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NATOs Northern Front: Developments and Prospects

DOV S. ZAKHEIM

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

Zakheim, D. S. NATOs Northern Front: Developments and Prospects. Cooperationand Conflict, XVII, 1982, 193-205.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of observers of the so-called Nordic balancebegan to draw attention to the growing imbalance in NATO and Warsaw Pactcapabilities in the region. The U.S.-Norwegian prestocking arrangement was oneNATO response to the limited warning time for a Soviet move to cut off the NorthCape area. Whereas Norway, in conjunction with the United States, is currently inthe midst of a major effort to restore the credibility of its northernmost defenses,Denmark has been amongst the most reluctant ofAlliance members to increase itslevel of defense spending. Furthermore, Greenlands home rule represents anothercomplication. Given Greenlands clear determination to go its own way in internationaleconomic affairs, it is important to assess whether it might do the same on defensematters. Greenlands importance to NATO is often overlooked but cannot be over-stated. Finlands neutrality and Swedens more forceful armed neutrality permit NATOto adopt a posture which does not impose upon Denmark and Norway the burden ofhosting foreign troops upon their soil.

I. INTRODUCTION

The 1980 election has had a profoundimpact upon U.S. defense policy. Theincoming Reagan Administration hasraised a number of fundamental questionsabout defense strategy, policy and pro-gram requirements, and proposed a var-iety of initiatives geared to strengtheningU.S. defense posture. In the realm of

conventional forces, theAdministrationhas discarded the timeworn notion of aone-and-one-half war strategy in favorof a more flexible approach that takesmore realistic account of the proliferationof Soviet capabilities, and clientsworldwide.

It is significant, however, that the newAdministrations approach has built

upon, rather than replaced, long standingcommitments to friends and Allies. For

no area is this observation more valid than

Europe, whose economic and political

security is the primary reason for therenewed U.S. concern about defendingvital petroleum supplies from the PersianGulf. Within Europe, the importance ofcontinuity is best underlined with respectto U.S. policy towards what has beentermed the Northern Flank.

For many years, the United Statesseemed somewhat less than preoccupied

with NATOs posture in Scandinavia,an

area that is as much NATOs NorthernFront as it is a flank. In part, U.S. uncon-cern was accidental, a carryover from the

early days of theAlliance whenAmericanand British naval forces posed the primarythreat to any Soviet aggression againstDenmark and Norway, and were expectedto balance the ground force advantagethat, as elsewhere in Europe, lay with theWarsaw Pact, specifically the SovietUnion and its East German and Polishallies.

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The static ground force balance, thatis, the quantitative disparity between theforces available to each alliance in North-

ern Europe, continues to favor the Pact.

On a day-to-day basis, the Soviet Unionsforces on the Kola Peninsula and the Len-ingrad Military District, as well as theGerman Democratic Republic and Polishforces likely to be committed to any battlefor Denmark, far outnumber active Nor-

wegian, Danish and FRG forces commit-ted to Allied Forces North. What has

shifted over the past two decades, how-ever, has been the degree of that groundforce

disparity,as well as the concomitant

naval and tactical air equation that hadunderwritten the balance in the area.

The United States no longer can assumefree and easy access to Soviet targets northof the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. TheUnited Kingdom no longer operates largedeck aircraft carriers. On the other hand,the Soviet Unions naval forces, particu-larly those deploying from the NorthernFleet based at Murmansk, include the

nuclear powered battle cruiser, the Kirov- the largest ship of its kind in any Navy-

one of the two Soviet VTOL carriers

and an ever more modern array of cruise

missile capable surface escorts, sub-marines and smaller patrol boats.

Finally, there is Backfire. Backfire con-stitutes the primary Soviet naval aviationthreat to U.S. carrier forces in theAtlan-

tic, to convoys that would provide needed

suppliesto U.S. forces

reinforcingEuro-

pean and forward based U.S. units, andto key NATO installations throughout theNorthAtlantic area. North of the G-I-

UK gap it has the potential (for which theSoviets have expended considerable train-

ing time) to operate in coordination withall of the aforementioned cruise missile

units in attacking U.S. carrier forces.Older Soviet NavalAviation aircraft -

Badgers, Blinders and Bear-Ds - also

have the range and payload to supplementBackfires capability north of the G-I-UK

gap, and to threaten early warning facil-ities throughout Scandinavia.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a numberof observers of the so-called Nordic bal-

ance began to draw attention to the grow-ing imbalance in NATO and Soviet capa-bilities in the region. It became clear thatwhile U.S. naval forces could be enhanced

to provide a continuing threat to Sovietfleet assets in the Barents and Baltic Seas,the price for their doing so was costly bothin terms of dollars to be expended onshipbuilding and losses to be expected inwartime. While neither cost deterred the

U.S.

