks with the help of the firemen saved the monastery almost from a new conflagration just one century after the last one (1891). Due to the very special characteristics of the area, Fire Brigade access time was too long and no so much effective. 103 The fire took place during a demonstration at the night of October 25, 1991. Fire Brigade was allowed to enter the University building only after 2 hours when the first flames were seen from outside. Fire load density was very high due to the wooden roof, floor, ceilings and cellular coverings etc. Estimated maximum gas temperatures reach almost 850 0C at certain places, especially at the higher parts of masonry walls and marble colonnades. Besides heavy damages and almost total collapse of the wooden roof, considerable damage appeared to the masonry vaults of the basement (library) due to the extinguishing water. Repair and rehabilitation of the building last almost 10 years, while the relevant cost was high as already mentioned.

44



Germany Hessen

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz

Germany Rheinland-

Pfalz Portugal Italy Portugal France France France ItalyFire identification Schloss



Maltesergebäude,

Amberg

Chiado (Historical

center)

Town Hall of Lisbon



Rennes


Godin”

Guarinis chapel in

Turin

Royal Palace

Were the on-site fire brigade effective in extinguishing the fire? NA NA

NA NA NA NA NA NA

If no, state the reasons why they were not effective. NA

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

Were the local municipal fire brigade effective in extinguishing the fire? Y

Y Y Y N N N NA

If no, why were they not effective? NA NA NA NA (104) (105) (106) NAHad staff received training in the use of first-aid fire fighting equipment?

N N NA N N N NA NA

If yes, did staff tackle the fire with first-aid fire fighting appliances? NA NA NA

NA NA NA NA NA

Were staff successful in tackling/controlling the fire with first-aid fire fighting equipment? N

N N N NA NA NA NA

If not, why were they not successful?

The fire was already too big

The fire spread out too fast

The fire spread out very fast

The fire was already too big NA

NA NA NA

104 Because the alert was given too late, when the fire brigade arrived the fire had already spread to the whole building 105 Due to the lack in effective vertical fire compartmentation (wooden floors) and to the type of fire load (easily ignitable, high density) the fire was difficult to fight and could propagate to other floors. 106 They had problems causing delays: to move the firemen cars in narrow streets with parked cars on both sides; then, difficulties to reach some dwellings in a complex arrangement of ancient buildings.

45



England Austria Holland Holland Holland Hungary Hungary Greece Greece

Fire identification Fenice theatre in

Venice


Bari

Windsor Castle


Wien


Windmill "De

Walvisch", Schiedam

Hollands Spoor

Miskolk "Tetemvar Planked Church"


Cathedral

Mount Athos monastery of Simonopetra

Historic library of the National

Technical University of

Athens Were the on-site fire brigade effective in extinguishing the fire? N NA NA NA

NA NA

If no, state the reasons why they were not effective.

(107)

NA NA

Were the local municipal fire brigade effective in extinguishing the fire? Y N N Y

N N

If no, why were they not effective? (108) (109) (110) (111) (112)

Had staff received training in the use of first-aid fire fighting equipment? Y N NA NA

Y Y

107 Presence of timber panelling and presence of wall and ceiling voids resulted in very rapid fire spread. Area was undergoing renovation at the time of the fire and the fire load may have been greater than normal. Fire team had modern firefighting equipment but included only a small number of firefighters. 108 For the reasons stated above the fire spread through the tower and the fire service decided to fight the fire by preventing spread beyond the original building, but this original building (origin of the fire) was severely damaged. 109 Fire in the wooden tower, very high up 110 Detection one hour after start of fire, complications with grinding stones in windmill preventing firemen to go in to the building and windmill wings threatening to fall outside the building. 111 Due the special characteristics of the area, as explained above 112 Due the special circumstances they were not allowed to enter the building immediately

46

Table 3 – Summary of the information collected by means of the Guidelines-Clarification (cont.) If yes, did staff tackle the fire with first-aid fire fighting appliances? Y NA NA NA

N N

Were staff successful in tackling/controlling the fire with first-aid fire fighting equipment? N N NA NA

N N

If not, why were they not successful? (113) (114) (115) (116) (117)

113 The fire load was increased during renovation work and the item first ignited was a vertical hanging curtain/wall covering. By the time the fire was discovered, it was beyond the scope of first aid firefighting appliances. 114 Fire had already spread under roof construction 115 Large fire when detected 116 The monks did their best, although the fire was large and very serious 117 There is not staff in the building during the night time, except few night-guards

47

In the following graphs, because not all the answers to every question were available, the number of answers in the graphs does not correspond always to the number of cases analysed. On the other hand, some questions allow more than one category of answer.

Original use of the building

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Castle

2. Church/ Temple

3. Hospital

4. Hotel

5. Industry

6. Library/ Archive

7. Market/ Commercial

8. Monastery

9. Monument

10. Museum

11. Office

12. Palace

13. School

14. Theatre

15. Other

Number of cases

Fig. 7

The set of fires selected include all the types of original building use, with the exception of the categories “monument”, “industry” and “hospital”. The same applies to the building use at the time of the fire, with the difference that one building has got with time the character of monument. The building use category “other” includes mainly dwellings, law courts and restaurants, which were not explicitly considered in the guidelines.

Type of structure

0 5 10 15 20 25

1. Composite steel/concrete

2. Masonry

3. Reinforced concrete

4. Steel

5. Wood

6. Other

Number of cases

Fig. 8

The best represented type of building structure is, as expected, masonry and wood, and this corresponds also to the most common type of construction in ancient buildings. Steel and especially reinforced concrete are sometimes found in ancient buildings where later refurbishing has been introduced.

48

Building contents

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Archaeological objects

2. Art objects

3. Films/ Photographs

4. Historic documentation

5. Other

Number of cases10

Fig. 9

Not all the ancient buildings contain objects with artistic/ historic value. With the exception of “Films/ photographs” all the categories of objects with cultural value are represented in the contents of some of the buildings involved in the fires analysed.

Use of the building at the time of the fire

0 2 4 6 8 10

1. Castle

2. Church/ Temple

3. Hospital

4. Hotel

5. Industry

6. Library/ Archive

7. Market/ Commercial

8. Monastery

9. Monument

10. Museum

11. Office

12. Palace

13. School

14. Theatre

15. Other

Number of cases12

Fig. 10

49

Type of occupants

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

1. Familiar with the building

2. Visitors

Number of cases

Fig. 11

Buildings open to the public put specific problems related to the evacuation in case of fire. Buildings receiving visitors are well represented in the sample of selected fires.

Age of the occupants

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

1. Adults

2. Aged

3. Children

Number of cases20

Fig. 12

Able, awake adults is the most frequent category of occupants of the selected buildings.

50

Physical condition of the occupants

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

1. Limited

2. Normal

Number of cases

Fig.13

State of the occupants

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 1

1. Asleep

2. Awake

Number of cases8

Fig. 14

51

Type of fire load

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1

1. Easily ignitable

2. Normal

Number of cases6

Fig. 15

In eleven cases easily ignitable fire load was considered to be a relevant component of the fire load inside the initial fire cell.

Fire load density

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. qf < 15 kg wood/m2 floor area

2. 15 < qf < 50 kg wood/m2 floor area

3. qf > 50 kg wood/m2 floor area

Number of cases9

Fig. 16

According to the classification adopted in the guidelines for the fire load density inside the initial fire cell, the fires analysed correspond mainly to medium-large fire load densities.

52

Type of detection system

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

1 None

2. Flame

3. Heat

4. Smoke

5. Other

Number of cases16

Fig. 17

It is remarkable that the majority of the buildings involved in the fires had no detection system. Among the others, smoke detection was the most common system.

Did the automatic detection system work?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig.18

The lack of information needed to answer the question “ Did the automatic detection system work?” was evident. Only five positive and three negative answers were given.

53

Was there a night watcher in the building?

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 19

Normally there was no night watcher nor on-site fire brigade in the building where the fire started.

Did the night watcher detect the fire at an early stage?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 20

From those buildings where there was a night watcher, only two cases report that the night watcher has detected the fire at an early stage.

54

Was there any safety management system implemented in the building, having a particular incidence in the fire safety of the building and its contents?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 21

Normally, no “safety management system having a particular incidence in the fire safety of the buildings and its contents” was implemented in the buildings involved in the fires analysed.

Did the building have an on-site fire brigade?

0

5

10

15

20

25

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 22

55

Did the on-site fire brigade act in due time?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 23

Was the building provided with first attack fire fighting equipment?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 24

In nine cases it was reported that the building where the fire started was not provided with first attack fire fighting equipment. In three out of the twelve cases where it was provided it was not available.

56

Was the first attack fire fighting equipment available?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 25

Was the alert to the fire brigade transmitted?

0

5

10

15

20

25

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 26

57

Was the building provided with portable extinguishers?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 27

Normally, the buildings were provided with portable extinguishers. However, in four cases the answer is no.

Was the building provided with a fixed suppression system?

0

5

10

15

20

25

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 28

Only three cases reported the existence of fixed suppression system, and in two of those cases it did not function as expected.

58

Did the fixed suppression system function as expected?

0

5

10

15

20

25

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 29

Was there enough extinguishing agent to fight the fire?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 30

59

Was the building divided into fire cells?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 31

Was compartmentation effective in keeping the fire inside the initial fire cell?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 32

60

Did the fire propagate to other floors?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 33

Normally the fires propagated to other floors of the building.

Did the fire propagate to other buildings?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 34

Five cases refer to fires that have propagated to other buildings.

61

Was there an alarm system?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 35

In fifteen out of twenty two cases there was no alarm system and two of the existing systems were not operational.

Was the alarm system operational?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 36

62

Was the alarm system activated?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 37

In one of the seven cases where an alarm system was installed it has not been activated.

Was the building provided with safe evacuation paths, in accordance with the relevant national regulation?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 38

In ancient buildings, the difficulty in providing safe evacuation paths is often a major problem. Ten of the fifteen answers report explicitly that there were safe evacuation paths. However, in three cases their number and/ or size were not adequate.

63

Were the number and size of the evacuation paths adequate and effective?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 39

Was the building provided with adequate evacuation signs?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 40

Six out of sixteen answers report explicitly that there were no evacuation signs.

64

Was the building provided with emergency illumination?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 41

Seven out of thirteen answers report explicitly that there was no emergency illumination.

Did the emergency illumination work?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 42

65

What was the type of smoke extraction system?

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

1 Mechanical

2. Natural

3. None

Number of answers18

Fig. 43

Sixteen cases have reported the inexistence of any smoke extraction system.

Did the smoke extraction system work?

0

5

10

15

20

25

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 44

From the three cases where the existence of a smoke extraction system was reported, one of them did not work as expected.

66

Was the smoke extraction system effective

0

5

10

15

20

25

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 45

Causes of the fire

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Old electrical circuits

2. Old gas ducts

3. Malfunctioning device/ installation (specify)

1. Cigarette

2. Candle

3. Fireplace

4. Heaters

5. Welding (refurbishment works)

6. Fireworks

7. Arson

1. Lightning

2. Earthquake

3. Vegetation fire

A.8.4 Other

Number of answers9

Fig. 46

Arson is the most frequently reported cause of fire. The four answers in the category “other” include a Christmas tree and an electrical spotlight (accidental misuse).

67

Could the occupants be evacuated without injury to people or casualties?

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

YES NO NA

Num

ber o

f ans

wer

s

Fig. 47

There were only four casualties in two of the eighteen fires analysed, three of them caused by heat and smoke and one by a fall.

Causes of the deaths

0 1 2 3

1. Smoke

2. Heat

3. Structural collapse

4. Trample crush

Number of answers

Fig. 48

68

Consequences to non-structural elements

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

1. Soot damage to wall paintings

2. Heat damage to bas-relief

3. Burnt woodwork

4. Other:

Number of answers14

Fig. 49

There is a homogeneous distribution among the categories of damage to non-structural elements.

