eliciting tactical knowledge and what happened next…. james w. lussier, phd barbara a. black, phd...

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Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences 7-8 November 2006

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Page 1: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Eliciting Tactical Knowledgeand what happened next….

James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD

US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences

7-8 November 2006

Page 2: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

To sleep, perchance to dream…

William Shakespeare

--from Hamlet (III, i, 65-68)

Page 3: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

“66 Stories”

• Elicit knowledge from tactical/battle command experts

• Elicitation method– “Tell us a good story”– “What lesson did you learn?”

• Share knowledge and improve performance of:– Battalion Commanders– Brigade Commanders

• Use in School for Command Preparation at Fort Leavenworth

Page 4: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Story #22

Page 5: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

What did we learn from 66 Stories?

• Lesson or concept tied only to one story is more difficult to generalize to new situations

• Need to categorize stories; to find common themes

• Need to find ways of training cognitive skills that are more interactive

Page 6: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Activities Specifically Designed to Improve

Performance

Deliberately Training Behavior

Identify desired elements for expert form Learner performs while attending to element Coach notes discrepancies from expert form Behavior is repeated until habitual Performance without attending to element

Page 7: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Expert Patterns of Battlefield Thinking

Model a thinking enemy. Consider effects of terrain. Keep a focus on mission accomplishment and higher commander's intent. Use all elements/systems available. Include considerations of timing. Exhibit visualizations that are dynamic and proactive. Consider contingencies and remain flexible. Consider how your fight fits into the bigger picture from friendly and enemy perspectives.

Page 8: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Cognitive Battle Drills

Think Like a Commander Method

Case-basedPerformance oriented

Theme-based coachingProbes facilitate observation & measurement Repetitive performance - varying conditions

Aimed at ingraining expert habits

Allow officers to model their battlefield understandings, plans, visualizations, and decisions after expert tacticians’ thinking patterns.

Page 9: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

• reflect the cognitive acts characteristic of experts

• support the deliberate training of cognitive behaviors

• support transition to more engaging and more interactive training

• the right level of generality

Model a thinking enemy. Consider effects of terrain. Keep a focus on mission accomplishment and higher commander's intent. Use all elements/systems available. Include considerations of timing. Exhibit visualizations that are dynamic and proactive. Consider contingencies and remain flexible. Consider how your fight fits into the bigger picture

from friendly and enemy perspectives.

Exemplar Tactical Themes:

Characteristics of Useful Themes

Page 10: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Students select a vignette.

1

Battlefield situation

is presented.2

Tactical Thinking Training

Page 11: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Students list their considerations.

Time limit begins at 15 minutes gradually

reduced to 3 minutes.

3

Instructor leads group discussion.

4

Overview of the Training Method

Page 12: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Students scorethemselves on the

indicatorsand receive feedback based on the themes.

5

Overview of the Training Method

Page 13: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Key Features of the Situation: Examples of Considerations

If I have good success, can we still use PL DIME as the battle handoff?

Will the movement delay affect my ability to accomplish my mission?

How will the enemy try to exploit the brigade’s disrupted timing in its movements?

Can I get division fire support to destroy the enemy between IOWA and DIME?

Do I need additional engineers to prepare the passage lanes in time?

Can I cross the LD prior to 0530 if the rest of the TF is not prepared?

Will crossing the LD prior to 0530 create unacceptable risks to my flanks?

How long will it take me to secure the passage lanes? How long before the other units arrive?

Will I be asked to continue the fight north if there is little enemy resistance?

Page 14: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Theme-Based Training Method

F(1, 23) = 19.62, p < .05

Page 15: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Measurement of Adaptive Thinking

F(1, 134) = 7.619, p. < .05

NS

Overall: F(1,134) = 17.102, p < .05

F(1, 134) = 11.896, p. < .05

NS

Page 16: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Adaptive Thinking TrainingModes of Delivery

Classroom Distributed (Internet) Instructorless (DVD/Internet)

Page 17: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Train a Variety of Topic Areas

• Tactical thinking (TLAC)

• Leadership at junior officer levels (Army Green)

• Crisis action planning and execution (Red Cape)

Page 18: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Army Green Process

• Researchers surveyed and/or interviewed 120 Lieutenants and 90 Captains

• “Describe a situation you felt ill-prepared to manage during your initial weeks or months as a Platoon Leader”

• Five Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and two research psychologists analyzed the stories and developed 10 themes

Page 19: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Army Green Structure

VIGNETTES

Failing APFTLost EquipmentRole ReversalCoping with DistanceTransporting TanksTroops Arrested ReassignmentsFamily IssuesSubstance AbuseShortcuts