Navyand its

supporters, growingdemands for Navy deployments elsewhereand continuing strains on the U.S. defensebudgets prompted a search for other, sup-plemental solutions to restoring theNATO/Pact balance in northern Europe.The greatest advances in rectifying theimbalance were achieved with respect to

Norway, and specifically, the defense ofnorth Norway, an area of special concernboth to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On

the other hand, there has been far lessprogress in this regard with respect to thedefense of Denmark, while budget con-straints also threaten to hamper the abilityof neutral Sweden and Finland to expandupon, or even maintain, current capa-bilities.Accordingly, the following pageswill deal in turn with developments relat-ing to each of the four continental Scandi-navian states.

II. NORWAY: THE U.S.-NORWEGIAN PRESTOCKING

AGREEMENTAND RELATED

ISSUES

The region encompassing the provincesof Finnmark and Troms would be a tempt-ing target for the Soviets in the contextof a conflict in Europe (some would evenargue that it would tempt the Soviets in

other contexts as well).A Soviet move tocut off the Northern provinces could be



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launched either across the border into the

Kirkenes area or through the Finnishwedge, thereby effectively isolating thenorth from the rest of the country. Were

the Soviets to control northern Norway,they could:

-

operate their Backfire bombers alongless demanding flight profiles into theNorthAtlantic

.0

- disrupt Western anti-submarine war-fare operations

- rob NATO of valuable early warninginformation on movements in the Kola

- and benefit from an additional

marginof protection for their own forces basedin the region.

Norway has always been sensitive toSoviet concerns about stability in the far

North, and has taken steps to limit thenature and locale of training in the North

Cape area. Traditionally, it has also

deployed a small, brigade-sized activeforce in the region, relying on reserve

call-upsand

redeploymentsto

respondto

any demands for active defense duringcrisis or wartime. Of course, these forces

were meant to be supplemented by theNATO naval forces that, as noted above,in fact have come to pose less of a credible

offset to Soviet capabilities than they hadin the 1950s and 1960s.

Beginning in the mid-1970s, a numberof observers of the balance in North Capesuggested that a combination of prestock-

ing of equipment and rapid deploymentby air ofAmerican ground forces wouldenable Norway to buttress its thindefenses in the event of a crisis. This

approach drew upon two distinctprinciples.

First, it was assumed that the warningtime available to NATO would be rather

limited. Deployments by sea thereforecould not be sufficiently well-timed to

preventa land

grab bythe Soviets that

could be expected to take place at or nearthe onset of conflict in Central Europe.

Second, it was assumed that the pre-stocking of equipment, organized alonglines similar to the POMCUS (preposi-tioned material configured to unit

sets)that was initiated in the Federal Republicof Germany, would not conflict with Nor-ways long standing policy of not permit-ting foreign basing on its soil.The first assumption dealt with military

planning and strategy; the second withpolitical realities. By the late 1970s it hadbecome abundantly clear that the Westcould no longer posit that warning timewas likely to be measured in weeks, but

that it could (some argued that it would)be measured in days.A number of observ-ers suggested that the Soviets could launcha bolt from the blue attack drawing upontheir 30 divisions in East Germany.Others argued that the Soviets could reachwell over twice that number within a

week. The Department of Defense, underHarold Brown, established a planningscenario that assumed a Soviet attack

could take

placewith as little as 14

dayswarning, and that, allowing for the timerequired for memberNATO governmentsto agree to mobilization, only ten dayswould be available to the United Statesfor a massive reinforcement of Europe.

1

To be sure, current assumptions are notimmutable. There is, in fact, a distributionof warning times ranging from none toseveral months to which the NATO allies

would respond in different and appropri-ate ways. Nevertheless, for a country asexposed as Norway, NATOs postulationof shorter warning times had to be takenmost seriously: Norwegian territorialintegrity rode on the effectiveness ofNATOs response to such short warning.To some extent, growing Western

preoccupation with shorter warning timeinteracted with Norways politicalresponse to the question of prestocking.

Norwayhad never ruled out

foreignreinforcements in the event of a crisiswhen it had first announced its no foreign



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basing policy. The door has been leftopen to some form of reinforcement if

Norway chose to open it. Furthermore,

prestocking merely involved the basing of

equipment, not foreign personnel, onNorwegian soil.At issue, therefore, washow Norway would choose to interpretits basing policy, not whether that policywas open to a looser interpretation.

Beginning in the late 1970s, the UnitedStates and Norway undertook seriousnegotiations on the prestocking of equip-ment in the northern theater. It soon

became clear that the U.S. Marine Corpswas a

particularlysuitable force for such

an arrangement. The Marines are theessence of a combined arms force, matinginfantry, artillery, armor and aircraft into

task-organized units called, appropriatelyenough, MarineAir/Ground Task Forces.The Marines also were not committed to

any particular NATO battle theater, butrather served in the rather ambiguouscapacity of SACEURs (SupremeAlliedCommander Europe) strategic reserve.

