Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg Institut für Staatswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie III

Critique of Current Communitarianism-Individualism Debate

Identity and Recognition

“Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.” — Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953

Yang Lu Doktorandin der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät Institut für Staatswissenschaft & Rechtsphilosophie — Abteilung 3: Rechtstheorie — Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät Albert- Ludwigs- Universität yang.lu@jura.uni-freiburg.de

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Contents 1. Division between the community identity and individual identity 4 2. Subjectivity as the core of identity and recognition 5 3. Interaction between identity as autonomous system and outside environment 6 4. Rise of the modern concepts of identity and recognition 7 5. The politics of universal dignity: meaning and origin 8 6. The enemies of liberalism 10 7. Value Judgement: the question about where and how 11 8. Pseudo-recognition and the presumption of recognition 13 9. Fusion of horizon: misunderstanding about the nature of our recognition 16 10. The philosophical debate behind Taylor’s recognition theory 17 11. Open dialogue: thoughts on forming recognition on social sphere 20

Bibliography 21

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Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich den Aufsatz

Critique of Current Communitarianism-Individualism Debate

Identity and Recognition

selbstständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe, alle (bildlichen Darstellungen und) Ausführungen, die anderen Schriften wörtlich oder sinngemäß entnommen wurden, kenntlich gemacht sind und die Arbeit in gleicher oder ähnlicher Fassung noch nicht Bestandteil einer Prüfungsleistung war.

Freiburg, den 11. Jan 2017, Yang Lu

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1. Division between the community identity and individual identity

To gain some clarification on the political discourse currently undergoing around identity, it is necessary to define the concept of identity first. According to the generally accepted idea and what Taylor also claims in the article, the concept of identity could be divided into two levels: 1

individual identity and community identity.

Taylor claims, individual identity means “a person’s understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being”. Then Taylor continues to emphasize, “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence”. There are so many times of confusion between the concept of individual identity and community identity, whether he is talking about our individual identities that each of us has one or the community identity that some of us share. For example, Taylor refers to the political movements such as feminism which obviously belongs to community identity, follows with the definition of individual identity, then jumps to the phrase “a person or group of people” which expresses a 2

combination of individual identity and community identity.

This has led to the conclusion that Taylor might haven’t taken the differentiation between individual identity and community identity seriously, or more precise, haven’t taken the individual identity seriously, instead we find out that he only sees individuals as members who share the identity of certain community, similarly to Michael Sandel, he “rejects the image of persons as separate and self-contained atoms” . Sandel negates 3

the existence of separated and bounded individual identity, instead advocates the “constitutive conception of self, expressed by the concept of

“I should note here that Herder applied his conception of originality at two levels, not only to the 1

individual person among other persons, but also to the culture-bearing people among other peoples. Just like individuals, a Volk should be true to itself, that is, its own culture.” Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, p31 http://elplandehiram.org/documentos/JoustingNYC/Politics_of_Recognition.pdf

see 1, p252

Iris Marion Young. The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, p5 3

Social Theory and Practice, vol. 12, no. 1, 1986 www.jstor.org/stable/23556621.

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community” . It essentially negates the possibility for the existence of any 4

individual identity separated from community identity.

2. Subjectivity as the core of identity and recognition What went wrong with Sandel’s assertion is that he confuses the constructing process of identity with identity itself, therefore mistakes all the influencing factors of the constructing process as parts of identity, inevitably leads to the confusion of recognition and identity.

This confusion between the concepts of recognition and identity is not rare to see in the current identity discourse, for example, another popularly accepted distinction between so-called “social identity” and “self-identity” created by Chris Barker. The “social identity” described as “the 5

expectations and opinions that others have of us” is as a matter of fact not identity anymore, but recognition, for what distinguishes recognition and identity is one simple question, who makes the decision, or in other words, whose subjectivity is in dominance.

