EU’s competency in conflict resolution: The Cases of Bosnia, Macedonia

(FYROM) and Cyprus examined

By Emel Akçali Phd candidate at Paris IV-Sorbonne, France

Research Assistant at the International Relations Department of Çukurova University, Adana, Turkey

emelakcali@gmail.com/emelakcali@cu.edu.tr

Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Session Workshop Nicosia, 24-28 April, 2006

Workshop: Cyprus- A conflict at the Crossroads

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ABBREVIATIONS AKEL Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou-Progressive Party of the

Working People. AKP Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-Justice and Development Party BIH Bosna i Hercegovina- Bosnia and Herzegovina CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CTP Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi-Republican Turkish Party DIKO Dimokratiko Komma-The Democratic Party DP Demokrat Parti-Democratic Party ECJ European Court of Justice ECHR European Court of Human Rights ESDP European Security and Defense Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union FRY Former Republic of Yugoslavia FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GC Greek Cypriots ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IFOR The first NATO military intervention force in Bosnia IMF International Monetary Fund JNA Yugoslav People’s Army KLA Ushtria Çlimtare e Kosovës-Kosova Liberation Army NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-governmental organization NLA Ushtria Çlimtare Kombëtare-National Liberation Army OHR Office of the High Representative in Bosnia OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe QMV Qualified Majority Voting PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PSC Political and Security Committee RRF Rapid Reaction Forces RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism RS Republika Srpska SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement SEE Southeastern Europe SFOR Stabilization Force SPSEE Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe TCCC Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce TEU-A Treaty on European Union, Amsterdam TEU-M Treaty on European Union, Maastricht TC Turkish Cypriots TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force UNMIBH UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina WTO World Trade Organization

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Note On Terminology The utilization of the word, Bosnian-Bosanac, inhabitant of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), regardless of ethnic origin and Boshniac-Bošnjak -the ethnic Slavic Muslim people living in Southeastern Europe is problematic. In the west, Boshniacs have generally been referred as Muslims with a capital M. This is mainly due to the official adoption of the term ‘Muslim’ in Socialist Yugoslavia in 1968 as a distinct identity to define the Muslim Bosnians. In 1993, the Congress of Bosnian Muslim Intellectuals adopted the term Boshniac instead of the previously used Muslim. Other nationalities objected to the term as a maneuver to monopolize the history of BIH. The Bosnian Muslim intellectuals argued that the term has been a historical ethnic term for their nation, living not only in Bosnia but also in the Sandjak area of Serbia and in Macedonia. Plus, they pointed out that if there was a true intention of monopolizing Bosnian history, they would have adopted the term ‘Bosnian.’ ‘Boshniac’ is in fact the historical term used for Slavic Muslims in the Balkans (Malcolm, 2000, Imamović,1998) and an official one recognized in the Ottoman Empire after the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It is also the common term to refer to a big number of Muslim Bosnians who came and settled in the Ottoman Empire (later Turkey) after the annexation of Bosnia to the Austria-Hungarian Empire, the First World War, the Second World War and the last Bosnian War. ‘Bosnian Boshniacs’ instead of ‘Bosnian Muslims’ will thus be the preferred term used in this paper as it’s the historical and common term employed in the author’s country and as the author prefers its secular implication. In this paper, Republic of Cyprus (RoC) will refer to the Greek Cypriot government having the control on the 63% of the southern part of the island. The northern part of the island under Turkish Cypriot control will be referred as Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) acknowledging the fact that TRNC is not recognized by the international community except Turkey and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Use will be made of the original script of the Serbo-Croatian/Bosnian and Turkish words and names in Latin alphabet. In order to facilitate the pronunciation of their specific letters a table is proposed below. Because of the author’s lack of knowledge of Greek and Cyrillic alphabets, Greek, Greek Cypriot, Macedonian and Serbian names and words will be written in Latin alphabet as well. Serbo-Croatian

Turkish Pronunciation in English

C Č Ć DŽ Đ or DJ J LJ NJ Š Ž

Ç C G Ğ Ö Ş Ü J

ts as in Tsar ch as in scratch ch as in chair g as in digest g softer as in gypsy g as in gap kh as in khan œu as ‘chef d’œuvre’ in French y as in year ly as in Ljubljana ny as in nymph sh as in ship u as in Munich j as in ‘Jacobin’ in French

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This paper considers the development of conflict resolution as a critical foreign policy measure and aims to assess EU’s competency in it as a third party. For this purpose, it explores EU conflict resolution stratagems and examines its involvement in three empirical case studies: Bosnia, Macedonia (FYROM), and Cyprus. The findings suggest that the EU’s most successful conflict resolution method lies with the EU integration process which acts as a catalytic effect on bringing the parties to the negotiation table. This is due to the confidence that adversary parties place in EU legislations. A successful use of conditionality further helps the EU to overcome the intransigence of the parties and achieve a settlement. Success in Macedonia and failure in Cyprus are two good examples and may be useful experiences for the case of Bosnia. The EU has a weakness, however, in conflict transformation which is the most promising process towards reconciliation. The paper argues that EU’s weakness in conflict transformation is mainly due to its deficiency in undertaking socio-economic inequalities and in fostering undistorted communication between adversary parties. Key Words: Conflict resolution, Conflict Prevention, Bosnian, Macedonian and Cyprus conflict, Conflict Transformation, Critical Thinking, Communicative Action

Unlike compromises achieved through bargaining process brokered or imposed,

conflict resolution tries to achieve agreements which are likely to generate the parties’ long-

term commitments to the outcome and transform the relationship. With such an agreement

and the new form of relationship it endorses, it aims to be “conducive to stable peace,

mutually enhancing cooperation and ultimate reconciliation” (Kelman, 112).

Conflict resolution is thus not a strategy of how to use most effectively the power of

authority of any of the parties1 to dictate outcomes. This would be rather conflict regulation,

settlement or management but not a resolution ‘proper’ (Avruch, 82). The realists argue that

there is no room for conflict resolution in disputes between irreconcilable interests when

power and coercion are the name of the game and conflict resolution interference may only

prolong the fighting and prevent a more secure peace following a clear-cut military victory

(Miall, Rambostham, Woodhouse, 56). The use of force by military interventions, has proved

to be helpful so far at stopping the bloodshed in violent conflicts and freezing the situations

preventing them from spreading. However, it has not been successful per se in bringing about

a viable peace. “Coercive action treats the symptoms, at worst, by merely suppressing them

but rarely treats the underlying pathologies” (Avruch, 83). Conflict resolution deals with the

socio-psychological process of conflict by getting into its root causes particularly in the form

of unmet or threatened needs for identity, security, recognition, autonomy and justice and by

this way, it offers a critical approach to existing peace-building and peace-making methods.

1 The primary parties to a conflict are those who are directly affected by it. An interested secondary party is the one has an indirect interest in the outcome of a conflict and support one of the disputants accordingly. The third parties are separated into an interested and a disinterested one. An interested third party is the one who has an interest in the successful resolution of the conflict and engages in active settlement efforts. A disinterested third party on the other hand is the one who does not take an active part in the settlement efforts despite its interest in its solution. (Eralp and Beriker, 5)

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Conflict resolution in Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War was

the core ambition of the European Community’s formation. Its accomplishment through

democratic, economic and political means has turned it into one of the most appealing tokens

of the so-called ‘Europeanization’ within the framework of the European Union (EU).2

Despite this, the EU has launched itself as a third party to conflict resolution only

recently. Given that most of the intractable conflicts in Asia, Africa or the Middle East are

arguably the results of policies of European colonial powers-reflecting their bias and

preference, there has always been an international incentive to get the EU to assume

responsibility towards conflict resolution beyond its frontiers. However, it was during the

post-cold war era that the developing global interdependence elevated the role of non-military

powers such as the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and recently the World Trade

Organization (WTO) in world affairs.

The post-cold war era has witnessed an eruption of inter-communal clashes based on

identity. In contrast to Huntington’s Clash of Civilization Theory or the religious and ethnic

base arguments which have become the explanatory theories for these conflicts, their root

causes still reflect traditional inter-communal disputes: competing claims on sovereignty, self-

determination, the redefinition of territory, state formation, power-sharing, control over power

and/or scarce resources and socio-economic exclusion. What are being called ethnic, religious

or cultural tensions are, as Laderach and Friberg point out, still caused by the failure of

governing structures to address fundamental needs to provide space for participation in

decision-making and ensure an equitable distribution of resources and benefits that makes

identification with a group so attractive that conflicts appear as if they had begun on the sole

basis of identity (Laderach, 1995 and Friberg).

Most ‘identity’ conflicts today are intrastate, thus, identified with the immediacy of

having the enemy virtually living next door. However, they still create a challenge for global

security and the defense of universal humanitarian values. When remaining unsolved for a

long period of time, these conflicts eventually become intractable as they get stuck at a high

level of intensity or sometimes destruction. Intractable conflicts can give rise to a threat to

basic human needs or values leading from mutual alienation to mutual atrocities such as

massacre, rape and genocide (Coleman, 428).

The decisive events that prompted the EU to start investing in cross-border or overseas

conflict resolution actions were two violent ‘identity’ conflicts, Bosnia in the Balkans and

2 The European Community was transformed into European Union by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992

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Rwanda in Sub-Saharan Africa and the political unrests in the Maghreb throughout the 90s. In

addition to the brutality of these conflicts, the flow of refugees and illegal immigrants and the

expansion of organized crime and terrorism towards the EU territory and the jeopardized

European foreign investments and trade rang the European alarm bells.

The EU chose to develop its conflict resolution capacities as a third party by investing

in conflict prevention. As early as 1992, conflict prevention started to be stated as EU

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) objective3 as prevention was qualified as the

most feasible way to ensure security both outside and inside European territory. Dealing with

violent conflicts has not been a practical option for the EU, both because of institutional

shortcomings and a lack of political will (Smith, 145). Also, the EU had fifty years of

acquired experience of conflict prevention between its members. Democratization,

demilitarization, socio-economic development, improvement of human rights, regional

cooperation have thus become the priorities of common European foreign policy theory and

more emphasis has been given to the establishment of political engagement and dialogue.

The Treaty establishing the EU Constitution with its Article III-193 (2)(c) further gave

conflict prevention a constitutional ground.

‘the Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to […] preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders.’4

The Barcelona Process of 1995 between EU member states and 12 Mediterranean

countries, aiming to foster economic development, democracy and political stability in the

Eastern and Southern Mediterranean and to minimize the region’s potential for conflicts and

illegal immigration, can be qualified as one of the first major non-coercive EU conflict

prevention efforts. However, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SPSEE)5, adopted in

June 1999 just after the Kosovo war, followed by the Stabilization and Association Process in

the Balkans (SAP), (consisting of Stabilization and Association Agreement-SAA and an

assistance program, Community Assistance and Reconstruction Development and

Stabilization-CARDS) is the first long term significant structural EU conflict prevention

initiative.