Finally, it was clear that Marines deployedaboard amphibious ships could not deployin time to arrive at the forward edge ofbattle if a conflict indeed began with lessthan a few weeks strategic warning.While this factor certainly did not rule outthe value of the Marines to a variety oftheaters within Europe, it did diminishtheir utility with respect to north Norway,whose defense, however demanding, is afar less arduous task than its

recaptureonce lost at the outset of conflict. Pre-

stocking Marine equipment in Norwayand having the Marines flown in by airwould do away with problems of speedof response and ensure that the Marines

would be available to defend the area,

not recapture it.If the issue of which forces might be

available to defend north Norway undera prestocking scheme was relatively

simple to deal with, the question of whereto prestock was an entirely different mat-

ter.At first blush, the logical assumptionwas that equipment should be prestockednear the area in which it was expected tobe used, namely, north Norway. On the

other hand, an arrangement to do soposed some political problems for Nor-way.A big buildup in northern Norwaywas likely to be construed as provocative,not only by the Soviets (that was to beexpected) but by the neutrals as well.On 16 January 1981, the U.S. and Nor-

wegian governments achieved a majormilestone in the effort to restore the

northern European balance. The govern-ments

jointlyannounced a

long-awaitedMemorandum of Understanding to pre-stock U.S. Marine equipment in Norway.3

3

The agreement permitted Norway tomaintain its long standing policy of noforeign basing on its soil, but neverthelessallowed a much more rapid reinforcementof its own military forces in time of crisis.The principle underlying the prestockingarrangement was therefore a cousin tothe POMCUS arrangements into which

the United States and the Federal Repub-lic of Germany had entered. The UnitedStates would procure the necessary equip-ment to support the ground element ofa Marine Air/GroundAmphibious Bri-gade, and store that equipment in Nor-way. Norway and the United States wouldreach an arrangement to finance the

operations and maintenance of thatequipment: During periods of crisis, andat the invitation of the

NorwegianGov-

ernment. the U.S. MarineAmphibiousBrigade, which, with its air arm is roughlythe size of a Soviet division (about 10,000men), could deploy to Norway aboardcommercial aviation and marry up withits equipment upon arrival.The agreement was very specific both

about the nature of the MarineAmphibi-ous Brigade and about the equipment tobe prestocked. The memorandum stated

that the Brigade would include infantryand combat service support as well as



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aviation, artillery, infantry and anti-tankweapons. It added that the Marine avi-ation element would consist of two air

defense

squadrons,two close support

squadrons, and other fixed wing supportaircraft as well as 75 helicopters of varyingtypes. The importance of this provisionsspecificity was that it highlighted theunique nature of the Marine air/groundtask force that was assigned the Norwe-gian mission: It was not merely a brigadein the sense employed byArmy forceseverywhere. Instead it was a large self-contained unit - matching the size of a

Soviet division, and probably balancingit in terms of combined air and groundbased firepower. Finally, the agreementspecifically provided for the prestockingof 24, 155 mm howitzers and associatedvehicles, bridging equipment, approxi-mately 250 trucks with about 100 trailers,ammunition, food, and fuel.

Speculation ended as to where exactlythe equipment might be stored. The twogovernments

agreedthat central, rather

than north Norway, was the preferredlocation, and specifically, the Trondelagregion. The choice satisfied several pol-itical as well as military requirements.Politically, the site appeared lessthreatening to the Soviet Union, and thearrangement could less easily be termed

destabilizing to the Nordic balance. (Tobe sure, the Soviets remained hostile tothe arrangement, and, as late as Decem-

ber 1981, they had pressed NorwegianForeign Minister Frydenlund not toaccede to an agreement on the groundsthat it violated Norways ban on the basingof foreign troops on its soil. )3 The decisionto base in central Norway also allayedsome of the concerns within the governingNorwegian Labour Party, who likewiseharbored fears of a new buildup andEast-West confrontation in northern

Europe. Militarily,the

agreement per-mitted the local commanders several

options for Marine Corps deployment.

The Marines could still deploy northward,of course. On the other hand, becauseTrondheim is a key railroad junctionalong the Norwegian coast, the Marinesmight prove more useful guarding thegeneral area, freeing local Norwegianforces for operations further north. Ifnecessary, of course, the Marines could

deploy south as well.

Evaluating the PrestockingAgreementWhile public and press comment tendedto focus on the fact that it was Marines

who were to deploy to Norway and thatthe agreed to site was in central ratherthan north Norway, the memoranduminvolved several other features of signifi-cance to the defense of the northern

region.First, while the memorandum ties the

Marines more explicitly to the defense of

Norway than to any other area, it actuallygoes no further than to state that the

United States may

provide,consistent

with SACEUR requirements (emphasisadded) a U.S. MarineAmphibious Bri-gade. In other words, the Marine bri-gade remains a key element ofSACEURs flexible strategic reserve that

might actually deploy elsewhere in theevent that SACEUR deemed some other

deployment more pressing. Althoughsuperficially the ambiguity of the com-mitment appears to undermine the intent

of the memorandum, in fact it preservesa key element of flexibility that is impor-tant in any effort to deter attack and to

confound those who plan any such attack.The provision, though incorporated in adocument signed during the final week ofthe Carter Administration, therebynevertheless reflects a key element ofReagan Administration strategy, which