The definition of subjectivity in Barker’s article is utterly passive, and ironically objective, “the condition of being a person and the processes by which become a person; that is , how we are constituted as a subjects (biologically and culturally) and how we experience ourselves(including that which is indescribable)” . There is no process of becoming a person, 6

one is either a person or not, there is indeed a constant process of changing identity, but the identity in every moment of that process is equally valid, as the person’s existence is equally complete of its own definition in every moment, because it would be wrong to presuppose a “ultimate goal” of being a person and therefore futile to name a “person in process”. We are not merely “experience” and wait to “be constituted” as s person, on the contrary, we are able to react and exercise our free-will, to make meaning of the objective existences and events, to “make the decision”, and by which express our own subjectivity, especially in the process of constituting one’s identity.

see 3, p6 4

Chris Barker, Issues of Subjectivity and Identity, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice 5

see 56

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3. Interaction between identity as autonomous system and outside environment The dialectic nature is not as Taylor puts within the identity but within the constructing process of identity, during which there is a constant interaction between identity and recognition, including the recognition from our “significant others” . It’s worth noticing that this interaction is 7

not limited with the recognition which was decided by the people around us, it happens generally between the internal identity system of myself and general surrounding environment all the time. For example, coldness in the winter made me shivering, therefore I built this belief of my identity as a cold-fearing creature.

The psychological matureness we gain with the growth of age, is that we are more capable to exercise our inner strength to resist the influence from those “significant others” and stay determined in the choice of our free-will. The dialogical relations with others shouldn’t be seen as conditions that my identity depends on, but gates to offer new possibilities for me to choose from. Sometimes we might end certain relations out of our choices. The cunning examples of “hermit” and “solitary artist” also address their 8

works to certain audience won’t change the self-determining nature of identity. The opinion of their audience might change and exist long after their death, but would it in any way influence a death man’s self identity? The discovering of my own identity is not “partly overt, partly internal”, but always begins with its subject “I”.

Autonomy or heteronomy, the different answer to the question “who decide”, is what differentiates identity from recognition. Firstly, whether group labels such as family, tribe or social class will constitute a part of my identity depends eventually on my decision. I could be familiar with a common vocabulary of discourse of certain group but choose to refuse to use it and not to be related to it. This freedom to refuse certain labels is more than crucial and highlight the essence of subjectivity and free-will. In the words of Rosa Luxemburg, freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently. Secondly, apart from our acceptance or refusal towards community identities, does there still exist an irreducible

Stuart Hall, The Question of Cultural Identity, 1992 7

see 1 8

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individual identity which is created by me as a unique autonomous individual? It would contradict the daily fact to deny such irreducible individual identity, we are not living under the dictatorship of community identity all the time, not at least when we choose what to eat for breakfast or how to decorate a room. There could be countless influencing factors wrestling with each other in our heads, countless possibilities to choose from, but it’s our free-will to make the finial call. We are our choices. The whole constitution of identity, whether is to take in certain group labels or to make our very own identities, are all results from our individual choices.

4. Rise of the modern concepts of identity and recognition Therefore the politics of difference should be defined from the start point of individuals, not the limited appliance on relationships of group identities and cultures as Iris Marion Young articulated or the relationships between communities. There is no such existing entity as community, but 9

individual members who choose to adopt the imaginary community identity. It’s a pity that after all the criticism towards the concept of 10

community, Young eventually fell into the same trap, used the concept of interest groups to substitute the concept of community and failed to see the similarity between those two. There is no reason to hold groups before individuals, nor should group interests before individual interests. A solidarity between robbers wouldn’t make it more compelling for people to “give political representation” or “celebrate the distinctive cultures and characteristics” of their group and their unique robbery culture, not any more than a single robber. 11

It’s true that nonrecognition or mis-recognition can inflict harm and can be a form of oppression, since our identity is in constant interaction with the 12

outside recognition therefore likely to take in the negative effects at our

see 39

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 10

, 1983

“If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 11

opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1869

see 112

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weak moments. Taylor blames this disconformity between identity and recognition on the rise of ideal of authenticity through a historical analysis. However, it’s worth noticing that in a hierarchical society, both identity and recognition are not out of free-will, but forced upon the both parts. Identity and recognition are unified and inseparable in such society as the concept of hierarchy, which holds indisputable dominance over the subjectivity of us and of the people around us.

It’s only possible in an enlightened society when the oppressive hierarchy was overthrown, individuals are free to exercise their free-will and to make judgment, the modern concept of identity and recognition could firstly be born and separate from each other. The massive subjective turn of modern culture, the new understanding of individual identity emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, contrary to what Taylor believes, should not be 13

seen as just a continuation and intensification of the ancient religious ideal of self-awareness inaugurated by Saint Augustine. Their prosperity is largely due to the power vacuum left after the overthrown of the old authority, including the old religious authority, the ending of the hierarchical society and the birth of the democratic society. It’s true that people can still define themselves by their social roles and as a matter of fact it still does today, but in a society without hierarchy it means that it’s 14

now up to the individuals themselves to decide their own social roles.

