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Peirce's Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and MeaningAuthor(s): John DeweySource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Feb. 14, 1946), pp. 85-95Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2019493

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VOLUME

XLIII,

No.

4

FEBRUARY

14,

1946

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

PEIRCE'S

THEORY OF

LINGUISTIC

SIGNS,

THOUGHT, AND

MEANING

IN a

recent

article I

pointed

out that

Stevenson's

identification

of

psychological

with

pragmatic in his

Language

and

Ethics

rests

upon the

interpretation f

"pragmatic"

which

s

put

forward

by

C. W.

Morris.' Morris's

point

of view

regarding

the

psycho-

logical differs rom that of Stevenson, ince the formerprefersa

behavioristic o an

introspective

pproach

(F.S.,

p. 6).

But, how-

ever

important

his

differences from

certain

points of

view, it

is

irrelevant

o

the issue

here

under

discussion,

namely,the

account

of

meaning

as

pragmatic

advanced

by

Morris on

the

alleged

au-

thority

f

Peirce. In

the

sequel,

it

will

be

noted

that

the

theory

of Peirce

also

bears

directly

on

Stevenson's

theory

of

some mean-

ings as

"emotive."

Consideration f

Peirce's actual

theory f

signs

in general and linguistic signs (called symbolsby him) in par-

ticular

is

pertinent

not

only because of the

present interest n

Peirce's

writings

but because the

inverted

report

of

Peirce

which

is

given

by Morris

has

influenced,

s

consultation

f

recent

itera-

ture will

show, other

writers

than

Stevenson.

Since Morris

has

professed

to be

sympathetic

with

Peirce's

theory, t

is

especially

important

o

rescue

Peirce's theory

by

reference o

Peirce's own

writings

before an

Ersatz

takes the

place

of

what Peirce

actually

held.

I

Morris

adopts from

Peirce

the

name

semiosis for the

general

theory

f

signs.

In

an

early passage he

distinguishes

our

factors,

components,

ometimes alled

aspects,

of

signs.

There is

the

(i)

sign

vehicle, that which acts

or

functions s a

sign; (ii)

there s

that

to

which the

signs

refer,

he

designatum;

(iii)

there s

"that

effect n

some

interpreter

n

virtue of

which the

thing

n

question

is a sign to that interpreter,"viz., the interpretant. (iv) "The

interpreter

may be

included as a

fourth

factor." Or, summariz-

ing,

"The

takings-account-ofre

interpretants; he

agents of

the

1

My article,

"Ethical

Subject-Matter and

Language," was

published in

this

JOURNAL,

Vol. XLII

(1945),

pp.

701-712.

Morris's view

is

contained in

his

Foundations of the

Theory of Signs

(referred to

hereafter

as F.S.) in

the

"International

Encyclopedia

of Unified

Science," Vol. I,

No.

2, Chicago,

1938.

85






86 THE

JOURNAL OF

PHILOSOPHY

process are

interpreters." In a later passage the "process of in-

terpreting"

s

telescoped nto the interpretant,

nd the consolida-

tion

is

henceforthalled the "interpretant."

The three factorsof

semiosisdealt with in the rest of the monograph re, accordingly,

"sign vehicle,

designatum, nterpreter. 3Since

the deviationfrom

Peirce, amounting s has been said to a reversal,

s connectedwith

the

gratuitous introductionof

an

"interpreter,"

and

since this

introduction s

the source from which there flowsthe account of

the

pragmatic

and of

pragmatismgiven by Morris, t may seem at

first ight as if

the point at issue in this article

were the nature of

"pragmatism."

So I wish to make it clear at the outset that this

is a secondarymatter. The primarymatter s the theoryof signs

in

general and linguistic signs (symbols) in

particular, and of

meaning,put

forwardby Peirce:-a theory

n

which "relation to

interpreters"not

only does not describe

"pragmatism" in any way

whatever,but

falls (and this is the primary

point) wholly outside

of

Peirce s theory f signs and meaning and of

anything

nvolved

in

that theory.

By parcelling

out the triadic relation mentioned bove, Morris

obtains three

dyadic "dimensions." The dyadic "relation

of

signs to that to which theyare applicable" is called the semantic

dimension;

the

relationof signs to one another" is called

the

syn-

tactical

dimension;

while

"the

relation

of

signs

to

interpreters"

s

called

the

pragmatic

dimension.