Damage to beams

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Masonry

Reinforced concrete

Steel

Composite steel/ concrete

Wood

Number of answers

CHDD

Fig. 50

Most of the reported damage to beams refers to heavy damage/ collapse of wooden beams.

69

Damage to slabs

0 1 2 3 4 5

Masonry

Reinforced concrete

Steel


Wood

Number of answers

CHDD

Fig. 51

Most of the reported damage to slabs refers to heavy damage/ collapse of wooden floors.

Damage to walls

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Masonry

Reinforced concrete

Steel


Wood

Number of answers

CHDD

Fig. 52

Most of the reported damage to walls refers to damaged masonry walls.

70

Damage to stairs

0 1 2 3 4

Masonry

Reinforced concrete

Steel


Wood

Number of answers

CHDD

Fig. 53

Most of the reported damage to stairs refers to Damage/ heavy damage of wooden stairs.

Damage to the roof structure

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Masonry

Reinforced concrete

Steel


Wood

Number of answers

CHDD

Fig. 54

Most of the reported damage to the roof structure refers to the collapse/ heavy damage of wooden roof structures.

71

Nature of damage

0 5 10 15 20 25

1. Damage by burning

2. Damage by heat

3. Damage by extinguishing water

4. Damage by soot

Number of answers

Fig. 55

As expected, the nature of the reported damage is homogeneously distributed among all the types of damage categories. Thirteen cases report damage by extinguishing water.

Estimated value of damage to the building - DB

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Chiado (Historical center of Lisbon)

Town Hall of Lisbon


Royal Palace/ Guarini's chapel(Turin)

Windsor Castle

Redoutensäle Hofburg Wien


Esztergom Roman CatholicCathedral

Mount Athos monastery ofSimonopetra

Historic library of the NationalTechnical University of Athens

Fire

Damage (million Euro)

Fig. 56

72

Estimated value of damage to the contents - DC

0 5 10 15 20 25


Royal Palace/ Guarini's chapel (Turin)




Fire

Damage (million Euro)

Fig. 57

Only five fires reported estimations of the damage to the building contents, which reflects the difficulty in making estimations for the value of artistic/ historic/ cultural items.

Declared loss (DB+DC)

0 10 20 30 40 50 6

Schloss Philippsruhe

Kurhaus, Baden-baden

Maltesergebäude, Amberg

Royal Palace/ Guarini's chapel (Turin)

Fenice theatre in Venice




Fire

Value (million Euro)0

Fig. 58

73

3.3 Overview of the main characteristics of each fire

Sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.19 summarize the main characteristics of each fire. These summaries were made on the basis of the answers from the Guidelines and additional available information on some of the fires.

3.3.1 Schloss Philippsruhe, Germany (Bavaria), 1984

A. Characterization of the fire scenario The palace Philippsruhe was built 1701 to 1712 in a baroque-style. In 1875 to 1883 Philippsruhe was rebuilt. The lower and first floor consisted of masonry-structure. The structure of the second floor up to the roof was wood. The roof was not very accessible because of the heavy wood-structure and the spiral-staircase. Air-shafts which existed were closed for protection reasons because of burglary The museum in the building reached from the lower floor over to the first floor. The use of the garret was commercial by ordinary apartments. One of the apartments was the centre of the fire. Teenagers burned in the year 1984 two envelopes and threw them out of the window in the gutter of the roof where they smouldered and ignited the wooden roof-structure. Visitors and people familiar with the building were the normal occupants. The fire load was considered to have a normal ignitability and a medium density. The building was not divided into fire cells but it was provided with safe evacuation paths, adequate in number and size. There were no detection or alarm systems, but adequate evacuation signs were provided, as well as portable extinguishers.

The building was not provided with emergency illumination or with a smoke extraction system. There was a safety management system (for the occupants and the building).

Arson is reported to have been the cause of the fire. The fire propagated to other floors inside the building, but not to other buildings. The fire brigades arrived 7 min after the alert transmission.


There were no casualties. Wall paintings were damaged by soot, bas-reliefs have been damaged by heat and the woodwork has been burnt. Masonry walls were damaged. The wooden beams and the wooden floors slabs were heavily damaged. The wooden roof structure collapsed. Damage by extinguishing water was reported.

The declared loss, value of the damage to the building and contents, was 5 million Euros.

C. Relevant aspects

Absence of adequate fire compartmentation, smoke extraction, fire detection and fire alarm systems are aspects to highlight in this fire.

After the fire and during the renovation works, fire walls, an alarm system and natural smoke extraction in the stair cases were installed.

3.3.2 Altstadt Lauterbach, Germany (Hessen), 1992

A. Characterization of the fire scenario The three involved buildings in half-timbering-structure were built in 17-18-th century. The lower floors were used by a restaurant and several shops and other business. The use of the upper floors were commercial. The stair-case of the building in which the fire propagated was made of wood. An additional danger was set by the gas-pipe which lead through the staircase. The fire, which was caused by arson, propagated to the roof and from there to the other two buildings. The fire load had a normal ignitability and a high density.

The occupants, of all ages and able, were familiar with the buildings but they were asleep.

The buildings were not divided into fire cells. There was no detection system, no night watcher, no safe evacuation paths, no emergency illumination and no smoke extraction system. One of the three

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buildings had a staircase and an evacuation path that lead through the entrance of a restaurant at the ground floor. There was a safety management system, and portable extinguishers were in place.

The cause of the fire was arson. The fire brigades arrived 7 min after the alert transmission.


There were no casualties. Masonry and wood walls were damaged. The wooden beams, wooden floors, wooden stairs and wooden roof structure were heavily damaged. Damage by extinguishing water was reported.

The declared loss, value of the damage to the buildings and contents, was 1 million Euros.

C. Relevant aspects

Fire protection was practically absent in this building. No automatic fire detection, no automatic fire suppression and the absence of adequate fire compartmentation are reasons enough to explain the extent of fire development with propagation to other buildings.

3.3.3 Kurhaus, Baden-Baden, Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz), 1987


With a structure made of masonry and wood, the building was built as a hotel and was used as such at the time of the fire. Archaeological objects are reported as being part of the contents of the building. The occupants included visitors of all ages in normal physical conditions. They were awake when the fire started. The fire load had a normal ignitability and a medium density.

There was an automatic smoke detection system but it did not work. There was an alarm system and adequate evacuation signs. The building was provided with safe evacuation paths (enough number and size). There was no smoke extraction system and no fixed fire suppression system. There was a safety management system and portable extinguishers were in place.

The old electrical circuits were the cause of the fire. There was no night watcher and the existing alarm system was activated but it was not operational. The building was divided into fire cells but the fire propagated to another floor. The alert was transmitted immediately after detection to the fire brigade.


There were no casualties

Masonry walls were damaged. The wooden beams, wooden floors and wooden roof structure were heavily damaged. Damage by extinguishing water was reported.

The declared loss, value of the damage to the buildings and contents, was 2.5 million Euros.

C. Relevant aspects

Lack of regular inspection and maintenance of the automatic smoke detection system as well as the alarm system, together with old and inadequate electrical circuits, are important aspects to highlight in this fire.

3.3.4 Maltesergebäude, Amberg, Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz), 1993

A. Characterization of the fire scenario The building was originally used as monastery. The fire broke out in 1993 and destroyed almost the whole north-wing of the building (3 floors). The structure of the historic building was made of masonry with a roof-structure made of wood. The roof itself was covered with roofing-title. The false-ceilings had a wooden structure covered with wood-work. At the time of the fire the building was being used as a hotel, a brewery, a restaurant, a boarding-school and a library. So, the occupants included visitors and people familiar with the building, adults and children, in normal physical conditions, with the possibility of being asleep. Where the fire started, there was no automatic detection system. The only fire-protection system was a smoke detection system situated in the library on the east-wing of the building. The fire load was considered to have a normal ignitability and a medium density.

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The building was provided with an alarm system, safe evacuation paths (enough number and size), and there were adequate evacuation signs. There was a safety management system and portable extinguishers were in place.

The old electrical circuits were the cause of the fire. The building was divided into fire cells but the fire propagated to other floors. The fire brigades arrived 5 minutes after the alert.


There were no casualties. Masonry walls were damaged. The wooden beams and wooden floors were heavily damaged. The roof structure collapsed.

The declared loss, value of the damage to the buildings and contents, was 4 million Euros.

C. Relevant aspects

The lack of renovation of the electrical circuits and the absence of automatic fire detection and automatic fire suppression are important aspects to highlight in this fire.

3.3.5 Chiado (Historical center), Portugal, 1988


Eighteen different buildings were involved in the Chiado fire. Most of them had been built to be used for commerce, as offices and dwellings and one of them as a monastery. Except for the monastery, which was being used as a commercial store at the time of the fire, all the other buildings were mainly serving for commerce, as offices and there were also some dwellings. Among them were the shopping stores “Armazéns do Chiado”, operating in the former monastery “Convento do Espirito Santo da Pedreira” built in the late years of the 16th century, the shopping store “Jerónimo Martins”, founded in 1792, the pastry shop “Pastelaria Ferrari”, founded in 1827

and the jewellery “Casa Batalha”, founded in 1635.

Most of the buildings had load bearing masonry walls, wooden floors, wooden roof structure, plastered wooden partition walls, and wooden stairs. Some of them had an interior steel structure, including cast iron columns, or reinforced concrete elements.

Along the years partition or even load bearing walls had been removed to obtain open spaces, more adequate to the commercial use, without alternative fire safety measures, thus facilitating the potential fire spread. Load bearing walls were replaced in some cases by steel beams, without adequate fire protection. For administration/ commercial purposes, unauthorized unprotected communication openings had been made by the owner/ user in the fire walls separating two or more adjacent buildings, thus drastically changing the fire safety of those buildings.

The buildings were occupied mainly during the shopping hours. Only a few residents of the upper floors of some of the buildings slept there at night.

The fire load density inside the building “Grandella” , where the fire started, was very high. The fire load was estimated as 670 x 103 kg of wood, and included easily ignitable items such as textiles, paper, plastics and camping gas bottles.

There was no automatic detection system and the night watcher failed to detect the fire in due time. There was also no first attack fire equipment, no portable extinguishers, and no fixed automatic suppression system. After receiving the alert, the fire brigade took only a few minutes to arrive to the local but the alert had been given too late after the fire begin.

In the Building Grandella, due to the various communication openings (unprotected wooden stairs, mechanical stairs, lift) between all the 8 storeys of the building (some of them interconnected) and to the easily ignitable character of the fire load, the fire and the fire effluents could propagate very quickly

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to all the floors. All the other affected buildings had unprotected vertical communication openings and wooden floors, which contributed to the quick fire spread inside them.


The fire developed during the night. Only one resident and one fireman lost their lives. Had it been however during shopping hours and the number of casualties could have been much greater, as a consequence of the quick fire development and the inexistence of adequately protected evacuation paths and smoke extraction systems.

At the time of the fire, renovation works were underway in the 3rd floor of the building Grandella and the plaster protection/ decoration of the wooden ceiling had been totally removed. Although the causes of the fire were never exactly clarified, arson or welding work were pointed out as possible causes at that time. This brings to evidence the need to implement and enforce regulations to be applied at construction sites, here including renovation works in existing buildings, especially when the fire protection of Cultural Heritage is the objective, either the protection of an historic/ classified building or the fire protection of its contents with particular historic/ artistic value.

One resident died from a fall when he was being helped to escape from his building. One of the two seriously burned firemen did not survive his injuries and 73 other people were reported has having suffered injuries.

The severity of the fire caused the complete destruction of several buildings or parts of them. Most of the main load bearing walls in these buildings were very thick (over 1 m) masonry walls that withstand well the action of heat. Many of them however collapsed or had to be demolished immediately after the fire as a consequence of heavy damage caused by the thermal elongations of the horizontal construction elements. Original ancient 78 rpm music records made by “Valentim de Carvalho” as well as the old archives were lost in the fire, with a value difficult to estimate.

