Environmental ConflictManagementPractitioners' Workshop

In October, 1982, leading practitionersand researchers in the field of environ­mental conflict resolution gathered for athree-day workshop in Florissant, Colora­do. The meeting was sponsored by theWilliam and Flora Hewlett Foundation,and organized by the Center for Environ­mental Problem Solving (formerly ROM­COE, now ACCORD). The organizershave compiled an 80-page summary ofthe proceedings of the workshop that isessential reading for those seeking anoverview of the state-of-the-art in environ­mental conflict resolution. The followingexcerpts from the WOrkshop Summary wereselected to interest those involved in im­pact assessment.

Gaining Acceptance

Panels addressed several issues currently facingpractitioners in thefield. One of the most impor­tant problems is "Gaining Acceptance", famil­iari<:ing potential clients with the procedures andadvantages of formal negotiations. This panelwas chaired by Charles Cooper, of the AmericanArbitration Association, and included KennethYoung, then of the Environmental ProtectionAgency Office of Standards and Regulations, EdClark, an independent consultant for nationalconservation groups in the areas of management,leadership and organizational development, andRichard Mullineaux of the Shell Oil Company.

Environmental impact Assessment Review, V. 3, N. 40195.9255/82/1200·387103.00/00\982 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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Ed Clark discussed some problems inbringing environmental interests to thenegotiating table. He noted that his ob­servations apply mainly to site-specificcases and local, state, and regional envi­ronmental groups rather than to nationalissues and organizations. He said that in­dividuals and environmental groups thatdo not have large support staffs and ex­tensive technical resources often mistrusttheir own ability to represent their posi­tion adequately in negotiations. There isa mistrust of the process, an inability toaccept a win-win scenario, and a feelingthat "if the other side is willing to sitdown to negotiate, they must be up tosomething." Clark said that, amongmany environmentalists, "there's a tre­mendous distrust of government agenciesand industrialjbusiness interests." Hesaid that there is very little faith in thecredibility of anyone who speaks for theestablishment. There is a feeling thateven if a well-intentioned risk taker in theestablishment is committed and trustwor­thy, "if he's too successful, he'll have hischain pulled from above."

Clark said that there is a real reluc­tance on the part of some environmental­ists to come to the table and "give upgrandstanding and sloganeering and getdown to specifics." It's easier to accusesomeone of raping and pillaging than it isto talk in terms of parts per million ofdischarge and technical standards thatare not being met - "That's a quantumleap that many groups can't quite make."

Clark said that it is important toshow that the negotiation process is suffi­ciently different from traditional ways of

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" ...there seems to be aperception that a plant hasto exist without anyimpact on the town and itspeople."

Richard Mullineaux,Shell Oil Company

even possible." He said that it is essentialto identify all the stakeholders, and"that's impossible for industry to do uni­laterally. The late appearance of impor­tant opposition can kill us." He pointedout that a company's investment is notjust in the plant - "we have to negotiatecontracts for what a plant is going to pro­duce, and if it isn't built we have to goout and buy that product from somebodyelse at a premium."

Cooper suggested two premises: (I) foun­dation support for environmental dispute

Financing: Problemsand Opportunities

The use of environmental mediation as an addi­tion to impact assessment consulting services re­quires more than acceptance; someone has to payfor these new processes, and do so without stig­matizing the enterprise. The panel on "Financ­ing: Problems and Opportunities" was moderat­ed by Howard Bellman, of the Institute for En­vironmental Mediation, and included CharlesCooper, Peter Adler, of the Neighborhood Jus­tice Center, and Ronnie Brooks, of the Dayton­Hudson Corporation.