3 Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusion on the likely development of the CFSP, June 1992 4 http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf 5 SPSEE aims to develop and promote free trade, democracy, human rights in and among Albania, BIH, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Moldova and Serbia and Montenegro

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With SPSEE, the EU also started to develop its crises management capabilities within

the Secretary General of the Council. The most important innovations have been the newly

established Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of national representatives who

examine the options for EU crises management, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

(PPEWU), monitoring potential conflict situations and drawing the attention of member state

governments to rising tensions at an early stage, the assignment of the position of a High

Representative6 to the Council’s Secretary General and the appointment of Special

Representatives to countries in conflict.

In December 2001, the EU added a coercive character to its conflict resolution

strategy. At the Laeken summit, the European Council declared the European Security and

Defense Policy (ESDP) operational through Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and Rapid

Reaction Forces (RRF) intended to consist of national armed forces ready for a rapid

deployment to high risk conflict areas.7 ESDP has been put into practice in Macedonia in

early 2003, (replacing NATO’s peace-keeping mission), in the Democratic Republic of Congo

in mid 2003, (providing a stabilization force) and in Bosnia since the end of 2003, (taking

over the operation of SFOR). Its main action has so far consisted of backing up the EU

civilian conflict resolution instruments, but it is designed to intervene when conflict

prevention proves to be unsuccessful.

In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy

(ESS) which called for an integrated approach to conflict prevention and crises management,

as well as to other security threats which may not be purely military. The European

Neighborhood Policy, on the other hand, in addition to bringing together a number of policy

instruments of which the objective is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with

neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and South Mediterranean, has

become another important framework for conflict prevention. Most recently, the Commission

Communication of 20 April 2005 on reinforcing EU disaster and crisis response in third

countries highlighted the work underway in order to strengthen existing mechanisms for crisis

response.

Finally, the magnetic attraction of the EU through its integration process has become a

leading conflict prevention incentive. Theoretically, unification prospects under the EU

6 ‘The Secretary General/High Representative shall assist the Council (…) in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions and when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of presidency through conducting political dialogues with the parties (Article 26 or TEU-A, 1997) 7 Laeken European Council Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, December 2001

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umbrella open up the possibility towards mutual identification and reversing competing

nationalist discourses. It further fosters the creation of multiple identities, aiming a step

further, and conflict transformation.8 EU financial assistance is there at the same time to

overcome socio-economic hardships and inequalities. The EU legislation also has the capacity

to safeguard communities against discrimination and show sensibility to communal identities,

reducing fears based on exclusion. The Treaty of Amsterdam determines that the voting rights

of a member state could be suspended in the event of serious breaches of rights and

constitutional provisions within that member state. (Article 6.1) The EU Council acting by a

qualified majority may decide to suspend certain rights deriving from application of the

Treaty to a member state. (Article 7.3)

Prospects of joining the EU therefore stimulate incentives to respond to the underlying

causes of an ‘identity’ conflict. Furthermore, the reforms demanded by the EU accession

criteria are designed to reconcile the intra-state conflicts by redefining interests and finding

common ground through multi-track third party involvement9 (Stern and Druckman, 5). The

Helsinki process launched after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 in candidate countries supported

by EU funds has for example encouraged reformers and created political space to address

previously sensitive contentious issues. It has also weakened nationalist discourse in most

candidate countries and put into action the sophisticated institution-building techniques

developed by the Enlargement Directorate of the European Commission (EDEC).

Despite these facts, the EU methods may or may not always contribute to sustainable

conflict resolution beyond its frontiers. (Smith, 146) The democratization objective of EU

involvement may permit the peaceful conciliation of group interests, but it may also create

political instability by enlarging the limits and enforcing the legitimacy of radical political

groups. The allocation of development or economic assistance, or trade concessions if not

observed carefully, may create or exacerbate inequalities among different identity groups.

Regional cooperation can result in sometimes disintegrative effects promoting identity-based

conflicts. (ibid.)

8 Conflict resolution was defined already by John Burton as ‘the transformation of relationships in a particular case by the solution of the problems which led to the conflictual behavior in the first place” (Burton, 3) Believing that conflict resolution as a term already has “too much ‘management’ and ‘settlement’ semantic baggage associated with it” John Paul Laderach proposed to abandon the term in favor of ‘conflict transformation’ as well. (Laderach, 1995:17-19) 9 Multi-track third party involvement implies that besides the top-level (Track I) leaders between whom high-level negotiations are taking place, the third party includes the middle-level leaders (Track II) to organize problem-solving workshops and grass-roots leaders (Track III) to establish local peace commissions. All sectors of the society are thus expected to participate in building peace, ‘with middle range rather than top level leaders having a particularly important role to play. (Laderach, 2004: 39)

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The realist foreign policy approach prevailing in member states, on the other hand,

creates a tendency to use the EU to pursue strictly national and economic interests since

member states still control many important foreign policy instruments within the EU and they

do not always share common interests. The stability of certain geographical areas is a direct

concern to some EU countries more than to others. Also “changes of governments or the

eruption of issues strike chords or can be exploited to strike chords in the national psyche, like

Macedonia for the Greek public in 1993 or Croatia for significant parts of the German public

in 1991” (Hill and Wallace, 8). Besides the diverging national interests, conflict prevention is

not the EU’s foreign policy priority most of the time. “Maintaining good relations with Russia

is prioritized over taking action to end the conflict in Chechnya and prevent its recurrence or

spread” (Smith, 169).

Lastly, EU’s conflict resolution strategies lag behind the times. As mentioned above,

conflict resolution has emerged as a critique of realist approaches for not being effective

because of its use of power politics to dictate outcomes. Although the EU integration opens a

way for transformative relations between adversaries and their competing claims, the

preferred method to achieve this end is the use of carrots (offering rewards by investing in

socio-economic development, institution building, and eventual EU accession) and sticks

(withdrawing rewards, threatening or imposing embargoes) which is usually the approach of

third parties with muscles.

Despite these arguments, being a world trade power and a major donor organization

with a strong currency and exemplary in enhancing interdependence within the states by

including regional or sub-national level role in policy-making, (Tocci,140) the Union’s

conflict resolution potential is quite impressive. As Solana argues in a Council’s report on the

Western Balkans:

“The Union is the only institution capable of comprehensive action, ranging from trade, economic reform and infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, human rights and democratization, justice and police to crises management and military security.”10

Thus instead of trying to undermine EU’s potential in conflict resolution, this paper

aims to reveal the inefficiencies of EU’s methods and suggest where to look to fill the gap. To

this end, it will examine three empirical cases of EU’s involvement as a third party in conflict

resolution: Bosnia, FYROM and Cyprus.

10 Secretary General/High Representative and the European Commission, ‘Report on the Western Balkans’ presented to the Lisbon European Council, Pres Release no:2032/2/00, 1 March 2000 http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-rl.en0.htm

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All three conflicts may be characterized by competing claims to the rights of self-

determination, sovereignty, ethnic identity, and territorial integrity and by international

mediators’ efforts to resolve these claims. Competing claims of the primary parties to these

conflicts have developed to become zero-sum issues (Self’s Gain is Other’s loss) over the

years. The zero-sum character of these conflicts has also coincided with the zero-sum

principles of the international community on the application of self-determination to territorial

units. (Burg, 194) While Bosnia and Macedonia are post-cold war conflicts, Cyprus is a

particularly intractable conflict on the international political scene of which the origin dates

back to the decolonization process, much like in Kashmir. The EU was not involved in these

conflicts from the beginning, at least actively, but has become perhaps the most ambitious

interested actor in the past 10 years.

The Case of Bosnia

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) erupted as a consequence of an

entrenched disagreement over whether the state claimed by Boshniacs should exist at all. The

Bosnian Croat and Serbian communities opposed the emergence of such a Bosnian state. The

Republic wide referendum on 29 February and 1 March 1992 was boycotted by the

overwhelming majority of the Serbian population who had declared by a separate referendum

before that they wished to remain in Yugoslavia, ruled predominantly by Serbs at the time.11

Despite this, 99.4% of the electorate (of 63% turnout) expressed support for the full

independence of BIH and the republic’s pro-Islamic president Alija Izetbegović12 immediately

declared independence. This declaration led to the first clashes between the ethnic

communities in Sarajevo, the republic's capital.

The first initiative for a negotiated settlement came from the EU which gathered the

three nationalist party leaders in the Bosnian government to reach an agreement. None was

reached, but the EU and the USA did not hesitate to extend recognition to the country. In

April 1992, extreme violence broke out throughout the country. Boshniac and Croat forces

first acted together against the Serbian dominated Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) who

besieged Sarajevo and launched frequent mortar attacks on the city from the surrounding

mountains and hills. Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb fighters and irregular troops from Serbia 11 The referendum was not boycotted by the Bosnian Croats since at that time Zagreb had not chose to announce publicly its intentions to construct a separate state, Herceg-Bosna in the west of Bosnia symmetrical to Republika Srspka created by Bosnian Serbs. 12 Boshniac national identity continued to develop with two distinct philosophies. In the 60s it was carried out mostly by secular Muslim communists, but in the following decades two separate schools of thought emerged. The first, was a secular ‘Muslim Nationalism’, and the second was a revival of Islamic religious belief advocated by people such as Alija Izetbegović. The effects of these two ideas prevail to this day.

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conducted a campaign of ethnic cleansing initially in the east and then in north-east and north-

west of Bosnia with the intent of creating an ethnically homogeneous Serbian territory and

systematically destroying Muslim and Roman Catholic places of worship. Early EU and UN

efforts proved unsuccessful and their respective peace monitors were withdrawn from

Sarajevo in mid-May 1992.

In July 1992, Bosnian Croats in Herzegovina (Western Bosnia) proclaimed an

autonomous Herceg Bosna covering 30% of the BIH territory and in October 1992, violent

conflict erupted between Croats and Boshniacs, resulting to further ethnic cleansing and

destruction of historic and religious monuments. In December 1992, the UN Human Rights

Commission declared that Bosnian Serbs were largely responsible for violation of human

rights in BIH and the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the

atrocities, particularly the widespread rape of Boshniac and Croat women and demanding

access to all Serbian detention camps.

There were few direct negotiating sessions among the warring parties. In 1993, the

Vance-Owen plan which foresaw the division of BIH (in ten provinces, with three provinces

allocated to each faction and Sarajevo as a province with special status) was mainly rejected

by the Bosnian Serb leader, Karadjić who insisted on the establishment of an autonomous

Serb state within the territory of BIH. In late May 1993, the USA, France, Russia, Spain and

the United Kingdom signed a communiqué declaring that the arms embargo to the post-

Yugoslav republics imposed in 1991 would continue and that international armed forces

would not intervene in the conflict. They proposed instead the creations of six designated 'safe

areas' (Sarajevo, Bihać, Tuzla, Goražde, Srebrenica and Zepa) mostly in eastern Bosnia, in

which disarmed Bosnians could settle. In early June, a UN Security Council resolution

permitted UNPROFOR to use force, including air power, in response to attacks against these

'safe areas.' 13

In June 1993, new peace proposals were announced in Geneva by Lord Owen and UN

mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg under which BIH would become a confederation of three

ethnically determined states. Izetbegović refused to discuss the tripartite division and

boycotted the Geneva talks.

