Ending America’s

Drug War Coming to Terms with the Drug War’s Failure and

Embracing Transition in Regional Philosophies

Ukiah J. Busch

April 4, 2013

American University, School of International Service

Advising Faculty: Dr. Robert Pastor

Table of Contents

Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1

Section 1: US Counternarcotic Policy in the 20th and 21st Centuries and the

Foundation of the US-led, International Counternarcotic Regime ..................................... 2

Section 2: Counternarcotic Policy Under President Obama: Continuity and Change ....... 13

2A: Obama Policy in the Source Zone .................................................................................. 18

2B: Obama Policy in the Transit Zone .................................................................................. 20

2C: Obama Policy in the Consumption Zone ........................................................................ 24

Section 3: Drug War Failure and a New Willingness to Dissent .......................................... 28

3A: Evidence of Drug War Failure........................................................................................ 29

3B: A New Willingness to Dissent ........................................................................................ 32

Section 4: Alternative Approaches and Reforms .................................................................. 38

4A: Demand-Side Reforms: Harm Reduction and Decriminalization .................................... 39

4B: Supply-Side Reforms: Focus on Organized Crime and Alternative Development ........... 44

Section 5: Conclusion and Recommendations....................................................................... 49

5A: General Recommendations.............................................................................................. 49

5B: Supply-side Policy Recommendations ............................................................................ 51

5C: Demand-side Policy Recommendation ........................................................................... 52

A Final Note............................................................................................................................. 54

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 55

List of Tables

Figure 1: 2012 National Drug Control Budget—Enacted ..................................................... 16

Figure 2: Historical Drug Control Funding .......................................................................... 17

Figure 3: Transit Zone Strategy Continuum ......................................................................... 21

Figure 4: Major Drug Trafficking Routes in Latin America and the Caribbean .................... 22

Figure 5: Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related Killings in Mexico by State in 2009 ................. 23

Figure 6: In Colombia, “Eradication” Hasn’t Eradicated Coca .............................................. 29

Figure 7: Andean Cocaine Production is Unchanged ............................................................. 30

Figure 8: U.S. Spending on International Drug Control Rising, Street Prices of Cocaine and

Heroin Falling ......................................................................................................... 31

Figure 9: Average Homicide Rates by Global Region: 2003-2008 ........................................ 33

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Introduction

The year 2012 marked the 100th

anniversary of the first international drug control

agreement, which sought to regulate the legal opium trade through enactment of the Hague

Opium Convention. 1 This landmark occasion set in motion the creation of a counternarcotic,

prohibitionist regime that would be championed and protected by the leaders of the United States

Government for the next century, with only limited variation in either objectives or strategy.

Over the years, it became the mission of the United States to eliminate illicit drug use and

criminally saction all those involved in the cultivation, production, trafficking, selling and

consumption of narcotic substances. After decades of lobbying, the United States finally

succeeded in expanding its anti-drug mission to the world stage by codifying the prohibition

regime in the United Nations Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988. In fact, by 1971 the US had

declared a global “War on Drugs,” initiating a dramatic escalation and militarization of

counternarcotic policy and the establishment of three pillars of engagement: crop eradication,

drug interdiction and law enforcement of drug prohibition. These pillars have provided the basis

for anti-drug policy around the world and, up until very recently, were considered nearly

unquestionnable in the eyes of US leaders and their supporters.

The tide has begun to shift, however, with leaders at home and abroad beginning to

evaluate the results of the Drug War policy pillars and to demand a reevaluation of strategy. The

calls for alternatives approaches is nowhere stronger than in those countries most negatively

affected by the War on Drugs, particularly in Latin America, where prohibition, eradication,

interdiction and militarization of policy have resulted in the stigmatization of users,

overcrowding of prisons, human rights violations, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced

persons, severe deforestation and pollution, a criminal market run by strong criminal

organizations, an underfunded public health sector, rampant street violence with untold

casualties and pervasive political, judicial and police corruption.

As evidence of the Drug War’s failure mounts, Latin Americans and others around the

world are demanding the freedom to choose their own drug policies and experiment with

alternatives to the US-led War on Drugs. Many have already enacted critical reforms, ranging

from harm reduction and alternative development measures to outright legalization or

decriminilization. Most reformers are drawing focus back to the most basic security of citizens,

enacting measures, for example, to fight crime instead of drugs, to keep people out of prison, to

treat addicts as ill individuals in need of help instead of as criminals and to reduce the harms of

drug use rather than try to eliminate it altogether. The debate on drug policy has, in fact, made a

great deal of progress over the last decade, reaching a point in which fully three out every four

Americans now believe that the United States’ forty year war against drugs has failed and that

new policies are now required.2

As stated in President Barack Obama’s 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, “we cannot

continue to pursue the same old strategy and expect better results.”3 This paper attempts to trace

the evolution of US counternarcotic policy, examine and assess the current drug policies under

President Obama, illustrate the rising tide of dissent broiling in Latin America and around the

1 Jelsma, Martin. “The Development of International Drug Control: Lessons learned and strategic challenges for the

future.” Transnational Institute (February 2011), 2. 2 Hakim, Peter. “Rethinking US Drug Policy.” Inter-American Dialogue, The Beckley Foundation Feb. 2011, 1. 3 Executive Office of the President of the United States. National Drug Control Strategy 2010. Washington, D.C.:

2010, p. v.

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world, analyze existing alternatives in practice globally and provide recommendations for

improving US policy. By accepting change in an ‘old strategy,’ perhaps the United States can

again assume the mantle of world drug policy leader.

Section 1: US Counternarcotic Policy in the 20th

and 21st Centuries and the

Foundation of the US-led, International Counternarcotic Regime

US concern over international narcotics movements dates to February 1909 when the

International Opium Commission brought together twelve countries in Shanghai, including the

US, to discuss how to regulate the opium trade. The resulting treaties, known as the Hague

Opium Convention, sought to regulate the legal opium market, but made no attempt to

criminalize or otherwise prohibit what was otherwise a free market. Some restrictions were

imposed on exports to countries with laws against non-medical use, but no obligations were

made to declare drug use or cultivation to be illegal. In effect, these early international drug

treaties established administrative controls of drug imports and exports, including opiates,

cocaine and, from 1925, cannabis, without criminalizing the users, growers, traders or

substances.4

The United States distinguished itself in these early talks by representing the most ardent

prohibitionist position, with the aid of China, and in the 1925 International Opium Convention,

representatives from both countries actually walked out, citing an unwillingness on the part of

the other representatives to impose sufficiently restrictive measures. At the time, most of the

colonial powers, including France, Great Britain, Portugal and the Netherlands, were operating

quite profitable narcotic monopolies from their colonial holdings and were disinclined to adopt

the Christian fundamental perspective that drove US policy.5

During the alcohol prohibition era of 1920 to 1933, the US initiated efforts to export its

restrictive drug policy to the rest of the world, though there were few early adopters. It was not

until after World War II, when the US emerged as the dominant economic, political and military

leader of the free world, that it was able to begin imposing a prohibitive anti-drug regime. The

newly minted United Nations provided the venue and the mechanism, though the United States

unquestionably provided the motivation. Indeed, the US representative who negotiated the 1961

Single Convention attributed nearly all the impetus to the United States, noting that “for more

than half a century, the United States had been advocating the international control of narcotic

drugs…[and]…the idea of a Single Convention had been a United States Initiative.”6

The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs marked a turning point in the

international regulation of drugs, replacing all previous international agreements with a much

stricter, zero-tolerance prohibition system that is still the basis for our current international drug

control regime. The 1961 Convention focused on plant-based drugs and established the

ambitious goal of eliminating opium use over a 15 year period and coca and cannabis within 25

years. It enacted requirements for all member countries to prohibit the cultivation, production,

distribution, trade, use and possession of narcotic substances for all non-medical and scientific

purposes, which in turn were limited to a narrow list of approved uses.7

4 Jelsma, 2.

5 Ibid., 2. 6 Giordano, H. L. Statement in the Official Records of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single

convention on Narcotic Drugs. In: E/CONF.34/24. 2001. 7 Jelsma 2011, 3.

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Four lists, or “schedules,” were issued to classify and determine the appropriate level of

control of the over 100 narcotic substances included in the Convention. Among the more

controversial items were the coca leaf, which appeared in List I, and the cannabis plant, which

was bundled in with the most dangerous substances in lists I and IV. These lists were expanded

ten years later in response to the diversification of drug markets, resulting in the 1971

Convention on Psychotropic Substances. More than 100 substances were added to the lists,

though controls for many psychotropics remained surprisingly lax due to lobbying by the

pharmaceutical industry.8

To enforce the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, the International Narcotics Control Board

(INCB) was created with the authority to regulate compliance among the member nations.

Before this point, an illicit drug market did not exist. Demand for recreational drug use had

previously been satisfied by “leakage” from the licit market. However, the tighter controls on

the licit market and the rising demand of the 70s and 80s led to the establishment of extremely

lucrative, illicit markets based in developing countries where production had traditionally taken

place. Under the control of criminal groups the illicit drug market soon grew to be a multi-

billion dollar enterprise.9

It was this rise in criminal activity that spurred President Richard Nixon in 1971 to

declare for the first time that the United States was engaged in a “War on Drugs.” Nixon stated

unequivocally that “America’s public enemy number one in the United States is drug

abuse…[and]…in order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out

offensive.”10

During his tenure, Nixon persecuted the War on Drugs domestically by pushing

through mandatory sentences for even the most minor drug offenses, passing legislation allowing

no-knock warrants and placing marijuana in Schedule 1, despite a 1972 bipartisan commission

recommendation to decriminalize marijuana possession for personal use.11

He also brought

jurisdiction for counternarcotic activities into the White House by appointing Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe

as Special Consultant to the President for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and giving him

authority to coordinate and direct the nine agencies then involved in the anti-drug effort.12

Nixon also persecuted the newly minted War on Drugs on the global stage, stating that "I

am convinced that the only way to fight this menace is by attacking it on many fronts."13

He

petitioned congress for additional funds for international drug activities and was given $150

million, a large sum in those days which brought total counternarcotic expenditures to $350

million.14

Incidentally, he foreshadowed the future growth of counternarcotic funding by stating

that “in order to defeat this enemy which is causing such great concern, and correctly so, to so

many American families, money will be provided to the extent that it is necessary and to the

extent that it will be useful.”15

Future leaders certainly felt the need and would define the

usefulness of funds very liberally.

8 Ibid., 4. 9 Ibid., 5. 10 Nixon, Richard. 1971. “Remarks about an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.” The

American Presidency Project. 11 “A Brief History of the Drug War.” The Drug Policy Alliance, 2013 < http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-

drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war>. 12 Nixon, 1971. 13 Vulliamy, Ed. “Nixon's 'war on drugs' began 40 years ago, and the battle is still raging.” The Guardian, July 2011. 14 Vulliamy, 1. 15 Nixon, 1971.

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Nixon’s bellicose terminology illustrates the thinking of leaders of the time. Most

viewed the rise of drugs and violent crime as inextricably related phenomena that originated

outside of the United States. The problem, they argued, was the failure of foreign countries to

keep drugs from being produced and shipped to the United States by international criminal

organizations. As Nixon put it, “this will be a worldwide offensive dealing with the problems of

sources of supply.”16 The problem was thus defined in national security terms, spurring the use

of national security tools.

Proponents of this thinking argued that disrupting drug markets and limiting supply

through interdiction would increase drug prices and lower the purity of available substances,

thereby decreasing the number of current and new users. According to scholar Renee Scherlen,

the early supply-side focus of the Drug War evolved into a “law enforcement prohibitionist

policy” that aims to “deter or punish users, sellers, and producers of illicit drugs…emphasizing

incarceration, eradication, interdiction, extradition, and supply reduction.”17

The consistent

objective of this policy has been simply to end, or at very least decrease, drug use in America.

Nixon took this issue very seriously and stated repeatedly that his personal goal was to

“eliminate drug abuse and all the antisocial activities that flow from drug use.”18

After Nixon, President Gerald Ford maintained close adherence to his predecessor’s drug

policies and even strengthened enforcement in several ways. Ford introduced, for example, the

practice of setting mandatory prison terms for drug related offenses. He complained of mild

sentences in a letter to Congress, saying that “for too long the law has centered its attention more

on the right of the criminal than on the victim of crime. It is high time that we reverse this

trend.” He added that “fines or prison terms should relate directly to the gravity of the offense.

Fines are woefully low and do nothing to deter offenders whose business is crime.”19

During his

tenure, Ford established a 5-year mandatory sentence for possession of less than four ounces of

heroin and a 15 year minimum for those caught with quantities in excess of four ounces.20

Such

minimum sentences became common practice in future administrations, leading to ever

increasing levels of incarceration.

Under President Jimmy Carter, the United States experienced one of the only departures

from what was otherwise a consistent zero-tolerance drug policy. Some believed early on that

Carter might take a hard line on drugs, especially after he declared the White House would be a

“dry” building, even during official events. Carter, however, was far more progressive than

many expected and even his “dry” White House policy was rumored to have been eschewed on

several occasions so that the President could enjoy a cold martini or the First Lady could sip on

the occasional screwdriver.21

Despite Carter’s evangelical background and the Christian flavor of his presidency, his

opinions and policies on drug enforcement were probably the most practical and open-minded of

any American president. Indeed, many of the policies Carter tried to implement are precisely

those being suggested now by drug policy reform advocates, some thirty-five years later. For

16 Nixon, 1971. 17

Scherlen, Renee. “The Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination.” Appalachian State

University, PS: Political Science & Politics (Jan. 2012): Volume 45, Issue 01, 67. 18 Ibid., 68. 19 Ford, Gerald R. “A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford.” Harper & Row & Reader's Digest,

August 1, 1979. 20 “H.R.5946, the Heroin Trafficking Act.” Bill sponsorship archives from the Library of Congress , Mar 21, 1973. 21

“Jimmy Carter on Drugs.” On the Issues: Every Political Leader on Every Issue.

<http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Jimmy_Carter_Drugs.htm>.

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instance, he pointed out the deleterious effects of draconian drug policy on the judiciary and

prison systems, remarking in 1976 that “our overcrowded court system is now a major cause of

crime…We should encourage local police to give priority to violent crimes- assault, robbery,

rape, muggings, murders. When I was Governor of Georgia, we stopped treating alcoholism as a

crime to provide increased medical help to alcoholics and to free our police and courts to

concentrate on violent crimes.”22

What’s more, Carter was among the first to recognize the impossibility of eliminating all

drug use and call for a harm reduction strategy. He encouraged “realistic objectives,” aiming,

himself, “to discourage all drug use in America (my emphasis)…and to reduce to a minimum the

harm drug abuse causes when it does occur.”23

He focused attention and resources on treatment

and prevention, while encouraging law enforcement and other drug-related agencies to give

“foremost attention… to those drugs that pose the greatest threat to health.”24

Perhaps Carter’s most progressive position on drug policy was his tolerant stance on

Marijuana. Arguments made today by reform proponents echo those Carter made in 1977, when

he argued that “after four decades, efforts to discourage [marijuana] use with stringent laws have

still not been successful.” “Penalties against possession of a drug,” said Carter, “should not be

more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug itself. Carter is, in fact, the only sitting

US president to state unequivocally that “I support legislation amending Federal law to eliminate

all Federal criminal penalties for the possession of up to one ounce of marijuana.”25

He went on

to clarify, of course, that decriminalization is not legalization, but his statement was nevertheless

a revolutionary revision of Nixon’s approach and the only significant departure from zero-

tolerance drug policy for decades.

On the international front, however, Carter’s drug policies were marked primarily by

continuity. He continued support for the United Nations Conventions of 1961 and 1971, called

for increased support of the International Narcotics Control Board, urged Congress to adopt the

Convention on Psychotropic Substances and maintained a focus on supply-side interdiction and

eradication efforts. He did, however, issue calls for international cooperation, increased

treatment options in our allies’ countries and issued strong support for crop-substitution and

alternate livelihood development approaches to supply reduction. In fact, three of the seven

actions Carter outlined for international drug policy in 1977 dealt directly with economic

development approaches to supply reduction, including crop and income substitution, economic

development loans and rural development programs.26

President Ronald Reagan, however, reverted largely to the tactics favored by Nixon,

implementing policies that went well beyond the “just say no” campaign led by his wife Nancy.

He spoke often of “fighting the crusade for a drug free America” and took steps both

domestically and internationally to pursue that ambition.27

Under his leadership, the Justice

Department brought the Federal Bureau of Investigation into the domestic drug fight and added

500 DEA agents. He also created thirteen regional anti-drug task forces and presided over record

22 Carter, Jimmy. “A Government as Good as Its People.” Campaign Speech in Detroit, Oct 15, 1976. University of

Arkansas Press; 2nd Edition (May 1996) p. 220. 23

Carter, Jimmy. "Drug Abuse Message to the Congress.," August 2, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.

Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7908. 24 Ibid., 1. 25

Ibid., 4. 26 Ibid., 2. 27 Reagan, Ronald. 1988. “Remarks at a Meeting of the White House Conference for a Drug Free America.” The

American Presidency Project.

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numbers of drug seizures and convictions.28 In fact, Reagan set in motion one of the largest

increases in incarceration levels ever seen. From a level of 50,000 at his election in 1980, the

number of people behind bars for nonviolent drug law offenses skyrocketed to over 400,000 by

1997.29

Increasingly severe federal policies, as well as coordinated media campaigns, provoked a

rapid increase in the fear of drugs and their effects at the state and local level. For example, the

DARE drug education program was founded in1983 by Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates,

who once stated that “casual drug users should be taken out and shot.”30 It quickly spread to

schools nationwide despite lack of evidence supporting its effectiveness. Polls taken in 1985

show that only 2-6 percent of Americans believed that drug abuse was the nation’s “number one

problem,” but by 1989, that number had grown to a remarkable 64 percent. According to the

Drug Policy Alliance, this was “one of the most intense fixations by the American public on any

issue in polling history,” leading to increased scrutiny of all anti-drug measures not adopting a

zero-tolerance approach.31

Under this new scrutiny, previously successful harm reduction

activities such as syringe access programs were prevented from expanding or, in some cases shut

down, leading to a surge in documented HIV/AIDS cases and higher numbers of overdoses.