attempts to avoid as much as possible any

telegraphingof the locale to which flexible

U.S. forces might be deployed. The U.S.Marines could operate anywhere in the



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NATO area from North Cape to theAzores. Being a relatively small force(two Division~Wing Task Forces are dedi-cated to NATO), it is obvious that theycannot deploy everywhere. To the extentthat ambiguity about their deploymentsmight deter or at least hinder Sovietattacks on a variety of exposed areas oneither NATO flank or front, the Marineswill have provided far greater leveragewith their forces than their size would

imply.Second, just as the memorandum does

not commit the Marines to deploy to Nor-

way, it also does not commit them todeploy to the far north even if they domary up with their equipment in centralNorway. In a section discussing the Nor-wegian provision of transport to theMarines (about which more will be saidbelow), the memorandum states that theMarines would be transported from cen-tral Norway to other threatened areas inNorway.As noted above, the flexibilitythat deployment to central, rather than

north, Norway affords to the local com-manders should not be lightly dismissed.Norwegian forces will have a comparative .advantage over the Marines with respectto in-country operations, however welltrained the Marines might be. That advan-tage is a function of more intense andsustained training, better familiarity andresistance to difficult climates, and thenatural boost to morale that any good

military force will acquire if it is defendingits own territory. Circumstances of a crisisor of combat will determine how that com-

parative local advantage can be maxi-mized : the Memorandum of Understand-

ing therefore usefully avoids imposing anartificial constraint upon the theater com-

mander that could be costly in time ofwar.

Third, the Memorandum sets forth insome detail the nature of host nation

support that Norway will provide to rein-forcing Marine units. Host nation sup-

port involves the provision by the receiv-ing country of various forms of combatsupport and service support to the arriv-

ing countrys units. The concept is simpleto understand but not necessarily appeal-ing to military strategists and operators.Combat commanders tend to be hesitantabout relying on foreign personnel for thecritical support of their troops. There isno certainty that there will be a commonunderstanding of procedures, or indeed,a satisfactory level of communicationbetween the combat forces of one state

and the support units of another. On the

other hand, policy makers who mustbudget for host nation support mustchoose between funding that support orproviding additional resources to theirown national military programmers. Thatchoice is particularly difficult at a time,such as the past few years, when budgetresources are severely constrained bystagnant economies and persistent publicdemands for maintaining, if not enhanc-ing, social entitlement programs.The aforementioned reservations did

not prevent the Norwegian governmentfrom undertaking to provide:- engineering and airbase support

equipment- 150 over-snow vehicles- two motor transport companies of 90

trucks each- an ambulance company (with 35

ambulances)-

a refueling section- general responsibility for security and

maintenance of the prepositionedequipment

-

means to load and transport Marinesto other parts of the country.

Most of these provisions resemble in ageneral way those of host nation supportagreements that have since been nego-tiated by the ReaganAdministration witha number of other European states includ-ing Luxembourg, Belgium, and, of the



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greatest scope, the Federal Republic ofGermany.

Beyond the PrestockingAgreementCompleting a negotiation and signing anagreement is, of course, a significantachievement. It culminates the efforts ofthe negotiators, who then turn their atten-tion to other matters. In reality, however,the signed agreement only begins the pro-cess of implementation, wh~h, in West-ern societies, is long, drawn out, and sub-ject to budgetary and political vag4riesthat might arise during the implementa-tion period.

It will take several years before the

equipment for a MarineAmphibious Bri-gade is prestocked in Norway. The equip-ment must be procured, and that in turnrequires Congressional support andauthorization of funds. The Reagan

Administration is staunchly supportive ofthe effort to strengthen north Norwaysdefenses and has

programmedfunds for

the necessary equipment purchases. Eachyear, however, the Congress will have tobe convinced yet again of the wisdom ofthe agreement. While all indications arethat problems are not likely to arise inthis regard, every year brings its ownbudgetary vicissitudes against which theprogram will have to be guarded.

For its part, Norway has undertakenseveral other commitments in addition to

its obligations under the prestockingagreement. Most notable is its plannedacquisition of the Improved Hawk airdefense missile system, a program thatwas dealt with tangentially in the pre-stocking agreement.Air defense and early warning in northNorway are critical elements in thedefense of the sea lanes from North

America to Europe. Early warning instal-lations are

likelyto be attractive

targetsfor the Soviets at the onset of a NATO/Pact conflict: the Soviet goal clearly would

be to silence NATO sensors so that, atmost, warning would be provided justonce, for the impending first attack.A number of observers of the Nordicbalance have pointed to Norways severedeficiencies in the realm of active air

defenses. It was suggested as early as 1977that Norway be provided with Hawkmissiles on favourable terms.5 The 1981Memorandum of Understanding commitsthe United States to make two ImprovedHawk missile batteries available for sale

to Norway, subject to the requirementsof U.S. laws and regulations.The Improved Hawk provides con-

siderably more capability than the earlierversion of the Hawk medium altitude

missile. The Improved Hawk has a newguidance package, a larger warhead, andimproved propellant for longer range. Itsradar is more resistant to electronic coun-

termeasures, as is the missile itself.

