crisis syria: amir sajedi a multi-protagonist ‘theatre’ of war · amir sajedi 158 ipri journal...

Amir Sajedi

154 IPRI JOURNAL WINTER 2018

Dr Amir Sajedi

Abstract

The Syrian Crisis, given vested interests of regional

and global powers, has now become one of the most

complex and protracted catastrophes. Six years after

the onset of the conflict, the region had slowly moved

towards the possibility of a negotiated settlement

through discussions (which though inconclusive)

remained ongoing. The chemical attacks on Khan

Sheikhoun and the consequent unilateral missile

attack by the United States (US) on the Al-Shayrat

airbase shows lack of interest to engage in peace. In

response to the missile attack, the decision by the

Russians to strengthen the Syrian Army has

augmented the severity of the situation. The article

analyses the change of tactics by the US and President

Trump‘s ensuing policy which shows the desire of his

administration to rest on military superiority and its

will to renew the era of US adventurism in a hotspot

such as the Middle East. An analysis of his actions in

Syria is accomplished through the prism of security

and political complexities in the region and the

interwoven roles of regional players.

Key words: Syrian Crisis, Regional Powers, Global Powers, Trump

Administration, Russia.

The author is a Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Islamic Azad University,

Central Tehran Branch, Iran.

________________________________

@2018 by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

IPRI Journal XVIII (1): 154-175.

Crisis Syria:

A Multi-Protagonist ‘Theatre’ of War

Crisis Syria: A Multi-Protagonist ‘Theatre’ of War

IPRI JOURNAL WINTER 2018 155

Introduction

he problems and demands of Southwest Asia and North Africa (the

Middle East)1 speak of the serious concerns and issues about the

political orders in these realms which at times have led to mass riots

and demonstrations. The 2011-13 crises in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya,

Bahrain and Syria - aptly named the Arab Spring or Islamic Awakening -

can be divided in two categories. In the first category, there are countries

such as Tunisia and Egypt where the outcome was a change of

government ending the demonstrations and upheavals. In the second

group, there are those states which, due to continuing demonstrations, are

still embroiled in instability and internal wars such as Syria, Yemen, and

Bahrain. The reasons for this are particular to each.

This article primarily explores the reasons for the continuation of

the crisis in Syria and the role of regional and non-regional powers,

especially United States (US). Some politicians and academics note that

different powers (regional and otherwise) with their own interests have

complicated this ordeal. In their view, the solution is far from simple and

the crisis is yet evolving. Others point out the recent military victories of

the Syrian regime and suggest that the crisis is in its final stages.

The continuation of the conflict and the use of chemical and non-

conventional weapons in Khan Sheikhoun in the province of Idlib in April

2017, which led to the death of innocent civilians (mainly children),

critically changed and expanded the crisis.2 This attack showed that the

political solution to the Syrian crisis is yet not at hand and would not

occur without a significant recalibration of the outlook of regional and

non-regional powers. The main question here is, why the Trump

1 Editor‘s Note: The countries in the North African region include those bordering the

Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea from Morocco to Sudan. The realm borders the

Atlantic Ocean, the Sahara Desert, and the African Transition Zone. Egypt has territory

in both Africa and Asia through its possession of the Sinai Peninsula. The second

region, Southwest Asia, includes Turkey, Iran, the Middle East, and the Arabian

Peninsula. The land on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea is frequently referred

to as the Levant and is often included as a part of the Middle East. Technically, the

term Middle East only includes the five countries of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and

Iraq, but in common practice Middle East refers to all of Southwest Asia. 2 The chemical attack reportedly killed 84 people.

T

Amir Sajedi


administration made a tactical change in its opposition to the Syrian

regime. The present assumption considering the lack of a solution to the

crisis and the recent events (such as chemical attacks) is that the inability

of the foreign policy of the US during the Obama era to solve the Syrian

crisis led to the weakening of its influence there and the expansion of

Russian influence (its main rival in the area). This led the new US

administration to expand its use of military power to gain influence. This

article is concerned with the Syrian crisis, the change in the US policy

towards it, along with the role of various other regional protagonists and

their interests in the region.

Dissecting an ‘International Crisis’

A crisis is the introduction of disorder and the disruption of balance in a

system, and inherently includes tensions and clashes.3 The international

system employs various variables which must remain in certain limits to

keep it stable. A crisis suddenly changes these variables in all or parts of

the system. An international political crisis is caused by events which

uproot the balance of power in the international or regional political order

beyond certain limits and which increase the danger of clashes and

increased violence within and without.4 Measures such as direct and

forceful actions using military hardware and hidden or apparent enmity

pertain to this analysis. Added competition and threats make relations

between governments unstable and the hostilities among governments

lead to disruptions in the political international order.5 Michael Brecher

describes the four stages of a crisis:

3 Mahmood Vaezi, Political Crisis and Social Movements in the Middle East, Theories

and Trends (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies, 2011), 11-12. 4 Ali Asghar Kazemi, Ravabet-e Beinolmelal dar Theory va Amal [International Relations

in Theory and Practice] (Tehran: Ghomes Publisher, 1993), 392-4. 5 Michael Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Conflict in the International System, Theory

and Evidence: Intellectual Odyssey III, 1st ed. (Cham, ZG: Springer International

Publishing, 2017); and Michael Brecher, Crisis in World Politics, Rise and Fall of

Crises, trans. MirFardin Ghorishi (Tehran: Strategic Studies Research, 2003).