It is further

dded that

in

their

semantic

dimension, igns designate and/or denote;

in

their

syn-

tactic

dimension,they implicate;

in

their

pragmatic dimension,

they express.4

It is,

in

my

judgment, a too frequent practice to attemptto

"solve" problemsby a distributionof subject-mattersnto dif-

ferent

compartments-a procedure

which

also,

in

my judgment,

evades the

issues that are serious. Mr.

Morris

thus

awards

the

semanticdimension

o the

empirical

tudent

of the

theory

f

knowl-

edge;

to

the

logician

is awarded

the

syntactical

dimension,

s

ap-

pears from

he word

"implicates" (implies)

in

the

above

statement

(the

formal

being

thus

successfully

ut

off

from factual scientific

subject-matter);

to

the

pragmatic

dimension

there remains the

extra-cognitive,

xtra-logical

domain

which

includes "all

the

psy-

chological,biological, and sociological phenomenawhich occur in

the

functioning

f

signs."

5

In

this

connection,

t

is said

that this

2

F.S., p. 3

and p. 4.

Italics in

original.

3

F.S., p. 6,

where the

three

matters ast

named

are

called "

three correlates

of the

triadic

relation of

semiosis.

4

F.S., pp. 6-7.

5

F.S., p. 30,

for the last

quotation;

considering

that

the

subject-matter

s

lnguistic

signs,

which

present

themselves to the

factual

student

as

themselves






PEIRCE'S THEORY 87

three-dimensional

ivision enables us to

recognize

the

validity

of

all three

points

of

view, including

the

pragmatic,

which

is

"in-

clined

to

regard

a

language

as a

type [sic ]

of communicative c-

tivity, ocial in originand nature."

Whether

I am correct or not in

my general

statement bout

the tendency

to solve

problems by parcelling

out

subject-matter

into independent domains or dimensions,one has only to read

Peirce to see that Morris's account effectuallyplits apart the very

subject-matters

with

which

Peirce labors

in order

to

provide

an

integrated olution.

And

while the point

at issue is not the nature

of

pragmatics,much less its correctness,

iscussion

must begin at

thisplace since Morris'smisinterpretation,s far as Peirce is con-

cerned,centers t

and

proceeds

from

his

extraordinary

ccount of

what Peirce means by "pragmatic" in connectionwith linguistic

signs.

The

actual

issue, however,

s the

theory

of Peirce

concern-

ing the nature of linguistic igns

and

of meaning.

The

misrepre-

sentation

n

question consists

n

converting nterpretant, s used

by Peirce, into

a

personal

user or

interpreter. To Peirce, "inter-

preter," if he used the word, would

mean

that which interprets,

therebygiving meaning

to

a

linguistic ign.

I

do not

believe that

it is possible to exaggerate hescornwith whichPeircewould treat

the

notion that what interprets given linguistic ign can be left

to the whim or

caprice

of those who

happen to

use

it. But

it

does

not follow

from this

fact

that Peirce holds

that

the

interpretant,

that which

nterprets linguistic ign,

s an

"object"

in

the

sense

of an

existential thing." On the contrary,

he

interpretant,

n

Peirce's usage,

is

always

and

necessarily nother inguistic ign-

or, better,

et of such

signs.

The

following assage

is

strictly ep-

resentative: "On the whole, then, f by the meaning of a term,

proposition,

r

argumentwe

understand

he

entire

general ntended

interpretant,

henthe

meaning

of

an

argument

s

explicit. It is its

conclusion;

while the

meaning

of

a

proposition

r term s all

that

that

propositionor term could contribute o the conclusion of a

demonstrative

rgument."

Against such statements s

the

above may

be

placed

the

follow-

biological-psychological-societal vents, this relegation

of the latter to an

extra-

cognitive, extra-logical compartment should prepare the reader for the dis-

integrationto which it

gives rise.

e

Collected Papers, Vol. V, pp. 110-111;

"conclusion" not

italicized in

original. The reader

who consults the Indices, especially of Vols.

II

and

V,

of the Collected Papers

will be readily

convinced

of

the representative haracter

of

this passage.

