eight years that shook vermont | vanguard press | mar. 16, 1989
TRANSCRIPT
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8/11/2019 Eight Years That Shook Vermont | Vanguard Press | Mar. 16, 1989
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What future for the Dems? P. age
VERMONT'S NEWS AND ARTS WEEKLYMARCH16-23,1989
FlPTYCENTS
Eight Yean That Shook Verm
, "9OO-OVO. LA ' NO. L9Nn~naWAn " l . d30SI VI ~3SA~v~aI I 3MOH A3I I V~
The 1JI I I I t l I o f Reform
W h e n P r o g r es s i v e s s u m u p t h e a c c o m p -
lishments of the past eighl years, theyinvariably list the innovative projects
andp r og r ams launchedb y the administration:
the Community Land Trust and Boathouse,p r o g r a m s f o r w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , Sister-City
It wasa holt from the blue, the longest issues. They have challenged the accepted at least as efflciently as their "old guard"of long shots. A t h ir d -p art y r ad ic al had r el at ion sh ip b e twe en c ommu n it ie s an d t be p re d ec e ssors-an d save some mon ey as we ll .turned a shoestring campaign into a real state and helped fuel a statewide progressive The intransigence of the Republicrats only
challenge of Burlington's five-term mayor, surge. fueled public discontent. In 1982, more Pro-~ordon Paque~te. B u t e ven on e le ct ion d ay, T h ey h ave e ven weat he r ed t h e storms of gressives replaced Democrats on the Boardaquette an d h is De moc rat ic c omrad es we re su cc ession str uggle , d e mon str ati ng t hat -i n of Al de r me n . B y Mar ch 1983 they were the
predictinga decisive victory. After a l l ,Ron al d S and e r' s word s- " It' sDotjusta one-man show, largest faction on the board. An d "Bernie"Reag~ h ad j us t b ee n e le ct ed p re si de nt i t' s a movement was more popular than ever re elected with a
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E1GHTYEARS< 4 continued from page 1.
bullied into reassessing its Grand List, even
threatened with loss oflunds wben local
officials tried to obstruct the building of the
southern connector bigbway. The legislature's
current attempt to strip local communities of
the power to choose alternatives to the prop-erty tax is only the most recent episode in8
struggle wbich began with Burlington's gross
receipts tax.
The bottom line. in financial matters, is
that the Sanders administration held the line
on taxes. Use of fees and an impressive set of
cost-saving reforms at least postponed in-
creases. BasicallY. what the Progressives badmanaged to do was "out-Republican theRepublicans."
1hlDe with Tnde-Olfa
S orne progressive initiatives- notably the
Land Trust and a short-lived proposal to
create a municipal cable TV service-did challenge the basic logic of capitalism.
Others simply provided benefits but left the
system unchanged.
A few initiatives. however. were reactionaryresponses mal contradicted the rhetoric of
the administration. Most Progressives agree,
for example,lhat the gross receipts tax, like
the recently defeated tax on alcohol andcigarettes to fund affordable childcare, is
actually regressive. Likewise, property re-
appnisal shilted the burden from businesses
to homeowners. The problem, explained
Sanders again and again. is that state and
federal policies severely limit the available
options.
Economic development presented especially
complex problems. Sanders had promised "real
change," yet faced a variety of obstacles.
Conservative opponents accused him of being
anti-business, while left-wing critics said he
was selling out to build the tax base.
The basic limitation, however, was the pro-
growth leanings of most residents. Tbus, it
was not surprising that most Progressivesagreed with Democrats and Republicans on
the need for "balanced growth." Tbe .... ulto fthese tensions was a development posturebaed on striking deals to extract some benefitsfor the public-a gentrified waterfront in
exchange for public amenities, the right to
build luxury bousing as long as "affordable"
units were aJso provided, and so on.
Inpractice.Iimits to growth were never set,
They simply changed with the terms of each
trade-off.
w ben it came to peace conversion,Sanders could not be swayed. Thetiming was wrong, be believed, an dthe movement could not avoid "blaming th eworkers" for producing rapid-fire G atling gunsat the General Electric plant.
Beginning in 1983.protests at GEproducedarguments on the left: protesters wanted a
city commitment to conversion: Sanders and
other Progressives wanted to tum the heat on
Congress instead. The fear was that protests,and particularly civil disobedience. would
AjIWoII . .. . 5oooIon.hIol . ._ t l t l o r y _ I o n l o . ' . . IItII ........ 19I1"force" unionized workers to the right.