1. The inception of crisis: This predates the crisis itself and is

limited in nature to a slight threat to the system which has not

reached a level, which significantly threatens its values.

Concerning Syria, this stage existed long ago due to its ethnic

issues and politico-economic order.

2. The expansion of the crisis: Crisis has reached a serious level

qualitatively leading to possible military clashes. A good measure

is the increase in the level of the threat and the expansion of

limited and unimportant clashes to larger and more serious ones.

The Syrian crisis rapidly became a serious threat to the

government leaving little time for it to react.

3. The resolving of the crisis: The stage of reduction of threats and

the end to the crisis happens when the implications of the crisis

for the assailants and other actors become evident. Threat levels,

pressures and the possibility of military actions no longer exist

and the sides believe that an agreement to end the conflict is in

their favour. The benefits of peace, then, outweigh the possibility

of military gains.6 There can be six methods to settle international

conflicts:

1. Withdrawal or voluntary cessation.

2. Violent domination.

3. Surrender or withdrawal due to threats of force.

4. Political agreement.

5. Referring the conflict to outside judgement.

6. The acceptance of a new situation in lieu of a formal

agreement.7

4. Post-crisis effects: This stage relates to the aftermath and

eventualities after the cessation of the conflict which involves the

effects of the crisis on the various sides and the international order

6 Ibid. 7 Kaloiyaka Holisti, The Basic Analysis of International Politics, trans. Bahram

Mostaghimi and Massoud Tarom Seri (Tehran: Institute for Political and International

Studies, 2005), 718.

Amir Sajedi


and subsystems. At this stage, the outcomes of the crisis are

defined and each side measures the benefits and losses. This

evaluation aims to consider the augmentation or reduction of the

powers of each side and the new level of conflict which has

remained post-crisis.8

Brecher believes that many crises exist in lieu of long-term enmity

caused over several issues with periodical hostilities or wars. These

conflicts then spread to related arenas. Long-term crisis and ensuing

conflicts affect national identity and social cohesiveness. This is so even

during periods when outward hostilities are not evident or when the crises

have not occurred. According to him, such conflicts are not defined by

specific events or even a collection of these events and are in reality an

ongoing phenomenon.

With the start of the demonstrations in Syria, most players in the

region including Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other outside

powers such as the US, Europe, and Russia were aware of their roles

within the Syrian crisis.9

The Syrian Crisis

With the start of the second decade of the Twenty-First Century in the

Middle East and North Africa, three upheavals shook Tunisia, Libya, and

Egypt leading to the downfall of all three governments. The events of the

Middle East soon spread to another state in the region- Syria. The spark of

the revolution started with a few slogans on a wall by a few students in the

border town of Daraa in 2011. These youth were then arrested and

tortured by the security forces. When the parents of those arrested and the

tribal leaders demanded the release of the youths, they were also arrested.

This led to demonstrations, demands for freedom of political prisoners,

cessation of emergency rule, a reduction of price of basic staples such as

oil and foodstuff, an end to corruption, and a return of the exiles. The base

8 Ibid. 9 Amir Nikoei and Hossein Behmanesh, ―Players in Conflicting Players in Syria: Goals

and Approaches,‖ Foreign Relations 4, no.4 (2012).



of this insurrection soon included Deir ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, and

eventually the whole country.10

The crisis, like any political, social or

security-related issue, slowly became coloured by the force of other state

actors such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and in time the US and Russia.

Owing to the special geographical location of Syria and the conflicting

interests of the parties, the Syrian crisis soon became a bona fide

international crisis with each player attempting to affect its course with its

own national interests in mind. Some of the regional powers including

Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel with a view of their own potential

and alliances, regional or otherwise, tried to weaken the influence of their

rivals. Other international powers such as the US, Russia, and European

Union (EU), which tried to advance their own aims and to lessen the

influence of their rivals, gave support to the opposition factions. These

Western powers soon decided that Syria (unlike Libya) should not be

brought down through military intervention. The US and its European

allies demanding an exit for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (without

destruction of the security, military structure) did not intervene directly in

order to remove him. However, in a reversal of policy after six years of

the Syrian crisis, the US unilaterally attacked a Syrian airbase11

with the

approval of some of its European and Middle Eastern allies. To

understand this change in the US policy, it is important to look at the role

of other important regional powers.

Role of Regional Powers in the Syrian Crisis

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) with its Shiite ideology and strategic

eminence is an important protagonist in the region and any solution

pertaining to security and political matters in the region without Iran‘s

10 Reinoud Leenders and Steven Heydemann, ―Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity

and Threat and the Social Networks of the Early Risers,‖ Mediterranean Politics 17, no.

2 (2012): 139-159,

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2012.694041. 11 ―Syria War: Why was Shayrat Airbase Bombed,‖ BBC News, April 7, 2017,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39531045.