Interestingly, the attention of the US public quickly declined and by 1990, only 10 percent of

Americans still believed that drug abuse was America’s “number one problem.” The policies

enacted during this period, however, remained in place, continuing to cause high levels of arrests

and incarcerations, the blocking of harm reduction policies and stigmatization of drug users.32

Reagan was also the first to deploy US troops on drug-related missions, when in 1983

Special Forces were sent to several Andean nations to provide counternarcotics training. These

missions were soon linked to counterinsurgency efforts in what came to be known as the “narco-

guerilla theory.” Embracing this theory, Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 221

(NSDD-221) in April of 1986, which declared drug trafficking a “lethal” threat and initiated

Operation Blast Furnace. This was the “first publicized employment of United States Army

combat forces on the sovereign soil of another country to conduct joint anti-drug efforts.”33

During this operation, six helicopters and 150 troops were sent to Bolivia to destroy cocaine labs.

Though the mission was considered a failure at the time, it set the precedent for many future

military engagements in counternarcotic activities.34

The Reagan Administration also oversaw implementation of the controversial practice of

drug ‘certification,’ which was a disciplinary mechanism meant to chastise those nations which

failed to sufficiently prosecute the US-led War on Drugs. First utilized by Congress in 1986, the

act of ‘decertification’ disqualified recalcitrant nations from attaining US development and

foreign aid funds as well as impeded the attainment of development loans from the international

development banks. Though waivers were occasionally granted for national security reasons,

countries like Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela and Mexico were targeted early and often

for decertification. According to Martin Jelsma of the Transnational Institute, “the procedure for

28 “Ronald Reagan on Drugs.” On the Issues: Every Political Leader on Every Issue.

<http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Ronald_Reagan_Drugs.htm>. 29

“A Brief History of the Drug War.” The Drug Policy Alliance, 2013 <http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-

drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war>. 30 Ibid., 1. 31 Ibid., 1. 32 Ibid., 1. 33 Abbott, Col. Michael. “The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security?” Parameters, December 1988. 34 Jelsma 2011, 5.

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inclusion was highly politicized, effectively working as a compliance mechanism to coerce

countries to carry out the forced eradication of a specified number of hectares; tighten drug laws

and arrest quotas; accept extradition of national citizens to the United States; or to refrain from

adopting less repressive policies.”35

Many Latin American and Caribbean countries bristled

under this coercive US tactic, but could not risk losing access to the desperately needed foreign

aid dollars and development loans controlled by the US.

It was in this same period that the UN convened another conference to develop the 1988

Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. These

measures “significantly reinforced the obligation of countries to apply criminal sanctions to

combat all the aspects of illicit production, possession and trafficking of drugs (my emphasis).”36

The 1988 Convention put enormous pressure on those countries not already allied with the US

War on Drugs to join in and support the effort to criminalize all illicit drug activities. This

marked a watershed moment in the promulgation of restrictive, criminalized drug policy in the

international community and according to Jelsma, “what followed was an escalation of

repression and consequent excessive negative effects.”37

With the 1988 Convention, the United States completed 9 decades of lobbying for its

restrictive drug policies and established the final pillar of the international prohibition

framework. Indeed, as President George Bush Sr. signed the bill ratifying the Convention in the

United States in 1989, he made clear the role of the US in the Convention’s design and passage:

“I am most pleased today to sign the United States instrument of

ratification for the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. We have labored long and hard to create

through this Convention stringent international norms for the criminalization of

drug trafficking, the forfeiture of drug proceeds, the control of chemicals essential

to the manufacture of dangerous drugs, and cooperation among nations in

combating drug trafficking. United States legislation already in place in each of

these areas is a model for the rest of the world and indeed formed the basis for

many of the central provisions of the Convention.”38

As is clear from his support of the 1988 Convention, President Bush both continued and

intensified the policies of the Reagan Administration and perpetuated a simplistic view of the

drug issue that stigmatized all those involved in the illicit drug markets, including users. For

example, in a 1989 address, Bush proffered a plan for those users “who cannot learn or will not

seek help,” stating that “we're going to take back the streets by taking them off the streets. And

that means helping your able police chief. That means punishing those who do evil.” He drove

the point home by adding that “crime fighting is usually a question of right and wrong -- good

and evil, if you will. And you know that a community that cannot understand the difference

35 Ibid., 6. 36 Ibid., 5. 37 Ibid., 6. 38

Bush, George. “Statement on Signing the United Nations Convention Against Illegal Traffic in

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.” February 13, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.

Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18149.

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between right and wrong can never protect itself.”39

This black-and-white view of the drug issue

and the fear-inspiring rhetoric were typical of his Administration and illustrated Bush’s hard line

approach.

On the international front, President Bush re-declared the War on Drugs in the wake of

the fall of the Soviet Union and promised the world that “this scourge will stop.”40 He made

quick moves to fulfill his promise and in 1989 he made one of his first significant international

moves by authorizing a three million dollar plot to overthrow the Panamanian dictator, Manuel

Noriega, who, among other things, stood accused of various drug-related offenses. The plan

involved recruiting members within the Panamanian armed forces to stage a coup, but the plan

was exposed and Panama declared war on the United States. Bush authorized an invasion which

began on December 20th, 1989 and ended with Noriega’s surrender on January 3

rd, 1990.

Noriega was extradited to Miami, where he was convicted of 8 counts of drug trafficking,

racketeering and money laundering and sentenced to 40 years in prison.41

With the victory in Panama under his belt, Bush greatly extended the role of the US

military in drug-related activities by signing the National Defense Authorization Act, which

made the Department of Defense the primary agency responsible for monitoring and intercepting

illicit drugs shipments. Due to this change, funding for military drug interdiction quadrupled

between 1989 and 1993, signifying a dramatic increase in military engagement in

counternarcotic missions. Most of the military focus was in Latin America, especially in

Colombia, where the US eventually invested some six billion dollars to support the combined

counternarcotic and counterinsurgency effort known as “Plan Colombia.” Though the “Plan”

would not commence until Bush’s son became president in 2000, Bush Sr. initiated this

unprecedented anti-drug expenditure, which funded joint military training, equipment transfers

and the controversial policy of aerial herbicidal spraying of coca and poppy fields.42

President Bill Clinton, famous for his “I did not inhale” campaign line, inherited the

strategies of Nixon, Reagan and Bush, and largely allowed them to continue on autopilot while

he dealt with numerous competing priorities. For example, he advocated for treatment

alternatives to incarceration during his 1992 campaign, but dropped the topic shortly after

election. What’s more, Clinton ignored a recommendation from the US Sentencing Commission

to eliminate the sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine convictions, leaving in

place a system that arbitrarily assigned longer prison terms for crack cocaine users. He similarly

ignored the advice of Health Secretary Donna Shalala who advocated the end of a federal ban on

funding for syringe access programs that had been conclusively shown to decrease the spread of

HIV/AIDS among drug users. In these and many other drug-related decisions, Clinton preferred

the status quo to any policy change that might distract from his economic priorities and other

agenda items.43

Indeed, Clinton’s most well-known anti-drug efforts were focused domestically rather

than internationally. For example, in 1997 Clinton invested some $195 million in the first

39

Bush, George. "Remarks at the Acres Homes War on Drugs Rally in Houston, Texas." December 7, 1989. Online

by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17917 . 40

“George Bush Sr. on Drugs.” Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1989. On the Issues: Every Political Leader on Every

Issue. <http://ontheissues.org/Celeb/George_Bush_Sr__Drugs.htm>. 41 “George Bush Sr. on Drugs.” The Family, by Kitty Kelley, p.486-487 , Sep 14, 2004. On the Issues: Every

Political Leader on Every Issue. <http://ontheissues.org/Celeb/George_Bush_Sr__Drugs.htm>. 42 Jelsma 2011, 6. 43 “A Brief History of the Drug War” 2013.

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National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, which was the largest effort to date to educate

young people about the dangers of drug use.44

The Clinton Administration also acted through

the Justice Department to address labeling and packaging of popular youth products. The

Administration believed, for example, that the “draft” label of R.C. Cola looked like beer and the

Big League’s bubble gum pouches resembled those of chewing tobacco, thus leading children to

the use of alcohol and tobacco and eventually drugs. The producers of these products were made

to change their packaging and labels in what became something of an embarrassing episode for

Clinton.45

In some ways, however, Clinton escalated the zero-tolerance policies that he inherited.

For instance, Clinton advocated strongly for an aggressive law enforcement approach, arguing

that the “next step in the fight against crime is to take on gangs the way we once took on the

mob.”46

This led him to increase the role of the FBI in drug and crime related investigations,

seek authority to prosecute more teenagers as adults and to appoint four-star General Barry

McCaffrey as America’s new drug czar. Together, Clinton and McCaffrey intensified legal

prosecution of drug users and sellers, advocating for a “one strike and you’re out” standard in the

1996 State of the Union Address.47

Clinton also drew focus to the issue of illicit financial movements that allow drug cartels

to launder, transport and store their drug market profits. He issued orders for the Departments of

Justice, State and Treasury to jointly “identify and put on notice nations that tolerate money

laundering…and force violators to bring their banks and financial systems into conformity” with

UN standards or suffer sanctions.48

The efforts were concentrated on the Colombian Cali Cartel

and in 1996 Clinton signed an executive order confiscating the US assets and prohibiting the

business transactions of 4 cartel leaders, 43 of their associates and 33 of their businesses,

including Colombia’s largest drug store chain, several import-export firms, holding companies

and automobile dealerships.49

This was the first major application of the 1988 Convention

clauses on illicit profit trafficking and set a precedent for future US actions.

Interestingly, President Clinton reversed his position on several major drug policy items

just before leaving office, giving hope to reformers that an open debate on drug policy might

actually occur under the subsequent administration. Clinton, for instance, stated in an interview

with Rolling Stone that “we really need a re-examination of our entire policy on imprisonment”

of people who use drugs. Even more surprising was his statement that marijuana use “should be

decriminalized.”50 In the years following his presidency Clinton actually became a strong critic

of the War on Drugs and of his own drug policies. He explained his views in a recent

documentary:

44 “Bill Clinton on Drugs.” On the Issues: Every Political Leader on Every Issue.

<http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Bill_Clinton_Drugs.htm>. 45 Barbour, Haley. “Agenda for America: A Republican Direction for the Future.” April 25, 1996: p. 121-122. 46 Clinton, William J. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” Jan. 23, 1996.

Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=51634. 47

Ibid., 4. 48 Blood, Thomas and Henderson, Bruce. “State of the Union: A Report on President Clinton's First Four Years in

Office.” General Pub Group. August 1, 1996: p. 39-40. 49 Ibid., 40. 50 “A Brief History of the Drug War” 2013.

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“What I tried to do was to focus on every aspect of the problem. I tried to

empower the Colombians for example to do more militarily and police-wise

because I thought that they had to. Thirty percent of their country was in the

hands of the narco-traffickers…Well obviously, if the expected results was that

we would eliminate serious drug use in America and eliminate the

narcotrafficking networks — it hasn’t worked…We could have fighting and

killing over cigarettes if we made it a felony to sell a cigarette or smoke one. So

we legalized it. If all you do is try to find a police or military solution to the

problem, a lot of people die and it doesn’t solve the problem…I think there should

be safe places where people who have addiction could come, and not think they’re

gonna be arrested and will have basic needs met.”51

Clinton’s newfound sympathy for drug policy reform was not shared by his successor.

President George W. Bush’s drug policies, both domestically and internationally, hewed closely

to the Drug War’s central tenets of interdiction, law-enforcement, eradication, prosecution,

international coercion and supply-side focus. His hardline ideology came under fire, however, in

both the 2000 and 2004 campaigns due to accusations that it was hypocritical for Bush to support

long mandatory sentences for cocaine possession, for example, when he himself had purportedly

used cocaine in his youth without suffering any major consequences.52

He was similarly

excoriated in 2000 when it was reported that he had been arrested for driving under the influence

some years earlier.53

When pressed on his own alcohol and drug use, Bush would often respond with the

ambiguous statement “When I was young and irresponsible, I was young and irresponsible,”54

leading many to assume allegations of his prior drug use were accurate. According to biographer

Kitty Kelley, “George never denied using illegal drugs. In 1999, for example, he swore to key

political supporters that he had never used "hard drugs," by which he meant that he had never

shot up heroin.”55

During his 2000 campaign, he chose his words carefully when speaking of his

drug use, stating that “As I understand it, the current FBI form asks the question, ‘Did somebody

use drugs within the last 7 years?’ and I will be glad to answer that question: ‘No.’”56

Despite his personal familiarity with substance abuse, President Bush was the

quintessential Drug War proponent as Commander in Chief. In fact, one of his first acts upon

entering office was to issue a call for some $2.8 billion of additional expenditure on the Drug

War, in excess of the $19.26 billion in Clinton’s FY 2001 request. Clinton, himself, had

overseen an incredible increase in annual anti-drug expenditures of more than $6 billion since

1993.57

Such increases became routine over the course of the Bush presidency, and by 2008, he

had increased annual spending on the Drug War to an astounding $22.5 billion.58

51 Breaking the Taboo, directed by Sam Branson (2012; YouTube.com, 2012), Online

<http://www.breakingthetaboo.info/>. 52 McClellan, Scott. “What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception.”

Public Affairs. May 28, 2008: p. 49-50. 53

Ibid., 52. 54 Ibid., 49. 55 Kelley, Kitty. “The Family: The Real Story of the Bush Dynasty.” Doubleday, Sept. 14, 2004: p. 265-266. 56 Ibid., 266. 57 Komblut, Anne E. and Johnson, Glen. Boston Globe, Oct. 7, 2000: p. A6. 58

Office of National Drug Control Policy in Hakim, Peter and Covington, Kimberly. “What is US Drug Policy?”

Inter-American Dialogue (July 2012). (see Appendix A)

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Domestically, Bush identified prevention and treatment as priorities, but maintained

focus on prohibitionist strategies that measured success in number of arrests, quantities of

product interdicted and the severity of sentences obtained. Bush’s drug czar, John Walters,

focused heavily on prosecuting marijuana users and coordinated a $23 million campaign to

increase randomized drug testing in schools. Domestic enforcement was highly militarized

under Bush, who oversaw the creation of hundreds of “paramilitary-style SWAT” teams that by

the end of his presidency were performing more than 40,000 raids on Americans every year,

mostly for nonviolent, misdemeanor drug offenses.59

Bush also extolled in each of his National Drug Control Strategy reports the benefits of a

“balanced approach,” but maintained consistent spending distributions that heavily favored

supply-side expenditures and actually increased the imbalance moderately. In 2005, for

instance, overall drug spending was allotted at approximately 33 percent for treatment, 10

percent for prevention and 57 percent for supply reduction efforts. In the final year of his

presidency the numbers remained similar to those of 2005, with 33 percent going to treatment,

only 8 percent to prevention and 59 percent to supply-side programs.60

On international drug policy, Bush shared the view of his predecessors, as was explained

in the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy where the administration stated that “for more than

20 years, the United States has viewed the global drug trade as a serious threat to our national

security because of its capacity to destabilize democratic and friendly governments, undermine

U.S. foreign policy objectives, and generate violence and human suffering on a scale that

constitutes a public security threat.”61

This national security view was further reinforced by

emphasizing the connections between the drug trade and international terrorist organizations

such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

As Bush put it in 2002, the drug trade “finances the work of terrorists who use drug profits to

fund their murderous work. Our fight against illegal drug use is a fight for our children's future,

for struggling democracies, and against terrorism.”62

This national security focus gave Bush all

the justification he needed to maintain coercive, militaristic policies internationally.63

In 2007, for example, Bush reacted forcefully to a 5 percent increase in Bolivian coca

production by “decertifying” Bolivia and cancelling existing trade preferences between the

countries. This move threatened thousands of Bolivian jobs, damaged countless export

industries and created significant ill will for the US among Bolivian leaders. It is worth noting

that the UN estimates that in Colombia, a close US ally and a recipient of massive US aid, coca

production increased by roughly 26 percent over the same period with no comparable reaction

from Washington.64

Bush also put significant pressure on Mexico to step up its counternarcotic activities,

resulting in increased police and military enforcement, harsher punishments for drug offenders

and exacerbated drug-related violence. Bush’s influence in Mexico was made clear in April of

2006, when the Mexican legislature under the Vicente Fox administration passed a law legalizing

the personal use of drugs. In practical terms, the law only decriminalized the possession of

59 “A Brief History of the Drug War” 2013. 60

Ibid. 61 “National Drug Control Strategy: 2008 Annual Report.” The White House: p. 34. 62

Bush, George W. “Message to the Congress Transmitting the 2002 National Drug Control Strategy.” February 12,

2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63682. 63 “National Drug Control Strategy.” p. 34. 64 Chomsky, Noam. “Hopes and Prospects.” Haymarket Books, Illinois. Jun 1, 2010: p. 215.

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extremely small amounts of marijuana, cocaine and heroin, but it was enough for the seriousness

of the Mexican government to be questioned by Washington. Bush urged Fox not to sign the bill

and Fox reluctantly agreed, despite serious concerns over the rising levels of violence and

incarceration caused by the escalated Drug War in Mexico.65

Most notably, Bush inherited and strengthened Clinton’s pledged support for Plan

Colombia, a multi-year effort launched in 2000 by the Colombian government to “(1) reduce the

production of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in 6 years and (2) improve security

in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed groups.”66

From 2000 to

2006, Bush contributed some $6 billion of aid to this effort, almost all of which was in the form

of military equipment, communications technology transfers and police and military training,

with only small amounts (20 percent) going to alternative development programs, judiciary

reform and other non-military initiatives.67

Though Plan Colombia was impressively successful at improving the security situation in

Colombia, it failed to produce the desired declines in drug production and had little effect on

availability in the US. According to the Government Accountability Office, the goal of reducing

drug production by 50 percent in 6 years “was not fully achieved,” with coca cultivation and

cocaine production levels actually increasing by 15 and 4 percent, respectively. What’s more,

the aerial spraying component of the effort contaminated hundreds of thousands of hectares of

arable farmland and spurred farmers to clear uncounted additional hectares of rainforest to

replant their illicit crops.68

The effort was nevertheless held up by the Bush Administration and

by many others as a great success and proof that the Drug War could be effectively prosecuted

with adequate cooperation from the source countries.

