envi law case digests

8/10/2019 Envi Law Case Digests

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San Sebastian College-Recoletos College of Law

Environmental Law

CasesCase Digests

Sharla Louisse A. CastilloSchedule: NEL, Friday, 5 to 7 PM

Submitted to: Atty. Caguiat


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CASE DIGEST IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES Sharla Louisse A. Castillo

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SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or OtherForest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather,collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land,ortimber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,without any authority, or possess timber or other forest productswithout the legal documents as required under existing forest laws andregulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed underArticles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in thecase of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers whoordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, bedeported without further proceedings on the part of the Commissionon Immigration and Deportation.

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of thetimber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed aswell as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area

where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting,or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without anyauthority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber fromalienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;[26]and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legaldocuments

Momongan vs Judge Omipon242 SCRA 332

Facts: Police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte

apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cutlumber. The truck and logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against BasilioCabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation,respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists against Mr.Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr.Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.

Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge allegingthat respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite thenon-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turnedover to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan,

Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same falls under theadministrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesOffice.

Issue: did the Judge commit a reversible error when he ordered the release of thetruck?


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Held: We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven byMr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any disciplinarysanction.

Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his dulyauthorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained orgathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offenseand to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws. However, ascomplainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in relation to theadministrative jurisdiction of the DENR, which is entirely different from the criminal

jurisdiction of the court that ordered the release of the truck as presided byrespondent Judge.

In addition, according to Article 45 of the RPC, Forfeiture of the proceeds of thecrime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed cannot be done ifthe same be the property of a third person not liable for the offense. Since thetruck here is the property of a third party not charged in the criminal complaint, the

order of its release here is henceforth justifiable.

Provident Tree Farms Inc. vs Batario231 SCRA 463

Facts: In the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order ofrespondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case forinjunction, i.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for thepurpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code and fordamages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by theimportation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the

protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."

Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No.1125 relative to incidents before the Court of Tax Appeals because the instantaction is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It thenargues that since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff andCustoms Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v.Alikpala.

Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted underSec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive isa ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated productswhich is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff andCustoms Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture casesand, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction overprohibited importations.

The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the RevisedForestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct


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recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner ofCustoms to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Now it follows that to allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impoundthe imported matches, as petitioner insisted, is clearly an interference with theexclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases.An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based on hisdetermination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, anusurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of theBureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau ofCustoms as well as the prayer for injunction against importation of matches byprivate respondent AJIC may not be granted without the court arrogating uponitself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.

Issue: W/N the BOC holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importation

Held: Petitioners position is inconceivable. The claim of petitioner that no

procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff andCustoms Code, if true, does not at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau ofCustoms over the subject matter. The enforcement of statutory rights is notforeclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customshas the power to "promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to enforce theprovisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the approval of theSecretary of Finance."

Moreover, it has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require anyparticular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, theagency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions."

But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau ofCustoms contesting the legality of match importations may already take the natureof an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the courtfrom interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

Aquino vs People of the Philippines 594 SCRA 50

Facts: On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 deadBenguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City.

Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing thecutting of 14 trees. Petitioner Aquino a forest ranger from Community Environmentand Natural Resources Office (CENRO) thereafter supervised together with severalsawyers the cutting of trees near the Teachers camp. However the number of treesthey cut exceeded those trees allowed under the permit issued by the DENR,petitioner together with the several sawyers were apprehended they were chargedwith a criminal complaint in violation of Section 68 of Presidential


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Decree No. 705. The sawyers were acquitted due to reasonable doubt butpetitioner was sentenced as guilty hence he filed this appeal.

Issue: Is petitioner Aquinio guilty of violating Section 68 of PresidentialDecree No. 705?

Held: No, There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68of PD 705, to wit 1. Cutting, gathering, collecting timber and other forest productsfrom any forest land 2. Possession of timber or any forest products without legaldocuments.

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect orremove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber fromalienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. Inthis case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of thepermit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine treeswithin the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the

cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitionercould not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all hisco-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.

Lagua vs Cusi160 SCRA 463

Facts : In a vigorous complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:

In Paragraph 5(a):

a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel fordefendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief Security Guard ofDefendant East coast directing the latter to prevent the passage ofPlaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanesevessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on thenational highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. Incompliance with this directive, the security force of DefendantEastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and otherequipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while thevehicles and trucks

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack

of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action.

The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitionersarose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast DevelopmentEnterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of itslogging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legallywithin the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree(P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda


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Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or"dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus may be entertained by the trialcourt.

Held: Yes. The petition for mandamus will be treated as a petition for certiorari inthe interest of justice.