Amir Sajedi


help is nearly impossible.12

Due to its support to Palestine and the

publically antagonistic stance towards Israel, Iran needs an ally (or allies)

in the Middle East which strengthens or improves its position. After the

Camp David Accords in 1978 and the exit of the Egyptian government

from the anti-Israeli camp, the Alawite Syria which is close to the Shiites

remains the sole opposition to Israel. The Syrian government being

fiercely opposed to the Baathists in Baghdad and in response to the

vacuum left by the Egyptian exit expanded its ties with Iran during the

imposed war with Iraq.13

Hezbollah in Lebanon and close cooperation

with Iran in defence of the Palestinians allowed the latter to expand its

strategic depth in and around the Israeli borders through the Iran-Syria-

Lebanon axis. Thus, Syria became a main channel of sending Iranian

financial resources and supplies to Lebanon.14

Naturally, with the

introduction of the anti-Assad and foreign-sponsored forces in Syria,

armed or unarmed, Iran became involved in the Syrian conflict along with

the Hezbollah. This strategic alliance allowed them to work in tandem

with support of the Syrian regime, leading to many important victories for

the latter in this conflict. Iran and Hezbollah‘s support to maintaining the

current political structure in Syria has kept it in the Shiite axis. El-Labad

notes:

Iran has been able through the Iranian-Syrian alliance, to

extend its regional influence from western Iran, Iraq to Syria.

Also, Syria guarantees the access of Iran to the line of

Palestinian cause, which will achieve positive results for the

Iranian regional project.15

Turkey, Syria‘s neighbour to the north, is another player in this

crisis. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) did not want to see al-

12 Mohammad Frazmand, Iran and New Political Order in the Middle East, Iran and

Arabs (Tehran: Institute for Strategic Research, 2009), 42-3. 13 Ali Easmaeili, Hamid Niko and Mehdi Goal Mohammadi, Foundation, Bases and

Geopolitics of Islamic Awakening (Tehran: Sorehmehr Publication, 2012), 274-5. 14 Ghasem Torabi, ―Regional and World Rivalry in the International Arab,‖ Research

Defense Research 1, no. 2 (2012). 15 M. El-Labad, ―The Iranian- Turkish Conflict on Syria and the Arab Vacuum,‖ Bidayat

Journal (2013): 29-32.



Assad fall, since Syria had become a symbol of its policy of engagement

with the Arab World. ‗Yet, the 2011 Syrian Uprising precipitated an

escalating negative tit-for-tat between the two states at the leadership

level.‘16

Not only this, the cause of Turkey‘s entrance into this crisis is to

be found in the 18 million Alawites that make up 20 per cent of Turkey

and the Syrian Kurds which are in part secessionist.17

In June 2011,

Turkey gave sanctuary to Syrian army defectors and helped them

constitute the Free Syrian Army (FSA) - an anti-Assad armed force.

Damascus retaliated by allowing the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK)-

affiliated Syrian Kurdish party, the PYD, to take over much of the

Kurdish inhabited Syrian border zone with Turkey.18

Turkish support of

Sunni forces in post-Assad era could not only empower it against its

neighbours, but in addition significantly lessen its Kurdish and Alawite

liabilities. Thus, creating a corridor for the entrance of Jihadi and Takfiri

forces19

from Turkey into Syria became a priority for the Turkish

government. This policy, for a limited time, made Turkey a Western ally

in removing al-Assad from power, and on a collision course with Russia,

which is another player in the crisis and an ally of the government. The

end of the regime could make Turkey the most influential actor in the

region and its popular secular model suitable for Syria and other regional

powers:

16 Raymond Hinnebusch, ―Back to Enmity: Turkey-Syria Relations since the Syrian

Uprising,‖ Orient 56, no. 1 (2015): 14-22 (14). 17 Amir Sajedi, ―The Syrian Crisis and the Intervention of Foreign Powers,‖ Research

Letter of International Relations 6, no. 24 (2013). 18 Hinnebusch, ―Back to Enmity.‖ 19 Elie Podeh, ―Egypt‘s Struggle against the Militant Islamic Groups,‖ in Efraim Inbar and

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, eds., Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East (New

York: Routledge, 2013), 43-61. Podeh distinguishes between conservative Islamists,

Jihadi Muslims, and Takfiri groups. Like Jihadis, Takfiri groups advocate armed

struggle against the secular regime, invoking concepts like al-hakimiyya (God‘s

sovereignty), and al-takfir (branding as apostate). However, Takfiri groups are more

extreme as they make no distinction between the regime and the ordinary population

when employing violence.

Amir Sajedi


In addition to this, Turkey was committed to an alliance with

Israel. The signing of the military cooperation agreement

between Turkey and Israel led to the adoption of the Turkish

foreign policy for escalating situations towards Syria.20

It is important to note that while in 2010, relations between the two

countries deteriorated because of the Freedom Flotilla crisis, ‗Israel sees

Turkey as an indispensable ally because it needs to use Turkey‘s strategic

depth to defend itself.‘21

The Saudi Wahhabi government which is opposed to Shi‘aism is

another player in the Syrian crisis. Saudi Arabia has remained in

competition and opposition to Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.22

After the fall of Saddam in 2003 and the improvement of the balance of

power in favour of Iran in the Middle East, the Saudi government with its

approach towards the West and through its alliance with regional Arab

governments has tried to limit the advancement of Iranian influence in the

Arab world.23

The penetration by the Iranians in Lebanon and Iraq (among

other Arab nations) and the downfall of its allies namely Hosni Mubarak

of Egypt and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 2011 and 2012 respectively,

has been additionally worrisome for Saudi Arabia.24

At the onset of the

Syrian crisis, Riyadh condemned the repression and recalled its

ambassador from Damascus in August of 2011 and gave support to the

armed opposition and protesters. Their rapid entry into the crisis could be

interpreted as attempting to change the power balance in the Middle East

in an effort to strengthen their position. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