I

add, however,

the

following:

"the conclusion of an

argu-

ment" is "its

meaning, .

.

. its

intended

interpretant.

.

.

It

seems

natural

to use

the

word meaning

to denote

the

intended

nterpretant" (Vol. V, p.

108).

In

the Indices, consult

Meaning

and

Symbol,

in

addition

to

Interpretant.






88

THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ing statements f

Morris,

n

addition to

what

has

previouslybeen

cited

fromhim

about the

pragmaticdimension

nd

the interpreter:

The relation of

language "to the persons

who use it"; "that effect

on some interpretern virtueof whichthe thingin questionis a

sign

to that

nterpreter"; "the relationof

signs

to

interpreters

. .

the

pragmatical

dimension"; "expresses

its

interpreter"; "ex-

presses is a

term of pragmatics"; "the

permanent ignificance f

pragmatism ies

in the fact that it has directed attention more

closely

to

the

relation

of

signs

to their

users."

7

The extent to which the

view presented

n

these

passages in-

verts Peirce

may

be

gathered

from

the fact that Peirce

uniformly

holds (1) that there s no such thingas a sign in isolation,every

sign being

a

constituent

f a

sequential

set of

signs,

so that

apart

from

membership

n

this

set,

a

thing

has no

meaning-or

is not

a

sign;

and

(2)

that

in

the

sequential

movement f

signs thus or-

dered,

the

meaning

of the earlier ones

in

the series is

provided by

or constituted

y

the later

ones

as their

nterpretants,

ntil a

con-

clusion

(logical

as

a matter

of

course)

is reached.

Indeed,

Peirce

adheres

so

consistently

o

this

view that

he

says,

more

than

once,

that

signs,

as

such,

form

n

infinite

eries,

o

that no

conclusion

of

reasoning s forever

inal, eing inherently pen

to

having ts mean-

ing

modified

y

further

igns.

Verbally,

this

intrinsic "relation

of

signs

to one another"

sounds

like the

syntactical

dimensionof

Morris.

But

in

the case

of

Peirce

this

moving

or

sequential

relation of

signs

is formal

only

in the sense of

being

the

form-of-the-movement-of-an-ordered-series-

of-signs-to-a-conclusion.

he formal

treatment f

Peirce

is

found

in his

Logic of Relatives,

which

is

integrally

connected

with

his

wholetheory fsigns. That toPeirce themovement fsigns,while

it has

form,

s

itselfmaterialor

factual,not

formal, ppears clearly

in the

following

passage:

"To

say,

therefore,

hat

thought

annot

happen

in an

instant,

but

requires

a

time,

s but

another

way

of

saying every

thought

must be

interpreted

n

another,

or

that all

thought

s in

signs."

8

As Morris's translation f

"interpretant"

into

a

personal

user

as its

interpreter

urns Peirce's

view

upside

down,

so

his

formula-

tion of semantic,or the relation of signs to "things," is so con-

trary

to what Peirce

says

on the latter

subject

as

to

make

nonsense

of

it.

The

most

direct

way

of

showing

this inversion

s

by taking

what Morris

says

about the case

of

a reference o

a

thing

n

what

7

F.S., pp. 2, 3, 6, 7, and 29;

similar statements

occur

on pp. 30,

31, and 33.

8

Collected Papers, Vol. V, p.

161. The

presence

of

the word

"time" in

this passage

while

speaking

of

a

sign-sequence,

s sufficient

vidence

of

the fact

that

to Peirce

"the

relation of

signs

to one

another"

is not

just

formal.






PEIRCES

THEORY

89

he

calls

a

"thing-sentence,"

which,

according

to

him,

s

used

"to

designate

ny

sentence

whose

designatum

oes

not include

signs."8

The

repeated

statement

y Peirce

that signs

as such

are

connected

onlywith other signs is enoughof itselfto showthat accordingto

him

a "designatum"

of a sign

which

s not

itself

a

sign

is

an

ab-

surdity.