The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courtshave jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had nobasis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine thatthe closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages can beinstituted.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest anypower in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the

closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.

Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages basedon the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure wasillegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to bedisproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out ina judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of ForestDevelopment to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less awardor deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside aforest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm thetrial court's ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar andDonga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue fordamages. They are not the real parties in interest. However, the complaint can stillbe maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzarand Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only thedropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of theRevised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.

Mustang Lumber vs Court of Appeals257 SCRA 430

Facts: The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts,and slabs that were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela,Metro Manila. Readily, the said organized a team of foresters and policemen andsent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard.

During the sting operation, the team members saw coming out from thelumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan andalmaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not


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Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information maybe quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute anoffense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is thesufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, ifhypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense, and matters aliundewill not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts oromissions complained of as constituting the offense.

Tan vs People of the Philippines290 SCRA 117

Facts: On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan,Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabinointercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck wasdriven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards

Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also anemployee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the constructionfirm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documentsshowing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forestguards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated.Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & EConstruction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocerowith violation of Section 68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. Theaccused were all convicted for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code. TheCA found no cogent reason for the reversal or modification of the decision.

Issues:1. Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is unconstitutional.2. Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as "timber" and/or forest product

within the contemplation of PD 705.

Held: Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collectingtimber or other forest products without license." One of the essential requisites fora successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of anactual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicialdetermination. As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitionerswere not charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark, honey,

beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish;thus, the inclusionof any of these enumerated items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern topetitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a

judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincingevidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justifythe nullification of said provision.


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A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on theground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included in theterm timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993copyright edition of Websters Third New International Dictionary, lumber isdefined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. Simplyput, lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude possession of "lumber" fromthe acts penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the law itself.

Taopa vs People of the Philippines571 SCRA 610

Facts: The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac,Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of lumberof Philippine Mahogany Groupand Apitong species without any authority and/or

legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicialto the public interest.) and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber wascovered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection.

On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain RufinoOgalesco as the owners of the seized lumber. In this petition Taopa seeks his acquittalfrom the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove thathe was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when thelumber was seized.

Issue: Whether or not Taopa is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705, as

amended?

Held: Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi becauseCuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seizedlumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with thecargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanyingthe truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. Thesefacts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over thelumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco)constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legaldocuments.

Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of thepolice was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa andOgalesco were owners of the seized lumber.


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Pallada v Court of Appeals 385 PHIL 195

Facts: Valencia Corps warehouse manned by its GM Pallada was raided by theDENR on the strength of a warrant issued by RTC Malaybalay Bukidnon. and a largestockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw was found therein.

During the trial, the defense presented this document, to establish that ValenciaGolden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal: Exh. 6 -Certificate of Timber Origin dated December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitchesequivalent to 12.23 cubic meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of theAutonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.

Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, theCertificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered inestablishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber. In support ofhis contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court ofAppeals

Issue: whether or not petitioners contention should be given credence

Held: The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumberis merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber,was made to fortify the lower courts ruling that the phrase illegal possession of

timber embraces illegal possession of lumber since to exclude it wouldemasculate the law itself.

On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates oforigin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin

are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.

Dagudag vs Judge Paderanga555 SCRA 217

Facts : Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. wereseized by the DENR. The items were found to be lacking the required legaldocuments and were consequently abandoned by the unknown owner.

Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of saidconfiscated products. Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the fact that anadministrative case was already pending before the DENR.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law andfor conduct unbecoming a judge.

Held: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright forthree reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In


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the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. Hewent straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.

Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance ofcases pending before administrative agencies of special competence.

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be thesubject of replevin.

Factoran vs Court of Appeals 320 SCRA 530

Facts: On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station,Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway.They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought thetruck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions andInvestigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There,

petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discoveredthe following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber which are inviolation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFDCircular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by thefollowing documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issuedonly by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2)Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and (4) Tally Sheets.

Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[5] Thus, petitioner Atty. Roblesissued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the

six-wheeler truck.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in theform of a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ ofpreliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount ofP180,000.00.

Issue: W/N the court injuction on the DENR lies, considering that exhaustion ofadministrative remedies were not followed

Held: No. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motupropio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Headwhose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days fromreceipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President xx x. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courtsexcept through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.


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The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasonsof law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the availableadministrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities havebeen given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,committed in the administrative forum.