In February 1994, NATO became involved for the first time with its jets shooting

down four Serb aircraft over central Bosnia in what was supposed to be a UN declared 'no-fly

13 Earlier proposals led by the USA to permit the use of force against Bosnian Serb positions had not reached accord, owing to a large extent to opposition by France, Russia and the United Kingdom

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zone.'14 In March 1994, Bosnian Croats and Boshniacs signed the Washington pressured

peace agreement, creating a federation. This narrowed the warring parties down to two.

In July 1995, a mass killing (considered to be the largest in Europe since the Second

World War) took place in Srebrenica, one of the UN 'safe areas' in Eastern Bosnia. Because of

its proximity to the Serbian border and because it was entirely surrounded by Serb-held

territory, Srebrenica was both strategically important and vulnerable to capture. General

Phillippe Morillon of France, the Commander of UNPROFOR at the time and a member of

the EU parliament visited Srebrenica in March 1993 and told the panicked refugees living in

miserable conditions that the town was under protection of the UN and that they would never

be abandoned. First Canadian and then Dutch lightly armed peacekeepers were deployed in

Srebrenica. However, they were not competent enough to protect civilians when the city fell

to the Bosnian Serb army in July 1995 who executed seven thousand Boshniac men and boys.

Two days after the massacre on July 16, 1995, during a press conference with the Dutch

Defense Minister Voorhove, the Dutch colonel Ton Karremans qualified the attack on

Srebrenica “an excellently planned military operation” and made no mention of the atrocities.

(Danner, 1998)

In his ‘To End a War’, the US negotiator, Richard Holbrook who brokered the Dayton

Peace Accord, wrote that the first line of resistance to any air action was the Dutch

government, which refused to allow air strikes until all its soldiers were out of Bosnia.

(Holbrooke,1999) Knowing this, the Serbs held the Dutch forces captive in the UN compound

at the nearby village of Potočari during the attack to Srebrenica. Voorhove, the then Dutch

minister of defense, took strong issue with Holbrooke’s description of the Dutch role in

Srebrenica and Holbrooke who had been just named US representative to the UN said that he

would revise the statement in future editions of this book and say European governments

refused to authorize air strikes until the Dutch forces had left Bosnia. (Danner, 1998)

In early August, the Boshniac and Croat alliance gained initiative in the war, taking

much of western Bosnia from the Bosnian Serbs and Croats took the Serbian Krajina. The

international community pressured Milošević, Tuđman and Izetbegović at this moment to the

negotiation table.15 On 28 August, a mortar attack on a Sarajevo market attributed to Bosnian

Serb forces was responded by a series of NATO air strikes on Serb positions and in

November 1995, peace negotiations between the three warring parties began on a US Air

14 This was the alliance’s first use of force since it was founded in 1949 15 There are allegations that the partition of Bosnia had been decided at the negotiation tables much before the fall of Srebrenica and the Croat offensive in Krajina.

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Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, USA. A peace agreement was reached on 21 November 1995

ending a fierce fighting and bloodshed in Europe once again by US initiative.

According to the Dayton Agreement, BIH was divided between a Muslim-Croat

Federation, with 51% and a Serbian Republic, the Republika Srpska (RS) with 49% of the

territory, making the cease-fire lines the border between both, while the sovereignty of the

state, which was henceforth to be known as BIH was to be maintained within its existing

borders. The RS was to be highly centralized with a directly elected presidency while the

Federation was divided into 10 cantons. Refugees were given either the right of return or to

have seized property returned to them or to receive fair compensation. The UNPROFOR

troops were to be replaced by an international NATO-commanded 60,000 strong

Implementation force (IFOR)16 which was given a mandate to oversee the withdrawal of the

warring parties from the zones of separation and arrest war crime suspects. The OSCE

mission would organize and monitor the elections.

The former Swedish Prime Minister and EU envoy to the Bosnian Peace talks, Carl

Bildt was appointed to (OHR)17 as the first High Representative of the International

Community in BIH with responsibility for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the

Dayton Agreement. The president of the Central Bank of BIH designated by IMF could not be

a Bosnian citizen and reorganization of the public sector, the sale of the government

enterprises and the acquisition of the funds of investments were placed within the prerogatives

of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (EBRD).

A number of political and military figures, the most known being the Bosnian Serb

leader Radovan Karadžić and the General Ratko Mladić were indicted by the International

Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY) as war criminals. According to the most recent

figures from the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo which has been working

closely with the ICTY, there were 93, 873 victims in the aftermath of a three and a half year-

old violent conflict of which 34, 610 were civilians. (88.2% Boshniacs, 5,9% Croats, 5,7%

Serbs and 0,2% others)

The EU was a confused and a controversial third party during the Bosnian war. It was

somehow unable to offer the same political will and consensus that it had before the eruption

of the violent conflict when it extended recognition to BIH. EU members had differing

policies towards the war. Germany was one of the main arms suppliers to the Croat and

Boshniac forces. France and Great Britain supported non-interventionism and the arms

16 IFOR was replaced by a Stabilization Force (SFOR) with effect from 20 December 1996 17 Office of the High Representative in BIH

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embargo to the Bosnian government. Various European scholars notably in Greece and

France wrote extensively about and warned against the Green Diagonal on the Sarajevo-

Kosovo-Macedonia-Western Thrace-Istanbul axis that the Muslims were trying to install in

the heart of Europe through Bosnia. (Del Valle, Gangloff: 349) Volunteers from Greece

fought in Srebrenica. (Michas, 2002). As Sokolović points out, if the Dutch battalion had

actually defended Srebrenica, it could lead to EU citizens-Greek and Dutch to shooting at

each other. (Sokolović, 17)

Despite these controversies, the EU had reached a consensus to act together with the

international bodies to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement which although legitimatized

the partition of Bosnia and the ethnic cleansing accordingly, sought to revive the country’s

multi-ethnic past. The HR has been elected thus far from EU member countries, Sweeden,

Spain, Austria, UK and Germany respectively and in 1997, was given what are colloquially

known as the “Bonn Powers”, the authority to remove all obstacles to peace implementation

and development. As multi-ethnic efforts did not take place per se, the OHR used this

authority whenever necessary and imposed actions such as common license plates for two

entities, a common currency, a citizenship law and a flag. In July 1997, the EU announced

the suspension of economic aid to RS, owing to its failure to extradite suspected war criminals

to the ICTY. The ultra-nationalist RS president Nikolas Poplasen was also dismissed from

power by the OHR in 1999.

A few days after the Laeken summit in 2001, the EU High Representative for CFSP

Javier Solana suggested that an EU police force replace the UN International Police Task

force (IPTF) in Bosnia whose mandate ended in 2003. This signaled the beginning of the

Europeanization of the de-facto mandate of BIH according to French academic Catherine

Samary (Samary, 4-5) and the EU’s determined involvement as a third party. In March 2002,

the EU also started to appoint the person serving as High Representative for BiH under the

Dayton/Paris agreement as EU Special Representative reflecting the leading position assumed

by the EU in BiH. Under the authority and operational direction of the EU High

Representative for CFSP, the EU Special Representative is to play a central a role in

promoting overall EU political co-ordination.

In May 2002, Paddy Ashdown, a former British diplomat became the High

Representative and he was additionally appointed to the new position of EU Special

Representative for BIH. In June 2003, during the Thessalonica Summit, the EU announced

the opening of the enlargement process towards the SEE countries. In November 2003, under

pressure from Ashdown, the investigation by the RS government into the Srebrenica

14

government was broadcast on Bosnian Serbian TV and the RS authorities conceded for the

first time that Bosnian Serb forces had perpetrated the killings. During a visit to Sarajevo later

in the month, Svetozar Marović, the President of Serbia and Montenegro ( as the FRY became

in February 2003) issued a formal apology for the atrocities committed against the Bosnian

civilians during the 1992-1995 and urged reconciliation.

On 28 January, 2004, Ashdown issued a decree providing for the reunification of

Mostar divided between its Boshniac and Croat inhabitants into a single administration,

thereby fulfilling one of the preconditions of signature of SAA with the EU. On 15 March, the

Mostar Administration was unified as one city. In April 2004, Solana made it public that the

objective of the EU is to pass from the Dayton to Brussels era and get BIH into NATO.

(Solana, 2004) To this end, the OHR started to work for the consolidation of the state of BIH

through the creation of central statist institutions having their own revenue sources and

decreasing the financial sources of the entities. (O’Tuathail, 244)

In September 2004, the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR)

announced that the one millionth refugee returned to his/her home (Approximately two

million were displaced during the war) and half of the displaced persons received

compensation. On 11 November, the RS government issued an official apology for

Srebrenica. On 22 November, the UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing the

establishment of a new peacekeeping contingent under the command of the EU force

(EUFOR) which incorporated many of the former members of the outgoing SFOR contingent.

EUFOR was additionally mandated to assist BIH in further progressing towards EU

integration.

In December 2004, NATO rejected for the second time BIH’s application to join the

Partnership for Peace program largely because of the failure of the RS authorities to co-

operate with the ICTY. Ashdown responded by announcing the acceleration of military

reforms: the entity ministries of defense were to be abolished by 2005 while three existing

police and security agencies were to merge into a single unit, which was to operate on the

basis of multi-ethnic regional divisions, in several cases including territories from both

entities. In addition, Ashdown removed nine RS security officials and the US Administration

imposed travel restrictions on the leadership of certain political parties. The RS government,

under continued pressure from the international community agreed to offer financial support

to the families of fugitives who voluntarily cooperated with the ICTY. Moreover, since

January 2005, it has started to transfer indicted war criminals to ICTY.

15

In the late 90s, Europeans started to criticize the Dayton for being non operational.

‘Bosnia to Bosnians’ has become the slogan of various conferences on the issue. Although

opposed to Dayton at the beginning because of its American origin and rejecting many of its

terms, the RS authorities, opposed revisions to Dayton fearing that this would make their

entity disappear. Boshniacs, on the other, hand wanted revisions especially for this reason.

The RS thus started to criticize and even resist the OHR practices which it qualified as non-

democratic.

On 23 June 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a

resolution of which paragraph 13, asked the Venice Commission to examine how far the OHR

practices comply with Council of Europe basic principles, in particular with the Convention

for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the efficiency and the

rationality of the constitutional and legal arrangements in BiH.18

As a result of a three day long field trip to Sarajevo (capital of the federation) and

Banja Luka (capital of RS) in March 2005, the Venice Commission issued an opinion stating

that that the practices of the OHR do not correspond to democratic principles when exercised

without due process and the possibility of judicial control. It further called for a progressive

phasing out of these powers and for the establishment of an advisory panel of independent

lawyers for the decisions directly affecting the rights of individuals pending the end of the

practice.19 As the HR is at the same time, the EU Special Representative, the Commission

Opinion also suggested that if he were to retain only the role of EU SR comparable to the

practice in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), this would allow the

transformation of the role of the HR from a decision-maker into that of a mediator.

