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to weaken the aristocracy by reducing and monitoring their ability to draw uponimportant sources of social, political, and military power throughout the Empire.

I. ISLANDS AND EXILE IN THE AUGUSTAN PRINCIPATE

By the end of Augustus lifetime there were two common forms of banishmentused in the Roman legal system: relegatio and deportatio.3Relegatio was the lesssevere of the two forms, requiring the offender to remain outside of Rome andItaly, although further constraints might be added.4 This form of imposed exilewas a clear development from Republican tradition, which had allowed its citizensvoluntary exile as an alternative to more serious legal penalties: Cn. Fulvius Flaccusretired to Tarquinia in 211 B.C. to escape a charge of perduellio, C. Porcius Catoretired to Tarraco in 109 B.C. after being convicted under the lex Mamilia for

inciting Jugurtha to revolt, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus retired to Rhodes in100 B.C. to avoid a heavy fine for refusing to take an oath supporting Saturninusland distribution law, P. Rutilius Rufus retired to Mytilene in 92 B.C. to avoid finesimposed by his conviction for extortion, and T. Annius Milo retired to Massilia in

3Deportatio would not become the technical term for this type of exile until the secondcentury A.D. (P. Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire [Oxford,1970], 113), but for convenience and clarity the term will be used in this article. A formaldiscussion of the history and development of Roman practices of exile is beyond the scope ofthe current work, but see L.M. Hartmann, De Exilio apud Romanos inde ab Initio Bellorum

civilium usque ad Severi Alexandri Principatum (Berlin, 1887), 832; M. Braginton, Exileunder the Roman emperors, CJ 39 (1944), 391407; G. Crif, Ricerche sull exilium nel peri-odo repubblicano (Milan, 1961), 77191; R.A. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the RomanRepublic and Augustan Principate (Johannesburg, 1967), 198206; Garnsey (this note), 11122;H. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, Historial Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge,1972), 3078, 403; S. Jameson, Augustus and Agrippa Postumus, Historia 24 (1975), 287314; E.L. Grasmck, Exilium: Untersuchungen zur Verbannung in der Antike (Paderborn, 1978),62145; B.M. Levick, Poena Legis Maiestatis, Historia 28 (1979), 35879; J.P.V.D. Balsdon,Romans and Aliens (London, 1979), 97115; E. Doblhofer, Exil und Emigration (Darmstadt,1987), 4959; R.A. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome (London and New York,1996), 920, 2634; G. Amiotti, Primi casi di relegazione e di deportazione insulare nel mondoromano, in M. Sordi (ed.), Coercizione e mobilit umana nel mondo antico (Milan, 1995),24558; S.T. Cohen, Exile in the political language of the Early Principate (unpublished Ph.Ddissertation, Chicago, 2002), 184; S. Bingham, Life on an island: a brief study of places ofexile in the first century AD, Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History 11 (2003), 376400;E.H. Rocovich, Exile in Roman life and thought from Augustus to Constantine (unpublishedPh.D dissertation, Chapel Hill, 2004), 1393; G.P. Kelly A History of Exile in the RomanRepublic (Cambridge, 2006), passim; Cohen (n. 1), 20617; Y. Rivire, LItalie, les les et lecontinent: Recherches sur lexil et ladministration du territoire imprial (Ier IIIe sicles), inC. Brlaz and P. Ducrey (edd.), Scurit collective et ordre public dans les socits anciennes(Geneva, 2008), 261310.

4 Tacitus, for example, provides numerous examples: Ann. 6.18.12, 12.8.1, 12.22.2, 14.28.2,15.71.5, 16.33.2. On occasion, an individual (often a woman) might only be banned from thecity of Rome (Tac. Ann. 2.50.3, 6.30.2, 6.49.2). Additional constraints might include forbiddingcondemned individuals access to other provinces in addition to Italy (such as Manlius, convicted

of adultery with Augustus grand-niece Appuleia, who was banned from Italy and Africa [Tac.Ann. 2.50.3]) or the sentencing of an individual to spend his exile in a specific location (such asOvid, who was ordered to live in Tomis on the Black Sea [Ovid, Trist. 2.137: quippe relegatus,non exul, dicor in illo]). It was also not uncommon for groups of undesirables to be orderedout of Italy in a similar fashion: Tac. Ann. 2.32.3 (astrologers and magicians), 4.14.3 (actors);Gell. 15.11.35; Dio Cass. 65.13.1 (philosophers).


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52 B.C. to escape punishment for the murder of Clodius.5 Indeed, Polybius singledout for special praise the Roman practice of allowing its citizens to escape severe

judicial penalties including execution by going into voluntary exile.6Althoughtheir choice of exile was voluntary, such individuals were usually condemned in

absentia and barred from returning to Roman territory on pain of death (aquae etignis interdictio).7 Thus their removal from Rome was voluntary, but their returnwas prohibited by the people.8 Exiled citizens merely had to take themselves

beyond the reach of Roman law, and Polybius notes that in his day exilesfrom Rome found safety in friendly but independent states like Naples, Praenesteand Tibur.9 In the early Republic aristocrats such as Camillus or Flaccus couldretire to Italian states that did not fall under Roman jurisdiction, but when theenfranchisement of the Italians following the Social War brought them under theaegis of Roman law, exiled Romans had to seek refuge outside of Italy in orderto escape the reach of Roman jurisdiction.10 As a result, banishment came to mean

self-removal from Italy, but the rest of the world including Romes provinces remained available to exiles. Fugitives would normally seek citizenship andtherefore legal protection in their new residence, thereby forfeiting their Romancitizenship.11Since the expense and effort of such relocation could be considerable,

5 Flaccus: Livy 26.3.12; Cato: Cic. Brut. 128, Balb. 28 (on the lex Mamilia see MRR 1.546);Metellus: Livy Per. 69; Plut. Mar. 29.78 (he later moved to Tralles [Val. Max. 4.1.13]);Rutilius: Cic. Rab. Post. 27 (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.13.2, Val. Max. 2.10.5 and 6.4.4); Milo: Asc. 54C;Dio Cass. 40.54.34. For a complete list of Republican exiles from 220 to 44 B.C., see Kelly(n. 3), 161219.

6 Polyb. 6.14.7:

. , , , , (among them there issomething about this practice [of conducting capital trials] that is worthy of praise and mention.Their custom gives the right to those being tried on a capital charge to depart openly uponbeing condemned so long as one tribe of those having a share in the judgment has not yetvoted thereby passing a voluntary sentence of exile upon themselves). Crif (n. 3), 1037,31112 considered exile to be a fundamental legal right of Roman citizens, but Kelly (n. 3),205 argues that it was merely custom, backed by the considerable weight of the mos maiorum.

7 Indicated by their interdiction from water and fire in Roman territory, which authorizedanyone to kill the condemned with impunity. Bauman (n. 3, [1996]), 12 calls interdiction a conditional death sentence. If the accused remained in Rome or Roman Italy he was liable to bekilled; but if he went into exile he was safe and argues (27) that it made [the wrongdoer]an outlaw liable to be killed by anyone with impunity. Roman law did not impose exile uponcondemned individuals until 63 B.C. (see below).

8 One exception to this rule was the consular prerogative of relegatio, by which a consul coulduse his coercitio to banish an individual from Rome, although the force behind such relegationexpired when the consul left office. For example, in 58 B.C. the consul Gabinius commanded byedict that L. Lamia be removed at least 200 miles from Rome for attempting to intervene forCicero (Cic. Sest. 29). See Garnsey (n. 3), 11516, 119, who also points out that a paterfamiliashad the same authority over those under his manus.

9 Polyb. 6.14.8: , , , (there is refuge for theseexiles in the territory of Naples and Praeneste, and also in the city of Tibur and other cities whohave a treaty [with Rome]). See Kelly (n. 3), 2312, who points out that an exile would

have sought refuge in a civitas libera, a state independent of Roman jurisdiction.10 Kelly (n. 3), 93 and 102.11 Cic. Balb. 28: duarum civitatum civis noster esse iure civili nemo potest; non esse huius

civitatis, qui se alii civitati dicarit, potest. See also Balsdon (n. 3), 97, who points out that until the Late Republic Romans who accepted citizenship in another state automaticallyforfeited their Roman citizenship. A common aspect of early treaties (foedera) made between


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voluntary exile was normally a practice of the aristocracy, although we can certainlyimagine that poorer citizens charged with capital offences simply disappeared fromRome, never to be heard from again.12 Once out of Roman territory, exiles werenormally free to travel to whatever location offered the most attractive lifestyle, 13

where they were under the jurisdiction of the Roman governor if they fled to aprovince,14 or the local authorities if they exited the provinces altogether.15 Suchexile remained a voluntary alternative to harsher penalties until the consulship ofCicero in 63 B.C., when a lex Tullia first established exile for a ten-year period asa standard legal sentence for certain crimes, although exiled citizens continued toenjoy the same freedom of movement once they were beyond Roman jurisdiction.16During his principate Augustus made considerable use of this type of relegatio toremove criminals and other troublesome people from Italy, but he seems to havedistinguished between individuals who were permanently banished (and thereforesubjected to interdiction) and those who were only banished for a period of time

(and therefore not subjected to interdiction). Romans would have recognized bothforms of relegatio as being perfectly consistent with their long tradition of exile,even if that tradition emphasized its voluntary nature. The second form of exile in use by A.D. 14 deportatio ad insulam was anunprecedented innovation that was established in the reign of Augustus. It was farharsher than relegatio, since it entailed interdiction, loss of citizenship, confiscationof property and permanent banishment to a small and usually unpleasant (by aris-tocratic standards) island.17 There is evidence that Augustus (Octavian at the time)

Rome and other states was the ius exilii, whereby both sides agreed to grant admittance to

each others exiles (see J.S. Reid, Some aspects of local autonomy in the Roman Empire, TheCambridge Historical Journal 1.2 [1924], 121; Crif [n. 3], esp. 12592; D.W. Baronowski,Roman treaties with communities of citizens, CQ 38 [1988], 173; Kelly [n. 3], 5465). Afamous example is P. Rutilius Rufus, who went into exile in 93/92 B.C. and was welcomed andgiven citizenship in Smyrna (Cic. Balb. 28, Tac. Ann. 4.43.5). Likewise, C. Porcius Cato (cos.114) acquired citizenship in Tarraco in Spain, where his family had clients and connections (Cic.Balb. 28, see Kelly [n. 3], 171).

