economic stagnation in the early roman empire (pp. 63-90) mason hammond

8/12/2019 Economic Stagnation in the Early Roman Empire (Pp. 63-90) Mason Hammond

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Economic History Association

Economic Stagnation in the Early Roman EmpireAuthor(s): Mason HammondSource: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 6, Supplement: The Tasks of Economic History(May, 1946), pp. 63-90Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2113075

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Economictagnationn theEarlyRomanEmpire*HAT the later Romanempire was a period of stagnation, not to sayof decline and total collapse,in the economicas in other sphereshaslong been recognized.'But it has been the contributionof such modernscholarsas Frank,Rostovtzeff,and Heichelheim o showthat the symptomsand causesof this stagnationare not to be sought solely in the anarchyofthe third centuryA.D.2They may be detected earlier,behind the facadeof peaceandprosperity n the second century,and have roots whichreach

back into the very beginningsof the Romandominationover the Medi-terraneanworld.In order to avoid too great extensionin time, as well asin space, the presentdiscussionwill be limited to the symptomsand causesof economic tagnation hatmaybe detectedthroughoutheMediterraneanworldduring he earlyRomanempire, he two hundredand fifty oddyearsthat elapsedfrom the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C., which left Augustusmasterof the Mediterraneanworld, to the assassinationof SeverusAlex-* This paper was read at the meeting of the Economic History Association under theassigned title, "Symptoms and Causes of Economic Stagnation in the Early Roman Empire."Thanks are due to the disputants of the papers and to the editorial readers of this JOURNALfor helpful corrections and suggestions. Limitations of time at the meeting and of space inthe JOURNAL have prevented the development of certain arguments."Stagnation" is taken in the general sense of an "inactive, sluggish, dull condition"rather than in the more restrictive meaning sometimes ascribed to it by economic historiansof a condition in which opportunity for investment is so glutted as to make the movementof capital sluggish. The author of the other paper on the program chose the phrase "re-tardative factors" to avoid possible ambiguity.'The following works have been particularly used in the preparation of this article:T. Frank, ed., An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsPress): Vol. I (I933), T. Frank, Rome and Italy of the Republic; Vol. II (0936), A. C.Johnson, Roman Egypt to the Reign of Diocletian; Vol. III (I937), R. C. Collingwood,Roman Britain, J. J. Van Nostrand, Roman Spain, V. M. Scramuzza, Roman Sicily, A.Grenier, La Gaule romaine; Vol. IV (1938), R. M. Haywood, Roman Africa, F. M. Heichel-heim, Roman Syria, J. A. 0. Larsen, Roman Greece, T. R. S. Broughton, Roman Asia;Vol. V (1940), T. Frank, Rome and Italy of the Empire. The Danubian provinces have notbeen covered. There is a General Index to Vols. I-V (1940). This work will be referred tohereafter as Economic Survey.M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford:Clarendon Press, I926), is referred to as Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire. There is a Germanedition (2 vols.; Leipzig: Quelle and Meyer, I93i) and an Italian (Florence: La NuovaItalia, I933).F. M. Heichelheim, Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums (2 vols.; Leiden: Sijthoff, I938);Vol. I (text) is referred to as Heichelheim, I, and Vol. II (notes) as Heichelheim, II. Chap.viii deals with the period from Augustus to Diocletian.The Cambridge Ancient History, Vols. IX-XII (Cambridge: The University Press;New York: The Macmillan Company, I932-I939) is referred to as C. A. H. Chap. vii ofVol. XII by F. Oertel deals with "The Economic Life of the Empire."Pauly's Real-Encyclopidie der classischen Alterturnswissenschaft is referred to by series,volume, and half volume as: RE, I (i), etc., and RE 2, I (I), etc. The first series begins with"A"; the second series with "R."

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64 MasonHammondander n 235A.D., whichushered n a half century of anarchyandeventu-ally the totalitarian tateof Diocletian andConstantine.'

IThe economichistory of the Mediterraneanworld during the Greco-Romanperiodrecordsfew of those drasticinnovationsthat have charac-terized economic history since I400 A.D.4 It affordsnothingso remotelyrevolutionaryas the introductionof the compass, the inventionof print-ing or gunpowder, he applicationof steam, electricity,or atomic fission

as sources of power,or the developmentof the steamship,the auto, theairplane,the telegraph,and radio.Moreover, uch inventionsor introduc-tion of noveltiesas there were occurredchiefly duringthe Hellenistic,notthe Roman,era.5The economichistoryof the Romanempire s largelyoneof the geographic xpansion, tagnation,and eventualdeclineof a relativelyunchanging conomicsystem.This static characterof the economicsystemof the Romanworld, thoughobviousfrom any considerationof its tech-niques,tools, and operation,has not been sufficientlyemphasized n dis-cussions of the causes for its decay. Considerationsof space, however,preventmore than this unsupported tatement of so important a factorin both the expansionand the decayof the Roman empire.In consequenceof this basically unchangingsystem, the symptomsofeconomicstagnationin the early Romanempireare not to be sought, asthey might be in more recentperiods, n a slowingdown of technologicalinventionsorimprovements, ut in the cessationof geographical xpansion

'The economic historian of the classical world has only scattered and inadequate evidenceon which to base his conclusions so that his treatment must inevitably be more general andless statistical than that of the modern economic historian (see Heichelheim, I, 5-7).'The failure of the Greek genius in practical inventiveness lies outside the scope of aneconomic discussion. There is a notable distrust of innovation in all ancient thought (cf.the myth of Prometheus). The Romans showed little inventiveness along either cultural ortechnical lines and their literature adopted the attitude that inventions and economic ex-pansion were responsible for the greed which led to wars and corruption and reduced theprimitive age of gold to the contemporary one of iron (see, for example, Horace Odes i. 3;Epodes7 and i6; Tibullus i. 3. 35-50; and similar passages in other authors). This distrustof inventions is well illustrated by -the story which Pliny the Elder tells about Tiberius.When an artisan discovered a method of making flexible glass, Tiberius ordered his wholeshop destroyed lest the value of bronze, silver, and gold be diminished.-Nat. Hist. xxxvi.26 (27). Pliny says the story was better known than certain. Petronius (Satiricon 5I) statesthat Tiberius executed the artisan, as does Dio Cassius (lvii. 2I. 7).'On inventions and introduction of new plants and products during the Hellenisticperiod,see M. Rostovtzeff,The Social and EconomicHistory of the HellenisticWorld (3vols.; Oxford:Clarendon ress,I941), I, 35i-80 (PtolemaicEgypt); II, ii80-I238 (generalsummary). For Syria, see Heichelheim in Economic Survey, IV, I26; for Roman science,see C. Singer, "Science," in C. Bailey, ed., The Legacy of Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press,I925), pp. 265-324, with bibliography.


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EconomicStagnationn the EarlyRomanEmpire 65and the beginningof disintegration,both geographicaland qualitative,inthe traditionalway of life. Possible symptomsmay, for convenience,bebrieflyconsideredunderthe fourheadsof agriculture,ndustry,trade,andfinance.But someof the importantsymptomsin these fields,particularlythe difficultieswith respectto coinage, he changingcharacterof labor,andthe increaseof government egulation,are not limitedto any one fieldand,in fact, haveoften beenconsidered ausesof the generaleconomicstagna-tion. It will appear,however,that any profoundsearch for the causes ofeconomic tagnation eads outsidethe purely economic phere nto politics,sociology,and intellectualhistory.6

DuringtheearlyRomanempire,agriculture ot onlycontinued oflourishin most of the older,well-cultivatedareasof the Mediterraneanworld,withthe possibleexception of Greeceand, to a lesser degree,Italy,' but it wasalso developed o a high degreeof intensity in the newly conqueredareasof the west andnorth.Therewasnot the sameagricultural xpansionn theeasternMediterranean asin,whose andshadlong beensubjectto intensivecultivation.Nevertheless, akingthe empireas a whole,there is noevidenceforany general oss of agriculturalproductivity n the early empire,or forthat matter, throughout he empire.Moreover,despiteprimitivemethodsof fertilizingand crop rotation,evidencefor the exhaustionof the soil is soslight that Rostovtzeffdoubtsif it occurred o any largeextent.8Certainlywriterssuchas ColumellaunderNero, Pliny the ElderunderVespasian,orDio ChrysostomunderTrajan, hough hey mayanimadvert n the agricul-tural decline of some areas, give the impressionof general fertility andproductivity hroughout he Mediterranean asin.Symptomsof stagnationin ancient agriculturemust be sought, there-fore, not in the soil but in its tillers, namely, in labor and organization.Agriculturalabor was of three types: the free peasanton his own farm,with at most membersof his familyanda few slavesto help him; the largeestateworkedby gangsof slaves; andthe largeestatelet out to tenants.Itis generallystated that these are successivestages, roughlyfree peasantsduring he earlyand middlerepublic, lave estatesduringthe late republicand firstcenturyof the empire,and tenant estates, or what is technically

calledthe colonate,fromthe secondcenturyonward.But this sequence s8 See below, n. 104.7 Rostovtzeff gives the best survey of general agricultural conditions during the early em-pire.-Roman Empire, chaps. vi and vii, pp. i80-305. See also the appropriate sections ofthe volumes of the Economic Survey, especially, for the decay of Greece, Vol. IV, 465-92,and, for the decay of Italy, Vol. V, i84, 297.8Rostovtzeff (Roman Empire, pp. 329-30) disputes the view of J. Liebig and his followers(see p. 59I, n. 30) that soil exhaustion was the cause of the decay of the Roman empire.On pp. 494-96, n. 25, Rostovtzeff denies soil exhaustion even in Italy.