Moreover, the Commission proposed a transfer of responsibilities from the Entities to

BIH by means of amendments to the BIH constitution but viewed that any solution implying

abolishing two entities and merge them into one is unrealistic in a medium term perspective

since this would not be accepted within the RS.20 This can somehow be interpreted as a

contradiction in EU’s BIH policies since while critizing the Dayton, it does not have a

problem with its establishment of a separate Serbian entity organized around ethnic

supremacy. 18 Resolution 1384, paragraph 13, 23 June 2004 http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)004-e.asp 19 Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in BIH and the powers of the High Representative, 11 March 2005 available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)004-e.asp 20A 2004 survey showed that only 40% of the population at large (but only 20% of the RS population feels proud of being a citizen of BIH. (UNDP 2004a) On the other hand, the relations between the Bosnian Croats and Boshniacs have not eased either, especially in the Herceg area where Bosnian Croats feel allegiance more to Croatia than to BIH.

16

The Commission members also observed a keen interest in BIH for a powerful wish to

participate in European integration. They noted, however, that division existing within the

country between the ethnic groups remains a major problem towards this end.

Following the Venice Commission Opinion, the OHR proposed transforming the OHR

to an EU-led mission and in August 2005, it announced further downsizing. In October 2005,

the RS adopted the police reform in accordance with EU principles and the same month, the

EU Commission recommended that EU member states open SAA negotiations with BIH. On

25 November 2005, the enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn declared the opening of

negotiations, making BIH a potential candidate for the EU. On March 18, 2006, BIH's

Boshniac, Serbian, and Croatian communities agreed to a constitutional reform that will

strengthen the country's central government.

Despite all these positive developments, clearly influenced by the EU integration

process, segregated educational system of BIH based on three distinct nationalist approaches,

the tendency among Bosnian Serb nationalists to make the RS a part of Serbia, the perceived

complicity of Serbian authorities in supporting Karadžić and Mladić who are believed to be

hiding in Serbia, the sensitive balances between the Croat and Boshniac partners of the

Federation and the widespread poverty of the country are casting a shadow on the

reconciliation process. As the current HR from Germany, Christian Schwarz-Schilling

underlined recently at a meeting with writers and intellectuals in Sarajevo, the burden of the

transition from OHR to EU SP, and BIH’s resumption of full sovereignty seems to fall more

on what the BIH authorities achieve than what the international community is doing at

present.21 However, the continuation of an impartial and competent third party action is still

the main locomotive for any viable progress in Bosnia and this designates a major challenge

for the EU.

Case of Macedonia (FYROM)

Like other ex Yugoslav republics, Macedonia also faced the challenge of being a

multi-ethnic society as it consists of a Slavic Macedonian majority and a large Albanian

community and small minorities such as Turks, Valachs, Boshniaks, Roma and Serbs.22

Tensions arose as the majority proclaimed a Macedonian nation-state in 1989 and the

minority in turn rejected independence and boycotted the referendum on the issue in 1991.

Macedonia saved itself from the extreme violence that swept Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, but

21 Christian Schwarz-Schilling “2006 is a crucial year for BIH” available at www.ohr.int/ohr-dep/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=36857 22 Because of its ethnic diversity, Macedonia gave its name to a mixed salad in French ‘la salade macédonienne’.

17

it did not enjoy complete serenity either because of its problematic relationships between its

neighbors Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia/Yugoslavia and EU member Greece.

No agreement was reached with Greece over the name Macedonia which led the

adoption of the acronym FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The two

countries also engaged in a dispute over the republic’s first flag which incorporated the

Vergina sun symbol, claimed by Greece as representing the historical Greek province of

Macedonia. Its adoption by Skopje, on 3 July, 1992 was seen as a reaction to Greek pressure

to change the name. The dispute which led to an economic embargo by Greece between

February 1994 and October 1995 was resolved after an interim accord between the two states,

when the flag was changed by an act of parliament.

The 90s passed with the hardships caused by the geographical isolation, economic

difficulties and political instability. In 1996, Macedonia became eligible for the EU PHARE23

program and in 1998, the EU and Macedonia concluded a cooperation agreement by which it

received asymmetric trade preferences. The EU transferred 394.14 millions of euros to

Macedonia between 1992 and 2000 for supporting various political and economical sectors.24

The Kosovo crises in 1999 challenged the imperfect balances in Macedonia. An

estimated 360, 000 Kosovo Albanians took refuge in the country and despite their departure

after the war, in early 2001, the Albanian nationalists, members of the National Liberation

Army (NLA-which had emerged as the successor movement to the Kosova Liberation Army-

KLA) began to infiltrate northern parts of FYROM from Kosovo, clashing with Macedonian

security forces.

The 1974 Yugoslav constitutional preamble described Macedonia as ‘the state of the

Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities’. The new version in 1989

defined it as a nation-state of Macedonian nation. Moreover, previously existing minority

rights were abolished or restricted. In 1992, Albanians held a referendum for the territorial

autonomy of the Albanians in Macedonia which was interpreted by the Slavic Macedonian

majority as a confirmation of Albanian separatism. As happened in Serbia and Kosovo, a

campaign of fear was spread over the Slavic majority that they would be outnumbered in the

long run by the Albanian ethnic group due to the claimed birth rate of Albanians and because

of immigration from Kosovo. A war of numbers on the population issues prevailed between

23Originally created in 1989 as the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) has expanded to all the Eastern European countries which have now become EU member states. Until 2000, Albania, FYROM and BIH were also beneficiaries of Phare. However, as of 2001, they have been receiving financial assistance from the CARDS program. 24 http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/eu/eu.assistance.pdf

18

the two communities throughout the 90s. The Albanians were underrepresented in the

parliament. Their demand for an Albanian university in Tetovo was also refused by the

government and resources were not equally allocated. (Blazevska , 110)

When the Albanian guerrilla insurgency emerged in the aftermath of the Kosovo crises

supported by the KLA, then in power in Kosovo, the UN Security Council adopted a

Resolution 1345, condemning the violence by Albanian nationalists. The EU followed and

supported the government in combating terrorist acts but at the same time urged it to start a

dialogue on political reform with the elected Albanian political parties. The major EU concern

at this time was to prevent another intractable conflict in the region.

The EU HR Solana, opened roundtable talks in March 2001 between the political

parties under the auspice of the Macedonian president. Albanian proposals included the

postponement of the national census due to take place in May 2001 until October 2001, to

allow the return of refugees who had fled the conflict, state funding for the University of

Tetovo and the conversion of the state television’s third service into an Albanian-language

channel. However, the Government continued to oppose demands that the constitution be

amended to grant the Albanian population (officially categorized as a minority) equal rights

with the Slavic Macedonian population and Albanian the status of second language.

In April, Macedonia signed the SAA with the EU which came into effect in April 2004

and in the context of adaptation of EU standards in democracy, human rights, the rule of law,

the parties had to resolve their problems. “This was also a face-saving strategy towards Slavic

Macedonian politicians who did not want to appear as making concessions to the Albanian

extremists.” (Schneckener, 35) At the same time, the EU commission offered further financial

and technical assistance in the course of the process, especially to the Albanian dominated

areas. In this way, the EU linked the crises management with long-term conflict prevention

measures. The violence ceased during this period but by the end of April 2001, but erupted

again when Albanian militants killed eight Macedonian soldiers. This led to the civilian

Slavic Macedonian riots against Albanian property. Government troops subsequently

launched an offensive against Albanian positions near Kumanova after two more of its

soldiers were killed.

The Macedonian President Trajkovski seemed committed to the dialogue but the

Prime Minister Georgievski moved along the line of Macedonian nationalist hardliners who

were convinced that the army could crush the Albanian struggle. In response to the escalation

of the conflict, the EU and NATO acted together. Solana and NATO General Secretary Lord

Robertson met jointly with the Slavic Macedonian and Albanian leaders and managed to

19

convince them to establish an all parts government and prevented Georgievski from declaring

a state of war. However, several cease-fires mainly brokered by NATO failed to prevent ten

thousands of refugees in northwestern Macedonia. Meanwhile in June 2001, NLA rebels

occupied the town of Aracinovo, only some 6 km east of the capital Skopje and in response,

the government announced the suspension of its offensive against the NLA. However, violent

protests were staged by Macedonian nationalists at the parliament building in Skopje, in

response to the NATO-mediated cease fire arrangement at Aracinovo, which was perceived to

be pro-Albanian.

On 29 June, NATO formally approved an operation to deploy a 3500 member

multinational force in the FYROM to assist in the disarmament of the NLA which was

conditional on the imposition of a lasting-cease fire. The EU announced at the same time a

substantial financial aid package for Macedonia in case of a peaceful solution. It also

appointed the former French Defense Minister, François Léotard as special EU representative

to Macedonia. (Scheneckener, 38) Léotard and US special envoy James Pardew acted as a

joint EU-US mediation team which was later complemented by the OSCE High

Commissioner. The tripartite team did not this time leave the negotiation process to the parties

but presented their own proposals such as the Framework Document to solve interethnic

problems, decentralization, non-discrimination in public service, special parliamentary

regimes and the other major laws, education and language issues.

The negotiations started in Ohrid and step by step disputed issues were resolved,

mostly importantly the public use of Albanian language and of the Albanian representation

within the police. Finally, on August 13, the Parties signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement

providing for the amendment of the constitution to grant greater rights to Albanian

community. On the following day, the NLA leader Ali Ahmeti agreed that 2500-3000 NLA

fighters hand in their weaponry to NATO troops.

In early September 2001, parliamentary debate on constitutional reform was delayed

by mass Slavic Macedonian protests against the peace plan. The EU and OSCE monitors were

displayed to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement while NATO troops to

protect them. In early October, the EU criticized delays in implementing constitutional

reforms and on 16 November, the Macedonian parliament finally adopted 15 key amendments

to the existing constitution. The principal reforms were the revision of the constitution’s

preamble to include a reference to members of non-ethnic Slavic Macedonian communities as

citizens of the country. A double-majority system was introduced to the Parliament whereby

certain legislation would require the approval of a minority group, the establishment of

20

Albanian as the second official language in communities where Albanians comprised more

than 20% of the population; and the right to proportional representation for Albanians in the

Constitutional Court, all areas of government administration and the security forces.