Finally, it incorporates a new procedurewhereby missiles can be delivered to thefield without field maintenance or

testing,thereby reducing operation and main-tenance costs.

The I-Hawk is an expensive system,however, with missiles costing roughly$250,000 each in current prices andlaunchers roughly a half million dollarseach. Although Norway has gone wellbeyond its commitment to increase itsdefense spending by three percentannually in real terms (in 1981 that

increase was about four percent), itsheaviest burden is the cost of acquiringthe F-16 fighter. Other major acquisitionprograms, such as the I-Hawk acquisition,have, as a result, been accorded lower

budgetary priority. Nevertheless, there iswidespread confidence in both Oslo andWashington that Norway will acquire anew air defense system in the near future.The delivery schedule for the ImprovedHawk missile

which, incidentally,was

chosen by the Norwegian Governmentover several other foreign competitors,



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has now been set. Early delivery of thefirst battery will take place in the springof 1984.

In a further effort to enhance the

defense of its northern territories, Norwayhas also announced that it will prepositionequipment for an additional Norwegianbrigade in north Norway. This measureis one that was announced roughly con-comitant with the signing of the Mem-orandum of Understanding. Under Sec-retary of Defense Robert Komer

described it as one which goes beyondNorways commitments in the LTDP

(Long Term Defense Plan).6 The prepo-sitioning of Norwegian equipment, inci-dentally, provides further indications thatthe Marines might not necessarily be sentnorth. Instead they might deploy to areasformerly assigned to the Norwegian unitsto which the newly prepositioned equip-ment in the north will be distributed.

One area that remains unexplored interms of enhancing Norways air defenseand early warning capability is the poten-tial of Jan Mayen Island. Jan Mayen isessentially a large rock in the north Nor-

wegian Sea located 640 miles from Nor-way and 360 miles from Iceland. There

have been suggestions for some time thatradars be placed on Jan Mayen becauseits elevation would enable the radar to

detect low flying missiles and aircraft.7

The counterargument has been ventured,however, that Jan Mayens radars would

provide early warning only once,because

they would then be destroyed. While sucha possibility certainly cannot be ruled out,the survivability of the radars will be afunction of their hardening, as well as ofother factors, such as control of the air

space near the island.A radar on Jan

Mayen might prove worthwhile even if itwere knocked out after the first attack;to the extent that it can survive beyondthat attack, its value increases

geometrically.In general, it can be said that Norway,

in conjunction with the United States, iscurrently in the midst of a major effortto restore the credibility of its northern-most defenses. The static balance, day to

day, will continue to favor the Soviets byan overwhelming margin. But the advan-tages that warning and terrain will provideNorway (its forces train for mobilizationwithin 24 hours) coupled with the moretangible evidence of a U.S. commitmentto assist in the defense of Norway, andthe improvement that Norway currentlyis undertaking on its own, should go someway to restore the dynamic balance that

has operated north ofthe

Arctic circle.

III. DENMARK: FRICTION,FRUSTRATIONAND

DISAPPOINTMENT

The southern part of the Northern Front- the region that centers on the JutlandPeninsula - has, like North Norway,witnessed a significant buildup in Sovietand Warsaw Pact capabilities during the

past decade, and particularly in the pastfew years. Unlike the Kola-based North-

ern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet deploying fromLeningrad and other Soviet parts is pri-marily geared to amphibious assault;Polish and East German forces are like-wise oriented to such operations. Sovietand Pact forces conduct training inamphibious assault tactics on a regularbasis, and Danish observers have notedwith some concern the

increasinglywest-

ward locale of Pact amphibious trainingexercises, such as those conducted off theEast German island of Rugen. Such con-cerns were certainly not dispelled duringthe Polish crisis, when the Baltic Fleetwas arrayed at nearly full strength duringthe posturing that preceded the imposi-tion of martial law in Poland

It is ironic, therefore, that despite aclear pattern of Pact efforts to establishthe Baltic as a Soviet lake, Denmark hasbeen amongst the most reluctant ofAlli-



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ance members to increase its level of

defense spending. Denmark has backedso far away from such increases that the

minoritySocial Democratic

governmentactually proposed a temporary freeze -that is, no real growth - in defense spend-ing. The implications of a long term freezewould have been extremely serious. Den-mark, like Norway, is committed to theacquisition of the F-16 aircraft which,though a low mix, inexpensive plane forthe United StatesAir Force (relative tothe more capable and more expensiveF-15), is nevertheless a very expensiveaircraft from the perspective of the Danishdefense budget. The F-16 purchase hasdominated Danish defense spending tothe point where three percent real growthin Danish spending could be consumedby the purchase of less than half a squad-ron of additional F-16s. Thus, a decisionto eliminate growth in Danish defense

funding would have had the effect of elim-inating other program initiatives andwould have

promptedforce structure

reductions. Indeed, one measure that hadbeen seriously considered by the Govern-ment was the reduction of force levels of