The direct damage to the buildings was estimated as 80 million Euros. The damage to the business in that area is difficult to quantify. Some firms moved to other zones in Lisbon, while some others stopped their

activity. 5.7 million Euros was the amount paid to the workers of the shops and offices affected by the fire that lost their jobs. Twelve years were needed to rebuild and normalize the activity in the affected area.

The fire occurred in the old city centre, one of the appreciated shopping areas of Lisbon, where some of the oldest and more famous shops were located. The fact that so many buildings were involved and the fear that the area would lose its character after rebuilding produced a great social impact and heavy discussions in the media. The socio economic consequences of the fire developed over the 12 year-period of the reconstruction, with the loss of their jobs for the workers of the directly affected commerce and offices, and the negative consequences of the rebuilding activity on the commerce in the nearby unaffected buildings. The complex decision

process after the fire was the main cause for the delayed reconstruction period. The heavy public pressure to rebuild respecting as much as possible the original architecture restrained the impetus to

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increase the volume of construction, and the final outcome resulted in a renewed zone, that locals and foreigners visit with renewed pleasure.

C. Relevant aspects

The main reasons why the initial fire became a conflagration can be summarized as follows:

1) Deliberate criminal human action or;

2) Human negligence / unqualified workmanship + lack of adequate fire safety regulations for construction sites + corresponding enforcing measures;

3) Inefficient / late fire detection;

4) Presence of easily combustible + big fire load;

5) Big opening factor + big radiation area of openings in the facades;

6) Lack of horizontal and vertical fire compartmentation in the building of fire origin, leading to great heat radiation rates simultaneously through all the large openings in the façade of the building of fire origin to the facing buildings;

7) Very short distance between facing openings in a shaft common to the building of fire origin and a neighbouring one;

8) Combustible materials used in advertising elements placed outside the facades and in the windows;

9) Lack of horizontal and vertical fire compartmentation in the additional buildings involved in the fire;

10) The existence of illegal unauthorized communication openings between different adjacent buildings;

11) The existence of illegal combustible constructions + stored goods / waste in inner yards common to several buildings (common situation in old urban areas). Horizontal loads developed by thermally restrained heated elements were the main cause for the collapse of vertical elements (columns and walls) or of the entire structure. Evidence of this type of action could be found in several locations. This was particularly evident in steel elements. Some of them were commonly used to replace the function of masonry walls removed to create wider spaces.

3.3.6 Town Hall of Lisbon, Portugal, 1996


The fire started at 11h 17 min on the 7th November 1996 in the upper floor of the building. After a fire in 1863, the building had been totally rebuilt in 1875 and was used since then by state administration services. It included at the top floor a recently built restaurant for the personnel of the Town Hall.

Like all the buildings of that time, the structure of the building consisted of masonry and wood. Besides the building itself, part of its contents had also cultural/ historic interest. This was the case of the paintings decorating the reception rooms of the Town Hall and an archive containing the drawings and projects of the constructions built in Lisbon in the last centuries.

The building was occupied during day time. Part of it, mainly the ground floor, was open to the public in general. Other areas were restricted to the staff of the Town Hall. Some rooms were used by the Mayor for receptions.

At the level of the top floor new constructions (like a restaurant for the personnel of the Town Hall) had been added. Significant parts of the building had been adapted for the use of the Administrative Services of the Town Hall, adding new light weight combustible partitions. The interior space of the building was intensively used by the Administrative Services of the Town Hall with a high fire load density, mostly consisting in paper documentation, without adequate fire compartmentation. Some evacuation paths were even being misused to store documentation and archives. A considerable amount of dust was accumulated under the roof.

The building was provided with a smoke detection system and first attack fire fighting equipment, but they were not operational. The firemen arrived shortly after receiving the alert, but they were unable to prevent the fire from propagating to the storey beneath through the burning of the wooden floor.

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The vertical evacuation paths consisted in non enclosed wooden stairs. The most critical was the evacuation through one single wooden stair from the upper level where the restaurant for the personnel was located. There was no smoke venting system.

The fire occurred during renovation works inside the building, which included welding. This is seen as the probable cause of the fire.


The fire affected the upper floors of the building, burning the wooden roof structure, the wooden floors, the wooden stairs, and producing heat damage to the masonry walls and soot damage to wall paintings. Important damage caused by extinguishing water was also reported. 25 million Euros were spent in the reconstruction, which included the repair of wall paintings damaged by water and the repair of wood carved ceilings.

C. Relevant aspects

1) Besides affecting an historical building, the fire had an increased social impact mainly due to the fact that it occurred in a State Building, administered by one of the entities that are supposed to enforce the fire safety regulations in Lisbon. Public opinion has difficulty in accepting the State Departments as exceptions in what concerns the application of the regulations.

2) Due to the high fire frequency during renovation works, and especially when these works take place in buildings with historic character, special fire precaution measures should be foreseen to be applied, and the State departments should not be excluded from these obligations.

3) Historic documentation should be stored inside compartments with an adequate fire resistance.

4) Evacuation paths should not be misused to store objects that could delay the evacuation of the building and especially if those objects are combustible.

5) Abnormal accumulation of dust in unoccupied spaces can lead to the quick propagation of a fire. Especially in historic buildings, regular inspection and cleaning of such spaces should be undertaken.

3.3.7 Ancient District of Chambéry, France, 2002


The site of the fire was a set of closely spaced ancient buildings (14th to 17th century) adapted to modern housing (concerning layout, equipment and materials). Installed fire protection measures were very limited. There were no detection, fire suppression or alarm systems installed, and no portable fire extinguishers. The buildings were made of masonry and wood, and although the fire brigade arrived quickly at the fire scene, the fire resistance between the first burning dwelling and the upper levels was not sufficient to prevent the vertical spread of the fire.

The fire started with a flashover in a dwelling, a probable cause being a fire in a Christmas tree (the date of the fire was the 1st of January). From the initial building, the fire spread to adjacent buildings, either through openings or across walls with lack of fire resistance. Attics had also been transformed into dwellings, increasing their fire load and making fire propagation at the highest levels very rapid.

Fire load is considered to have a normal ignitability and a medium density.


Two people were killed in the fire and a small number (1-4 ?) injured. A large number (27) of dwellings were destroyed, causing about 60 people to loose their housing. Several shops in the vicinity were forced to close. About 18 months were needed for restoration of the place.

C. Relevant aspects

There are aspects of the present fire which deserve some comments, because they appear in the characterization of fire risk in different historic zones:

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a) Low fire resistance of structural elements (wood is extensively used as a building material), alterations in the original layout of the buildings and lack of fire protection measures (passive or active).

b) Difficulties encountered in fire fighting, some related to the remote date of construction (narrow streets, complex configuration of the buildings arrangement, main doors locked …)

3.3.8 Parliament of Britany in Rennes, 1994


The “Familistère of Godin” was founded in the 19 ry. It is a society of workmen composed of different families aiming at providing better dwellings for the workmen. The site is composed of several buildings with different activities such as library, museum and school. The fire started in the museum, located in the building of the primary school. The buildings were made of masonry walls with wooden roof. The museum had two main places, one study with paintings and engravings and another with cabinets with books, paintings, unique pieces of the foundry St. Godin and a scale model of the “Familistère”.

The building, considered a monument, was built as a palace, to be used by the law courts and had the same use at the time of the fire. The building structure consisted in masonry walls and a wooden framework. Art objects, furniture, tapestry and archives were the contents with artistic/ historic value.

There was nobody inside the building when the fire started, as it was during the night. The fire load included an easily ignitable component and had a medium density. Smoke detection and alarm systems were provided and were operational. Additionally there was a night watcher. The building was not divided into fire cells. The lack of fire compartimentation in the large void under the roof, with a wooden framework from 17th century, is considered to have given an important contribution to the fire propagation/ development.

It is estimated that the alert was given only one hour and thirty minutes after the fire had been detected by the automatic detection system. The alarm seems to have been ignored by the night watcher. The fire brigade arrived a few minutes after the alert was given, and the level of fire extension observed seems to have been largely facilitated by the long time taken to take the alarm signal into account, and also, due to the large wooden framework and the lack of fire compartmentation. Several assumptions have been made for the causes of the fire.


Injuries to several firemen were reported. The ancient framework and the roof were fully destroyed and 2/3 of the surface of the building were damaged. The wooden beams, the wooden floor, the wooden stairs and the wooden roof structure have suffered damage by burning. Heat damage to the masonry walls and damage by the extinguishing water were reported.

The estimated value of the damage to the building is 40 million Euros and the estimated value of the damage to the contents is 20 million Euros.

C. Relevant aspects

The long time passed until the fire alarm signal was taken into account was one of the causes for the fire severity, together with the lack of fire compartmentation in the building and the large wooden framework. A human fault seems to have been the main cause for the great fire development. Would an automatic suppression system have had a much better performance and drastically limited the fire damage?

3.3.9 Museum of "Familistère Godin", France, 1997

A. Characterization of the fire scenario th centu

Because the fire was during the night, there was nobody inside the building, but usually there are occupants of different ages, familiar with the building, and visitors. The fire load was easily ignitable and there was a large amount of books/cassettes and wood based materials, resulting in a high fire load density. There was no automatic detection system and no alarm system. Portable fire extinguishers and a mechanical smoke extraction system were in place. Although the building had

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different parts with different uses, no fire compartmentation existed because the national regulations allow fire compartments up to 2500 m2.

The cause of the fire was arson in the school, where the museum was situated. The alarm was given relatively late because the building is very isolated. The first attack fire fighting equipment was not used because the fire had developed too far. Due to the large amount of books and cassettes the fire could spread easily and reached the roof after the collapse of the ceiling. The fire did not propagate to other buildings but reached another part of the building with a different use. The smoke extraction system did not work.


No injuries to people were reported. The self-ignition of the linseed oil of the paintings was probably the origin of the destruction of the canvas; the frames were nearly intact after the fire. Wall paintings were damaged by soot. Woodwork (roof and cabinets), engravings were burnt. The masonry walls were damaged, the ceiling of the library collapsed, the roof structure was heavily damaged and collapsed. Damage by extinguishing water is also reported.

There are no estimated values for the damages.

C. Relevant aspects

Lack of automatic fire detection, automatic fire suppression and adequate fire compartmentation between parts of the building with different uses are important aspects to highlight in this fire.

3.3.10 Royal Palace/ Guarini’s chapel (Turin), Italy, 1997


The present fire actually consists of two separated fires, which took place in two adjacent buildings (The Royal Palace and Guarini’s Chapel) on April 11, 1997. The fire investigation is still continuing, and it is not yet known if there have been one or two initial fire cells, because the fire stop door connecting the Chapel to the Royal Palace was found closed after the fire.

The Royal Palace (1646-58), with masonry walls and wooden roofs and floors, contains various decorated halls and a rich collection of arms, the king's library,

furniture from the 18th and 19th centuries and valuable paintings. The fire load was estimated at 50-60 kg wood/m2 floor area, due to the furniture, the wooden floors (made of small section beams), the carpets covering the floor and the fabrics covering the walls.

The Palace was provided with a fire detection system, and the alert to the fire brigade was transmitted almost immediately. The fire brigade was based 5 km from the building and took only a few minutes to arrive.

The Guarini’s Chapel (1694), attached to the cathedral dedicated to St. John the Baptist, is also known as the chapel of the Santissimo Sudario (Holy Shroud), because it kept the shroud which many people believe to have wrapped Christ's body after the Crucifixion. Its walls and dome were made of masonry, and the dome was provided with tie-beams made of iron.

The chapel was undergoing repair work, with wooden scaffolding erected in the dome. The shrine containing the Holy Shroud was provided with a CO2 fire suppression system.