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66 MasonHammondtrue only with qualifications. n the main it applies to Italy.9Large estatesworkedby slaves or tenants had long been familiar in the Near East andin Carthaginian reas; in fact it was from Carthage hat Romefirstlearnedthe techniqueof operating hem.'0 ven in Italy and Sicily, it is questionablewhetherthe growthof large estates ever really drove out the independentpeasant except in the flat areas suitable for large-scalecultivation or inthe uplandsdevotedto the pasturingof herds." t is moreoverprobable hatthe Celtic and eventhe more civilized Germanchieftains held their tribes-men in some sort of tenant or, if the term may be used, feudal subservienceso that the greatvillas of Roman Gaul,Germany,and Britain grew natu-rally out of indigenous nstitutions.' Hence a widespreaddisplacementoffree peasants by large estates, particularly outside of Italy, may bequestioned.Heichelheim, n fact, feels that the Greeksand Romansfailed in theirpolicy of expandingthroughout he Mediterraneanworldan agriculturalsystem in which municipalitiesdominatedover the surroundingfarmland. He holds that the self-sufficient argeestate as developedundertheempirewas the economicandsocial institution whichendured,not only inMedieval Europe,but also in Byzantineand Islamic countries. It might,

9W. E. Heitland, Agricola (Cambridge: The University Press, 1921), is still standard foragriculture in the classical world, particularly in Italy. He argued that, as the upper classesacquired wealth during the later republic, they gradually bought out the small farms toform large estates worked by slave gangs and that, when the supply of slaves diminishedunder the empire, the large landowners substituted tenants (see esp. pp. 205-I2, and below,n. 69, for a similar thesis in Barrow, Slavery).10M. Rostovtzeff (here spelled Rostowzew), Studien zur Geschichte des rdmischenKolonates, erstes Beiheft zum Archiv fur Papyrusforschung (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner,

i910), is still the fundamental study of tenant farming in the ancient world, although hisconclusion that the Romans borrowed the system from the Near East is perhaps overdrawn.See Frank in Economic Survey, V, 300-2. See also Heichelheim, I, 744-49, and II, II7I-73,n. 42 (bibliography); and Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, p. 646, index under Coloni."Rostovtzeff holds that free peasants in Italy survived the growth of large slave-workedestates only to become tenants of absentee landlords at a later date.-Roman Empire, pp.192-93. Frank in Economic Survey (V, i68-75) accepts their survival in Italy during thefirst century. Scramuzza in Economic Survey (III, 366-67) argues that they were nevereliminated in Sicily." Grenier in Economic Survey (III, 495) states that the domains established in Gaul atthe opening of the Roman epoch reproduced to a large extent those of the Celtic aristocracy.Collingwood traces the contrasting villa and village systems in Roman Britain to nativeorigins.-Ibid., pp. 73-87.' Heichelheim, I, 747, 749. Similarly (pp. 753-59), he sees in this period the beginningof a shift from the distinction between farmers and city dwellers to that between the greatlandowning officials, the honestiores, and the tenant serfs, the humiliores, of the later empire,a distinction perpetuated in the feudal societies of both the eastern and the western Medi-terranean. Oertel accepts this view.-C.A.H., XII, 28i. Heichelheim (I, 67i-82) blamesAugustus for having failed to carry through the Caesarian program of a classless society anda unified economic system, and for having perpetuated the city-state concept of economicorganization, which proved inadequate to maintain itself on an imperial scale (see below,n. 85).


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EconomicStagnationn the EarlyRomanEmpire 67however,be arguedthat the economicconditionsrepresentedby the largeestates were favorableto stagnationand that stagnation in agriculturaleconomicswas characteristicnot only of the Romanempirebut also ofthe MiddleAges. Hence,whetherthe system of large estates as developedunder the empirerepresents,outside of Italy, a serious displacementoffreepeasantryor simplythe continuanceof previousconditionsundernewmasters,the system itself may be takenas a symptomof stagnation.Thisstagnation,however,wasnot dueto failureof productivityor to inadequacyof method,except insofar as agriculture, ike other activities, showednotechnological mprovement.The stagnationresultedratherfrom the loweconomic tatus of laboronthe largeestates.Heitland,in his study of classicalagriculturecalled Agricola,felt thatthe failure of the agricultural ystem, and therefore,since agriculturewasthe main economicactivity of the Mediterraneanworld, of the wholeeconomic structure, derived from the failure adequately to solve thelaborproblem."He regards he slave systemin itself as evil, becauseof thelack of incentivefor the laborer,and he interpretsthe substitutionof thecolonate,or serfdom,as simply the impositionof a differentformof eco-nomic slavery,necessitatedby the shortageof slave labor.His conclusionthat slaverywas the cause of economicstagnationhas not been generallyaccepted.'On the one hand,as will be shownpresently,under the Romanempire he statusof slavessteadilyimprovedandtheirnumbers, hankstoshort supply and manumission,became fewer. On the other hand, thetenant system does not seem to have been developedas a substitute forslaverybut originallywith a definiteview to maintaininga peasantecon-omy.1" he tenant workedhis own farm as did the free peasant; he wasnot workedin gangs like slaves except for such labor as he owed to thegeneralestate.However,there was one feature of the system of large estates as it ex-istedunderthe empirethat was economicallyunsound.Wheresuchestateshad existed previously,they were ownedlocally andwhat profitcameoutof themwaseither accumulated rspent locally.Underthe Romanempire,rich senatorsacquiredpropertieswidely spreadthroughout he provincesand the profitsfrom these estates were drawnoff for the luxurious iving

14Heitland, Agricola, PP. 432-59. He remarks (pp. 434, 443) on the scorn that the ancientsfelt for manual labor.1"Frank in Economic Survey, V, 175-82, 297. Broughton in Economic Survey (III, 690-92, 839-40) finds that the amount of agricultural slavery in the province of Asia is hardto estimate." Rostovtzeff (Roman Empire, pp. 3I9-23) thinks that Hadrian and (p. 357) evenSeptimius were eager to promote a free peasantry.


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68 MasonHammondof theowneror for the taxes that he paid.'7Moreover,an increasingnumberof estates passed to the emperor,though it has been questioned whetherthis tendency reached dangerousproportionsbefore the confiscationsofSeptimiusSeverusat the close of the secondcenturyA.D."8 he profitsfromthese imperial estates went to the support of the court, the provision offood and entertainment or the parasiticalpopulationof Rome,or the main-tenanceof the machinery of government.Not only, therefore, were theprofitsdrawnaway from their place of origin,but pressurewas ever heavierto get more out of the land. This had three bad results: first, the tenantcultivator had less opportunity o build up a reserveand less incentive towork; second,the governmentwas increasinglyforced to bind the culti-vator to the land to ensure its revenue and the productionof food; and,third,the government oughtmeans to bringunder cultivation andwhichhad either not previouslybeen cultivated or which had been abandonedas.unprofitable, the so-called agri deserti.'9These tendencies begin to appear

'7lbid., pp. 296-97. For the wealth of senators, L. Friedliinder, Darstellungen aus derSittengeschichte Roms (9th ed.; Leipzig: Hirzel, I9I9-I92I), I, I21-35; and for luxury, II,263-379. W. S. Davis, The Influence of Wealth in Imperial Rome (New York: The Mac-millan Company, i9io; reprint, New York: Peter Smith, I933), is a vivid if popular studyin which the undue pursuit of wealth is blamed for the fall of Rome (see below, n. I04;also Frankin EconomicSurvey,V, 22-26, 56-6o).

18Frank in Economic Survey (V, 300-2) doubts that the growth of large estates andtenant farming had serious economic effects before the extensive confiscations of Septimius,which vastly increased the crown property (res priuata). He feels that this caused rivalryfor the throne, loss of initiative in agriculture, and increased pressure for production. ForAsia, Broughton in Economic Survey (IV, 587, 648-63, 905-6) reaches the same conclusion.Van Nostrand in Economic Survey (III, 2i6) also thinks that imperial properties were notlarge in Spain until the time of the Severi. It is possible that the imperial properties inAfrica were extensive at an earlier date, if there is any truth in Pliny the Elder's remarkthat Nero put to death six men who owned half of Africa (presumably the old proconsularprovince, namely, Tunis).-Nat. Hist. xviii. 6 (7). 35. The conclusion is generally drawnthat Nero confiscated their estates, though Pliny does not say so and only cites the fact toillustrate the spread in the provinces-of large estates, which he condemns as the ruin ofItaly. From just outside proconsular Africa come the much discussed inscriptions concerningthe management of the Saltus Burunitanus under Trajan, Hadrian, and Commodus. Hay-wood in Economic Survey (IV, 83-102, esp. pp. 85-86) thinks that, whatever the previousimperial holdings in Africa were, Septimius greatly increased them.' Rostovtzeff (Roman Empire, pp. 266, 269) thought that concern with abandonedor unreclaimed land became a government policy when Augustus took over the managementof Egypt (see his Kolonates, pp. 351). The policy was later applied by Hadrian to theAfrican estates.-Idem, Roman Empire, pp. 321, 330, and 591j n. 3I; Kolonates, pp. 391-93.Herodian (ii. 4. 6), quoted in Kolonates (p. 39I, n. i), states that Pertinax, in 193 A.D., gen-eralized the rule that those who would work uncultivated land could possess it. It is, in fact,at about this time, under Marcus, that the settlement of barbarians within the empire beginsto become common. Rostovtzeff (Roman Empire, p. 374) connects this settlement ofbarbarians with the general policy under the Severi of converting the army into a farmingmilitia, settled on farms around strongholds which served as a rallying point for defensiveoperations (see pp. 375-79 and below, n. 75).


