detecting selective dropping attacks in bgp mooi chuah kun huang {chuah,kuh205}@cse.lehigh.edu...

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Detecting Selective Dropping Attacks in BGP Mooi Chuah Kun Huang {chuah,kuh205}@cse.lehigh.edu November 2006

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Detecting Selective Dropping Attacks in BGP

Mooi ChuahKun Huang

{chuah,kuh205}@cse.lehigh.edu

November 2006

Outline

BGP Security Issues Selective Dropping Attack Detecting Selective Dropping Attack Evaluation of IANP on DETER Conclusion

BGP Security Issues

BGP4 (RFC1771) Inter-domain routing, Autonomous System Path vector protocol, shortest path Policy based routing [Gao’s]

E.g. customer will not export routes learned from one provider to another

Messages of interests: (BGP updates) ANNOUNCE: AS_PATH, PREFIX WITHDRAW: PREFIX

BGP Security Issues

Vulnerabilities No encryption: eavesdropping No timestamp: replaying No signature: masquerading MOAS -- multiple origin AS Selective dropping

Proposed Solutions S-BGP, So-BGP, Pretty Good BGP

Selective Dropping Attack

AS3 use path 3-2-1 for prefix 1 Link 1-2 break AS2 filters WITHDRAW

PREFIX1 to AS3 AS3 still use stale path 3-2-1

for prefix 1 AS2 has full control of traffic

from AS3 for prefix 1

AS1Prefix 1

AS2Prefix 2 AS3

Prefix 3

AS4Prefix 4

W: 1

Detecting Selective Dropping Attack

Instability Analysis with Neighbor Probing Identify key events by BGP message volume at particular

monitor node Use locating instability alg. [Mao’s] to locate an instability

e.g. a link break Check instability against a monitor’s routing table to detect

poisoned routes, correct it if found e.g. a route using the broken link

Issue warning msg to neighbors when suspecting a selective dropping attack (msg. includes instability info.)

Issue probing msg to neighbors when locating alg. fails to find the source of instability (msg. includes burst period)

Detecting Selective Dropping Attack

Instability Analysis •1-2 link breaks

•At AS4, we know

Routes not changed:

to prefix 1 via AS1, 4-1

to prefix 5 via AS1, 4-1-5

{1-4,1-5, …} candidate stable set

Routes changed:

to prefix 2 via AS1, 4-1-2 4-1-5-2

{1-2} candidate instable set for prefix 2

So, ∩candidate instable per prefix – U candidate stable per prefix = {1-2} is instable, flood warnings

AS1Prefix 1

AS2Prefix 2 AS3

Prefix 3

AS4Prefix 4

W: 1

AS5Prefix 5

Detecting Selective Dropping Attack

Compute instable

Classify

events

Compute instable

Compute instablefinal instable

Detecting Selective Dropping Attack

Detecting Malicious Routes

•AS4 finds 1-2 link break, warning msg. reaches AS3, AS3 routing table has 3-2-1

•Disable 3-2-1 route

•Use 3-4-1 route

AS1Prefix 1

AS2Prefix 2 AS3

Prefix 3

AS4Prefix 4

W: 1

AS5Prefix 5

Detecting Selective Dropping Attack

probing

Possible warning

Detecting Selective Dropping Attack

Warning and probing If can’t locate the source of instability, probe

neighbors within Q hops (e.g. Q=1) If suspects an attack, warn neighbors within K

hops (e.g. K=2) Router scoring

Score BGP router reputation by counting warning messages

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Setup 3 30-node topologies generated by BRITE Emulation on DETER using Quagga package 10 experiments per topology

In each exp., one link is broken and one node launches a selective dropping attack against a neighbor node

Post processing BGP messages and routing table using IANP module Warning neighbors within 2 hops

Metric Damage Cost = # of poisoned best routes / # of total best routes # of total best routes= 30*29

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Test 1: 14 drops messages to 15

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Test 1:W1= unable to locate instability, DC = damage cost

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Test 2: 16 drops messages to 23

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Test 2:W1= unable to locate instability, DC = damage cost

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Test 3: 15 drops messages to 23

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Test 3:W1= unable to locate instability, DC = damage cost

Evaluation of IANP on DETER

Overall performance Without IANP

0-30% ASes can’t find broken link Damage is range from 0-22.7%

With IANP no warning Failure of finding broken link decrease by 0-23% Damage cost is very low, max=4.8%, mostly < 2.0%

With IANP and warning Everyone can find the broken link Damage cost decreases to 0

Conclusion Encryption and authentication do not mitigate selective dropping

attack Instability analysis is useful information in selective dropping

attack IANP standalone version reduces damage cost IANP warning version reduces damage cost to 0 IANP is promising, and worth further research

Impact of warning scope damage cost message overhead

Deployment of IANP based on internet topology hierarchy Large scale simulation on internet scale