Mullineaux said that one obstacle tothe use of negotiation by industry is con­cern that the company will have to giveup some chips that would be valuable ifthe dispute ultimately ends up in litiga­tion. There is also a perception of givingup control - management perceives itselfas being in control of a traditional litigat­ed process. Mullineaux said, "We're usedto depending on the legal department totell us what to do, and naturally they tellus to get ready to litigate."

problem solving to warrant an investmentof time and effort. "Traditional disputeresolution and public participation pro­cesses are a hoax to many grass-roots or­ganizations and citizens," he said. Final­ly, he advised against trying to make peo­ple give up their power - "Make it clearthat if they don't like the way things comeout, they can still take [the industry] tocourt. "

Richard Mullineaux said that oneenvironmental concern that will bearound for a long time is how to dealwith abandoned toxic waste dumps."There isn't any disagreement amongmost industry people that something hasto be done," he said. "But we get hungup on how much has to be done, how fastit has to be done, who pays, and that sortof thing." Mullineaux observed that thereis a lot of emotionalism and lack of un­derstanding about the facts involved indealing with abandoned toxic waste sites.Because there is "a substantial element ofcommon objective, but conflict over thedetails," Mullineaux sees this as an issuethat has potential for being resolvedthrough environmental conflict manage­ment processes.

He said that another area that haspotential is community relations. Peopleused to be prepared to accept whateverimpacts came with a plant that was lo­cated in their community. Now, accord­ing to Mullineaux, "there sometimesseems to be a perception that a plant hasto exist without any impact on the townand its people." Mullineaux believes thatbecause there is a lot of uncertainty abouthow one seeks a balance, along with arecognition by industry and communityleaders that some kind of balance has tobe found, this is another kind of issuethat is suited to negotiating processes.

Mullineaux said that a key issue inpermitting and siting disputes is to assessthe possibility of reaching agreement aseatly as possible. "Sometimes there areissues that are just nonnegotiable; it'sa ... waste of time to be going downthe track toward something that's not

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Brooks' second idea was aimed atgroups who work in metropolitan areas.She suggested that their work might beinstitutionalized within community foun-

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"Are there already too manyof us in the field for thenumber of people who arewilling to pay for ourservices? I don't have ananswer."

Charles Cooper, AmericanArbitration Association

education, legal aid to the poor, studentloans, and support for other programsapproved by the bar foundation. TheFlorida program is voluntary; 1500 attor­neys participated and raised $250,000 inone year. Idaho, Maryland, Oregon, andCalifornia are beginning to implementsuch programs, Adler said, and Hawaii isexploring the idea.

Adler said that there are some prob­lems to be resolved, such as the fact thatthe interest actually belongs to the cli­ents. But he said that this idea offers "apotential source of funding for disputeresolution when other sources arecollapsing. "

Brooks proposed two new fundingideas. The first was to establish what shecalled a "national dispute resolutionpractitioners' revolving fund." Each par­ticipating organization would raise $5000to go into a fund governed by a board se­lected by the participants. Brooks esti­mated that "we ought to be able to comeup with $200,000 to $250,000." Anygroup that contributed to the fund wouldbe eligible to draw from it to finance in­volvement in a specific dispute. Brookssaid, "It would be available quickly togive us opportunities to improve the fieldby taking cases that we might not be ableto afford to handle for lack of resources."At the end of the mediator's involvement,the parties in the dispute would be askedto reimburse the fund.

resolution will run out some day and (2)a large number of other practitioners willenter the field. He said, "I think thismeans that the groups involved in provid­ing this kind of service are going to haveto be well run organizations." By wellrun, Cooper said he meant that an orga­nization is cost effective, has a fundingplan for the time when its foundationgrants run out, and is already working toimplement this plan.

Cooper said that competition is go­ing to increase - "Our organizations willexpand and new ones will enter the field.We have to accept the competition withgood grace and avoid suicidal competi­tion." He asked, "Are there already toomany of us in the field for the number ofpeople who are willing to pay for our ser­vices? I don't have an answer."

He said, "As organizations, we haveto expand or die." Groups that have beenworking in one geographical area willhave to expand into other areas. Groupsthat have been involved solely in environ­mental dispute resolution will have to of­fer other services. Alternative ways ofgenerating income, such as training, willhave to be explored and expanded.

How do we protect our neutralitywhen we start applying the fee-for-serviceconcept? Cooper suggested that weshould focus on the question: "How dowe avoid the risk that he who pays thepiper calls the tune?" He did not offer ananswer to this question.