12 See Garnsey (n. 3), 120 and Balsdon (n. 3), 112.13 In the Late Republic, Greek states that offered a high quality of life were particularly popu-

lar among exiled Romans, including Athens, Delos, Massilia, Mytilene, Rhodes and Smyrna (seeKelly [n. 3], 161219 for references). Kelly (6981) notes that exiles normally selected theirnew home by the quality of life it offered, but when the political turmoil of the Late Republicincreased the possibility that sentences would be reversed and exiles recalled, those who wereoptimistic about their chances for recall tended to select residences closer to Italy from whichthey could communicate with allies and work for their return.

14 In the provinces, exiles were under the jurisdiction of the governor and not the courts ofRome. So all of Clodius rabble-rousing could not prevent Cn. Plancius, quaestor to the governorof Macedonia, from receiving Cicero and offering him shelter while in exile (Cic. Planc. 989,cf. Att. 3.14, Fam. 14.1.3). Likewise, Sextilius as governor of Africa refused to admit the fugitiveMarius into the province, but chose to turn a blind eye to his occupation of Cercina (an islandjust off the coast of Africa) and to his recruitment of soldiers from Africa (Plut. Mar. 40.341.2).

15 Marius and his son were initially welcomed by the king of Numidia following their exile(although he later turned against them) (Plut. Mar. 40.56), Attidius found refuge in Pontuswith Mithridates (App. Mith. 90), and Pompey expected to receive refuge in Egypt followinghis defeat by Caesar (he also considered Parthia as a potential sanctuary) (Plut. Pomp. 769).

16 Cic. Mur. 47, 89; Dio Cass. 37.29.1; A.H.M. Jones, The Criminal Courts of the RomanRepublic and Principate (Totowa, 1972), 57; Balsdon (n. 3), 104; Levick (n. 3), 371. Kelly(n. 3), 434 points out that this punishment did not include interdiction.

17 These are the conditions in its fully developed form (Dig. 48.22.118). The present articleis concerned only with the use of islands to hold exiles, but for discussion of the terminologyand legal foundations of deportatio see Hartmann (n. 3), 24; Braginton (n. 3), 391407; Jolowicz


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was tinkering with the Republican traditions of exile even before he became thesole ruler, as indicated by his decision in 36 B.C. to banish his deposed triumviralcolleague M. Aemilius Lepidus to the small Italian town of Circei.18 This was aconsiderable break with the Roman tradition of allowing a defeated political enemy

to slink off quietly into ignominious exile wherever he wished, but Lepidus was thepontifex maximus and had wielded tremendous power and influence, and Augustusmay have been nervous about granting such a man too much liberty in exile.19This

political problem was solved with geography: Lepidus was restricted to the small(and somewhat remote) town of Circei, where he was near enough to be watchedclosely but far enough away to be out of sight unless wanted.20 It is possible thatthis solution was inspired by Julius Caesars proposal to confine the Catilinarianconspirators in fortified Italian towns, thereby reducing their ability to cause harmin the future.21 But whatever his motive or intention, Augustus seems to have beenthinking about ways to control defeated but still influential rivals years before he

achieved sole rule. Augustus thinking on exile evolved even further when he was confronted withthe shocking and unacceptable behaviour of his daughter Julia in A.D. 2. Ratherthan banishing her from Italy (relegatio) or confining her like Lepidus in an Italiantown, Augustus chose to ship her off to the island of Pandateria where he intendedto lock her away for life (although he later changed her sentence to perpetualconfinement in Rhegium).22 The emperor likewise banished many of her loversto islands, although only the destination of Sempronius Gracchus is known: theisland of Cercina off the coast of Africa.23 Augustus evidently liked his solutionfor punishing Julias indiscretions, because he inflicted similar punishments on

other troublesome relatives: in A.D. 7 he banished his grandson Agrippa Postumusto the island of Planasia, and in A.D. 8 he banished his granddaughter Julia tothe island of Trimerus.24 While this stringent form of exile was initially reservedfor peccant members of the imperial house, in A.D. 12 Augustus decided to widenits use and decreed that all exiled persons whose relegation had been confirmed

by interdiction (that is, had been permanently banished) should be confined on a

and Nicholas (n. 3), 403; Grasmck (n. 3), 64109; Bauman (n. 3, [1996]), 28; Bingham (n. 3),3778.

18 Suet. Aug. 16.4.19 During the Republic political competition between aristocrats was frequently resolved by

the losing party going into voluntary exile (a sort of informal, voluntary ostracism), such asScipio Africanus in 187 (or 184) B.C. (Livy 38.50.455.8, 58.1); Metellus Numidicus in 100 B.C.(Cic. Dom. 82, Liv. Per. 69, Plut. Mar. 29, App. B Civ. 1.312); Cicero in 58 B.C. (Cic. Planc.73, Plut. Cic. 31.46, Dio Cass. 38.17.4); and T. Annius Milo in 52 B.C. (Asc. 54C, Dio Cass.40.53.2, 40.54.34, 40.55.1). Kelly (n. 3), 13 argues that exile acted as a safety valve toprevent public disputes among elite citizens from turning into civil conflict.

20 Indeed, Augustus seems to have enjoyed periodically summoning Lepidus to attend meetingsof the senate where the princeps would humiliate the pontifex maximus by asking his opinionlast of all the consulars a significant insult to such a senior senator (Dio Cass. 54.15.45).

21 Sall. Cat. 51.43; Plut. Caes. 7.89.22 Vell. Pat. 2.100.5; Tac. Ann. 1.53.1; Suet. Aug. 65.13, Tib. 50.1; Dio Cass. 55.10.14.23 Julias lovers: Vell. Pat. 2.100.5; Sen. Clem. 1.10.3; Tac. Ann. 3.24.2; Dio Cass. 55.10.15

(for discussion, see Bauman [n. 3, (1967)], 198206 and A.J. Woodman and R.H. Martin, TheAnnals of Tacitus Book 3 [Cambridge, 1996], 2259); Sempronius Gracchus: Tac. Ann. 1.53.4,4.13.3.

24 Agrippa: Tac. Ann. 1.3.4, 1.5.1, 2.39.1; Suet. Aug. 65.4; Dio Cass. 55.32.2, 57.3.6 (for dis-cussion, see Jameson [n. 3], 287314, esp. 3023); Julia the Younger: Tac. Ann. 4.71.3; Suet.Aug. 65.13.


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specific set of islands.25 In doing this, the emperor established in law a principlethat may have existed in practice for some time that Rome had two categoriesof banishment: relegatioand deportatio ad insulam. In very little time deportatio toan island became a normal feature of Roman law, one of several possible punish-

ments that might be inflicted upon elite members of society (eventually known ashonestiores). It is possible that this innovation in exile was nothing more than alogistical convenience for Romes judicial system, but several aspects of this newform of exile suggest that a deeper imperial agenda was being pursued. This agenda is suggested by Appendix Two, which presents a list of islandsknown to have been used or suggested for holding deportees under the Julio-Claudian dynasty. While the exile of Julia the Elder may have influenced Augustus

policy of elite banishment, the data presented in this appendix indicates that thedeportation of Roman aristocracy was very different in nature and conception fromAugustus punishment of his own family members. To begin with, members of the

imperial house were all banished to small islands right off the coast of Italy asthe Julias and Agrippa Postumus had been: Tiberius banished Agrippina the Elderto Pandateria and Nero Caesar to Pontia, Caligula sent his sisters to the PontianIslands, Claudius recalled his niece Julia Livilla only to banish her to Pandateria,and Nero banished Octavia to Pandateria (see Map One).26 Furthermore, theseindividuals were not left to their own devices on their islands, but rather werekept under guard and carefully watched, allowing the emperor to monitor closelyhis relatives activities and visitors (if they received any).27 In some of these cases,the emperor may have used his patria potestas to punish those family membersunder his manus, although he also had recourse to other legal procedures to remove

these individuals to islands.28

We may guess that the emperors chose these par-ticular islands because they were simultaneously remote and accessible: they werephysically detached from Italy, and therefore remote enough to keep members ofthe imperial house securely and uncomfortably incarcerated out of the public eye, 29

25 Dio Cass. 56.27.23 (quoted in full below). Presumably, exiles who had been relegatedwithout interdiction were not affected by this increased penalty, and thus Ovid continued to livein Tomis on the Black Sea, where he died a few years after the emperor.