From 1909 to 2008, the United States led a successful campaign to expand its War on

Drugs to the world stage, creating an international prohibitionist regime that penalizes the

production, shipment, sale, possession, and use of illicit drugs. Together, the three UN

Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 define and codify the objectives, tactics and obligations of

the international community in the execution of the US-led War on Drugs. And while the

International Narcotics Control Board is charged with enforcing these measures, it has been the

US that has provided the carrots, and more notably the sticks, to ensure compliance. The tools

and tactics of this counternarcotic regime-- law-enforcement, eradication, extradition, military

action, interdiction and incarceration-- have consistently been selected based on the US

understanding of the drug trade as a threat to national security originating in producer countries.

While countries in the source zone bristled under Washington’s hardline policies and coercive

insistence on prohibitionist policies, the US has, in fact, successfully spread the prohibitionist

model to nearly every country in the world. The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) alone

has over 80 foreign offices in over 60 countries and the Conventions effectively maintain

pressure on the 192 members of the United Nations.69

The status quo, however, is beginning to change. In the next section, we will look at

current counternarcotic policy under President Barack Obama and examine both the continuity

and change his Administration has implemented.

65

Gilchirst, Jim and Corsi, Jerome. “Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America’s Borders.” World Ahead

Publishing, Inc., Los Angeles. July 15, 2006: p. 158-159. 66 “PLAN COLOMBIA: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies

Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance.” Government Accountability Office, October 2008. 67 Ibid., 1. 68 Ibid., 1. 69 “A Brief History” 2013.

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Section 2: Counternarcotic Policy Under President Obama: Continuity and

Change

As Mr. Obama’s 2008 campaign drew to a close and he ascended to the presidency,

advocates of drug policy reform had good reason to be hopeful. During his campaign, Obama

distinguished himself quickly from President Bush on the issue of drugs. For example, his

forthright approach to questions about his own drug use differed greatly from that of his

predecessors. When asked in 2006 by Jay Leno if he had ever smoked marijuana Obama

responded candidly, saying “Not recently, that was in high school.” When further pressed by

Leno with the question “Did you inhale?,” Obama responded simply, “That was the point.”70

Obama later admitted to having tried cocaine as well, but asserted that he demurred when offered

heroin and other drugs. As biographer John K. Wilson put it, “Obama almost certainly isn’t the

first person to use cocaine and then run for president. But he is the first presidential candidate

honest enough to talk about the troubles of his youth.”71

The young candidate set himself apart on his drug policy proposals as well, making three

campaign promises that appealed to practical drug reform advocates. His first promise was to

remove the 100 to 1 disparity in sentencing for possession of crack and powder cocaine, which

since the 1980s had arbitrarily resulted in larger sentences for those caught with crack cocaine.

Secondly, he promised to ease the harsh federal stand on state medical marijuana laws, which

won praise from Californians and others. Finally, candidate Obama promised to end the ban on

federal funding for needle exchange programs, which had been conclusively shown to hinder the

spread of HIV/AIDS among drug users.72

Obama won further praise for his position on drug courts, which are special judiciary

bodies set up to provide alternatives to prison sentencing for nonviolent, first-time drug

offenders. These courts had already been shown under the Clinton and Bush administrations to

produce far superior recidivism, re-incarceration and recovery outcomes than the traditional

judicial system, but they had not yet been implemented on a grand scale. Obama pledged to

support these courts with federal funding and increase the total number of drug courts.73

As he entered the first year of his presidency, Obama appeared poised to shake things up

in drug policy. He immediately departed greatly from the role of his predecessors by introducing

a dramatic shift in drug policy rhetoric. In his first meeting with Mexican President Felipe

Calderon, for example, Obama acknowledged the “shared responsibility” of the United States in

Mexico’s cartel issues, stating that “a demand for these drugs in the United States is what is

helping to keep these cartels in business. This war is being waged with guns purchased not here,

but in the United States. More than 90 percent of the guns recovered in Mexico come from the

United States, many from gun shops that line our shared border.”74

This admission was warmly

received in Mexico, where officials had waited for decades for an American president to

70 Dougherty, Steve. “Hopes and Dreams: The Story of Barack Obama.” Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers,

February 15, 2007: p. 29-32. 71 Wilson, John K. “Barack Obama: This Improbably Quest.” October 30, 2007: p. 12-13. 72

Youngers, Coletta A. “The Obama Administration’s Drug Control Policy on Auto-Pilot.” International Drug

Policy Consortium (April 2011). 73 “The Blueprint for Change: Barack Obama’s Plan for America.” Barack Obama Presidential Campaign 2008

(February 2, 2008). 74

Obama, Barack. “The President's News Conference With President Felipe de Jesus Calderon Hinojosa of Mexico

in Mexico City.” April 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency

Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86014.

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acknowledge the US role in Mexican cartel violence so that collaborative work could actually

begin to stem the flow of guns and drugs.

Obama received similar acclaim for statements in Colombia, where he met with President

Alvaro Uribe to discuss continued US support for Plan Colombia. The President showed

solidarity with Uribe and recognized again the US role by stating that “it's important that the

United States steps up and cooperates effectively in battling the adverse effects of drug

trafficking. And that includes, by the way, the United States reducing demand for drugs. We

have responsibilities. We have responsibilities to reduce the trafficking of guns into the south

that help strengthen these cartels and the flows of money and money laundering.”75

By

acknowledging the US responsibility for drug demand, illicit gun flows and the permissive

financial regulations that allow drug money to be laundered, Obama legitimized the decades-old

complaints of Latin American critics and laid the groundwork for a truly collaborative, balanced

debate of drug policy.

He further shifted rhetoric by addressing the issue of drugs as a public health concern

rather than a national security threat or a law enforcement responsibility. For example, President

Obama’s drug czar, Gil Kerlikowske, decided early in the Obama presidency that the US is no

longer in a “War on Drugs” because “we’re not at war with people in this country.”76

Instead,

the administration emphasized a “new, balanced approach” that would invest in prevention,

treatment and a drug policy “based on common sense, sound science, and practical

experience.”77

As Obama himself said in 2009, “Never has it been more important to have a

national drug control strategy guided by sound principles of public safety and public health.”78

The point was even further driven home in a 2012 Fact Sheet on US Drug Policy released by the

Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), where the following appeared:

“Decades of scientific study show that drug addiction is not a moral failing on the

part of the individual – but a disease of the brain that can be prevented and

treated. And while smart law enforcement efforts will always play a vital role in

protecting communities from drug-related crime and violence, the Obama

Administration has remained clear that we cannot arrest our way out of the drug

problem through an enforcement-centric ‘war on drugs.’”79

The culmination of these rhetorical shifts, and what many hoped would be the turning

point in US drug policy, came with the release of the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, the

first released by the Obama Administration. This document laid out seven objectives that

together were meant to reflect a “comprehensive approach to reducing drug use and its

consequences.”80

1) Strengthen Efforts to Prevent Drug Use in Communities

2) Seek Early Intervention Opportunities in Health Care

75 Obama, Barack. “Remarks Following a Meeting With President Alvaro Uribe Velez of Colombia and an

Exchange With Reporters.” June 29, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American

Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86352. 76

Nadelmann, Ethan. “An Imperfect Improvement: Obama’s New Drug War Strategy.” Huff Post (May 11, 2010). 77

National Drug Control Strategy 2010. iii. 78 Ibid., v. 79 “Fact Sheet on US Drug Policy.” Office on National Drug Control Policy, April 17, 2012: 1. 80 Ibid., 1.

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3) Integrate Treatment for Substance Abuse Disorders into Health Care, and

Expand Support for Recovery

4) Break the Cycle of Drug Use, Crime, Delinquency, and Incarceration

5) Disrupt Domestic Drug Trafficking and Production

6) Strengthen International Partnerships

7) Improve Information Systems for Analysis, Assessment, and Local

Management81

The 2010 Strategy also stated the following specific goals to be accomplished by 2015:

Goal 1: Curtail illicit drug consumption in America

1a. Decrease the 30-day prevalence of drug use among 12-17 year olds by 15%

1b. Decrease the lifetime prevalence of 8th graders who have used drugs,

alcohol, or tobacco by 15%

1c. Decrease the 30-day prevalence of drug use among young adults aged 18-

25 by 10%

1d. Reduce the number of chronic drug users by 15%

Goal 2: Improve the public health and public safety of the American people by

reducing the consequences of drug abuse

2a. Reduce drug-induced deaths by 15%

2b. Reduce drug-related morbidity by 15%

2c. Reduce the prevalence of drugged driving by 10%82

The 2010 Strategy and the Obama Administration were recognized for breaking new

ground on several policies, including, for example, a lift on federal housing, driver’s license,

employment and student loan restrictions for people with criminal drug convictions and

recovering addicts. More importantly, the Strategy endorsed a number of recognized harm

reduction measures, despite continued aversion to the term ‘harm reduction’ itself, and initiated

the integration of drug treatment into ordinary medical care. It also endorsed alternatives to

incarceration, such as the drug courts, for non-violent offenders struggling with addiction.83

However, for those reform advocates awaiting a monumental shift under Obama, the

2010 Strategy was a bitter disappointment that failed to live up to the inspiring rhetoric of the

2008 campaign and the first year of the Obama Presidency. Many pointed, for example, to the

lack of change in budgetary distribution and the continued prioritization of law enforcement and

supply control strategies that marked the policies of previous administrations. Indeed, the

balance of spending in the Obama budget remained almost identical to that of Bush, with 59

percent focused on interdiction and supply reduction efforts and only 41 percent allotted to

prevention and treatment (demand reduction).84

This imbalance is further exacerbated after

considering that the 2010 budget failed to count the $2 billion in annual spending on the

incarceration of drug offenders in federal prisons, which appeared in every prior budget.85

81 Ibid., 1-3. 82 Ibid., 6. 83 Nadelmann, 1. 84 Hakim, Peter and Covington, Kimberly. “What is US Drug Policy?” Inter-American Dialogue (July 2012), p. 4. 85 Nadelmann, 1-2.

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Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (chart from

Hakim and Covington 2012: p. 4)

Figure 1: 2012 National Drug Control

Budget—Enacted

Figures rounded to the nearest 100 million

Researchers Peter Hakim and Kimberly Covington of the Inter-American dialogue

illustrated many of the shortcomings of the Obama Strategy in their 2012 piece, “What is US

Drug Policy?” They break the Obama policy into three sections: the declared objectives, the use

of available resources and the data collected.86

In their first section, Hakim and Covington call

the seven objectives listed in the Strategy “vague, barely defined aspirations for improvement”

and lament the lack of real focus on international policy. Indeed, of the seven objectives, only

one concerns international counternarcotic efforts, which the authors say “continue to stress

traditional supply-side approaches, such as law enforcement, interdiction and crop eradication.”87

Worse, they say, are the specific incidence reduction goals set by the administration. “The

strategy,” affirm Hakim and Covington, “does not indicate how these targets were selected,

identify which agencies have most responsibility for pursuing them, or estimate the likelihood

they will be achieved. Indeed there is no

evidence that the targets stem from serious

analysis of what realistically can be

accomplished—nor that they are related to

or aligned with specific budgetary

outlays.”88

In their second section, Hakim and

Covington criticize not only the distribution

of spending under Obama, but also the

disjointed alignment of targets and spending

across the seventeen federal agencies

involved in implementing drug policy. They

assert that “there is, in fact, no overall

federal budget for drug control that is tied to

the priorities and objectives of the White

House.” Instead, “each of the seventeen

federal agencies negotiates its own budget

with Congress…[and] each agency carries

out its designated programs with no general

accountability for the totality of drug

spending—or its results.”89

Of the distribution of drug spending between demand and supply

programs, the researchers say that “the amount and composition of anti-drug spending has not

change markedly.”90

In their third and final section, Hakim and Covington lament the “dismal state of data on

every aspect of the drug problem.”91

On this point, they make the following key assertions:

“Without dependable and consistent information on the price and availability of

different drugs in the United States, the volume of drugs entering the US territory

and the total revenue from drug sales in the country, there is little basis upon

86

Hakim and Covington, 2. 87 Ibid., 3. 88 Ibid., 2. 89 Ibid., 4-5. 90 Ibid., 5. 91 Ibid., 5.

P a g e | 17

which to develop effective anti-drug policies or evaluate the results of current

approaches and possible alternatives. Without that information, it is impossible,

for example, to assess the value of eradication and interdiction programs,

mainstays of US international drug control strategy. Absent data on the overall

volume of drugs entering the country and the profits they generate, it is not very

useful to know how much coca leaf is destroyed overseas or the quantity of

cocaine intercepted en route to the United States.”92

By the same token, “drug problems cannot be seriously addressed as a health issue unless

data on drug use and addiction meet the standards used for other major medical challenges.”

And while the priority goals of the US government have always centered around reducing the

prevalence of illicit drug use, the researchers suggest that “prevalence data may carry too much

weight in shaping US drug control policy, mainly because other critical information—such as the

amount and value of the drugs consumed, their cost and purity in the marketplace, their damage

to health and the violence they provoke—is not collected systematically…At the same time,

there is virtually no effort to measure the collateral costs and damage of US anti-drug

measures.”93

The central data problem, according to Hakim and Covington, is that the little

information agencies do collect has little relevance to the stated policy objectives and offers

almost no guidance for the evaluation of current or alternative policies.94

Altogether, Hakim and Covington conclude that “inertia appears to be the main driver of

US drug policies and programs.”95

As vocal reform proponent Ethan Nadelmann stated at the

92 Ibid., 6. 93 Ibid., 6. 94 Ibid., 7. 95 Ibid., 7.

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (chart from Hakim and Covington 2012: p. 10)

Figure 2: Historical Drug Control Funding

(Some totals may not sum due to rounding)

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time of the Strategy’s release, “there’s little doubt that this administration seriously wants to

distance itself from the rhetoric of the drug war, but new plan makes clear that it is still addicted

to the reality of the drug war.”96

Hakim, Covington and Nadelmann express the widely held view that Obama raised

expectations through his change in rhetoric and progressive style, but failed to fulfill hopes for a

significant departure from traditional Drug War strategies. However, the enormous complexity

of the issue demands a more nuanced look. In truth, the Obama drug policies should be

considered in their disaggregated form, with focus on the three theaters of the narcotic supply

chain: the Source Zone, the Transit Zone and the Consumption Zone.

2A: Obama Policy in the Source Zone

International drug policy under Obama has been marked by inspiring rhetoric focused on

“partnerships,” “shared responsibility,” “cooperation,” a “regional response,” and a

“comprehensive approach.”97

It is questionable, however, whether the substance of the policy

approach under Obama is markedly different than that of his predecessors. Indeed, drug policy

expert Coletta A. Youngers affirms that “despite the change in discourse and diplomacy,

international drug control policies remain largely intact…and most existing drug policies

continue on auto-pilot.”98

This continuity is on display in Latin America. Though its reported use has declined

since its peak in the 1980s, cocaine remains one of the most worrisome of the drugs smuggled

into the United States, with 95 percent of the country’s supply originating in just one country:

Colombia. The other 5 percent originates in other Andean countries, primarily Peru and Bolivia,

but Colombia remains the primary producer and exporter of cocaine for US consumption and is

thus the focus of source zone policies.99

According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “Targeting cocaine

at the source consists of disrupting coca cultivation, cocaine processing and trafficking in

Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia along three vectors: eradication, interdiction, and organizational

attack.”100 Eradication, says the ONDCP, “is capable of making coca fields less productive by

reducing the yield of cocaine from given coca fields: by repeatedly eradicating fields, the fields

can no longer produce four crops a year, for example, reducing their output, sometimes by as

much as 50 percent; 100 percent if a farmer abandons it because he gets tired of losing his

investment due to eradication efforts.”101

These efforts include manual and voluntary eradication, but are primarily focused on

aerial spraying, which is the primary method of eradication in Colombia. Eradication in

Colombia reached its peak under the Bush Administration in 2008 at 225,607 hectares, but has

continued to feature as a primary component of Obama’s source zone strategy with 162,527

hectares destroyed in 2009, 141,796 in 2010 and 137,894 in 2011.102

Interestingly, Youngers has

noted that although there has been a “much-touted reported decrease in coca production in

96 Nadelmann, 1-2. 97

National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 77-82. 98 Youngers, 2. 99 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy. Coca in the Andes. Washington: Online, 2013

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/targeting-cocaine-at-the-Source>. 100 Ibid., 1. 101 Ibid., 1. 102 Ibid., 2.