Mamanteo vs Deputy Sherriff Magumun311 SCRA 259

Facts: The forest employes of DENR CAR tasked wit the enforcement of forestry lawintercepted a San Miguel Corp Van with narra fitches wrapped in nylon sack. Thedriver of the van could not produce ant legal permit authorizing him to transportthe narra lumber. The vehicle and its load of narra fitches were confiscated. Acriminal complaint against the driver was filed for violation of Sec. 78 of PD 705(2)as amended and implemented by DENR Admin order 59. after due notice andopportunity to be hear, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was issuedby the DENR Regional pursuant to its quasi-judicial authority.Thereafter SMC, the owner of the vehicle filed a case for recovery of personal

property and damages with the application for writ of replevin with the RTC ofTugegarao. Such court issued a warrant of seizure of personal property which wasenforced by respondent herein deputy sheriff despite the refusal of DENRemployees and officials on the ground that it had already been forfeited in favor ofthe government and was now in custodial legis.Issue: Whether or not the deputy sheriff committed grave misconduct in takinghold of the property which is already in custodia legis confiscated by othergovernment agency.Held: A sheriffs prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who amongthe parties is entitled to the possession of the attached property; much less does hehave any discretion to decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority

over the matter at hand. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is hisduty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonablecelerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.However, the prompt implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only ininstances where there is no question regarding the right of the plaintiff to theproperty.

In this case, the prudent recourse then for respondent was to desist from executingthe warrant and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff.

Paat vs Court of Appeals266 SCRA 167

Facts: The controversy started when the truck of private respondent Victoria deGuzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seizedby the Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao,Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for theforest products found concealed in the truck. The truck was confistcated.

Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed was filed bythe private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director


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Baggayan. The Court issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to privaterespondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion todismiss with the trial court contending that private respondents had no cause ofaction for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners averthat the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truckwas under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705,as amended by E.O. 277.

Private respondents resisted to avoid the operation of this principle asserting thatthe instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that(1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard,and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that theSecretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate andforfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that thetruck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

ISSUE: W/N Replevin lies in a case where the Doctrine of Administrative Exhaustionwas not followed

HELD: No. A crime was committed and the tools of the crime are under custodialegis. With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forestproducts without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from thecrime of theft under Articles 309

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin cannot besustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them

for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D.705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view ofthe private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should havebeen the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdictionover the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a conditionprecedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being anelement of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid bythe lower court.

Alvarez vs PICOP508 SCRA 498

Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber LicenseAgreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City aPetition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusingand/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatterhas complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLANo. 43, asamended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc.(PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is


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bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos,to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

Issue: Whether the 1969 document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of theIFMA)

Held: NO. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot beinvoked.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as acontractual undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of itsconcession areas. Such an interpretation wouldresult in the complete abdication bythe State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise theexploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

ALvarez vs PICOP606 SCRA 444

Facts: PICOPs predecessor, Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. (BBLCI) was grantedTimber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43.

TLA No. 43, as amended, expired on 26 April 1977. It was renewed on 7 October1977 for another 25 years to "terminate on April 25, 2002.

On 25 November 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.297,

"EXCLUDING A CERTAIN AREA FROM THE OPERATION OFPROCLAMATION NO. 369 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1931, ANDDECLARING THE SAME AS MINERAL RESERVATION AND ASENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA."

The excluded area consists of 8,100 hectares, more or less, which formed part ofPICOPs expired TLA No. 43, subject of its application for IFMA conversion.

On 21 January 2003, PICOP filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the

aforesaid presidential proclamation as well as its implementing DENR AdministrativeOrder.

In said NULLITY CASE, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)enjoining respondents therein from implementing the questioned issuances. TheDENR Secretary and her co-respondents in said case filed on 6 February 2003 anOmnibus Motion (1) To Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order dated 3 February2003; and (2) To Dismiss


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While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided tosell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven mining claims in favor ofprivate respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals forbrevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its ownright as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreementwith CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediatelyapproved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondentBase Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the newoperator of its claims

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau(MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition toprivate respondent Base Metals' application on the following grounds:

I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE

METALS WILL VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OFOBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the PresidentialWarranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcosmerely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter'speaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It wasonly given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish theboundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did notconvert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create anyobligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-

impairment clause finds no application.

Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession,occupation and exploration of the concession areas covered. If that were so, thegovernment would have effectively surrendered its police power to control andsupervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's naturalresources.

ISSUE: W/N the impairment of contracts apply?

Held: No. The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement.

An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassuresPICOP of the government's commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of itstimber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession andenjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its woodprocessing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and removetimber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of otherresources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.