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EconomicStagnationn the EarlyRomanEmpire 69under Hadrian, though Rostovtzeff thinks that his enactments,knownchiefly from certain importantAfrican inscriptions,were aimed at therestorationof free peasant cultivators.' By the time of the Severi,flightof the tenants, or colony,from intolerableoppressionhad become fairlycommon.=In regard o agriculture,herefore, ymptomsof economic tagnationarenot to be sought in any failureof productivity,or in the growth of largeestates per se, or in the substitutionof slave for peasant or tenant forslave, but in the over-all political and economicconditions, which meantthat the profitsof agriculture n the estateswere drawnoff beyondmeasureand that the needs of the governmented to oppression.Ancientindustrynever really developedbeyond a householdeconomy,that is, one based on either the smallproducer-shopkeepern townsor theartisan-laborer n large estates. Industrialconcentrationoccasionallyoc-curredbecauseof particular actors.In Egypt, the Pharaohsand Ptolemieshad imposeda highdegreeof statemonopolisticmanagement f production,both agriculturaland industrial.In RomanEgypt, however,there was atendencyto returnto privateownershipof both land and industrialestab-lishments.22n certain placeselsewhere n the empire,the existenceof nat-ural suppliesof raw materialsor concentrationof particularskills led tocentralizedproduction.The sands of the coast of PhoeniciaaroundSidonwereparticularly uited for glassmaking.'Depositsof special clay aroundArezzo n Italy and later at certainpoints in Gauland Britain causedtheestablishmentn these localities of potteriesto make the red ware which,

See above, n. i6.21Rostovtzeff (Roman Empire, pp. 349, 597, n. 8) compares the threat of the peasantsof the Saltus Burunitanus under Commodus "to flee to some place where we can live as freemen" to the traditional "strikes" of Egyptian peasants (see p. 256), who would stage a"secession" to a temple if they felt that some wrong was not being properly redressed.The cases are, however, somewhat different: the Egyptian peasant did not plan to settlesomewhere else if he did not get justice; the Africans definitely threatened to depart. Thegrowth of desertion, both of peasants after the time of the Severi and, under the laterempire, of the oppressed tax-paying bourgeoisie (see below, n. 92), is a well-knownphenomenon. Rostovtzeff connects various "peasant uprisings" of the late second century,notably that of Maternus in Gaul and Spain, with the oppression of tenants (see pp. 327,357, 424, and 620, n. i6, 436, 438). The government of the fourth century tried to combat

the tendency toward "desertion" by binding all classes of the population more strictly totheir appointed tasks (see pp. 465-69; see also Johnson in Economic Survey, II, 245-46,for Egypt, and Heichelheim in ibid., IV, 234, for Syria; Broughton in ibid., IV, 658-6o, forAsia; Oertel in C.A.H., XII, 254-59).' For Roman relaxation of Ptolemaic monopolies, see Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, pp.I59, i69; Heichelheim, I, 736-37. Johnson in Economic Survey (II, 325-35) discusses themonopolies but draws no conclusions concerning Roman policies." For glass, see Heichelheim, II, I139, n. I4.


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70 MasonHammondoriginating n Samos,becamethe commonfine tablewareof the empire.'Otherexamplesof similarconcentrationsmightbe adduced.But in noneofthem is therea real factorysystemof mechanizedmassproduction uch ascharacterizesmodern ndustry.Theremightbe somesubdivisionof labor,forinstance, n thepotteriesbetweenthemoldingandfiringof thepots, butby and largesuchconcentrationsweresimply of individualworkmenunderone roof. Each man continuedto producehis particularobject by hand,just as if he wereworking ndependently.During the early empire, he disparity n civilizationbetweenthe centralMediterraneanndthenewly conquered utskirts,particularlyn the west,led to an artificialsemblanceof the present-daycontrastbetweenindus-trial and agriculturalareas.Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Greece,and Italyproducedmanufacturedgoods for export in return for raw materialsorpreciousmetals and luxury objects.' By the second century,however,thenewerprovinceshad developedtheir own industrialskills, either throughthe immigrationof workmenor through the trainingof local talent, andthe primacyof the central areas was lost. This caused an economicdeclineof these centralareaswhichhas often been taken as a symptomof stag-.nation; rather t is a symptomof a readjustment f balanceand a restora-tion of the normalconditionof ancientindustry,that is, local productionof the ordinary,simple necessities of life and trade only in luxuriesorthose manufacturedgoodsor raw materialswhichwere restricted n pro-duction to certain areas.The most famousinstance of this decentralizingtrend is that alreadymentioned, he spreadof the manufacture f ArretinepotteryfromItaly into Gauland Britain.

Symptomsof economicstagnationin industry,therefore,are not to befoundin respectto techniques,whichwereunchanging,or in a declineofover-all productionand consumption,which probablydid not alter verymuch.They are to be foundin aspectsnot purelyeconomic.The tendencytoward ocal economicself-sufficiencymade easierthe politicaldisruptionwhichmanifestsitself from the time of Marcusonward, irst into easternand westernhalvesand, from the thirdcentury,into smaller units. More-over, the disseminationof industryinto the provinces s accompaniedby

' For Arretine ware, see Heichelheim, II, ii63, n. 32; Comfort in a special section onterra sigillata in Economic Survey, V, i88-94.' Rostovtzeff,RomanEmpire,pp. i6i-69; Heichelheim, , 732-40; Frankin EconomicSurvey, V, I85-2I7 (Italy), 222-29 (Rome).


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EconomicStagnation n the EarlyRomanEmpire 7Ia markeddecline in artistic and professionalskills.' The explanationofthis, however,goes far deeper than pure economics; it was not the resultof mass or standardizedproductionas against individual or piecework,since the individualworkmanwas still supreme.Rather it was one aspectof the generalstagnationand declinethat overtookGreco-Roman ultureas it spreadoutward.Overland rade n antiquity,by wagon,beast, orpackman,wasexpensiveand thereforeprofitableonly forgoodsof smallbulkand highvalue.' Evensea trade,suitableforshipmentsnquantity,was slow andunreliable.Romehadsuppressedpiracyin the firstcentury B.C.,but shippingwas still sub-ject to uncertaintiesof weatherand fear of anything but coastwisenaviga-tion.'2Twenty days was an averageallowancefromthe Bay of Naples toAlexandria.'9 t. Paul took all winter, with a shipwreckthrown in, to get

a Rostovtzeff (Roman Empire, p. i67) connects the decline in artistic skill with standard-ization and decentralization. Standardization should not have caused a decline in artisticskill, because standardization did not really cut the workman off from directly shaping hisproduct. Even in mold-made pottery decorated with reliefs, the mold was handmade andnew ones had frequently to be made. Athenian pottery of the sixth to the fourth centuryB.C. was produced in quantity for export on fairly standard models, but the individualpotters and painters achieved a high level of artistry. More properly, Rostovtzeff later(p. 479) connects the decline in industrial art with the general decline of classical civiliza-tion. An interesting, but noneconomic, question is that of how far the decline was due to"barbarization," that is, the spread of classical culture to peoples who, not temperamentallyinclined to accept it, therefore handled it without inspiration, whatever their native abilitiesalong the lines of their own native cultures. R. C. Collingwood, in his and J. N. L. Myers'Roman Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I936; chap. xv, pp. 245-60), maintains that thishappened in Britain; that the normal development of native Celtic art was interrupted bythe Roman conquest and that the British during the Roman period produced nothing butdull provincial imitations of classical art, but that the native Celtic genius reasserted itselfas the Roman hold weakened.

'7 For overland trade, see Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, pp. 142-6i; Heichelheim, I, 690-722; appropriate sections of the Economic Survey; M. P. Charlesworth, Trade-routes andCommerce of the Roman Empire (Cambridge: The University Press, I924).' For piracy, see H. A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Liverpool: The UniversityPress of Liverpool, I924). Piracy was largely suppressed during the later republic, chieflyby Pompey.-Frank in Economic Survey, I, 30I-3. For geographic and climatic factors innavigation, see E. C. Semple, The Geography of the Mediterranean Region (New York:Henry Holt and Company, I931), Part IV, pp. 579-707. Caesar's pursuit of Pompey acrossthe Adriatic in the winter of 49/48 B.C. was seriously, and almost disastrously, interruptedby storms-Bell. Ciu. iii. 25. According to Tacitus (Ann. xv. 46. 3), Nero in 64 A.D. orderedthe Italian squadron to return (presumably from Ostia) to its station at Misenum withoutregard for the weather. It was caught off Cumae in a southwest (Africus) gale and most ofthe triremes and lesser craft were blown ashore.'Twenty days from Puteoli to Alexandria is the average given by E. H. Warmington,The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India (Cambridge: The University Press,I928), in his table on p. 50. J. W. Thompson, An Economic and Social History of the MiddleAges (New York: Century Company, I928), p. 3, gives twelve days, presumably for a fastvoyage.


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72 MasonHammondfrom Judea to Rome.' The delay of the corn fleet by storm occasionallycausedriots at Rome which might even result in the fall of ministers.31

Duringthe early empire,two artificialstimuli induceda high degree oftrade throughout he Mediterraneanbasin and beyond.The first was theprosperityof Italy, which drew thither uxuryobjects even from the Baltic,the Congo,or India and China.' The second was the fact that the city ofRome had grown in populationfar beyond the possibilityof nourishmentfrom the neighboringareas of Italy and that she had to draw her grain,oil, and even wine from overseas: from Sicily, Egypt, Africa, and Spain.'It used to be argued that Rome's use of supplies fromoverseas,of whicha considerableportionwas procured n the form of taxes in kind, meantthe agriculturaldecline of Italy. But this was probablynot so; overlandtransport was so expensive, particularlyin mountainous Italy, that itwould have been ruinous,not to say impossible,to tap, for instance, thePo valley for the support of Rome's million or more inhabitants. Sea-bornesupplieswerethe onlymeans of provisioning hem.' Naturallytherewas nothinglike a corresponding ulk of export goods,even in the flushdays of the early empirewhen Italian potteryand metalworkcommandedprovincial markets. Nor did the populationof Rome, collected there be-

'3Acts of the Apostles 27-28; Heichelheim, I, 730. Paul's journeys in the east are dis-cussed by Broughton in Economic Survey (IV, 858-60).3 According to Tacitus (Ann. xii. 43), a shortage of grain in Rome during the winterof 5i A.D. led to a riot in which the mob surrounded Claudius and had to be driven away bytroops. Only ten days' supply remained in the city but a fortunate spell of good weather(as well as the kindness of the gods) permitted the ships to come from Africa. Tacitusmoralizes that formerly Italy had fed not only itself but distant legions; now it was de-

pendent on Africa and Egypt and the life of the Roman people was subject to the chancesof shipping. In i89 A.D., on the occasion of a severe famine, the prefect of the grain supplyartificially aggravated it in such a way that the pernicious minister of Commodus, Cleander,should seem responsible. Thereupon, the people besieged Commodus in his villa and, despitethe Praetorian Guard (the police), forced him to have Cleander and his son executed.-DioCassius lxxii (lxxiii in Boissevain and the Loeb ed.). I3; Scriptores Historiae Augustae,Comm. I4. i-3; Herodian i. I2. 3-I3. 6."Frank in Economic Survey, V, 267-95.The general supplying of grain to Rome was called annona (a term applied also to otheraspects of the supplying of grain); the distribution of grain free to the poorer people ofRome was called frumentatio (see Rostovtzeff's article on "Frumentum" in RE, VII (13),I26-87, and the articles in E. de Ruggiero, Dizionario Epigrafico di Antichita Romane, on"Annona" (I, 474-87) and on "Frumentatio" (III, 225-3I5). The dole, as well as the freegifts of money to the people (congiaria or liberalitates, as against donatiua to troops) arefrequently alluded to in the imperial coinage.-H. Mattingly, Roman Coins (London:Methuen, I928), p. I5I. See generally H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, The ImperialRoman Coins (London: Spink and Sons, I923) and H. Mattingly, Coins of the RomanEmpire in the British Museum (London; For the Trustees, I923-)."For the view that Rome could not be supported by grain transported overland butmust draw from overseas, see H. M. Last's discussion of the grain bill passed by GaiusGracchus in I22 B.C. in C.A.H., IX, 4, 57-60.