It took about 200 fire fighters more than four hours to extinguish the fire. At the present time, a possible cause is thought to be defective protection of electrical circuits. This will be less probable if the investigation concludes that there were two separated ignitions.

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In the Royal palace

Masonry was damaged by heat; the floors were heavily damaged, while the damage to the roof structure was less severe. Paintings contained in the gallery were also damaged by the fire.

The Monumental Staircase was badly damaged both by the fire and by the water used in the fire suppression.

In the Guarini’s Chapel

The dome acted like a chimney, minimizing the damage in the church.

The masonry was damaged by the heat; the damage to the dome was due to the collapse of the iron tie-beams inserted in the masonry.

Some heat damage to bas-relief occurred (the altars were made of marble); the glass wall separating the cathedral from the chapel broke.

In both buildings, at the time of the fire, there was nobody inside; therefore the fire caused no victims.

C. Relevant aspects

This is another fire occurring during repair works. Inefficient protection of the new electrical circuits is pointed out as one probable cause of the fire. However, there is evidence that supports the assumption that there may have been two initial fire cells. This could mean that arson would have been the fire cause.

Fire investigation being still in progress, any conclusions based on the incomplete information available will necessarily be premature.

3.3.11 La Fenice theatre in Venice, Italy, 1996


The Teatro La Fenice, the leading opera house of Venice and one of the most famous in the history of opera, was destroyed by a fire on the night of January 29, 1996. The building had masonry walls, wooden roofs and floors, and part of the roof was made of copper.

The theatre was closed for repair work, and at the time of the fire only four people were within the building (two workmen, the watcher and a photographer). The fire started about 8:30 in the evening and burned for nine hours. There was a smoke detection system, but it was disconnected due to the repair work in course.

In the initial fire cell (the foyer of the gallery), there were synthetic resins and the wooden plank floor had been removed, leaving the

underlying beams exposed.

The fire was detected 15 to 20 minutes from the beginning, and the fire brigade arrived in 4 to 5 minutes; however, the fire spread to the entire building through burning and collapse of the wooden floors.

The building was provided with two separated fixed suppression systems, but both were disconnected. Existing fire compartmentation was only partially effective: some of the fire stop doors were found open after the fire, while the fire stop curtain protecting the stage resisted for about 2 hours and 20 minutes.

Efforts to control the fire were hindered because the two canals nearest to the theatre (one of them was the source for one of the fixed suppression systems) had been drained for dredging, ironically, in

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order to facilitate access by Venice's emergency motor boats. Moreover, the fire hydrants were too distant (22 m) from the initial fire cell and so the water pressure was too low to reach it.

The firemen used an helicopter to fight the fire, after the occurrence of two flashovers inside the building and the collapse of the roof.

The cause of the fire was arson. The two workmen were charged and submitted to trial, having been sentenced to jail.


The external walls survived, although heavily damaged, but the interior was completely destroyed by the fire. The estimated loss, based on the reconstruction costs, was about 48 million Euros.

C. Relevant aspects

Disconnecting fire detection/ suppression systems is a common practice during repair/ refurbishing work, thus increasing the vulnerability of the building. In the present case, an aggravating factor was the emptying of the nearby canals.

3.3.12 Petruzzelli Theatre in Bari, Italy, 1991


The fire occurred on the 27th October 1991 in the Petruzzelli Theatre in Bari, which had been built in 1903 as a standalone construction, consisting in load bearing masonry walls, a dome (with a steel structure) covering the stalls and a wooden truss supporting the roof above the stage. The theatre had no automatic detection system, no portable extinguishers and no fixed suppression system. There was a night watcher in the theatre but it did not detect the fire. The fire compartmentation between the stage and the adjoining rooms was not efficient. No one was inside the theatre when the fire started.

The cause of the fire was arson. The ex-manager of the theatre was convicted as the fire instigator.


The fire caused the collapse of the dome and heavy damage to the wooden roof truss. It almost destroyed all the interiors of the building. Only the perimeter and load bearing walls survived, with soot and mechanical damage to wall paintings and heat damage to bas-relief.

The theatre, dating from 1903, was a symbol for the history of Bari and a meeting place for the residents of the city.

C. Relevant aspects Arson is again the cause of a fire. This time instigated by someone who was supposed to care for the conservation and protection of the theatre. The total lack of fire protection measures is to be emphasised in this case. Extensive damage was the result.

3.3.13 Windsor Castle, England, 1992


The fire started at 11.37 am on the 20th November 1992 in the Private Chapel of the Windsor Castle and raged for 9 hours, putting in danger one of the world’s greatest collections of art treasures and archaeological objects.

Masonry and wood were the main elements of the structure. Easily ignitable fire load was present in the initial fire compartment in the form of large quantity of paintings and plastic, because the Private Chapel was being used as a temporary store and restoration area for paintings.

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A full detection and alarm system was being installed in the sequence of the Hampton Court fire. The alert to the fire brigade was given 5 minutes after detection and the fire brigade arrived 7 minutes later.

No fixed suppression system was installed in the building out of fear of water damage to the paintings. Portable fire extinguishers were used to fight the initial fire, but some of them failed to work. There was no fire compartmentation. In particular, the fire could easily spread over a 1,8 m high void between the ceiling and the roof of the 54 m long St George’s Hall, the state banqueting room.

At the time of the fire, the Castle was undergoing an extensive renovation programme, including an overhaul of the electrical system. Rooms were being cleared as part of this process, and some were being prepared for rewiring. The fire started when heat from a powerful spotlight set light to one of the curtains in the Queen’s Private Chapel.


Training exercises were regularly carried out by the fire brigade and the on-site fire crew. Despite the terrible destruction wreaked by the fire on the fabric of the Castle, only a few works of art were lost or damaged. The organization of the salvage operations may be pointed out as an important reason for the low damage to the movable contents.

Ten people have suffered injuries by the fire. Six rooms and three towers were destroyed or badly damaged. Only one painting was lost in the fire, Sir William Beechey’s equestrian portrait George III at a Review. Other few major works of art damaged or lost: The 19th century organ built by Henry Willis; An Axminster carpet made for the Great Exibition in 1851 (damaged); A sideboard by Morel & Seddon dating from the late 1820s.

The estimated loss to the building amounts to 95 million Euros. As a result of the fire, estimations for the repair were circa £60m. The issue as to whether public money should be used to repair the Castle was discussed in the House of Commons and in the National Media.

Responsibility for enforcing fire safety precautions in Crown premises rests with the Home Office Fire Service Inspectorate through the Crown Premises Inspection Group. But although some buildings in the Great Park did require a fire certificate under the Fire Precautions Act 1971, the Castle itself did not.

C. Relevant aspects

1) Adequate emergency management can decisively contribute to save from fire movable items with great historic/ artistic value.

2) Compartmentation of unoccupied voids in ancient buildings can contribute to significantly delay the fire propagation. In many situations this can be done without harming the architecture of the building.

3) Regular inspection/ maintenance of portable fire extinguishers reduces the probability of failure, which may be the difference between a starting fire and a full developed one.

4) A balance should be made between the reduction in fire damage achieved by the installation of an automatic fire suppression system and the damage caused by the suppression agent.

3.3.14 Redoutensäle Hofburg Wien, Austria, 1992


It is believed that the fire started late in the evening of the 26th November 1992 in the halls for festival events in the Imperial Castle in Vienna. Masonry and wood were the main elements of the structure. Valuable art objects were an important part of the contents of the building. At the time of the fire the building was used for conferences. The fire load was considered normally ignitable with a medium density. The building was provided with a smoke detection system but it detected the fire too late.

The fire probably broke out on the 26th November. On the 27th at 01:05 a.m. a security guard detected the fire. At the same time a ionisation detector located in the air conditioning of the interpreters’ rooms was activated. There was a local fire brigade in the building but they could not act in due time because of the late detection.

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The building was provided with operational first attack fire fighting equipment and with portable extinguishers. It was also provided with an operational alarm system, which was activated, and with safe evacuation paths (enough number and size), adequate evacuation signs and operational emergency illumination. The building had no fixed suppression system, no smoke extraction system and it was not divided into fire cells. The fire propagated to other floors.

The alert was transmitted to the fire brigade a few minutes after detection and the fire brigade took about 8 min to arrive. On the 28th at 08:15 a.m. the fire fighters reported “end of fire”.

Old electrical circuits were the cause of the fire.


There were no casualties and no injured people. Damage by heat and by burning to beams (wood), to walls (masonry), to stairs (masonry and wood), and to the roof structure (masonry and wood) were reported. Wall paintings, bas-relief and woodwork were destroyed. Damage by extinguishing water is also reported.

The reconstruction costs were about 54.5 million Euros, plus 1.5 million Euros for the furniture. The value of the damage to the contents with artistic/ historic interest could not be estimated.

C. Relevant aspects

There was an automatic detection system but it failed to detect the fire at an early stage. The causes for that have played a major role in this fire, together with the defective state of the electrical circuits. Would an automatic fire suppression system have contributed to limit the overall damage?

3.3.15 Hollands Spoor, Holland, 1989 The Fire at the Hollands Spoor station - Draft report Authors: M. Öhlin and L. Twilt, TNO Centre for Fire Research Introduction The first railway in the Netherlands was built in 1839. It connected Amsterdam to Haarlem, via a 16km long track. After realising that transport of people, and not only goods, was lucrative the railway from Amsterdam to Rotterdam passing by The Hague was built during the period 1842- 1847. At the same time as the railway developed the necessity to construct places where the passengers could step on and off, where tickets and tolls could be paid, and where wagons could be stored became apparent. Thus the appearance of the railway station. In the Netherlands today around 20 stations are listed as monuments. One of the most important is the Hollands Spoor in The Hague. Hollands Spoor The Hollands Spoor station was built in 1888 and was designed by the architect D.A.N. Magradant. It is the main international station of the two stations in The Hague, the other being the Central station. The Hollands Spoor was placed in the countryside of The Hague in order to make the connection between Leiden and Delft as straight as possible, and also to solve the problem of land cost. The train station consists of a main building in neo-renaissance style in which, among other things, a very richly decorated royal waiting room is situated. Behind the main building a very large cast iron roof construction, consisting of two equally large very long coverings is situated. One of these coverings was totally destroyed by a fire on the night of 14-15 October 1989. Fire During the night of 14-15 October 1989 at around four o'clock in the morning the station guard heard glass breaking from the middle train track where a restaurant was situated. When he arrived at the track he saw flames coming from the restaurant area. He alarmed the train services and the fire services. When the fire services arrived they quickly realised that two factors could cause problems during their extinguishing attempts: the fire was already very large with one of the roof coverings totally in flames, and the extinguishing water supplies could be too low. Water was

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first taken from fire wells on different train tracks but the water jets could not reach the roof. The roof covering furthest from the main station building was now in flames over a distance of 150m. The roof cover closest to the main station building had now also started to burn and because of the wind there was a possibility that the fire would spread to the main station building. The water problem was solved by gathering water from a lake situated around four hundred meters from the station. Due to the new water supplies the fire spread could be stopped and the extinguishment attempts could be concentrated on the roof covering. The fire services work was made difficult due to falling debris from the fire. Especially the glass debris posed a problem because they cut the fire hoses open. Three hours after the start of the fire the fire services had the fire under control.

A large part of the second roof covering was destroyed. However the train station was back in use one day after the fire, mainly because the track normally only used for the royal family was taken into service. The fire had been started by arson by a man who had been refused entry on to a train earlier that night at the Central station of The Hague because he was not in possession of a ticket. He decided to walk to the Hollands Spoor station and arrived at around three o'clock in the morning. There were no trains at that moment so he decided to take a look around the station and arrived at the restaurant where money was kept in a cash register. The amount of money was low and out of frustration the man ignited a couple of table clothes and napkins and then ran away from the station. The costs of the damage were estimated to be around 5 to 7 Million Euro. Conclusions and recommendations - No alarm (neither fire nor burglary) was situated in the station. The station guard detected the fire.