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Held: Yes. In several cases on mining disputes, the Court recognized a distinctionbetween (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the thenSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of anexecutive or administrative nature, such as granting of license, permits, lease andcontracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or canceling applications, or decidingconflicting applications, and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil orcontractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature thatmay be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.The allegations in Tuasonscomplaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within the

jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is amining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is notdue to Asaphils refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, butdue to Induplexs alleged violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its JointVenture Agreement with Grefco, Inc.. Also, Tuason sought the nullity of theContract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, based on the same alleged violation.Obviously, this raises a judicial question, which is proper for determination by theregular courts.

The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise overany mining operations or dispute; rather, it is being asked to determine the validityof the agreements based on circumstances beyond the respective rights of theparties under the two contracts. Thus, the DENR Regional Executive Director wascorrect in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint;consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking cognizance of the appeal, andin ruling upon the validity of the contracts.

Dipidio Earth-SaversMulti-Purpose Association vs Gozun485 SCRA 586

Facts: After the EDSA Revolution, Cory swiftly rolled out EO 279 w/c empoweredDENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either technical orfinancial large scale exploration or mining.

Nine years later, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australiancompany. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land inQuirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENRrolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to beannulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property.

In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as

unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 andSection 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust takingof private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III ofthe 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except forpublic use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert thatpublic respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules andRegulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allowtaking of land without payment of just compensation.


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Despite petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not ataking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, thestate may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulationinvolves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustmentcurtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property.Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all suchcircumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD: The SC that the RRs are indeed valid. The SC noted the requisites of eminentdomain. They are;

(107) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informallyappropriated or injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way asto oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of theproperty.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. There is takinginvolved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for justcompensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properlycompensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage doneto the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as aconsequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or

installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly andjustly compensated.Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domainto exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

Republic vs Rosemoor 426 SCRA 517


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Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (spearheaded byfour individuals) after having been granted permission to prospect for marbledeposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded indiscovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in MountMabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

Rosemor thereafter applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and GeosciencesBureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marbledeposits.

Within that same year, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favorof the herein petitioners. It is largely unfortunate that thereafter, RespondentErnesto Maceda cancelled the petitioners license stating that their license hadillegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there wasno more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license.The latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. Accordingto this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was

excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of theBiak-na-Bato national park.

Issue: whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

Held: Yes. Proclamation No. 84 is not a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative actwhich inflicts punishment without judicial trial." Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is apatent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of thelicense a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription againstbills of attainder.

There is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. Itis settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal innature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal incharacter.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987,she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitutionof 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated theProvisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is electedand convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitlyrecognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.


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La Bugal-BLaan vs Ramos421 SCRA 148

Facts: In 1987, Pres. Aquino issued EO 279 whereby she authorized DENR toaccept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-ownedcorporations or foreigninvestors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financialassistancefor large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,which, upon appropriate recommendationof the Secretary, the President mayexecute with the foreign proponent.

In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributionsto the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, aswell as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that willbe promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shalldetermine otherwise, large-scalemining, for purpose of this Section, shall meanthose proposals for contracts or agreements for mineralr esources exploration,development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single

miningunit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US$50,000,000. 00)

The timeline illustrates:

March 1995 RA 7942 signed into law

March 1995 Government entered FTAA with WMCP 99,387 hectares of land inSouth Cotabato, SultanKudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato .

April 1995 30 days after publication on 10 March 1995, RA 7942 took effect

December 1996 DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued DAO 96-40

January 1997 counsels for petitioner sent letter to Ramos demanding DENR tostop implementing RA7942 and DAO 96-40. No response, thus this petition forMandamus and Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary injunction(denied)claiming that petitioner Ramos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction inimplementing the assailed Constitutionality of RA 7942 of DENR AdministrativeOrder 96-40 and of the Financial and TechnicalAssistance Agreement entered intoon 30 March 1995 between the Republic of the Philippines and WMC(Philippines) ,Inc..

January 2001 Manifestation of respondents that WMCP is no longer foreign-ownedas WMC has sold100% of its equity to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc.which is 60% owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is renamedas Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation. 18 December 2001 DENR approvedthe transfer and registration of FTAA to Sagittarius from WMCP. Supreme Court saidthat this manifestation and transfer does not render the issue moot since thequestion of validity of the FTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius.


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exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineraloils.

Although counsel for respondents claim that technical is a very broad term thatmay cover the management and operation of such activities, it is still clear fromthe deliberation of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to limit theutilization of the natural resources for the sole enjoyment of the Filipinos.

Ultimate decision.

Petition Granted. Certain provisions of RA 7942 are declared null and void. So areall provisions of Departmentof Environment and Natural Resources AdministrativeOrder 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity withthis Decision, and theFinancial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of theRepublicof the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.