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EconomicStagnationn theEarlyRomanEmpire 7 3cause it was the centerof the world,contributeanythingeconomically othe empire.'From the time of the Gracchi, n the secondcentury B.C., ef-forts hadbeen madeto drawoffthesurplusandidlepopulationof the capi-tal, but these failed.In the end, the governmentnot only had to take overthe supervisionof the provisioningof the city, to preventprofiteering nduncertainties; t was also compelled o supportfree a considerableportionof thepopulation.'Onlya few othercities of the empireeven approachedRomein size, perhapsCarthage,Alexandria,Antioch, and, after Constan-tine, Constantinople.Except for Constantinople,hese cities seem to havebeen supported argely from their hinterlands;at least there is no suchevidenceas there is for Rome that a vast organizationwas necessary tofeed themfromoverseas.'In the case of trade,the territorial imits of the empirewereoversteppedby the economicsystem and briskcommercewas conductedboth overlandandby sea with the far east andoverlandwith the far northand even withcentral Africa.' To some extent, bulk trade shows the same, tendencytowardregionalism hat was indicated in the case of industry, n part be-cause of the decentralizationof industry itself and in part because thedevelopment f agriculturen the westshifted the supplyingof Rome fromEgypt to Africa and Spain. Under the later empire, Egypt fed Constan-tinoplewhich, like Rome, dependedon overseassupplies."There is little

'SFrank in Economic Survey (V, 2 I8) compares Rome's unfavorable trade balance, metby government expenditures or paid for by income from provincial investments, with thoseof such modern capitals as Washington or Rome.3 Even Athens, in the fifth century B.C., routed the import of grain from the Black Seathrough the Piraeus, where her citizens had first claim on it. The Gracchan grain law is de-rived by Last (C.A.H., IX, 57) from Hellenistic precedents.'3 But Rostovtzeff indicates that the administrations of all large cities had to assist andcontrol the food supply.-Roinan Empire, pp. 148-53, esp. p. I49, and p. 532, n. 22).3 For trade outside the empire, see Frank in Economic Survey, V, 283-90; Johnson inibid., II, 344-46 (part played by Egypt); Heichelheim in ibid., IV, i98-20I, 203 (partplayed by Syria). The trade with India and China was very large and is well discussed byWarmington, Commerce. The Chinese sources are translated and discussed by F. Hirth,China and the Roman Orient (Leipzig: G. Hirth, i885). Hirth tries to identify the countriesand products mentioned in the Chinese sources. He thinks (pp. I73-78) that the famousembassy mentioned as having reached the Chinese court in i66 A.D. from "Antun, rulerof Ta-Ts'in in [Syria?]' was not an official embassy from Marcus Aurelius Antoninus butcomprised traders who, having reached Annam, pushed into China in the guise of an of-ficial embassy. He points out that their gifts were not typically Syrian products but objectsthat they could easily have procured in Annam. Oertel, however, in C. A. H. (XII, 235) ac-cepts a view that they were an official embassy which had started from Ctesiphon [TaTs'in?]. Hirth (pp. 22I-4I; see below, n. 67) remarks on the high esteem enjoyed bySyrian glass in China. The New York Times (April 26, I946, p. 23) reports the finding inIndo-China of a hoard of coins and precious objects, partly Greco-Roman and partlyHindu, among which was a coin of Antoninus or Marcus.39Diz. Epigrafico, I, 485 (left col.) under "Annona," citing Codex Theodosianus xiv. 26. Iwith the comment of Gothofredus (see Heichelheim, I, 799).


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74 MasonHammondevidence,however,for stagnation in the movement of luxury objects orof thoseproducednspecializedregions.' Pirennewentso far as to maintainthat the economicunity of the Mediterranean,as far as this trade wasconcerned,was not brokenuntil the eighthcentury, in consequenceof theMoorishoccupationof Sicily and Spain.4"Symptomsof stagnationwith respect to trade, therefore,are not to befoundin the normalinterchangeof goods of small bulk and high value.Granted,as will be remarkedpresently, that this trade meant a drain ofcash out of the empire, this is a financial, not a trade, problem. In thesea-bornemovementof foodsupplies,the symptomsof stagnation,namely,increasinggovernment ontroland support,are likewise factorsnot of thegrain trade itself, which was artificial to begin with, but of politics andfinance.

IIFrom a generalfinancialpointof view, the early empirewas a period ofgreat prosperity as regardsboth public funds and private capital.42 hisprosperity was not confined to the upperclasses; to judge from the ar-

chaeologicalevidence, it extendedfairly far down the social scale, par-ticularly nthetownswhosematerialremains,asat Ostia, Pompeii,Timgad,or Delos, show considerablecomfort in simplehomes.4' nscriptionsbearthis out, forvery simple peoplecouldafford o havegravestonescut, muchas they do today." But, by the end of the secondcentury, this prosperity? Heichelheim (I, 796-808) contrasts the continuance of the luxury trade after the bar-barian invasions with the decentralization of trade in cheaper goods and thinks that theByzantine emperors fostered the former.4 H. Pirenne's view is briefly and recently set forth in his Economic and Social Historyof Mediaeval Europe (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, I937), Introduction,pp. I-I5. His view is accepted by Thompson, Middle Ages, pp. 2I7-i8.4 Perhaps the most famous description of the prosperity of the early empire is Gibbon's,in the first three chapters of his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. In the third chap-ter, after discussing the reign of Marcus, he makes the famous remark: "If a man werecalled to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the humanrace was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that whichelapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus" (see the edition byBury, London: Methuen, i896, I, 78; see also Thompson, Middle Ages, chap. i).'For Rome, Ostia, and Pompeii, see Frank in Economic Survey, V, 2 i8-66; for Rome,J. Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome at the Height of the Empire, ed. H. T. Rowell(New Haven: Yale University Press, I940). In general, see Oertel in C. A. H., XII, 249-50;Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, passim; Friedlinder, Sittengeschichte, passim; S. Dill, RomanSociety from Nero to Marcus Aurelius (2d ed.; London: Macmillan and Company, I905),passim."The best impression of the character, content, and distribution of Latin inscriptionscan be obtained from an examination of H. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae (3 vols.in 5; Berlin: Weidemann, i892-I9i6).


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EconomicStagnationn the Early RomanEmpire 75had begun to wane.It is true that rightdown to the end of the empire therichgot, if anything,richerand lived on a fabulousscale. But the poor gotpoorer and increasingburdens fell upon the middle classes in the towns.The depressionof peasants into colonyhas already been mentioned;afterthe second century,inscriptionsmarkedlydecline in numbers,which in-dicates that ordinarytownspeopleno longerhad enough wealth to affordthem.'Augustusplacedthe public financesof the empireon a sound, f cautious,footing.'Much wealth had poured nto Italy from the easternconquestsofthe last centuries of the republic and from Caesar'sconquest of Gaul,whose chiefs had apparentlyhoardeda good deal of gold.Augustusaddedto this the treasuresof Egypt, and to some extent those of other easternsupporters f Antony.'7Moreover,Augustusdevotedthe revenuesof Egyptand of his considerablepersonal estate to the public service.' Even withthese resources,however, t is clear that he was hard put to it for revenuesadequateto supportthe restricted administrativemachine which he es-tablished.When Varuslost three legions in the Battle of the TeutobergForest in 9 A.D., Augustus felt unableto replace them.' Whether or notbecauseof this defeat,heput a practicalend to theexpansionof the Greco-Romanworld whichhadbeen continuous ince the conquestsof Alexanderthreeanda half centuriesbefore. The next two centurieswerea period ofconsolidationwithin the frontiers set by Augustus, except for such oc-casional venturesas Claudius'conquestof Britain which,in all probabil-ity never paid for itself, and Trajan's conquest of Dacia, the costs of

'Baynes in C. A. H. (XII, 713) comments on the lack of money for memorials in thethird century.' For Augustus' budget, see Frank in Economic Survey, V, 4-i8. See also in ibid., pp. 36-56, for the Julio-Claudians and Flavians, and pp. 65-90, for the Antonines and Severi.'For the flow of accumulated wealth from the east to Italy, see Rostovtzeff, RomanEmpire, pp. I5-22; Frank in Economic Survey, I, 296-98, 324-26, 338-4i; V, i8, 25-26;Johnson in ibid., II, 48i (Egypt). For the wealth of Gaul, see Grenier in ibid., III, 455-64.For the wealth of the west generally, see Heichelheim, I, 695-96.'5Augustus set forth his contributions to the state in his own memorial, the Res Gestae(see the summary in Economic Survey, V, 14-I5).' For defeat of Varus, see H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions (Oxford: ClarendonPress, I928), pp. 89-go (see also below, n. ioi). According to Suetonius, Augustus was soupset by the loss of Varus' three legions that for months on end he let his hair and beardgrow (a sign of mourning) and occasionally beat his head against doors, crying "QuinctiliusVarus, give me back my legions," and kept the anniversary of the defeat as a day of gloomand mourning.-Aug. 23.2. When the Pannonian legions revolted on the accession ofTiberius in I4 A.D., demanding a reduction of service from twenty to sixteen years (theterm for the praetorians) and increased pay, Tiberius refused their demands because thetreasury could not stand the expense.-Parker, Legions, p. 77, on the basis of Tacitus Ann.i.I 7.6, 78.2.