Adler said that there is a move afootin a number of states to create bar foun­dations that can receive interest fromlawyers' clients' trust accounts. Thismoney, held in trust for clients from re­tainers and settlements, is usually in fair­ly small amounts that traditionally havebeen deposited in non-interest-bearingaccounts to avoid tax work.

A new idea is that interest fromthese trust accounts can be given to foun­dations that can put the money to gooduse. In Florida, the only state that hasimplemented the concept, uses that havebeen identified include continuing legal

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Confidentiality

In designing interventions through mediation,environmental professionals will face a new and

difficult choice. Traditionally, mediation hasbeen a closed andconfidential process. However,environmental decision making has been subjectin its recent history to demands for maximumopenness in its procedures.

Wendy Emrich, of the Brandywine Con­servancy Environmental ManagementCenter in Chadd's Ford, Pennsylvania,said that in mediation and other forms of"collective bargaining", the assumptionhas usually been that closed meetings arebetter than open ones. This assumptionwas based on the traditional and general­ly successful labor-management negotia­tion model. Closed meetings have beenjustified on the basis of increasing can­dor, ensuring confidentiality, and main­taining the momentum of negotiations.

Emrich pointed out that labor-man­agement negotiations have usually beenperceived as private transactions betweenemployer and employees, even thoughthey can have large impacts on publicconcerns. But public involvement in envi­ronmental decision making is perceivedvery differently. The recent history of en­vironmental affairs in this country hascentered on the idea that environmentaldecisions are public decisions, and therehave been statutory requirements forpublic participation in many environmen­tal decision-making processes. Industryand environmental groups have come toexpect this kind of openness in environ­mental matters, whether or not they feelcomfortable with it.

Emrich said that experienced media­tors often want meetings to be closed,and parties in negotiations often insist onit. But sunshine laws may require discus­sions to be open, and people sometimesperceive that the spirit of the law calls foropen meetings even if it is not clear thatthey are specifically mandated.

Emrich said that some recent exper­ience indicates that several of the disad­vantages associated with open meetingsmay not be real and that open meetingscan offer certain advantages. For exam­ple, pressure from the press and the pub-

dations. She said, "Many communitieshave foundations that are closely in touchwith the resources of the community, andthey almost all have as a key mission con­vening groups to address important com­munity issues. The kind of work many ofus do is consistent with their larger pur­pose." Brooks said that a communityfoundation can offer an established insti­tutional framework and a mechanism fordrawing on resources with which dispute­resolution groups may not be in contact.She said that the foundation "offers le­gitimacy for the kind of community in­volvement that many of us aspire to."

Someone suggested that a communi­ty foundation can receive money from aparticipant in a dispute, then use it tosupport a third party intervenor, mini­mizing the risk of jeopardizing the thirdparty's neutrality.

Someone asked about the possibilityof establishing a conflict managementservice as a public utility, funded as a lineitem in city or county budgets. Thisfunding would support a continuing oper­ation but probably would not finance in­tervention in specific disputes. The citi­zens would pay to keep it in existence,like a fire department, to be availablewhen it is needed. Brooks replied thatdispute resolution is not valued as highlyas fire protection or sewage disposal, andthat she doubts that citizens would bewilling to support it.

The person who had brought up thepublic-utility idea replied that this callsfor education. "Through education," hesaid, "you can teach a very significantcommunity about the value of these kindsof services. At least in the Bay Area, it isnow an accepted practice to pay for theseservices on a very regular basis. It's ama­zing how quickly an education processcan be effective, at least when you'redealing with a well-defined urban area."

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Goals and process of negotiations• Rules and procedures should be

agreed upon and developed by the

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Stakeholding interests• AI) stakeholding interests should be

informed that a proposed interven­tion will take place and how theywill be able to participate.

• All stakeholding interests should havean opportunity to express their viewson issues under consideration. (Ex­pressing views is not the same asparticipating in negotiations.)

• All stakeholding interests should beapprised of the process whereby sta­keholding representatives will be se­lected and should have some oppor­tunity to participate in that selection.

• Those without the capacity to repre­sent themselves ought to be given thetime and assistance that they need atleast to present their views and statetheir interests on the issues underconsideration.