P a g e | 19

Colombia,” it has “gone hand-in-hand with reduced eradication. From 2006 to 2009, aerial

fumigation declined by 39 percent. In 2009, manual eradication efforts fell as well- precisely the

year that the UNODC found a significant drop in coca growing, indicating that other factors have

been the driving force behind reduced coca production in Colombia.”103

The other two elements of Obama’s source zone strategy, interdiction and organizational

attack, have primarily been pursued through continued support of Plan Colombia, the $6 billion

bilateral partnership that has provided law enforcement and military aid and training,

accompanied by vocal US support for an aggressive Colombian anti-drug policy. According to a

2011 RAND Corporation study funded by the US Air Force, this support has included “the

transfer of ground-based radar systems, helicopter troop carriers, and various forms of heavy

artillery; the institution of in-country training programs aimed at augmenting coastal surveillance

and interdiction, port security, containerized cargo inspections, and high-speed pursuit tactics;

the deployment of U.S. special forces advisers to create elite antidrug units in both the police and

army; and the provision of technical advice and equipment.”104

The substance and levels of this

support has not changed significantly since Obama’s inauguration.105

Despite continued support for Plan Colombia, the Obama Administration has begun to

cut back on the overall spending on the program, transferring responsibility for continued

enforcement to the Colombians in an effort to meet the deficit reduction demands of the US

Congress. These reductions are being phased in gradually, with only a 15 percent reduction

appearing in the request for FY 2012. Additionally, some of the remaining funds are being

transferred away from military and law enforcement programs and to alternative development

efforts.106

These programs attempt to provide farmers with licit crop alternatives that are meant

to replace dependence on coca cultivation. Though alternative development receives the

majority of the non-military spending in Plan Colombia,107

its significance is small under

Obama, receiving only one paragraph of real discussion in Obama’s 2010 Strategy.108

In Bolivia, the continuity of old policy is unquestionable. Since his ascent to the

Presidency in 2006, Bolivian President Evo Morales has been at odds with the United States on

the issue of drugs. He first raised Washington’s ire by ceasing the practice of forced eradication,

relying instead on agreements with the local coca growers federations to meet coca reduction

targets. The situation was further exacerbated in September of 2008 when Morales decided to

expel the US Ambassador, who he believed to be “meddling in the country’s internal affairs and

supporting violent opposition groups.”109

Bush retaliated by cancelling various trade benefits for

Bolivia and vehemently chastising the Bolivian President. Though alternative strategies have

allowed Morales to continue meeting coca reduction targets and increase illicit drug seizures, the

Bush and Obama Administrations remained suspicious of Bolivian efforts. In 2009, Obama

showed his continuity of Bush policies by releasing a “determination” that Bolivia had “failed

demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international

counternarcotics agreements,”110

and in the following months refused to renew the trade benefits

103 Youngers, 5. 104

Chalk, Peter. The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response. Project Air Force,

RAND Corporation: 2011, p. 59. 105 National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 107. 106 Ibid., 5. 107 “PLAN COLOMBIA” 1. 108 National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 83. 109 Youngers, 6. 110 Youngers, 6.

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that had been cancelled in 2008. These benefits remain suspended and Bolivia has been

“decertified” by the Obama Administration each year since 2009.111

The US has also continued to oppose Bolivian efforts at the United Nations to remove

from the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs a ban on the traditional indigenous practice

of chewing the coca leaf. This centuries-old tradition has been a key issue for Morales and his

constituency, causing the Bolivian President in 2009 to write to the UN Secretary General, Ban

Ki Moon, to request the removal of the ban, which went into force in 1989. The United States,

fearful that a single change to the Convention could open debate on other elements of the law,

rallied a group of 17 allies to oppose the amendment.112

After several years of successfully

stalling, the amendment passed in January of 2013 despite continued US opposition.113

Where Obama’s source zone policies have shown significant change is in Afghanistan,

where marked opposition by President Hamid Karzai to aerial spraying and other crop

eradication tactics convinced certain key US officials that a change of course was needed.

Foremost among the advocates of change was the late Richard Holbrooke, who was the US

Special Envoy to Afghanistan at the time. In March 2009, for instance, Holbrooke described the

poppy eradication programs in Afghanistan as “the most wasteful and ineffective program that I

have seen in 40 years.”114

Only a month later, he added that “the poppy farmer is not our enemy,

the Taliban are, and to destroy the crops is not an effective policy. And the U.S. has wasted

hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars on this program and that is going to end. We are

not going to support crop eradication.”115

In keeping with these comments, the US government ceased its funding for forced crop

eradication programs in Afghanistan in 2009 and channeled the resources into interdiction and

alternative development efforts. However, the Administration soon made it clear that this lesson

would not be transferred to Latin America, where eradication programs continue unabated.116

In short, the Obama Administration has largely allowed the source zone policies of its

predecessors -eradication, interdiction and military and law enforcement support- to endure,

though it led a dramatic shift in Afghanistan and oversaw a modest reduction in Plan Colombia

spending.

2B: Obama Policy in the Transit Zone

The transit zone, as identified by the ONDCP, covers an area roughly twice the size of

the United States, stretching some seven million square miles from the Caribbean Sea to the

Pacific Ocean.117

It is the responsibility of the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-

South), a law enforcement, military and intelligence team based in Key West, Florida, to

coordinate the interdiction effort in this transit zone and ensure that the international and inter-

agency actors are working harmoniously to maximize effective monitoring and interdiction

111 Ibid., 6. 112 Ibid., 6. 113 “Bolivia achieves coca-chewing victory at United Nations.” British Broadcasting Company, January 11, 2013:

Online <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20994392>. 114 “Envoy Damns US Afghan Drug Effort.” British Broadcasting Company, March 21, 2009: Online <

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7957237.stm >. 115 Siddique, Abubakar. “Shift in Afghan Antidrug Policy Draws Mixed Reaction.” Radio Free Europe, July 8, 2009. 116 Youngers, 5. 117 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy. Transit Zone Operations. Washington: Online, 2013

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/transit-zone-operations>,.

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efforts. According to the ONDCP, “Transit Zone interdiction is a team effort that relies on the

successful execution of several steps in an interdiction continuum, including the collection and

dissemination of actionable intelligence, the detection and monitoring of suspect vessels, and the

physical interdiction of those vessels.”118

ONDCP expresses that continuum in the following

graphic:

The strategy expressed in this continuum has remained largely unchanged from Bush to

Obama. Interdiction of cocaine and other drugs, along with the arrest and prosecution of the

smugglers, remain the primary objectives of the transit zone strategy, while intelligence

gathering, detection, monitoring and military and law enforcement interception remain the

primary tools. Obama continues to support this effort much as did President Bush and his

predecessors, supplying advanced military, intelligence and communication equipment and

training to international partners and reinforcing US efforts through the JIATF-South and the

Southwest Border Security Initiative.

In addition, the Obama Administration has adopted the transit zone interdiction targets

established under Bush, which set a 40 percent annual interdiction goal to be reached through

incremental increases by 2014. Established in 2007, this set of goals was meant to increase

interdiction incrementally by 2.5 percentage points each year, from 25 percent in 2008 to 40

percent by 2014, allowing the US to show demonstrable improvement in lowering the 75 to 80

percent success rate of international cocaine smugglers. Obama reset the incremental

adjustments of this timeline upon becoming president, delaying the deadline for the 40 percent

interdiction rate until 2015. Even with this extra time, however, the Administration has failed to

meet its established interim targets in every year except 2010 and according to the government’s

own measures, “removal rates for the past several years have hovered near the historical

norm.”119

The latest figures, which are from 2011, show a removal rate of 25 percent- far short

of the 32 percent interim target for that year.120

118 Ibid. 119 National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 84-86. 120 Executive Office of the President of the United States. National Drug Control Strategy 2012. Washington, D.C.:

2012, 36.

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy, Transit Zone Operations

Figure 3: Transit Zone Strategy Continuum

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Source: Seelke, Clare Ribando and Wyler, Liana Sun and Beittel,

June S. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug

Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs.” Congressional

Research Service, April 30, 2010.

Figure 4: Major Drug Trafficking

Routes in Latin America and the

Caribbean

Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has

claimed success on other fronts of the transit zone

interdiction effort. The 2012 National Drug Control

Strategy points, for example, to the Panama Express

Program, “a multi-agency task force dedicated to

disrupting and dismantling major maritime drug

transport organizations based in South and Central

America.” This program is credited with “the

interdiction of over 850 tons of cocaine in

international waters…[and] 2,100 individuals being

brought to the United States for prosecution—with

a 97 percent conviction rate.” 121

However, many studies have concluded that

increasing eradication and interdiction success

along traditional transit routes stemming from

Colombia has not actually slowed drug shipments to

the United States. Drug smugglers continuously

adapt to conditions and find ever more creative

routes and methods for evading detection. Many

have even developed “low-profile, fully

submersible vessels” which can transport tons of

cocaine for hundreds of miles without surfacing.122

The RAND Corporation concluded in 2011, that

“trafficking routes from Colombia and the wider

Andean region have, by no means, been curtailed,

merely shifting in response to extant interdiction approaches. Indeed, the mosaic of smuggling

conduits extending from Latin America is now arguably more complex than ever before,

embracing at least five principal transpacific and transatlantic corridors.”123

In reality, the greatest change instigated by Obama in the transit zone has been the

regional shift in focus in response to these shifting trafficking routes. As Plan Colombia efforts

wind down, the US attention has shifted noticeably to the Caribbean, Central America and

Mexico, with regional security agreements providing the framework for cooperative interdiction

and law enforcement efforts. The Central American Regional Security Initiative, for example,

received an increase in annual funding from Obama of about $200 million to combat trafficking

along new routes, especially in Guatemala. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative has also

received increased support under Obama, but the largest contribution and most important

Administration focus has shifted to the Merida Initiative in Mexico.124

121

Ibid., 36. 122 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy. Transit Zone Operations. 123 Chalk, xvi. 124 Youngers, 5.

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Source: Seelke, Clare Ribando and Wyler, Liana Sun and Beittel, June S. “Latin

America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug

Programs.” Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010.

Figure 5: Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related

Killings in Mexico by State in 2009 (per 100,000 people)

Mexico has long been an important

target of drug policy, historically for its

marijuana and poppy production and more

recently for the increased cocaine

trafficking and cartel violence. Though

Mexico has been historically suspicious of

joint action with the United States,

relations took a positive turn under the

Bush Administration and have continued

to improve under Obama, at least on the

issue of joint counternarcotic policy. With

the election of Mexican President Felipe

Calderon in 2006, Mexican efforts to

combat drug cartels rose sharply and

became highly militarized, mobilizing

some 25,000 troops and causing a steep

increase in drug related violence.

According to US government estimates,

approximately 40,000 Mexican deaths due

to cartel violence occurred between 2006

and 2011 alone, most of which has been

tied to competing cartels.125

The Merida Initiative has been a

major US effort to support the

counternarcotic activities of the Calderon

government. Started in 2007 and meant to

have a three year duration with $1.6

billion in funding, the program has now

been extended by the Obama

Administration and according to the 2012

National Drug Control Strategy, has now

received some $1.9 billion.126

The initiative has four strategic pillars that carried over from the

Bush Administration:

1) Disrupt Capacity of Organized Crime to Operate

2) Institutionalize Capacity to Sustain Rule of Law

3) Create a 21st Century Border Structure

4) Build Strong and Resilient Communities

While pillars 2, 3 and 4 have received increased support from Obama, the first pillar remains the

core of the strategy, emphasizing “better investigations, more captures and arrests, successful

prosecution, and shipment interdiction.”127

These bulwarks of old-style Drug War policy have

125 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy. Mexico. Washington: Online, 2013

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/mexico>. 126 34. 127 U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy. Mexico.

P a g e | 24

largely endured Obama’s shift to Central America and Mexico and continue to be the

cornerstone of US counternarcotic policy. In the transit zone, as in the source zone, Obama

policies are marked more by continuity than by change.

2C: Obama Policy in the Consumption Zone

The most prominent of the Obama reforms on drug policy have taken place in the

domestic sphere, where consumption is the primary issue and prohibition enforcement the

primary objective. Obama marked a prominent rhetorical shift early in his presidency by

emphasizing the US’ shared responsibility for international drug problems, based on the obvious

connection between US demand for drugs and the resulting supply. He stated in 2009, for

instance, that “drug trafficking cannot be ended by decree. As long as there is a high demand,

there will be a high supply.” The President accordingly committed to “act preventively in order

to bring down the consumption of drugs in the United States.”128

Obama reinforced such statements in his 2010 Strategy by advocating a “balanced

approach” that stressed the importance of a public health perspective and emphasized treatment

and prevention without forgetting the vital role of law enforcement.129

Thus, the President laid

out a three pillared domestic drug prevention policy— prevention, treatment and law

enforcement. The strategy pillars, themselves, are not distinct from the policy of previous

administrations, but Obama can claim certain innovations within each pillar.

To address the challenge of drug use prevention, President Obama released as part of the

Affordable Care Act the first ever National Prevention Strategy, which “recognized drug

prevention as a part of overall wellness.”130

The Strategy laid out a framework for community-

led, drug prevention programs and recognized the importance of investing in evidence-based

efforts to prevent the initiation of drug use, especially among the nation’s youth.131

Additionally,

the Obama Administration has been credited with the reconfiguration of the ONDCP’s National

Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, which had been criticized “for not being relevant to children

and adolescents.” However, Congress cut funding for the program in FY 2012 and it has been

sustained only on the minimal funds remaining from the 2011 cycle.132

Prevention was also highlighted in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, in which the

Administration recognized that “research indicates that preventing drug use in the first place is

the most cost-effective strategy in drug control policy.”133

The Strategy focused attention at the

community level, committed to reaching youth in the range of settings where they grow up,

discussed the importance of spreading accurate information about drug use, instructed criminal

justice agencies and prevention organizations to work together and brought attention to the issue

of drugged driving.134

Together, the Administration hoped these efforts would “prepare

128 Obama, Barack. “The President's News Conference…” 2009. 129 National Drug Control Strategy 2010, iii. 130

“Fact Sheet on US Drug Policy.” 2. 131 National Prevention Council. “National Prevention Strategy: America’s Plan for Better Health and Wellness.”

June 2011, 33-35. 132 “Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs.” United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotic

Control:” One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session (June 2012): 4. 133 National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 8. 134 Ibid., 14-23.

P a g e | 25

communities to efficiently and effectively assess the unique nature of their local drug problems

and to deliver evidence-based prevention targeted specifically toward those problems.”135

On treatment, the Administration actually made some significant changes and cleared the

way for more innovative approaches. In 2009, for example, the Administration established the

“Recovery branch” at the ONDCP “to support the 23.5 million Americans in recovery by

eliminating barriers to recovery and lifting the stigma associated with drug addiction.”136

The

President also took steps to integrate the treatment of drug abuse disorders into the traditional

healthcare system in order to expand access to such services. The Affordable Care Act, for

instance, required “insurers to cover treatment for substance abuse disorders the same way they

would other chronic diseases starting in 2014.”137

Although this last measure has not yet taken

effect, it promises to create real change for those suffering from substance abuse disorders.

Obama also added the element of recovery to the standard treatment policies in the 2010

National Drug Control Strategy. According to the Strategy, “a key to solving America’s drug

problem is greater support for and partnership with the huge number of our citizens who have

recovered from addiction and who deserve the opportunity to fully rejoin society.”138

To realize

this ambition, the Administration expanded the Access to Recovery program, encouraged

lawmakers to review and reform laws that inhibit access to government services for recovering

addicts and “fostered the expansion of community-based recovery support programs.”139

According to the Senate Caucus on International Narcotic Control, this was the “first time ever”

that a President had “focused on the need to invest in recovery” and recognized that “recovery is

a lifelong process.”140

Obama also fulfilled his campaign promise to end the ban on federal spending on sterile

needle and syringe exchange programs (NSPs), which have been shown to drastically reduce the

spread of HIV/AIDS among drug users and the general community. This policy reform affected

not only the domestic sphere, but also had an international impact due to the State Department’s

adoption of the new freedom to utilize funds from the President’s emergency Plan for AIDS

Relief (PEPFAR) for NSPs. NSPs were also recognized in the first National HIV/AIDS Strategy

as an evidence-based intervention and were mentioned in the 2010 National Drug Control

Strategy. Budget restraints and Republican opposition, however, have slowed implementation

and effectively halted widespread use of NSPs, despite the lifting of the federal ban.141

Obama additionally introduced a number of harm reduction measures and targets, despite

continued aversion to referencing the words “harm reduction,” themselves. Adopting such

measures implicitly accepts the fact that it is impossible to end all drug use, as many of Obama’s

predecessors aimed to do. Some of these harm reduction targets and measures appear, for

instance, in the 2010 Strategy, which set numerical targets for reducing both overdose fatalities

and drug-related emergency room visits.142

It also recognized the growing issue of incarceration

in America and called for “promoting and supporting alternatives to incarceration,” such as drug

courts.143

135 Ibid., 14. 136 “Fact Sheet on US Drug Policy.” 2. 137

Ibid., 2. 138 35. 139 45. 140 “Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs,” 9. 141 Youngers, 3. 142 National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 6. 143 Youngers, 4.

P a g e | 26

Finally, Obama has modestly increased spending on treatment, requesting a 4.6 percent

increase in his 2013 budget. This brings total Federal funds for early intervention and treatment

services for substance abusers to $9.2 billion.144

However, this increased investment continues

to appear insufficient when one considers the estimate by the National Institute on Drug Abuse

(NIDA) that “substance abuse costs the United States over $500 billion dollars annually.”145

NIDA goes on to affirm that “every $1 invested in addiction treatment programs yields a return

of between $4 and $7 by reducing drug-related crime, criminal justice costs, and theft.”146

Thus,

a larger investment in treatment would appear to be an important element within a “science-

based” and “cost-effective” drug control strategy. It has not, however, been embraced on a scale

comparable to the potential for savings.

President Obama’s greatest reforms, however, have affected the law enforcement pillar of

his domestic drug strategy. Indeed, President Obama fulfilled two campaign promises early in

his presidency that greatly affected the law enforcement approach to drug policy enforcement.