The ideal of authenticity, same as the modern concepts of identity and recognition, are basically consequential by-productions of this historic social structure shift, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau helped to bring about the ideas in accord with the coming democratic society. The 15

disconformity between our self identity and exterior recognition of us is due to the very nature of modern identity and recognition, that is, the different subjectivities expressed in the two concepts.

5. The politics of universal dignity: meaning and originThe conflict between the politics of difference and the politics of universalism mentioned by Taylor is an illusion. If recognition means the 16

see 113

see 1, p3114

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire15

see 1, p3916

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others’ opinion about my identity, and the motive of equal recognition is to avoid the pain caused by the disconformity between recognition and identity, since identity in fact varies from person to person, then the recognition without pain would ideally, though unrealistically, be the politics of difference. What politics of universalism offers, it’s an entirely difference topic, it’s about to open certain areas to people in general to freely form their identities there and these areas used to be closed to some under-privileged people, such as political rights. Therefore the politics of universalism should be seen as a continuing part of the historic course to dismantle the left-overs of the old hierarchical society.

The nature of the politics of universalism is to offer equal opportunities, that is, centrically to eliminate obstacles on the opportunity access. The ground for this equal opportunity for all to develop their own personality is the free-will that each of us living human beings all possesses or as what Taylor refers as the “universal human potential”. Surely the principles of the politics of equal dignity grow under the influence of Christianity and western culture, but this is no sufficient reason to accuse them of being “particularism masquerading as universal” , “suppressing identities”, or 17

for the principles of liberalism to be vulgarized by certain well-meant scholars like Taylor into the shallow and misleading “this is how we do things here”. 18

Firstly, like how Cronus overthrew his father and was overthrown by his own son Zeus in the Greek mythology, the history of western civilization is a constant negation of the negation, an ascending spiral. One example 19

is how some of the bright pupils of the Jesuits such as Descartes and Voltaire, “went on to undermine the dogmas they had so well learned, became leaders of the 18C Enlightenment, to whom the church was the ‘infamous thing’ they must crush.” Liberalism is in a much greater sense 20

the negator of the Dark Ages than the inheritor. 21

see 117

see 118

Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life19

see 13, p4220

see Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1887 §125 ’Der Tolle Mensch’21

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Secondly, the classical ideal of liberalism expressed by Dworkin, a liberal society adopts no particular substantive view about the end of life and is united around procedural equality, which is the exact political 22

embodiment of the positive nihilism expressed by Nietzsche, the re-23

evaluation of all values, welcomes different perspectives of individuals, the openness towards new possibilities during the process of eternal return. 24

6. The enemies of liberalism Same as any ideology, the positive nihilism has its own enemies, that is, all that deny its principles. When a thesis is made, a line is drawn and separate the arguments, the thesis itself and the negation of it born at the same time. In this case, the negation of nihilism is to assert certain predetermined objective value system; reflected in the area of politics, the negation of liberalism is to adopt particular substantive view about the end of life, which is the imposition of cultural particularism. Adopting a contradictory value system and using it against another is not anti-particularism but still particularism, liberalism objects the whole idea of adopting certain value system completely therefore true goes beyond particularism. Anti-particularism doesn’t make liberalism particularism, it’s in fact anti-anti-neutralism, which proves the complete cultural neutrality of liberalism.

But it’s true that liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, definitely not a meeting ground for the enemies of liberalism, 25

not for those particularistic believes of narrow oppressive nature. The necessary procedures of liberalism to ensure the equal respect towards people is to defend this neutrality from the oppressive impulse of any particularism. Taylor believes certain substantive distinctions must be made when facing the cultures contradict our political principles , but he falsely suggests it might cause the guilt of cultural imposition. The only 26

kind of truly existing imposition is never one ideology on another, but always takes place on substantial individual human beings. The ones

Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, 197822

http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s9593.pdf23

Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra; Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 24

see 1 25

see 126

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which are true guilty of imposition on their people are those oppressive ideologies, not their opponent— liberalism, which is by its nature against the imposition.