We

seemto have

here further vidence

of the

extent

to

which

the

type

of ogic

presented

by

Morris

nd others s

controlled

by

the

epistemological

eritage

f

a

knowing

ubject,

person,

elf,

or

what

have

you,

set

over

against

the

world,

or

things,

r

objects,

and

capable

of

reference

o the latter

eitherdirectly

n

virtue

ofits

own

faculty

epistemological

ealism)

or through

n

idea or thought

s

intermediaryepistemologicaldealism). The schoolwhose ogical

tenets

are

adopted by

Morris substitutes

a

word

for a

knowing

mind

or

subject,

endowing

t with

the same

miraculouspower

for-

merly

ttributed o

mind

or

to

an

idea as

a

go-between.

I

do

not

see

how

conversion

of

Peirce's

interpretant,

which as later

sign

supplies

meaning

to the

earlier

ones,

can

be

explained

save as a

diluted

relic

of the

traditional

epistemological

heory,with

word

or sign taking

the

place,

as tertium

uid,

of

the

idea,

thought,

r

mental

tate of

that

tradition.'0

We do nothave,however, o dependupon inference romwhat

Peirce

says

about signs

as the

objects,

or designata,

of

other igns,

to

observe the departure

from

him that

is involved

n the notion

that

the

designatum

f a linguistic

ign

can be

an

existential

hing.

In one

passage

Morris

mentions

n

indexicatsign;

were

it

not

for

the

presence,

n what he says

in that

passage,

of the

word

"desig-

nata," it approximates

he actual theory

f Peirce

concerning

ow

one

kind of

sign,

but

not word,

sentence,

r

linguistic

sign,

refers

to things. The passage ofMorrisreads: "Things maybe regarded

as

the designata

of indexical

signs."

11

To connectthings

with

n-

dexical signs

is,

in Peirce's position,

a

way

of

denying

that they

are

connected

with

linguistic

signs,

with words;

or

anything

he

calls a

symbol.

For

an indexical

sign

is a case

of

what Peirce

calls Secondness,

while a

linguistic

sign

is

a case

of Thirdness.

It

is out

of

the question

here

to go

into

details

of what

in Peirce's

9

F.S.,

p.

15.

The fact

that

Morris

adopts this term

from

those who,

like

Carnap, think that logic can be a purely or exclusivelyformal or

syntactical

affair

is a

good illustration

of the confusion

that

is bound

to result

when

an

attempt

is made

to

link

up

Peirce s

theory

with the kind

of theory

which

he

constantly

opposes.

Doubtless

Morris s

unquestioning

acceptance

of the

kind

of

formalism

expounded

by

Carnap

is the

reason

why

he is

forced

to

give

an

account

of

Peirce's pragmatic

that

has nothing

n common

with the

latter.

10

See Bentley

s article,

"On

a

Certain

Vagueness

in

Logic,"

this Jouu-

NAL,

Vol.

XLII

(1945),

pp.

6-27 and pp.

39-51.

11

F.S.,

p.

25.






90

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

writings

s

the meaning

of

these

terms, long

with

his

Firstness.

But

a

reader

who

consults

almost

at random

any

passage

referred

to

by

these

words

in the

Indices of

his

volumes

will see

that

they

are used to differentiate, ith great care and in a fundamental

way,

the status,

force,

nd

unique

function

of linguistic

signs.

Linguistic

igns,constituting

hought

nd

conferring

enerality,

continuity,

aw, are

cases

of Thirdness.

They

have

of

themselves

no

reference o

"things."

Such

connection

s

they can

have is,

accordingly,

dependent

upon

the

intervention

f another

factor.

This

factor called

Secondness

by Peirce)

is ofa

radically

different

sort

from

Thirdness.

It

is

particularity

as against

generality;

brute interruption s against continuity;contingency s against

law.

As respects

he difference

etween

ndexical signs

as cases

of

Secondness

and

linguistic

igns

as cases of Thirdness,

he following

passage

is

both representative

nd conclusive:

We are continually

bumping

against

hard fact. . .

.

There can be

no resistance

without

effort; there

can

be no

effort

without

resistance.

They are

only

two

ways

of describing

the same experience.

It

is

a

double

consciousness.

.

.

As

the consciousness

tself

is two-sided,

o

it

has

also two varieties;

namely,

action,

where

our

modification

of

other

things

is

more

prominent

than

their

reaction

on us, and perception,where their effecton us is overwhelmingly reater than

our effect

n

them.