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76 MasonHammondwhich, in Rostovtzeff'sopinion, far, exceeded the much advertised bootytherefromor the profit fromthe new mines.' While it is impossibleto fixany accurate igurefor the Roman budget, t is clear that in the opinion ofAugustus and his more competent successors the public resources werelimited.5'New taxes might be imposed, ike those created by Augustus tofinance veterans' bonuses, and undoubtedly the increasingprosperity ofthe westernprovincesmeant added income.'2But expensesalso increased.Augustus eft an armyof twenty-five egions which, with the auxiliarytroops, represents some 250,000 to 300,00o men. Vespasian increased thelegions to thirty, at which number they remained fixed until Septimiusaddedthreemore.Thus underSeptimius he numberof troopswasprobablyover330,000 men."The pay of legionariesunderAugustuswas 225 denariia year, which Domitian raised to 300. Under the Severi the sum rose to 750a year."This representedhe pay of the simple legionary;auxiliarytroops

' The reasons for Claudius' conquest of Britain are much disputed.-Collingwood andMyers, Roman Britain, pp. 76-78. Wealth, exaggerated by report, was probably one of thereasons. No estimate is possible of the income and expenses of the province but it is probablethat the increasing cost of the military establishment was a drain on the central govern-ment.-Collingwood in Economic Survey, III, i4-i6. Yet in the third century, Britainescaped the general anarchy of the empire.-Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, p. 422. Ros-tovtzeff blames the financial difficulties of the mid-second century on the cost of Trajan'swars against Parthia and Dacia.-lbid., pp. 307-I5. Frank in Economic Survey (V, 65, 67)regards Trajan's finances more favorably and cites a lightening of taxation and the bootyfrom Dacia.-Ibid., p. 65, n. I3.

51 Heichelheim (I, 762-65) regards it as impossible to estimate the Roman budget. Thevarious authors of the Economic Survey have attempted to do so (see esp. Frank in Vol. V,as cited above in n. 46, and, for Egypt, Johnson in Vol. II, 48i-90).6' New taxes for the aerarium military were established in 6 A.D. to pay the veterans a cashbonus in place of allotments of land.-Frank in Economic Survey, V, 7. Veteran colonies

continued to be founded, particularly in the colonies.-Parker, Legions, pp. 246-47; Brough-ton in Economic Survey, IV, 702-3, for Asia; Frank in ibid., V, 30-32, 62-65, for Italy.But the legionaries tended to settle themselves in the provincial towns near which theyhad seen service.Parker, Legions (pp. 92-II7) traces the history of the legions from the death ofAugustus to 193 A.D. The basic statement is given by Tacitus (Ann. iv. 5) on the dispositionof the Roman forces in 23 A.D. The fundamental discussion is Ritterling's article, "Legio," inRE, XII (23-24), ii86-i837, of which the first half, to col. I376, is a general discussion,and the second half treats the individual legions. Septimius' three new legions, I-III Par-thicae, are discussed in Half Vol. 23, cols. I308-9. The normal imperial legion should havehad 5,600 legionaries, but is generally figured at 5,ooo, which would give I25,000 legionariesfor twenty-five legions. It is usually estimated that there were about an equal number ofauxiliaries, making a 250,000 minimum for the whole army. Thirty-three legions withauxiliaries would give a minimum of 330,000 men.-J. E. Sandys, ed., A Companion toLatin Studies (3d ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, I925), pp. 464-68; M. P. Nilsson,Imperial Rome (London: Bell and Sons, I926), p. 285.' For the pay and extras of legionary soldiers and officers, see Parker, Legions, pp. 2I4-24 (up to I93 A.D.). For increases under the Severi, see Lammert's article, "Stipendium"in RE2, III (6), 2537. A good table is in M. Durry, Les Cohortes pretoriennes (Paris:Boccard, I938), p. 267. The fundamental work is still A. von Domaszewski, "Der Trup-


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EconomicStagnation n the Early RomanEmpire 77probablygot less, but special troops and officersgot much more.Also, thispay was supplementedby donatives on such occasions as accessions,vic-tories,or the like, in proportion o the pay and increasedas the pay in-creased.Thus it is apparent hat the cost of defending he empire rose notonly as regardspay but as regardsall the other expenses. This was par-ticularly true when, under Marcus, the pressureon the frontiers becameheavier.'It may be assumed that the other normal expenses of the governmentwent up correspondingly ince it is clear that the numberof civil servantssteadily ncreased'andhatvoluntarypublicserviceby the well-to-do,whichhad been the rule under the republic,was graduallyreplacedby paid pub-lic service on the part of all classes.' To this increase of administrativeexpenses must be added the heavy expenses of the court, once the sim-plicity of the Augustanhouseholdwas replacedby the trappingsof orien-tal monarchs."7inally, the occasionalspendthriftemperorsdissipatedthecapital accumulatedby the businesslikerulersin a whirl of favorites,en-tertainment, nd similarextravagances.The excessesof the so-called"bad"emperorsmay, as is often argued,have had little effect on the empire out-side of Rome, but they certainly constituteda devastatingdrain on thereservesof the imperialtreasury.'Onesymptomof the strain on government inances s the evidence,be-pensold der Kaiserzeit," in Neue Heidelberger Jahrbiicher, X (I900), 2i8-4I. Frank inEconomic Survey (V, 30I) argues that the confiscations and innovations of Septimius, byreducing a large number of tenants to the position of imperial coloni, made them un-available for military service because their labor on the imperial estates was "essential,"and therefore encouraged the hiring of barbarian mercenaries, which both increased thecost of defense and tended to draw money out of the empire (see below, n. 64).' For difficulties under Marcus, see Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, pp. 325-27; see alsobelow, n. io6. Frank in Economic Survey (V, 76-77) points out that the imperial treasury(fiscus) contained two billion seven hundred million sesterces at the accession of Marcusin i6i A.D. and was empty at his death in i8o A.D. Marcus was generous in gifts to thetroops (donatiua) and to the people (congiaria).' The best discussion of the Roman civil service is still 0. Hirschfeld, Die kaiserlichenVerwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian (2d ed.; Berlin: Weidmann, I905); more summaryis H. Mattingly, The Imperial Civil Service of Rome (Cambridge: The University Press,igio). For salaries, see Rosenberg's article "Salarium" in RE2, I (2), i847. Hirschfeld (I,477-80) thinks that the thoroughgoing reorganization of the administrative machine underHadrian, with its sharp differentiation between the imperial household and the imperialofficials, meant a considerable increase of personnel. Septimius introduced further funda-mental reforms, chiefly to the disadvantage of the senatorial class (see pp. 48o-82).' For the court, Hirschfeld, Verwaltungsbeamten, pp. 307-I7; Friedlinder, Sittenge-schichte, II, 32-Io2.' For extravagances of "bad" emperors, see Frank in Economic Survey, V, 39-40 (GaiusCaligula), pp. 43, 45 (Nero), pp. 55-56 (Titus and Domitian). He does not give detailsfor Commodus, Caracalla, or Elagabalus. Thompson agrees that their faults had littleadverse effect on the empire as a whole.-Middle Ages, pp. 6-7.


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78 MasonHammondginning at least with Trajan, that the governmentwas forced from timeto time to canceltherecordsof unpaid axes.'

Evenmoresymptomatic s the gradualdepreciation f thecoinage.' Thisfirst occurredunderNero. His reductionof the weight of the gold aureusmay have been justifiedby a rise in the value of gold in relationto othermetals.61More dangerous,n the example it set, was his increaseof alloyin the silver coinage, an increasewhich continuedduring the second cen-tury, becamesevere under Caracalla,and proceededrapidly throughoutthe rest of the thirdcentury.62 his depreciation f the silver content of thecoinagesuggests that even during the second century the incomeof thegovernmentwas inadequate o meet its expensesunless the supplyof pre-cious metals was spreadmore thinly. In a society which estimated thevalue of coinsin termsof their content of preciousmetals andnot in termsof an arbitrary (or token) valueset uponthemby the government,depre-ciation was bound to lead to publicloss of faith in the coinageand thus tosuch inflationaryeffects as the ruin of capital values, the dislocation ofrates of pay, and a trend toward barter and payment of taxes in kind.'

" Cancellation of delinquent taxes by the emperors was much praised during the secondcentury but it proves either that people were increasingly in default or that the governmentcollection agencies were inadequate. See Frank in Economic Survey (V, 65 and 70, n. 23)for the burning of records under Trajan as portrayed on one of two balustrades now in theForum (photograph in Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, p. 3I4), ibid., p. 70 for Hadrian (fromDessau, Ins. Lat. Sel. no. 309), p. 77 for Marcus (from Dio Cassius lxxi [lxxii]. 32.2, of i78A.D.). Egypt had difficulty meeting the burden of taxes in the third century.-Johnson inEconomic Survey, II, 354." The content of the coins is conveniently presented by Frank in Economic Survey,V, 90-93; see also Heichelheim, I, 682-89."This interpretation of Nero's changes is Mattingly's in his Roman Coins (pp. I2I-32).Frank in Economic Survey (V, 35) justified Nero even for silver. Nero reduced the aureusfrom I/42 to I/46 of a Roman pound and changed the silver from practical purity to ioper cent alloy.' Silver was alloyed I5 per cent under Trajan, 25 per cent under Marcus, and 40 percent under Septimius.-Mattingly, Roman Coins, p. I25; Frank in Economic Survey, V,9I-92. Caracalla "reformed" the coinage by displacing the silver denarius (legally 25 to theaureus) by a new coin, the antoninianus, supposedly worth two denarii but slightly lessthan twice the size of the denarius and so alloyed as to have only two thirds the silver ofthe Neronian denarius. Even this coin was soon debased and the gold aureus continued alsoto lose weight.-Mattingly, Roman Coins, pp. I25-26; Frank in Economic Survey, V, 93.'For depreciation in Syria, see Heichelheim in Economic Survey, IV, 2I9-23; in Asia,Broughton in ibid., IV, 906-7. For depreciation and rise of prices, see Rostovtzeff,Roman Empire, pp. 4I9-2I; Johnson in Economic Survey, II, I47-48 (Egypt). For re-version from a money to a natural economy in the third century, see Rostovtzeff, RomanEmpire, p. 6I2, n. 57; Heichelheim, I, 784. Naturally, the "bad" money drove the "good"money out of circulation into hoarding or the melting pot. Ancient politicians had neitherthe ingenuity to devise nor the control of public opinion to enforce a "managed" currency.And excessive depreciation can destroy faith even in token money, as in Germany in theinflation of 1920.