Obama fulfilled his first campaign promise in August of 2010 by signing the Fair Sentencing

Act, which lowered the mandatory 100 to 1 sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and

powder cocaine to a more modest level of 18 to 1. This disparity was installed in the 1980s

during the peak of crack consumption to dissuade its continued use, but in recent decades, 80

percent of those convicted of crack use have been African Americans, causing the policy to be

denounced by many as racist. Though reform proponents did not get the 1 to 1 sentencing ratio

they wanted, most were pleased by the improved ratio and gave Obama credit for the

accomplishment. According to Marc Mauer of the Sentencing Project, the Fair Sentencing Act

represents a “watershed event in the long campaign for a more rational approach to drug policy”

and “is expected to benefit about 3,000 defendants a year, with an average sentence reduction of

twenty-seven months.”147

Obama fulfilled his second campaign promise to curb arrests of non-violent marijuana

users in the fall of 2009, when he instructed the Justice Department to “stop aggressive

enforcement of federal drug laws in states that have adopted laws legalizing marijuana for

medical purposes.”148

Though the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) immediately stated its

intention not to comply with these instructions, arrests related to marijuana use in such states

have indeed fallen. The DEA continues to conduct raids on marijuana facilities, though far less

than before.149

Obama has, in fact, been considerably more open-minded about marijuana policy than

any of his predecessors, except perhaps Carter, and it appears that his tolerance has opened the

door to both more active debate and more progressive marijuana policies at the state and local

levels. Today, 18 states and the District of Colombia have legalized medical marijuana use,

despite its continued classification as a Schedule I substance. Indeed, the legalization of

recreational marijuana use in Colorado and Washington in the 2012 election showed that the tide

is changing significantly on marijuana policy, while the Obama Administration permissively

asserts that it “has bigger fish to fry.”150

After the elections in Colorado and Washington, Obama

144 “Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs,” 35. 145

In “Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs,” 36. 146 Ibid., 36. 147 Mauer, Mark. “Beyond the Fair Sentencing Act.” The Nation, December 9, 2010. 148 Youngers, 3. 149 Ibid., 3. 150 Obama, Barack in Cohen, Adam. “Will States Lead the Way to Legalizing Marijuana Nationwide?” Time

Magazine: Ideas, January 28, 2013.

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also said that the federal government has a lot of crime to prosecute and so “it does not make

sense from a prioritization point of view for us to focus on recreational drug users in a state that

has already said that, under state law, that is legal.”151

The Administration has not, however, endorsed legalization efforts. Indeed, it has gone

out of its way to express its belief that legalization is not the answer. Drug czar R. Gil

Kerlkowske explained the reasoning behind the Administration position in 2010:

“The concern with marijuana is not born out of any culture-war mentality,

but out of what the science tells…And the science, though still evolving, is clear:

marijuana use is harmful. It is associated with dependence, respiratory and mental

illness, poor motor performance, and cognitive impairment, among other negative

effects… Several studies have shown that marijuana dependence is real and

causes harm…Those dependent on marijuana often show signs of withdrawal and

compulsive behavior…lower test scores and lower educational attainment.”

Advocates of legalization say the costs of prohibition…place a great

burden on taxpayers and governments. While there are certainly costs to current

prohibitions, legalizing drugs would not cut the costs...Our current experience

with legal, regulated prescription drugs like Oxycontin shows that legalizing

drugs…widens its availability and misuse, no matter what controls are in place.

Controls and prohibitions help to keep prices higher, and higher prices help keep

use rates relatively low, since drug use, especially among young people, is known

to be sensitive to price…The tax revenue collected from alcohol pales in

comparison to the costs associated with it…Tobacco also does not carry its

economic weight when we tax it; each year we spend more than $200 billion and

collect only about $25 billion in taxes… Legalizing marijuana would also saddle

government with the dual burden of regulating a new legal market while

continuing to pay for the negative side effects associated with an underground

market whose providers have little economic incentive to disappear…Legalization

means the price comes down, the number of users goes up, the underground

market adapts, and the revenue gained through a regulated market will never keep

pace with the financial and social cost of making this drug more accessible.”152

While much of this is undoubtedly true, it does not negate the fact that public sentiment on

marijuana legalization is shifting in a permissive direction, both domestically and internationally.

Obama has departed significantly from the path of his predecessors by tolerating this shift, but he

has neither endorsed marijuana legalization nor led the charge for a full reconsideration of

domestic drug policies.

As shown above, the continuity and change of the Obama Administration drug policies

can more clearly be described when disaggregated into the source, transit and consumption zone

strategies. In the source zone countries, President Obama has pursued a strategy very similar to

that of his predecessors, depending on the Drug War pillars of eradication, interdiction and

151 Obama in Cohen, 2. 152 Kerlikowske, R. Gil. “Statement from ONDCP Director R. Gil Kerlikowske: Why Marijuana Legalization Would

Compromise Public Health and Public Safety.” Delivered at the California Police Chiefs Association

Conference, March 4, 2010: 7-13.

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military and law enforcement support, though some changes were implemented in Afghanistan.

In the transit zone countries, geographic emphasis has shifted to Central America, the Caribbean

and Mexico, but the tactics used in Plan Colombia have largely been continued in the new

theater, maintaining the bulwarks of old-style Drug War policy- investigation, military and

police aid, interdiction, extradition and prosecution. At home, in the primary consumption

country, Obama has implemented significant reforms in treatment, prevention and law

enforcement, but has not fully embraced a policy reform agenda, leaving many disappointed with

the lack of larger reform initiatives.

In the next section, international efforts to depart from Drug War tactics and pursue

alternative drug policies will be examined.

Section 3: Drug War Failure and a New Willingness to Dissent

Latin America has long been the focal point of international US drug policy due to the

extensive production of cocaine, marijuana and other drugs in the region, as well as the porous

borders and weak governments and institutions that have for many years allowed criminal

organizations to flourish. In recent decades, Colombia has received the majority of attention

through Plan Colombia, but Mexico has also risen in importance as a key transit country, causing

substantial aid flows to ensue via the Merida Initiative. In both countries, and in the

surrounding region, leaders have embraced the inflexible US eradication and interdiction policies

with mixed feelings. On one hand, the significant flows of US aid money help to bolster

flagging institutions, train police and military personnel and provide development opportunity.

On the other hand, Latin American leaders have long affirmed that the majority of the

responsibility for existing drug trade is to be found in the countries where the drugs are

consumed, a point the United States has resisted admitting. Leaders further point to the

increasing levels of violence, corruption and fear that have resulted from enforcing the US-led

prohibition regime. At least in the beginning, when eradication and interdiction efforts seemed

to be working, the Latin American policy makers were content to accept the US policies in the

genuine hope that the problem could be managed. In recent years, however, as the costs of the

Drug War are seen to be rising and the Drug War is perceived to have failed, these leaders are

voicing their criticism more loudly and are demanding a change in strategy.

In 2010, some of the most important anti-Drug War voices of Latin American were

united in the release of a report by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy.

The report, entitled “Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift,” was co-authored by

three of the region’s most highly respected former presidents: Fernando Henrique Cardoso of

Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico and César Gaviria of Colombia (who has also served as

Secretary General of the Organizations of American States).153

This highly regarded report

decried the “failure of current policies” and called for a change in the “repressive policies

promoted at the global level by the United States.”154

Indeed, the report takes as its center-piece

the conclusion that “prohibitionist policies based on the eradication of production and on the

disruption of drug flows as well as on the criminalization of consumption have not yielded the

desired results. We are further than ever from the announced goal of eradicating drugs.”155

153 Gaviria, Cesar, et al. “Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift.” Latin American Commission on Drugs

and Democracy, 2010. 154 Ibid., 6-7. 155 Ibid., 5.

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3A: Evidence of Drug War Failure

There exists ample evidence pointing to shortcomings in the current strategy. Data

shows, for example, that “US consumption of cocaine and marijuana has been essentially stable

for many years—although considerably reduced from its peak in the 1970s and 1980s…today,

the United States consumes illegal substances at a rate some three times that of Europe.”156

In

fact, a study conducted by the European Union in 2009 showed that both drug use and

production remained steady over the years from 1998 to 2007, while the number of heroin and

cocaine users expanded and the price of illicit drugs in Western countries fell slightly, “including

in those [countries] that increased the stringency of their enforcement against sellers, such as the

U.K. and the U.S.A.”157

As a 2012 report by the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics

Control concluded, “with almost nine percent of the U.S. population using illegal drugs in 2010,

it is difficult to argue that enough is being done to reduce our demand for illegal drugs.”158

With steady demand in the consumption countries, production has adapted to meet the

consistent need. According to a RAND Corporation study, after the distribution of over $6

billion of US aid through Plan Colombia and over a decade of concentrated efforts, Colombia

“still constitutes the principal source of cocaine for both the U.S. and global markets, accounting

for 90 and 80 percent of respective consumption.”159

The report goes on to state that “there is no

sign that overall volumes shipped from the country will drop any time soon…Such an outcome

156 Hakim 2011, 4. 157

“A Report on Global Illicit Drug Markets 1998-2007.” European Commission: Directorate General, Justice

Freedom and Security. European Communities 2009, 10. 158 “Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs,” 45. 159 Chalk, 63.

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (chart from Isacson, 7)

Figure 6: In Colombia, “Eradication” Hasn’t Eradicated Coca

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might appear counterintuitive given the vast areas of coca leaf that have been destroyed through

aerial and manual eradication efforts. However, it is merely indicative of the ease with which

crops can be regrown…Indeed, the very use of crop eradication is questionable.”160

Adam Isacson of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) testified on similar

findings in a 2010 congressional hearing, stating that “by every measure, these ten years (2000-

2009) of aid to the region (Latin America) did not reduce cocaine supplies.”161

Isacson goes on

to explain that by sheer tonnage, the amount of cocaine produced in Latin America has either

stayed the same or increased since 1999, depending on which data source is referenced. In 1999,

the UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that Latin America produced 925 tons of cocaine.

The same agency reported in 2009 that between 842 and 1,111 tons were produced, while the US

Southern Command estimated that some 1,250 to 1,500 tons were produced.162

In fact, lowering overall drug production has been one of the most elusive targets of the

Drug War. Several individual countries have experienced occasional drops in production, many

of which can be traced to eradication and interdiction efforts, but such declines have invariably

been offset by increases in other countries. This “balloon effect” as it is called, has been

160 Ibid., 63-64. 161 Isacson, Adam. “International Counternarcotics Policies: Do They Reduce Domestic Consumption or Advance

other Foreign Policy Goals?” Testimony before the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and

Government Reform Committee, July 21, 2010: p. 2. 162 Ibid., 2.

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (chart from Isacson, 2)

Figure 7: Andean Cocaine Production is Unchanged

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documented thoroughly in various locations and time periods. In Peru and Bolivia in the 1990s,

for example, extensive eradication efforts led to a dramatic fall in coca leaf production,

stimulating an equally dramatic increase in production in Colombia. As spraying and manual

eradication efforts picked up in production regions of Colombia, farmers shifted to more remote

areas of the country. Likewise, the US success in shutting down Caribbean drug transit routes in

the early 1990s resulted in the rerouting of cocaine shipments through Central America and

Mexico.163

Along with steady or increasing demand and production, the price of many illicit drugs

has been falling for decades while the drugs on the streets reach ever higher levels of purity.164

Recall that US Drug War policy has consistently operated under the assumption that lowering

production and interdicting shipments would reduce the supply, thus increasing the final retail

price of drugs and disincentivizing their purchase and use. Testimony from another WOLA

scholar, John M. Walsh, shows that “cocaine’s U.S. retail price per pure gram in 2007 was the

lowest figure on record – nearly 22 percent lower than in 1999, the year before Plan Colombia

was launched (my emphasis).”165

Walsh goes on to affirm that “prices have fallen even as the

United States has escalated its central enforcement-led strategies to attack supply and restrict

163 Hakim, 4. 164 Ibid., 4. 165 Walsh, John M. “Assessing U.S. Drug Policy in the Americas: Time to Revisit Goals and Strategies.” Testimony

before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, October 19,

2009: p. 6.

Note: Heroin Prices have been divided by six to fit scale

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy (chart from Walsh, 7)

Figure 8: U.S. Spending on International Drug Control Rising,

Street Prices of Cocaine and Heroin Falling

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availability.”166

The 2009 European Commission report came to similar conclusions, stating that

“drug retail prices have generally declined in Western countries…[and] there are no indications

that drugs have become more difficult to obtain.”167

If price is an appropriate measure of how

well production is satisfying demand, it would appear that supplies continue to satisfy demand at

the same or higher levels than ever before.

What’s more, many of the countries traditionally thought of as production or transit

zones are now developing consumer blocks of their own, with markets responding to the new

demand by increasing production and inventing new avenues for illicit trade. According to a

RAND Corporation study, “in 2008, an estimated 2.7 million people were using cocaine in South

and Central America and the Caribbean, accounting for about 20 percent of global

consumption.”168

In fact, countries such as Puerto Rico and the Domincan Republic are now as

much consumption states as they are tansit hubs, resulting in significant challenges for the public

health and law enforcement sectors of these small countries.169

One country that is not so small has also developed a very lucratice market for illicit

drugs. Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, has long been the second most important

consumer of cocaine after the United States, but after lifting 30 million of its people into the

middle class in just over a decade, its market for illicit drugs has exploded.170

According to 2010

data, Brazil “consumes 18% of the world’s yearly supply of the drug (cocaine), with 2.8 million

Brazilians, or 1.4% of the population, snorting or smoking a combined 92,000 kilograms” per

year.171

This rise in drug consumption in Latin America has caused Latin leaders to examine

even more closely the demand reduction strategies employed in the US, as well as the supply

reduction strategies that continue in Latin America, and they have largely found both to be

yielding insufficient results and ever increasing economic and human costs.

3B: A New Willingness to Dissent

The costs and collateral damage of the Drug War have, in fact, been enormous, with costs

piling up for both the United States and Latin America. The sheer financial toll the Drug War

has taken on the United States is astounding. Between 1981 and 2008, “federal, state, and local

governments are estimated to have spent at least $600 billion (adjusted for inflation) on drug

interdiction and related law enforcement efforts; factoring in costs associated with treatment and

rehabilitation, the overall total rises to around $800 billion.”172

According to a 2012

Congressional Report from the Senate Cuacus on International Narcotics Control, drug-related

spending levels have only increased and as of 2012 had reached $193 billion per year.173

This

substantial financial burden represents a large opportunity cost for the United States, drawing

funds from other valuable priorities and saddling the Americna tax payer with the responsibility

for supporting the international drug prohibition regime.

166 Ibid., 7. 167

“A Report on Global Illicit Drug Markets 1998-2007,” 10. 168 Chalk, 40. 169 Ibid., 40. 170 Forero, Juan. “As U.S. Consumes Less Cocaine, Brazil Uses More.” National Public Radio, January 31, 2013. 171 Bradley, Theresa. “Brazil now consumes 18% of the world’s cocaine.” Quartz, September 23, 2012. 172 Chalk, 47. 173 “Reducing the U.S. Demand for Illegal Drugs,” 45.

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However, the costs and damages of the Drug War enforcement interventions have

unquestionnably been concentrated in Latin America, where prohibition, eradication, interdiction

and militarization of policy have resulted in the stigmatization of users, overcrowding of prisons,

human rights violations, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, severe

deforestation and pollution, a criminal market run by strong criminal organizations, an

underfunded public health sector, rampant street violence with untold casualties and pervasive

political, judicial and police corruption.

Latin American leaders are responding now, more than ever, to the costs of the Drug War

and are increasingly giving voice to their desires for alternative strategies. According to Hakim

and Covington, “Latin Americans have never been more critical of US drug policy than they are

today.”174

In fact, many countries have enacted what Martin Jelsma calls a “soft defection” from

Washington’s zero-tolerance prohibition model, enacting changes in policy that are inconsistent

with the letter and intent of US Drug War policies without overtly challenging the US on the

issue of drugs. What follows is a brief discussion of the most important reforms under wayin the

countries of Latin America.

Uruguay: Uruguay’s current leadership is among the most progressive in Latin America

on the issue of drugs, though current laws do not yet reflect those attitudes. Law 14.294 of 1974,

for example, allows that an “individual possessing a minimum quantity solely for personal use

will be expempt from penalty,” but it leaves to the judges discretion whether or not to invoke this

174 Hakim and Covington, 3.

Source: U.N Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Homicide Statistics, February 2010 in Seelke, Clare Ribando and Wyler, Liana Sun

and Beittel, June S. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs.” Congressional

Research Service, April 30, 2010.

Figure 9: Average Homicide Rates by Global Region: 2003-2008

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clause. The effect has been that many users continue to be arrested and tried for possession

despite the language of the 1974 law.175

The National Drugs Board of Uruguay, on the other hand, has called for an open debate

on drug policy at the global and regional levels and has issued statements declaring the

prohibition model to be a failure. President José Mujica, too, has pushed for the adoptin of

alternative policies. His 2012 security strategy, for example, called for Uruguay to become the

first country to regulate a legal cannabis market, and the President has followed that call with the

drafting of a legislative proposal that would realize that vision. Throughout 2012, the measure

was debated alongside an existing drug policy reform bill, under which an individual may grow

and harvest narcotic plants such as marijuana for personal consumption, but cultivation for

trafficking purposes remains illegal. Mujica’s bill, on the other hand, would establish a

government monopoly on the production of marijuana.176

After much debate, the two bills were combined in late 2012 and presented to Congress

in November, where they were expected to pass without delay. However, polls released just

before the vote indicated that 64 percent of Uruguayans oppose the bill in its current form,

spurring President Mujica to conclude that the time “is not ripe” for full legalization, and that the

“people must be educated.” “There is no reason to vote on a law just because it has the majority

in parliament,” Mujica said. “The majority has to come from the streets. The people have to

understand that with violence and putting people in prison the only thing we are doing is helping

the drug trafficking market.”177

The bill would have created a new government agency to regulate the legal drug market

and dsitribute licenses to produce, distribute and sell marijuana. Adults would have been

required to register with the governemnt in order to purchase marijuana and would have been

limited to purchasing no more than 40 grams of marijuana per month. Home cultivation would

have been limited to no more than six plants per household. The bill is expected to be

resubmitted in the near future, once the Uruguayan government has had a chance to rally the

public with an education campaign.178

Argentina: Policy reform has been driven in Argentina by the Supreme court, which

ruled in the “Fallo Arriola” case of 2009 that punishment in cases of possession for personal use

is unconstitutional. The legislature has been working since that ruling to reconcile this new legal

standing for personal use with the established police practice which continues to result in the

detention of casual drug users. Eight different reform bills have been submitted to date, all of

which decriminilizae personal marijuana possession and use to various extents. A proposal for

“self-cultuvation” of cannabis calls for the distinction of possession with intent to use and

possession wth intent to sell and leaves to the judge the taks of determining which is the case.

