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Disaster Evacuation and Risk Perceptions in
Democracies Norichika Kanie ([email protected]) Noriyuki Ueda ([email protected]) Shunji Matsuoka （[email protected]） Yui Nakagawa Masahito Tanada
François Gemenne ([email protected]) Alexandre Magnan ([email protected]) Reiko Hasegawa ([email protected])
This study aims at clarifying the disaster evacuation process and risk perception in demoocracies, by examining the immediate response of Japanese politics and society to the triple disaster triggered by 3.11 earthquake, and providing a comprehensive and multidisciplinary analysis.
Decision-making in the Evacuation Process
Futaba
Two municipalities, Futaba and Naraha, are chosen for further investigations to explore the immediate response to the nuclear disaster.
3/11 20:50…An EI to persons within a radius of 2km from the plant 21:23…An EI to persons within a radius of 3km from the plant 3/12 5:44…An EI to persons within a radius of 10km from the plant 18:25…An EI to persons within a radius of 20km from the plant
The evacuation instruction in the early phases
2 Research Questions: How and why were instructions determined and/or revised? Were those instructions actually effective?
The evacuation zone was expanded 4 times within only 24 hours
NERHQ at the PM's Office. a Local ERHQ at Off-site Center, and the NERHQ secretariat in the Emergency Response Center (ERC) were established.
Actions taken right after the earthquake
Around 17:00 Several TEPCO executives were summoned to the PM’s Office as requested to explain the situation
METI established an Emergency Response Headquarters for the disaster
16:36 Crisis Management Deputy Chief Ito established an Emergency Response Office in the PM’s Office
18：10 Start of reactor core exposure
15：42 STATION BLACKOUT of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
14：46 A 9.0 magnitude
earthquake 15:27 ~ Tsunami arriving
16:36 Disability of the emergency core cooling system of Units 1 and 2.
15：42 Based on Article 10, Clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness notified by TEPCO. (TEPCO→NISA)
19：03 A declaration of a nuclear emergency situation was issued by the government .
18：50 Start of reactor core damaged
3/11 NISA called up essential ERC personnel and formed six squads, each with a specific function.
Fukushima Prefectural Government had a
sense of crisis
16:42 Based on Article 15, Clause 1 of the Act notified by TEPCO.
PM‘s Office took time before
launching the emergency action.
NISA informed the PM’s Office and other competent bodies.
METI established a NEPHQ in ERC and a Local NEPHQ in the Off-site Center
NISA Director-General Terasaka was deispatched to the Crisis Management Center at the PM’s Office.
Around 17:35 METI Minister Kaieda agreed to declare a nuclear emergency situation.
Around 17:42 METI Minister Kaieda and NISA Director-General Terasaka submitted the Article 15 Situation to PM and asked him to agree to declare a nuclear emergency situation. The report was suspended at 18:12 for PM's schedules.
around 20:00~ PM gathered members in a small room on the mezzanine floor and formed a team for the accident response.
NISA informed the PM’s Office and other competent bodies.
× lack of information sharing 19:03 – 19:22 the first NERHQ meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s Office
Fukushima Prefectural Government was
feeling sense of crisis
3/12 3:05 The press conference held by METI to announce a venting operation. It would be carried out at around 3:30
1：30 Permission of a venting operation to TEPCO.
5:44 ... 3rd EI The evacuation zone was determined to be expanded within a 10km radius
around 6:00 MELTDOWN of Unit 1
21:23 ... 2nd EI An evacuation instruction was issued by PM to persons within a radius of 3 km from the plant.
20:50 ... 1st EI Fukushima Governor ordered evacuation of Futaba Town and Okuma Town within a radius of 2km from the plant. ×confusion in decision-making
and communication gap
0:06 Site Superintendent Yoshida ordered preparations for the venting of Unit 1.
around 20:00~ PM gathered members in a small room on the mezzanine floor and formed a team for the accident response.
It consisted of the Prime Minister Kan, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano, METI Minister Kaieda, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Tetsuro Fukuyama, Special Advisor Hosono , and NISA Director-General Terasaka
Around at 21:00 to 22:00 NISA Vice Director-General Hiraoka, NSC Chair Madarame, and TEPCO Fellow Takekuro also joined to provide explanations.