La Bugal-BLaanvs Ramos 445 SCRA 1

Facts: The extant case involves a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before theCourt which challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (ThePhilippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENRAdministrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical AssistanceAgreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government withWestern Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).

Before February, the Court released its Decision, granting the Petition and declaringthe unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of

the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on thefinding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.

The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to servicecontracts,which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequentlydenounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our naturalresources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our naturalresources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

The landmark decision drew strength from several legal scholars and authors whohad criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractorexclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field

in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion anddevelopment; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of theproducts discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at thepoint of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources.

According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII)effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Ramos severalgovernment officials filed a motion for reconsideration.


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Issue: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of controlover the EDU of our natural resources?

Held: Most certainly not. The Chief Executive is the official constitutionallymandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations. On theother hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of

every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision withinthirty days from its execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the Presidentand Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of naturalresources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary.However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion inthis regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty underArticle VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in theexercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and

coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intrudinginto policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretionin using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreigngroups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry forviable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to interferewith the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, Just as theSupreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanctionusurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confineits own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on itby the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry be the

responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Courtinterfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is thesupreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of allthe people.

Lepanto vs WMC 507 SCRA 315

Facts: Lepanto Consolidated and Tampakan Companies dispute ownership of sharesof stock at WMCP, Tampakan Companies bought such shares of stock through theirright of first refusal under an agreement denominated as tampakan optionagreement. Lepanto, getting wind of the Sale and Purchase Agreement betweenWMC and Tampakan Companies, wrote, by letter to the DENR Secretary about the

invalidity of said agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of itsacquisition of the disputed shares. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) ofthe DENR accordingly informed the Tampakan Companies of Lepantos position onthe matter and required the submission of a comment thereto. WMCP and WMC byletters to the MGB, proffered their side. Several other letters or position paperswere filed by the parties with the MGB of the DENR. In addition thereafter, Lepantofiled before the Makati RTC a complaint against herein respondents WMC, WMCP,


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3. Did the cancellation of the RAWOP amount to unjust enrichment of J.G.Realty at the expense of Benguet?

Held: On correctness of appeal: Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to theCA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On thisground alone, the instant petition must be denied.

(1) Yes, the case should have first been brought to voluntary arbitration before thePOA.

Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide:

11.01 Arbitration

Any disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET and the OWNER withreference to anything whatsoever pertaining to this Agreement that cannot beamicably settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever in

any court or administrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the other,be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to beselected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to beselected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.

11.02 Court Action

No action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabovestated, except to enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators

A contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to voluntary arbitration before

the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and is in fact promoted by theState.

To reiterate, availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courtsor quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation thatmust be adhered to by the parties.

In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntaryarbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motionof the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether suchcontractual provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, thecourt or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision.

In sum, on the issue of whether POA should have referred the case to voluntaryarbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute which isgoverned by RA 876, the arbitration law.

HOWEVER, ESTOPPEL APPLIES. the Court rules that the jurisdiction of POA and thatof MAB can no longer be questioned by Benguet at this late hour. What Benguetshould have done was to immediately challenge the POA's jurisdiction by a special


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civil action for certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. Toredo the proceedings fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of sevenyears from date of institution of the original action with the POA would beanathema to the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

(2) The cancellation of the RAWOP was supported by evidence.

(3) There is no unjust enrichment in the instant case. There is no unjust enrichmentwhen the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.

The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1)that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that suchbenefit is derived at another's expense or damage.

Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of theRAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in furtherdeveloping the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP.

Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its predicament.

Metro Iloilo Water District vs Court of Appeals454 SCRA 249

Facts: Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of PresidentialDecree No. 198. It was granted by the Local Water Utilities AdministrationConditional Certificate of Conformance No. 71. Its service areas encompass theentire territorial areas of Iloilo City etc.

Sometime between April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual yetidentical petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and / or

temporary restraining order against herein private respondents the pertinentportions of which read:

4. That pursuant to the provisions of section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, asamended, the petitioner as a Water District was authorized to adoptlaws and regulations governing the drilling, maintenance and operationof wells within its boundaries for purposes other than single familydomestic use on overlying land, with then provision that any welloperated in violation of such regulations shall be deemed aninterference with the waters of the district;

Private respondents invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, contendingthat the cases were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NationalWater Resources Council (Water Council) under Presidential Decree No. 1067,otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code). In addition,


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private respondents Emma Nava and Rebecca Berlin denied having extracted orwithdrawn water from the ground, much less sold the same

Additionally, he alleged the petitioners rules and regulations were not published inthe Official Gazette and hence petitioner had no cause of action. Meanwhile, privaterespondent Gerry Luzuriaga claimed that he was not the real party in interest, butShoemart, Inc. which has the control and possession of the property where thealleged withdrawal of ground water was taking place.