• Stakeholder representatives ought tobe selected by interests involved andnot appointed on their behalf.

• Stakeholders ought to be asked topresent a clear statement of the ex­tent to which they are empowered tospeak for the interests they represent.

the monitoring and implementa­tion of the agreement.

Susskind said that the intervenorshould be accountable at the outset forwhat he or she is prepared to do to assurethat these five points are considered bythe parties to a dispute. The intervenorshould be clear about where he or shestands with regard to these five pointsand should be able to state carefully whathe or she is prepared to do on each pointif the negotiations or negotiators goastray.

In line with the above five points,Susskind prescribed the following norma­tive statements regarding interventionethics in public policy issues:

Ethics of Intervention

Third party intervention in environmental con­flict raises difficult ethical issues. These prob­lems were addressed in a session on the "Ethicsof Intervention. "

lie who may be present can keep the mo­mentum of negotiations going instead ofslowing it down....

Lawrence Susskind, of M.LT.'s Environ­mental Negotiation Program, began bysaying, "We have three basic institutiona­lized means of making decisions and re­solving disputes in our society: legislative,judicial, and executive/administrativeprocesses. In examining the outcomes ofthese procedures, one is often led to askwhether through greater and more directpublic participation and more responsiveofficials more desirable outcomes can beobtained. Can this machinery be supple­mented to produce more effective, effi­cient, desirable, responsive, and appropri­ate outcomes in the eyes of the partici­pants and those affected by the deci­sions?"

Susskind suggested that one way toimprove the quality of decisions is to as­sure high ethical standards for the behav­ior of intervenors and participants and toestablish standards for the outcome ofdisputes. He suggested five general areasthat should be considered in developingan ethical code for intervention:

1. How the stakeholding interests in adhoc dispute resolution efforts are de­fined and how their spokespeopleare identified.

2. How the objectives of the ad hoc ne­gotiations are defined and how theprocess of negotiation is conducted.

3. How the interests of those notpresent at the bargaining tableand not directly involved with ne­gotiations are protected.

4. What the terms of the final agree­ments are.

5. What has been agreed to about

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Compliance

In these early years of environmental conflict me­diation, one of the most problematic areas hasbeen compliance - ensuring that theparties actin accordance with the negotiated agreement. Asthe discussion reveals, designing a stable settle­ment requires fine balancing between too littleand too much trust.

will leave the contending interestsin the best possible working rela­tionship for the future.

The agreements themselves• All agreements should be written

so that they can be scrutinized bythe public.

• Contingencies should be specifiedin the agreement.

• Agreements should be scrutinizedby all the parties to ensure thatjoint gains have been maximized.

• All links to formal decision makingor formal bodies with authorityshould be spelled out.

• Remediation procedures should bespelled out.

• All participants should ascertainthat they have built the agreementon principles that they would beprepared to argue for in the future.

Impact• The participants I responsibility for

monitoring and reviewing subse­quent enforcement should be madeclear.

• Availabilityand role of the intervenorsubsequent to the agreement shouldbe made clear to the parties.

Michael Wheeler, who teaches at theNew England School of Law and M.LT.,and holds a research position at the Har­vard Negotiation Project, spoke on theproblem of securing compliance with ne­gotiated agreements. Negotiation and me­diation are sterile exercises, he observed,if one is not concerned with what hap­pens to the parties after settlement.Moreover, if disputants are at all sophisti­cated, they may not even go to the bar-

parties, not imposed by anyoneparty or outside interests.

• The pace of negotiations shouldprovide time for thoughtful reflec­tion and adequate time to checkback with constituents.

• All parties that are part of the ne­gotiations should have time toquestion the facts and assumptionsupon which other stakeholders'views are based.

• Promises of confidentiality must bekept. (This is not to say that every­thing should be confidential.)

• Agreements or consensus shouldnever be based on purposeful de­ception. (There is a fine line be­tween hard bargaining and pur­poseful deception.)

• The public should be kept in­formed of the progress of negotia­tions and all agreements should bemade public. Tentative agreementsshould be made public before theyare formalized, and there should bea period for public comment bycitizens who will be affected.