26 Agrippina the Elder: Tac. Ann. 14.63.2; Suet. Tib. 53.2, Calig. 10.1; Nero Drusus: Suet. Tib.54.2; Caligulas sisters: Dio Cass. 59.3.6, 59.22.8; Julia Livilla: Tac. Ann. 14.63.2; Dio Cass.60.8.45; Octavia: Tac. Ann. 14.63.1; Suet. Ner. 35.2.

27 See particularly the descriptions of the guard around Agrippa Postumus (Tac. Ann. 1.6.12;Suet. Aug. 65.4, Tib. 22; Dio Cass. 57.3.6). No guards are specifically named around the Julias,but the number of restrictions and deprivations placed upon Julia the Elder probably requiredenforcement by guards (Suet. Aug. 65.3, Tib. 50). Soldiers are also known to have accompa-nied Octavia (Tac. Ann. 14.60.45), as well as Agrippina the Elder and her son Nero Caesar(Suet. Tib. 64).

28 Bauman (n. 3 [1967]), 198206 suggests that Julia the Elders punishment was determinedby the adultery law of that time, but Woodman (in Woodman and Martin [n. 23], 2259) arguesthat Augustus punished Julia for violating his patria maiestas, which was theoretically a privatematter but the emperors unique position as pater patriae gave the crime a public dimensionand thus rendered the offence and therefore the punishment more severe. Jameson (n. 3),302 argues that Agrippa Postumus was relegated in A.D. 6 by virtue of Augustus patria potes-

tas. See also Cohen (n. 1), 20617 and (n. 3), 437, 612. On the legal charges used to banishother family members, see above (n. 3).

29 The seclusion of these islands was particularly useful if the prisoner was popular in Romeand his or her imprisonment a social or political embarrassment to the emperor. This was par-ticularly true of female prisoners: Augustus was enraged by popular petitions for the recall ofhis daughter Julia (Suet. Aug. 65.3), Tiberius popularity suffered by his banishment of Agrippina


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but their proximity to Italy, to the watchful gaze of the emperor and his praetorianguards, and to the fleet at Misenum, rendered escape virtually impossible.30 Indeed,the closeness of these islands to Italy even allowed the emperor to visit his exiledrelations if he wished, or to have them quickly executed if necessary.31 Finally, byall accounts the conditions on these islands were very unpleasant, either becausethey were naturally devoid of luxuries or because the emperors guards maintainedtheir captives with only the barest of necessities.32 Like an ancient Alcatraz, these

the Elder (Tac. Ann. 14.63.2), and Neros divorce and exile of Octavia aroused vocal and wide-spread complaint among the people (Tac. Ann. 14.60.163.3).

30 Members of the imperial family especially those disaffected with the reigning emperor were valuable commodities to those wishing for revolution. Suetonius reports the foiled plan toliberate Julia the Elder and Agrippa Postumus from their prison islands and deliver them to thelegions (Aug. 19.2, cf. Tib. 53.2), and Tacitus records a similar plot to free Agrippa Postumus(Tac. Ann. 2.39.1). Loyalty to the imperial house (even exiled members) was strong: an imposterposing as the deceased Agrippa Postumus appeared in the provinces and caused considerabledisturbance by gathering crowds of supporters (Tac. Ann. 2.39.140.3; Dio Cass. 57.16.3). SeeJameson (n. 3), 289.

31 Tacitus (Ann. 1.5.12) reports that Augustus was rumoured to have visited Agrippa Postumuson Planasia, and the rapid execution of Agrippa following Augustus own death demonstratesthat those incarcerated on Planasia (and other similar prison islands) were firmly under the con-trol of the imperial house. Although Tacitus is usually interpreted as indicating that Augustus

or Tiberius ordered Agrippas death, A.J. Woodman (Tacitus Reviewed [Oxford, 1998], 2332)argues that Tacitus is really presenting Tiberius as ignorant of the execution, which was carriedout independently by a centurion who assumed the new emperor would give such an order. Ineither scenario, however, Agrippa was completely at the mercy of the emperor and his soldiers.

32 Agrippina the Elder was said to have been beaten viciously (she lost an eye as a result)and to have died of starvation in exile (Suet. Tib. 53.2), Julia the Elder was stripped of all

MAP ONE: Islands off Italy used to hold exiled members of the imperial family.


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were very much prison islands that provided secure incarceration, harsh livingconditions and proximity to (but separation from) Italy. On the other hand, the terms that Augustus laid down for the deportation ofother, non-imperial aristocrats indicate that he intended them to experience a very

different type of exile. Cassius Dio wrote: , , , R [Boissevain; ms.] , . ,

Since many exiles were residing outside of those areas to which they had been banishedand others were leading a very luxurious life in the assigned places, [Augustus] decreedthat no one banned from fire and water was to live on the mainland or on one of theislands less than 400 stades [= 50 miles] away from the mainland, except Cos, Rhodes,Samos and Lesbos; I do not know why he excluded these islands alone. And furthermorehe commanded these exiles not to cross over the sea to any other place 33

This decision was prompted by his discovery that many banished individuals hadleft their designated places of exile, which indicates that even before this edict

the emperor had been banishing Romans to specific places.34 Ovid is the mostfamous example of this development: the vehement hatred he expressed for Tomisstrongly suggests that he had not chosen the town for himself, but had been specifi-cally sent there by Augustus. We do not know when Augustus began limiting the

movement of Romans in exile, but it is possible that Sempronius Gracchus exileto Cercina in A.D. 2 was only one example of a policy that had been in place long

before that year, and the fact that Julias other lovers were also banished to islandssupports this possibility. Indeed, when Augustus received word of the destructionof Varus army in the Teutoburg Forest in A.D. 9, one of his first reactions was toremove the members of his German bodyguard to islands until the emergency had

passed.35 While this action may have been a sudden inspiration, it is perhaps morelikely that Augustus had long been using islands to hold potentially dangerous (or

particularly annoying) persons, and Julias lovers were merely the first such exilesto be named in our sources. Regardless of how early the practice was adopted,

Augustus was the author of the two-tiered system of banishment that is well

remaining property by Tiberius (Suet. Tib. 50.1), Julia the Younger, who had been dependentupon her grandmother Livia for subsistence, was denied even this support after Livias death(Tac. Ann. 4.71), and Germanicus children Nero Caesar, Drusus Caesar and Julia Livilla wereall starved to death while imprisoned on islands (Suet. Tib. 534; Sen. Apocol. 10.4). Bingham(n. 3), 3858 points out that the existence of several large and well-outfitted imperial residenceson many of these islands may have ameliorated the conditions of exile, but of course we haveno way of knowing to what degree exiled members of the imperial family were permitted toenjoy the luxuries provided by such accommodation.

33 Dio Cass. 56.27.23. P.M. Swan, The Augustan Succession (Oxford, 2004), 288 believes

that this passage of Dio no doubt originated in a senate decree whose wording, with itslegal distinctions and qualifications, is reflected in our text , and he argues against Garnseyssuggestion ([n. 3], 112 n. 5) that this passage presents an amalgam of regulations issued atseveral times, and tied only loosely to AD 12.

34 Garnsey (n. 3), 112 n. 5 and Levick (n. 3), 376 also make this observation.35 Dio Cass. 56.23.4; Suet. Aug. 49.1.


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attested later: relegatio that required temporary removal from Italy and deportatioad insulam that imposed permanent exile to a designated island. At the same time, there were some very significant differences between the exileof imperial and non-imperial elite persons. In addition to restricting exiled individu-

als to islands in A.D. 12, Augustus also instituted new regulations that establishedthe conditions of exile and limited the wealth and possessions an individual couldpossess in his or her new home:

, , , , , .

And furthermore he commanded these exiles not to cross over the sea to any other place,

nor to own more ships than one 1,000-amphora cargo vessel and two ships furnishedwith oars, nor to make use of more than twenty slaves or freedmen, nor to own propertyvalued above 125,000 drachmas [= 500,000 sesterces], and he threatened to punish boththe exiles themselves and any others who lend aid to them in violation of these decrees. 36

While this certainly represented a significant loss to the greatest aristocrats, theseconditions seem very generous, especially when viewed alongside the far harshertreatment the emperor meted out to his own family. Considering that a sentenceof deportatio ad insulam was second only to death in severity under Roman law,deportees were permitted to retain a high level of wealth and creature comforts;Augustus limitation of exiles to 500,000 HS in property is well above the minimum

property requirement for membership in the equestrian order (400,000 HS), andalthough this may have felt like hardship to wealthy senators, it was more thansufficient to afford a comfortable living in exile, especially on a provincial island.37Indeed, P. Suillius reportedly lived in great comfort and ease while in exile, AvilliusFlaccus purchased a farm on Andros and Juvenal lamented the shamelessness ofMarius Priscus, who having been condemned for extortion spent his exile incareless drinking.38 Seneca remarks that exiles of his day retained more wealthin banishment than leading senatorial families had ever owned in the Republic.39Furthermore, the emperors decree permitted exiles to own ships and even a cargovessel, enabling them to engage in trade and to import whatever necessities and

36 Dio Cass. 56.27.3. See Swan (n. 33), 28890.37 Kelly (n. 3), 137 has suggested that this cash limitation was established to force wealthy

Romans to leave much of their property in Rome where it could be confiscated by the state andthe emperor. See Dig. 48.22.1 [Pomponius] where Trajan condemns the avarice of the traditionalpractice whereby the imperial treasury acquired the property of relegated persons.