That’s why it’s always wrong to argue collective ends such as cultural survival as justified ground to violate individual rights. It is not “let cultures defend themselves” , it’s forcing a certain kind of culture on 27

people in certain area to ensure it’s adopted, a dangerous oppressive impulse towards “those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development” . A culture has sunk to this level of 28

unattractiveness and low self-esteem might better off extinct than create more victims of it. This is a dangerous precedent of tramping individual rights since “within reasonable bounds” is so vague and arbitrary to define. It’s logically absurd to try to justify this proposal of creating new problems to the system with the already existence of other unrelated problems in the liberal society, liberalism should not be seen as a building with already 29

broken windows awaits further vandalization.

7. Value Judgement: the question about where and howIt’s also logically wrong to seek to draw a judgement about whether this “universal human potential” is fully realized or not, it would inevitably indicate predetermined goals and value standards imposed from the outside, and any predetermination will limit such potential, hence directly violates the concept of free-will, as a result, views humans as means, contradicts Kant’s view about human dignity. Potentials without telos cannot be judged, but the achievements as concrete facts are open for judgments based on different perspectives. The handicapped people, or those in a coma are not “incapable of realizing their potential in the normal way” and at our mercy as Taylor puts, their free-will is untouched 30

therefore deserves equal dignity as much as the next man, only they have problem with expressing them, but it doesn’t mean that we could deprive

see 127

see 128

see 1 , 29

“There will undoubtedly be tensions and difficulties in pursuing these objectives together, but such a pursuit is not impossible, and the problems are not in principle greater than those encountered by any liberal society that has to combine, for example, liberty and equality, or prosperity and justice.”

see 130

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their freedom and impose our decisions on them as we please. Only those who are medically diagnosed as psychologically unfit or unable, mentally immature to make their own decisions, that is, the partly or completely absence of free-will, would justify the outside impositions on their personal matters.

Taylor is right about the politics of difference grows organically out of the politics of universal dignity, since the complete of the overthrow of the 31

old hierarchical society opens up more room for identity and recognition, therefore more chance to experience the disconformity between those two, and therefore more advocate for the politics of difference in hope of pain-avoiding.

As stated before, the politics of universalism is only concerned and justified with the equal potentials therefore inapplicable to the judgment of the actual results coming out of this potential. The equal value of all identities is about others’ opinion of our identities, therefore about the recognition. The politics of difference as mentioned before is the only grounded solution on the question of recognition, holds the view that everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity. With the 32

uniqueness of identities and the conformity between identity and recognition, one can only logical deduces the uniqueness of recognition concerning different individuals. Thus the claim of equal value of all identities, or the presumption as Taylor prefer to call it, cannot be 33

logically extended either from the politics of equal dignity or from the politics of difference.

One tricky question is, to complete this conformity, when forming the recognition, especially the value judgment part, should we adopt the value system owned by the identity subject himself/herself, or should we use our value system? The latter answer would inevitably lead to the possibility of disconformity since the value systems same as identities vary between individuals. Therefore the only choice left is to adopt the value system owned by the identity subject himself/herself, to reach the complete

see 1 31

Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Harvard University Press, 198232

see 1, p6633

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reciprocity in a “common self” individualized, a miniature of Rousseauian general will. 34

At this stage, we find that there is no place left in the politics of difference for the subjectives of the others. My subjective monopolizes both identity and recognition, this pseudo-recognition from others is merely a duplication of my self identity, it’s my opinion put into others’ mouth for my own delusional self-satisfaction. The assumed vigorous interaction between identity and recognition can no longer exist in this autistic mode which desperately seeks to escape any discomfort. And based on the requirement of politics of difference, every individual should only be judged by his/her own value system, there is no room left for comparison between identities, therefore the claim that all identities are of the same value under the premises above is a meaningless assertion towards an impossible situation.

The politics of difference is essentially not promoting the difference, regardless of the identity differences between individuals a priori just like people were endowed with different classes in a hierarchical society, is promoting the homogeneity between recognition and identity which is forced upon by the outside ideology.