And

this

notion,

of being

such as

other

things

make us,

is

such

a

prominent

part

of our

life that

we conceive

other things

also

to exist

in

virtue

of

their reactions against

each other.

The idea

of

other,

of not,

be-

comes

a

very

pivot

of

thought.

To this element

give

the name

of

Secondness.12

The passage

is

quoted

at

length.

It

indicates

not only

how,

according

o

Peirce,

reference

f

linguistic

igns

to

things

s

accom-

plished,

namely,

hrough

heir

getting

nto connection

with

ndexi-

cal signs,

but

in its "two-sidedness"

anticipates

what James,

ater,

but probably independently, alled the doublebarreledness f ex-

perience.

Implicitly,

ut

not

explicitly,

t

anticipates

he

principle

of

"indeterminacy,"

ccording

o

which,

when

a cat looks

at

a

king,

there

s a

bumping

n

which

the

king

as well

as the

cat is

moved-

though

not of

course to

anything

ike

the same

extent.

Perception

of

"internal"

and "external"

worlds

is

a

matter

of one and

the

same

event-the

event

to

which,

n recent

psychology,

he

name

"sensori-motor"

s

applied.

And while

Peirce uses the

word

"in-

ternal'" to expressthe organism'spart in this two-sided ffair, t

is

equally

true

that

the

organism's

ide

is

"

external"

to that

of the

part

of environing

onditions

n

the common

transaction.

It

all

depends,

so

to

say,

on whose

side we

are on.

12

Ibid.,

Vol. I, p.

162.

Physical

pointing,

and

the

expressions

"this,"

"that,"

"I," "You,"'

etc.,

or all demonstrative

nd

personal pronouns,

are

reflections

of

Secondness.

Peirce says

somewhere

that

instead

of

pronouns

standing

fornouns,

the

reverse s the case;

nouns

depend

upon

pronouns.






PEIRCE'S

THEORY

91

This

perceptual-manipulative ehavioral

event

determines

he

indexical

sign

which

brings

"us"

into

connection

with

"things,"

something

t

is

impossible,

ccording

to

Peirce,

for

symbols,

inguis-

tic signs,or,in Morris'swords,fora "sentence" to do. What the

latter

calls

"semantic

reference"

takes

place,

on

Peirce

s

view,

when,

and

only

when,

there

s a

conjunction

of

the

"Secondness"

of

an

indexical

sign

with the

movement

of

linguistic

signs, or

"Thirdness,"

thereby

ringing

he

latter

to a

close in

a

way

which

links

it

into

the

former,

nd

thereby

also

conferring

generality,

reasonableness,

upon

what

in

itself is

like

a sheer

bumping of

things

nto

one

another.'3

Along with the statements hat a "sign is not a sign"-in the

linguistic

sense-unless

it

"translates itself

into

another

sign

in

which t is

more

fully

developed,"

and

that

"the

immediate

bject

of a

symbol

can

only be a

symbol,"

may

be

placed

the

following:

"The

Sign

can

only

represent the

Object

and

tell

about

it. It

can

not

furnish

cquaintance

with

or

recognition

f

that

Object;

for

that

is

what is

meant

in

this

volume

by the

Object

of

a

Sign;

namely,

that

with

which it

presupposes

an

acquaintance in

order

to

convey further

nformation

oncerning t."

14

In adult

experience,

here

are few

cases

of

pure or

exclusive

Secondness

or

Thirdness;

indeed,

if

there

were, Peirce

would

not

have

had

to

take

such

pains

to

restate

raditional

heories

f

knowl-

edge

and

of

logic

by

the

careful

discriminations

e

institutes, irst-

ness,

Secondness, nd

Thirdness

being

the

names,

perhaps not

very

happy

ones,

given

to

the

subjects

that

are

differentiated.

It is

not

part of

the

present

paper to

go

into

detail

about

the

way

in

which

linguistic

signs

interlock

with

indexical

signs. It

sufficeso say that such interception akes place and that by and

through

t

linguistic

igns

get

that

reference

o and

connection

with

"things"

which

by

themselves

hey

lack.

It

is

also

true

to

say

that

our

scientific

nowledge

with

the

exceptionof

mathematics)

and

those

portions

of

"common-sense

knowledge

which

possess

generality

along

with

existential

reference

represent

an

inter-

locking

of

linguistic

with

non-linguistic

modes

of

behavior.