Soldiers’ Stories

VIGNETTES

Failing APFTLost EquipmentRole ReversalCoping with DistanceTransporting TanksTroops Arrested ReassignmentsFamily IssuesSubstance AbuseShortcuts

Soldiers’ StoriesClassroom Training Field Training

THEMES

Be Proactive Be HumbleTake ChargeBe ApproachableBe Confident Be ConsistentBe a Good Communicator Be a Learner Be a Role ModelKnow Your Soldiers

Classroom Training Field Training

THEMES

Be Proactive Be HumbleTake ChargeBe ApproachableBe Confident Be ConsistentBe a Good Communicator Be a Learner Be a Role ModelKnow Your Soldiers

Page 20: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Themes and Definitions

Theme Definition 1. Be Proactive Strive to improve people, facilities, equipment, training, and resources.

2. Be Humble Be aware of strengths and weaknesses and seek self-improvement.

3. When In Charge, Take Charge

Analyze a situation thoroughly and in a timely manner, determine what is important, and decide what needs to be done.

4. Be Approachable Exhibit humility, avoid a condescending attitude, and strive to understand

individuals based on their own ideas, qualifications, and contributions.

5. Be Confident Believe in yourself and in your NCO’s.

6. Be Consistent Set expectations (set powerbase early) and reliably maintain standards.

7. Be a Good Communicator

Listen carefully to verbal and non-verbal messages and ensure understanding of your intent.

8. Be a Learner Capitalize on experiences and heed (recognize the value of) constructive

criticism for self-improvement and professional development. Be willing to innovate and adapt.

9. Be a Role Model Inspire and motivate by performing with personal courage, making ethical

choices, and embodying army values and the warrior ethos.

10. Know Your Soldiers

Understand their perspective and know their capabilities (use XO, NCO’s, and approach your Soldiers).

Page 21: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Training Method

1. Describe the problem ___________

2. Describe the PL challenge _______

3. What was best COA? ___________

4. What is the best COA now? ______

Read vignette with a non-tactical problem

Write answers to the non-tactical problem

1

2

VIGNETTES

Failing APFTLost EquipmentRole ReversalCoping with DistanceTransporting TanksTroops Arrested ReassignmentsFamily IssuesSubstance AbuseShortcuts

Soldiers’ Stories

VIGNETTES

Failing APFTLost EquipmentRole ReversalCoping with DistanceTransporting TanksTroops Arrested ReassignmentsFamily IssuesSubstance AbuseShortcuts

Soldiers’ StoriesClassroom Training Field Training

THEMES

Be Proactive Be HumbleTake ChargeBe ApproachableBe Confident Be ConsistentBe a Good Communicator Be a Learner Be a Role ModelKnow Your Soldiers

Classroom Training Field Training

THEMES

Be Proactive Be HumbleTake ChargeBe ApproachableBe Confident Be ConsistentBe a Good Communicator Be a Learner Be a Role ModelKnow Your Soldiers

Page 22: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Training Method

3

Experts rate (1-7) the participants’ answers4

Expert Rater

Ingrain themes through a series of realistic vignettes

Discuss problem and theme-based solutions

3

1. Analysis of the Situation

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

3. Leadership Behavior

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

2. Quality of Solution

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

Adaptive Thinking1. Analysis of the Situation

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

3. Leadership Behavior

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

2. Quality of Solution

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

Adaptive Thinking1. Analysis of the Situation

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

3. Leadership Behavior

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

2. Quality of Solution

1…2…3…4…5…6…7

Adaptive Thinking

Page 23: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Sample Vignette

Vignette 1: Failing APFT PT 61-01

Participant # _____________

LT Davis had just taken over as PL when he receives orders of deployment to a combat theater of operations in two months. In reviewing the PT records for his platoon, he notices that PFC Freeman failed his last two APFTs. However, there is no record that he was flagged, counseled, or given any special PT program. He is given the test and once again fails due to his inability to run without periodically stopping to walk. He is an otherwise good guy with a strong desire to serve. LT Davis believes that, in a short time, he can motivate him to pass on his own, so, for now, gives him a passing score to allow him to deploy. The LT warns PFC Freeman that he will not allow any promotions until he passes the APFT. The unit deploys with PFC Freeman. LT Davis puts him on a remedial PT program for running and goes to great lengths to motivate him to run, but 6 months later, he fails again.