Fire, smoke, and burglary alarms should be at appropriate places. - The person responsible for the fire was allowed in to the station even though no more trains were

departing and no one else was present in the station. This should not be permitted. - The water supplies to extinguish the fire were not sufficient in the early stages of the fire. If no

other water supplies would have been available the fire could have spread to the main station building. The amount of water supplies should be studied for this kind of building, taking into account the fact that fire could break out high up in the roof covering.

- Falling debris were seen to be a problem. Glass fell down from the roof and damaged the water hoses. If possible, under roofs consisting of glass, nets or other materials could be situated in order to spare equipment and to avoid injuries. If not, fire-fighting tactics should be changed.

- Train services were resumed as normal on Monday, one day after the fire, mainly because of the availability of a "royal" track. The special vulnerability of a train station (as a travel connection point for goods / people) should be taken into account when planning the fire protection.

- More of these incidents should be studied in order to be able to draw general conclusions for train stations.

Ref: F.H.J. Van der Beek ; Groot alarm!, branden in binnen en buitenland, Ref: Saal, P, en Spangenberg, F; Kijk op stations

3.3.16 Windmill "De Walvisch", Schiedam, Holland, 1996 Fire Protection of Mills Authors: M. Öhlin and L. Twilt, TNO Centre for Fire Research

A. History:

100 years ago there were around 10 000 mills in the Netherlands. Around 1100 of these remain today. 10% of the existing mills are so called watermills (mills driven by water), the remaining 1000 are

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windmills. More than 90% of the mills in the Netherlands are considered to be monumental buildings. The government owns around 40% of them, the remaining 600 are owned by associations or private persons [118].

Registered fires in mills in one of the mill rich areas in the Netherlands, Zaanland, date back to the sixteenth century when the Spanish troops invaded Holland and set fire to a number of mills in the process. The first fire with a registered cause, not being a wartime action (lightning), in the same region dates back to 1691 [119]. Up to 1920 there was no real interest to keep mills in The Netherlands [120]. They were considered as tools for grinding grains or water regulation without a cultural historic value. With the creation of the Dutch association for the preservation of mills (Vereniging De Hollandsche Molen) in 1923 the acknowledgement of the importance of mills in the Netherlands grew.

Since 1945 approximately 1.5 mill per year is destroyed by fire, from 1997-2000 this number went up to 3 mills a year [120]. In the period 1997 -1999 almost 50% of the fires were caused by arson [121]. Because of the large number of fires from 1997-1999 the Netherlands department for conservation (RDMZ, Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg) decided to design guidelines for fire protection in mills. To protect mills from fires presents a particular problem because of the main materials that the mill is built of are easily ignitable, i.e. a mill consists of large amounts of wood and straw. Mills, being high buildings, with generally no or few separations between floors, will also allow a fast fire spread. Mills are often positioned on the countryside, and are not easily accessible for the firemen and the fire trucks which will delay the fire fighting actions. As said before a mill consists of large amounts of wood and straw, which leads to numerous flying brands in the case of a fire, also making the work of the fire fighters difficult. B. Case study " Molen de Walvisch", Schiedam:

Description of the windmill: The windmill de Walvisch is an old wheat-grinding windmill situated in Schiedam, in the South Holland region of the Netherlands. It is one of the highest windmills in the world, reaching in total 43.4meters [Fout! Bladwijzer niet

gedefinieerd.]. The windmill is constructed of masonry up to a height of around 30m, above that it is built of wood. The windmill, dating from 1794, had been damaged by fire in 1938 and had been repaired shortly after122. In 1972 a restoration of the windmill took place. Description of the fire: On February 14 1996 at around 02.30 in the night an electrical device malfunctioned 123 and started a fire. One hour later a person passing by saw the windmill in flames and alarmed the fire services. The firemen arrived and

saw that the fire no longer could be fought from the inside. Inside the windmill there were eight 1,5 ton heavy grinding stones and it was unclear how they were attached to the windmill. Outside of the windmill there was a threat that the 26m long windmill wings would fall down. It was decided that water canons were needed to fight the fire. The windmill was situated beside a channel, however the temperature had gone below zero and the firemen had to hack openings in the ice in order to allow water to be taken. When the fire spread to the outside of the windmill, flying brands became a problem and a number of houses around the windmill had to be evacuated. The fire was extinguished

118 De Hollandsche Molen : Molen Vragen (Questions about mills), www.molens.nl/content/kennis/faq.html 119 R. Couwenhoven; Zaanse Molenbranden, (Mill fires in Zaanland), 2001, uitgave van Stichting Archief Ron Couwenhoven, Zaandam en Feniks Design, Zaandam. 120 Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg (RDMZ, Netherlands department for conservation): Brandbeveiliging in molens (Fire protection in windmills), info Restauratie en beheer nr. 20, september 2000 121 Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg (RDMZ, Netherlands department for conservation): Project verslag: Sprinklers in Molens, (Sprinklers in mills), 1999-2000 122 Histografie van Schiedam, Molen de Walvisch, http://www.scyedam.nl/gebouwen/walvisch.html 123 Potsma, J., gemeente brandweer Schiedam; Historische molen in Schiedam brandt af (Historical mill in Schiedam burns down), Brand en Brandweer, April 1996

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later that morning and the problem of demounting the wings in a controlled manner started. With the help of numerous cranes this was finally managed late the same evening. The windmill has been rebuilt and was re-inaugurated on May 29, 1999. The costs of the rebuilding were estimated to be around 1 million Euros. Conclusions from fire: The first important point is that there was no detection system in the windmill and the fire was detected one hour after it started, by a person passing by. A correctly installed and working detection system would have detected the fire in an earlier stage and maybe saved the windmill. A sprinkler system would have increased the possibility of the windmill being saved, giving the possibility of not only early detection, but also early fighting or extinguishing of the fire. The second important point is that there were heavy grinding stones present on wooden floors in the windmill and that the firemen did not know how they were attached. In order to allow a fire attack from the inside, it would have been necessary to know the positions of the grinding stone and the risk of the stones falling down. The wings of the windmill also posed a problem. With 26m long wings threatening to fall extra precautions had to be taken, also after the fire while taking the wings down. This highlights the importance of identifying significant risk factors, before a fire occurs, in order to know how to tackle all risks correctly and in a safe way. Flying brands was seen to be a problem during the fire. The firemen took this into account and houses around the windmill were evacuated and a number of fire-fighting cars had to be detached to protect the surroundings from eventual secondary fires. Normally in the Netherlands channels around buildings or waterways are taken into account for the (extra) supply of extinguishing water. In this case it turned out to be difficult because of the freezing of the water outside the windmill. C. What has been done to prevent fires? The Netherlands department for conservation have set up three relevant documents concerning fire safety in windmills, [3], [4], and [

124]. Document [120], called "Fire Protection in Mills", was set up in 1999-2000 following the large number of fires in mills the years before. It is a general document explaining the historical background of fires in mills, including fire causes. It then presents solutions to limit the risk and the extent of a fire. The prevention measures are for example: - No smoking, -Carefulness by repairs, -Locking of doors, and -Keeping the windmill accessible for fire services. The mitigation measures include: - Installation of smoke detection, - Compartmentation, and -Installation of fire retardant coatings on the straw. Thereafter the repression measures are treated and sprinklers in particular, with the mentioning of different kinds of sprinklers that are applicable in mills. Finally, this booklet contains a chapter explaining the installation, the costs, and the possibility to receive subsidies for sprinklers. Document [121] is called sprinklers in mills. The booklet is the result of a project held in 1999. The goals of the project were: -To develop new techniques and installations for fire fighting in mills, -To gather information and knowledge about the installation of sprinklers in mills,

124 Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg (RDMZ, Netherlands department for conservation): Leidraad; Bliksembeveiligingsinstallaties, (Lightning protection installations), 1993

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-To Install sprinklers and fire fighting apparatus in mills without disturbing the historic character of the mill, and -To make the results available to the mill owner and stimulate them to use the results. The booklet contains specific information about the use for sprinklers in windmills, including descriptions of other measures that can be taken to prevent or limit the extent of a fire. It then presents a pilot project of the installation of a sprinkler and smoke detection system in a mill, including the presentation of tests of the sprinklers and the smoke detection systems. The costs of these measures are presented in a separate chapter. In the annexe a control list for fire prevention in mills is presented. The third document available [124] is called "Lightning Protection" and concerns lightning protection of monuments in general and including a chapter explicitly for windmills. It highlights specific problems concerning mills and also the danger caused by the turning parts present on windmills. D. Control list – Fire prevention in windmills: The list presented below, taken from [121], has been made by the Netherlands Department for Conservation. The list can be used to check if the mill to be controlled is sufficiently protected against fire. There is no official decision / rule on how many yes’s or no’s that a mill should have in this list. It is only stated that the more yes’s that there are, the better the mill is protected against fire. Mill name Place of mill: Form completed on: By:

Security concept Measures / Available security measures YES NO Smoking prohibited All garbage in appropriate place / good house keeping No flammable items present Electrical installation controlled this year Heating has been controlled last year Lightning safety device present Lightning safety device controlled in the last year Chain for wind-arm put on daily Doors and windows can be sufficiently closed The ground around the mills is not accessible

Prevention

The neighbours ”keep an eye” on the mill

The staircases can be closed by trapdoors There are fire resistant floors and compartments There are strips of wood to prevent leakage and leakage openings present

There has been a straw coating applied this year There is a (mobile) phone present There is a fire detection system present The firemen have been inside the windmill The windmill is always easy to reach There are possibilities for the firemen to park There is a good extinguishing water appliance There is an emergency plan available There is a plan of attack for the firemen

Preparation

The firemen have come to practice this year.

There is a fire extinguisher available per floor There is a extinguishing water system available Repression There is a sprinkler installation available

First help There is a first help box available

There is a hose extinguisher available

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There is a trained first helper present

Insurance The windmill is insured for the value of the reconstruction

Documentation The measures and data of the windmill are available Conclusions: It is very useful to have a simple list to ensure that windmills are protected properly against the threat of fire. It should be noted that in some cases one measures does not exclude another, and one yes could have a larger impact on the fire safety than another yes. A minimum level of fire protection is not mentioned in the document above. The situation in the Netherlands is however that if the mill (owner) is to receive subsidies for his mill the Netherlands department for conservation can request a minimum level of fire safety in the mill. It could be useful to re-design this table into a simple kind of fault tree including a description of measures and of the general cost or effort needed in order to apply it. The usefulness and the completeness of the different measures might then be clearer for the general user.

3.3.17 Sint Petruskerk, Oisterwijk, Holland, 1998


The 63 m high church was made of masonry and wood. The fire occurred during daytime. The occupants were mainly elderly people, physically limited, familiar with the building and visitors.

The fire was caused by soldering work. The church was not provided with any type of automatic detection system it had no fixed suppression system and no alarm. There were portable powder extinguishers. The fire propagated through the wooden floor separations. The alert was transmitted to the fire brigade a few minutes after detection, who arrived 7 minutes later. The fire had spread under the wooden tower without any visible exterior signs.

The firemen were familiar with the site, how to reach it, knew where extinguishing equipment was and had held exercises there. The fire fighting was difficult because of the height of the church. A high ladder was available only 20 minutes after arrival.

The evacuation took time and was the main issue of the fire fighters upon arrival. The persons in the church were elderly and not very mobile and had to be helped out of the church.


There were no casualties. Woodwork has been burnt. There were collapse and damage to the wooden roof structure. The collapse of the church tower and the fall of the church clocks on the interior of the church caused additional damage.

There are no available values for the damage to the building or to the contents.

C. Relevant aspects

The fire was considered of importance because the church had been newly renovated and because the church tower was very high. In addition, the fire was also spectacular.