8. Pseudo-recognition and the presumption of recognition Apart from all the issues that Taylor “leaves aside” and “does not have 35

space to address” , the left arguments made by him might still be “by no 36

means unproblematic” , as matter of fact are probably “shot through with 37

confusion” . 38

Firstly is the confusion between recognition and identity which I have criticized in detail, Taylor wrongly believes that our identities are formed

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 34

see 1, p6835

see 1, p6936

see 1, p6637

see 1, p6938

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by recognition, the borrowed Hegelian jargon “an sich, für sich” in his 39

article might well explains the root for such confusion. He then quotes 40

Frantz Fanon’s view about how image-imposition is the major weapon of the colonizers. However, what truly purges oneself of the depreciating 41

self-image caused by negative image-imposition is not a positive image-imposition, for they are equally oppressive and inauthentic. Since the 42

depreciating image was imposed by the colonizers, it reflects the subjective of the colonizers instead of my own, therefore it’s only a pseudo-identity based on the definition above. If we seek to impose a positive image of my own onto all others, even violence as means was suggested, then it would only create a pseudo-recognition. This 43 44

depreciating image-imposition shows that colonial society is actually a form of hierarchical society which unequally classifies people by their race, hence a pre-identity society. Continuing fulfilling of the politics of equal dignity is the major weapon to dismantle the colonial left-overs, and the best way for the people in the form colonies to purge the imposed depreciating image is to confidently exercise their own free-will, to build their own true identity.

see 1, p6439

see Arthur Schopenhauer, Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde §20 40

‘Dann philosophieren wir von oben herab, lassen aus demselben, mittelst der verschiedenartigsten und nur durch ihre marternde Langweiligkeit einander ähnlichen Deduktionen, die Welt hervorgehn, nennen diese auch wohl das Endliche, jenes das Unendliche, — was wieder eine angenehme Variation im Wortkram gibt, — und reden überhaupt immer nur von Gott, explizieren, wie, warum, wozu, weshalb, durch welchen willkürlichen oder unwillkürlichen Prozeß, er die Welt gemacht, oder geboren habe; ob er draußen, ob er drinne sei u.s.f.; als wäre die Philosophie Theologie und suchte nicht Aufklärung über die Welt, sondern über Gott.’

see also Karl Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, S. 198f ‘So verrückt mache die Hegelei, d.h. der dialektisch formierte historische Sinn.’

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 196141

Ludwig von Mises, Omnipotent Government ,1944 42

“It is vain to fight totalitarianism by adopting totalitarian methods. Freedom can only be won by men unconditionally committed to the principles of freedom. The first requisite for a better social order is the return to unrestricted freedom of thought and speech.”

see 3743

Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism, 1927 44

“Repression by brute force is always a confession of the inability to make use of the better weapons of the intellect—better because they alone give promise of final success.”

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If we understand the helps offered to those long time under-privileged people are for them to enter those new areas and adjust themselves to the new freedom more rapidly, then it’s clear such measures will only be temporary and will not lead to the new favoritism never-ending as Taylor fears to be. The politics of difference is with the goal to maintain and cherish the distinctness of individual identities, not the distinctness with the possibilities of forming one’s identities, hard to image that people would cherish being denied to certain rights and wish to maintain it. 45

Another confusion occurs when Taylor conclude that there is no reason to believe that all culture are of same value, however then attempts to admit this idea as a presumption of recognition, as “a starting hypothesis which we ought to approach the study of any other culture” . But is this 46

presumption of recognition before we even approach the culture even possible? Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. It’s only 47

logic to honestly admit our ignorance on topics we have no knowledge of than to make assumption without any ground. Such presumption of recognition towards other cultures is the real “breathtaking condescension” and “contempt for the latter’s intelligence”. Recognition starts to exist 48

only after the process of approach begins, before that we might not even know the actual existence of certain culture, let alone presume value in it. Taylor attacks withholding the presumption ‘as the fruit merely of prejudice or of ill-will’. Ironically, prejudice, by its definition, is “preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual experience” , 49

seemingly just describes the feature of Taylor’s presumption.

see 1 45

see 1, p6746

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus 747

see 1, p7048

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/prejudice49

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9. Fusion of horizon: misunderstanding about the nature of our recognition Taylor then suggests the correct way to form “real recognition” is 50

through what Gadamer called “fusion of horizons” , and hereby free of 51

the charge of trying to “cram the others into our categories” . However, to 52

gain such a broader horizon would require a learning process which is hard to define, in order to get to know the formerly unfamiliar culture. How long should this “intensive study” continue until we are confident, if not 53

hubristically, to say that we have fully understood another culture? It’s unrealistic to forbid ordinary people of forming their own opinions on other culture unless they have qualified themselves by obtaining a doctor title on it. Due the complexity of culture, there aren’t so many people 54

who can claim the fulling understanding of their own culture, even professors might sometimes seem clueless when step out of their own research fields. One further question it couldn’t dodge is, which value standard should be applied when facing conflict. This effort of “transforming our standards” will nevertheless fall into our standards and our categories, it’s always my subjective takes charge in the judgement, it’s still my decision to take in certain part of the value system of other culture, which is actually transplanted as part of my own value system.