the island of Zealand, which is a potentialtarget for a Soviet amphibious assault.Danish attitudes to the NATO-wide

commitment to real increases in defense

spending particularly galled CarterAdministration officials who had engi-neered those commitments. During the

final year of the CarterAdministration,Denmark was the cause of particular frus-tration in Washington because of its seem-ing overreliance upon hoped for U.S.reinforcements as compensation for itsown proposed reductions in force struc-ture. Furthermore, Denmark seemed to

yearn for a stronger effort to achievedetente at the very time that the CarterAdministration began to have second

thoughtsabout that

approach.The vari-

ance between Washington and Copen-hagen grew so great by 1980 that Den-

markization, (a play upon Finlandiza-tion, which describes the influence of

proximity to the Soviet Union upon Fin-nish

neutrality)became a

popularterm

in some European and U.S. circles whofound themselves unable to impress uponthe Danes the urgency for significantimprovements in their military capability.

Little has changed since the ReaganAdministration took office. Denmarkcontinues to maintain a level of spendingconsiderably below the prescribed threepercent increases in real growth that theNATO members agreed to in the 1977

Long Term Defense Program. Denmarkhas been lukewarm to the deployment oflong range theater nuclear forces inEurope, and has been among the mostvocal in pressing for arms control agree-ments. Danish officials have indeed goneso far as to voice sympathy for the Brezh-nev INF Proposals.

1Finally, Denmark

has evinced little public support forNATO initiatives outside the NATO

area,

althoughthe Danes, like most of

Western Europe (but unlike Norway) arehighly dependent upon the importationof Persian Gulf oilDenmark continues to suffer from rela-

tive economic stagnation, and it will con-tinue to face internal pressures for elim-

inating real increases in defense spending.Ironically, despite what appears to beDenmarks implicit assumption that moreU.S. reinforcements will offset Danish

reductions in force structure, there hasbeen little evidence that the United Statesis moving towards anything like a pre-stocking arrangement for Denmark suchas that which was achieved with Norway.Indeed, suggestions for such an arrange-ment have been criticized in a Congres-sional report in part because they mightfurnish Denmark with further excuses forreductions in defense spending.&dquo;Denmarks economic situation is not

unique to the West, however, and itsproximity to Poland places it in a particu-



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larly exposed position. Indeed, whileobservers of the Nordic balance enjoypointing to its stability, they tend to focuson the far northern balance. Poland is

hardly a stable country, and will not beas long as the current repression con-tinues. In these circumstances, Danes maywish to reconsider their reluctance tocommit themselves more forcefully toprograms that, in the end, may prove tobe the critical difference between freedomand subjugation to a hostile adversary.

Greenland: Does Departure from theEuropean Community Have an Impacton NA TO Posture?

On 1 May 1979, Denmark granted Green-land home rule. Denmark retained

responsibility for the management ofGreenlands foreign policy and defenseconcerns, while ceding responsibility inother areas. Despite formal Danish reten-tion of the defense and foreign affairs

portfolios, the complexity of modernaffairs of state rules out the possibility of

maintaining a neat differentiationbetween these areas and other concerns,as was the case when other Europeanpowers granted their colonies home ruleearlier in this century. Decisions on so-

called domestic issues such as manage-ment of the economy or energy policyinevitably have an impact on defense

decisionsand

foreignaffairs

posture.Indeed, it is noteworthy that one ofGreenlands earliest major domesticdecisions after it acquired home rule wasits vote to withdraw from the EuropeanCommunity. The EC can no longer bedefined as merely an economic com-munity (the term economic was droppedfrom its nomenclature some time ago). Its

purview extends to foreign policy, suchas its stand on the Middle East outlined

in the Venice Communique of 23 June1980, and, indirectly to defense policy as

well. That Greenlanders decided in their

plebiscite to opt out of the Communityin February 1982 (despite the face thatDenmark was to assume the presidencythe following June) cannot be construedsimply as a domestic political decision.Given Greenlands clear determination

to go its own way in international econ-

omic affairs, it is important to assesswhether it might do the same on defensematters. Greenlands importance to theNATO alliance is often overlooked butcannot be overstated. Greenland sits

half-way along the great circle routebetween the most vital

militaryareas to

the United States and the Soviet Unison. 13It is therefore a critical location for the

emplacement of sites capable of providingearly warning of ballistic missiles aimedat targets in the United States. It is incor-

porated into the Distant Early Warning(DEW) line system that stretches acrossAlaska and Canada, and into the BallisticMissile Early Warning Systems(BMEWS), with an installation at Thule.

The BMEWS radar in Greenland is cur-

rently being upgraded.Greenland also provides an important

link to the defense of the Atlantic sea

lanes.As part of the G-1-UK gap, it sitsastride the primary Backfire (and sub-marine and surface ship) route from theKola Peninsula to the Atlantic Ocean.