An EU sponsored international donor conference on economic assistance for the

FYROM originally scheduled to take place in October 2001, was postponed in December,

pending the implementation of additional reforms. In January 2002, new legislation providing

for the devolution of greater authority to local government (thereby granting a measure of

self-rule to predominantly Albanian regions) was approved by the parliament and the donor

conference took place in March. In October 2002, NATO agreed to extend the mandate of

Operation Amber Fox until December and in March 2003, the remaining contingent was

replaced by an EU led mission, Operation Concordia comprising 350 military personnel. 13

EU member states and 14 non-EU nations were to participate in the force. The purpose of the

operation, which was deployed at the official request of President Trajkovski was to maintain

security in order to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Peace Agreement.

In December 2003, Operation Concordia was replaced by a 200 member EU mission,

Operation Proxima which in addition to maintaining security and combating organized crime

in the country was to advise the FYROM police forces. In February 2004, the Government

prepared to designate municipal boundaries as part of a process of administrative

decentralization included in the provision of the Ohrid agreement. However, approval of the

draft legislation received a widespread popular opposition from the Slavic Macedonians.

After lengthy negotiations, the parties of the governing coalition reached an agreement on the

redefinition of the country’s municipal boundaries.

The two predominantly Albanian municipalities were integrated with the capital

Skopje as well as three surrounding rural municipalities with the municipality of Struga. The

agreement reduced the total number of administrative districts from 123 to 85, with the ethnic

balance of 26 districts becoming predominantly Albanian. It saw the adoption of Albanian as

a second official language in a number of these, including Skopje and Struga. This decision

elicited public criticism. Protests in Struga escalated into violence and it was reported that a

total of 15 protesters and 24 members of the security forces had been injured.

On 22 March 2004, Macedonia submitted its application to the EU. On 26 July, a large

demonstration staged in Skopje protested the draft agreement on decentralization, which had

been submitted for approval to the Parliament. Slavic Macedonian nationalist opponents

began to organize a petition for a referendum to be conducted on the issue, delaying the

reform process. On 7 November 2004, following the petition, a referendum on the proposed

21

redemarcation of administrative districts was conducted. However, the governing coalition

together with representatives of the international community urged a boycott and voter

participation in the referendum was estimated at only 26% thereby invalidating the results and

allowing the local government reforms to proceed.

The EU granted Macedonia candidate status on 17 December 2005 but with no

promise of when such negotiations could start. France had made a budget deal as a condition

for granting Macedonia a candidate status and Greece agreed not to veto the decision on the

basis that the name dispute would be resolved. According to the EU, the main obstacles

before its eventual membership are good relations with its neighbors and reforms to its

judicial and police systems. Also Macedonia’s growth rate lags much behind that of most EU

members. Unemployment is high (40 %) and foreign investment is relatively low. (Blazevska,

108) The decentralization process still requires full implementation. However the relatively

low population and the European characteristics of the country win sympathy among EU

states.

In February 2006, Macedonia became the fourth member of Central European Free

Trade Agreement (CEFTA) joining Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania for further efforts of

integration to Western European institutions and opportunities for close economic and

political cooperation. As the EU ambassador in Macedonia, Erwan Fouéré expressed it, the

European perspective is the motor for the conduct of reform process in Macedonia and “the

faster that the oil is put in, the faster the engine will work”.25

The Case of Cyprus

Cyprus like Bosnia has had multiple primary parties to its conflict: Greek Cypriots

(GCs) representing the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Greece on the one hand, and Turkish

Cypriots (TCs) representing, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey on

the other.26

RoC and the EU are associative partners since 1972. RoC made its first application for

membership in 1962. However, the constitutional disputes between GCs and TCs, TCs’

boycott of the RoC’s institutions and the formation of their own, postponed this application

until 1972 when the EC signed the Associative partnership with the GC administration alone.

There was little opposition from Turkey since it was caught up with its own internal 25 Le Figaro, 12 December 2005 26 One can argue that once Greece helped the RoC get into EU, it has stepped back from being a primary party to the conflict because Cyprus has since become an European internal problem. This view is consolidated by the interviews held by the author with Greek researchers, Dr. Thanos Dokos and Dr. Marios Evriviadis in November 2005 in Athens who both stated that Greece feels that it does not anymore have a Cyprus burden as it has accomplished the plan to establish RoC in the EU.

22

problems. In addition, on the question of trade, the Association Agreement did not

discriminate between nationals and companies of Cyprus. The exclusion of TCs from the

process was however criticized by TC authorities. (Hasguler, 16)

After the military interventions in Cyprus in 1974 which led to the de facto

partitioning of the island,27 the EC conformed to UN resolutions and identified the RoC as the

sole representative of the island, but continued to trade with the self-proclaimed TRNC28 until

1994. Thus, on July 4, 1990, when application for the membership of the EU by GCs acting

on behalf of the Cyprus Republic since 1963 was presented to the European Council and RoC

was found eligible for membership, the EU was more of an interested third party to the

conflict, considering the accession of Cyprus could bring settlement to the Cyprus problem.

This was the main argument of the GC political leadership29 and the Commission’ opinion on

Cyprus in 1993 endorsed this view.30

The Turkish Cypriot leadership in TRNC, however, questioned the legitimacy of the

application this time, on the grounds that the GC government did not represent the whole

island. Greece, already a EU member threatened using its veto power against the enlargement

of the EU to the Central and Eastern European Countries if Cyprus’s application was rejected

and if official negotiations with Turkish Cypriots were opened.31 The European Council

summits at Corfu in June and at Essen in December 1994 not only confirmed that the next

round of European Union enlargement would involve Cyprus and Malta but adopted a more

partial approach by not making any reference to the need for settlement to the Cyprus problem

before accession.32 From this period on, one could argue that the position of the EU shifted

from being an interested third party to that of an interested secondary one.

27 On 15 July 1974, dissatisfaction of right-wing Greek nationalists in favor of the long-term goal, Enosis, union with Greece led to a Coup d’Etat against President Makarios of RoC which was sponsored by the military regime in Greece. On 20 July, 1974, Turkey intervened militarily on the basis of the Treaty of Guarantee and to protect the Turkish Cypriot community. As the talks in Geneva involving the three guarantor powers of RoC, Greece, Turkey, Great Britain and the two Cypriot factions failed, Turkish forces moved from the agreed cease-fire lines and took the control of 37% of the island’s territory in the north. While 160,000 GCs were forced to flee to the South, approximately 50,000 TCs moved to the North. 28 On November 15, 1983, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed a separate state under the leadership of Rauf Denktaş. The UN Security Council declared the action illegal with its Resolution 541 and called for its withdrawal. Turkey is the only country to recognize TRNC so far while it does not recognize RoC’s authority over the whole island. Turkey also keeps a military presence in TRNC since 1974. 29The strategy of mobilizing the international factor especially the EU to realize the reunification in Cyprus was expressed by the then RoC President Clerides, in his inaugural address at the House of Representatives of RoC. C.H Dodd, Storm Clouds over Cyprus:A Briefing, Huntingdon, Eothen, 2001 p:40 30 Commission opinion on the Accession of Republic of Cyprus, 30.06.1993 31 Greek memorandum on EU-Turkish Relations’ in Greece, a news review from the embassy of Greece available at www.greekembassy.org/press/bulletin.nov 98, cited in Eralp and Beriker, p: 8 32 Corfu European Council Presidency Conclusions, 24-25 June 1991

23

In July 1994, European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued a ruling against the importation

of Turkish Cypriot potatoes and citrus fruits without RoC health and transport certificates. In

August 1994, the TRNC assembly revoked all past commitments to a federal solution that it

had put forward during the negotiations. (Eralp and Beriker, 34) In June 1995, the EC-Cyprus

Association Council adopted a common resolution on the establishment of a structured

dialogue between the EU and the RoC and on laying down a roadmap on how to start

negotiations. In response, the TRNC leadership introduced preconditions to direct

negotiations and they would only be resumed if concluded on a state-to-state basis.

Meanwhile, the EU embargo on export of citrus fruits was damaging and TRNC suffered a

financial crisis, the following year. Moreover, during the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, the

European Council rejected Turkey as a candidate.

In March 1998, RoC and the EU established a joint-economic zone and on 23 April,

1998, Turkey and TRNC jointly declared that

The EU has disregarded the international law and the 1959-1960 Treaties on Cyprus by deciding to open negotiations with the Greek Administration only and has dealt a blow to the efforts for a solution. Currently, any negotiation process aimed at finding a solution to the Cyprus Question can have a chance of success only of it is conducted between two sovereign equals.33

The TRNC leadership also rejected the RoC’s invitation to the TC to appoint

representatives for the accession negotiations.

The assumption of the EU in the 90s was that the accession process and the conflict

resolution efforts under the auspices of the UN would go hand in hand. (Tocci, 1).However,

the parties involved seemed to have differing views on the process. The TCs were not against

integration with the EU but they called for a settlement to the conflict before EU membership

and demanded separate negotiations The GCs wanted to tie all the talks to the accession. The

EU rejected the TCs demands, arguably due to its involvement as a secondary rather than a

third party.

EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999 changed the equation by granting candidacy

to Turkey, thus opening up the Helsinki Process both in Turkey and TNRC. It also

emphasized that RoC’s accession to the EU is not linked to a settlement to the conflict.

“If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a pre-condition. In this, the council will take all relevant factors.” 34

Demetriou argues that the reference to ‘relevant factors’ in the conclusion has

generally been interpreted as a precondition that this decision would hold, provided that the

failure of negotiations was not due to the stance of GC side and in fact, it tied Cyprus’ 33 Anadolu Agency, 1998 cited in Eralp and Beriker, 183. 34 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 1999

24

accession to the negotiation process. (Demetriou, 13) However, as she stressed, it has not

engaged RoC to an absolute requirement that a resolution be reached. (ibid.)

In November 1999, Alvaro De Soto, who helped broker the peace agreements in El

Salvador was appointed as Special Adviser on Cyprus to the UN Secretary General and his

meetings with the GC and TC leaderships subsequently led to a new round of negotiations. As

no common ground was found, threats passed between a primary and the secondary party. On

November 2001, Turkey threatened to annex the TRNC and in a speech made in Athens,

Gunter Verheugen, the then European Commissioner on enlargement, threatened Turkey’s

application for EU membership as a response.35

However, since the Helsinki Summit, the EU-Turkish relations have entered a new

phase and the Helsinki process started to challenge the firm political standpoints in Turkey.

Through its representative, the EU started to work on Track Two diplomacy both in Turkey

and TRNC as clearly revealed in Karen Foggs’ emails.36 Pro-European intellectuals,

journalists, academics were contacted, networks were established and many organizations

were funded to challenge the status quo on sensitive issues, namely Cyprus. TCs at the same

time started to increase their pro-solution forces as their economic and political isolation was

increasing and Turkish economic crises throughout the 90s affected them severely.

At the same time, Turkey launched its own reform process and conducted a major

review of its constitution. The reform period has gained momentum as the pro-EU forces in

Turkey were delivered an unexpected breakthrough with the Justice and Development Party’s

(AKP) election victory in November 2002 under the leadership of Recep Tayyib Erdoğan.