The trial court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the controversy was within theoriginal jurisdiction of the Water Council, involving, as it did, the appropriation,exploitation, and utilization of water, and factual issues which were within theWater Councils competence. In addition, the trial court held that petitioner failed toexhaust administrative remedies under the doctrine of primary administrative

jurisdiction.

MR denied shortly thereafter.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court may entertain the positions

Held: Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 31 (now 32) of PD 198, as amended,which reads:

Sec. 32. Protection of waters and Facilities of District. A district shallhave the right to :(a) Commence, maintain, intervene in, defend and compromiseactions or proceedings to prevent interference with or deterioration ofwater quality or the natural flow of any surface, stream or groundwater supply which may be used or useful for any purpose of the

district or be a common benefit to the lands or its inhabitants. Theground water within a district is necessary to the performance of thedistricts powers and such districts hereby authorized to adopt rulesand regulations subject to the approval of the National WaterResources Council governing the drilling, maintenance and operation ofwells within its boundaries for purposes other than a singled familydomestic use on overlying land. Any well operated on violation of suchregulations shall be deemed in interference with the waters of thedistrict.(c) Prohibit any person, firm or corporation from vending, selling, orotherwise disposing of water for public purposes within the service

area of the district where district facilities are available to provide suchservice, or fix terms and conditions by permit for such sale ordisposition of water.By virtue of the above provisions, petitioner states that as a waterdistrict, it has the right to prevent interference with the water of thedistrict; and to enforce such right, it is given remedies of commencing,maintaining, or intervening in, defending or entering into appropriateactions or proceedings.


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In their Answer, private respondents denied the existence of any right on the partof the petitioner to the use of the canal mentioned in the complaint nor anycontract, much less any deed or encumbrance on their property and assert thatthey have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will warrant thefiling of the complaint against them. By way of affirmative and special defenses,private respondents alleged that petitioner's complaint states no cause of actionand that the Court has no jurisdiction over the same.

Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, petitionernow comes before SC through the instant petition contending:

That the case at bar is not to settle any water dispute between the parties but acomplaint which calls purely for a determination of the right of the plaintiff to havean established right amounting to an easement annotated on the certificate of titleof the defendant, hence the question is judicial which may be taken cognizance ofby the respondent court;

Acting on private respondent's motion, respondent Judge dismissed petitioner's

complaint for lack of jurisdiction in an Order dated January 14, 1981. The pertinentportion of that Order reads as follows:

... The basis of the motion to dismiss are the provisions of Presidential Decree No.424 and the Water Code known as Presidential Decree No. 1067. In opposing themotion to dismiss, plaintiff contends that the present action does not involve waterdispute and that since the present action was filed before the court prior to theeffectivity of the Presidential Decree No. 424, it is the old law on the matter thatshould be applied. These contentions of the plaintiff are without merit.

Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, petitionernow comes before SC through the instant petition contending:

(1) That the case at bar is not to settle any water dispute between the partiesbut a complaint which calls purely for a determination of the right of the plaintiff tohave an established right amounting to an easement annotated on the certificate oftitle of the defendant, hence the question is judicial which may be taken cognizanceof by the respondent court;

Issue: Whether or not the Court had jurisdiction.

Held:Private respondents' insistence that what is involved in the instant case is theright to use, exploit and convey water is controverted by the "STIPULATION OFFACTS" entered into between them and the petitioner in the court below which was

approved in an Order dated February 20, 1975, the pertinent portion of which readsas follows:

From the foregoing stipulations, private respondents admit that petitioner, thenplaintiff, has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of PublicWorks, Transportation and Communications. Private respondents, however, contendthat the said grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water fromSilmod River. The records, however, do not show any other irrigation water going


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to petitioner's property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that coming fromthe Silmod River. Respondents' controversion of petitioner's right to irrigation waterspecifically from Silmod River is undoubtedly a lame denial.

The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, andincontrovertibly entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River.

That right is now a vested one and may no longer be litigated as to bringpetitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. Toresurrect that issue right to the use of invistigation water from Silmod River will be violative of the rule on res judicata which also applies with equal vigor andeffect to quasi judicial decisions.