Everyone in the platoon is aware of the situation with PFC Freeman. His name appears on the promotion list, along with several others who did pass the APFT, and LT Davis is powerless to stop PFC Freeman from being promoted. 1. Describe the Red Flags/problem in this situation ____________________________________________ 2. Describe the leader challenge for LT _____________________________________________________ 3. What would have been the best COA for LT? ______________________________________________ 4. What is the best COA now? ____________________________________________________________

Page 24: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Expert Solution

The LT failed to balance Army standards with relationship development and safety. There could be a clinical reason the Soldier could not run. His safety and those around him can be at risk if this is not addressed before deployment. A full medical checkup was warranted. The LT did not understand his own influence on the promotion system. Once he indicated that the Soldier passed the APFT, the Soldier’s promotion status is out of the LT’s control. Barring a medical condition causing the poor performance, the LT did not know the Soldier well enough to be able to motivate him and did not use his NCOs, such as tasking for development of a remedial PT program.

The LT did not provide fair and consistent treatment for each of his Soldiers, negatively impacting unit morale. Falsifying the report damaged his own credibility with unit and up chain of command also (if he will falsify report, what else will he do?). Now, the LT must counsel the Soldier indicating that future APFTs will not be falsified and that he has to embark on a program that will enhance his chances of passing. The LT should admit his mistake to the PSG and ask him to help with damage control. PSG will handle NCO’s. The lesson learned is to never compromise standards and commit to upholding standards from now on.

Page 25: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Crisis Action Planning (RedCape)

Approach:● Conducted elicitation sessions with experts using complex realistic situation

snapshots (Over 75 elicitation sessions were conducted).● Allowed participants to “leave their fingerprints on the vignettes,” that is, the

elicitation procedure incorporated the ideas and assessments of participants.● Developed methods to synthesize concepts and present conclusions.

Partners in Development: ● The Indiana Army National Guard● Indiana Department of Homeland Security/

State Emergency Management Agency● Indiana Department of Environmental

Management● Indiana Department of Transportation● Transportation Security Administration● Bartholomew County Emergency

Management Agency

● Marion County Emergency Management Agency

● Indiana State Police ● Columbus County Police

Department● Indianapolis Fire Department ● Fort Wayne Fire Department ● Columbus County Fire Department

Page 26: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Expert Themes for RedCape

● Maintain Focus on Mission Priorities.● Keep Chain of Command Flexible. ● See the Big Picture. ● Plan for and Recognize Decision (Trigger) Points.● Reprioritize as Necessary. ● Use All Available Assets. ● Think in Shades of Gray, not Black and White. ● Model a Dynamic Situation.● Understand the Public Need.

Page 27: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Multimedia Vignettes with Expert Considerations

1. Power Grid Shutdown2. Industrial Plant Explosion in Gary, IN3. Dirty Bomb4. Capital Punishment of a High Profile Criminal5. Storm of the Century 6. Severe Earthquake along New Madrid fault 7. Sports Riot in University Town8. Vehicle Accident with HAZMAT in a Rural Area9. Prison Riot with Helicopter Crash10. Nuclear Bomb in Shipping Container11. Airplane Crash in Restricted Area12. Animal Borne Disease in Stockyard13. Industrial Plant Fire Explosion Near INANG

Headquarters14. Rail Yard Explosion15. INANG Arrives in Theater

Page 28: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

Cognitive Skills Training Process

• Elicit knowledge from experts using storytelling

• Identify themes

• Develop realistic vignettes (partial stories)

• Build in measures of performance

• Adapt to variety of media

• Apply to variety of topics

• Research ways to speed the process

Page 29: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

References

Lussier, J. W., & Shadrick, S. B. (2003). Adaptive thinking training for tactical leaders. Paper presented at the Human Factors & Medicine Panel Symposium on Advanced Technologies for Military Training. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Genoa, Italy.

Lussier, J. W., Shadrick, S. B., & Prevou, M. I. (2003). Think Like a Commander prototype: Instructor’s guide to adaptive thinking (Research Product 2003-02). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences.*

Shadrick, S. B. & Lussier, J. W. (2002). The application of Think Like a Commander in the Armor Captains Career Course. Presented at the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation & Education Conference, Orlando, Florida.

Shadrick, S. B. & Lussier, J. W. (2004). Assessment of the Think Like a Commander training program. (ARI Research Report 1824) Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences.*

* Can be obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center at http://www.dtic.mil/

Page 30: Eliciting Tactical Knowledge and what happened next…. James W. Lussier, PhD Barbara A. Black, PhD US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social

POCs

• James W. Lussier, PhD – ARI SCO Ft Bragg– [email protected]

• Barbara A. Black, PhD– ARI Unit Chief Ft Knox– [email protected]– DSN 464-3450