(KSA) has sought the removal of the Assad government through financial

and military support of the opposition in Syria and with its Arab allies to

20 Mira A. Abdel Hameed and Mohamed Hussein Mostafa, ―Turkish Foreign Policy

towards Syria since 2002,‖ Asian Social Science 14, no. 2 (2018): 57-68 (58),

http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/view/71742/40186. 21 Ibid., 58. 22 Amir Sajedi, ―Iran‘s Relations with Saudi Arabia,‖ India Quarterly 49, no.1-2 (1993):

75-96. 23 Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firozabadi and Mehdi Farazi, ―Islamic Awakening and the

Security of Islamic Republic of Iran,‖ Islamic Revolution Studies 9, no. 28 (2012): 291-

2. 24 Amir Sajedi, ―Yemen Crisis in the Regional Context,‖ Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs

5, no. 3 (2014): 65-85.



eventually eject Syria from the Arab union to further weaken it politically.

The KSA leadership sought to disrupt the Iranian alliance with Lebanon

by supporting the Takfiris fighting in Syria and weakening its

government. This aimed to reduce the Iranian influence in the Middle East

and the Arab world. They viewed the attack on the Al-Shayrat airbase as

part of rebalancing of power in the region.

The government of Israel has paid added attention to its security

since the onset of the Syrian crisis. The national security of Israel has

traditionally been defined through its strategic military position via its

Arab and non-Arab neighbours which are its opposition in the Middle

East. After the Islamic Revolution, the Israeli regime over the past 39

years has considered Iran an even larger threat than the current Arab

governments. The political and military support of Iran of the Hezbollah

in Lebanon (through Syria) which provided a safe route to transfer

resources, made Israelis look for ways to disrupt this threat. For this

reason reducing the Syrian Army, breaking up the corridor, and

manoeuvering Iranian military support became a top priority. Israel‘s

support of armed Syrian opposition, the treatment of some of its injured,

and air assaults on the transport route to Lebanon through Syria should be

seen as attempts to disrupt this axis of resistance and the creation of a new

politico-security understanding in the region.25

To this end, the Netanyahu

government repeatedly demanded that the US should attack Syria (during

the Obama administration) and to overthrow Assad‘s regime and destroy

its chemical weapons. The Obama administration paid scant attention to

this request, and only when Syria was accused of using chemical

weapons, did the US work with Russia in order to remove its chemical

weapons.

25 Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Failure of the Greater Middle East Plan in the Wave of

Islamic Awakening (Tehran: Center for International Research and Education, 2013),

188.

Amir Sajedi


Russia and the Syrian Crisis

The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced its status to a ‗second-class‘

power with its foreign policy being unconcerned with the Middle East.

However, after two decades during which its economy significantly

improved along with its political standing, the Putin government began

inculcating a bigger role in international politics. The West tried to isolate

Russia strategically in particular areas such as the Middle East, but since

2002, the Kremlin started focusing on this region by pursuing friendly

relations with Muslim countries. The Russian government, since 2003, in

order to diffuse Western pressure on Iran cooperated with Tehran in the

atomic arena and with the Syrian government it its energy and tourism

sector, thus, significantly increasing its role in the Middle East.26

The

Russo-Syrian alliance was formed during the Cold War, and since then,

Damascus has been one of Moscow‘s ‗remaining geopolitical sites in the

Middle East.‘ The Republic maintains a naval base at the Port of Tartus -

critical because of the larger role it wants to play in the Middle East.27

Al-

Assad backed the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 – another

reason why the Kremlin is not in favour of any military intervention.

Throughout the Syrian conflict, Russia has supported the Assad regime at

the United Nations (UN) to stall Security Council (SC) resolutions

advocating for military intervention.28

‗Russia seeks to maintain and

expand its status as a world power, and views the focused, purposeful

export of its military technologies to key countries as a fundamental tool

26 Paul D. Miller, ―With Syria Chemical Attack, Another Obama Foreign Policy Deal Fails

Hard,‖ Hill, April 13, 2017,

http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreignpolicy/328654-after-syria-chemical-attacks-

obama-pack-up-that foreign. 27 Dmitri Trenin, ―Russia‘s Interests in Syria,‖ Carnegie Moscow Center, June 9, 2014,

http://carnegie.ru/2014/06/09/russia-s-interestsin-syria-pub-55831. 28 Editor‘s Note: For example, the October 2011 resolution which advocated a Syrian-led

political process and condemned human rights abuses was vetoed by Moscow. Another

similar resolution was vetoed in February 2012. While this article was being finalised,

Russia again blocked a UN resolution to establish a 30-day ceasefire and humanitarian

deliveries to eastern Ghouta which saw one of the bloodiest weeks of aerial

bombardment in the civil war that has devastated the country. The UNSC finally

approved a resolution on 26 February 2018 for the 30-day ceasefire.



in achieving this.‘29

The import of arms to Syria from Russia now

accounts for some 78 per cent of its total, and during 2007-10, arms

exports reached USD 7.4 billion. It is important to point out that Moscow

claims that no arms deals have been signed and current weapons

deliveries are part of earlier deals, which range from small arms to tanks,

heavy munitions, helicopters, and aircrafts.30

Russian firms invested

nearly USD 20 billion in Syria in 2009 alone.31

With the removal of the

governments of Iraq and Libya (2011), the only remaining Russian client

state in the region is Syria, making it a significant actor for Putin. The

Russians have had strong economic, political, and military links with

Syria, and the Putin government has a special interest in this profitable

market.32

There are approximately 30,000 people of Russian origin in

Syria and al-Assad has cooperated in reducing the influence of the Syrian

Chechens in Russia. This also shows a willingness by Russia to remain

increasingly involved in the Middle East. Agela Stent has also noted that:

[Russia‘s] unanticipated military foray into Syria has

transformed the civil war there into a proxy US-Russian

conflict.33

The Russians, for the aforementioned reasons, do not want to

abandon their last base in the Middle East. The support of Putin for the

29 Stephen Blank and Edward Levitzky, ―Geostrategic Aims of the Russian Arms Trade in

East Asia and the Middle East,‖ Defence Studies 15, no. 1 (2015):63-80,

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2015.1010287. 30 Lily Anderson, Gil Bar-Sela, Kell Brauer, Alexis Chouery, Rebecca Donato, Melanie

Eng, Patrick Gallagher, Trenton Holmberg, Veronica Jimenez, Bryan Lam, Daniel

Maggioncalda, Amanda Ramshaw, Anna Rumpf and Annie Wang, Syria: American

Action for a Complex Crisis, report (Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International

Studies, 2014), 9,

http://courses.washington.edu/hrmena/Library_files/Task%20Force%20G%20Syria.pdf. 31 Anna Borshchevskaya,―Russia‘s Many Interests in Syria‖ (Washington, D.C.: The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2013),

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-many-interests-in-

syria. 32 Mohammad Sohrabi, ―Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East,‖ Political Science and

International Relations Journal 7, no. 25 (2014): 113-144. 33 Angela Stent, ―Putin‘s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia‘s

Intervention,‖ Foreign Affairs 95, no. 1 (2016): 106–113.

Amir Sajedi


Assad government against the opposing forces and groups has made an

abandoned policy quite active and the continuing presence of the Russian

naval forces at Tartus has added to Syria‘s capability and strength. The

government of Putin with its support of the al-Assad regime and its close

military cooperation with Iran and the creation of a united front against

the Western influence in the Middle East has added to Russia‘s stature in

the region.

The presence of Russian warships in Syrian ports in support of al-

Assad, cooperation with Iran in curtailing his opposition, opposition to the

UNSC wanting to admonish the Syrian government in response to its

alleged use of chemical weapons in 2013 and again in April of 2017

should all be seen as part of its new policy to return as an influential

country in the power equation of the Middle East.

At one point during the Syrian crisis, both Russia and Iran believed

that it had reached Brecher‘s third stage and was becoming less critical

and would soon reach its last and post-crisis stage. The government

victories in Aleppo and other Syrian fronts created an outlook, it appeared

as though al-Assad had the upper hand in the negotiations within the

framework of the International Syria Support Group chaired by the

Russian Federation and the US. In September 2016, this framework

process also broke down.34

However:

Moscow did not fail to take advantage of the transition period

under the leadership of the United States to seize the initiative

and outline its ―rules of the game‖ in Syria. This was the focus

of the ―triadic initiative‖ in December 2016 and the

subsequent Astana and Geneva negotiations. However, neither

Astana talks (to which even Moscow sent low-level

delegations), nor those in Geneva, which were convened twice

at the insistence of the Russian leadership and was never

remembered for anything other than the mysterious ―Naumkin

document‖ as well as the de facto ceasefire regime, were

turning points.35

34 Leonid M. Issaev, ―Can Russia Reach a Consensus on Syria with Trump?‖

(brief, Alsharq Forum, Istanbul, 2017), http://www.sharqforum.org/wp-content/uploads

/dlm_uploads/2017/06/Can-Russia-Reach-a-Consensus-on-Syria-with-Trump.pdf. 35 Ibid., 4.



With the US Presidential election in 2016 and with the new

administration considering a stated policy of non-interference in Syria,

there was little expectation of any particular change in the US policy in

the Middle East or Syria.36

However, two months after the arrival of

Donald Trump at the helm of US affairs, there was a massive change of

policy towards Syria. The US administration in a surprise move and in

response to the chemical attacks in Khan Sheikhoun in the state of Idlib

ordered an attack of nearly 59 cruise missiles on the Syrian airbase in Al-

Shayrat.37

The Russian government immediately condemned this attack

calling it an open violation on the sovereignty of Syria and international

law, and requested an immediate session of the UNSC.38

Russian

President Putin further stated that this attack damaged the relations

between Moscow and Washington and ordered additional elements of its

naval fleet to the Mediterranean.

US Policy towards Syria during the Obama Administration

From the end of the Second World War to the break-up of the Soviet

Union, the US foreign policy was based on its fight with communism.

This policy involved maintaining its allies in the Middle East and the safe

passage of oil from there to international waters. With the break-up of the

Soviet Union and liberation of Kuwait by the coalition forces under the

US leadership, Washington sought the creation of a unipolar world. The

events of September 11 in 2001, defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and

Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, and the US

occupation of both countries convinced the Republican administration of

George W. Bush that the US was the sole superpower and that it must

36 Dexter Filkins, ―Trump and Syria,‖ New Yorker, November 10, 2016,

http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/president-trumps-policy-on-syria. 37 ―United States Strikes Syrian Government Airbase in Response to Chemical Weapons

Attacks by Syrian Forces; Two Additional Strikes on Syrian Government Forces

Justified by Defense of Troops Rationale,‖ American Journal of International Law 111,

no. 3 (2017): 781-787. 38 ―Syria Missile Strike Condemned by Russia in Firm Warning to US,‖ ABC News, April

8, 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-08/8427456.