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EconomicStagnation n the Early RomanEmpire 79However, these results of the depreciationof the coinage only becamedisastrous during the third century and therefore lie outside the limitof this discussion.Depreciationof the coinagemay have had a secondpurpose, o increasethe amount of coinage in circulation n order to providefor the needs ofdeveloping rade,rising prices, andsimilar results of the prosperitywhichtheearly empirewitnessed.If so, it would seem that whenthe accumulatedreservesof cashwhich Rome hadacquired rom theHellenistic monarchieswere exhausted,the normal productionof the mines would not suffice to,increase the amount of preciousmetals in circulation.' The coinage incirculationwas subject to at least two constant drains.A certain amountwas hoarded,but how much cannot be even guessed at.' More significantwas the export of coinage outside the empire, particularlyto the east, topay for raw materialsor luxury goods.This export has been estimated bysome as a seriousinroadon the availablesupply of preciousmetals, butmost scholars do not think that it reachedsufficientproportions o con-stituteby itself a primarycause of economicstagnation.'Whilethe export

' Heichelheim (I, 683-84) apparently regards the supply of metal as inadequate andconnects the shortage not only with the exhaustion of reserves but with the flow outof the empire to pay for imports (see p. 7i7) and later with the tribute payments to bar-barian tribes (see p. 689 and Frank, as cited above in n. 54). Frank in Economic Survey(I, 349, and V, 20-2i) regards the supply of metal as adequate under Caesar and Augustusbecause of influx of capital from the east (see above, n. 47). But coinage was severely re-stricted under Tiberius and the more liberal coinage of his successors may have beeneconomically unsound.-Ibid., V, 32-36.Under hoarding might be included the wear and tear on coinage through use (Warm-ington, Commerce, p. 3i6, under item III b, and n. 66 below); and use for ornamentation(Thompson, Middle Ages, pp. 40-4I).' Estimates of the flow of coinage out of the empire in connection with the easterntrade (see above, n. 38) are based on two statements by Pliny the Elder (Nat. Hist. vi.23[261.IoI) in connection with the sea route from Egypt to India: "India in no yearabsorbs less than 50,000,000 sesterces ($2,2I3,200 gold) from our empire and sends backgoods which are sold with us at a hundredfold profit"; and (xii.i8[4f].84) in connectionwith the spice and pearl trade from Arabia Felix: "By the lowest reckoning, each yearIndia and China and the [Arabian] peninsula take from our empire iooooOoo sesterces($4,426,400 gold). So much do our luxuries and our women cost us." The above equivalentsare figured on a Neronian gold aureus weighing 7.39 grams and worth 25 denarii or ioosesterces (Frank in Economic Survey, V, 9i) and a gold dollar weighing i.67i8 grams,which gives $4.4264 per aureus. The amounts would be somewhat less on a Flavian aureusweighing 7.3 grams. Frank in Economic Survey (V, 32) thinks that the drain was con-siderable under the Julio-Claudians but that Vespasian (see p. 283) restricted the exportof bullion. He feels, however (pp. 298-99), that a considerable flow continued. Warmington(Commerce, pp. 39-40) says that finds of coins indicate a high rate of flow to India fromAugustus to Vespasian but less thereafter. Yet he says later (pp. 120-24) that in Ceyloncoin finds are of late imperial pieces. Warmington surveys the question generally in hisCommerce, pp. 272-3i8, "The Adverse Balance," and concludes that, though the outflowwas always considerable, its ultimate effect was at most to hasten a financial collapse which


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8o MasonHammondseems to have been considerableduring the first half of the first centuryA.D., finds n India suggest that it fell off after the reign of Vespasian,whomay have tried deliberately o check it. Nevertheless, he sustainedvolumeof the eastern rade down to the end of the empire ndicatesthat the exportof coinagemust have continued,since, for the most part, India and Chinadid not desirewesternmanufactured oods or raw materials.67The two symptoms of economic stagnation which have just been con-sidered under the head of finance are, in fact, symptoms of general eco-nomic difficulty.They emphasizewhat were the fundamental hortcomingsof the ancientfinancialsystem: it was based primarilyon hard cash, sincethe public was not conditioned o accept coinage at a token value, and itdid not providefor any extensivesystem of credit, and particularlynot forany long-termpublic debt. Just as the possibilitiesof expansion n agricul-ture, trade,and industrywere only geographical-the extensionof existingtechniques, tools, and operations outward toward the frontiers-so, infinance,expansionwas restrictedwithin the available supplies of preciousmetals. When the expenses of government ncreased, and increased un-productively,more and more of the profit gained by the individualhad tobe drawnoff in taxationand dissipated n ways that did not increasetheindividual's or the state's productive capacity or their potentiality forcreatingcredit.'Anotherproblemwhichhad significancebeyonda single field was thatof labor. In agriculture,as has been said, the absorptionof small farmsworkedby freepeasants nto largeestatesworkedfirstby slaves andlaterby tenants,forwhomconditionsof labor became ncreasinglyunfavorable,constitutesa serioussymptom,not to say cause, of economicstagnation.In other fields, therewas no greatconcentration f laborand,so faras canwould have come in any case. His sequence of economic causes for the collapse (p. 3i6)is: (i) lack of sufficient regular substitute for "spoils of war" as source of metal; (2) un-productive use of money and selfishness of the rich; (3) failure to maintain a good supplyof silver coinage because: (a) mines were wastefully worked and slave labor fell off, (b)coinage in circulation wore out and was lost, and (c) coins were drained out of the empire.' Syrian glass products were exported to. China in considerable quantities and sold atgreat profit (see above, n. 38).

' G. Salvioli, Le Capitalisme dans de monde antique (Paris: Girard and Briere, i906),gives in his two last chapters (ix, "Le grand ebranlement economique," and x, "L'Economieantique") the most forceful presentation of the effects of the shortage of coinage and thewaste of capital in luxury and other unproductive manners. He emphasizes the funda-mental difference between classical capitalism, based on commerce and usury, and moderncapitalism, based on industrial production, with its divorce between capital and labor andits monopolization of the means of production. This view is rejected by Rostovtzeff, RomanEmpire, pp. 302-3, 585, n. 9I, 482-85, and by Frank in Economic Survey, V, 299.


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82 MasonHammondprobably declined throughout the Hellenistic period because men werelured elsewhereby the greater opportunitieswhich Alexander's onquestshad openedup."It is possible that the Romanconquestof the west hadthesame effect on Italy; at least the establishmentof private and state fundsfor the supportof orphans n Italy, attested about ioo A.D. under Nerva,has been taken to indicate a concernwith the problem of depopulation."It has also been arguedthat the settlementof barbarianswithin the fron-tiers,whichbecamecommon romthe middleof the secondcentury,signalsa desire to make up for losses of populationelsewhere,especially along thefrontiers."These are not, however, convincing evidences of a shrinkageof population; decline cannot be proved, at least before the late empire,save in certain areas, like Greeceand Italy, or in some cities.7'Neverthe-less, it is likely that the populationtended to level off at a limit set byavailablefood suppliesand similareconomic factors. It is probable,also,that losses which resultedfrom seriousplagues, ike that in i66 A.D. underMarcus,or from invasions werenever made up.7'The factors that causedthe populationto become static, if not to decline, were not only economicbut also biologicaland sociological,so that they lead outside the scopeofthis discussion.Nevertheless,the static condition of the population s notonly a symptomof economic tagnation;insofaras it meant a limited sup-ply of labor, it may be regardedas a cause of that stagnation'

'For depopulationof Greece,see Beloch,Bevilkerung, pp. 496-500; Rostovtzeff,Hel-lenisticWorld, I, 623-25.74Fordepopulationof Italy, see Beloch,Bevdlkerung, pp. 4i8-i9; Rostovtzeff,RomanEmpire,p. 3II (underTrajan). State funds for orphans (alimenta)are attested only forItaly and were aimedat helpingagriculture s well, since the capitalwas put out on loanto farmers.In the end, this probablyhad a disastrouseffect,since the loan was on a per-manentbasis and the interestactuallyconstituteda permanentaddedtax on the farms inquestion.By the time of Septimius, he state funds were in financialdifficulty and theyvanishedduringthe third century.Privatealimentaare attested n the provincesas well asin Italy. See the article,"Alimenta,"n Diz. Epigrafico, , 402-II, whichis fullerthan thatin RE, I(2), I484-89; also Frank in Economic Survey, V, 65-67, 70, 75, 86, n. 50, 88, ioi,i06-7, I73-74; Rostovtzeff,Roman Empire, pp. 3II-I3, 314 (balustradeof Trajan fromForum), 356, 544, n. 4, 587, n. 6.75 For settlementof barbarians,eeNilsson, ImperialRome, pp. 35I-52, and above,n. i9.