While providing for one to six years of oncarceration for those found to be trafficking or selling

marijuana, the law makes excpetion for some lo-level offenders, especially couriers who are

normally from marginalized and impoverished social strata.179

Ecuador: In response to sever prison overcrowding, Ecuador decided in 2005 to launch

a rethining of the country’s drug codes. The government started by granting pardons to some

175 Armenta, Amira and Metaal, Pien and Jelsma, Martin. “A breakthrough in the making?: “Shifts in the Latin

American drug policy debate.” Transnational Institute, June 2012: p. 8. 176 Ibid., 8. 177 Hesson, Ted. “Uruguayan President: Time "Not Ripe" for Pot Legalization.” ABC News, December 2012. 178 Ibid., 2. 179 Armenta et al., 9.

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2,000 convicted drug courriers in an emergency measure to ease strain on the overburdened

prison system. The prisons were soon filled again, however, due to the continuing effects of the

strict drug laws. Realizing this reality, the country “ began a political process to reform the

current Law on Narcotic Drugs and Pschotropic Substances (Law 108).”180

A new “Integral Organiza Penal Code” is now under debate in the National Assembly.

This new law proposes a comprehensive reform of all penal legislation and its implementation.

Articles within the law provide for the decriminlization of consumers by setting quantitative

thresholds for the possession of controlled substances. The law also sets special reduced

sentences for drug courriers and establishes the new category of “micro-traffickers” with

appropriately decreased sentences. What’s more, the new 2008 Constitution establishes the

drug consumption issue as a public health concern and allows that for users, “in no case will

criminilisation be permitted nore will persons’ constitutional rights be violated.” According to

Armenta et al., “the reform in general tends to amend the disproportionate nature of the penalties

and to emphasize the effectiveness of less repressive policies.”181

Brazil: Drug law changes in Brazil are also directed at reform of the penal code.

Consumption has been legal since 2006, but contradictions in the law and a lack of clarity have

allowed prosecution of drug possession and consumption to continue. The Legal Commission of

the Brazilian Senate has drafted legislation establishing the legal right to possess up to five days’

worth of certain drugs and to cultivate for puersonal consumption. The legislation also lowers

the maximum penalty for trafficking from 15 years to 10.182

The Brazilian judiciary has also been active in drug reform, decalring unconsitutional in

2012 the preventive detention of a person suspected of drug crimes. While this practice is

considered by many to be “one of the most aberrant examples of discrimination in Brazilian

law,” tens of thousand sof people remain imprisoned due to its continued existence.183

Colombia: With a 1994 ruling of the Constitutional Court, drug use was decriminilized

in Colombia. The ruling stated that “possession of a ‘minimal dose’ of drugs for personal use

‘can not be penalized’ when it occurs’ in the exercise of their personal rights, [and] the defendant

did not affect others.’”184

However, this ruling was overturned in 2009 when the Colombian

government amended its Constitution by abolishing the exception of 1994 and once again

establishing criminal penalties for consumption and possession of drugs. This has not taken full

effect, however, since the Supreme Court maintains its 1994 ruling. In practice, users caught

with minimal amounts of drugs are given an administrative penalty rather than a criminal

sanction. The term “minimal dose” was further defined in 2010 legislation limiting the

minimum dose of marijuana to 20 grams. Later legislation attempted to lower this threshold to 5

grams, but it has not ye been adopted.185

According to Armenta et al., Colombia is showing strong trends that favour

decriminlization and the view of drugs as a public health issue…, despite these regressive moves

to punitive schemes.” In fact, the plenary of the House approved a bill in June of 2012 which

recognizes that “the use, abuse and addiction to phsychoactive substances, legal or illegal, is a

public health matter.” The bill would require theState to provide special attention for problem

180 Ibid., 9. 181 Ibid., 9. 182 Ibid., 9. 183 Ibid., 10. 184 Ibid., 10. 185 Ibid., 10.

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drug users and incorporate them into the public health system. In addition, large swaths of civil

society and drug policy experts in Colombia have protested against the recriminilization of drug

use and Congress is once again considering a bill to decriminalize possession and consumption

of minimum doses.186

What’s more, the Congress began debating a bill in April of 2012 that would

decriminalize cultivation of cannabis, coca and poppy. Thought the bill is unlikely to pass, it

breaks new ground on a topic that was previously considered taboo in policy circles. Perhaps

most importantly for Colombia, President Juan Manuel Santos has openly questioned several

elements of the global prohibition regime enforced by the United States and has supported the

idea of treating drug abuse as a public health concern.187

Mexico: Mexico introduced the Law Against Drug Dealing in August of 2009, which

decriminalized possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use. According to the law, the

ttorney General is instructed “not to prosecute individuals found in possession of less than 5

grams of cannabis,0.5 grams of cocaine, 50 milligrams of heroin, or one ecstasy tablet, among

other minimum quantities.” If caught with amounts under the legal limit, the law instructs

officials to simply recommend and encourage the user to seek teatment, but after three

detainments for possession treatment becomes mandatory.188

The law, however, did not have the positive effect that many had expected. Due to the

extremely low thresholds for personal possession, the law effectively strengthens the hand of

police rather than improving the legal standing of users. For example, a user can only legally

possess half of one gram of cocaine, despite the fact that cocaine is sold on the street in one gram

portions and the average user consumes more than one half of a gram daily. This has resulted in

a significant increase in arrests and prosecutions rather than a decrease and has caused more

users to be identified as traffickers, causing stiffer penalties to be enforced.189

Mexican civil society, however, is “increasingly demanding a radical change of course in

the domestic drug war, including major business sectors calling for legal regulation.”190

The new

Mexican President, Enrique Peña Nieto, has signalled a shift in the drug control strategies of his

predecessor, though it is too early to tell if he will be an advocate for real reforms. He has called

for a refocusing on violent crime reduction, stating that “We are all clear that Mexico now

demands a country in peace, a quiet country, a safe country. This is our main objective.” The

President has also signalled wililngness to review detention policies and combar corruption in

the government’s drug enforcement agencies. Both initiatives are promising for drug policy

reform.191

Since Barack Obama ascended to the presidency in 2009, reform advocates in Latin

America have become even more vocal. The report of the Latin American Commission on

Drugs and Democracy is a perfect example. With full knowledge of the Drug War’s lack of

success in reducing production or demand and with personal experience of the devastating costs

those policies inflict on the people of Latin America, former Presidents Gaviria, Zedillo and

186

Ibid., 10. 187 Ibid., 10. 188 Rosmarin, Ari and Eastwood, Niamh. A Quiet Revolution: Drug Decriminalization Policies in Practice Across

the Globe. Release: Drugs, the Law and Human Rights: 2012: p. 25. 189 Armenta et al., 10-11. 190 Ibid., 11. 191 Casey, Nicholas. “Mexico's Drug War Takes New Direction.” The Wall Street Journal, December, 2012.

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Cardoso concluded in their report, “Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift,” that the

Drug War has failed.192

They went on to make the following key observations:

“Over the past decades we have witnessed:

A rise in organized crime caused both by the international narcotics trade and by the

growing control exercised by criminal groups over domestic markets and territories;

A growth in unacceptable levels of drug-related violence affecting the whole of society

and, in particular, the poor and the young;

The criminalization of politics and the politicization of crime, as well as the proliferation

of the linkages between them, as reflected in the infiltration of democratic institutions by

organized crime;

The corruption of public servants, the judicial system, governments, the political system

and, especially the police forces in charge of enforcing law and order.”193

Drawing from these observations, the report concluded with recommendations that each country

engage in an open debate on drug policy, adopt harm reduction measures wherever possible, and

engage in a “paradigm shift” by adopting the following three core directives:

Treating drug users as a matter of public health.

Reducing drug consumption through information, education and prevention.

Focusing repression on organized crime.

The report received wild acclaim in Latin America and around the globe for its open and honest

assessment of the effect of drug policies in Latin America. Indeed, it has galvanized Latin

American reform efforts and validated views previously considered too radical for mainstream

politics.

These views were again on display in the 2012 Summit of the Americas, where

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos played host, but also pressed President Obama on US

drug policy and pushed for a wider examination of alternatives to Drug War policies. “In spite

of all the efforts, the illicit drug business is still buoyant, drug addiction in all countries is a

serious public health issue, and drug trafficking is still the main provider of funding for violence

and terrorism,” Santos said. “An in-depth discussion around this topic is needed, without any

biases or dogmas, taking into consideration the different scenarios and possible alternatives to

more effectively face this challenge.” President Obama gave some ground, admitting at one

point that he is willing to discuss whether American drug laws are “doing more harm than

good in certain places.”194 President Obama explicitly refused, however, to consider the legalization of marijuana

and other drugs, telling press that “legalization is not the answer.” Facing Santos’ calls for a

debate among the 33 nations present, Obama affirmed that “the capacity of a large-scale drug

trade to dominate certain countries if they were allowed to operate legally without any constraint

192 Gaviria et al., 5. 193 Ibid., 5. 194 Parsons, Christi and Gold, Matea. “At Americas summit, Obama says no to legalizing drugs: Colombian

President Juan Manuel Santos and others want to talk about what they call the failed war on drugs, as

President Obama tries to focus on economic ties.” Los Angeles Times, April, 2012.

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could be just as corrupting, if not more corrupting, than the status quo.”195

Despite this

intransigence, Obama’s signaling that he is open to a debate on some US drug policies is an

important step forward, one that would not have occurred without the increasing pressure from

Latin American leaders who are no longer content to carry the burden of enforcing Washington’s

prohibition regime.

Section 4: Alternative Approaches and Reforms

Latin Americans are not the only ones showing readiness for a change in the drug policy

paradigm. European countries such as Holland, Spain and Portugal have been leading the way in

adopting innovative and more tolerant drug policies, while countries such as China, Mexico,

Australia and the United Kingdom have been experimenting with more limited, but still strongly

reformist measures. The tide is even shifting in the US. According to Peter Hakim of the Inter-

American Dialogue, “an increasing number of Americans support major change in US

policies.”196

In fact, polls suggest that almost 50 percent of Americans “favor legalizing the

possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use,” and according to a 2008 Zogby poll,

some 27 percent of Americans believe that “legalizing some drugs is the best way to combat both

the international and domestic drug trade.” That is nearly twice the number of people who

believe that eradication is the best method for stopping the drug trade.197

Recent state ballot initiatives to legalize recreational marijuana use illustrate these

shifting attitudes. By legalizing marijuana use, Colorado and Washington have initiated a grand

experiment that will test the government’s long-held belief that legalization will drastically

increase use without stemming the costs of the status quo. California, too, has pushed the

envelope with its medical marijuana laws. In fact, some 19 states and the District of Columbia

now have medical marijuana laws on the books. According to Hakim, “there are now few places

in the United States that actively prosecute possession of small quantities of any drug.”198

Many Americans have also become acutely aware of the high cost of the prohibitionist

system now in place. The recent recession and the ensuing fiscal crises in Washington have

“brought home to many Americans the immense financial and human costs of punitive drug

policies.”199

America is, in fact, the country with the largest percentage of its population behind

bars, due almost entirely to the long-term incarceration of those involved in drug activity.

Mandatory sentences and indiscriminate prosecution of users along with traffickers and sellers

has swollen the US prison population, disrupting lives and families while saddling the public

with enormous financial responsibilities. Americans are taking notice and demanding change.200

Even President Obama has signaled willingness to engage in an open debate on drug policy,

though no steps have yet been taken to realize that commitment.

Countries and states pursuing alternative drug approaches have varied policies stemming

from the unique context and challenges present at the time of reform and no two are exactly

alike. Reform agendas do, however, tend to include many of the same elements. Most countries

are not so active internationally on the drug issue as is the United States, so the primary concern

195 Ibid., 1. 196 Hakim 2011, 10. 197 Ibid., 10. 198 Ibid., 10. 199 Ibid., 10. 200 Ibid., 10.

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for most is the domestic drug policy sphere. Domestic drug reforms tend to focus on two

categories: Harm Reduction and Decriminalization. The US, of course, must also consider its

international drug policy responsibilities. While reforms on this front have been limited, several

changes enacted in the target countries of US drug policy illustrate the possibilities for larger

scale reform. These international reforms tend to fall into three categories: Focus on Crime, not

Drugs, Nation Building and Reduce Demand First.

What follows is a more in-depth look at each of these reform categories.

4A: Demand-Side Reforms: Harm Reduction and Decriminalization

Harm reduction “refers to policies and practices aimed to reduce adverse health and

social consequences for drug users, their families and society as a whole, without necessarily

ending drug consumption.”201

To adopt a harm reduction strategy requires as a prerequisite the

acknowledgement that supply and demand strategies may be capable of limiting drug use, but

they cannot succeed in eliminating drug use altogether. Harm reduction thinking also demands a

shift from the criminal enforcement paradigm to one based on public health and citizen

protection, one in which drug use is considered a treatable affliction rather than a criminal

offense. It is understandably difficult for policy makers to acknowledge that current policies

cannot succeed and to accept that drug use is an implacable reality, yet harm reduction reforms

have been shown to be enormously effective and cost-saving.202

For its part, the United States has been a staunch critic of harm reduction strategies and

has engaged in what Martin Jelsma calls “an ideological crusade against harm reduction,”

refusing even to include the phrase in public documents.203

The US has long upheld bans on

needle exchange programs, for example, which are known to lower HIV prevalence among

injection drug users. The Obama Administration has softened this resistance, but has not fully

embraced harm reduction strategies. Most UN agencies, on the other hand, including the World

Health Organization, the UN Development Programme, the Joint United Nations Programme on

HIV/AIDS and the Human Rights Council have fully endorsed harm reduction strategies and

attested to their effectiveness. Curiously, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs has remained

silent on the issue of harm reduction while the other UN bodies have wholeheartedly endorsed

it.204

The following reforms can contribute to a harm reduction strategy:

Focus on Prevention: Clearly the best way to minimize the damaging effects of drug use

is to prevent that drug use from occurring. Though this is never possible 100 percent of the time,

policies aimed at prevention have been shown to be a cost effective method for minimizing the

effects of drugs on a society. In fact, “research indicates that preventing drug use in the first

place is the most cost-effective strategy in drug control policy (my emphasis).”205

The fact is,

however, that spending on prevention in the US and many other countries remains insignificant

when compared with spending on law enforcement and supply-side strategies. Reforms in many

countries, such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Netherlands, have begun with a

201 Jelsma, Martin. “Legislative Innovation in Drug Policy.” Latin American Initiative on Drugs and Democracy,

October, 2009: p. 12. 202 Walsh, 2. 203 Jelsma 2009, 12. 204 Ibid., 12. 205 National Drug Control Strategy 2010, 8.

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rebalance of spending with significantly higher focus on prevention. These efforts often include

media and educational campaigns and youth outreach and should be based on “clear language

and arguments that are consistent with the experience of those they try to reach.”206

Provide Alternatives to Incarceration: As John Walsh affirms, “the challenge” of a

harm reduction strategy “is to minimize the damage caused by drug production, distribution, and

use – but also to minimize the damage caused by our drug policies themselves.”207

To achieve

this minimization of drug policy damage, a public health perspective on drug use must be

adopted and the traditional view of users as criminals must be abandoned. As Hakim affirms,

“arresting and imprisoning drug users does little, if anything to reduce consumption, and may

cause more harm to the individual and society than the drug use itself. Treatment not

punishment is the right way to deal with drug addicts and abusers.”208

Many countries have, therefore, implemented judiciary reforms that allow for alternatives

to incarceration. The United Kingdom, for example, implemented an “arrest referral scheme” in

1999, offering drug offenders the options of treatment or imprisonment. The approach resulted

in a dramatic drop in petty crime and was deemed by a review panel to be “a viable alternative to

imprisonment.”209

A similar program in Hawaii combined the treatment option with a probation

program that guaranteed community supervision of offenders with swift and certain

consequences for recidivism and drug use. This “HOPE” program required frequent drug testing

to ensure compliance and has been shown to reduce positive drug tests by three-quarters and new

arrests by half among probationers.210

However, outcomes for such programs are dependent on

the eligibility criteria for admission, the range of alternative sanctions and the quality of

available treatment services, so focus should be given to these elements when implementing such

a policy.211

Decriminalization: Much of the domestic policy reforms have also focused on the

decriminalization of drug possession and use. In fact, the very first reform measures in Europe

focused on “absolving drug users from arrest and prosecution for drug use and preparatory acts

like acquisition, simple possession or cultivation for personal use.”212

Marijuana has been the

most commonly decriminalized drug due to widely accepted views that it is the least harmful and

addictive of all common drugs. Hakim contends, for example, that “putting an end to the

criminal sanctions on marijuana also eliminates most of its harmful consequences—including the

crime and violence associated with its production, distribution, and sale; the damage done to the

careers and lives of the many young people arrested and imprisoned; the health dangers from

unregulated marijuana markets; and the huge financial burdens associated with enforcement

(overstretched police and overcrowded prisons and courts, for example).”213

It is important, however, to distinguish between decriminalization and legalization.

According to Jelsma, decriminalization is “the elimination of a conduct or activity from the

sphere of criminal law…commonly used in reference to offenses related to drug consumption

206 Gaviria et al., 9. 207 Walsh, 2. 208

Hakim, 7. 209 McSweeney, Tim and Stevens, Alex and Hunt, Neil. “The Quasi-Compulsory Treatment of Drug-Dependent

Offenders in Europe: final National Report.” England, ICPR/EISS, February 2006. 210 Walsh, 9. 211 Jelsma 2009, 8. 212 Ibid., 4. 213 Hakim 2011, 8.