Proposal of a venting operation by NSC Chair Madarame
3:00 ~ 4:00 no information on the
progress in the venting to PM’s office from NISA
Around at 5:00 PM asked and TEPCO Fellow Takekuro why the venting was not being carried out. The answer was “I don’t know.”
The PM‘s Office was irritated, as a venting
operation was delayed
3:30 The venting was not carried out on time. Trial-and-error efforts were exerted manually in carrying out the venting, due to loss of power of the valves that operated by air pressure
×information did not reach where decisions should have taken
3/11 20:50 - 1st Evacuation Instruction • to persons within a radius of 2km from the plant • issued by the Fukushima Governor • "2 km" came from the prior emergency prevention
training • The instruction was not issued on the basis of a
specific act, but de facto measure.
3/11 21：23 - 2nd Evacuation Instruction • to persons within a radius of 3km from the plant Persons within 10 km of the plant were told to stay
indoors. • issued by Prime Minister. • "3 km" came from Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ)
presented by IAEA documents
3/12 5:44 - 3rd Evacuaiton Instrcution • to persons within a radius of 10km from the plant • issued by Prime Minister • "10km" came form Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
presented in “Guideline for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness” by NSC .
• “We decided to expand the zone. That’s not because
something happened. That’s because it may possibly happen.” ( a comment by the Chief Cabinet Secretary)
18:25 ... 4th EI The evacuation zone was be determined to be expanded within a 20km radius.
7：45 Issuance of the declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation of the Fukushima Daini NPP
15：36 an explosion in the Reactor Building of Unit 1
6:50 METI Minister Kaieda ordered TEPCO to carry out the venting based on Reactor Regulation Act
7：12 PM arrived at the Fukushima Daiich NPP by helicopter, for an inspectation and a demand of implementation of venting.
14：50 A vent operation of Unit 1 was finally succeed.
8：37 TEPCO informed the Fukushima prefectural government about carrying out the venting around at 9:00. They were requested to undertake a venting when the evacuation of residents is completed.
9:02 TEPCO instructed a venting operation, regarding the evacuation completed. (The evacuation was actually not done at that time.)
6:15 PM departed for the plant, together with NSC Chairman Madarame. In the helicopter, PM
asked NSC Chairman Madarame about the possibility of hydrogen explosion. Madarame answered “It wouldn’t happen.”
× But it did happen. This contributed to the sense of
mistrust.
3/12 18：25 - 4th Evacuation Instruction • to persons within a radius of 20km from the plant • issued by Prime Minister
• not clear how "20km" was caliculated. • Some point out that the evacuation zone within 20㎞ was
determined by few people with their personal knowledge.
Significant amount of confusion in decision-making, communication gap, lack of information sharing can be pointed out at important points.
Centralization of
information?
Decentralization of
information?
× Both did not function sufficiently.
Evacuation Processes carried out effectively at Futaba Town ? 3/11 15：42
Based on Article 10, Clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, TEPCO notified METI, the Governor of Fukushima, the Mayors of Okuma and Futaba.
Municipality of Futaba was not notified of this. ×
16:42 Based on Article 15, Clause 1 of the Act, TEPCO notified .
Municipality of Futaba got contacted by phone for the notification.
19：03 A declaration of a nuclear emergency situation
Municipality of Futaba was not notified of the declaration.
×
20：50 An EI to persons within a radius of 2km from the plant
Municipality of Futaba was notified took possible measures to alert citizens in the area.
21：23 An EI to persons within a radius of 3 km from the plant was issued.
Municipality of Futaba alerted citizens in the expanded area.
By using a municipal disaster management radio communication networks
"I was told to be evacuated to a community center by volunteer fire corps, but I chose to stay home with my mother all the day."
Many citizens actually did not notice the EI in the day, because electorical radio networks stopped functioning.
Low awareness of the accident can be pointed out ×
On the basis of regional disaster prevention plans, in an accident situation, 6
relevant municipalities were supposed to send
staffs to an Off-site Center for coordination.
3/12 5:44 An EI to persons within a 10km radius from NPP
around 6:29 The evacuation instruction was sent by FAX, but people couldn‘t notice it at that time.
×
around 7:30 The evacuation of the whole town to Kawamata Town was determined as the instruction from the government was transmitted.
I saw several police patrol car coming, and was directed to "run away." When I found armoured vehicles of Yamanasi Prefectural Police, I though "Something serious happened." But I only thought of tsunami, not accidents of NPP.