38 P. Suillius: ferebaturque copiosa et molli vita secretum illud toleravisse (Tac. Ann. 13.43.5);Avillius Flaccus: Philo, Flacc. 168; Marius Priscus: exul ab octava Marius bibit et fruitur dis| iratis; at tu victrix, provincia, ploras (Juv. 1.4950). Lollia Paulina, who was only exiled

from Italy, was permitted to take with her five million sesterces, an amount that exceeded themaximum established by Augustus and therefore probably represents a special exception grantedbecause of her previous relationship to the emperor (Tac. Ann. 12.22.23).

39 Sen. ad Helv. 12.4: eo temporum luxuria prolapsa est ut maius viaticum exulum sitquam olim patrimonium principum fuit ( in these times luxury has progressed so far that theallowance of exiles is greater than the inheritance of leading men once was).


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luxuries they wanted.40 Caligula as emperor would order the execution of manyexiles in order to acquire their money, indicating his belief that aristocratic exileswere a source of considerable wealth.41 Presumably they could also receive friendsand family as visitors, and many were accompanied into exile by wives or family.42

On the whole, existence under these conditions would have been far more pleasantthan that of Julia the Elder, who was specifically forbidden all luxuries, includ-ing wine, and all male company.43 Indeed, the fact that exiles were permitted toreside on the beautiful, sophisticated and rich islands of Cos, Lesbos, Rhodes andSamos demonstrates that the emperor was not trying to subject them to particularlyharsh conditions. While some exiled aristocrats may have fallen into poverty and

become dependent upon support from family and friends,44 many could and didlive in wealth and comfort, indicating that Augustus was not concerned to punisharistocratic exiles with the poverty and misery he inflicted upon members of hisown house.

Second, although exiles were instructed to remain on their islands, Augustus doesnot seem to have attempted to confine them as he did his own relatives. Whereasthe Julias and Agrippa Postumus were closely guarded and watched, the emperorsedict suggests that the majority of exiled aristocrats were not placed under directguard, but rather were expected to live in designated places on their own recog-nizance. Indeed, his permitting to them of long-distance boats demonstrates thathe did not try to eliminate their means of escape. While the emperor may haveexpected local magistrates to act as wardens, the fact that by A.D. 12 a greatnumber of exiles had left their assigned places of residence apparently without

permission or hindrance and moved to other locations suggests that they had not

been under guard or even closely monitored. When guards delivered the condemnedAvillius Flaccus to Andros, they did nothing more than display him to the localinhabitants before leaving him there otherwise unattended.45 While it is known thatlater emperors did indeed send soldiers to guard some select deportees, Augustus

40 Swan (n. 33), 28990 discusses the utility of a 1,000-amphora vessel and considers it rathersmall and less serviceable in the open sea than the larger merchant ships that carried between10,000 and 50,000 modii.

41 Dio Cass. 59.18.15. D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor (Princeton, 1950), 487 suggeststhat Roman exiles were sufficiently wealthy that they conferred substantial financial benefits totheir new residences.

42 e.g. Sempronius Gracchus took his infant son into exile as a companion (Tac. Ann. 4.13.3),Seneca was accompanied by his friend Caesennius Maximus in Corsica (Mart. 7.44), RubelliusPlautus had the company of the Stoic philosopher C. Musonius Rufus (Tac. Ann. 14.59.12), twomen exiled in A.D. 65 took their wives with them (Tac. Ann. 15.71.3), and Fannia twice followedher husband Helvidius Priscus into exile (Pliny, Ep. 7.19.4). When the philosopher Musonius wasexiled to Gyaros, he was said to have regularly received visitors who came to talk and studywith him (Philostr. VA 7.16). In the opening of his Histories Tacitus (1.3.1) praises the loyaltyof those who accompanied family into exile: non tamen adeo virtutum sterile saeculum ut nonet bona exempla prodiderit. comitatae profugos liberos matres, secutae maritos in exilia coni-uges (the age was not, however, so devoid of virtue that it did not produce good examples.Mothers were companions to exiled children, wives followed their husbands into exile ).

43 Suet. Aug. 65.3.44 e.g. Seneca mentions a father who provided for a son in exile (Sen. Clem. 1.15.2).45 Philo, In Flacc. 161. Basing his argument on the example of Flaccus, Hartmann (n. 3),

4952 suggested that all exiles were kept under guard by local officials, but Braginton (n. 3),395 argued against this, pointing out that agents often had to be sent from Rome when emper-ors wanted exiles executed, indicating that there were no wardens or other viable executionerswith the prisoner.


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240 FRED K. DROGULA

does not seem to have thought such precautions to be generally necessary. 46Withoutarmed men to enforce the terms of banishment, exiled Romans could easily changetheir exile by moving elsewhere; during the civil war that followed Neros death,two exiled senators Octavius Sagitta and Antistius Sosianus took the opportu-

nity to leave their islands, apparently without encountering any obstacle.47

By allindications their departure would have passed unnoticed, but they made the mistakeof presenting themselves before Mucianus in expectation that the new emperorslieutenant would pardon them, an expectation that was disappointed when theywere ordered back to their islands. It would seem, therefore, that the only thingkeeping most deportees from leaving their designated island was the threat of worse

punishment if caught. We should not imagine that Augustus lacked the resourcesto guard exiles if he so wished. Indeed, his eventual discovery that many Romanshad left their assigned places of exile demonstrates that there was some level ofmonitoring, but this was obviously minimal and had not prevented the deportees

from leaving in the first place. Augustus simply did not make guarding exiles apriority, and Hadrian may have been reacting to these lax security measures whenhe decreed that relegated or banished individuals would suffer worse penalties ifthey violated the terms of their banishment.48 In all, it would appear that Augustusdid not banish aristocrats to islands because they were secure places of imprison-ment, which is a distinct difference from the heavily guarded prison islands thatheld members of the imperial family. Augustus deportation of aristocrats deviated from his treatment of his relativesin a third way: the locations of the islands used for the two groups. While exiledmembers of the imperial house were kept on islands close at hand just off the

coast of Italy, it seems to have been imperial policy to send non-imperial exilesfar away from Italy, usually to small islands in the Aegean.49 This suggests thatAugustus (and his immediate successors) held two very different ideas about thegeography of exile, and this difference was determined by the status of the offender.Yet, it is not at all clear why Aegean islands should be preferred for holding exiles,since being situated far from Rome and in the middle of busy sea lanes theylacked the security advantages that made Pandateria and other Italian islands souseful. While the use of Aegean islands suggests a policy of imprisonment andisolation, the terms of such exile indicate a general unconcern with security. Indeed,the general absence of guards, the distance from Italy, the ease of communication

and their possession of wealth and boats made it impossible to prevent deporteesfrom breaking their exile if they wished, which is surprising since secure islandexile was possible and used for members of the imperial house. In short, Aegeanislands did not offer secure detention as did Italys prison islands, which suggeststhat those distant islands offered another advantage of which the emperor wishedto avail himself.

46 Caligula, for example, told one senator that he would be guarded in exile by as manysoldiers as the senator had slaves (Dio Cass. 59.8.7).

47 Tac. Hist. 4.44.13.48Dig. 48.19.28.13 [Callistratus]. Hadrian declared those who violated the conditions of theirsentence would face the next (more severe) penalty in the following sequence: temporary rel-egation, permanent relegation, relegation to a specific place (probably an island), deportation toan island, and execution.

49 See Appendix Two. Some exceptions to this pattern are discussed below.


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The great advantage of these Aegean islands was their ability to separate exiledaristocrats from all forms of military, political and social power; detainees weresimultaneously disconnected from Italy as well as from the provinces. Indeed,removal from the provinces seems to have been the main purpose behind the

development of island exile, a fact that is supported by a curious correlation: allof the islands that Augustus and his immediate successors used to hold exiledaristocrats seem to have been autonomous, such as Amorgos, Andros, Cythnos,Donusa, Gyaros and Seriphos, none of which constituted a province or were prov-ably a part of a province until Vespasian or even Diocletian (see Map Two).50Cos, Lesbos, Rhodes and Samos which belonged to the province of Asia bythe time of Augustus do not appear to have been actually used for deporteesdespite Augustus inclusion of them in his decree; the only exile known to havetaken up residence on one of these islands was swiftly removed and hauled backto Rome.51 Indeed, it is possible that Dios editorial comment I do not know

why he excluded these islands alone should be taken to mean I do not knowwhy Augustus named these four islands and yet did not permit exiles to live onthem.52 Furthermore, no exiles are known to have been deported to the island

provinces of Crete, Cyprus or Sicily under the Julio-Claudians,53 and the condi-tions on Corsica and Sardinia, as well as the treatment of those known to have

been banished to those two islands, suggest that individuals sent there were notexpected to survive long, making deportation to Corsica and Sardinia more of adeath sentence than exile.54 Juvenal a great commentator on exile never men-tions islands within provinces as places of confinement, but emphasizes rather thatthe small islands of the Aegean were generally used for this purpose.55 Indeed, it

seems that the intention of Augustus edict was to deny exiled aristocrats access tothe provinces: by forbidding them to live on the mainland, the emperor separatedthem from the vast majority of the provinces,56 and by requiring them to live on

50 See Appendix One.51 Junius Gallio on Lesbos (see Appendix Two, no. 20).52 Dio Cass. 56.27.2, quoted in full above. Swan (n. 33), 289 notes this admission of igno-

rance but does not comment.53 See the case of Cassius Severus below.54 Corsica and Sardinia were famous for their bad climates and dangerous inhabitants (Sen.