The initial difficulty of the fire brigade in fighting the fire, because of the height of the church, is to be highlighted in this fire.

3.3.18 Oude Brug - Kartuizerinnestraat "Gallerijen De Jonckheere, Belgium, 1992


The building, with a structure composed of masonry, reinforced concrete and wood, included shops, dwellings and restaurants. At the time of the fire the building was empty, because it was undergoing renovation works. The detection system was not operational and fire compartmentation was

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completely absent. The fire started when the workmen were burning off the bituminous roof covering. Only the workers were inside the building.


No casualties were reported, but the fire propagated to other buildings and caused extensive damage.

C. Relevant aspects

Narrow streets in an old city centre have difficult the access to the fire brigade and delayed the fire fighting operations. This is another fire occurred during renovation works. It is important to stress out the fact that the workmen were the cause for the fire start and that they

were not equipped (and trained ?) to adequately react to an emergency like this.

3.3.19 Miskolk "Tetemvar Planked Church", Hungary, 1997 A. Characterization of the fire scenario The wooden back façade of the one hundred years old protestant wooden church was ignited by unknown people at about 2.20 a.m.. It had very valuable handmade carved artistic woodworks on the pieces of furniture and the wooden columns and beams. The shingles (tiles) of wood covering the roof acted as an easily ignitable fire load component. The fire propagated up very quickly from the wooden back façade to the wooden roof, and from there to the inside of the church. The fire load density was considered high due to the big contribution of the combustible structure. There was no detection, no night watcher, no alarm system, no safety management system, no first attack fire fighting equipment nor fixed suppression system. Only portable extinguishers were in place. The church was located 10 m far from the public road on the middle of hillside, but it was very difficult to approach (this can be done from only one direction). Because of the high quantity of combustible building structure the need of the water-intensity was high, the fire has spread widely on the roof very quickly, and it was impossible to go inside the church. B. Consequences of the fire Soot damage to wall paintings, burnt woodwork, damaged masonry walls and collapse of wooden beams, wooden walls, wooden stairs and of the wooden roof structure were reported as consequences of this fire. The value of damage to the building was estimated in 0.28 million Euros. The estimated value of the damage to the contents was 0.1 million Euros. The one hundred years old protestant church was considered unique. C. Relevant aspects The location of the church placed additional difficulties to the fire fighting. Total lack of fire protection measures. 3.3.20 Esztergom Roman Catholic Cathedral, Hungary, 1993 A. Characterization of the fire scenario Arson is considered to be the probable cause of the fire in this masonry church. The fire load was considered normally ignitable and with a low density. There was no detection, no first attck fire fighting equipment, no fixed suppression system and no alarm system. There was a night watcher but he did not detect the fire at an early stage. Portable extinguishers were in place. B. Consequences of the fire No injuries to people or deaths were reported. Wooden beams and the wooden roof structure collapsed as a consequence of burning.

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The estimated value of the damage to the building was considered to be over 0.4 million Euros. C. Relevant aspects

The eight of the building was considered to represent a special difficulty to the fire fighting. 3.3.21 Mount Athos monastery of Simonopetra, Greece, 1990 A. Characterization of the fire scenario

Monastery of Simonopetra is a five centuries old building, one of 20 monasteries established in the Mount Athos peninsula. Built on the top of a huge rock, most of the external walls consist of wide stone masonry (1-2 m thick). Inside there is a variety of brickwork, masonry and light-weight traditional walls. Timber roofing is covered by slate tiles. The monastery has a record of some previous large fires in 1580, 1622 and 1891. In August 1990, a very large wildfire devastated the peninsula of Mount Athos. Although many resources were involved in fire suppression operations (firemen, the army, fire engines and aerial means) adverse weather conditions

caused the fire to burn for almost two weeks, destroying 2230 hectares of forest and shrub land. The fire approached the monastery from the east, but the monks with the help of the firemen were able to control it. However, two days later it came back and surrounded the monastery. Trees burning near the bottom of the rock originated firebrands which were transported upwards by the strong convection. Some old wooden balconies had been pulled out for replacement some days before. This helped the fire to enter the building, spreading through old timber buildings and window frames. The monks with the help of the firemen fought the fire by cutting the burning timber elements and using a hose reel system. B. Consequences of the fire The fire caused serious damage to the land property and to the water and irrigation systems of Simonopetra, ruined nine outlying buildings and threatened the main complex of the monastery. The declared loss, not including other buildings and forest damage, was 2.1 million euros. C. Relevant aspects Due to its location, the monastery of Simonopetra is very vulnerable to severe wildfire spreading in the forest surrounding the rock which supports it. Some fire protection of the exposed timber elements might in some cases be applied. However, prevention against this type of fire origin could only be achieved using measures outside the building fire area (like firebreak construction, use of prescribed fire, etc). In general, fire protection of historical buildings which are located near or inside forested areas must rely, not only on the standard measures used to prevent/protect against building fires but also on the techniques used to prevent/fight forest fires. 3.3.22 Historic library of the National Technical University of Athens, Greece, 1991 A. Characterization of the fire scenario With a structure made of masonry and wood, the building was built to be used as library and rector’s office of the National Technical University of Athens and was being used as such at the time of the fire. Art objects, paintings, films/photographs and historical documentation were part of the contents of the building. The occupants were adults in normal physical conditions. An accident during a demonstration was the cause of the fire. The fire load had a normal ignitability and a very high density due to the wooden roof, floor, ceilings and cellular coverings etc.

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C. Relevant aspects

There was neither automatic detection system nor an alarm system. The building was provided with safe evacuation paths (enough number, size and signs), but it was not provided with emergency illumination; the evacuation was not a significant problem for that low rise building. There was no smoke extraction system and no fixed fire suppression system. There was no safety management system but CO2 portable extinguishers were in place. The initial “fire cell” was the heavy wooden roof of the building. Masonry walls of triangular shape with large non fire resisting doors resulted in inadequate compartmentation. Due to the various structural damages and local collapses, the fire propagated to other floors. Through openings and collapsed external walls it propagated to other buildings.. B. Consequences of the fire Besides heavy damages and almost total collapse of the wooden roof, considerable damage appeared to the masonry vault of the basement (library) due to the extinguishing water, serious damage to marble beams, columns and other structural elements, damaged walls and burnt woodwork. The declared loss, values of the damage to the buildings and to the contents, were 5 million Euros and 1,5 million Euros, respectively (values of 1995). Repair and rehabilitation of the building lasted almost 10 years, while the relevant cost was high as already mentioned. The library and rector’s office were considered the symbol of Athens city. There were no casualties

The fire took place during a demonstration at the night of October 25, 1991. The Fire Brigade arrived 30 min. after the beginning of the fire but it was allowed to enter the University building only after 2 hours when the first flames were seen from outside. Estimated maximum gas temperatures reached almost 850 0C at certain places, especially at the higher parts of masonry walls and marble colonnades.

3.4 Conclusions

When planning the improvement of the fire safety in ancient buildings the challenge is to find a balance between the fire protection measures to be implemented and the respect to the original character of the building, aiming at increasing the safety of the occupants against fire and at reducing to a minimum the extent of the damage caused by the fire to the building itself and to the contents with artistic/ historic character, whenever that is the case.

The respect to the original character of the building sets limitations to the type and extent of the protection measures to be applied. The resulting fire safety in the building is the outcome of a summation of the single contributions of the different fire protection measures adopted, although some of them may not be in some cases 100% efficient.

Each one of the fires selected for this analysis brought its own contribution to the understanding of the aspects which are relevant for the fire protection of Cultural Heritage. From each of them, lessons can be learned and conclusions can be drawn, which can be used when preparing a strategy for the fire protection of Cultural Heritage, both at a national level and when planning the protection of single items.

3.4.1 Causes for fire ignition

Old electrical circuits and old gas ducts are two aspects that distinguish ancient buildings from new ones, from the point of view of the causes for fire start. Upgrading of these installations is then a starting point to reduce the probability of fire start.

Causes connected to human action are identified as the main causes for fire ignition. Arson and carelessness during renovation works seem to play an important role. According to the British Ecclesiastical Insurance Group, six out of ten serious church fires are the result of arson. In the years

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1992-95, arsonists set fire to more than 30 churches in Norway. About half of these suffered total damage. To reduce the probability of a fire being started as a consequence of arson, two different steps can be done:

1) To install/ improve safety measures against intrusion.

2) Being arson a social deviant behaviour, it is assumed that increasing the level of education of the population in general will contribute to decrease the magnitude of this problem.

The high frequency of fire start during renovation works states the need to define/ improve/ enforce special fire precaution measures to be applied in construction sites and especially when these works take place in buildings with historic character. State departments should not be excluded from the obligation of applying these precautionary measures.

It was apparent from this study that a great number of fires have unknown causes. This may reflect the difficulty in determining those causes or the lack of systematic data collection. Systematic data collection on fires in general, and on fires affecting Cultural Heritage in particular, is an important starting point to identify the most suitable measures to reduce the probability of fire occurrence and the importance of their consequences.

3.4.2 Fire propagation/ development

A great number of ancient buildings have in common the type of construction. Load bearing masonry walls are connected to a wooden structure, which supports wooden floors. Roof structures, as well as stairs are also frequently made of wood. The ceilings are either in wood or have a plaster cover.

From the point of view of the fire propagation the worst fire scenario that can happen is a conflagration, where several buildings are simultaneously involved, like it happened in the Chiado fire in Lisbon. External walls of ancient buildings are usually thick enough to exclude fire propagation by conduction. The weak points are normally the openings in the facades, more critical when the streets are narrow, as it is frequently the case in old city centres, and the propagation through the roof. It is thus very important that measures are taken to increase the fire resistance of the roof structure that prevent it from collapsing.

The vertical propagation of a fire inside the building of fire origin is mainly due to the collapse of the wooden floors or via non enclosed staircases. Whenever possible, it is recommended to improve the fire resistance of the floors and the fire resistance of the access doors to the vertical communication paths.

Compartmentation of unoccupied voids in ancient buildings can contribute to significantly delay the horizontal fire propagation. In many situations this can be done without harming the architecture of the building.

Modifications in the use of the buildings have in the past lead to changes in the corresponding fire safety level. Unauthorized openings made in fire resisting walls can lead to unexpected fire propagation/ development, thus creating additional unexpected difficulties to the fire fighting. Unoccupied voids between the ceiling and the roof are prone to the accumulation of large amounts of dust, which contributes to a faster fire propagation. If the building is remodelled and these spaces are occupied, dust accumulation ceases to be a problem but the change in use is tied to an increase in the fire load and to an increase in the probability of fire start, which shall always be considered by the corresponding fire safety engineering project.

Early detection plus early fire fighting is the best way to limit the fire development and the extent of fire damage to people, to the building and to its contents. Most of the ancient buildings where fires have occurred had no automatic fire detection or fire suppression systems. Some of them were not even provided with portable fire extinguishers. Fire fighting has often started only when the fire had developed to a stage where it was very difficult to fight and to limit the extent of damage.

Regular inspection/ maintenance of portable fire extinguishers reduces the probability of failure, which may be the difference between a starting fire and a fully developed one.

During renovation works the existing fire detection/ fire suppression systems have sometimes to be put out of service. The great number of fire starts during these sometimes short periods of time shows that the probability of fire start is non negligible and therefore alternative measures should be implemented. Even when these renovation works are restricted to a delimited area of the building an eventual fire may put in danger all the building, its contents and the occupants of the remaining areas.

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As stated above, the use of automatic suppression systems should be considered as a means of limiting the extent of damage from fire.

3.4.3 Fire fighting/ suppression

As in any other fire, fires in ancient buildings that have propagated to several floors and/ or buildings become more difficult to fight. The access by the fire brigades is more difficult in old urban areas with narrow streets. This may require the definition of a mesh of streets where car parking is forbidden and the use of fire fighting equipment more adapted to the situation. Volunteer elements of the resident population may be trained in first attack fire fighting operations and make use of first attack fire fighting equipment strategically distributed in the old urban centre.