It w as a disagreement on tactics, but theimplications went deeper. By opposing the
GE protests, was Sanders protecting the
corporation and the military-industrial com-
plex behind it?Did his position contradict thecity's strong pronouncements on intervention
in Central America?Sanden' commitment to an industrially-
based socialism bad collided with the com-munity-based peace movement's commitment
to ending foreign intervention. The casualtywa s some mutual trust.
U sua I1y , though, the working relationshipbetween city ball and the peace movement
wa s much smoother. The results were clearand often significant. Burlington developed,
aD d to a limited extent began to implement aforeign policy. A series of citywide votes
establisbedthelrameworlr.forlocalinitiatives-
cooperation and exchange with the SovietUnion, protests against intervention, people-
to-people programs. Designed to change
consciousness and challenge the dominant
anti-Communist logic, they did just that.Between 1981 and 1987, Burlington voted
to cut aid to ElSalvador, oppose crisis re-
location planning for nuclear war, freeze
nuclear weapons production, transfer military
funds tocivilian programs, condemn Contra
aid and divest from companies doing business
with apartheid South Africa. Buttressing the
efforts of the independent peace movement,
Sanders was a consistent and compeUing voice
for a new foreign policy.
Did such resolutions, statements and even
diplomatic links with Nicaragua pose a threat
lOcapitalist interests? Hardly. But they didcontribute to a profound change in attitudesand meshed weD with the efforts of other
activists around the state. By the late 1980s.most Vermont potiticians supported efforts
at disarmament and a non-interventionist
foreign poliey. Peace and, to a limited extent,
socialjustice,bad become "mainstream ..issues.
Itwas not so much that other questions were
ignored; the administration's record onyouthprograms, tenants' rights an d women's issueswas broad and impressive. Rather it was a
matter of priorities and focus. Issues affecting
women and the gay community, for example,sometimes took a back seat. Or they were
handled indirectly as mailers of civil rights
and economic justice.
Comparable worth, for instance, w a s aneconomic approach to sexual discrimination,
ambitious inintent and yet based on concernsabout equity discrimination, rather than sexual
oppression. The city's anti-discrimination
ordinance addressed the problems of gay men
and women as a matter of civil rights, yet
Sanders. among others, was not eager to carrythe banner of gay and lesbian rights. Most
reforms relating to sexual preference and
relations between the sexes did not originate
in city haJl. Normally, they received cautious
support at best.
One striking example was Sanders' response
jo questions from loeaJ feminists about his
support of proposals to prevent job discrimi-nation against gays "I will not make it a major
Movl.ng C.udously
T he thrust of reform efforts in Burlington
was primarily economic, driven by themayor's "redistribute the weaJth" logic .
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priority," he said bluntly.
The Sanders revolution helped to widen
the terms of debate about sexual relations,
but coul d not resol ve the dilem mas . The sam ecould also be said of its impact on perceptions
of taxation and development. Clearly, these
were matters no local community couldaddress on its own, even if a consensus couldbe established. Insome areas, even a consensusamong Progressives was missing.
Despite changes in local demographics andthe presence of a strong left-wing movement,
Burlington was not transformed into a post-
industrial Paris Commune. City hall power
was divided between the "old guard," which
dominated the city council and commissions,
and the "new guard" running the executive
branch. The community itself was diverse-
from the conservative North End (0theProgressive inner-city strongholds and main-
stream Democratic South End.
A majority of voters supported Sanders in
three re-election bids, but the reason was not
primarily his socialist sympathies. Rather itwas his anti-establishment style and ability to
"get things done." Burlingtonians had a popularleader, but not a clear direction. The Pro-
gressive program, to the extent that it existed
and could be implemented. was basically aset
of reforms glued together by fiery-yet
vague-speeches.
Idendry Crisis
T he Progressive Coalition was forced by
history to handle power before it even
began to organize itself. In a sense, it isremarkable that so many programs could have
been launched by such a loose collection of
activists and liberal professionals. Until 1986,
the only regular planning of Progressive
strategy occurred at the weekly Sunday meet-
ing of key administration and elected officials.
In an internal memo to coalition leaders in
1984,David Clavelle and Tim McKenzie, two
key organizers, noted that Progressives had
"been successful in creating effective campaign
organizations in some wards, yet unsuccessful
in maintaining some form of organization
between elections."