Just at this period, the UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, released a comprehensive

peace plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Commonly known as the Annan Plan, it

35 See NTVMSNBC online (2002) cited in Eralp and Beriker, 184

36 The EU representative Karen Foggs’ emails were hacked in February 2002 by nationalist forces in Turkey who considered her acts as fatal threats to the Turkish state. The left-wing Worker’s party published her emails as a book.. (Karen Fogg’un E-Postallari-Karen Fogg’s E-Boots- a pun on the word ‘posta’ (e-mail) and ‘postal’ (military boots) - by Doğu Perinçek, 2002.) Fogg had a broad understanding of the Helsinki process. In an email to an English friend, she was saying that she has organized for the Turkish President's ‘knuckles to be rapped’ referring to the breakfast news programs on television containing orchestrated attacks on him by journalists in her orbit. The President's crime was, apparently, to have stood up for national interests. Other emails reveal that she is paying said journalists for articles submitted or for conferences attended. She is on very close terms with 'Sweetheart', the best-known anti-establishment Turkish journalist. In many of the emails, Fogg is also outspoken on the subject of President Denktaş of TRNC, whom she disliked. Fogg was withdrawn from Turkey in the aftermath of this event.

25

proposed the creation of a United Cyprus Republic, covering the entire island (except for the

British bases) under a loose federation of two constituent states, one GC and the other TC.37

Intensive efforts were made to get the both sides sign the document prior to the RoC’s

membership that was going to be confirmed at the EU’s December 2002 Copenhagen

Summit. As neither side agreed to sign, the EU invited only the RoC to join. Despite these

developments, the UN continued dialogue with the two sides with the goal of reaching a

settlement prior to the Cyprus’ signature of the EU Accession Treaty on 14 April 2003. A

third version of the Annan plan was presented to the parties in February 2003. The same

month, the candidate of the Progressive Worker’s People Party (DIKO), a hard-liner, Tassos

Papadopulos, was elected as the RoC president with 51.51 % of the votes. His election ended

the term of previous RoC president Glafcos Clerides who has been engaging on the

negotiations for months and was favorable to the Annan Plan. This was somehow an indicator

that the EU neglected its Track Two diplomacy among GCs while concentrating too much on

Turkey and the TRNC. Meanwhile the talks on the last phase of the Annan Plan collapsed as

the TC hard-liner, TRNC president Rauf Denktaş walked out of the negotiations.

On April 16, 2003, RoC signed the Accession Treaty with other nine countries. A

week later, the TRNC leadership opened two crossing points on the Green Line first time

since 1974. This opening favored the pacific contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

and increased the reunification demands of TCs. Mass demonstrations were held against

Denktaş’ intransigence. Meanwhile, TCs started to apply for RoC citizenship, since despite

the division, they would still have the right to be individual citizens of RoC, thus of the EU

after accession. They also started to use RoC state institution facilities such as the public

health service.

“Many of these rights, it should be noted, are rights, the denial of which would contravene EU law and for which the RoC could be liable to the European Court of Human Rights.” (Demetriou, 9)

On 14 December 2003, a coalition government was formed in TRNC under a pro-

change and pro-solution Republican Turkish Party (CTP) leader Mehmet Ali Talat. Thus, the

same plan was brought to the table again in February 2004 and Papadopoulos and Denktaş

37 At the federal level, the plan incorporated -A collective presidential council made up of six voting members, allocated according to the population (4 GC and 2 TC and selected and voted in the parliament.) - A president and a vice-president chosen by the Presidential Council from among its members to alternate in their functions every 20 months during the council’s five-year term of Office - A bicameral legislature A Senate with 48 members divided into 24:24 A Chamber of Deputies with 48 members divided in proportion to the two community’s populations A Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of GC and TC judges, plus 3 foreign judges to be appointed by the presidential council.

26

accepted Annan’s invitation to resume negotiations. While they met almost daily, numerous

technical committees and subcommittees met in parallel in an effort to resolve legal, political

and economic issues. The talks failed to reach an agreed settlement and Denktaş refused to

attend the next stage of meetings which were scheduled to take place in Switzerland in March

2004. The coalition partners Talat and Serdar Denktaş38 continued the talks which

nevertheless collapsed and no agreement was reached by the two communities.

Annan stepped in as arbitrator and presented a final version of his plan. Rauf Denktaş

rejected it immediately and started his No campaign for the referendum that was going to take

place in April 2004. A week later, in a televised speech, Papadopolous called for GCs to reject

the plan. Together with the Orthodox Church and the left-wing AKEL, he started his own

version of the No campaign. Talat supported the plan and as he had the largest share of the

popular support in TRNC, together with other pro-solution TC parties and NGOs, he launched

a Yes campaign. The No campaign of the RoC bothered the EU Commission which invested

much in the plan. Verheugen, even said publicly that he had been cheated by the GC

government.39 He was also vexed by the refusal that he faced by two GC television channels

to allow him to explain the competency of the Annan Plan. (ibid.)

The plan was placed before the two communities in a simultaneous vote in the

reunification referendum of 24 April 2004 and was rejected by 75% of GC and accepted by

65% TC vote. Since the implementation of the Plan was dependent on the approval of the two

sides, it was rejected.

Following the failure of the referendum, in light of Protocol 10 of the Accession

Treaty 2003, Cyprus as a whole entered the EU on May 1, 2004 but the acquis

communautaire has been suspended in the northern part of the island. Thus TRNC stayed

outside of the customs and fiscal jurisdiction of the EU. However, the EU Council stated on

26 April 2004 that

The Turkish Cypriot community has expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Council invited the Commission to bring forward comprehensive proposals to this end with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the island and on improving contact between the two communities and with the EU.40

38 Rauf Denktaş’ son and leader of the coalition partner Democrat Party of TRNC 39 Le Monde, 22.04.2004 40 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_en.htm

27

Responding to this invitation, the Commission came up with three regulations: Green

Line to deal with the movement of goods and persons41 and Financial Aid coupled with Direct

Trade. 42 On 7 July 2004, the Commission proposed a comprehensive package of aid worth of

259 million euros be coupled with an agreement that would have allowed direct trade between

TRNC and the EU's 25 member states. Verheugen underlined many times that these steps do

not mean the recognition of TRNC but only constitute a set of possible solutions for the

unification of the island.

“Recognition of a small Turkish State in the Eastern Mediterranean is not in our interest. Such a situation would make things much more difficult.”43

These steps were received with much enthusiasm in various EU countries, Turkey and

TRNC. They were seen as EU rewards to the Turkish Cypriot side for their Yes vote and for

denouncing their aspiration to be a secessionist entity. They were thus considered to be

positive steps to the resolution of the conflict.

Nevertheless, things did not go that smoothly in reality. While the Direct Trade

regulation was rejected at the European Parliament, the Green Line one (as confirmed by the

report of the Task Force of the EU Commission44 and the letter of the ex-president of Turkish

Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (TCCC), Ali Erel45) has remained very limited. The

prohibition of the crossing of commercial vehicles (trucks, taxis, buses, rented cars, etc) from

TRNC to RoC, the impossibility of moving equipment for services (like the tools of a

furniture manufacturer or instruments for a concert), the non-recognition of diplomas, the

movement of livestock and animal products constituted the main obstacles for trade between

the two sides and the economic development of the north. Besides, the Green Line Regulation

has provisions for exporting the goods via the ports of RoC and according to the Turkish

Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (TCCC), not one application has yet been received, because

of the need of double registration of companies and for double taxation. Moreover, the main

41 Council Regulation (EC)no:8661 2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession, Official journal of the European Union L161 of 30 April 2004 The EU accepted the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (TCCC) in TRNC as the sole interlocutor for the implementation of the Green Line regulation and opened an EU documentation office in its building. 42 Com (2004) 465 final du 07-07-2004 43 Halkin Sesi, 8 Juillet 2004 44The report acknowledges the failure by underlining that because of transportation problems and the double registration, there has been no trade between the north and the EU and volume and value of goods crossing the line remained very limited. The report also stressed that although no freedom of movement goes smoothly, illegal immigration of thousands of 3rd country nationals across the line took place and many of them have requested asylum in RoC which has led to a significant increase in asylum applications. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 14.07.2005 (COM(2005) 320 final 45 www.ktto.net Official website of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce

28

exports of TRNC, potatoes and citrus fruits can not be sold easily to or via RoC, due to

phytosanitary checks in the past 3 years and ‘subsidies and quotas’ for citrus fruits.

The proposed Direct Trade Regulation, on the other hand, was opposed by the RoC,

Spain and the new member states due to its non-conformity to the legal framework, namely

article 133 of the TEU-M46. Spain was concerned that such a regulation could be applied to

Gibraltar and to its enclaves near Morocco. The new members, meanwhile showed solidarity

with the RoC.47 RoC rejected the direct trade regulation arguing that it would mean a de facto

recognition as the bylaws of any country or economic bloc clearly state that trade may only be

conducted between states. RoC, nonetheless accepted the aid regulation. The TC side,

however, rejected the aid only, insisting that both packages be coupled into one.

Since 2004 summer, the non solution to the problem impacted on the conflict’s most

intractable issue, property ownership. TRNC experienced a construction boom on GC

property and advertised their sale to foreigners. This became its most profitable economic

sector. Encouraged by some of their politicians, GCs started to take TCs who had renewed

their RoC citizenship, (having acquired EU citizenship) to court over the illegal use of their

land. With the GC courts’ new powers to issue European arrest warrants against property

violations, appeal to the court became attractive for GCs. As arrest warrants started to be sent

to TCs, the TC authorities reacted immediately by declaring that they would arrest anyone

crossing the border to bring arrest warrants to TCs. Although the situation soon calmed down,

it seriously harmed bi-communal relationships.48

Turkey’s EU candidacy has brought another complication to the problem especially at

the expense of TCs. According to the Association Agreement, Turkey has to recognize RoC

and open up its ports and air space. However, before a comprehensive peace settlement,

Turkey considers that trading and normalizing relations with the RoC would isolate the 46 External trade relations of the EU and third countries are specified in Articles 11-28 of the EU Treaty and in Articles 131-134 and Articles 177-181 of the EC Treaty. Since TRNC is not a state, the legal opinion of the Council said that trade with TRNC has to be realized on the basis of Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 47 Author Interview with Derya Bayatlı, June 2005, North Nicosia 48 In December 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) gave Turkey and TRNC three months in which to come up with a mechanism for providing ‘effective remedies’ for GC refugees’ property claims (appr. 1400 pending before the ECHR) and six months in which to execute any applications wishing restitution to or compensation for their properties in the TRNC. On 22 March 2006, TRNC announced the launch of the ‘Compensation Commission’ and if endorsed by the ECHR, it must examine and pass judgements on any cases brought before it within three months. If the GC applicants are actively prevented or discouraged by the RoC government, Turkey and TRNC by default may appear non-guilty. On the other hand, TCs who are permanent residents in the RoC have appealed to RoC courts in order to gain the right to return to their own property in the South occupied largely by GC refugees. The RoC administration says that compensation is awarded to TCs which is channelled in to a special fund and the relevant laws (Guardian Law of 1991) prevents the money from being disbursed before a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem. Some other TCs also made appeals to RoC courts to receive compensation for their expropriated land. TC Hüseyin Helvacıoğlu claims that Larnaca Airport lies on part of his land.