Nevertheless, the current basing structureon Greenland is not optimally configuredto

support interceptor operationsover the

Denmark Strait. U.S. bases are in western

Greenland, at Sondre Stromfjord and atThule; both are too distant to supportsupersonic fighter intercepts of Soviet air-craft transiting the Denmark Strait. Forthe present, therefore, the burden ofdetection and response falls to Iceland-based aircraft, though these might bepreoccupied with the direct defense ofIceland itself.An additional, longer-rangeproblem is that posed by the prospect ofSoviet development of bombers with



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longer combat radii than Backfire. Suchbombers could avoid Iceland-based radars

entirely and possibly fly outside the orbitsofAWACS

planesbased in Iceland. It

may well be necessary to expand currentfacilities in Greenland to permit the bas-ing of a larger, more responsive airdefense capability. Such expansion mightbe resisted by Greenlanders, however,unless the importance of Greenland toNATOs defense, and the importance ofair defense to Greenlands defense, istransmitted clearly to the local

population.Greenlands rupture oftits ties to the

European Community certainly does notindicate that similar feelings obtain withrespect to NATO. Norway, for example,rejected entry into the European Com-munity but remains a critical and activemember of the Alliance, while, on theother hand, Ireland belongs to the Com-munity but not to NATO. Membership- or the refusal to join - one of the

organizations does not, therefore, implyany particular policy posture with respectto the other. Nevertheless, Greenlandersdecision on the European Communitydoes indicate a strong independence ofmind as well as a readiness to interpretdomestic affairs in its broadest sense.

Efforts will have to be made to ensurethat no aspect of defense policy is similarlyincluded in a broad interpretation ofdomestic affairs. It is therefore somewhat

worrisome that Denmarks own markedlack of enthusiasm for major defense com-mitments could have a negative impact onGreenlanders perceptions, with unfore-seen consequences for theAlliance as a

whole.

IV. THE NEUTRALSAND THE

BALANCE IN THE NORTH

It is commonly accepted that the neutrals,and particularly Sweden, play an impor-tant role in maintaining the balance in the

North.A recent survey of Swedishdefense capabilities has termed Swedenthe regional equilibrator, adding that

Sweden has provided yeoman service overthe years for western defense... Withoutthis Swedish contribution, NATO wouldhave to shift large forces, particularly air,for Norwegian and Danish defense from analready tenuous military balance in theall-important center region. 14

Budget constraints have not been the soleprovince of the West, however, and bothSweden and Finland have had to confront

unpleasant choices regarding the futureof their defense posture. Swedens com-mitment is, of course, greater than thatof Finland, and the alternatives it is con-

sidering likewise have more significantimplications for its overall posture thanthose which are the primary focus of Fin-nish concerns.

Swedens budget problems arise fromits long standing commitment to a largedefense establishment, including highly

capable, high-technologyAir Force andNavy components. Budget constraintshave already forced the Swedes to movefrom a destroyer-oriented surface fleet toone consisting exclusively of fast patrolboats. 15 That shift, incidentally, has notbeen slowed by the Whiskey Class Inci-dent of 27 October 1981, although it hasbeen argued that larger surface shipscould better support coordinatedASW,anti-air and anti-surface operations as wellas provide important sea-based platformsforASW helicopters.l6 Instead, the Swed-ish government has actually acceleratedthe patrol boat program, providing formore conversions of T-42 motor torpedoboats into patrol craft as well as for moreshorebased helicopters and surveillance.&dquo;Swedens high-technology orientedAir

Force has declined by roughly 50 percent(in terms of the number of squadrons it

operates) in the past fifteen years.&dquo; Tobe sure, the rising costs of defense tech-nology have forced similar retrenchments



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in other western states, including theUnited States, whose fleet has declinedfrom about 1,000 to about 500 ships in the

past decade. Nevertheless, the Swedish

decision to forego development of theB3LA ground attack fighter could rep-resent the start of an ominous trend if

Sweden does not find the wherewithal to

develop its new Viggen follow-on, theJAS.

Sweden is currently committed to

developing its own, homebuilt fighter; theSwedish Parliament approved the JAS bya five-vote margin on 4 June 1982. Never-

theless, the Social Democrats, then inopposition, favored postponement of thedecision. Should the Social Democrats

return to power in the September elec-tions, or should budget constraints com-bine with an unstable parliamentarymajority subsequent to the election, theJAS issued may remain, de facto,unresolved.

The future of Swedens fighter force isbut one aspect of a debate that has been

ongoing for some time in Sweden, andthat is of great consequence to Swedenscontribution to the balance in northern