Helv. 6.5, 7.8, Strabo 5.2.7, R. Ash, Tacitus Histories Book II [Cambridge, 2007], 119), andCaracalla was said to have banished people to such places specifically so they would bekilled by the wretched and unhealthy conditions (Dio Cass. 78.11.6), although J.-M. Claassen,Displaced Persons (Madison, 1999), 2412 suggests that Corsica may not have been as bad asSeneca describes. Bingham (n. 3), 38890 argues that Corsica and Sardinia were used when theemperor or senate wished (for some reason) to give a deportee a more pleasant exile. On theother hand, no one known to have been banished to Corsica or Sardinia may be called a typicaldeportee: Anicetus, Neros loyal henchman and the false accuser of Octavia, was said to havebeen rewarded for his treachery with a very comfortable exile and long life on Sardinia, andSeneca was alleged to have committed adultery with Julia Livilla, making his crime an offenceagainst the imperial house (see Appendix Two, nos. 25 and 28 for references). Of the othertwo men sent to these islands, one was executed immediately (hence, his deportation was notgenuine), and the other was very elderly and the unhealthy climate was probably expected tofinish him off rapidly (see Appendix Two, nos. 36 and 38 for references). Seneca recorded that

other exiles were present on Corsica with him, but we do not know who these individuals wereand whether they had been deported to Corsica or merely relegated from Italy.

55 Juv. 1.734 (Gyaros), 6.5624 (Cycladic islands and Seriphos), 10.16873 (Gyaros andSeriphos), 13.2456 (small Aegean islands).

56 Those individuals merely relegated from Rome and Italy still had access to the mainlandprovinces, but if they were important enough the emperor might well confine them to a spe-


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242 FRED K. DROGULA

islands at least fifty miles from the mainland he kept deportees off those coastalislands that were generally attached to provinces.57 His inclusion of Cos, Lesbos,Rhodes and Samos in his decree seems to have been disingenuous, since we donot know of any exiles who were actually permitted to reside on them, which isremarkable considering that they had been favourite residences for Roman exilesin the Republic. Augustus, therefore, wanted deportees not only on islands, butislands that did not constitute or belong to a province. Perhaps the best example

of this policy is Cassius Severus, who inA

.D

. 24 was sentenced to a lesser form ofbanishment relegatio that exiled him from Rome and Italy but did not deporthim to a specific island. Cassius settled in Crete, a Roman province, where hecontinued to publish treatises offensive to the emperor. Because of this unrepentant

behaviour, he was subjected to the more severe form of exile deportatio andsent to Seriphos, a small island in the Aegean where Severus would live in harshconditions and find no audience for his provocative writings.58 Thus it had been

cific place (albeit not an island). For example, when the Greek orator Moschus was relegatedto Massilia we hear of no further restrictions, but when two Roman citizens of the senatorialclass were relegated to the same city, they were specifically ordered to remain within the town

walls (Appendix Two, nos. 19 and 27).57 The province of Asia included most of the islands along its coast (Magie [n. 41], 155).Athens, Massilia and Sparta each owned nearby islands, and although these cities were autono-mous they and the islands they owned were nevertheless part of a province (Athens: Strab.5.1.7, 9.1.1011; Massilia: Strab. 4.1.10; Sparta: Dio Cass. 54.7.12). See Appendix One.

58 See Appendix Two, nos. 6 and 15.

MAP TWO: Islands in the Aegean Sea used to hold exiled aristocrats.


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acceptable for Severus to live in a Roman province when he was merely relegated,but when given the heavier form of exile he was transferred to an island outsidethe provinces. Thus a major effect of Augustus reform was to sweep deportees out of the

provinces. By choosing to send troublesome members of the aristocracy to thecluster of autonomous islands in the Aegean, Augustus was exiling them to theonly inhabitable area within Romes empire that was external to both Italy and the

provinces.59 While there were exceptions, the general rule of the emperors seemsto have been to send deportees into this geographic phantom zone and to leavethem there. It is clear that banishment away from Rome was a devastating punish-ment for a Roman aristocrat to whom that city was the centre of the world, butit is less clear why Augustus and his successors should be at such pains to keepexiled aristocrats out of the provinces. Why was Seriphos better than Tomis? Whysend a potential aristocratic enemy into banishment on an unguarded island in the

middle of the empire when there were cohorts under loyal legates and fortifiedcities under picked governors and outposts on the edges of the empire that couldguard the exile far more effectively? Why was it so important to keep banishedaristocrats not only away from Rome but out of the provinces?

II. IMPERIAL CONTROL OF SENATORIAL TRAVEL

It turns out that exiles were not the only ones Augustus ordered out of the provinces.Throughout his principate the emperor maintained a careful policy of regulating all

senatorial travel outside of Italy, which ensured that no senator entered a Romanprovince without Augustus knowledge and approval. The importance and indeedthe very existence of this policy has been overlooked generally, but it is neverthe-less the case that, from the beginning of the Augustan regime, all senators wereforbidden to leave Italy and travel in the provinces without the permission of theemperor. Only a small number of modern historians have noted in whole or in

part the existence of this policy,60 and to my knowledge only R.J.A. Talbert hasdiscussed it at any length.61 Talbert notes the usefulness of this policy for ensuringregular attendance at meetings of the senate, and although he cautions that evidencefor enforcement of the travel ban is slim, he does indicate that the emperors had

59 E. Gabba, True history and false history in Classical Antiquity, JRS 71 (1981), 5560argues that islands had a mystique about them an otherworldliness that separated themfrom the mainland in the imagination and thought of ancient Greco-Roman culture.

60 Balsdon (n. 3), 113, R. Syme, The Augustan Aristocracy (Oxford, 1986), 9 and M. Reinhold,From Republic to Principate (Atlanta, 1988), 21213 all noted this regulation, but they did notexplore the motives for the policy (Syme doubted that it was ever truly enforced). M. Goodman,The Roman World (London and New York, 1997), 196 and 204 mentions that Narbonensis andSicily were eventually made accessible to senators, and A. Lintott, Imperium Romanum (London,1993), 173 likewise refers to Narbonensis, but neither comment upon the reason why theseareas were opened to senators nor upon the original prohibition. R.J.A. Wilson, Sicily under the

Roman Empire (Warminster, 1990), 45 suggests that Sicily may have been opened to senatorialtravel to speed Romanization, but does not discuss the original prohibition. Finally, C. Moatti,Le contrle de la mobilit des personnes dans lempire romain, MEFRA 112.2 (2000), 93840has pointed to the inability of senators to travel freely, but like Talbert (see below) she focussesprimarily upon the presumed goal of retaining senators in Italy.

61 R.J.A. Talbert, The Senate of Imperial Rome (Princeton, 1984), 13841.


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244 FRED K. DROGULA

good reasons to keep senators out of some provinces.62 This cautious endorsementof the argument that emperors did indeed enforce restrictions against unauthorizedelite travel is strengthened by the practice of deportation to islands, which pro-vides valuable evidence indicating that Augustus did exercise considerable control

over the movements of the senatorial order, and was in particular determined todeny senators (including those in exile) free access to the provinces. This policywas maintained by his successors, although some of them (out of confidence orcarelessness) made exceptions they came to regret. While this aspect of imperialcontrol was far more subtle than imperium maius or tribunician potestas, it wasnevertheless a very important component of Augustan rule because it provided theemperors with a means of containing the potent social force of aristocratic prestigeand influence without resorting to open oppression. Augustus policy for regulating elite travel appears to have been one of thevery first innovations he made in his efforts to consolidate his domination over the

empire. Dio states that this restriction was established in 29 B.C., when senatorswere prohibited from leaving Italy without permission, although eventually Sicilyand Narbonese Gaul were exempted from this rule.63 While senators of the LateRepublic had usually registered their plans to travel abroad with the senate andreceived what Reinhold calls the fiction of legatio libera (unrestricted ambas-sadorship) by action of the senate, Augustus decree and his resultant capacityto deny senators permission to leave Italy was quite new and unprecedented.64 Itis common knowledge that Augustus decreed that Egypt was off-limits to senatorsand illustrious equestrians, and it should not be surprising that he also used thistype of regulation to protect his control over the other provinces as well.65 Indeed,

the remarkable proximity in time of the two decrees Egypt was made a provinceand forbidden to senators in 30 B.C., and senators were forbidden to leave Italy(and thereby enter other provinces) in 29 B.C. should lead us to understand thetwo as part of the same strategy.66 This policy of regulating senatorial travel seems

62 Talbert (n. 61), 140: Since all emperors were no doubt pleased to be kept informed ofthe movements and plans of senators, and since there were sound political reasons for keepingthem out of certain provinces, we might reasonably guess that some observance of the regula-tions did persist.

63 Dio Cass. 52.42.67. Kelly (n. 3), 129 notes the curious fact that during Julius Caesarsdictatorship A. Caecina had received permission from Caesar to live in Sicily until the year45 B.C. Kelly points out that exiles at that time were only barred from Italy, and suggests thatSicilys strategic importance may explain the necessity of Caesars permission for an exile toreside there. While Kelly is certainly correct about the importance of Sicily (especially in a timeof civil war), this episode may also indicate that the Romans were already beginning to thinkof Sicily conceptually as a part of Italy. If so, then perhaps Sicily was open to senators fromthe very inception of Augustus regulation of senatorial travel.