Loney vs People482 SCRA 194

Facts: Foreigners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez arethe Pres.and CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,

respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., had been storing tailings (mine waste)from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. On March 24, 1994, tailingsgushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, Mt. Tapianpit had dischargedmillions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

Sometime August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC ofBoac,Marinduque with violation National Pollution Decree of 1976 and Art. 365 ofthe RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property.In theConsolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration to its JointOrderquashing the information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984.

The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the

RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailingthat the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations forviolation of RA 7942.

Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Br. 94acted withgrave abuse of discretion because 1.the Informations for violation of PD1067, PD 984, RA7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC proceeded from are based on asingle act or incident of polluting the rivers thru dumping of mine tailings, and thecharge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since theelement of lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness andimprudence is common among them, 2. The duplicitous nature of the Informationscontravenes the ruling in People v. Relova. The Court of Appeals affirmed lowercourt ruling.

Issues:

1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should bequashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless ImprudenceResulting in Damage to Property should stand


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2. Whether or not Br. 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenesPeople v. Relova.

Held: The redundancy of charges simply means a single complaint or informationcharges more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules ofCriminal Procedure. As early as the start of the last century, the court ruled that a

single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct andunrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for morethan one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional prohibition that no personshall be twice put in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense.

In People vs.Doriquez, the court held that two or more offenses arising form thesame act are not the same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue because not allits elements are present.

On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365 of the RPC absorbsthe charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that amala in sefelony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property)

cannot absorb malaprohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 andRA 7942).

What makes the former felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) andwhat makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.Petitionersreiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenes ruling inPeople vs.Relova.

MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay574 SCRA 661

Facts: This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents ConcernedResidents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inImus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, forthe cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that thewater quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set bylaw, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine EnvironmentCode.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinentprovisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specificpollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising

concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitionersalso asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bayis not a ministerial act which canbe compelled by mandamus.


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Issues:

1. Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD under the headings, Upgrading ofWater Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are theylimited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents.

2. Can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate theManila Bay?

Held:

1. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the governmentagencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, andcleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec.17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as longas water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect

its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies,when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet theprescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade thequality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicatesthat it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is causedby polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, theconcerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the pollutersaccount. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in theManila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters donot undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark.

As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comesinto play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if thereare no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invokeand hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that theircleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In thisregard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims tointroduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management.This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather thanlimiting them to specific pollution incidents.

2. Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerialduty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of officialdiscretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to thediscretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising underconditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.[10] Mandamus isavailable to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but notto direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.


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Public Hearing Committee of the LLDA vs. SM Prime Holdings Inc.

G.R No. 170599

Facts: The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on February 4, 2002by the Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of the wastewater collected from

herein respondent's SM City Manila branch. The results of the laboratory testsshowed that the sample collected from the said facility failed to conform with theeffluent standards for inland water imposed in accordance with law.

On March 12, 2002, the LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation, directing thesame to perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution caused bythe said company and ordering the latter to pay a penalty of "One Thousand Pesos(P1,000.00) per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from 4February 2002, the date of inspection, until full cessation of discharging pollutivewastewater."

Issues:

1. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in finding that the petition cannot bedismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, by way of exception to thegeneral rule.

2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it took cognizance of the petitionof sm prime.

Held:

1. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party isallowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himselfor herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.15Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be madeby giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on amatter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should beexhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.16 The prematureinvocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action.17 Thedoctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal

reasons.18 The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and

provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts ofjustice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute untilthe system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so asto give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its errorand dispose of the case.19 While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case doesnot fall under any of them.


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It is true that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies is when the issues raised are purely legal. However, the Court is notpersuaded by respondent's contention that the special civil action for certiorari itfiled with the CA involved only purely legal questions and did not raise factualissues. A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows thatfactual matters were raised, to wit: (a) whether respondent has immediatelyimplemented remedial measures to correct the pH level of the effluent dischargesof SM City Manila; and (b) whether the third party monitoring report submitted byrespondent proves that it has complied with the effluent standards for inland waterset by the LLDA. Respondent insists that what has been raised in the petition filedwith the CA was whether the LLDA committed grave abuse of discretion indisregarding the evidence it presented and in proceeding to impose a penaltydespite remedial measures undertaken by the latter. Logic dictates, however, that adetermination of whether or not the LLDA indeed committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in imposing fine on respondent would necessarily and inevitably touch onthe factual issue of whether or not respondent in fact complied with the effluentstandards set under the law. Since the matters raised by respondent involve factual

issues, the questioned Orders of the LLDA should have been brought first beforethe DENR which has administrative supervision of the LLDA pursuant to E.O. No.149.