"I was exposed to radiation, when I moved to Kawamata Town. I wasn't cautioned about those things." The evacuation was reported to be almost
completed around at 14:00 - 15:00.
Many residents did not really understand what was about to happen and why they needed to evacuate. As a result, some evacuated to areas which later became evacuation zones. It is difficult to say that safe and effective evacuation process was achieved.
Because the municipality could prepare only ten buses, most of residents were required to evacuate individually by their own cars.
×
3/11 15：42 Based on Article 10, Clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, TEPCO notified METI, the Governor of Fukushima, the Mayors of Okuma and Futaba.
Municipality of Naraha was notified by phone and FAX.
16:42 Based on Article 15, Clause 1 of the Act, TEPCO notified .
Municipality of Naraha was not notified.
19：03 A declaration of a nuclear emergency situation was issued.
Municipality of Naraha was not notified of the declaration. ×
×
3/12 Municipality of Naraha was not notified.
× 5:22 On the basis of Article 15, Clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, occurrence of a Nuclear Emergency Situation at the Fukushima Daini NPP was issued.
InEvacuation Processes carried out effectively at Naraha Town ?
5:44 An EI to persons within a 10km radius from NPP
× Although Naraha was located out of the evacuation zone, the zone seemed likely to be expanded. Naraha started to discuss the evacuation on its own.
Municipality of Naraha was not notified.
Low awareness of the accident can be pointed out
8：00 Municipality determined the evacuation of the whole town to Iwaki City on its own.
8：37 The evacuation instruction was issued to all citizens to Iwaki City, using a municipal disaster management radio communication networks.
7：45 Issuance of the declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation of the Fukushima Daini NPP An EI to persons within a radius of 3 km from NPP was issued to relevant local governments (including Naraha)
Municipality of Naraha was not notified.
×
There were some citizens who knew nothing about accidents of NPP before the annoucement.
8：30 The evacuation instruction was issued to citizens within a radius 3 km from NPP.
15：36 an explosion in the Reactor Building of Unit 1
The evacuation of all citizens of Naraha Town was supposed to be completed by the time of explosion.
"We arrived at Iwaki City around noon on 12nd. But the evacuation sites were so full, I thought we couldn't live in this place and decided to go back to Naraha. Since we heard of the explosion of Unit 1 around 17:00 afternoon, we moved to Iwaki again in a big hurry."
"I heard of the accident of NPP when I was in Naraha, and moved to Iwaki once as I was told to do so. But I came back to Naraha, because the evacuation sites was full."
"Since I was told to move to Iwaki for evacuation, I went there. But there was no room at evacuation sites, I returned to Naraha. I moved to Iwaki again on 14th." In the absense of appropriate risk perception, no effective evacuation process achieved
"Even when I heard of the accident of NPP, I didn't understand why we had to be evacuated. I though NPP was not much dangerous."
Not only smooth transmission of evacuation instruction, but also appropriate risk perception of residents are also necessary to carry out evacuation process effectively.
The Nuclear `Safety Myth' in the Context of Japanese Culture
The Fukushima accident is not a natural disaster.
It is a man-made disaster, which is deeply embedded in Japanese society and culture.
But to what extent is it Japanese problem
or problem of nuclear industry ?
No vent filter is set at Japanese NPP
After Chernobyl accident, European countries add vent filters at all NPP. ＊France completed the installation in 3 years. Why did not Japan install it ?
“…If we add vent filter, it proves that the NPP was not perfect and damage the belief that NPP is absolutely safe.” (senior engineer of a manufacturing company)
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Nuclear ‘Safety Myth’
NPP is absolutely safe with no defects. Japanese technology is so high that there is no
room for errors. So we need not / must not think about the
possibility of severe accidents, nor must we talk about the danger of NPP. Is it unique to Japanese society /culture?
How Japanese society make the reality invisible
Many have pointed out the defects of NPP for over 30 years.
But government and electric power
companies denied and suppressed the facts.
Alerts before the disaster 1/3
Jinzaburo Takagi [1938– 2000] A physicist, who specializes in nuclear chemistry . Have pointed out the danger of Japanese NPP for 30 years.
Takagi warned it as follows in 1986. The safety examination of the nuclear power plant is not intended for nuclear reckless driving or meltdown and the accident such that a storage container is broken. The accident of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant is the last warning. …The next will be a Japanese turn if we fail to take this message.