64 Reinhold (n. 60), 21213. Reinhold does point out (213) that consuls in the Republic hadthe ability to recall absent senators in times of crisis, but this is very different from forbid-ding senators to leave Italy in the first place. For discussion of the legatio libera, see Moatti(n. 60), 93840.

65 Tac. Ann. 2.59.3:nam Augustus, inter alia dominationis arcana, vetitis nisi permissu ingredisenatoribus aut equitibus Romanis inlustribus, seposuit Aegyptum (for Augustus, among the

other secrets of domination, isolated Egypt by forbidding senators or illustrious equestrians toenter it without permission [cf. Tac. Hist. 1.11.1]).

66 The emphasis on imperial control of Egypt derives largely from Tacitus account ofGermanicus trip to Egypt, which angered Tiberius because Germanicus had failed to receivepermission to enter this province (Tac. Ann. 2.59.2: Tiberius acerrime increpuit quod contrainstituta Augusti non sponte principis Alexandriam introisset). On the debate about Germanicus


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to have been strictly maintained, since senators were only able to escape a seriousfamine in Italy in A.D. 6 because Augustus published a special, and temporary,dispensation allowing them to leave Italy.67 Furthermore, Augustus also decreedthat all retiring governors had to return to Rome from their provinces within three

months of laying down their commands, thereby reducing significantly the licenceof powerful men to remain in the provinces.68 Augustus regulations also extendedto his own family: in 6 B.C. his stepson Tiberius had to go on a hunger strike inorder to receive permission to depart from Italy in order to travel to Rhodes, andhe was long denied permission to return to Italy.69 The new imperial post system

probably helped to enforce Augustus regulations, since the changing stations thatwere distributed along the empires highways could easily monitor traffic, especiallythat of senators and other high-profile aristocrats with large entourages. Indeed,since those senators travelling on official business bore diplomata that authorizedtheir use of the post, any senator who lacked a diploma would probably have

attracted the particular notice of imperial officials.70

Claudius even punished someequestrians for leaving Italy presumably on private business without his per-mission and the proper travel documents (se inscio ac sine commeatu).71 For thisreason it is probably safe to assume that exiles (especially those unaccompanied

by guards) carried some form of passport authorizing their presence outside ofItaly, such as Seneca mentions when he writes that Augustus gave diplomata tothe exiled adulterers of his daughter to ensure their trip into banishment.72

Augustus successors would be equally vigilant in regulating senatorial travel.Tiberius decreed that all sitting magistrates had to remain in the city of Romeduring their term in office, thereby making official what had been an informal

practice of Augustus, and Suetonius thought it noteworthy that Tiberius allowedeven a single exception to this rule.73 When Rubrius Fabatus was discovered trav-elling through the Sicilian Strait in A.D. 32/3, a centurion hauled him back toRome for questioning, presumably because he had neither property in Sicily norimperial permission to leave Italy.74 That a centurion knew to arrest Fabatus and

bring him before the emperor demonstrates that the restriction on senatorial travelwas common knowledge. Fabatus was unable to provide an acceptable explanationfor his unauthorized departure from Italy, so he was placed under guard and heldon suspicion of harbouring illicit intentions.75 Under Caligula a former praetor,claiming severe illness, applied to the emperor for an extension of his permission

Egyptian trip see B. Kelly, Tacitus, Germanicus and the kings of Egypt (Tac. Ann. 2.5961),CQ 60 (2010), 22137 and D. Hennig, Zur gyptenreise des Germanicus, Chiron 2 (1972),34965.

67 Dio Cass. 55.26.68 Dio Cass. 53.15.6.69 Suet. Tib. 10.2, 11.413.2.70 For discussion of the diplomata and the movement of government officials, see Moatti (n.

60), 9413.71 Suet. Claud. 16.2. The commeatus was an imperial version of the Republican legatio libera

for travelling aristocrats (Moatti [n. 60], 940).72 Sen. Clem. 1.10.34.73 Suet. Tib. 31.1. Tiberius allowed the senate to contravene this rule by authorizing a praetor-

elect to travel abroad, but Suetonius offered this as an example of Tiberius early moderation.74 Tac. Ann. 6.14.2.75 Although he gives no definitive explanation for Fabatus illegal departure from Italy, Tacitus

suggests that he was arrested under suspicion of attempting to escape the tumultuous affairs inItaly by fleeing to Parthia.


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246 FRED K. DROGULA

to remain abroad in Greece; Caligula had him killed instead.76 Claudius took greatpersonal interest in this policy: he extended the regulation of travel to includecertain equestrians, and he made it his own prerogative to approve senatorialtravel requests.77 Furthermore, it was Claudius who granted senators unrestricted

access to Narbonese Gaul a privilege that had already been extended to senatorstravelling to Sicily by that time.78 It is likely that this decision was motivated bya high number of senatorial requests to leave Italy in order to travel to Massiliaand Narbonese Gaul for business or pleasure, a congestion of applications that theemperors dispensation was intended to alleviate. While it is difficult to determinehow aggressively senatorial travel was controlled, Claudius decision to extendthe exemption of Sicily to Narbonese Gaul suggests that he intended to enforcethe regulation of travel to the rest of the empire, and Dio a Roman senator recorded that this constraint was still being enforced in the third century A.D.79Somereasons for travel seem to have been generally accepted: senators were certainly

permitted to visit estates they held outside of Italy (and Nero even requested thata particular senator reside permanently on his familys holdings in the provinceof Asia);80 and senators could travel for the purpose of sightseeing, even visitingEgypt that most carefully guarded of all provinces if they first received per-mission.81 Indeed, senators and equestrians could own land and live in Egypt, solong as they were authorized by the emperor to do so. 82 There can be no doubtthat senators could and did travel throughout the empire, but it would seem thatthey did so only with the knowledge and approval of the emperor. Regulation of travel in the provinces seems a minor matter compared toAugustus control of armies and his supremacy in the senate, but such a restric-

76 Suet. Calig. 29.2. He had originally been given a period of leave to live in Greece toimprove his health.

77 Regulation of equestrians: Suet. Claud. 16.2; Claudius takes personal control of approvals:Suet. Claud. 23.2; Dio Cass. 60.25.67. It had previously been the responsibility of the senateto review such requests and after consulting the emperor to grant or deny permission totravel in the provinces.

78 Tac. Ann. 12.23.1.79 Dio Cass. 52.42.67.80 Tac. Ann. 14.22.3. The number of senators owning land in the provinces was not necessar-

ily a large number when Augustus first imposed this travel regulation. I. Shatzman, SenatorialWealth and Roman Politics (Brussels, 1975), 30 and 4601 points out that in the period fromSulla to Augustus, only 29 senators (other than Augustus and Agrippa) are known who ownedland in provinces: four in Spain, three each in Asia, Greece and Sicily, two each in Africa,Epirus, Istria and Transalpine Gaul; one each in Egypt and the Thracian Chersonesus. Reinhold(n. 60), 140 also notes that some Romans owned land in Egypt.

81 This is, of course, what Germanicus had failed to do, thereby angering the emperor. See L.Casson, Travel in the Ancient World (Baltimore and London, 1994), 285. On the active tourismindustry of Egypt, see V.A. Foertmeyer, Tourism in Graeco-Roman Egypt (unpublished Ph.Ddissertation, Princeton, 1989), 10424, 15981, 20830.

82 Dio Cass. 51.17.1: , ( but he did not give [senators] permission to live there, unless hehimself conceded the privilege to a man by name). Reinhold (n. 60), 1401 states that senatorswere not permitted to live in Egypt, but he seems to be speaking in general terms only and

does not take into account that senators could receive individual concessions from the emperor.M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1957), 671provides a list of ten members of the senatorial or equestrian orders who owned land in Egyptunder the Julio-Claudians (mostly under Augustus). Naturally, ownership of land in Egypt doesnot prove residence there, but several of the individuals identified by Rostovtzeff were friendsand supporters of Augustus and could safely be granted access to that strategic province.


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tion was clearly of the utmost importance to the emperor, since it was among hisfirst reforms after Actium and preceded his acquisition of other powers by severalyears.83 Furthermore, the fact that this regulation was still in place and enforcedunder later emperors demonstrates that it was not made redundant or superseded by

the multitude of powers Augustus acquired in 23 B.C. Rather, the ability to regu-late the movements of the aristocracy complemented the emperors other powersby providing him with the necessary means to control the potent and pervasiveinfluence that aristocratic prestige wielded in Roman society. Following his defeatof Mark Antony in 31 B.C., Augustus legal and military positions were strong:as consul he held the highest judicial and legislative prerogatives in Rome, andhis possession of multiple provinciae gave him legitimate command over most ofRomes legions. Despite these substantial powers, however, he had no way of con-trolling or suppressing the tremendous social power wielded by the elite of Romansociety, who were often tacitly and some openly opposed to his domination.84

Although the civil wars had greatly diminished the nobiles, there were still senatorswho possessed immense ancestral prestige, many of whom sprang from far moredistinguished and respected families than the Octavii and could even hold theirheads up beside the ancient if recently undistinguished (excepting of course thecontroversial Caesar) Julii. Any one of these senators could, under the propercircumstances, use his familys auctoritas, resources and connections to acquire

political status and power independent of the new princeps. The young Augustuswas surrounded by men of ancient family, and the assassination of Caesar by suchnames as M. Junius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus had demonstrated that theimportance and ambition of men with ancient names were not readily undervalued

by the wise. Nor were such concerns eliminated by the victory at Actium: afterseven years of humiliating exile, Augustus old enemy M. Aemilius Lepidus wasstill nominated over Augustus objection for membership in a revised senate list

by Antistius Labeo, who maintained that Lepidus great prestige made him worthyof the honour.85 Men of famous name were the natural rallying points for con-spiracies against the emperor, and Augustus had to crush several aristocratic plotsthat were led by such names as Aemilius Lepidus (the younger), Licinius Murena,Fannius Caepio, Marcus Egnatius, Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Iullus Antonius.86

83 It is possible that Caesar was considering a similar ban on senatorial travel: as dictator hedecreed that the sons of senators could not go abroad except as the companion or subordinateof a magistrate (Suet. Iul. 42.1: neu qui senatoris filius nisi contubernalis aut comes magistratusperegre proficisceretur ).