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and usually manifested by the imposition of sanctions of a different kind (administrative) or the

abolition of all sanctions.” Legalization, on the other hand, “is the removal from the sphere of

criminal law of all drug-related offenses: use, possession, cultivation, production, trading, and so

on.” In short, decriminalization allows users to avoid criminal prosecution, but maintains

restrictions on drug use and continues enforcement of criminal laws regarding production and

trafficking.214

This is an important distinction that is often lost is public dialogue, where

legalization and the prohibitionist approach of the Drug War are presented as the only two policy

options.

According to the drug policy research organization Release, “to call the decriminalization

option a new one is misleading. Some countries have had decriminalization policies in place

since the early 1970s; others never criminalized drug use and possession to begin with.”215

The

last decade, however, has seen a dramatic rise in the number of countries decriminalizing drug

use, with estimates of the total number reaching 25 to 30 countries, depending on which

definition is used. Even more surprising is that these reforms are not geographically or

economically concentrated, but rather are appearing in countries as diverse as Armenia, Chile,

Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia Mexico and Portugal.216

The movement toward decriminalization received great support in 2011 when the Global

Commission on Drug Policy endorsed decriminalization policies in its War on Drugs report. The

Commission, which was made up of current and former heads of state, human rights and global

health experts, economists, UN leaders and business advocates, discussed in its report the failure

of the global Drug War and included a recommendation that “countries adopt decriminalization

policies.” In response, a series of summits were planned by Latin American leaders starting in

2012 to discuss “the feasibility of reforming their drug laws with a focus on decriminalization

and possible regulation of drugs.”217

In 2012, the organization Release published a broad survey of decriminalization policies

entitled “A Quiet Revolution: Drug Decriminalization Policies in Practice Across the Globe.”

This report documented the variations in policy across countries and examined the results of

decriminalization on drug use and other related indicators. Critics of decriminalization have long

predicted that the only possible outcome is a dramatic increase in drug use as well as in all the

related negative effects of drug use. The report by Release concluded, however, that “after

evaluating many of the decriminalization policies in practice around the world, there are few

broad, unifying conclusions that can be drawn, except that the doomsday predictions are wrong.”

What the researchers, in fact, found was that “the harms of criminalization far outweigh those of

decriminalization…, [which] appears to direct more drug users into treatment, reduce criminal

justice costs, and shield many drug users from the devastating impact of a criminal

conviction.”218

However, decriminalization policies vary on a number of characteristics, including the

quantitative threshold of legal possession, the use and types of administrative penalties, the roles

of the judiciary and police, the role of medical professionals and harm reduction programs as

well as the challenges of implementation.

214 Jelsma 2011, 7. 215

Rosmarin et al., 9. 216 Ibid., 8. 217 Ibid., 8-9. 218 Ibid., 11.

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Quantitative Thresholds: Many countries that have decriminalized the personal use of

drugs have decided to maintain criminal penalties for drug producers and distributors, creating

the need for a mechanism to distinguish between users and those involved in other drug-related

activities. Quantitative thresholds establish maximum amounts of a drug that can be possessed

without suspicion of intent to distribute. These amounts vary greatly and have a great impact on

the law’s effectiveness in decriminalizing drug use. In Spain, for example, possession of 7.5

grams of cocaine is permissible, whereas in Mexico possession of any amount over 0.5 grams is

considered a criminal offense. In practice, Mexico’s law has not decriminalized drug use

because of the inordinately low threshold.219

Administrative Penalties: In place of criminal sanctions, many countries put

administrative penalties in place to maintain civil pressure on drug users. These penalties may

include community service, fines, warnings, education classes, suspension of a driver’s or

professional license, travel bans, property confiscation, mandatory reporting, termination of

public benefits, administrative arrest, or no penalty at all.220

Role of Judiciary and Police: Some countries grant authority to local police to issue

“fines in the field,” much as they would for a traffic violation or for speeding, while others

require individuals to appear before a judge in court.221

Role of Medical Professionals and Harm Reduction Programs: The integration of a

country’s public health system with the judiciary system for drug users greatly affects the

outcome of decriminalization. Some countries, such as Portugal, arrange for every arrestee to

meet with a panel of medical professionals and social workers to determine whether and what

kind of treatment might be necessary. In other countries, such as Poland, this responsibility is

assigned to the prosecutor. In addition, the availability and resources dedicated to treatment and

harm reduction greatly affects outcomes.222

Implementation Challenges: In certain cases, the existence of a statutory, judicial or

regulatory decriminalization policy is not enough to end persecution of users due to

unwillingness or inability to implement the policy on the ground. Police in Peru, for example,

regularly arrest and detain individuals for possession, but issue no official charge, despite

Peruvian laws stating that there should be no penalty for minor possession offenses. For those

detained for long periods of time, this does not resemble true decriminalization.223

CASE STUDY, Portugal: Over the past ten years, Portugal has become the poster child

for both harm reduction and decriminalization reform policies. Reform in Portugal was initiated

in 2001 in response to a perceived national drug problem and began with the decriminalization of

use and possession of all drugs. A second law in 2001 refocused the country’s drug policies on a

public health model and provided substantial state funding for a number of harm reduction

initiatives, including drop-in centers, shelters, mobile health units, prescription programs,

syringe-exchange programs and other initiatives for dependent drug users.224

The decriminalization law set a loose quantitative threshold limiting acceptable

possession to 10 days’ worth of an average daily dose of drugs for personal use. Anyone caught

219 Ibid., 9. 220 Ibid., 9. 221 Ibid., 9. 222 Ibid., 9. 223 Ibid., 10. 224 Ibid., 28.

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with up to 10 days’ worth of drugs is issued a citation referring the individual to a “dissuasion

commission” (CDT), which is a three person panel made up of medical experts, social workers

and legal professionals. These panels are designed to be “non-adversarial,” are focused on a

“health-centered approach” and are equipped with an array of administrative penalties that can

be assigned based on the severity of the individual’s offense and the observed need for treatment.

Possible administrative sanctions include “requiring treatment for those who are drug-dependent,

requiring regular reporting to the panel, mandating community service, suspending a driver’s

license or other licenses, or, as a last resort, issuing fines.” For first time offenders who are not

addicted to drug use, the panels will almost always suspend the proceedings and impose no

sanctions. Those caught with more than 10 days’ worth of a drug enter the criminal justice

system and can be charged with trafficking or criminal consumption. 225

The CDTs facilitated some 6,000 cases per year between 2002 and 2009, with an average

of 63.5 percent of cases resulting in suspension of proceedings for non-dependent users. In

2009, 15 percent of cases ended with a requirement to seek treatment, approximately 76 percent

of which involved cannabis alone, while an additional 11 percent involved heroin and 6 percent

involved cocaine, with the remainder of cases involving multiple drugs.226

Observers of the Portuguese model have issued reports with judgments ranging from

“resounding success” to “disastrous failure,” but according to the Release report, “the truth lies

somewhere in the middle.” The report concluded, in fact, that “Portugal experienced a small

increase in lifetime drug use among adults following decriminalization, on par with its regional

neighbors. Yet Portugal’s level of drug use still remains generally below the European average.

Significantly, analysis has also demonstrated marked decreases in reported prevalence of use

among particularly vulnerable groups.” Recent and current use among 15-24 year olds, for

example, declined during the years from 2001 to 2007. Rates of reported lifetime use among

adults appeared to increase, but the prevalence of cannabis among this group remains the lowest

in Western Europe. Trends also suggest that fewer young people are becoming addicted to

harder drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Perhaps most importantly, recent studies suggest “that

there has been a 50 percent decrease in the number of problematic drug users, from 100,000 in

the early 1990s to 50,000 in 2012, [while] the estimated numbers of injecting drug users in

Portugal also decreased by over 40 percent during that same period.”227

Results for the public health sector have also been promising. For example, the number

of drug-dependent individuals seeking treatment has increased significantly and transmission of

HIV and tuberculosis have drastically fallen due to the harm reduction measures put in place. In

fact, the “number of new drug users diagnosed with HIV decreased from 907 in 2000 to 267 in

2008 and the number of new AIDS cases decreased from 506 to 108 over the same period.”

What’s more, the National Statistics Institute of Portugal has recorded “a significant decrease in

the number of drug-related deaths since the introduction of decriminalization and the increased

investment in harm reduction services.”228

The policy has been a resounding success on the criminal justice side as well, with the

number of criminal drug offenses falling from approximately 14,000 per year to an average of

5,250, leading to a dramatic reduction in both the number and proportion of individuals serving

time in Portuguese prisons for drug-related offenses. 44 percent of prisoners in 1999 were

225 Ibid., 28. 226 Ibid., 28-29. 227 Ibid., 29. 228 Ibid., 30.

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incarcerated for drug-related offenses, but by 2008 that number had dropped to only 21 percent,

resulting in “a major reduction in prison overcrowding.” What’s more, Portuguese law-

enforcement statistics show that capacity has been freed up among law enforcement agencies,

“resulting in more domestic drug trafficking seizures and an increase in international anti-

trafficking collaborations that have provided for greater targeting of drug traffickers by sea.”229

In short, decriminalization coupled with well-funded harm reduction initiatives in

Portugal resulted in fewer problematic users, more users seeking treatment, a fall in use among

youth, a decline in HIV and tuberculosis transmission, a fall in drug-related mortality, a decrease

in the number of individuals incarcerated for drug-related offenses and an increase in the

capacity of the police forces to target, interdict and arrest drug traffickers and organized crime.

There is still much to be learned from the Portuguese model and the long-term effects of the

reforms remain unknown, but 12 years of experience indicate that an aggressive prohibition

approach is certainly not the only viable path for confronting the issue of drugs.

4B: Supply-Side Reforms: Focus on Organized Crime and Alternative Development

Focus on Organized Crime: Traditional supply-side strategy has focused on the pillars

on eradication, interdiction and law enforcement to confront the cultivation, processing and

trafficking of narcotics. These strategies have failed to decrease cultivation or significantly

impact the amount of product arriving in consumption zones, but they have succeeded in

inflicting incredible social, economic and human costs. Corruption and violence are on the rise

in many source zone countries, while national governments and US aid continue to focus on the

traditional Drug War tactics.

Leaders in some source zone countries have accordingly drawn focus away from certain

of the traditional pillars in order to increase focus on what they see as the core issue and the

source of the most damage related to the drug trade: organized crime. In fact, Hakim maintains

that “most Latin American governments consider the control of crime and violence – not the

elimination of the drug trade – to be their main goal.”230

This shift in objectives and strategy is what David Johnson of the Center for Strategic and

International Studies calls a “redefinition of the battle space.” From the US perspective, Johnson

explains, this means “directing significant funds toward helping our partners build the kinds of

police, judicial, and corrections systems they need and deserve,” as well as reconsidering the

indicators of policy success. Eradication and interdiction quantities, kingpin eliminations, arrest

records and prosecution rates are measurements of the old strategy. According to Johnson,

“seizures can help you keep score and can help starve traffickers of revenue. Cases prosecuted

in the United States can satisfy a need for justice and give space for foreign institutions to

become resilient. But unless the United States wants to combat this scourge forever, helping our

Latin American partners grow their own effective, resilient criminal justice institutions is not just

the most important thing—it is really the only thing.”231

A new focus on fighting organized crime and a departure from the pillars of eradication

and interdiction is exactly what leaders are calling for. In the 2010 report by the Latin American

Commission on Drugs and Democracy, for example, former presidents from Colombia, Brazil

229 Ibid., 30. 230 Hakim 2011, 9. 231 Johnson, David T. “Recommendations for a New Administration: Justice and Police Reform for Safer, More

Secure Societies.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2012: p. 2.

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and Mexico called for the United States and their fellow Latin American nations to “redirect

repressive strategies to the unrelenting fight against organized crime.” They stated that “public

policies should be targeted to fighting the most harmful effects of organized crime on society,

such as violence, institutional corruption, money laundering, arms trafficking, and the control

over territories and populations.”232

In practical terms, this means tempering or eliminating eradication efforts and instead

putting more focus on citizen security, judicial and police reform, improved governance and

economic development.

Alternative Development: As shown earlier, the challenges of preventing coca and

poppy production through forced crop eradication, either manual or aerial, are daunting and the

results of such programs are disappointing to say the least. Indeed, Coletta Youngers and John

Walsh of WOLA affirm that eradication as a “strategy is not only ineffective, but actually

counterproductive.”233

Fortunately, say Coletta and Walsh, “even as the evidence of forced eradication’s failure

has mounted, a growing body of research and experience is pointing to more promising options

for sustainably reducing coca and poppy cultivation.” This approach is what many call

‘alternative development’ or ‘alternative livelihoods.’ “Rather than continue to focus on

destroying crops that are sooner or later replaced, a ‘development first’ approach emphasizes

improving the economic options available to coca and poppy farmers, permitting gains in their

welfare that can eventually translate into reduced reliance on crops for illicit markets.”234

Such

an approach recognizes the following realities:

Coca and other illicit crops are poor targets for policy because they can easily be

replanted and represent only a tiny portion of the retail price of the end product, meaning

that even aggressive eradication has only minimal effect on drug availability and price;

Farmers with limited survival options will continue to depend on illicit crop cultivation

until sustainable alternatives become readily available;

Developing sustainable alternatives to illicit cultivation requires a comprehensive, long-

term commitment to addressing the structural deficiencies and problems that led farmers

to grow illicit crops in the first place.235

While alternative development schemes have been part of US policy for decades, their

focus has traditionally been on short-term, project-based interventions that have generally

ignored the larger-scale, underlying issues pushing poor farmers to grow illicit crops. Youngers

and Walsh point to an evolution in thinking on alternative development, “progressing from the

notion of ‘crop substitution’ projects to ‘alternative development’ programs, and then finally to

an ‘alternative livelihoods’ approach.” This shift, they say, “has generally involved a transition

from isolated, project-specific interventions to broader, multi-sectoral policies aimed at reducing

232 Gaviria et al., 10. 233 Youngers, Coletta A. and Walsh, John M. “Development First: A More Humane and Promising Approach to

Reducing Cultivation of Crops for Illicit Markets.” Washington Office on Latin America, March 2010: p.

10. 234 Ibid., 10. 235 Ibid., 10-11.

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farmers’ reliance on crops for the illicit market by addressing the structural and institutional

factors that share their decisions to grow coca or opium poppies.”236

These underlying issues include the lack of roads and transportation infrastructure, lack

of access to credit and markets, inadequate irrigation, the lack of markets for alternative crops,

land insecurity due to lack of government deeds, land ownership concentration and myriad other

problems. In a study of efforts to address these obstacles, the European Union concluded the

following:

“No single project or program can address the multiple factors that drive illicit drug

production;

Evidence points to the fact that it is a combination of improved governance, security and

economic growth that will deliver development impact required to improve the life and

livelihood of primary stakeholders and reduce illicit drug [crop] cultivation; and

Development assistance in illicit crop producing areas should be undertaken in full

compliance with the overall aims of human rights protection, poverty alleviation, conflict

prevention and resolution, peace building and human security.”237

The United Nations has also begun to move its rhetoric and policy in this direction,

stating in the 2012 World Drug Report that “Alternative Development is the key to reducing

illicit drug crop cultivation and drug production.”238

This approach was also endorsed by the

Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, though an additional element was added

in this report. The authors added that “such initiatives must also take into account the legal uses

of plants, such as the coca leaf, in countries with a long-standing tradition of ancestral use

previous to the phenomenon of their exploitation as an input for drug production.”239

This has

been a long term issue for countries such as Bolivia, where traditional practices include chewing

the coca leaf as well as consuming it in teas and other forms. Gaining local support for

alternative development will necessitate a more flexible approach to dealing with these

traditional practices.

Isacson, of WOLA, raises an important question in regards to alternative development:

“Is the U.S. government ‘set up’ to help?” Isacson contends that the broader approach required

for alternative development really has little about it that is specifically “counternarcotic,” rather

it has more in common with “nation building.” The US Government, according to Isacson, has

avoided this term because of the long-term commitment it implies and because the agencies

charged with counternarcotics are not those normally responsible for governance and

development. The DEA, ONDCP and other counternarcotic agencies “have important

contributions to make,” says Isacson, “but in a ‘strengthening states without impunity’

environment, their roles must be part of a much bigger effort.”240

236 Ibid., 11. 237 “EU presidency paper: Key points identified by EU experts to be included in the conclusion of the open-ended

intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops

and on alternative development.” 4 July 2008, presented to the open-ended intergovernmental working

group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development

(2-4 July 2008),UNODC/CND/2008/WG.3/CRP.4, 4 July 2008, p. 5. 238

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2012. Vienna: United Nations, 2012: p. iii-iv. 239 Gaviria et al., 10. 240 Isacson, 16-17.

P a g e | 47

Isacson in fact affirms that “the ironic but unavoidable reality is that, in order truly to

reduce drug supplies, the supply-side reduction agencies’ role may have to be reduced to a

supporting role subordinate to a larger, more complex, longer-term governance effort.” The US

Agency for International Development, says Isacson, is “the natural lead agency” for such an

effort, having already implemented civilian governance programs in countries around the globe.