Amir Sajedi


play the role of a world policeman.39

He believed that by following

Hobbes‘ theory, the US had a responsibility to bring its irregular orbits

back to order with force.40

However, there arose various problems which stood in the way of

this, such as the formation of terrorist groups in the Persian Gulf, the

Middle East and other regions. Given the inability of the US to govern in

occupation (Iraq and Afghanistan) and its heavy price tag which created

problems for its economy, the people demanded a different solution and

policy. The entry of Barack Obama in the Presidential race in 2008 with

his Senate experience and the slogan of change benefitted from this

situation. Most observers agree that the life of a policymaker, his/her

education, political experience, the defining experiences in his/her social

life, and physical and mental health have a great role in his personal and

public choices. Obama, like his predecessors, sought a larger influence of

the US politically in the world. However, unlike Bush, Obama believed

that the tools of diplomacy are less expensive and can give better results.

Accordingly, he was able to work with the European and non-European

allies to support the US policies. For example, with respect to the Iran‘s

nuclear programme, he was able to push through several resolutions in the

UNSC against Iran, while leaving the door open for diplomacy. As

popular uprisings brought the reigns of long-time dictators in Tunisia and

Egypt to an end, his administration tried with only lukewarm support of

the new rulers to force them to relegate power to their people. The US

did, however, in the last stages of the Libyan war interfere in a limited

way against Muammar Gaddafi and in support of the people.

The foreign policy of the US in the Syrian crisis was built on the

basis of support of the opposition without the use of military intervention.

The Obama administration repeatedly asked al-Assad to abdicate power in

favour of the populace. As efforts of the regime to crush resistance failed

and given the expansion of clashes, entrance of armed Takfiri/Jihadi

39 Mohammad Ali Kadivar, ―Liberalism and Conservatism in Thomas Hobbes Thoughts,‖

Political & Economic Ettela’at 20, nos. 5&6 (2005): 88-89. 40 Amir Sajedi, ―Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf Security: Iran and the United States,‖ IPRI

Journal IX, no. 2 (2009): 77-89, http://www.ipripak.org/wp-

content/uploads/2014/01/art5amis2009.pdf.



groups in Syria, many believed that the US military would soon make

limited moves in order to overthrow al-Assad. In 2012, President Obama

established a ‗red line‘ with respect to the use of chemical weapons by the

regime in Syria. But, when al-Assad was accused of a Sarin gas attack in

August 2013 near Damascus in which 1,500 people were killed, President

Obama did not intervene militarily and agreed with Russia to remove

chemical weapons from Syria.41

Not using the military option at that time

and handling of the ‗red line statement‘ was near unanimously seen as a

failure - the loss of US credibility in the Arab world and in Europe. It has

become one of his administration‘s ‗worst blunder.‘ 42

It has even been

proposed that this decision led to a spiralling of events starting from the

downfall of the rulers in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Some Islamic groups,

radical and moderate, were able to assume power in Tunisia which could

have created issues for the West and Israel. Libya (a country where with

the help of US forces, the rule of Colonel Gadaffi had come to an end)

witnessed an attack on the US Counsel in Benghazi that resulted in the

killing of the American Counsel and other diplomats. Islamic forces came

to power in Egypt threatening the West; in Syria radical Jihadi groups and

the liberation forces fought against al-Assad and at times with each other.

When in a cruel show of force one of the Syrian opposition rebels cut out

the heart of a government soldier in front of a camera and bit into it, one

was left asking what kind of government can come to power in Syria after

al-Assad. It has been pointed out that:

41 Pamela Engel, ―Obama Reportedly Declined to Enforce Red Line in Syria after Iran

Threatened to Back Out of Nuclear Deal,‖ Business Insider, August 23, 2016,

http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-red-line-syria-iran-2016-8; and Michael

Crowley, ―Obama‘s ‗Red Line‘ Haunts Clinton, Trump,‖ POLITICO, October 11,

2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-clinton-syria-red-line-228585; 42 Derek Chollet, ―Obama‘s Red Line, Revisited,‖ POLITICO, July 19, 2016,

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-

revisited-214059.

Amir Sajedi


Norms like the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons are

not self-enforcing. They require a superpower like America to

deter other dictators from future violations. When the US

abdicates its responsibility to make good on its red line on

chemical weapons, it invites mischief from rogues all over the

world. 43

New US Policy towards the Syrian Crisis

Considering the support of Barack Obama to his former Secretary of

State, Hillary Clinton, as a Presidential candidate in 2016, it seemed that

with her election, the US foreign policy would remain as before in relation

to the Syrian crisis. However, the entry of a successful businessman, albeit

with personally offensive manners and no previous political background

nor executive experience, as a contender for the Republican nomination,

amazed many. This was even more so as he led the pack of other

contenders. The manner in which Donald Trump carried on his election

campaign and his populist speeches concerned many politicians. Senior

members of the Republican Party even criticised him during the election

or kept their distance from him. However, the outcome of this election

was at odds with political opinions and polls as most predicted a

democratic win. Trump‘s decade-long experience as a ‗showman‘, his

populist speeches and the unique US election process (the Electoral

College) won him the White House, but not the popular vote advantage in

which Hillary Clinton led by several million.44

Trump had disregarded

interference in Syria and did not ask for the removal of al-Assad during

his campaign. Even after two months of his Presidency, the US diplomats

at the UN passed on any military interference in Syria and sought

discussions and talks with al-Assad and his opposition. The new

administration wanted a provisional government without further

destruction of the underlying military and security structures. This was so

43 Eli Lake, ―Thank Trump for Enforcing Obama‘s ‗Red Line‘ in Syria,‖ Bloomberg,

April 7, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-07/thank-trump-for-

enforcing-obama-s-red-line-in-syria. 44 ―Clinton Lost the Presidential Race Despite Larger Number of Voters,‖ Pars Today,

2016, www.Parstoday.com/fa/Europe_and_ammerica-i24157.