The use of automatic sprinkler systems has been contested for the fear of the damage caused by the extinguishing water to the building and its contents. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the damage caused by a fully developed fire is certainly greater, and that in such a case the fire brigades will fight the fire by using water in larger quantities.

Some buildings, like churches, railway stations and similar, place special problems as far as fire fighting is concerned. They are relatively high open spaces with few or no fire compartmentation, where the needs in fire fighting equipment, the fire fighting strategy and any particular conditions should be studied and tested in advance. Any risks associated with the fire, like the fall of heavy or somehow dangerous parts of the construction should be anticipated and taken into account when planning the fire fighting strategy.

3.4.4 Nature and extent of fire damage

There were only four casualties in two of the fires analysed. The selected fires were considered relevant and had great social impact not because of the number of deaths, but because of the damage that they have caused to the Cultural Heritage.

Fire damage to ancient buildings can result from burning or be caused by heat, by soot or by the extinguishing water. Even when a fire remains confined to the compartment of fire origin, fire gases can cause important damage in the adjoining compartments. That is the case of the damage caused by soot to wall paintings or the damage caused by the corrosive gas products yield by the combustion of plastics like the insulation of electrical cables. Whenever possible, a smoke extraction system should be implemented in order to limit the extent of affected areas, with the additional advantage of protecting human life against fire gases. In parallel, the application of fire retardant coatings to combustible elements should also be considered as well as limitations to the presence of plastic items. This will in addition limit the extent of damage caused by burning.

Damage caused by heat is a natural consequence of the fire and the extent of it can only be limited by limiting the fire development.

The limitation to the extent of damage to the contents with artistic/ historic value will be achieved by the following measures:

1) limitations to the fire load density in the corresponding fire compartment

2) early fire detection + early fire fighting

An aspect which deserves a special consideration when dealing with the fire protection of building contents with artistic/ historic value is the planning of the emergency management. The exact knowledge of the important items to protect, with a list of priorities, and the set of actions to undertake in case of fire, with regular training exercises, is a recommended option. A demonstrative example of the above procedures is the Windsor Castle fire, where the extent of damage to the contents was very limited. Effective staff training is to be emphasized in all the cases where the protection against fire of moveable Cultural Heritage is a goal. This minimizes the likelihood of items being damaged during the rescue operations.

Also, it is very important to identify the significant risk factors in each situation, before a fire occurs, in order to know how to tackle all these risks correctly and in a safe way. A simple list can be used to regularly check if all the relevant aspects of the fire safety concept applied to the building are still verified.

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The value of historic buildings cannot be solely expressed in financial terms. It is their history, age, appearance and quality of materials or craftsmanship that makes them irreplaceable. From the fires analyzed, only a reduced number had available estimations of the value of the damage to the building, but this can amount to several million Euros. The cultural value of an historic building is usually difficult to translate into currency. The same applies to certain items of the contents with cultural value. But for setting priorities when deciding where and how to apply financial resources to the fire protection of Cultural Heritage it may be enough to establish some sort of grading for the buildings and for the contents.

Fire conflagrations have usually important socio-economical consequences. A considerable number of people may loose their jobs or their homes. Small firms have usually no economic capacity to withstand the inactivity period of the reconstruction. For these reasons, and for the extent of possible damage to the Cultural Heritage, the prevention of fire conflagrations shall then be a first priority.

3.4.5 Mitigation means used and their efficiency

Table 4 summarizes the list of mitigation means that were in place in the buildings involved in the fires selected. The efficiency in this table is defined as the quotient between the number of affirmative answers to the question about the acceptable fulfilment of their performance and the total number of cases where the mitigation means were in place.

It should be stressed that these results are only indicative and have no statistical value. To draw general conclusions about the efficiency of the mitigation means just on the basis of these results would be inappropriate.

Table 4 – Efficiency of the mitigation means used

Mitigation means Yes Efficiency

Smoke 7 4/7 Heat 1 1/1

Automatic detection

Flame 0 Night watcher 6 1/6 On-site fire brigade 4 2/4 First-aid fire fighting equipment 9 6/9 Portable extinguishers 13 Fixed suppression system 2 0/2 Compartmentation 5 3/5 Safety management system 5 Alarm system 6 5/6 Evacuation paths 9 9/9 Evacuation signs 9 Emergency illumination 5 4/5

Mechanical 2 1/2 Smoke extraction Natural 1 1/1

The FiRE-TECH “Work Package 4 – Existing fire safety technologies and products” will make a review of the state of the art of fire protection techniques and products supporting the various components of fire safety design, quantify their reliability and costs and assess their acceptability and limitations within the context of protecting Cultural Heritage. 4. Summary Information on a reasonable number of fires occurred in the last decades affecting historic buildings and/ or contents with artistic/ historic value, with a wide range of original/ actual uses was collected in several European countries. The information gathered allows the following main conclusions:

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1 – The most frequently reported causes of fire were arson and carelessness during renovation works, figs. 4 and 46. 2 - Load bearing masonry walls and wooden elements are the main components of the structure in ancient buildings, figs. 1 and 8. From these fires a selection of 22 was used for further detailed analysis. From this analysis the most relevant aspects are summarized below. General aspects of fire protection having a particular incidence on the fire protection of Cultural Heritage

The protection of Cultural Heritage against fire and the protection of life/ health against fire are two coupled goals that must be handled together. In the context of FiRE-TECH however, attention was focused mainly in the first one. Fire protection/ prevention measures that are usually taken to protect human life or common property are in principle the same that will also be applied to protect Cultural Heritage, taken as such or after being adapted to the specific constraints of historic buildings.

The characteristics of the construction and the properties of the construction materials used, very frequently not having the desirable performance in case of fire, together with heavy restrictions to interventions, is what really distinguishes the fire protection of historic buildings from the fire protection of other buildings.

The following are general aspects of fire protection, which have a particular incidence on the fire protection of Cultural Heritage.

• Early detection plus early fire fighting is the best way to limit the fire development and the extent of fire damage to people, to the building and to its contents. The solution to adopt shall always be adapted to each situation, having in mind to achieve maximum safety with minimum damage to the construction. Non invasive detection and suppression solutions are necessary.

• Modifications in the use of the buildings should always be done after an adequate fire safety assessment.

• To install/ improve safety measures against intrusion is a means of reducing the probability of a fire being started by arson.

• In regions where lightning is a major cause of fire start, buildings should be provided with lightning protection systems.

• Regular inspection/ maintenance of portable fire extinguishers will reduce their probability of failure.

• Planning the fire fighting strategy and anticipating any risks associated with the fire will increase the efficiency of the fire fighting operations, and are essential measures to tackle with particular situations (e.g. windmills, churches, railway stations).

• Planning of the emergency management and regular training exercises can reduce the extent of damage to the building contents with artistic/ historic value.

• Acceptable solutions for smoke extraction systems as well as limitations to the presence of plastic items is a means of reducing the damage caused by soot.

Aspects that are specific to the fire protection of Cultural Heritage

• Systematic data collection on fires affecting Cultural Heritage is an essential step to identify on a sound basis the most suitable measures to reduce the probability of fire occurrence and the importance of their consequences.

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• Avoiding conflagrations in historic centres shall be a first priority. To accomplish this, beyond improving the fire safety in each individual building, attention should be given to the following specific aspects:

o Measures to reduce the probability of fire propagation between buildings through facing openings in narrow streets are necessary.

o Methods of improving the fire resistance of the roof structure are necessary as a means to reduce the probability of fire propagation between buildings through the roof.

o The definition of a grid of streets where car parking is forbidden may be necessary to facilitate the approach of fire fighting vehicles.

o Fire fighting equipment more adapted to operate in narrow streets may be necessary.

o Volunteer elements of the resident population may be trained in first attack fire fighting operations and make use of first attack fire fighting equipment strategically placed.

• Ancient buildings have often old electrical circuits and old gas ducts. Upgrading them is essential to reduce the probability of fire start.

• Special fire precaution measures to be applied during renovation works in buildings with historic character should be defined, improved and enforced to reduce the probability of fire start during these periods. Adequate legislation should also be developed to guarantee that the State departments are not excluded from the obligation of applying these precautionary measures.

• Acceptable methods of improving the fire resistance of wooden floors and the fire resistance of the access doors to the vertical communication paths are necessary as a means of limiting the fire propagation and the extent of fire damage.

• Acceptable means of improving the fire resistance of combustible elements of the structure, like the application of fire retardant coatings, are necessary.

• Compartmentation of unoccupied voids in ancient buildings is essential to limit the fire propagation.

• Some buildings, like churches, railway stations and similar, place special problems as far as fire fighting is concerned. They are relatively high open spaces with few or no fire compartmentation, where the needs in fire fighting equipment, the fire fighting strategy and any particular conditions should be studied and tested in advance.

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Annex 1 Questionnaire for bodies dealing with Cultural Heritage in member states - Part B: Identification of interesting fires

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Annex 1 - Questionnaire for bodies dealing with Cultural Heritage in member states - Part B: Identification of interesting fires This part B of the questionnaire is developed by FiRE-TECH: WG2 WP2 will collect information from fires in heritage buildings in order to typify the hazards, evaluate the risks and identify the measures that would reduce the occurrence of such fires, their development and the extent of damage. Therefore, information on the following types of fires is needed: A – Fires causing great damage to an historic building B – Fires causing great damage to several historic buildings C – Fires occurring in buildings with no special historic meaning, but affecting items with great artistic/ historic value D – Fires causing great damage both to the building and to the contents with historic value Information considered to be relevant includes: - type and use of the building: tables B1 and B2 - cause of the fire: tables B3 Has your organisation data on the causes and consequences of important fires occurred in your country in the last 15 to 20 years? Is this information available? If yes, please fill in this part of the questionnaire, using one form for each important fire, and keeping in mind the fire classification above. If not, could you give us an indication of the organisations where such information can be obtained? Definition: In this context, an important fire in a country is a fire, which has had significant social impact as a consequence of extensive damage to historic buildings or important damage to the contents with artistic/ historical value, either with great or small human losses If further clarification is needed, please contact the convenor of Working Group 2: Prof. I. Cabrita Neves

Departamento de Engenharia Civil Instituto Superior Técnico Av. Rovisco Pais 1049-001 Lisboa Portugal

tel.: 351-218418202 fax: 351-218497650 e-mail: [email protected]

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mailto:[email protected]

Table B1: General information on identified fires (pls. fill in per fire)

GENERAL INFORMATION PER FIRE Country

Identification of the organization where the information was collected

Name: Address:

Identification and contact of the person answering the questionnaire

Name: Address: Phone: Fax: Email:

Date of completion Identification of the building/ fire

Date of occurrence

Table B2: Type of construction, affected by fire

B2: TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION A.1 - Wood A.2 - Masonry A.3 - Reinforced concrete A.4 - Steel A.5 - Composite steel/concrete A.6 - Other (specify)

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Table B3: Use of building, affected by fire

B3: USE OF THE BUILDING

B.1 B.2 Original

use At the time of the fire

1. Castle 2. Church/ Temple 3. Hospital 4. Hotel 5. Industry 6. Library/ Archive 7. Market/ Commercial 8. Monastery 9. Monument 10. Museum 11. Office

13. School 14. Theatre 15. Other (specify)

12. Palace

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Table B4: Cause of fire, affecting Cultural Heritage

B4: CAUSES OF THE FIRE 1. Malfunctioning device/ installation (specify) 2. Old electrical circuits 3. Old gas ducts

B4-1 Faulty installations

4. Other (specify)

1. Arson

2. Candle

3. Cigarette

4. Fireplace

5. Fireworks

6. Heaters

7. Welding (renovation works)

B4-.2 Human causes (undue human action)

8. Other (specify)

1. Lightning B4-3 Natural causes 2. Earthquake

B4-4 Other (specify)

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Table B5: Damage caused by the fire

1. B5-1: TYPE OF DAMAGE B5-1.1 – Fire causing great damage to an historic building

B5-1.2– Fire causing great damage to several historic buildings (conflagration)

B5-1.3 – Fire occurring in a building with no special historic meaning, but affecting items with great artistic/ historic value

B5-1.4 – Fire causing great damage both to the building and to the contents with historic value

B5-2 NATURE OF DAMAGE B5-2.1 - Damage to archaeological items B5-2.2 - Damage to art objects B5-2.3 - Damage to the building B5-2.4 - Damage to written historic information B5-2.5 - Injury to people B5-2.6 - Other (specify)

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Annex 2

Replies to part B of the Questionnaire for bodies dealing with Cultural Heritage in member states

Annex 3

Guidelines for the data gathering on a selection of fires involving Cultural Heritage

Annex 3 - Guidelines for the data gathering on a selection of fires involving Cultural Heritage

The scope of Work Package 2 (WP2) of the FiRE-TECH project is to draw as much knowledge as possible from significant fires affecting Cultural Heritage occurred in the last decades, in order to identify their human, cultural and economical consequences and the measures susceptible to reduce their probability of occurrence as well as the importance of their consequences.