He therefore recommends that the entire US supply-side strategy be shifted to promote

alternative development under the auspices of USAID, with a subordinate role for the traditional

counternarcotic agencies.241

Though a deeper discussion of alternative development methods is beyond the scope of

this paper, it is worth including the “ten lessons learned for promoting alternative livelihoods”

that Youngers and Walsh believe should serve as the basis of supply-side reforms in this

direction:

1. Proper sequencing is crucial: Development must come first

2. Eradication of coca and opium poppy crops is counter-productive unless alternative

livelihoods are already firmly in place

3. Farmers should be treated as partners in development, not as criminals

4. Development assistance should not be contingent on the prior elimination of crops

deviated to the illicit market

5. Alternative livelihoods goals and strategies should be integrated into local, regional and

national development plans

6. Agricultural and trade policies must prioritize small-scale rural development

7. The basic elements of effective governance and the rule of law must be in place for

development and drug control efforts to succeed

8. Reducing violent conflict creates the conditions for promoting sustainable development

and hence effective drug control

9. Progress toward development goals and crop reductions should be measured using human

development and socio-economic indicators

10. Development and crop reduction strategies must respect the traditions of local cultures242

CASE STUDY, Bolivia: Since the election of President Evo Morales in 2006, Bolivia

has pursued drastically different supply-side strategies than those proffered by the United States,

including alternative development and a renewed focus on organized crime. Most of the

attention to the changes has focused on the conflict they have caused between Bolivia and the

US-- the decision of the Chapare farmers not to work with USAID; the Bolivian government’s

expulsion of the US Ambassador and the DEA in 2008; the Bush Administration’s

“decertification” of Bolivia and its cancellation of trade benefits; and the Obama

Administration’s renewal of decertification for Bolivia in 2009. Little attention has been given,

however, to the merits of the policy reforms now at work in Bolivia.243

Before Bolivia’s reforms took place, forced coca eradication in the Chapare coca growing

region created enormous tension in the country, resulting in “protests, violent confrontations,

attacks on alternative development installations and human rights violations, including illegal

detentions, torture and killings.” During the worst of it, political unrest and instability led to a

241 Ibid., 17-18. 242 Youngers et al., 27-32. 243 Ibid., 23.

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rapid succession of five failed presidencies in as many years. According to Youngers and

Walsh, “during this time, eradication far out-paced the provision of alternative development

assistance, causing significant declines in the already meager incomes, as well as the health and

nutrition, of local families.”244

Forced eradication of coca was destroying famers’ ability to

support themselves and they, in turn, were making the country impossible to govern.

However, the Bolivian government began to change its strategy in 2004, when it was

decided that farmers would be allowed to ensure some basic level of income through limited

cultivation of coca, while the government simultaneously works with coca growers’ federations

and the security forces to seek voluntary reduction of overall coca production. President Carlos

Mesa spear-headed this effort, signing an agreement in 2004 with the Chapare coca growers’

federation allowing each family to maintain one cato of coca (1,600 square meters, or about one-

third the size of a football field). This agreement also dictated that coca cultivation found to be

in excess of that limit would be subject to destruction and the owner subject to stiff penalties

under law. This ended the practice of forced eradication, replacing it with community

cooperation, thus bringing to an end the violence and conflict that had wracked the country for so

long.245

Morales continued these efforts and designed a strategy based on cooperative eradication,

community enforcement, alternative development and strong policies against illegal trafficking.

Its four main pillars are as follows:

“Continuation of cooperative coca reduction in the Chapare and extending it into other

coca producing areas previously unaffected by forced eradication, while avoiding the

violence and conflict that have characterized past efforts;

Recognition of the cultural, religious, health and other positive attributes of the coca leaf;

Industrialization of coca for licit uses; and

Increased interdiction of precursors, cocaine and other drugs at all stages of

production.”246

According to Youngers et al., “allowing limited coca cultivation provides families with

subsistence income (and food security), affording greater flexibility to experiment with other

agricultural products and seek out other income generating opportunities – key elements of a

long-term coca reduction strategy.”247

The Morales government has also sought alternative sources of income for farmers by

experimenting with new crops and new uses for old ones. The administration has pursued, for

example, the development of alternative, licit uses for the coca plant, including in products such

as tea. Subsidies for corn and rice cultivation are also providing avenues for alternative income

development as well as creating additional food security.248

The European Union is providing development aid for these programs and is monitoring

the results of these methods in Bolivia. Their studies have noted that “for the most part, the cato

limit is being respected,” while “interdiction rates have hit record levels.”249

What’s more, US

244 Ibid., 23. 245 Ibid., 24. 246 Ibid., 24. 247 Ibid., 24-25. 248 Ibid., 26. 249 Ibid., 26.

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and UN estimates indicate that the growth of coca cultivation in Bolivia has slowed since

implementation of these new policies began in 2005. Records show that cultivation increased by

23 percent between 2001 and 2004, but only grew by 20 percent between 2005 and 2008. It is

additionally worth noting that even with this growth in production, Bolivia still produces far less

than either Colombia or Peru.250

Perhaps the most important result has been the stabilization of

the country’s political system, with Evo Morales having held office now for seven consecutive

years.

Section 5: Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has traced the evolution of US counternarcotic policy, examined and assessed

the current drug policies under President Obama, illustrated the rising tide of dissent broiling in

Latin America and around the world and analyzed existing alternatives in practice globally.

Each section has illuminated one facet of the incredibly complex and convoluted morass that is

US drug policy, scratching only the surface of the available information and analysis available.

The object of this review, however, has been to illustrate the pressing need for an immediate

change of course and provide some guidance for that historical inflection based on evidence,

experience and lessons learned. As stated in President Obama’s 2010 Strategy, “we cannot

continue to pursue the same old strategy and expect better results.”251

The recommendations that

follow could effect lasting change in US drug policy and lead the country to the ‘better results’

that still seem so far out of reach.

5A: General Recommendations

1) Provide presidential leadership: The history of US international engagement in narcotic

control efforts lends the United States a special responsibility and claim to leadership on

the issue of drug reform. If President Obama is unable or unwilling to lead on this issue

due to the numerous competing priorities, he should assign someone at a high level in his

administration to play a leadership role in drug policy reform and clearly place the weight

of the White House behind him or her.

2) Increase focus and spending on demand reduction efforts at all levels: Spending on

demand reduction has consistently been about two thirds of that spent on supply

reduction efforts, despite evidence indicating that demand reduction is both more

effective and less costly. Increased focus on demand reduction would also satisfy critics

of US drug policy and help reinforce positive relations with our Latin American partners.

3) Support and encourage the establishment of commissions in both the House and

Senate to review US antinarcotic policy: Legislation pending in both the House and

Senate would establish commissions to engage in comprehensive reviews of current US

anti-drug policies and develop alternative domestic and international policies. President

Obama should support passage of one or both of these bills and ensure that US

government agencies comply with the inquiries of the commissions. Past drug reform

250 Ibid., 27. 251 National Drug Control Strategy 2010. v.

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commissions have been unwilling to consider a sweeping overhaul of drug policy due to

the perceived political ramifications, but the current shift in international drug practices

and philosophies, as well as changing public opinion in the US, have opened the door to

an evidence-based debate and more progressive approaches to reform. Now is the time

for the government to explore the possibilities for policy reform within a structured

investigation of options.

4) Promote the establishment of an international task force for drug policy review: The

report issued by the Latin American Commission of Drugs and Democracy stimulated

incredible discussion and debate among leaders around the world. This debate should be

given an official venue, either in the UN or through an independently organized body, to

discuss global anti-drug policies, evaluate outcomes and identify effective practices, as

well as encourage the adoption of alternative, evidence-based approaches. This, too, has

been proposed in the past, but current conditions promise better results.

5) Improve collection of data: The poor quality and inconsistency of current data

collection on virtually all aspects of the drug trade and anti-drug policy frustrate efforts to

accurately assess and compare policies across time and countries, while providing little

information to inform alternative strategies. Varying definitions and methodologies,

incomplete collection and conflicts of interest among data collectors all undermine the

collection of reliable data. The US should lead in establishing a standard set of drug

policy indicators and collection techniques, as well as advocate for more frequent

analyses and better dissemination of data. While increasing spending is difficult under

the current budgetary conditions, lawmakers should consider the costs of not improving

data collection on policies that affect millions of people. Billions of dollars have been

committed to the War on Drugs. It’s time to allot the funds that will make it possible to

better measure its results, compare it to alternatives and weigh the existing policy

options.

6) Select indicators that can better inform policy: Indicators should be directly tied to the

desired policy outcomes—such as reduced crime and violence, fewer overdose

mortalities, reduced spread of HIV/AIDS, improved standards of living for farmers,

fewer individuals incarcerated and lower rates of problematic substance abuse -- rather

than simply describing anti-drug activities (e.g., hectares of crops eradicated, tons of

drugs seized, number of arrests and convictions obtained). Selecting better indicators

will aid in the evaluation and comparison of policies and build the right incentives within

the anti-drug bureaucracy.

7) Reclassification of Substances: The classification schedules attached to the 1961 and

1971 UN Conventions do not provide sufficient differentiation between narcotic

substances, confusing the identification of appropriate policy interventions for varied

substances. The Conventions convey a zero-tolerance ideology and fail to take into

account the different properties and reasons for use of the included substances, lumping

drugs as varied as coca, cocaine, cannabis, opium and heroin into the same category.

Classifications should be reconfigured based solely on a scientific examination of a

substance’s specific characteristics, the related health risks, the dynamics of their markets

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and their primary user groups. Such a change would inevitably require US backing,

which is not forthcoming, but the balance is shifting internationally with more and more

countries moving to alternative policies. If the US does not lead reform in the UN on

drugs, it may soon find itself isolated on this issue.

5B: Supply-side Policy Recommendations

1) Relinquish the dominant US role in shaping regional drug policy: Washington

should be encouraging and participating in cooperative approaches to drug policy with

Latin American governments. Genuine cooperation should extend not only to the

technical and bureaucratic levels, but also to the formulation of policies and strategies.

Latin America is more active than ever before in experimenting with alternative drug

policies and is moving away from the hub-and-spoke model that has kept Washington at

the center of drug policy formation. The US should support such experimentation. If the

US does not adopt a more cooperative approach soon, it risks being sidelined on the drug

issue as Latin America forges ahead in spite of US resistance instead of because of US

assistance. President Obama should welcome and participate in serious drug policy

discussions with hemispheric leaders, perhaps at the next Summit of the Americas or in

his upcoming trip to Central America.

2) End the practice of decertification: This overtly paternalistic practice belongs to an era

in which the United States was the unquestioned leader of the free world. Today’s

environment demands a cooperative approach that emphasizes equal partnership and

shared responsibility for global issues such as the drug trade. Ending the practice of

decertification will demonstrate to our Latin American and other partners that the US is

serious about pursuing a new relationship built on mutual respect, shared responsibilities

and earnest intentions. With the increased importance of the Latino vote in the US, it is

possible that conservative congressmen would be more flexible on this issue than in

previous decades.

3) Adopt and expand alternative livelihoods development approaches to reduce illicit

crop cultivation: Alternative development has been shown to create sustainable

alternative livelihoods for farmers of illicit crops, resulting in long-term reduction of

illicit cultivation. This approach requires a comprehensive approach that is larger than

traditional counternarcotic activities and more closely aligned with activities of civilian

agencies such as USAID and the Departments of State and Justice. The US should shift

responsibility for such activities to these civilian agencies and encourage continued

review of results of alternative development programs and adopt and expand effective

practices in this field. In the medium term, alternative development should become the

primary method for combatting illicit drug production. In a shift away from the Drug

War, adopting alternative development measures is a politically safe alternative that

carries few of the risks associated with more ambitious reforms such as endorsing

decriminalization or legalization.

4) Abandon forced eradication: Forced eradication has been shown to be a

counterproductive strategy that causes untold environmental damage, hurts poor farmers

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and wastes billions of dollars while failing to stem production. Crops are too easily

replanted and production can too easily shift into new areas and countries. More

promising results have been obtained when cooperative eradication is coupled with a

well-funded, long-term alternative development program with local support. Abandoning

forced eradication will go far in improving relations with our Andean neighbors and will

improve the outlook for thousands of farmers. Lobbying efforts by the producers of

aerial spray chemicals will undoubtedly seek to stall any measure halting forced

eradication, but the damage of this policy is evident, as is its failure to reduce the flow of

drugs.

5) Refocus strategic attention on combatting organized crime: Many countries in Latin

America are becoming less concerned about combatting drug use than they are about

stemming the violence and crime that the drug trade creates. With over 50,000 homicides

in Mexico in the last 5 years, it is not hard to understand this shift in priorities. The US

needs to recognize and support Latin American efforts to decrease the violence and

increase security, even if it means tempering the aggressive military and police approach

of the War on Drugs. This means putting more focus on citizen security, judicial and

police reform, improved governance and economic development.

5C: Demand-side Policy Recommendations

1) Officially adopt harm reduction as both a goal and a strategy for combatting illicit

drug use: Eliminating all drug use is impossible. Policy should, therefore, focus on

reducing the harms caused by drug abuse. The Obama Administration should publicly

endorse and adopt a public health approach based on the principles of harm reduction and

informed by evidence and effective practices. These efforts should include the

incorporation of addicts into the existing public health system and the proliferation of

harm reduction services such as syringe exchange programs. Some of these policies have

already been loosely adopted by the Obama Administration, but their scale and impact

are limited by political unwillingness to retreat from the goal of ending all drug use.

With attention focused on the economy and shifting public opinion in favor of reform, the

time has never been better for a redirection toward harm reduction. America is ready and

waiting.

2) Increase funding for prevention and treatment programs: Investments in prevention

have been shown to be more cost effective than later interventions, saving money and

preventing the damaging effects of drug use. Yet funding has been withheld for

information and educational campaigns such as the Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign

while spending has increased for interdiction, eradication and law enforcement efforts.

President Obama and Congress should act immediately to reestablish balance between

prevention and law enforcement expenditures and provide for continued examination of

effective practices in drug use prevention. Reallocating funds is never easy, and the

existing Drug War bureaucracy is sure to resist any diversion of its funding, but the

desperate search for budgetary savings coupled with the proven cost effectiveness of

prevention and treatment programs make this reform a very real possibility.

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3) Stimulate an open debate at all levels of government and society on the merits of

alternative approaches to drug control, including decriminalization: The greatest

challenge to drug policy reform is a pernicious unwillingness to talk about it. President

Obama can make the most important and most easily achieved advancement in drug

policy reform simply by opening an honest, evidence-based debate and examination of

current drug policies and the existing alternatives. This crucial step will serve, at the very

least, to educate the American public about the shortcomings in current policy and may

create more political space for the consideration of reforms.

4) Evaluate from a public health perspective, and with full recognition of the collateral

damage caused by current policies, the merits of decriminalizing the possession of

marijuana for personal use: Marijuana is by far the most commonly used illegal drug

and American public opinion grows continuously more accepting of its use both for

medicinal and recreational purposes. Strong evidence suggests that the damage caused

by its prohibition may outweigh the potential harms of its decriminalization. Certainly

the experiences of countries such as Portugal and Spain demonstrate that fears of

dramatic increases in use have been exaggerated. It is time for an open evaluation of the

merits of marijuana decriminalization, with a sober look at the costs and benefits.

Allowing such reforms at the state level indicates a certain implicit acceptance of the

possibility of responsible marijuana decriminalization on the part of the Obama

Administration. Perhaps in a second term the conditions will be more favorable to an

open discussion.

5) Establish and expand alternatives to incarceration for drug users: Imprisonment is

not a solution for drug addiction and does nothing to rehabilitate users. In fact, prison

sentences often lead users into a cycle of petty crime, imprisonment, release and return to

crime. Alternatives to incarceration, such as drug courts, have been shown to

significantly reduce recidivism and drug use while simultaneously easing the financial

burden of the state and lowering overall prevalence of problematic drug use. Alternatives

to incarceration should be expanded with federal funding and baseline standards and

practices should be set to ensure that effective treatment options are available and

sufficient for the expected number of referrals from the criminal justice system. To its

credit, the Obama Administration has already implemented some expansion of

incarceration alternatives, though much more effort is needed.

6) Ensure proportionality of sentences and eliminate mandatory minimum sentences

for drug offenses: Disproportionate prison sentences and mandatory minimum

sentences arbitrarily punish users of certain drugs more harshly than users of other drugs,

with little regard for the circumstances or appropriateness of extended incarceration.

President Obama and Congress should ensure that drug related offenses are dealt with in

a proportional manner and mandatory minimum sentences should be abandoned entirely.

Additionally, special amnesties or pardons should be considered for those already serving

unduly long prison sentences due to disproportionate sentencing practices. Such reforms

would lower prison crowding and save millions of tax-payer dollars that could be used

for deficit reduction.

P a g e | 54

A Final Note

On the day of this paper’s completion, Tim Rogers of Time Magazine published an

article entitled “Drug War Do-Over: Can the U.S. Push Trafficking Out of Central America?,” in

which he documented a telling admission by Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield.

Brownfield, the Obama Administration’s point man on Central America’s drug war, is quoted in

the article affirming that “we don’t have to establish a paradise in Central America to have

success in the efforts against drug trafficking. All we have to do is increase the operating costs

for drug traffickers by perhaps 10% to 15% in the coming years. And when we achieve that, the

drug traffickers will apply the law of the market that applies across the entire planet and they will

look for new routes to traffic their products. And that is totally viable and possible in the coming

two or three years.”252

Such a statement inevitably leads one to ask if the measure of success in

the US drug war has been so diluted as to be satisfied by a mere adjustment in trafficking routes?

Are we simply trying to change the roads taken before drugs enter our country? Is the War on

Drugs to continue on repeat for the foreseeable future with only the venue changing from time to

time? By Mr. Brownfield’s own admission, success in one arena of the Drug War pushes the

conflict into new territory, precipitating another battle and another list of casualties with the

same end result of drugs being produced, drugs reaching the US and drugs being consumed.

What Mr. Brownfield has unwittingly landed upon is the undeniable fact that markets do, indeed,

govern the drug trade and where there is demand, supply will surely materialize. Latin

Americans don’t expect a ‘paradise,’ but they do hope for a more inspired vision of a post-Drug-

War world, one where evidence, innovation and humility drive a new approach to mitigating the

devastating effects of drugs. If our leaders can find the courage to move beyond another ‘Drug

War do-over’ and pursue real, impactful reforms, the United States has a chance to participate

and lead in the creation of that new vision.

252 Rogers, Tim. “Drug War Do-Over: Can the U.S. Push Trafficking Out of Central America?” Time Magazine,

April 4, 2013.

P a g e | 55

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