84 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939 [2002]), 368, Before his marriage to Livia,only one descendant of a consular family (Cn. Domitius Calvinus) belonged to [Octavians] fac-tion the aristocracy were slow to forgive the man of the proscriptions (see also Syme [n. 60,1986], 28). K.A. Raaflaub and L.J. Samons, Opposition to Augustus, in K.A. Raaflaub and M.Toher (edd.), Between Republic and Empire (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990), 417, That thereexisted opposition under Augustus and that much of it was aimed no less at the new systemand individual solutions introduced by Augustus than at the princeps himself cannot be doubtedand 454, contrary to all expectations, opposition to Augustus was scattered, isolated, inef-

fective, and, overall, minimal.85 Suet. Aug. 54 (cf. Dio Cass. 52.42.13).86 Vell. Pat. 2.91.2; Suet. Aug. 19.1; Tac. Ann. 1.10.4 (cf. Dio Cass. 55.27); Sen. Brev. 4.5.

On the identities and motives of these conspirators, see Raaflaub and Samons (n. 84), 41754.On the problem of identifying Licinius Murena, see M. Swan, The consular Fasti of 23 B.C.and the conspiracy of Varro Murena, HSPh 71 (1967), 23542 and Syme (n. 60), 3878. Later


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Aristocratic prestige dignitas had been a major component of Roman politicsthroughout the Republic, enabling men like the famous Scipios to acquire honourswhile still young, boosted to high office early by their familys name.87 In morerecent times Marius and Cicero had to struggle against the advantages of their

more prestigious political opponents, carrying the humiliating stigma of being anovus homo up every step of the political ladder. Catiline with the support ofP. Cornelius Lentulus Sura and other aristocrats had been so convinced that his

prestigious lineage automatically entitled him to honours and a consulship that hewas willing to start a civil war in order to defend this entitlement. 88 Despite the

political successes of men like Marius, Pompey and Cicero, most important militarycommands and political power in the Late Republic remained in the hands of menwith prestigious family names.89Cicero, having elbowed his way through the nobil-ity to win a consulship, observed that a man could win elections in Rome simply

by the family name he bore, largely because Romans expected sons to emulate

their fathers.90

In Romes hierarchical society people lower on the social ladderwere irresistibly drawn to the dignitas of the senatorial order, and J.E. Lendon hasdemonstrated that dignitas and honour continued to be fundamental social forces inthe Roman Empire that could be used to considerable social and political effect,and that emperors were very nervous of those who possessed the most. 91Of course,the new princeps had more than enough power at his fingertips to quash any one

possible rival, but such open tyranny worked against the traditional appearancethat Augustus thought it wise to project. Instead of crushing senatorial influence,therefore, he sought to circumscribe it by controlling senators ability to use theirauctoritas on susceptible audiences. Later emperors would be less reserved in their

open use of force, but in the early years of his rule Augustus attempted to findalternatives to naked oppression to control the aristocracy.

emperors would continue to feel threatened by men of famous name (Tac. Ann. 6.9.3, 12.52.2,13.47.1, 14.22.1, 14.57.23, 15.56.4).

87 Scipio Africanus was elected proconsul in 210 B.C. even though he was only twenty-sixyears old (Livy 26.18.1), Scipio Nasica (who was not yet old enough to stand for the quaes-torship) was chosen the best of the Romans in order to receive the Great Goddess to Romein 204 B.C. (Livy 29.14.8) and Scipio Aemilianus was elected consul even though he was onlystanding for the aedileship (Livy Per. 49).

88 Sall. Cat. 31.7: Catilina, ut erat paratus ad dissimulanda omnia, demisso voltu, vocesupplici postulare a patribus coepit ne quid de se temere crederent; ea familia ortum, ita seab adulescentia vitam instituisse ut omnia bona in spe haberet; ne existumarent sibi, patriciohomini, cuius ipsius atque maiorum pluruma beneficia in plebem Romanam essent, perdita republica opus esse and 35.3: (Catiline writes to Catulus) iniuriis contumeliisque concitatus,quod fructu laboris industriaeque meae privatus statum dignitatis non obtinebam

89 Syme (n. 84), 1027. For example, between the years 133 and 49 B.C., sixteen familiesheld 115 out of 170 (68%) consulships (the Aemilii, Aurelii, Caecilii, Calpurnii, Cassii, Claudii,Cornelii, Domitii, Julii, Junii, Licinii, Marcii, Mucii, Papirii, Porcii and Valerii).

90 Cic. Pis. 2 and Rab. Post. 2. On the disadvantages of new men and the advantages of thenobiles, see T.P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C. A.D. 14 (Oxford, 1971),10016.

91 J.E. Lendon, Empire of Honour (Oxford, 1997), Honour among aristocrats, once acquired,

was not a passive possession, like an engraved watch or an honorary degree. Rather, those whohad honour were able to exert power in society by virtue of the desire of others for it, and theconcern of others not to lose it (55); honour was a source of legitimate social authority,that is, of an authority people were brought up to obey (69); and men of too much renownwere dangerous to the emperor, and suspected by him, so contemporaries thought. Men with asmaller portion were no threat (111).


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Although Rome was the heart of the empire, the exercise of power requiredthe control of provinces and the resources they contained. In the Late Republic,command of one or more provinces had been essential if a Roman senator wereto be a serious contender in civil war: Sulla, Marius, Pompey and Caesar had all

used the resources and armies of the provinces against their political enemies, andrenegades like Sertorius and Sextus Pompeius had spread havoc in Rome for yearsbased on their respective control of Spain and Sicily. Octavian himself had spenta decade competing with Antony and Lepidus to bring more provinces under hissway because they were and would continue to be rich sources of soldiers,wealth, supplies and clients, all of which were necessary for initiating and con-ducting war. Anyone wishing to rival the emperor, therefore, would have to gaincontrol over the resources of at least one province if he were to have any chanceat succeeding. Rome was the empires heart and brain, but the provinces were themuscle that enforced Romes will, and, as Tacitus would later describe the situation,

an emperor could be made outside of Rome.92

Provinces (with their legions andresources) were the greatest sources of power in the empire, and Augustus wasdetermined to safeguard his control over them by every means possible. 93While hecould have simply murdered dangerous aristocrats whose power in the provincesgrew too great, the emperor preferred to avoid such despotic action by preventingsenators from acquiring such commands in the first place. In his First Settlementwith the senate (27 B.C.), therefore, Augustus retained for himself (initially) the

provinces of Egypt, Gaul, Spain and Syria, which gave him direct command over20 or 21 of Romes legions, although by the end of his rule he commanded all

but one.94

Still, this careful monopoly of military command was not sufficient to guaranteethe loyalty of the legions, as the revolt against Nero would demonstrate. Men ofexceptional prestige and reputation could and would still attract the respect andloyalty of the emperors legions in A.D. 14 the German legions offered to makeGermanicus emperor instead of his adoptive father Tiberius.95 While no senatorcould surpass Augustus status and dignitas, the emperor was not always presentwith his legions; direct command was delegated to legates who commanded in theemperors name, and who occasionally had trouble keeping their soldiers under

proper discipline.96 The legions were tempting and critical targets for anyone wish-ing to topple the princeps, and the traditional way to win over Roman soldiers

92 Tac. Hist. 1.4.2: evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri.93 One could argue that Augustus command over the legions rendered other methods of

control redundant, but the emperors thoroughness in protecting his position from all possibleavenues of attack was famous; one need only reflect that, in addition to being pontifex maximus,Augustus made himself an ex officio member of all other priestly colleges as if the septemviriepulones might topple his rule!

94 Initially, as many as seven or eight legions were distributed among the public provincesof Africa, Illyricum and Macedonia, but as Augustus and his subordinates expanded Romesnorthern border to the Danube the legions of Illyricum and Macedonia were transferred to theimperial provinces of Moesia and Pannonia, leaving only a single legion (the III Augusta in

Africa) stationed in a public province.95 Tac. Ann. 1.35.3.96 At the death of Augustus the imperial legates commanding legions along the Rhine and

Danube lost control of their soldiers, and military discipline could only be restored by sendingthe emperors own sons (Tac. Ann. 1.16.145.2). See B. Campbell, The Emperor and the RomanArmy 31 B.C. A.D. 235 (Oxford, 1984 [1996]), 36574.