29

Turkish Cypriots and their economy even further. As a way out, during the meetings they

attended in Brussels, the TCCC team proposed the lifting of the restrictions on goods under

the Green Line Regulation, its extension to include imported goods to TRNC and allow free

circulation of goods all over the island together with the rest of the Customs Union area. To

this end, it recommended the legal and physical harmonization of the north customs and port

regulations and co-management of TC ports with the EU Commission. Under these

conditions, TCCC suggested that Turkey would not fear of opening its ports and air space to

RoC commercial vehicles. This proposal was also rejected by the GC government seeing it as

a way of upgrading the TRNC’s status arguing that trade with any entity is equal to accepting

it as a separate state.

In a televised address on the eve of October 1 anniversary of RoC’s 1960

independence, Papadopoulos said the government would be seeking more active EU

participation in future Cyprus settlement talks and this is an objective that they are promoting.

A recent survey conducted by consulting and research company Noverna for Politis

newspaper of 500 Greek Cypriots over the age 18 interviewed at random between September

24 and September 30, revealed that 59 percent were satisfied with the way the President was

handling the problem with just 30 percent dissatisfied.49

Meanwhile, the EU participation to the conflict is being further problematized as

Turkey’s possible accession to the EU raises ardent debate between members. France and

Austria want to leave the process open ended. The new chancellor of Germany, Angela

Merkel suggests a privileged partnership and they are all using the Cyprus issue as leverage to

Ankara. The negotiation process opened in October 2005, but France and Austria have

pledged to hold referendums on Turkey’s accession.

“As Germany used Greece in the past on consistent/inconsistent grounds, Paris is using the Greek Cypriots today since there is no reason left to object to the Copenhagen Criteria or other commitments.”50

In late December of 2005, half of the EU financial aid set aside for TCs was about to

be redeposited into the EU budget since TRNC rejected it without the direct trade. Both sides

got together once again in Brussels, but no agreement was reached and RoC once again

blocked the direct trade. In January 2006, the Council of Europe Rapporteur for RoC

submitted his resignation announcing that he no longer enjoyed the trust of the Greek Cypriot

49 Cyprus Mail, 4 October, 2005 50 Abdulhamit Bilici, ‘What is France’s problem with Turkey’ Zaman Daily News, Sept. 14, 2005

30

side.51 Meanwhile Turkey proposed a revival of Cyprus reunification talks under UN auspices

as the Greek Cypriot government started to say that it may block Turkey’s efforts to join the

EU. Turkey proposed an action plan that envisaged the opening of Turkish ports and airports

to Greek Cypriot ships and planes in return for the lifting of trade and other restrictions

against the TCs The Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn welcomed the initiative, but strong

representations have been made to him by the RoC government. British Foreign Minister Jack

Straw’s visit to the island and his insistence to visit the TRNC president Mehmet Ali Talat in

his office was further greeted angrily by GC protests.

Finally, following several months of debate, the EU foreign ministers approved on 27

February 2006, a financial aid package of 139 million euros to the Turkish Cypriot

community in 2006.52 (of the originally planned 259 million euros, 120 million were lost as

the deadline for using the funds from the EU's 2005 budget was missed)

Turkey and TRNC expressed disappointment with the EU while in the words of RoC

government spokesman, Georgios Lillikas, the “fairy tale of Turkish-Cypriot isolation is now

removed with the EU decision.”53

Findings and Assesment:

The EU became involved at different phases of the above examined conflicts and to

varying degrees. Its involvement as a third party occurred with membership prospects which

have had a catalytic effect in all the three cases. This is mainly because all the primary parties

could seize a ground within the EU framework for their competing interests.

Parties to the Bosnian conflict are well aware that the EU is the most promising

remedy to their frozen ills. First of all, the EU cannot bear the cost of another Bosnian war at

its periphery, mainly from the moral standpoint and is ready to allocate financial, political and

military assets to secure justice and basic human rights to prevent a violent conflict. Second,

BIH is geographically at the heart of Europe and it has no other geopolitical option.

Moreover, the EU is planning to integrate the entire region, the SEE to its union. Thus, BIH’s

destiny is tied to EU beyond the mere aspiration of conflict resolution and the EU is

determined to be involved in solving Bosnia’s problems. It seeks an agreed political

framework, to address unattained justice and the lack of an enduring security and in broad

terms, seeks reconciliation.

51 His report said that the EU is not fulfilling its promises it made to end the isolation of TC and that RoC since it became an EU member, did not have the same motivation to push for a settlement. The report was found pro-Turkish by the Greek Cypriot side. Cyprus Mail, 26, 01, 2006 52 Com (2004) 465 final du 27.02.2006 53 www. euractiv.com EU news, policy positions and EU actors on line

31

As argued at the beginning of this paper, conflict resolution is a critical approach to

realist way of trying to solve and bring a settlement to international conflicts. It seeks to go

beyond the negotiation of a settlement by power politics and its ambition is reconciliation.

- Security.

- An agreed political framework

- Justice and basic human rights

- Socio-Economic Development

are the widely accepted requirements for a reconciliation and the third party involved in such

an effort should not have an exclusive attitude towards any party to the conflict

The challenge before the EU is that it has to help achieve such reconciliation in BIH

before the accession of Croatia, not to repeat the mistake of becoming a secondary and then a

primary party to the conflict before its resolution as in the case of Cyprus. Conditionality and

conflict transformation seem to be the magic words for viable actions. EU’s biggest weakness

in Bosnia at the moment seems that whilst BIH holds a strong European orientation, its

inhabitants do not have full confidence in the EU since memories of its controversial role in

the violent conflict endure. Opinion polls in BIH show that Bosnians hold the international

community responsible for the war and given the course of events, European powers have yet

not spoken openly about their own share of responsibility in the war.

“In respective blame games, Boshniacs blame the Serbs and the International community, the Serbs blame the US and the NATO and Croats blame the Serbs and the International Community.” (Irwin, 2004 cited in Hatay, 83)

Furthermore, according to a Bosnian attorney who has been working in international

NGOs, NATO membership is what matters the most to Bosnians as their primary concern is

not to go through another war. This implies the fact that the EU alone is still not the most

reliable actor on security matters in BIH. The attorney also asserted that the EU integration

process has not yet opened a ground for reconciliation as the country still remains very much

divided and the state level body (Directorate for EU Integration) carries out the so called

vertical and horizontal coordination, without really changing anything in the governmental

structure. As for economic development, on the other hand, it’s still too early to determine

any EU impact.

The EU became involved in Macedonia with much improved conflict resolution

capacities. Although poor at preventing the conflict, it acted more effectively in crisis

management by responding fairly quickly to the outbreak of violence. Member states acted

jointly and the EU HR and Commission with its readiness for mid and long term

commitments proved to be effective. However, the Macedonian case also proved that EU

32

actions in violent conflicts are successful only in conjunction with other powerful

international actors such as NATO, the OSCE and the US. (Schneckener, 41) Nonetheless,

EU’s integration process has offered an example of non-coercive method to conflict

resolution. The EU’s use of sticks and carrots policy proved successful since it conducted a

policy of conditionality which suppressed the intransigence of all sides. This might be useful

for Bosnia, too. In 2001, 87% of Albanians stated that it was important to them that the

country remains united. (Hatay, 90).

The Ohrid Framework was based on commitments from both sides to the country’s

territorial integrity and the preservation of its unitary structure. It also ruled out territorial

solution to ethnic disputes. At the same time, the framework called for reforms to transform

the state from an ethnic Slavic Macedonian nation state (which privileged the majority

population, its language, religion, and culture) into a multi-ethnic or more precisely a bi-

ethnic state. (Hatay, 91) Although these reforms were met with enthusiasm by Albanians,

Slavic Macedonians were less impressed. In a 2003 UNDP survey, 38% of Macedonians and

91.6% of Albanians stated that they support the agreement strongly. (UNDP, 2003 cited in

Hatay, 91)

However, the Slavic Macedonians felt the positive outcome of the conflict resolution

efforts since they also benefited from the structural changes which have brought peace,

economic perspectives and EU candidacy. Moreover, policies of conditionality may incite

changes in the short to medium run, but the more deep-rooted change through an actual

transformation of identity and interests are usually expected in the longer run. A change in

political discourse may however incite early results in genuine identity and interest change

(Emerson, Vahl, Coppieters, Huysseune, Kovziridze, Noutcheva and Tocci, 4). Thus, it is

rather up to the local actors’ to develop and improve the settlement process whilst the EU

needs to be careful about keeping its promises such as the promotion of socio-economic

development, a major weakness in FYROM at the present time. As a third party, the EU

should also pay attention to safeguarding the remaining minorities’ rights in Macedonia since

the state has become more bi-ethnic between Slavic Macedonians and Albanians rather than

multi-ethnic.

For Cyprus, it is arguable if the enlargement process without conditionality served

conflict resolution at all. It would be incorrect to deny the catalytic effect the EU had on

preparing the ground for negotiation and reversing the incentive systems of the parties in

Cyprus, where for years non solution was regarded as the only solution. Even the opening of

the borders after about 30 years giving the possibility to the post-74 generation to see the

33

‘Other Side’ for the first time can be considered worthwhile. However, as the above

developments reveal the EU became too dependent on the effect of membership negotiations

(Eralp and Beriker, 187) and missed the opportunity for resolution by promising accession to

the Greek Cypriot community alone without the presence of a common ground for collective

social construction. (Boedeltje, Plug, Kramsch and Houtum, 36). Besides, by lifting the

conditionality on the RoC and failing to convey to the GCs, the potential repercussions of

entering the Union as a divided island, EU actors were partially responsible for the GC

rejection of the Annan Plan (Tocci, 165).

Developments in the post-Annan period reveal that settlement efforts under the EU

framework have also been ineffective since with the RoC as a member, the EU has become a

primary party to a protracted and intractable conflict.

Had there been a policy of conditionality on all sides, it could be argued that the EU

legislation and institutions would have had the potential to implement the Peace Plan,

however imperfect.

In all the three cases, the EU has used its structural conflict prevention methods and

has even tested its military capacity. It has thus far achieved progress especially in Macedonia

but even there has not created ground for full reconciliation. The main reason is that the EU

does not invest enough, is not interested in or is confused about, conflict transformation

mechanisms. A just conflict transformation might be the only way to change the course of

conflicts and lead the primary parties to reconciliation whilst at the same time free the third

parties from rigid use of carrot and stick policies.