Europe. Sweden traditionally has reliedupon a strategy of armed neutrality that

emphasizes forward (or extrovert)defense based on a high-technology NavyandAir Force.A number of observers

have argued for less costly, introvertedor territorial defense, expanding primarily

theArmys current tactics, that draw theFinnish model of fluid, regional defense.Indeed, the case has been made thatSweden must now choose between its

long-standing posture and an introvertdefense.9

It is unlikely, however, that a Swedishdecision for the upcoming five year periodwill necessarily be final, even if it doespoint towards a more introverted pos-ture. To begin with, the Swedish AirForce will continue to operate high-performance fighters for several more

years, barring the unlikely instancewherein a large number of remainingsquadrons would be prematurely retired.Secondly, the options remain open for the

opening of a new high-performancefighter production line, or for the pur-chase of a foreign aircraft such as the USF/A-18 fighter/attack plane. Thus, a breakwith past Swedish posture is more likelyto be evolutionary rather than revolution-ary- if any break is made at all - and

could, in any event, be reversed at least

during the next few years.Budget constraints have been as much

in evidence in Finlandas

in Sweden. Inparticular, the Navy has been forced toabandon its plans to build additional cor-vettes and minesweepers, and to foregoconversion of a Riga class frigate to aminelayer. Nevertheless, Finland doesnot appear to have cut back on its plansto create a brigade structure out of itsbattalion in Lapland.

Finlands build-up in the North willnot, of course, change the balance in that

region or truly offset the forces that theSoviet Union could marshal on the Kola

Peninsula for a thrust through the Finnishwedge. Nevertheless, in its own small

way, this restructuring represents a

continuing Finnish determination to pre-serve its neutrality within the politicalconstraints that geography has imposedupon it. It is this neutrality, coupled withSwedens more forceful armed neutrality,

that permitsNATO

to adopt a posturewhich does not impose upon Denmarkand Norway the burden of hosting foreigntroops upon their soil. Thus a change inSwedish policy, and even a slackening inFinnish determination - within its own

well-known constraints- to preserve the

image of independence, could have pre-cisely the opposite effect for which thosewho seek reductions in the force levels

deployed in Scandinavia profess to strive.Unless and until the Soviet Union is pre-

pared to countenance reductions in its



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own posture in both the far north and theBaltic Sea, cutbacks by any of the Scandi-navian states will be inherently destabil-

izing, for they will merely tempt theSoviets to exploit growing imbalances intheir favor, with consequences that theso-called Nordic Balance has successfullyforestalled for over three decades.

NOTES

*

Dov S. Zakheim is SpecialAssistant to theUnder Secretary of Defense (Policy). Theauthor wishes to thank Ms. V. Lane Pierrot.for her assistance.

U.S. Department of Defense, AnnualReport, Fiscal Year 1979, p. 38; AnnualReport, Fiscal Year 1980, p. 110.

2 The differences between the Norwegianand Danish formulation on this issue are inter-

esting, but are beyond the scope of this essay.3Frydenlund was quoted by Reuters in

NorwayApproved U.S. Plan to StoreArmsfor Marines, The New York Times, 14 January1981. The Norwegian Foreign Minister also

indicated that the Soviets had pressed theargument that the agreement violated the Nor-

wegians on the stationing of nuclear weaponson its soil in peacetime.

4Memorandum of Understanding Govern-

ing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Nor-way, Washington, D.C., 16 January 1981, p.1.

5 Dov S. Zakheim, The U.S. Sea ControlMission: Forces, Capabilities and Require-ments, Congressional Budget Office, Back-ground Paper, Washington, D.C., June 1977,p. 29.

6 Remarks ofAmbassador Robert Komer

at signing of MOU-US and Norway, 16 Jan-uary 1981.

7Dov S. Zakheim, The U.S. Sea Control

Mission, p. 22.

8Captain Matthew J. Whelan, USN, TheSoviet Baltic Fleet:AnAmphibious Force in

Being, United States Naval Institute Proceed-ings, Vol. 107, December 1981, pp. 122-124.9U.S. Discloses Soviet Fleet Data, The

New York Times, 7August 1981, p. 3; RichardHalloran, Soviet Ships in Baltic Mass for

Amphibious Games, The New York Times,5August 1981, p. 8.

10 Morton Fyhn, Anker Jrgensen UnderPressure, Nordic Affairs, Vol. 7,19 May 1982,p. 2.

11 H. Peter Dryer, Danes See Need for NewApproaches to the Problem of Energy Sup-plies, Journal of Commerce, 22April 1974,p. 2.

12 Dov S. Zakheim, The Marine Corps inthe 1980s: Prestocking Proposals, The RapidDeployment Force, and Other Issues, Congres-sional Budget Office Budget Issue Paper forFiscal Year 1981, Washington, D.C. 1980, p.24.

13 Commander H. C. Bach, RDN and

Jrgen Taagholt, Greenland and theArcticRegion in the Light of Defense Policies,

Danish Defense Information and Welfare Ser-vice, Copenhagen 1977.

14 Steven L. Canby, Swedish Defense, Sur-vival, Vol. 108, May/June 1981, pp. 116-117.

15Stephen S. Roberts, Western European

and NATO Navies, United States Naval Insti-tute Proceedings, 108, March 1982, p. 41.

16Dov S. Zakheim, The Power Balance in

the NorthAtlantic, in Lars B. Wallin (ed.),The Northern Flank in a Central EuropeanWar, Swedish National Defense Research

Institute, Stockholm 1982, p. 51.17 Roberts, Western European and NATO

Navies, p. 41.18

Canby, Swedish Defense, p. 117.19 Ibid.


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