• The goal of negotiation is an effi­cient, equitable, and stable agree­ment as seen by the communitywhose resources are being allocated.

Serving the public interest• Participants should be able to state

explicitly how the interests ofstakeholders who are hard to repre­sent will be taken into account.

• Intervenors should be responsiblefor pointing out to the group howand why stakeholder interests notat the table may not be well servedby proposed agreements.

• Agreements should not be finalizeduntil steps for implementation areclear.

• Tentative agreements on publicpolicy choices should not be final­ized before all interests have hadan opportunity to comment.

• Participants should seek to ascer­tain that the proposed agreement

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Recent Cases

In addition to these selected issues, the workshopcovered such important areas as gaining entry tocases, the role of information and research, selec­tion of participants, institutionalization, andagenda for further research. Conference partici­pants shared the details of actual mediated casesin which they had been involved - a valuableexperience, since few project descriptions havebeen published. T# close our excerpts from theFlorissant workshop with some of the discussionof recent cases.

sounds as if we can't trust each other suf­ficiently to have a simple and reasonableagreement. "

Wheeler replied that there are differ­ent approaches to the problem of non­compliance and that he was simply argu­ing for informed choice. In some cases,emphasis on possible noncompliance mayactually increase its likelihood by plant­ing suspicions. On the other hand, hestated that he had observed a discourag­ing number of cases where the negotia­tors had worked hard and in good faith,and had come to agreement, only to see itsoon come unglued. The circumstances ofa given case and the relationship of theparties may call for a strategic, legalisticapproach, while another might requireonly trust. In either case, however, theparties should not skirt the problem ofnoncompliance.

Virginia Toxics Roundtable. Richa. i Collins,of the Institute for Environmental Negoti­ation at the University of Virginia, Char­lottesville, opened the session on casestudies by describing the work of the Vir­ginia Toxics Roundtable, with a focus onwhat could be learned from some of theproblems encountered in setting up policydialogues. The Roundtable was estab­lished by the Institute to address the is­sue of hazardous waste disposal in Vir­ginia. It has reached agreement on a pro­posed state statute to govern the siting ofhazardous waste disposal facilities. Indi­viduals employed by the Environmental

gammg table in the first place if theyforesee a likelihood of noncompliance. Al­though implementation is the last step innegotiation, Wheeler believes that the is­sue of compliance is lurking from the out­set.

If negotiators wish to address theproblem of potential noncompliance, theymust recognize its various causes. Wheel­er proposed three broad categories ofnoncompliance: deliberate repudiation,unavoidable noncompliance, and unin­tentional noncompliance. Within eachcategory, there may be different forms.Deliberate repudiation may be total orselective; in the latter case, a party maytry to benefit from parts of the agreementwhile escaping its costly provisions. De­liberate repudiation, moreover, may beopen or covert. It may be unilateral or inresponse to a percei ved breach by anotherparty.

Turning to preventive measures,Wheeler noted that deliberate repudiationsometimes may be discouraged by structur­ing implementation so that costs and bene­fits are kept in balance. Holding back onsome rewards can be a means of inducingpeople to meet their obligations. In othersituations it may be possible to enhance theimportance of reputation; if breaches will behighly publicized, people may live up toagreements that are no )onger to their eco­nomic advantage. Agreed upon penaltyclauses may deter parties who otherwisemight have been tempted to breach, believ­ing that doing so would not be costly. Theimpact of unavoidable noncompliance canbe. mitigated through the use of contingencyclauses and performance bonds. Uninten­tional noncompliance may be reducedthrough the use of monitoring and griev­ance provisions.

One participant suggested that care­ful drafting of agreements is very impor­tant: "Cross all the t's, dot all the i's, anduse very precise language." But anotherexpressed concern that the discussionseemed to abandon the view of mediationas an informal process based on trust: "It

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Clark-Mctllennon Associates. John McClen­non opened the session on site specificwork with a discussion of a successful dis­pute resolution conducted in Marylandby his firm. The dispute concerned waterquality in the Patuxent River, which/lows for 110 miles from the densely pop­ulated suburbs of Baltimore and Wash­ington through several rural counties intolower Chesapeake Bay.