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-07/thank-trump-for-enforcing-obama-s-red-line-in-syria

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-07/thank-trump-for-enforcing-obama-s-red-line-in-syria



that the Jihadists could not use the weakened military and security-related

structure of Syria in a war-torn country.

The use of chemical weapons on April 7, 2017 at Khan Sheikhoun

led to a major tactical change by the US President in handling of the

Syrian crisis.45

Many states, including Iran and Russia, immediately

condemned the chemical attack and asked for an investigation so that the

perpetrators could be punished according to international law.46

However,

without any investigation, most Arab states accused the Syrian Army

commanded by al-Assad and made his government responsible for the

chemical attack. The US, along with most Arab governments, claimed

that the chemical attack had been advanced by air and that only the

Russian and the Syrian governments had that capability and previous

history. The Trump administration only three days later unleashed no less

than 59 Tomahawks from the USS Porter and USS Ross at the Syrian

airbase in the outskirts of the city of Homs which destroyed parts of this

base and left eight dead.47

The election promise of Trump to increase US power in the world

was based on economic grounds. However, he tried, along with increasing

economic influence and with threats of using military force in the Syrian

crisis, display the military power and re-new the era of US unilateral

moves in troubled regions of the world such as the Middle East. This

surprise attack was welcomed by some of the governments allied to the

US and Arab and non-Arab governments in the Middle East that were

opposed to Obama‘s nuclear Iranian policy. However, as discussed earlier,

this soured relations between Moscow and Washington.48

The attack also

did not have the consent of the UNSC.

Professor Patrick M. Morgan in his analysis has said that

international politics are in the end made by people who are in a position

of influence in world affairs. One, therefore, needs to conduct a personal

45 Zack Beauchamp, ―Trump‘s Response to an Atrocity in Syria: Talk Tough and Blame

Obama,‖ Vox, April 5, 2017, http://www.vox.com/world/2017/4/5/15189820. 46 ―Iran Condemned Missile Attack on Syrian Air Base,‖ Alef.ir, 2017. 47 ―Why America Attacked Syria?‖donya-e-eqtesad.com, 2017,

www.donya-e-eqtesad.com. 48 ―U.S. Missile Attack on Syria,‖ Tabnak, May 7, 2017,

http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/691685.

https://www.vox.com/authors/zack-beauchamp

Amir Sajedi


analysis of the behaviour and modes of thought of those who are decision-

makers such as presidents, prime ministers and their close advisors.49

Most administrations either continue the policy of their predecessor or

through long deliberations frame a new policy. This was particularly true

of the new Obama administration in 2008 as described in its treatment of

the Iraq war. The Trump administration has, in fact, done neither and has

relied on its decisions which are seemingly rash. It is the conclusion of

this paper that Trump‘s personal thoughts and feelings are to be noted as

much as a consensus formed by the administration at the highest levels.

Some social scientists believe that approach to decision-making

should be one that closely resembles economic and business management

methods. This presumes the existence of personal clear thinking and

access to all existing knowledge and a clear evaluation of the

repercussions of all possible moves. This allows a clear and free choice in

one‘s priorities, whereby decision-makers can act firmly and definitely

according to their priorities. However, the process of decision-making

leading to an appropriate result presupposes that instead of relying only on

personal priorities, one makes use of organisational rules, common

organisational experience relating to a particular period, and the given

information received through related organisations, in order to arrive at

the final decision.50

In contrast to other politicians, the decisions taken by Donald

Trump in Syria, a real estate mogul-turned-president, have been

unpredictable and vaguely logical, especially since at one point he had

even offered tacit support for al-Assad,51

and on more than one occasion

told Obama to ‗not attack Syria‘ via Twitter and accused him of being the

‗founder of ISIS‘ over covert support for rebel groups, and who, since

then has made the US deeply involved in this complex international war

49 Seyed Hossein Seifzadeh, Different Concepts in International Relations (Tehran: Nasher

Sefid, 1992), 29-30. 50 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International

Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, trans. Vahid Bozorgi and Alireza Tayyeb (Tehran:

Ghomes Publisher, 1993), 725-30. 51 Tom O‘Connor, ―War in Syria: U.S. Will no longer Target Assad,‖ Newsweek, March

30, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/us-war-syria-stops-focus-assad-removal-crisis-

mideast-576984.



zone.52

There has even been speculation that Trump was influenced by his

daughter Ivanka, who was affected by the horrendous scenes of the

chemical attacks in Syria, in his decision to attack the Syrian airbase.53

This, followed by comments of the US Commerce Secretary that the

cruise missile attack was merely ‗after-dinner entertainment‘ for guests

dining at Donald Trump‘s Mar-a-Lago club on April 6, 2017 when the

President decided to launch the strike.54

Trump, after the missile strike and in another obvious turn, stated

that the US priorities are not regime change in Syria, but the fight against

radical Islamic and Jihadi forces. It would not be a surprise if Trump

changes his mind, again, because even though:

Foreign policy ‗doctrines‘ are overrated — being able to

reduce your policy to a bumper sticker-sized slogan doesn‘t

mean that it‘s any wiser or more effective than one that can‘t

be described so succinctly. But it does help to have some

guiding principles that help everyone — your own

government, Congress, both allies and adversaries overseas —

understand what you‘re trying to achieve. And it doesn‘t

appear that there‘s much of a structure underlying U.S. policy,

beyond whatever President Trump thinks of what he saw on

cable news that day.55

52 Tom O‘Connor, ―Trump‘s War: From Bombing Syria to Challenging Russia and Iran,‖

Newsweek, June 27, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/trump-war-bombing-syria-

challenge-russia-iran-629526. 53 Kate Brannen, ―Did Trump Bomb Syria because Ivanka Told him to?‖ Newsweek, April

12, 2017; Simon Johnson, ―Ivanka Trump Influenced my Father to Launch Syria

Strikes, Reveals Brother Eric,‖ Telegraph, April 11, 2017; and Zachary Cohen, ―Eric

Trump: Ivanka Influenced Syria Strike Decision,‖ CNN.com, April 11, 2017. 54 Lauren Gambino, ―Trump‘s Attack on Syria was ‗After-dinner Entertainment‘ says US

Commerce Secretary,‖ Guardian, May 2, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/us-

news/2017/may/02/trumps-attack-on-syria-after-dinner-entertainment-wilbur-ross-

commerce-secretary. 55 Paul Waldman, ―Six Questions about Trump‘s Missile Attack in Syria,‖ Washington

Post, April 10, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-

line/wp/2017/04/10/six-questions-about-trumps-missile-attack-in-

syria/?utm_term=.908ff4a3b855.

Amir Sajedi


Conclusion

The Syrian crisis is on a long, complex and difficult road owing to the

involvement of internal and external players. At the start of the crisis,

many Western and Arab governments believed that the Assad regime will

fall in a short time. Most governments, assured of the continuing support

for the internal opposition to al-Assad, demanded his removal from

power. However, the resistance of his regime which became possible with

the support of his allies in Iran and Hezbollah and later with large Russian

military aid has kept him from being removed. With the passage of time

and the entry of Jihadi and Takfiri forces in Syria and the destruction

brought on by the Islamic State and considering a lack of an adequate

alternative to al-Assad, the West has also become less desirous of his

removal. The role of Russia with its logistical and air support has made

this crisis far more complex. The Obama policy did not call for military

intervention in Syria and sought a diplomatic solution involving

negotiations among the various parties. Even when al-Assad crossed the

‗red line‘ for the supposedly first time and used chemical weapons, there

was no military response, instead the US cooperated with Russia in

removing 1,300 tonnes of chemical weapons.56

There were important reasons for Obama to choose the path of

‗coercive diplomacy.‘ After his eight years at the helm, he believed

diplomacy to be a more effective and less costly tool.57

He was aware of

how much hatred the militaristic nature of the Bush Presidency and its

unilateral approach had created among many war-torn Muslim states for

the US foreign policy. Obama had gone to the White House with a call for

a change of policy. The bitter feelings about the US presence in

Afghanistan and Iraq, and the killing the US Counsel and other diplomats

in Benghazi (Libya) caused Obama to rely more on the policy of

economic sanctions and use of diplomacy. The achievement of an

understanding with Iran on the nuclear issue and the establishment of

diplomatic relations with Havana (Cuba) after half a decade are testament

to that fact.

56 Chollet, ―Obama‘s Red Line, Revisited.‖ 57 Ibid.



Trump assumed power with his peculiarities, crude behaviour, lack

of any political experience, and (known by many) his exuberance. His

election sloganeering, advertisements and interaction with the media made

many think that his domestic and foreign policies would be in contrast to

his predecessor. Not only this, his decisions are certainly affected by what

the majority of his conservative-leaning voters want. After the end of his

first 100 days, many, including his own party members noted the lack of

clarity and forthrightness in his policies along with the contradictions

regarding terrorism, immigration and climate change etc.58

The attack ordered by Trump on Syria showed him to be an

opportunist preoccupied with power and one who wants to return the US

to the policies of aggression pursued unilaterally after the Cold War.

From the missile attack on Syria without consulting Congress or the UN

to sending navy ships to the waters off the Korean Peninsula and using the

mother of all bombs in Afghanistan, one sees decisions arising out of

inexperience and lack of counsel. The UN has been pursuing peace

through a political framework composed of talks leading to a transition

out of the Syrian crisis. These efforts were taking place between the

representatives of opposition groups and Assad‘s regime in Geneva and

Astana and according to Resolution 2268 of the UNSC.59

These talks

although so far ineffectual had raised hopes of further rounds of

negotiations among the participants with the aim of ending the Syrian

crisis. However, the US missile attack, which rose out of Trump‘s unusual

behavior, did not aid these efforts, rather re-invigorated the opposition to

al-Assad and made these discussions and the Syrian crisis more difficult.

58 Michael Wolffe‘s, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House (New York: Henry

Holt & Co, 2018). 59 United Nations, ―Security Council Endorses Syria Cessation of Hostilities Accord,

Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2268 (2016),‖ press coverage, February 26, 2016,

https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12261.doc.htm.

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