While

he

does

not

use the

following

mode

of

speech t

is, I

believe,

faithful

to his positionto say that in thecourse of cosmicor natural evolu-

tion,

inguistic

behavior

supervenes

on

other

more

immediate

nd,

13

As

to

lack

of

reference

of

linguistic

signs,

or

sentences

as

such,

to

things,

see

Indices

under

Thirdness,

Symbols,

Continuity,

Generality.

14

The last

quotation is

from

Vol.

II,

p.

137;

italics not

in

original;

the

earlier

ones from

Vol.

V, p.

397, and

Vol.

II, p.

166,

footnote.

Cf. the

following:

"A

sign

is

only

a

sign

in

actu

by

virtue

of

its

receiving

an

interpretation,

hat

is,

by

virtue

of

its

determining

nother

sign

of

the

same

object,

"

Vol.

V,

p.

397.






92 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

so

to

say, physiological

modes of

behavior, nd that in supervening

it also intervenes

n

the course of the latter, so that through

this

mediation regularity, ontinuity, eneralitybecome properties of

the course of events, o that they are raised to the plane of reason-

ableness. For, "the complete bject of a symbol, hat is to say, its

meaning,

s

of the nature

of a law."

15

II

Peirce uses the word "thought" quite freely. The mentalistic

associationsof the word,which re due to the epistemological radi-

tion, may give the careless reader the impression hat Peirce re-

gards linguistic signs as "expressions" of something hat is itself

mental. The followingpassage sums up Peirce's constant ttitude

on this

point: "What

I

could

never

admit [is] that logic is pri-

marily conversantwith unexpressed thought nd only secondarily

with language." The followingpassage should provide the basis

for whatever

ne says who sets out to write about the logical theory

of

Peirce:

"The

woof and warp of

all

thought nd all research s

symbols;

and

the

life of

thought

nd

science

is the life inherent n

symbols;so that it is wrongto say that a good language is impor-

tant

to

good thought,merely;

for it is of

the

essence of it."

16

In

one passage Peirce explicitly differentiateshree kinds of

"interpretants." The "interpretant" of an iconic sign, as a form

of

Firstness,

s

emotional;that of

an

indexical sign s,

as we have

al-

ready seen in another connection, nergetic. Meaning, or intel-

lectual and logical, interpretants re found, however, xclusively,

in connectionwith linguistic signs.'7 These signs in their inter-

connections re "thought."

If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought

which

we can

find are of thought

in

signs. Plainly, no other thought

can

be evidenced

by

external

facts. But

we

have

seen

that

only by

external

facts can

thought

be

known at all. The only thought, hen,which

can

possibly

be

cognized

is

thought

in

signs. But thought

which

cannot be cognized

does

not

exist.

But

thought,

therefore,

must

necessarily

be

in

signs.18

It

is worth

while to refer to

what

is

said

in

connection

with the

phrase"we have seen." For

what

is here referred o is denial

by

Peirce

of a

faculty

or

power

of

introspection

s

the source

of

psy-

chologicalknowledge.

And

certainly ny

case

of

reference

f

signs

to

their

personal

users must

be a

case

of

psychologicalknowledge.

15

Collected

Papers,

Vol. II, p. 166.

18

Collected

Papers,

Vol.

II, p.

284,

footnote,

nd

Vol.

II, p.

129.

17

Collected

Papers,

Vol.

V, pp.

326-327.

18

Collected

Papers,

Vol. V, p.

151.






PEIRCE'S THEORY

93

Now in

Peirce, because

of

denial

of

introspective

knowledge,

ll

psychological

knowledge

s

a

case

of

what

Morris calls

semantic,

r

of

reference o an

existential

thing.

Only

it

is a

reference

which

is morehighlymediatedthan is a case of reference f a linguistic

sign to things

commonly

alled

external." There

are,Peirce

says,

"logicians

who . . .

[follow]

themethodof

basing

propositions n

the science

of logic

upon

results

of the science

of

psychology....

Those

logicians

continually onfound

psychicaltruths

with

psycho-

logical

truths,

lthough he distinction

etween hem s

of that

kind

that

takes

precedence

ver

all

others.