Taylor believes our judgements of cultures cannot be dictated, however inappropriately compares it to concrete nature facts such as “we find earth round or flat, the temperature of the air hot or cold”, a failing comparison 55

of apples and oranges. It should be noticed that there is a distinctive difference between our subjective judgment of others which cannot be proved to be untrue and the scientific thesis with falsifiability. Clearly Taylor has confused the objective existence of our judgment with the

see 1, p7050

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 196051

see 1, p7152

see 1, p7053

E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture ,1871 54

see 1, p6955

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scientific judgment towards objective beings. Strictly speaking, the 56

scientific thesis Taylor quotes is not judgment which would imply a value system, but a description of the reality, therefore has its falsifiability based on whether it’s in accord with the objective reality. Taylor claims to uphold the view of the objectivity of judgments, and “does not have much sympathy for these forms of subjectivism” , only two sentences after, 57

Taylor starts to giving descriptions of judgments in classic subjectivism to support his refusal towards certain complaint, “those judgments are ultimately a question of the human will” , a coherence issue might indeed 58

exist here. The objectivism Taylor believes in surely differs from what’s considered to be in the philosophical discourse, but a very unique objective existence of subjectivism, which is same as subjectivism itself, since all judgments must firstly exist then to be whether objective or subjective. 10. The philosophical debate behind Taylor’s recognition theory The “subjectivist, half-baked neo-Nietzschean theories”, deriving from Foucault or Derrida, which have been found guilty by Taylor for hoping to “escape this whole nexus of hypocrisy by turning the entire issue into one of power of counter power”. However, those philosophical opinions 59

could hardly be categorized into the traditional “objective-subjective” division, nor do they have any serious link to the thoughts of Nietzsche which as stated above emphasizes inner strength to excise will of

see 1, p69 56

“On examination, either we will find something of great value in culture C, or we will not. But it makes no more sense to demand that we do so than it does to demand that we find the earth round or flat, the temperature of the air hot or cold.”

see 1, p6957

see 1, p69 58

“But if those judgments are ultimately a question of the human will, then the issue of justification falls away. One doesn’t, properly speaking, make judgments that can be right or wrong; one expresses liking or dislike, one endorses or rejects another culture. But then the complaint must shift to address the refusal to endorse, and the validity or invalidity of judgments here has nothing to do with it.”

see 1, p7059

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individuals more than the exterior power. The prominent names in this 60

philosophical wave which have been quoted by Taylor are very telling, they belong to the French post-modern deconstructionism. Their claim of 61

the existence of the structures of power is more like a variant of the Hegelian “Weltgeist” with real danger, since now instead of resignation, they indicate that this new “Weltgeist” could and should be controlled by us, with good intention. We know too well how dangerous it could be to judge an action by its intention rather than its real results. 62

Always judge an action by its consequences instead of its intention, we may take this argument further into the discussion about evil. Hannah Arendt claims that the banality of evil is caused by a misunderstanding of Kantian principles, one no longer obeys his/her own category, but submits oneself to an exterior category, in this case the category of national law, which would indicate the group identity of nation. One can surely argue 63

that this abdicated of autonomy is after all a choice made out of his own free will, however significantly limited by circumstances. The question here broadly is rather, especially as government employers or soldiers, how far should they allow their group mentality overcomes the sense of humanity? If human rights are considered to be a part of international law,

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §§261 60

“In fact, conformably to the slow rise of the democratic social order (and its cause, the blending of the blood of masters and slaves), the originally noble and rare impulse of the masters to assign a value to themselves and to "think well" of themselves, will now be more and more encouraged and extended;”

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §§208 61

“It is therefore in the France of today, as can be readily disclosed and comprehended, that the will is most infirm, and France, which has always had a masterly aptitude for converting even the portentous crises of its spirit into something charming and seductive, now manifests emphatically its intellectual ascendancy over Europe,”

C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology( Making of Modern Theology), 1970 62

“Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience. They may be more likely to go to Heaven yet at the same time likelier to make a Hell of earth. This very kindness stings with intolerable insult. To be "cured" against one's will and cured of states which we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level of those who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals.”

Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 196363

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yet certain part of national law contradicts those principles, for individuals it will a choice about which group identity to adopt, whether he/she chooses to see himself/herself as a member of its own nation or as a member of the whole human race. With Kant’s categorical imperative which is in trust of individual judgment and demands for universal applicability, it will inevitably lead to the demand for cosmopolitanism 64 65

and individualism, as two sides of one coin, over the sectarian communitarianism.

The anti-essentialism wave in the academical sphere nowadays is a regressive combination of sophistry, agnosticism, resignation and systematic null which of no practical use, except giving some pretentious pedants, ignorant youths and dissatisfied under-classes a false pride of occupying the moral high ground, providing them a tool to justify, if not glorify, their own barrenness by smearing others’ achievements. What went horribly wrong with the current so-called “left liberals” is what I prefer to call it “dominance inversion”, they refuse to take responsibility of making their own choices during the identity forming process therefore avoid any possible chance to be at fault and victimize themselves by blaming it all on the socio-economic condition and hide behind the group politics; instead, they seek the control over the recognition from the others, build their partial moral tyranny to fanatically shush any free speech. Their existence indicates the decadence of the Enlightenment spirit in the current western world. Not only they give up their own free-will, but also they 66

seek to deprive others’, with the finial goal of all us equally enslaved. Those “left liberals” are not “liberals”, they are fanatics who are on a 67

moral crusade, they have built a new god of ideologies which they bow to

Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 178564

Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 179565

Decadence was brought about by the easy way of producing works and laziness in doing it, by the 66

surfeit of fine art and the love of the bizarre. - Voltaire (1748)

Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy, 1945 67

“The champions of socialism call themselves progressives, but they recommend a system which is characterized by rigid observance of routine and by a resistance to every kind of improvement. They call themselves liberals, but they are intent upon abolishing liberty. They call themselves democrats, but they yearn for dictatorship. They call themselves revolutionaries, but they want to make the government omnipotent. They promise the blessings of the Garden of Eden, but they plan to transform the world into a gigantic post office. Every man but one a subordinate clerk in a bureau.”

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and determined to force all others to bow to. Like attracts like, it’s not surprising that they are often also sympathizers of extreme religionists.

11. Open dialogue: thoughts on forming recognition on social sphere Similar to the individual identity and community identity division, Taylor also divides recognition into intimate sphere and social sphere, mainly focuses on the latter in the article. Dialogue, a frequent mentioned 68

concept on both levels of recognition, by Taylor it means the interaction 69

between identity and recognition. However, it will be careless to neglect what has made social recognition so different from the intimate one, not just the untangling of old hierarchy, it’s “the very condition of plurality” 70

of society, the dialogue between the various recognitions towards the same identity held by plural actors from their own different perspectives. This “haphazardness” makes this dialogue and society itself unpredictably and inexhaustibly “open”. Contrary to what Hannah Arendt believes, 71 72

totalitarianism, thus a closed society, is not caused by nihilism, but caused by the firm refusal towards nihilism. This refusal, is the readiness to surrender themselves to any myth, an occasional or determined political 73

romanticism, the wait for the replacement of the old myth, just to 74 75

see 1, p3668

see 1, p33, p36, p3769

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, p234 70

“Yet, if these recommendations were followed and this attempt to overcome the consequences of plurality were successful, the result would be not so much sovereign domination of one's self as arbitrary domination of all others, or, as in Stoicism, the exchange of the real world for an imaginary one where these others would simply not exist.” p176 “The calamities of action all arise from the human condition of plurality, which is the condition sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the public realm. Hence the attempt to do away with this plurality is always tantamount to the abolition of the public realm itself.”

Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 194571

see 67, p261 72

Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 1847, p2873

the similarities between Carl Schmitt and the political romanticism which he has intensively 74

criticized, see John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, 1997

http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43034299.html75

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escape the fear and emptiness caused by the freedom and the necessity of excising one’s own will.

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Nationalism , 1983 3. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Harvard University Press, 1982 4. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945 5. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition 6. Chris Barker, Issues of Subjectivity and Identity, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice 7. C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology( Making of Modern Theology),

1970 8. E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture ,1871 9. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1961 10. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886 11. Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1887 12. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, 1847 13. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 1963 14. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958 15. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 1960 16. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 1795 17. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785 18. Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, Social

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