Alerts before the disaster 2/3
Hidekatsu Yoshii, is a Diet member of the Japanese Communist Party, graduated from Kyoto University department of engineering nucleonics department.
Yoshiiat Japanese Parliament There is a risk of meltdown due to failure of the cooling systems in 43 nuclear power plants (including Fukushima I), because power transmission lines would be damaged by earthquakes, thereby causing a complete power failure; or the supply of cooling water would be disrupted in the event of large tsunami waves. [October 2006 at Parliament]
― PM Shinzo Abe (LDP) rejected the request. “A failure of emergency diesel generators or a failure of the cooling systems of reactors will never occur in Japan."
Alerts before the disaster 3/3
Okamurareported the tsunami waves caused by Jogan earthquake in 9th century were so big that they caused damage three to four miles inland.
Urged TEPCO to make security
arrangements with respect to the occurrence of large tsunami waves in Fukushima (June 2009 in parliamentary committee)
―TEPCO’s response: available data was insufficient to justify such precautions.
Yukinobu Okamura A geologist and director of the National Institute for Advanced Industrial Science and Technology.
NISA and TEPCO recognized the risk but suppressed
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency;(NISA) and TEPCO were aware at least by 2006 that the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant was at risk of having its power knocked out by massive tsunami. “There is a possibility that power equipment could lose their functions if 14-meter tsunami hit the Fukushima plant, with seawater flowing inside the (reactor) turbine buildings." (paper of study session in response to the 2004 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia)
‘Myth’ in 70 years ago
Nuclear ‘Safety Myth’ is very much similar to the ‘Invincible Myth’ before the World War II. Government knew the disadvantage of Japan and expected little chance to win, but finally opened the war, which resulted in 3 million deceased.
Cabinet Total War Research Institute[1941]
Cabinet Total War Research Institute had predicted precisely what happened in the war.
1. victory, getting oil fields in Indonesia 2. gradually losing, long war, starving 3. war ends in defeat when Soviet invades Cabinet ignored the report, though they
recognizes it as reality.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (May 1946 ‐Nov. 1948)
a.k.a. the Tokyo Trials Former Prime Minister:
Hideki Tojo
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SHIGENORI TOGO
A: “My own personal feeling was opposed to the Tripartite alliance…” (But Togo himself delivered the enthusiastic speech on the tripartite alliance …) A: “There was no room in this public speech to include my own personal feelings,…”
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1941－Sep. 1942, Apr.－Aug. 1945)
A: “It would be more accurate to say that as Foreign Minister of Japan I was in such a position that I had to make a speech of that… ”
KUNIAKI KOISO 1/3
Denies responsibility for all his orders and policy .
Prime Minister (Jul. 1944 － Apr. 1945)
Governor-General of Korea (May 1942 － Jul. 1944)
Army General (Nov. 1937－ )
KUNIAKI KOISO 2/3 Q[Prosecutor Fixel ]: “ …you claim you opposed the March 1931 Incident; you tried to prevent the Manchurian Incident; you opposed the China Adventure; you opposed the tripartite Pact; you opposed going into a war against the United States; and you tried to settle the China war when you became Premier, and in all of these … you were frustrated and prevented from having your ideas and desires prevail.
If you disagreed with and were opposed to these events and polices, why did you accept one important position in the Government after another whereby you became one of the protagonists of the very matters you now say you so strenuously objected to? ”
KUNIAKI KOISO 3/3
A: “The way of we Japanese is that no matter what our own personal opinions and our own personal arguments may be, once a policy of State has been decided upon, it is our duty to bend all our efforts for the prosecution of such policy. This has been the traditional custom in our country. ”
Japanese ‘Reality’ Masao Maruyama Analyses the pre-war Japanese social
structure and mentality that escalated militarism as absence of subjective sense of responsibility
“ Reality is not thought as being created by ourselves, but thought as already made or happened in somewhere.” “ ‘Realistic’ action is always restricted by the
past. Thus, reality is not the subjective construction toward the future, but inevitability from the past.”
Masao Maruyama [1914 - 1996]
A political scientist and political theorist.
Japanese or Nuclear Industry ?