7 E. Stein, Geschichte der Spitrimischen Reiches (Vienna: Seidel and Sohn, I928-),pp. I, 3, statesthatthe generalpopulationof the empire ell from about seventymillionat thebirth of Christto about sixty million at the end of the third century. Oertel n C. A. H.(XII, 267-68) acceptsthis view. Johnsonin Economic Survey (II, 246) acceptsa declinein Egypt in the thirdcentury;Collingwoodn ibid. (III, 77) adducesevidence or infanti-cide in Britain; Scramuzza n ibid. (III, 368) thinks that the populationof Sicily wasstatic rather handeclining see below,n. 78).'For plagueunderMarcus, ee Rostovtzeff,Roman Empire, p. 325; Frank n EconomicSurvey,V, 76, with references.8Rostovtzeffdisputes he view of Seeckand others(see above,n. 76) that depopulationwas generalthroughoutthe empireand a cause of the collapseof ancient civilization.-Roman Empire, pp. 328-29, 59i, nn. 30-3I, for references. t is equallydifficult o blame


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EconomicStagnationn the Early RomanEmpire 8 3One aspect of the populationproblem, the failure of the Romanaris-tocracy to perpetuate itself, had particularly deep economic, as well as

political and social,effects.9The tendencyof Romansenatorsto limit theirfamilies below the numbersnecessary or maintenanceof the class, a tend-ency natural to all aristocracies,had become so acute at the beginningof the empire that Augustus legislated against it fiercely but futilely.'Appearance f "newmen" n the senatorialclass was very rapid duringthefirst two centuries,more because of "race suicide"than throughactualsuicidesor political executions.8"he effect was not at first entirely bad;the old republican tiff-necked rreconcilableswereeliminatedand newerfamilies, drawn from provincialaristocraciesand raised in the imperialservice, took their places. But the interests of these families fell outsidethe collapseon the mixtureof races,as is done by Nilsson, ImperialRome, in his chapteron "The PopulationProblem,"pp. 3I7-67 (see below, n. i04).7 R. Syme,TheRoman Revolution(Oxford:ClarendonPress,I939), chaps.xxxi-xxxxiii,pp. 476-524, gives a vigorouspictureof the oppositionand doom of the republicannoblefamiliesandtheirreplacement y "newmen"underAugustusand his immediate uccessors.Syme'spictureof Augustusas the comingpolitician s perhapsoverdrawn.-M. Hammond,TheAugustanPrincipate(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,I933), pp. II7-20; H. S.Jones in C. A. H., X, I76-8i. Augustus'policy was to maintain the supremacyof theRomano-Italicelementsagainst the provincial (Rostovtzeff,Roman Empire, pp. 47-49)and it is questionable ow farthispolicywas seriouslyabandoneduntilthe Flavians,despiteClaudius'admissionof certain Gallicchiefs to the Senate.-V. Scramuzza,The EmperorClaudius(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, I940), pp. 99-iio. For Vespasian'sad-missionof provincials, ee Last in C. A. H., XI, 418-20. Duringthe Flavianand Antonineperiod,not only were provincials ncreasinglyadmittedto the senatorialclass and highadministrativepositions (see below, n. 8i) but also citizenshipwas widely extendedandits privileges ameto countfor little whileits obligationsbecamemoreburdensome. inally,Caracalla,by an edict in 2I2 A.D. (the ConstitutioAntoniniana),extendedcitizenship opractically llwhoweretheninhabitantsof the empire.At leastoneancientauthor, he con-temporaryDio Cassius(lxxvii [lxxviii]. 9.5) gives as a reason Caracalla's esireto collectfrom everybodythe taxes previouslypaid by Roman citizensonly, presumably ince theexemptionswhich citizenshad originallyenjoyedfrom other taxes (suchas that on land)had been forgotten.Dio's explanationhas not, however,been unanimouslyaccepted.SeeA. N. Sherwin-White,TheRoman Citizenship Oxford:ClarendonPress, I939), Part II,pp. i67-230, passim. For the edict, ibid., pp. 220-27; Miller in C. A. H., XII, 45-47 andbibliographyon p. 734.The fullest study of the edict is V. Capocci,"La ConstitutioAn-toniniana,"n Studi di papirologiae di dirittopubblicoRomano,MemoriedeltaR. Acca-demiaNazionaledei Lincei,classe di sciencemorali,storichee filologiche,anno CCCXXII,SerieVI, Vol. I, Fasc.I (Rome:Bardi, 925).

80For the socialpolicy of Augustus, ee Last in C. A. H., X, 425-64; for the "eugenic"purposeof the LegesIuliaet PapiaPoppaea, ee J. A. Field,"The Purposeof the Lex Juliaet Papia Poppaea,"TheClassicalJournal,XL (I945), 398-4i6.

8 For studies of the compositionof the senate,see J. Willems,"Le Senatromainen l'an65," Le Musge Belge, IV (I900), 236-77; V (i9oi), 82-I26; VI (I902), I0-5I; B. Stech,"SenatoresRomaniqui fuerint ndea Vespasianousquead Traianiexitum,"Klio, BeiheftX(1910), 70-II7; P. Lambrechts,La Compositiondu Senat romainde l'accessionau throned'Hadriena la mort de Commode(Antwerp:De Sikkel,I936), pp. II7-92, and idem, LaCompositiondu Senat romainde SeptimeSlv~re a Diocletien,DissertationesPannonicae(Budapest:Inst. de Num. et d'Arch.de l'Univ. P. Pazmany,I937), Serie I, Fasc. 8, pp.I93-284. See Duff in C. A. H. (XI, 746-48) for a brief statementof the position of thesenatein the second century.


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84 MasonHammondof Rome and of participationin the old republicaninstitutions. Theyserved the emperorand often their service was largely military or pro-vincial. Their landed propertiesalso lay in the provinces,not in Italy.Politically, this changedthe senate from an active political organ to aneconomicclass; economically,t encouragedhat absentee andlordismanddrainingoff of local wealth which has already been mentionedas one ofthe most serious symptomsof economicstagnation.82Referencehas alreadybeen made to the most significantover-allsymp-tom of economic tagnationduringthe early empire,the trend towardgov-ernment regulationof the whole economic system.' This must not bethoughtof as a consciouseconomicpolicy, in the sense that it wouldbe ina modernsocialist state, but only as an attemptto stem, if not to remedy,the increasing inancial and politicaldifficulties n which the governmentfound tself.8' t is veryquestionablewhether he Romanemperorshadanyrealizationof economicproblemsas such. It does not seem, for instance,that there was any deliberatepolicy favorableto trade or opposedto theexportof currency o the east; such stepsas weretaken wereeitherad hocattemptsto meet some immediatedifficulty,or simplymethodsof raisingtaxes,or the incidentalresultof politicalpolicies.'Similarly,regarding ov-ernmentregulation,Hadrian'sattempt to secure tenants for the Africanestatesand to encourage he cultivationof the uncultivated ieldsmaywell

'For the senateof the thirdcentury,see Ensslin n C. A. H., XII, 375-76. For a pictureof the great Romanand provincialsenatorsof the later empire,see SamuelDill, RomanSociety in the Last Century of the Western Empire (2d ed.; London: Macmillanand Com-pany, i899), Bk. II, pp. II5-223.3For the developmentof "litourgies"nto a systemof state compulsion, ee Rostovtzeff,Roman Empire, pp. 333-43. "Litourgy"s the Greekword for uncompensated ublicser-vice (otherthan military) expected romthe individual.8 It is notedby one of the editorialreaders or this JOURNALthat governmentcontrolasexpressed n "mercantilism"etween about I55o and i8oo did not prevent the great ex-pansionof the European conomicsystem.' Frank n EconomicSurvey (V, 2 i) holds that Augustuspromotedcommerceonly toincreaseport duesand (pp. 294-95) deniesin generalany consciouscommercialpolicy onthe part of the Roman government.Charlesworthhinks on the contrarythat there wasconscious encouragementof commerce.-Trade-routes,pp. 228-34. Rostovtzeff praiseshighlyHadrian'sappreciation f the economicproblemsof his day and the measures hathe took to combatthem,particularlywith reference o agriculture,axation,and municipalexpenditures.-RomanEmpire, pp. 3I5-25. Heichelheim(I, 678-82) regardsAugustusastoo conservativeand reactionary n his economicprogram,as against Caesar (see above,n. I3). Consciouseconomicpolicy was familiarto the Greekworld, particularly n themonopolisticPtolemaicstate and in the commercial tates of Carthageand Rhodes.-C. J.Bullock,Politics, Finance, and Consequences (HarvardEconomic Studies,LXV, I939).But Frankargued n his Roman Imperialism (New York: The MacmillanCompany, 9I4)that the Romanaristocracywas not guidedby economicmotivesuntil the emergence f theequestrian lassin the first centuryB.C.,whosepoliciesare chiefly represented y Pompey.The Augustanreaction avoredthe senatorialandowningclass,with its Junkerprejudices,and tended to shepherd he republican inanciers,he equestrians,nto government erviceand to reducetheir opportunitiesor gain in handlingthe collectionof taxes (see below,n. 88).


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EconomicStagnationn the EarlyRomanEmpire 85have had the purelypoliticalmotive of buildingup the agriculturalclassand securinga good returnfrom the imperial estates."The governmentsubsidies to shipownerswhich began under Claudius were intended toassurea regularsupplyof grain for Rome.Since this trade probablygrewless andless profitable,whilethe demandsof the Romanmobgrew greater,the governmentincreasinglyassumed direct control of the associationsof merchantsandshippersengaged n the variousaspectsof the provision-ing of Rome in order to ensure the fulfillmentof their functions.Govern-ment regulation hen extendedto the distributors-the bakers, the oil andwine merchants,and so on.8'But this growth of government nterferencein privateenterprisedoes not reflectany theoryof state socialism; it wassimply an attempt to cope with practicalproblemsof agricultural aborand food supply.Anotheraspect of the same regulatory rendis to be seen in the collec-tion of taxes.The Roman state never hadan adequatefiscalorganization.Under the republic, t had farmed out the collectionof taxes to privatebankers.'These abused their position not so muchby extortingmore thanwas due in taxes as by lendingmoneyat extortionaterates to permitthecommunitiesto pay their taxes in anticipationof their own collectionsor during periodsof financialstress. Becauseof the evils of this-system,Augustus o curtailed t that it graduallyvanishedduring he early empire.'To some extent, direct collectionby governmentagents was substituted,butincreasinglyhemunicipalities,which n factmeant,under heoligarchicsystem encouragedby Rome, the municipalcouncils composedof wellto do, were saddledwith the responsibilityfor the collection.' When fi-

8' See above, n. i6.87Subsidies to shipowners under Claudius.-Suetonius Cl. i8.2; Scramuzza, Claudius,pp. i67-69. In general, see Rostovtzeff, RomanEmpire,pp. I49 and 532, n. 22 (with furtherreferences), 336, 359, 36i, 379-80, 397, 408-9, 474, 592, n. 37; Heichelheim, I, 711-I2;Thompson,Middle Ages,pp. 26-28. J. P. Waltzing,Etude historique ur les corporationsprofessionelleshez les Romains(4 vols.; Louvain: Peeters, i895-I900) is still the funda-mental study of the collegia.8 For the contract system of tax collection under the Republic, see Last in C. A. H.,IX, 65-66 (Gracchan period) and Stevenson in ibid., IX, 469-7i (Ciceronian period); forthe Augustan reforms, see Stevenson in ibid., X, 190-93. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire,pp. 159-60; G. H. Stevenson, Roman ProvincialAdministrationill the Age of the An-tonines (Oxford:B. Blackwell, 939), chap.v, pp. I33-55.9For public contracting of the collection of taxes and the management of public prop-erties, such as estates and mines, see M. Rostovtzeff (Rostowzew) "Geschichte der Staats-pacht in der romischen Kaiserzeit bis Diocletian," Philologus, Supplementband IX (i9oi-4), Heft 3, pp. 329-5I2. In pp. 367-74, he discusses briefly the publicaniunder the laterrepublic.