1'

Again,

"

there s

no reason

for

supposing a

power

of

introspection,nd,

consequently,

he

only

way of investigating psychological uestion s by inference rom

external facts."

Again, "we have

no

power of

Introspection,

ut

all

knowledge

f the

internalworld

is

derived by

hypothetical

ea-

soning

from

our

knowledgeof

external

facts.

. .

. We can admit

no

statement

oncerningwhat

passes

withinus

except as

a hypothe-

sis to

explain what

takes

place

in

what we

commonly all

the ex-

ternal

world."

Again,

"Introspection s

whollya

matterof

infer-

ence. . . .

The

selfis only

inferred."

0

Since

thought

onsistsof

signs, it

is

neither

psychical

nor

psychological;

and, as has

been

said, any

reference

f a sign to

its

"users" is more

highly

mediated,

more

complex,

nd more

difficult

o

accomplish

han is

reference f

it

to things

commonlycalled

external." The

fact that

the occur-

19

Collected

Papers,

Vol. V, pp.

332-333.

The

"precedence" in

question

is

that while

linguistic

signs as

such

refer only to

one

another, what

he

here

calls

psychical is

a

case of sheer

Firstness, or an

iconic sign

whose

"interpre-

tant"

is feeling.

20

Collected

Papers, Vol. V,

pp.

150, 158, and

313.

As to

what is

here

meant by

the

"internal" as

distinguished

from

external, see in addition to the

passage

already

quoted

from Vol. I, p.

162,

the section

on

"Struggle,"

Vol.

V,

pp.

32-40,

Vol. V, pp.

326,

334, and 378.

It

lies outside

the

scope of the

present

paper to

go in any

detail

into what

Peirce

means by

"internal." The

following

passages, however,

give

the clue to

any one

interested

n

following out

the matter.

"The old

expectation, which

is what

he was

familiar

with,

is

his

inner

world, or Ego.

The

new

phenomenon,

he stranger,

s

from the

exterior

world or

Non-ego"

(Vol. V,

p. 40). And

in

reference

o a case of

"bumping"

or

interferencewith

expectation we find

direct experience

of the

duality

of

the

inward

past and

the outward

present" (Vol.

V, p.

378). And,

after

the state-

ment

that

the "self is

only

inferred:

"

"There is no

time

in

the Present

for

any

inference at all.

. . .

Consequently,

he

present object

must

be

an

external

object

if

there be any

objective

reference

n

it." It is

obvious that

interpre-

tation

in

terms

of past,

present,

and future

is

radically diff

rent

from

that

given by

the

epistemological-psychological

radition

to "inner" and

"outer."

That

introduction of

the

future is

relevant

is

clear from

the

following pas-

sage, the

"subjectivity

of

the

unexpected

. .

.

the

objectivity

of

the

un-

expected"

(Vol.

V, p.

379). "The

Consciousness of

the

present

is then

that

of

a

struggle

over

what shall be"

(Vol.

V,

p.

313).






94

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

rence and

movement

f linguistic

signs

or symbols

s neither,

c-

cording

to

Peirce,

a

psychical

nor

a

psychological

ffair

points

di-

rectlyto

the

fact that

according

to

him "biological"

and

"socio-

logical" factsare integraland indispensablefactorsof such signs

-not

something

o

be dismissed

o a non-logical

nd

non-cognitive

dimension.

For

wherever

there

is

generality,

continuity, here

is

habit.

And

even a casual

reader

of Peirce

should

be aware

that

habit on

his view

is

first cosmological

matter

nd

then s

physiological

nd

biotic-in

a definitely

xistential

ense.

It,

habit, operates

n

and

through

he human organism,

ut that

very

fact is to

him convinc-

ing evidencethat the organism s an integratedpart of the world

in which

habits

form nd

operate.

As to the "sociological"

factor,

it is easy

to quote

many passages

from

Peirce

in

which

whatever

s

entitled to

the names

"logical"

and

"cognitive"

is brought

spe-

cifically

nd explicitly

within

the

societal.

So far is

he

frompen-

ningthe

sociological,

long

withthe

biological,

within

phenomena

that occur

in the functioning

f signs,"

that he

sticks

to the

ob-

served fact

that

language

and linguistic

signs

are modes

or

forms

of communication,nd thus are intrinsicallysocial."