There is not such ‘Myth’ in other industry. cf. Toyota, Honda, Sony, Panasonic Monopolized industry: Lack of competition ‘REALITY’ vs. ‘reality’ REALITY : total framework people can not create REALITY but very good at realistic innovation
REALIY in transition
Before WWll Emperorship: Void-Center Leadership ministers predict what emperor want During Economic Growth(1950’s-1990) Loyalty to company /Life time employment Neo-Liberalism Threat to lose job → forced loyalty Japanese REALITY system + NPP Industry = Nuclear ‘Safety Myth’
Will the Japanese ‘Reality’ change? Q: Your factory in foreign country discharges toxic substance to river and many people suffer from serious disease in the lower stream. You discussed with your boss to stop it, but rejected. What will you do then? A: Students of Tokyo Institute of Technology (no.=200)
2006 2011 2012
disclose by your name 5 30 50
disclose with anonymity 15 100 120
do nothing 180 70 30
Japanese society is facing the turning
point whether to create the new reality.
It may lead the revolution in consciousness and socio-cultural system in Japan.
What about in other countries?
What do we learn from Fukushima
accident ?
Fukushima accident was deeply connected with Japanese socio-cultural system. But it does not mean that the NPP in other countries are safer than Japanese NPP. It shows that the nuclear industries in any countries have much to do with their socio-cultural background and thus the risk of them should be examined in the context of societies and cultures.
38
DEVAST Field Research
•January - June 2012 •Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews A Total of 106 Persons 66 Evacuees (37 Tsunami, 29 Nuclear) 7 Affected Municipalities (3 Tsunami, 4 Nuclear) 8 NGOs, 7 Academics, 2 Government Agencies
•Target cities/towns: Tsunami – Ishinomaki, Ofunato, Rikuzentakada, Iwaki Nuclear – Futaba, Naraha, Minami-soma, Iwaki
Evacuation and Risk Perception from the Japanese triple disaster
39
Towns/Cities of Origin of evacuees for interviews
Tsunami Nuclear
Evacuees
Ishinomaki Rikuzentakada
Ofunato Iwaki
Futaba Naraha
Tomioka Ookuma Namie
Kawamata Minami-Soma
Iwaki Fukushima Koriyama Ootama
Interviewee Tsunami Nuclear Accident
Central government 0 2 1: Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry (METI) 1:Reconstruction Agency
Local government (Municipalities)
4
2: Ishinomaki City 1: Ofunato City 1: Rikuzentakada City
9
3: Naraha town 2: Minami-Soma City 2: Futaba town 2: Iwaki City
Evacuees
37 28: Ofunato City 4: Ishinomaki City 2: Rikuzentakata City 3: Iwaki City
29
11: Naraha town 7: Futaba town 2: Minami-Soma City 2: Iwaki City (Hisanohama District) 1: Namie town 1: Okuma town 1: Tomioka town 2: Fukushima City 2: Koriyama City
NGOs
4
1: Child Fund Japan 1: Peace Winds Japan 1: Peace Boat 1: Platform Japan
7 3: AAR 2: Fukushima CRMS 1: Kodomo Fukushima 1: ADRA
Academics
3
1: Aoyama Gakuin University (at the time) 1: California Institute for Technology 1: Kyoto University
4 3: Fukushima University 1: Tohoku University
Affected residents (and other non-evacuees)
1 1: Rikuzentakada City 6 4: Iwaki City 1: Gumma City 1: Fukushima City
TOTAL 49 57
GRAND TOTAL 106
Risk Perception on Tsunami High Risk Perception Probability of a great earthquake more than 98% within the next three years Lessons learnt from the 1968 Chili Earthquake Hazard map and tsunami disaster drills Shortcomings Disaster drills and preparation depend on ward leader Contingency planning contracted out to consultancy
42
Risk Perception on Tsunami (2) Negative effects of high risk perception Anecdotes from former tsunami experience
“Even if a tsunami comes, it would be around 1 meter. The maximum would be 6m.”, “If the tsunami alert warns 1m tsunami, the actual one would be 20cm.”, “Tsunami arrives 15 minutes after an earthquake.”, “No need to evacuate, as we have a tsunami barrier of 6 meters.” Underestimation of the risk due to the Hazard Map based training
The areas outside of the predicted inundation zone produced many victims.