'9For the collection of taxes by municipalities and the responsibility of the members(curiales)of the municipal councils (curiae), see Rostovtzeff, RomanEmpire,pp. I59-60,3i7-i8, 339-43, 593-95, nn. 4o-46; F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, MunicipalAdminis-tration in the Roman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926), chap. ix, pp.117-37.


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86 MasonHammondnancial stringencyincreased, the rich themselves were expected to makeup any deficiencies.Towardthe end of the first century, the municipalitiesof the Hellenisticeast began to find themselves n financialdifficulties. npart these were due to mismanagement nd to competitiveextravagancein public buildings,shows, poor relief, and the like; in part they weresymptomatic of the general economicstagnation which was overtakingthe Mediterraneanworld.' Thus the burden of makingup on behalf ofthe municipalities he deficienciesof taxes bore moreandmoreheavily onthe municipalwell to do who could seldom recoverthis outlay. Under thelater empire, this class, Rostovtzeff'smiddle class, were as much serfs ofthe state as were the agriculturalworkers, and equally eager to escapefrom their intolerableposition by securinga government ob, by enteringthe army, by fleeingfromtheir nativeplace, or by joiningthe church.9'The problemof collecting taxes led the government o interfere moreand moredirectly n themanagement f local affairs.EvenunderAugustus,imperial agents were dispatched to solve local difficulties, ike a certainScaevawho was sent to Cyprus.'When Vespasianrevisedthe easternfron-tier by movingthe defense forcesfromSyria to Cappadocia,he shifted themain line of communicationsrom the southernpart of Asia Minor to thenorthern.'In the reignof Trajan,Pliny the Youngerwas sent as a specialimperial governorto the senatorial province of Bithynia, through whichcommunicationsromByzantiumto the legionspassed,with the particularmissionof restoringthe financesof the municipalities.'A similar specialimperial agent, Maximus,is found somewhatearlierin Greece.' Towardthemiddleof the secondcentury,specialcuratorsof citiesbeginto appear.'These instancesforeshadow he direct controlof local affairs by the cen-tral governmentwhich was made general by Diocletian.' Diocletian was

"'For the decay of municipalities, see Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration,chap. xiv, pp. I I 7-3 7.9For plightof curiales, see Rostovtzeff,Roman Empire, pp. 469-77; Thompson,MiddleAges, pp. 45-46; Dill, Roman Society, pp. 245-8i." For Scaeva,seeDessau, ns. Lat. Sel. no. 915.9 For Vespasianand the eastern frontier,see C. A. H., XI, I40-41.9For Trajan and the financialdifficultiesof cities, see Rostovtzeff,RomanEmpire,pp.

3I3-I5; for Pliny,see C. A. H., XI, 2i8-20; for Pontusand Bithynia,see ibid., pp. 575-80.'9For Maximus n Greece(provinceof Achaea),see Pliny the YoungerEp. Viii.24.2.' Articleson "Curatores,"ec. io in RE, IV (8), i8o6-ii and "Curatorrepublicae"nDiz. Epigrafico, I, 2, 1345-86.'9For the "statesocialism" f the laterempire,see Oertel n C. A. H., XII, 270-8i. Themost interestingnstanceof the attemptof the government o regulateeconomicactivitywas Diocletian'sedict in 30I which fixedmaximumprices (anticipating he O.P.A.?). Thetext is reconstructed y E. R. Grasern an appendix o Economic Survey, V, 305-42i. Frank(in ibid.,pp. 299-300) thinks that the effortwas justified,but this is not the generalviewand certainlythe attemptwas short-lived;see Heichelheim,1, 788-9i, and II, 1202, n. 9,who finds parallelsn the near easternmonarchies;Ensslin n C. A. H., XII, 405 and bib-liographyon p. 762; andBlUmner's rticle,"EdictumDiocletiani,"n RE, V (Io), 1941-57.


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88 MasonHammondlater empire.The labor supply seems to have been adequate,even thoughconditions of economic organization,particularly n agriculture,becameworseand possibly populationbecame static or even fell off.Despite the difficultyof detecting economiccauses of stagnation duringthe early empirein any one of these major economicfields, the fact thatstagnationhad set in and the measureof its scale appears from one verysimple contrast. During sixty years of the first century B.C., from theoutbreakof the Mithridaticand Social Wars in about go to the Battle ofActium n 3I, not only Italy but the whole Mediterranean asin was subjectto almost continuouswarfare,with the attendant evils of piracy and con-fiscation and proscriptions.Yet, once Augustus had established peace,prosperitynot only was restored, t surpassed hat previouslyattained inthe Hellenistic period. During fifty years of the third century A.D., fromthe murder of Alexander in 235 to the accession of Diocletian in 284, thesomewhatlargerarea then coveredby the Roman empire was similarlysubject to war, barbarian nvasion, and their attendant evils. Classicalcivilization showed no such recuperativepower after this disease as ithadafterthe previousone andthelaterempire ucceededat best in staying,rather than curing,its decay.' The cause of this inner weaknesswhichhad developed n the outwardly lourishing ocialsystem duringthe periodfromAugustusto Alexandermusthave beensomethingmorefundamentalthan the economicsymptoms alreadydiscussed.Considerations f spacedo not permita discussionof the many explana-tionsgivenfor the declineand fall of the Romanempireand,in particular,prevent quotation of the conclusions of the economichistoriansFrank,Rostovtzeff,and Heichelheim,to whomthis discussionhas been so muchindebted.' Suffice t to say that theirviews,likeso many previousattempts

103On the crisis of the third century and the economic restoration, see Oertel in C. A. H.,XII, 259-70. In pp. 279-80, he argues that the fourth century witnessed a considerabledegree of recovery but that this was not adequate and was purchased at the price of statesocialism. See also Rostovtzeff, Roman Empire, chaps. x-xii, pp. 381-478; Frank in Eco-nomic Survey, V, 302-3; Thompson, Middle Ages, p. 42.IA popular but interesting summary of various explanations which have been givenfor the decline and fall of the Roman empire is E. L. White, Why Rome Fell (New York andLondon: Harper and Brothers, I927), pp. 260-323. White agrees with Gibbon that theintroduction of Christianity, with its otherworldliness, undermined the will of the Romansto resist the barbarians. Nilsson (Imperial Rome, p. 299) blames the fall on the barbariza-tion of the army because of the growing disinclination of the more civilized populationsfor military service and (pp. 360-67; see also above, n. 78) on the loss of the superiorityof the Greco-Roman stock in consequence of "mongrelization." For wealth as a factor inthe fall, see above, n. I7. For Frank's general conclusion, see his concluding essay in Eco-nomic Survey, V, 296-304; for Rostovtzeff's, his two concluding paragraphs, Roman Empire,pp. 486-87; for Heichelheim's, his concluding paragraph, I, 859.


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EconomicStagnationn theEarlyRomanEmpire 89to generalizeon thisproblem,reflectnot only conclusionsdrawnfrom theirstudies but also their attitudes towardcontemporary onditions. Each inhis own way blamesthe collapseon the aristocratic,or oligarchic,characterof ancient society and on the failure of the favoredfew to measureup totheir responsibilities.Whetheror not this explanation s correct,it is sig-nificantthat these economichistoriansof the Roman empire found thatthe search for the causes of economicstagnationled beyond economicsinto politics, sociology,intellectualhistory, and philosophy.The presentdiscussion must refrain from following their lead into these tantalizingareas of speculation.Perhaps,however,three generalobservationsmay bepermitted.First, economic stagnation itself, whether, as has been argued here,inherent n the ancienteconomicsystem or inducedby conditions duringthe Romanempire,wouldnot have necessitated he collapseof that empirewithout some other cause.'05 haraonic Egypt survived for thousandsofyearswith a self-containedand almostunchanging conomic ystem. Chinaequallyhas passed throughperiodsof stagnationand progresswithouteverfallinginto completedecay.The existence of a stagnantnation wouldper-haps be unenviable,as is life in a beehiveor an anthill,but if an economicsystemreachesa balance thereseemsto be no reasonwhy it shouldnot goon endlesslyin its drearyround.The survival of Egypt andChinawas dueto the samefactor,theirrelative mmunityfrom externaldisturbance.Andthe failureof the economicsystem of the classical world to achieveuni-ficationandbalanceunder he Romanempirewithinthegeographicalimitsof the Mediterraneanbasin was due to its exposureto outside pressuresboth fromnorth and east.'?Secondly,the result of these pressureswas, as has been suggested,thatthe governmentwas compelledto maintain forces and an organizationbeyondwhat the economicsystem, capableof only limited development,couldbear.Increasingexpensesmeantincreasing axation,and increasingtaxationmeant increasingcontrolby the government o ensure that the

'So Thompson (MiddleAges, pp. 55) citing the survivalof the Byzantinestate, theeven more corrupt,stagnant,and oppressive uccessor o the later empire.He concludes:"Whydidthe RomanEmpirepassaway?To thisquestionCliovouchsafesno clearanswer."It is symptomaticof the fascinationwhichthe fall of the Romanempireexercisedover themedievaland modernmind that thinkers rom Augustineand Orosius o the presenthavenevertheless ontinuedto plagueClio for an answer.' This pressurebecameacute underMarcus(see above, n. 55) just at the time whenthe internaldifficultieshad become apparentunder Trajan and Hadrian.-Rostovtzeff,RomanEmpire,pp. 306-25. It seemslike a turn of the tide from the high-watermarkofTrajan'sadvances nto Daciaand Parthia.


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90 MasonHammondrevenueswould be forthcoming.This in turn meant the impoverishmentboth of the city dwellersandof the agricu

economic stagnation in the early roman empire (pp. 63-90) mason hammond

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