In each country, this information will be obtained by each partner of the consortium, according to the distribution of tasks summarized in Annex 2, in direct contact with the organizations, identified in part B of the “Questionnaire for bodies dealing with Cultural Heritage in member states” as having the requested data stored and available.

These Guidelines for the data collecting have been prepared by FiRE-TECH Working Group 2, and are expected to guarantee that the data gathering is done in a harmonized way, which will facilitate the subsequent treatment and interpretation. Significant aspects eventually not covered in these Guidelines should be included in those fields where comments or further specification are asked for.

In agreement with the Workplan, the partners of the FiRE-TECH consortium are asked to fill in the Guidelines forms, one per significant fire, whenever necessary with the help of the national organizations where the relevant data is stored and available.

For a list of addresses to which these Guidelines have been sent, refer to Annex 1. Some of these partners are asked to contact neighbouring countries, not represented in the FiRE-TECH consortium (i.e. WFR to contact Ireland; RUG to contact Luxemburg). Other partners are asked to supply the name of a contact person in a neighbouring country, who will then directly be approached by the convenor of Working Group 2. For details, refer to Annex 2.

Respondents are kindly requested to complete the forms and to return them prior to June 15, 2002. Suggestions for contact persons are expected within one week. If further clarification is needed, please contact the convenor of Working Group 2: Prof. I. Cabrita Neves tel.: +351218418202 Departamento de Engenharia Civil fax: +351218497650 Instituto Superior Técnico e-mail: [email protected] Av. Rovisco Pais

1049-001 Lisboa Portugal

On behalf of WG 2 with kind regards, I. Cabrita Neves (convenor WG2)

II

mailto:[email protected]

Fire Risk Evaluation To European Cultural Heritage

(FiRE-TECH)

Quantification of priorities and optimisation of fire protection strategies



A.1.1 Original use of the building

A.1.2 Type of structure

A.1.3

Building contents

1 Castle 1 Composite steel/concrete

1 Archaeological objects

2 Church/ Temple 2 Masonry 2 Art objects (specify)

3 Hospital 3 Reinforced concrete

4 Hotel 4 Steel 3 Films/ Photographs

5 Industry 5 Wood 4 Historic documentation

6 Library/ Archive 6 Other (specify) 5 Other (specify)

7 Market/ Commercial

8 Monastery

9 Monument

10 Museum

11 Office

12 Palace

13 School

14 Theatre

15 Other (specify)


(FiRE-TECH)


A.2 Characterization of the occupants/ activity

A.2.1 Use of the building at the time of the fire

1 Familiar with the building

1 Castle

A.2.2 Type of occupants

2 Visitors

2 Church/ Temple 1 Adults

3 Hospital 2 Aged

4 Hotel

A.2.3 Age of the occupants

3 Children

5 Industry 1 Limited

6 Library/ Archive

A.2.4 Physical condition of the occupants 2 Normal

7 Market/ Commercial 1 Asleep

8 Monastery

A.2.5 State

2 Awake

9 Monument

10 Museum

11 Office

12 Palace

13 School

14 Theatre

15 Other (specify)

16 If the use of the building at the time of the fire was different from the original, please comment below on any aspects linked to this change of use that may have had a negative or positive impact on the fire (e.g. renovation technique, new interior design, new materials)


(FiRE-TECH)


A.3 Type and amount of fire load

1 Easily ignitable (specify)

A.3.1 What was the type of fire load in the initial fire cell? 2 Normal

1 q od/mf < 15 kg wo 2 floor area

2 15 < qf < 50 kg wood/m2 floor area

A.3.2 Please give an estimate of the fire load density qf in the initial fire cell

3 qf > 50 kg wood/m2 floor area

A.4 Detection

1 None

2 Flame

3 Heat

4 Smoke

5 Other (specify)

A.4.1 What was the type of automatic detection system?

Yes No

Did the automatic detection system work?

A.4.3 Was there a night watch in the building?

A.4.4 Did the night watch detect the fire at an early stage?

A.4.2


(FiRE-TECH)


A.5 Fire fighting/ containment Yes No

1 Was there any safety management system implemented in the building, having a particular incidence in the fire safety of the building and its contents? If yes, describe briefly below.

2 Was there a local fire brigade in the building?

3 Did the local fire brigade act in due time?

4 Was the building provided with first attack fire fighting equipment?

5 Was it available?

6 Was the alert to the fire brigade transmitted?

7 How long after detection?

8 How long did the fire brigade take to arrive?

9 Was the building provided with portable extinguishers? If yes specify.

10 Was the building provided with a fixed suppression system? If yes specify.

11 Did it function as expected?

12 Was there enough extinguishing agent to fight the fire?

13 Was the building divided into fire cells?

14 Was compartmentation effective in keeping the fire inside the initial fire cell? If not specify

15 Did the fire propagate to other floors? If yes, how?

16 Did the fire propagate to other buildings? If yes, how?


(FiRE-TECH)


17 Please comment below on any particular aspects linked to the special character of the building and its contents that you may consider relevant for the fire fighting / containment.

A.6 Evacuation Yes No

1 Was there an alarm system?

2 Was it operational?

3 Was it activated?

4 Was the building provided with safe evacuation paths, in accordance with the relevant national regulation?

5 Were the number and size of the evacuation paths adequate and effective?

6 Was the building provided with adequate evacuation signs?

7 Was the building provided with emergency illumination?

8 Did it work?

9 Please comment below on any particular aspects linked to the special character of the building and its contents that you may consider relevant for the evacuation.

A.7 Smoke management

1 Mechanical 2 Natural 3 None A.7.1 What was the type of smoke extraction system in the building?

Yes No

1 Did it work?


(FiRE-TECH)


2 Was it effective?

3 Please comment below on any particular aspects linked to the special character of the building and its contents that you may consider relevant for the smoke management in the building.

A.8 Causes of the fire

1 Old electrical circuits

2 Old gas ducts

3 Malfunctioning device/ installation (specify)

A.8.1

Faulty installations

1 Cigarette

2 Candle

3 Fireplace

4 Heaters

5 Welding (refurbishment works)

6 Fireworks

A.8.2 Human causes (undue human action)

7

Lightning

1

Arson

1 A.8.3 Natural causes 2 Earthquake

3 Vegetation fire

A.8.4 Other (specify)


(FiRE-TECH)


A.8.5 Please comment below on any particular aspects linked to the special character of the building and its contents that you may consider relevant for the causes of the fire.


B.1 Consequences on people Yes

B.1.1 Could the occupants be evacuated without injury to people or casualties?

B.1.2

B.1.3 Number of injured people

1 Smoke

2 Heat

3 Structural collapse

B.1.4

Causes of deaths

4 Trample crush

No

Number of casualties


(FiRE-TECH)


B.2 Consequences on the building

B.2.1 Non-structural elements

1 Soot damage to wall paintings

2 Heat damage to bas-relief

3 Burnt woodwork

B.2.2 Structural elements

D – damage HD – Heavy damage C – Collapse

Material Elements

Masonry Reinforced concrete

Steel Composite steel/ concrete

Wood

Beams

Slabs

Walls

Stairs

Roof structure

B.2.3 Please describe below any additional aspects not covered above and considered to be relevant for the description of the damage to the building

Please describe the type of structural damage by filling in the table below and using the following symbols

B.3 Nature of damage


(FiRE-TECH)


1 Damage by burning

2 Damage by heat

3 Damage by extinguishing water

4 Damage by soot

B.4 Damage value

1 Estimated value of damage to the building DB (Euros)

2 Estimated value of damage to the contents DC (with artistic/historical interest) (Euros)

3 Estimated value of damage to the business (Euros)

4 Damage ratio R = DC/DB

5 Declared loss (DB + DC) (Euros)

6 Please describe briefly below the socio-economic impact of the fire (main reasons why the fire was considered at the time of occurrence an important fire affecting Cultural Heritage)

B.5 Environmental damage (Describe briefly, if any)


(FiRE-TECH)


C. Additional information

Describe briefly any aspects not covered above that might be considered relevant to the understanding of the causes of the fire, the reasons for the fire extent, the type and extent of damage, the causes of the damage, etc.

Annex 4

Information on the selected fires collected by means of the Guidelines

Annex 5

Guidelines-Clarification

Clarification to the Guidelines In the FiRE-TECH meeting on the 3rd and 4th October 2002 in Oudenaarde it was pointed out that some of the answers to the Guidelines might indicate that some questions had more than one interpretation. For the sake of clarity and uniformity, it was decided to clarify and eventually reformulate those questions and then ask each member of WG2 to review the corresponding answers. Under the heading “A.2 Characterization of the occupants/ activity”, the questions A.2.1 to A.2.5 were intended to contribute to the general characterization of the fire scenario. Please check the answers given under the light of the added clarification. Fire identification

A.2.2 Type of occupants (was the building normally used by people familiar with the building or was it open to visitors as well?) 1. Familiar with the building

2. Visitors

A.2.3 Age of the occupants (did the building include schools for children, kindergarten or elderly homes?) 1. Adults 2. Aged 3. Children

A.2.4 Physical condition of the occupants (did the building include health care services or homes for disabled people?) 1. Limited 2. Normal

A.2.5 State of the occupants (did the building include sleeping facilities?) 1. Asleep 2. Awake

Additional information regarding the exact situation when the fire occurred may be added as comments. Comments

It was also considered relevant to clarify the answers given to the questions relative to the fire fighting/ containment by a different formulation. Please put an x where relevant. A.5 Fire fighting/ containment Yes No 1. Did the building have an on-site fire brigade? 2. If yes, did the on-site fire brigade attend the fire? 3. If yes, were they effective in extinguishing the fire? 4. If no, state the reasons why they were not effective.

5. Were the local municipal fire brigade summoned? 6. If yes, did they attend in good time?

a) less than 5 minutes b) 5-15 minutes c) more than 15 minutes 7) If the answer to 5 was yes, were the local municipal fire brigade effective in extinguishing the fire?

8) If no, why were they not effective?

9) Had staff received training in the use of first-aid fire fighting equipment? 10) If yes, did staff tackle the fire with first-aid fire fighting appliances? 11) Were staff successful in tackling/controlling the fire with first-aid fire fighting equipment?

12) If not, why were they not successful?

13) Were there fire rated elements in the building? (EI doors, EI/REI walls, REI floors)

14) Were they effective in keeping the fire inside the initial fire compartment?

Annex 6

Additional information on the selected fires collected by means of the Guidelines-Clarification

european study into the fire risk to european cultural ... · joão ventura . 1. introduction 2....

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