The very idea of transformation is actually a deliberation of the anti-hegemonic

discourses. Marxism sheds light on transformative practice as it challenges the class hierarchy

and exclusion based on economic exploitation, which are still the basic causes of most of the

‘identity’ conflicts, today.

In fact, without the elimination of socio-economic inequalities and exclusion, the root

causes of conflicts are not eliminated. Funds and financial assistances prove to be helpful but

do not provide long-term remedies to revive economic sectors that all parts of societies can

benefit from. The EU has contributed significantly in Bosnia and Macedonia and to a certain

degree in TRNC, to reconstruction and development projects. “While most people in BIH and

FYROM are worse off than 20 years ago, in the absence of aid, today, they probably would be

further worse off.”54 The EU has also supported small and medium sized enterprises,

54 E-mail interview with Kristof Bender, March-April, 2006

34

vocational, management or human resources training and efficient management of public

finance to combat unemployment, especially in Macedonia. However, it has made long-term

contribution to socio-economic development in none of these cases. Except for banks and

couple of investments like the Macedonian Telecom, cement factories and breweries, there

have not been significant EU foreign investments directed to BIH or FYROM while TRNC

remains embargoed. The widespread poverty in Bosnia55, the high unemployment in

Macedonia and the economic isolation of TRNC, all major obstacles towards a successful

conflict resolution are thus not significantly tackled by the EU. Moreover, the EU does not

seem to take into account that the mass and fast-track privatization that it requires in

Macedonia and Bosnia, may result in ethnic identity ownership, aggravating further

segregation.

Exclusion and alienation based on nationalism, ethnicity and cultural identity, on the

other hand, constitute the other side of the medallion which is neglected by traditional theories

including Marxism. Critical Thinking marks a step beyond, by articulating for example, a

relationship between the capitalist world economy and the international system of national

identities. (Stone, 107) It provides an explanation for the existing mechanisms and criticizes

them in order to transform them. Fetherson argues that the danger of failing to incorporate a

critical-theoretical approach to conflict resolution is that attempts will once again simply

reinforce the unchallenged order which generated the conflict in the first place. (Miall,

Rambostham, Woodhouse, 56) Critical approach has also shifted the focus of security from

the sovereign state to humanitarian.

It is in fact the Foucauldian premise which opens space for transformation by rejecting

power as a form of domination and assuming that power is diffuse and within our reach.

In other words, it suggests that anti-hegemonic practices offer perhaps the greatest potential

space for difference. (Foucault, 1994) Gramsci on the other suggests counter-hegemonic

action for a transformative practice. (Gramsci, 2005) Fetherston draws our attention to two

problems with both suggestions. First, not all anti or counter hegemonic projects are

progressive such as religious fundamentalism. Second, anti-hegemonic practices may enable a

change in globalized discourses, but not always in power. (Fetherston, 210-11)

55 According to the World Bank Report in 2003, poverty if so widespread in BIH that there is a constant danger that it might lead to social unrest and upheaval. Bosnia and Herzegovina Poverty assessment no:25342 available at www.esiweb.org

35

Communicative action theory of Habermas, on the other hand, suggests creating

possibilities for the production of a new meaning inherent in the encounter between the Self

and the Other, which could open a post-hegemonic window to conflicts and their resolution.

Communicative action thrives where institutions enable citizens to debate matters of

public importance. Ideally, actors must be equally, endowed with the capacities of the

discourse, recognize each other’s basic social equality and in which their speech is completely

undistorted by ideology or misrecognition. It’s a means of intersubjective dialogue between a

community of actors which enables them to reconstruct common understandings of their

lifeworld and, therefore, renew the shared basis for culture, social integration and

socialization that underlie a mutual existence. (Habermas, 1985)

The notion of discourse ethics, on the other hand, derived from his consent-oriented

theory of communicative action enters into force by providing a means of solving situations

of social conflict in a just and impartial manner. It offers a basis for advancing the moral point

of view in conflicts and when a consensus is reached, it leads to deciding upon new principles

and institutional arrangements. It also aims to arrive at resolutions, which are acceptable to all

affected parties.

In the case of involvement of the third party to facilitate the discourse ethics, the

objective is achieving a non-hierarchical and non-coercive resolution of conflict by including

both or all affected parties as participants to the dialogue (Hoffman, 265). The third party also

has to seek a self-generated and self-sustaining resolution to the conflict and promotes a

cosmopolitan ideal where political organization is decided by a process of dialogue in which

participation should be open to all who stand to be affected by the decision (Stone, 113).

Finally, the third party facilitation could be characterized as the promotion of consensual

decision-making towards the resolution of conflict via a process of undistorted

communication (Hoffman, 270).

Obstacles to these goals are primarily nationalist ideologies and ideologies based on

cultural exclusion recognizable in three of the conflicts examined above. In order to apply a

transformative approach to these conflicts on the Habermasian line, the third party not only

has to promote emancipation, to secure the freedom of the communities, reduce injustice, and

release them from relations of dominance that lead to distorted communication and

understanding, but it also has to posses them, itself.

The third party with such a perspective in mind has first to be competent in its

understanding of the forces operating on the conflict, and secure the participation and

36

empowerment of the marginalized. It has to possess freedom from fear and freedom from

distorted conditions of communication.

In its legislation, the EU includes the ‘Other’, but how in fact does this translate in

practice or communication? EU leaders and academics usually talk about flexible cross-

border identities within the EU, suggesting this as an example. They ignore, however that post

9/11 syndrome has made the EU borders extremely exclusive to the non-EU world outside

except for certain allies.

The Hungarian academic, Böröcz asserts that

“In the enlargement scheme, identities that posture themselves as less Oriental than a chosen Other have systematically latched onto the synecdoche notion of ‘Europe equals EU’ and perpetuate that schema as a core element of their identity focus. Acceptance vs. Postponement for accession to the EU is read, in this frame as reinforcement or rejection of Europeanness (i.e non Orientalness) and hence ultimately of ‘whiteness’ … The diversity and multi-culturality stressed by the plurilingual label ‘Europa, Europa” is also strictly internal to EU.” (Börözc, 6)

The consolidation of this new hegemonic European space has also charged the EU

with a disciplinizing mission which is assumed by all EU member states whether they have

acquired all the EU values or not. When Greek Cypriot politician Lyssarides was asked his

opinion about Turkey’s accession, he stated:

‘We support Turkey’s accession to the Union. Not because we love Turkey, but it’s better to have her in the family and make her behave according to the family rules than keep her outside’ 56

The disciplinizing approach is still not the most exclusivist among some other

discourses prevailing in EU today. The Dutch European Commissioner responsible for

Europe’s free market rules, Frits Bolkenstein, said recently that if Turkey was admitted to the

EU, ‘the liberation of Vienna in 1683 would be in vain’57 The debate about Turkey’s

impending membership to the EU has been characterized by overblown rhetoric and lack of

finesse according to Ramonet. (Ramonet, 2004)

“Framed in terms of the clash of civilizations, it testifies to the identity crises of western societies when faced with Islam. It also reveals that anti-Islamic sentiment lurking in almost every sector of the political classes” (ibid)

Possessing such exclusivist approaches which exist in other forms and against other

targets within the EU today, how as a third party, would the EU then persuade its Orthodox

Christian Slavic Macedonian partners to reconcile their differences on political, economical or

social grounds with their Muslim Albanian compatriots, or the Serbs and the Croats with

Boshniacs or the Greek Cypriots with Turkish Cypriots? Funds would have to be poured in,

investments would rise and conditionalities would be set, but as long as the exclusion and its

56 Author Interview, June 2005, Nicosia 57 Financial Times, 8 September, 2004

37

discourse exist within Europe itself, it would be reflected in various other forms within and

beyond its territory and would not help to achieve reconciliation.

There have been some modest trials of EU academics or problem solving trainers on

the issue, but arguably not to transform the relationships between parties but only to ease the

‘Other’s inclusion. During the Track II diplomacy efforts, Turkish Cypriots were informed

that they could possibly be the Islamized Greek Cypriot or the Venetian or Lusignan58

descendants. EU citizens have been reminded, on the other hand, that Albanians and

Boshniacs are European Muslims “which have nothing to do with the existing ones in the EU:

Pakistanis in Great Britain, Magribians in France and Spain and Turks in Germany.”(Sanguin,

Cataruzza, Chenevau, 12)

Conclusion:

This paper finds that the EU has a great potential to act as a catalyst in bringing the

parties to negotiate their differences and work together, thanks to its developing conflict

prevention mechanisms and the integration process. Through its treaties and legislations, it

also has a potential to create an open and emancipatory ground to resolve conflicts on

competing political interests. However, it has a weakness in conflict transformation because

of its own deficiencies in tackling socio-economic inequalities and in fostering an undistorted

communicative action between adversary parties. An impartial and successful conduct of

conflict transformation fed by critical thinking, on the other hand, is the most promising

method towards reconciliation not only beyond EU frontiers but within EU itself.

The paper further asserts that as long as investments within or beyond EU frontiers

will not target socio-economic development of societies; a Turkish Cypriot holding a RoC

(thus an EU passport) in the name Erhan Ahmet will be held unnecessarily at a German

border as his name draws suspicion on his Europeaness; a Boshniac intellectual living in

Scandinavia will feel fearful of returning home because he might experience genocide again,

(to be killed only because of his name), yet that is the same reason why he wants to return for

he is not capable of becoming a sophisticated European with such a name (Sokolović,17); or

an EU member state president will declare that parliaments cannot take decisions of history

when it comes to their own colonial past whilst supporting other parliamentary decisions

concerning other countries’ histories, (recognizing the Armenian genocide, for example), the

EU will remain an inadequate actor in conflict resolution within or beyond its frontiers.

58 The French crusading dynasty which ruled in Cyprus from 1192 until 1474

38

Acknowledgement:

The author would like to express her gratitude to Antonija Petričusić, Ayşe Karapınar,

Džemal Sokolović, Erhan Türbedar, Kristof Bender, Mahir Aydın, J.C Tordai and Zoran

Ilievski for providing suggestions, corrections and information during the preparation of this

paper.

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Newspapers Cyprus Mail Financial Times Halkın Sesi Hürriyet Kıbrıs Le Figaro Le Monde Zaman Other internet sources: www.esiweb.org www.europaworld.com www.euractiv.org www.eu.int www.greekembassy.org www.ktto.net http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/eu/eu.assistance.pdf www.ntvmsnbc.com List of Interviewees: Derya Beyatli, Deputy Secretary General of Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, Nicosia, TRNC Dr. Thanos Dakos, Director of Studies, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens, Greece Dr. Marios Evriviadis, Defense Analyse Institute, Athens, Greece Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, Founder of the movement of Social Democrats, EDEK in Nicosia, RoC Kristof Bender, Senior analyst who leads research projects in Serbia, Montenegro and FYROM

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