Though Sanders is currently pusbing forthe formation of a new political party in
Vermont and across the country, he was less
than eager to see it happen while he was
mayor. Disillusioned by his years as a "minor
party" candidate under the Liberty Union
banner in the 1970.. be felt that America-
and even Burlington-wasn't ready for a third
party.
Even after the Progressive Coalition took
shape, his connection with it remained am-
biguous. Despite all the hoopla about Burling-
ton's "socialist" government, Sanders never
sought office as anything but an "Indepen-dent." His political choices, he felt, were best
made without submitting them to group
approval.
Working with aldermanic allies and top
appointees, he could act fast and. as he put it,
"boldly." But the atmosphere in city hall was
less than chummy. since the boss was a man
of gruff speech and limited tact. Most sup-
porters not intimate with the city hall group
heard little about decisions until after they
had been made.
What was efficient and bold, unfortunately.
was not always so democratic.
By the time the Progressive Coalition was
formally launched in 1986. some of those il
hoped to attract and represent had drifted in
other directions. Many women, while wel-
coming specific programs, found the "PC" to
be too much of a "boys club." Due to the
impact of tbe Jackson campaign and the
Rainbow Coalition,left-leaning Democrats
were returning to the party. Some peace
activists found the mayor unresponsive. And
the Greens had concluded that the admini-stration was part of the problem, offering no
solutions to emerging ecological threats.
Building a solid and broad-based coalition
while struggling to bold onto power proved a
demanding task. Increasingly. the leaders of
the coalition were also city officials; tbeir
day-to-day struggles determined most of theagenda. Ifa choice bad to be made between
the practical and the ideal, or between tbe
"winnable" and the "good" fight, the former
usually held sway.
Maldag 01 Legend
B y the mid-1980s, the vision that the left
might one day "take over" Vermont was
no longer a far-fetched fantasy. Itwasn'tactually "the left," however, but Sanders him-
self who was positioned for victory.
Party loyalty had been dropping for more
than a decade. Up to4 0 percent of Vermontvoters considered themselves Independents.
Even many party stalwarts crossed party lines
to vote for the most likeable, trustworthy or
competent person in a race. Sanders profited
from these shifting realities of electoral life.
Like many successful politicians, he had be-
come a political institution. He could com-
mand respect and votes without tying himself
to any concrete program or organization.
In1986, he chose to run for governor against
Vermont's first female governor, Democrat
Madeleine Kunin, despite warnings that it
was the wrong race at the wrong time. For
almost any other leftist. the result would have
been a disaster. But Sanders managed to win
15 percent of the vote even without solid
organizational support, scoring best in the
most conservative area of the state, the
Northeast Kingdom.For the Rainbow activists who struck with
him, it was a trying experience that demon-
strated Sanders' preference for winning votes
over organizing a movement. But that did not
prevent him from returning to tbe well two
years later. His 1988 run for Congress became
a triumph of profound importance. Without
party backing he raised about S300,ooo.donti-
nated the debate, eclipsed Democrat Paul
Poirier and came within 3 percentage points
of winning.
"What I have been saying over and over
again," Sanders explained after that election,"is that it is absolutely outrageous that you
have a handful of giant corporations and
wealthy individuals who have so much wealth
and so much power when most people are not
getting a fair shake. And you know what?
People accept that message. People under-
stand that. Tbey're not stupid."
As he had done four times at the local level,
Sanders bad also handed the Democrats a
demoralizing defeat. making it clear that they
might one day be the state's "third party."But whether they will be replaced by a
statewide Progressive party or a permanent
campaign machine is very much the question.
For all Sanders' talk about the need for an
alternative to the Republicrats, he has done
little to date except make himself the de factohead of whatever eventually may emerge.
What Re-m.,
B
efore Sanders and the Progressives,
Burlington was a cultural backwater run
by an aging generation, unresponsive to
the changing needs of the community. Ifyouattended an aldermanic meeting with a prob-
lem. the first question asked was, "How longhave you lived here?" Political competition
was the exception; clannish Democrats and
compliant Republicans made the rules.
As the eighties end, the Queen City is
nationally known for its radical mystique and
"livability." Ex-urbanites and counter-cultural-
ists have transformed it from a provincial
town into a sophisticated cultural mecca,
socially conscious and highly charged. Yet
the fundamental nature of the change remainsdifficult to pinpoint.