Historical1y, the upper river has re­ceived discharges of effluent from indus­try and sewage treatment plants, and thelower part has been used for shellfish har­vesting, fishing, and recreation . Thesetwo kinds of uses have always been in­compatible, and nutrients in the sewageeffluent produced increasing eutrophica­tion in the river. The downstream peoplecriticized the upstream people and a bit­ter controversy developed over the issueof water quality.

Court action by a downstream grouphad blocked $29 million in federal con­struction grants for sewage treatmentplants along the river. The Environmen­tal Protection Agency was threatening toreallocate the grant money if the state didnot produce an acceptable nutrient con­trol strategy developed with adequatepublic participation.

Maryland's Office of EnvironmentalPrograms called in CMA in October1981 to bring the disputants together soan acceptable nutrient control strategycould be negotiated before the January15, 1982 deadline. McClennon said,"This issue created an environment with­in which we could help resolve the dis­pute. First, there was an unequivocaldeadline. Second , there was tremendousimpetus to save the $29 million for thestate of Maryland, particularly because ofthe potential political embarrassment forthe governor and his administration. "

CMA's conllict assessment showedthat technical issues were fundamental tothe dispute. A day-long technical work­shop produced consensus on river qualitycriteria, trends, and objectives among 18

Institute for Environmental Negotiation . BruceDotson, also of the Institute for Environ­mental Negotiation, described a one-daydialogue on hydropower issues for whichhe served as convenor. The Institute stud­ied some site specific controversies atRichmond and on the Appomattox Riverand determined that the time was notright for mediation. The dialogue was setup to help hydro developers and state of­ficials learn more . The objectives were:(1) to break down stereotypes, (2) toidentify areas of agreement, and (3) to ar­ticulate areas of disagreement. Some ofthe things learned were:

• Conservation groups found it diffi­cult to attend meetings held duringthe week.

• There were vastly different levels ofsubstantive knowledge. Informa­tion should be sent out in advance.

• There are natural lul1s in contro­versies of this sort when site specif­ic work can't be done.

• There is great need but too oftenlittle demand for negotiation/medi­ation services. Workshops such asthe one on hydropower help devel­op demand.

Defense Fund and the Du Pont Companywere among the participants in theRoundtable. One of the first problemswas how to select other participants .Once dialogue was under way, anotherproblem arose - that of overcomingnew-found harmony which, on some oc­casions, stood in the way of effectivestruggle over the hardest issues.

Collins said that in an effort like this,the mediator, as well as the participants,needs to be familiar with the politics ofhow their efforts might be received. Hesaid that once some progress is made,other groups come in "saying it's theirturf. "

Collins added that he will be work­ing with a group of people who are in­volved with coal issues to encourage themto use the format of the ToxicsRoundtable.

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out to draft the settlement in the last fewhours, CMA actually prepared texts, cir­culated drafts among the participants forrevision, and assisted in polishing theagreement into a final document for pub­lic release.

The final settlement, called the Ac­tion Plan, contained several river protec­tion measures - water conservation, oys­ter and fish stocking, a minimum flowguarantee, a flood-proofing goal - thatwere not previously linked with the moreostensible sewage treatment dischargeproblem.

A seven-year program was set up tomonitor and assess the Patuxent's re­sponse to these measures. More restrictivemeasures will be implemented under theagreement if improvement is not seen.Each state agency was assigned specificresponsibilities. Funding and politicalsupport for the agreement were commit­ted at the charrette.

Institute for Environmental Mediation. LeahPatton said that she had decided to out­line several of the Institute's cases brieflyinstead of discussing one in detail. Sheprovided participants with a printed out­line for each case and said that she hopedthat people would discuss them with her,Verne Huser, and Sam Gusman (whomediated some of the cases) during theremainder of the workshop.

The first case dealt with the QueetsSewer Lagoon in the state of Washington.A river was about to undercut the lagoonof a sewage treatment plant on the Quin­ault Indian Reservation. The lagoon wasexpected to go out at the next combina­tion of high tide and storm conditions,probably in about 30 days, if the Corps ofEngineers did not repair the rock rip-rapthat provided protection from erosion.However, to do this, they had to havepermission to cross land on the reserva­tion that was owned by a real estate com­pany that would not cooperate because itwas in litigation with the Quinault Tribe.