2. The Court does not agree with petitioners' contention that the CA does not havejurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by respondent questioningthe subject Orders of the LLDA. Petitioners argue that Section 1,22 Rule 43 of theRules of Court enumerate the quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions or orders aredirectly appealable to the CA and that the LLDA is not among these agencies.Petitioners should have noted, however, that Rule 43 refers to appeals from

judgments or orders of quasi- judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicialfunctions. On the other hand, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court specifically governsspecial civil actions for certiorari, Section 4 of which provides that if the petitioninvolves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise providedby law or the rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the CA.Thus, it is clear that jurisdiction over acts or omissions of the LLDA belong to theCA.

Pacific Steam Laundry Inc., vs LLDA608 SCRA 442

Facts: Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged inthe business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management

Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsedto respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report onthe complaint of black smoke emission from petitioners plant located at 114Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.[3] On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted aninvestigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitionerslaundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del MonteRiver. Furthermore, the Investigation Report[4] stated that petitioners plant wasoperating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On


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A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board andthe LLDA reveals substantial similarity. Both the Pollution Adjudication Board andthe LLDA are empowered, among others, to: (1) make, alter or modify ordersrequiring the discontinuance of pollution; (2) issue, renew, or deny permits for theprevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrialwaste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposalsystem; and (3) exercise such powers and perform such other functions necessaryto carry out their duties and responsibilities. The difference is that while Section 19of EO 192 vested the Pollution Adjudication Board with the specific power toadjudicate pollution cases in general,[24] the scope of authority of LLDA toadjudicate pollution cases is limited to the Laguna Lake region as defined by RA4850, as amended.

In this case, the DENRs Environmental Management Bureau endorsed to LLDA thepollution complaint against petitioner. Under Section 16 of EO 192, theEnvironmental Management Bureau assumed the powers and functions of the NPCCexcept with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.

The Environmental Management Bureau also serves as the Secretariat of thePollution Adjudication Board, and its Director is one of the members of the PollutionAdjudication Board. Clearly, by endorsing to LLDA the pollution complaint againstpetitioner, the Environmental Management Bureau deferred to LLDAs jurisdictionover the pollution complaint against petitioner.

2. Contrary to petitioners contention, LLDAs power to impose fines is notunrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint againstpetitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. It was onlyafter the investigation result showing petitioners failure to meet the establishedwater and effluent quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner.

LLDA then imposed upon petitioner a penalty ofP1,000 per day of dischargingpollutive wastewater. The P1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amountof penalty prescribed under PD 984

Alexandria Condo vs LLDA599 SCRA 452

Facts: On 2 September 1987, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commissionissued a Development Permit to Phil Realty to develop Cluster A of the project. Inthe Development Permit, PhilRealty was required to submit its condominium plansto the Building Official of Pasig City. A building permit was issued

Shortly after Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its

wastewater did not meet government effluent standards provided in Sections 68and 69 of the 1978 National Pollution Control Commission Rules and Regulations(NPCC) as amended by Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR)Administrative Order No. 34. LLDA informed TACC that it must put up its ownSewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet governmentstandards.

In a Notice of Violation dated 6 May 1999, LLDA directed TACC to submit correctivemeasures to abate or control its water effluents discharged into the Laguna de Bay.


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LLDA likewise imposed upon TACC a daily fine of P1,000 from 26 March 1999 untilfull cessation of pollutive wastewater discharge.

TACC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals with a prayer for theissuance of a temporary restraining order.

The Court of Appeals sustained LLDAs contention that the petition for certiorari wasprematurely filed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the proper remedy should havebeen to resort to an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to

judicial action.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding TACCs exhaustiveefforts in complying with the governments standards on effluent discharge;

Held: The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the transfer of LLDA to the DENRunder Executive Order No. 149[10] (EO 149), TACC should have first resorted to an

administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to filing a petition forcertiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort befirst made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversyfalling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of

justice for review. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders thecomplaint without cause of action and dismissible.

EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR for policyand program coordination and/or administrative supervision x x x.[13] UnderEO 149, DENR only has administrative power over LLDA. Administrative power is

concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined byproper governmental organs.[14]

However, Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR,mandates the DENR to promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water,air and land pollution and to promulgate ambient and effluent standards for waterand air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. EO192 created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENRSecretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to theadjudication of pollution cases, including NPCCs function to serve as arbitrator forthe determination of reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resultingfrom pollution. Hence, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR

Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals.


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permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31,1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.

One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of theillegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advisingthem to dismantle the irrespective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof,

otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The fishpen owners filed injunction casesagainst the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss thecases against it on

jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writsof preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA fromdemolishing the fishpens andsimilar structures in question. Hence, the presentpeti

envi law case digests

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