Even a clear definition of the term "pro-
gressive" is elusive. At one time a progressivewas someone fighting for relief from the
devastating impact of a new industrial order.
Early in the 20th century Burlington had a
self-described progressive mayor named James
Burke, an Irish Catholic blacksmith who led a
pragmatic reform movement. In the 1960s,
when a new political alignment in Vermont
led to the election ofDemocrat Phil Hoff. the
forces behind the man also called themselves
progressive.
For Hoff and his allies, progressive meant
modernized state government. improved
schools and regionalized services. Twenty
years later the definition changed again,
incorporating tax reform, open government
and redistribution of wealth.
On any standard scale, the achievements of
the Sanders administration command high
marks. Since 1981. Burlington has clearly
become more dynamic, more open. The
unemployment rate is virtually the lowest in
the nation. The cultural forces set loose in the
eighties and nourished by local government
have made the urban core more a magnetthan ever.
But there are clouds on the horizon, some
new and others gathering force after years of
neglect. For Burlington, the price of success
isseen in traffic jams and high rents, toxic
dumps and a landfill crunch, the feminization
of poverty and the building boom.
In her 1989 race for mayor, Sandy Baird.
mounting a leftist challenge to the Progressives,
provided perhaps the most damning critique.
"The past and present administrations of our
city ," she charged, "are on a collision course
with both the natura! world and poor people."Clearly, the progressive movement of the
1980shas brought anew. expanded definition ofthe role of the city to Vermont. But unmet chal-
lenges remain, problems not yet solved or even
fully acknowledged by the new political estab-
lishment. Profound and crucial, tbey await
answers from another progressive wave.
Greg Guma ha s completed a book on Bur-lington and the Vermont progressive move-ment. Itwill be published in the fall by the
New Engkmd Press.
e-......T....h'''1-1888Bul i lng ton Vo tee Only
" " o rteat
B er ni e S en de . .. . I nd . 4 03 0 ( 43 %)
Gordon Pequette. Dem . 4020
Joseph McGreth. Ind. t 39
Richard Bove.lnd. t09t
1983
B er ni e S en de rs , I nd . 8 94 2 15 2' lb l
Judith Stephany, D e m . 4088James GIIeon . Rep. 2292
tll85
Bernie Send ..... Ind.
Brian Bums. Oem.
Oiene Gallagher. Ind.
William Murray, Ubert
Micheel Hacket t . NeutralRicherd Serlelle. I nd ,John Tatro. Ind_
t987
Bernie Sendera. Ind.
PeulLafayette. Oem.
t989
Pet er Cleve li e, Ind. 5917 C54%)
Nency Chioffi, Oem. 4824
Sendy Beird, Green 370
Michael Hackett , Tax Revolt 95
5780 C55%)
3275
1234
7220
34
17
890t C55'lbl
5594
Gov.mor
1988
Bernie Sanders, Ind.
Msdeleine Kunin, Oem .
Peter Smith, Rep.
Richerd Gottlieb, LU
3003 (21%)
7621
3333
16
Congressional RIle.
1988
Bernie Sanders, Ind.
Paul Poirier. Oem.
Peter Smith. Rep.
P e te r D i am o n d st on e . L UJim Hedbor, Uberl.
Morris Earle. Small ie
Beeutlful
8675 (50%)
3227
5014
52
169
32
NOTES1881; Richard Bova w a Democret running. . a n Ind.pendent _Iooing the DemocraticCaUCU8. Terry 8ouriciu8 w e . 81ao ehtctedalderman, the find Citizen. Ptlrty candidate.lected in the nation and S.nd ... first .11yon the boerd.
1983.JudithStephany.-tgnod from he.legislative 1 1 1to run. James GiIeon weB the1.lt Republicen to run for mayorin the 1910&
1985.DIane Gallaghor,.RopubllcM_ .._ranaaanlndopondant. __
wo fo r rnor Sandora ally. Brian Buma _ formar Democraltc __ .
1988:Sandara_15 __
Kuni n did not _50_ but_ '
confirmed by tile otateloglalatunl.
1887:Paul ~ _ _ 5aid_
t_Sandara_38_.lIIl11wlda.Pomerwaea'" leal.'ltCt'.Smilttwa eiectMt
witll., pereent.