The deadline was too close for con­demnation proceedings to be used, so the

scientists and engineers. CMA facilitatorsassisted the participants in drafting a setof recommendations to policymakers andriver users.

" ... one way to improvethe quality of decisions is toassure high ethicalstandards for the behavior ofintervenors andparticipants and to establishstandards for the outcomeof disputes."

Lawrence Susskind)Environmental NegotiationProgram) MIT

With agreement on the technical is­sues established, CMA planned a three­day mediation workshop - called a char­rette - for 43 river users, policy makers,scientists, and concerned citizens. A six­person steering committee representedthe most affected parties and the primaryopinion leaders. CMA managed the char­rette so that a final settlement wouldevolve from several phases. First the par­ticipants reached a common understand­ing on how the river worked; goals forriver use; alternative methods for achiev­ing those goals; a comprehensive plan in­tegrating those elements; and, finally, as­signment of responsibilities for imple­menting the plan. All decisions weremade by group consensus.

CMA's role in the charrette shiftedas the participants grew more accus­tomed to the process. At first, CMA fa­cilitated the meetings to insure that ev­eryone was able to participate equally,and to communicate their ideas clearlyand without fear of attack. CMA kept ex­tensive wall notes to serve as the groups'collective memory of what was said andwhat was decided. As coalitions began toform, CMA helped the groups articulatetheir positions and served as a Iiason be­tween groups. Finally, as the coalitionsrecognized their common ground and set

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For more information contact:

Copies of the Workshop Summary may beobtained from the Center for EnvironmentalProblem Solving for $70.00 a copy.

op the island as a public park but hadbeen unable to develop an agreement foraccess across the tribal lands. Much ofthe preliminary work focused on thequestion of who should participate in themeetings. The Lummi leaders wanted todeal with the highest level of government,the county commissioners, but the com­missioners wanted the county to be repre­sented by the park board. This causedsome problems later, when a settlementnegotiated by the tribe and the parkboard was altered in major ways by thecommissioners before they agreed to rati­fy it. The final settlement was a fairlystraightforward business deal - the tribebought the island from the county andagreed to develop it as a park.

Susan CarpenterACCORD Associates5500 Central Avenue, Suite ABoulder, Colorado 80301(303) 444-5080

executive director of the Federal RegionalCouncil suggested mediation by IEM.They did not hold any joint meetings; themediator shuttled from one party to an­other. Five separate agreements were ne­gotiated, and the repair of rip-rap wasdone in eight days.

The second case concerned the Co­lumbia River Estuary in Oregon. The issuesinvolved protection of natural resourcesduring development of port facilities. Theparties were a number of governmentagencies, and Patton said that "it was alittle hard to figure out what they wereafter. There was a lot of frustration intrying to define the goal." The negotia­tion process was totally open to the pub­lic and the news media, and each sessionopened with a public comment period.The negotiators signed an agreement thatwas subsequently endorsed by letters ofrati.ication from agencies and resolutionsof legislative bodies.

Patton said that the Homestake PitchMine case in Colorado was initiated by ajoint request from an environmental co­alition and the Homestake Mining Com­pany. The company was developing ahigh-elevation open-pit uranium mine,and the issues centered on water quality,backfilling, revegetation, and mitigationof impacts on fish and wildlife. The dead­line was the beginning of hearings on thecompany's proposed pitch mill. A majorproblem was that the environmental co­alition included an anti-nuclear groupthat "saw no middle ground" - theywere flatly opposed to the project. Thecoalition decided to split, leaving thisgroup out of the negotiation. Patton saidthat the deadline was not met, and thiscreated some problems - "they are stillfighting over the mill." However, she saidthat the agreement is holding in spite ofthe problems.

The Portage Island case in Washingtoninvolved an island owned by WhatcomCounty within the boundaries of theLummi Indian Reservation. The What­com County Park Board wanted to devel-

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