43
Key: First Evacuation Point ○ Evacuation Centres ○ Watergate □ Stairs Public loudspeakers Evacuation route
Hazard map of Takada district
Risk Perception on Nuclear PP •Low Risk Perception
“Myth of Absolute Safety”
Evacuation without training
Within a 1-3km radius
Evacuation without information >20% know about the accident,
>10% about evacuation order, SPEEDI
45
Concluding Remarks •Japan - one of the largest economy, known for its highly advanced technologies. •In the face of extreme disasters, even a developed country could not fully mitigate the effects of the disaster or avoid a serious nuclear accident. •In the absence of political will, financial capabilities and technological advances served little to mitigate the impacts of disasters. •Democracies do not always respond better to disasters, especially the nuclear one.
46
Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Agencies and Fukushima disaster
• Creation and self-reproduction of "Nuclear Safety Myth" by an
exclusive, sub governmental body called "Nuclear Power Village." ： Government and Governance （Hitoshi Yoshioka, 1999）
• Social and industrial behaviour of Japan's electric power industry,
which is regulated by regional monopoly, integration from power generation to distribution
：Electric Power Market （Takeo Kikkawa, 2011. Shunpei Takemori, 2011）
• Regulatory capture, a form of government failure, can be seen in Japanese nuclear industry
：（The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission 2012）
Relations between technical and social competences are also essential to
clarify significant factors for the nuclear accident.
47
Independene and Competence of Nuclear Regulatory agencies
１. Throughout the analysis of the developmental processes of nuclear regulation, path-dependency can be found to be clarified.
→ technical and social independence of regulatory agencies
Establishment of Nuclear Safety Committee (Genshiryoku Anzen Iinkai) in 1978 METE and Nuclear Safety Committee becomes two main regulatory agencies: so-called Double Checking (DC) system.
48
2. Creation of Nuclear Safety Institute under METE The nuclear regulatory was reorganized during the 2001 Central Government Reform. Tokaimura nuclear accidents occurred in 1999 can be seen as one of triggers. Creation of Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (Genshiryoku Anzen Hoanin) under METE affected DC system negatively.
Centralized Regulation sytem by NISA would be maintained.
Independene and Competence of Nuclear Regulatory agencies
49
3. Fukushima Nuclear Disaster in 2011.3.11 Under the DC system re-organized in 2001, the nuclear accident happened. ・Social capacity problem ・Combination of factors in DC system and electric power industry
Independene and Competence of Nuclear Regulatory agencies
50
Conclusion 1. Brief history of Japan's nuclear safety regulation can be described: First Phase（1957-1977）based on the Science and Technology Agency Second Phase（1978-1999）Commercial nuclear power reactors：MITI,
Nuclear reactors for provide in research and test ：Science and Technology Agency, Establishment of Nuclear Safety Committee
Third Phase（2000-2011）Government took a measure of enforcement of Nuclear Safety Committee and creation of Nuclear Safety Institute under METE.
2. Japan's Nuclear Safety Regulation Institutional architecture: Consistent Pro-nuclear policy 制度論的には、開発制度が基幹制度、規制制度は補完制度 3. Overseas Cases Independent Agency Models：Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the U.S.),
Autorite de Surete Nucleaire（France） Ministry and Department Models：Germany/Switzerland ・Differences between countries possessing nuclear weapons and
countries not possessing（“human resource pool”, management of Plutonium）
4. How should we cooperate for nuclear safety in East-Asia? Japan-China-Korea: Top Regulators’ Meeting (TRM) held in 2011
Reference •高木仁三郎『新装版 チェルノブイリ原発事故』七つ森書館 2011 •Japanese, Waiting in Line for Hours, Follow Social Order After Quake, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/japan-victims-show-resilience-earthquake-tsunami-sign-sense/story?id=13135355, last updated: 15 March 2011. •The moment the earthquake hit in Tokyo , http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12782427, last updated: 18 March 2011. •Pritchard, R. John and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL, N.Y. and London, Garland Publishing Inc., 1987. •Reports by the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commision (2012) http://naiic.go.jp/en/report/ •Reports by Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (2012) http://icanps.go.jp/eng/ •Reports of the Working Group on Nuclear Emergency "Survey local governments affected by the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident" (2012) http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2012/siryo19/siryo1-1.pdf •Survey reports of the municipality evacuation by the Nuclear Safety Commision of Japan (2012) http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/bousin/bousin2012_15/ksiryo1.pdf http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/bousin/bousin2012_15/ksiryo2.pdf •Yomiuri Newspapers •Asahi Newspapers •Fukushima Minpo Newspapers