In so

many

words

he

says

"Logic

is

rooted n

the social principle."

"No mind

can

take one step

without

the

aid of other

minds -mind

as

thought

being

defined,

e

it recalled,

in terms

of

linguistic

signs.

"When

we come to

study

the

great principle

of

continuity

nd

see

how

all is fluid

nd everypoint

directly

partakes

the

being

of every

other,

t

will

appear

that

individualism

nd falsity

re one

and

the

same. Meantime,

we

know that

man

is

not

whole as

long

as

he is

single,

that he

is

essentially

possible

member

of society.

Espe-

cially,one man's experience s nothing, f it stands alone.

. .

. It

is

not my'

experience

but

'our'

experience

hat

has to

be thought

of;

and this

us' has indefinite

ossibilities."

1

III

I

believe

that

in

the present

state

of logical

theory

Peirce

has

a

great

deal

to

say

that

is of

value.

There is

potential

advance

contained

in the

present

concern

with

language

and

"symbols."

But it can not be carriedinto effect,t is nullified, s long as the

shadow

of the old

epistemological

dichotomy

hangs

over

writings

that

profess

to be

logical.

Peirce

uses

at times

words that

have

strong

mentalistic

ssociations.

It

is

a reasonable

conjecture

that

the

explanation

of this

usage

is

to be

found

in the

fact that

his

cosmology

was closely

affiliated

with

panpsychism.

But,

as

the

21

Collected

Papers,

Vol.

II, p.

398

and

p.

129;

Vol.

V,

p.

259,

footnote.






BOOK

REVIEWS

95

foregoingdiscussion

shows, he

completely

repudiated

the

notion

that

language

is a tertium

uid

in which

something alled

thought

is

expressed or

clothed.

With this

repudiation goes

denial

that

the names Self, Mind, Knowing Subject, Person as user of signs,

apply to

anything except a

particular

sort of

natural

existence,

or

"thing," whichcan be known

nly

through

nd

by

means

of

the

best

knowledge

we have

of other

things,"

physical,

biological,

nd

socio-cultural.

"Users" of Peirce's

writings

hould

either

tick to

his basic

pattern

or leave him

alone.

JOHN

DEWEY

COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY

BOOK

REVIEWS

Philosophy n

American

Education.

Its

Tasks

and

Opportunities.

BRAND

BLANSHARD, CURT

J.

DUCASSE,

CHARLES W.

HENDEL,

ARTHUR .

MURPHY,MAX

C.

OTTO.

New York

and

London:

Harper

and

Brothers.

1945.

xiii

+

306

pp.

$3.00.

This

book is an

"outgrowth"

of an

inquiry

conductedby

the

authors s members fa Commission n theFunction ofPhilosophy

in

Liberal

Education.

The

inquiry

was

financed

by a

far-sighted

and

generousgrant to

the

American

Philosophical

Association

from

the

Rockefeller

Foundation. The

"commissioners"

were

selected

by

the

officers

f the

Association from a

panel

of

nominees

sub-

mitted

by

its

members.

The book

was

published with

the consent

of

the

officers

f the

Association

but is not to be taken

as

forecasting

official

ctions

of

that body"; the authors "are simply offering their] personal

views

for

general

discussion" and

"are alone

responsible or

what

is said"

(p.

vii).

In

addition,

they present factual

information

and

a

considerable

body

of

opinion

gathered

from

a

variety

of

sources:

from

even

two-day

egional

conferences

with

nvited

par-

ticipants,

from

interviews

with

colleagues

and

informed

aymen,

and from ome 280 letters.

The

letters are

considered

so

signifi-

cant

that

they

will

be

published

separately.

It

is

not

indicated

whetheror

not the

committee

ought

any

expression

of

opinions

from tudents"in course."

The

Commission

undertookto

do

three

things:

(1)

to

report

the

contemporary

ituation

n

philosophy;

(2)

to

define

he

func-

tion

of

philosophy

n liberal education

and in the

community;

(3)

to

study

ways

and means

by

whichthe

philosophical

profession

might

more

adequately perform

this function

and

realize

other

possible

purposes

(p.

vii).

The authorsare careful to

point out

dewey - peirce's theory of linguistic signs, thought, and meaning

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