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was to stress the auctoritas and dignitas of ones lineage.97 In the Late Republicarmies had been drawn to the power of famous names: the blue-blooded Catilineand the sons of Pompey the Great had organized powerful and dangerous revolts,98and the famous Brutus and Cassius were able to take over entire provinces and

armies not assigned to them.99

Augustus had not only been able to raise an armyusing his adopted name of C. Julius Caesar,100 but he also wrested the loyalty ofHirtius and Pansas legions from the state after the consuls deaths, and yearslater he succeeded in drawing Lepidus legions from him in Sicily.101 Even alliedsoldiers responded to the pull of ancestral prestige: in 46 B.C. Gaetulian soldiersserving under the Pompeians in Africa deserted to Caesar en masse when theywere told that he was the relation of Gaius Marius, who had treated their peoplewell a generation earlier.102

Augustus knew from experience that famous names and their associated reputa-tions had a magnetic attraction for Roman soldiers that could not be eliminated

but could be substantially weakened by distance. An excellent example is the legionIII Augusta. Augustus had been content to leave this legion under the commandof the proconsular governor of Africa, but Caligula, perhaps sensing his owncontrol over the legions to be weaker than that of his predecessors, removed thislegion from the governors control in A.D. 39 when he learned that the incoming

proconsul of Africa was L. Calpurnius Piso.103 This Piso was not only knownto be exceedingly proud of his ancient and prestigious heritage, but his fatherhad been the famous (and infamous) Calpurnius Piso who had been accused oftampering with the loyalty of the soldiers of Syria by supplanting the emperor asparent of the legions.104 An aristocrats prestige was a potent weapon that could

turn legions against an emperor: Nero merely scoffed at the report of the humbleVindexs rebellion, but we are told he fainted outright when he learned thatthe blue-blooded Servius Sulpicius Galba had also risen in revolt.105 Two otherrivals for the emperorship, Marcus Salvius Otho and Aulus Vitellius, were likewisefrom illustrious ancient families.106 The responsiveness of the legions to illustriousnames was well known and feared by the emperors: in A.D. 62 Nero was alarmed tolearn that two famous senators, Rubellius Plautus (of the Julian clan) and Cornelius

97 See Lendon (n. 91), 23843.98 On Catiline, see Sall. Cat. 5.1, 16.4, 28.4, 35.34. On Pompeys sons, see [Caes.] B Hisp.

1, and see Syme (n. 84), 157.99 Following Caesars assassination, Cassius (who had been assigned the province of Cyrene)

took over command of Asia and its vast resources (MRR 2.320), while Brutus ignored hisprovince of Crete and instead took over Macedonia with its substantial army (MRR 2.3212).

100 Suet. Aug. 10.3. Note also Ciceros reference to the young Octavian as Caesar in thePhilippics (for example, see 3.3, 4.4, 5.45, 7.10, 8.5 and 10.15), and Augustus identification ofCaesar as parentem meum in the Res Gestae (2).

101 On his acquisition of the legions of Hirtius and Pansa, see Cic. Fam. 10.24.3, 11.14.2,11.19.120.4; Vell. Pat. 2.62.5; App. B Civ. 3.76 and 3.97. On Augustus winning over thelegions of Lepidus, see Vell. Pat. 2.80.34; Suet. Aug. 16.4; App. B Civ. 5.1245; Dio Cass.49.12.15, 50.1.3.

102 [Caes.] B Afr. 32.103 Dio Cass. 59.20.7. The legion was transferred to the command of an imperial legate.104 Tac. Ann. 3.13.2. In the SC de Cn. Pisone patre Piso is said to have given out largesse to

the soldiers in his own name from the imperial treasury and to have specially honoured thosesoldiers who called themselves Pisonians (CIL II2/5 900, ll. 436).

105 Suet. Ner. 40.4 and 42.1.106 Suet. Otho 1.1 and Vit. 1.13.


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Sulla, were living in close proximity to large Roman armies.107 Nero himself hadthoughtlessly ordered Plautus to retire to his Asian estates and Sulla to retire toMassilia, but when he realized his mistake and the senators nearness to the armiesin Syria and Germany he immediately had both men killed.108 Armies, perhaps

more than any other part of Roman society, responded to the power of prestigiousnames, and therefore it was essential for Augustus and his successors to preventpowerful aristocrats from tampering with the loyalty of the legions. Augustus had good reason to worry about the influence of aristocratic auctoritasupon his soldiers at the start of his rule. Whereas armies of the Republic had beentemporary and changeable entities they often formed, served and disbanded undera single commander, and few armies remained in one place long Augustus senthis legions into permanent camps in Romes frontier provinces following his victoryat Actium in 31 B.C., establishing what would become the new imperial army.109For the first time, legions were permanently stationed in the provinces far from

Rome and from their commander-in-chief, and those masses of soldiers would havebeen very tempting prizes for disgruntled senators still smarting from Augustusnew pre-eminence over the entire empire. It cannot have been a coincidence,therefore, that in 29 B.C. only two years after the dispersal of the legions to

permanent camps in the provinces Augustus imposed his prohibition on unau-thorized senatorial travel, thereby denying senators free access to the provincesand especially to the legions now quartered along Romes frontiers. Likewise, thenew positioning of the legions would have required Augustus to rethink Romes

policies regarding exile, since traditional relegatio from Italy would have permittedtroublesome aristocrats to have contact with and possibly suborn the legions in

the provinces. He eliminated this danger by adopting the policy of island exile fortroublesome senators, placing them (and their influence) far from Romes soldiers.Thus, it was likely the redeployment of Romes legions to permanent camps in the

provinces after the Battle of Actium that first drove Augustus to devise methodsfor regulating and limiting senatorial access to the provinces. Three unusual appointments in the reigns of Tiberius and Nero illustrate espe-cially well the tendency of emperors to prevent important senators from enteringthe provinces. These two emperors were known for honouring influential senatorswith important and prestigious provincial commands only to deny them permissionto set out for their provinces. Tiberius honoured Aelius Lamia (in A.D. 21/2) and

L. Arruntius (in A.D. 22/3) respectively with the governorships of Syria (with fourlegions) and Spain (with three legions), but withheld from them permission to leaveItaly and enter their provinces.110In Tacitus words, Tiberius gave provinces to menhe would not allow to leave the city.111 Tiberius may well have been unnerved by

107 Tac. Ann. 14.57.1: conpertoque Plautum et Sullam maxime timeri, Plautum in Asiam,Sullam in Galliam Narbonensem nuper amotos, nobilitatem eorum et propinquos huic Orientis,illi Germaniae exercitus commemorat [sc. Tigellinus].

108 Plautus retired in A.D. 60 (Tac. Ann. 14.22.13) and Sulla in A.D. 58 (Tac. Ann. 13.47.13).Both were executed in A.D. 62 and their heads were brought back to the emperor (Tac. Ann.14.57.4 and 59.23).

109 See L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (Norman, 1984), 13271.110 Tac. Ann. 6.27.23 (cf. Hist. 2.65.12).111 Tac. Ann. 1.80.3 ( mandaverit quibusdam provincias, quos egredi urbe non erat passu-

rus) and 6.27.3 (extremo anni mors Aelii Lamiae funere censorio celebrata, qui administrandaeSyriae imagine tandem exsolutus urbi praefuerat [Tiberius] oblitus Arruntium, ne in Hispaniampergeret, decumum iam annum attineri).


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Cn. Calpurnius Pisos attempted military coup in A.D. 19 and felt himself trapped:he was afraid to allow Lamia and Arruntius to take up their large and importantcommands, but could not give the provinces to less important men without insultingthe senatorial elite.112 He therefore allowed both senators to hold these prestigious

commands for a decade, but they had to govern their provinces from Rome throughlegates. Likewise, Nero appointed P. Anteius to be the governor of Syria in A.D.55, but did not give Anteius permission to enter his province and take up hiscommand.113 In this way the emperor could win the support of certain importantsenators by bestowing high office and honours upon them, but he mitigated (ina back-handed way) the potential danger they represented. Although prestigioussenators probably resented their confinement in Rome during their governorship,their dignitas was nevertheless increased by possession of these provinces anduse of the curule symbols of their office at the centre of all eyes in Rome. Thiswas an innovative use of Augustus regulation of senatorial travel, but his policy

provided Tiberius and Nero with a way of separating potential rivals from theresources of the provinces. A second advantage of confining elite persons to Italy was that it preventedthem from acquiring dangerous levels of non-military influence abroad. Provincialcities, especially in the East, were a tremendous source of political and financialsupport, and had to be carefully guarded against ambitious senators. Indeed, sincethe auctoritas of the Roman elite was all the more potent in the provinces (wheremen of such prestige and importance were rare), rich provincial cities would have

been tempting targets to senators seeking to augment their own status.114Prestigiousnames were awe-inspiring and commanded obedience in the provinces: a young

Julius Caesar, having been captured by pirates in 75/74 B.C. while travelling in theEast as a private citizen, quickly and easily arranged for nearby cities to pay hisransom and, upon being freed, he raised a fleet of ships completely on his ownauthority and hunted down his former captors.115 Furthermore, when the governorof Asia delayed the punishment of these pirates, Caesar without any officialauthority removed them from prison and had them crucified. A short time laterCaesar (still a privatus) raised a force of provincial troops to fight Mithridatessoldiers in 74 B.C.116 As a scion of one of Romes most ancient families, Caesarcertainly understood the power his descent granted him, and he knew well that

provincial citizens would obey him even as a private citizen. Cities continued to

respond favourably to Romes aristocracy even after the rise of Augustus: in A.D.34 many eastern cities flocked to support a man pretending to be the deceasedDrusus,117 and in A.D. 66 Capito Cossutianus would tell Nero that, throughout theempire, provincials paid close attention to Thrasea Paetus and followed his displays

112 On Pisos attempt to take over the governorship of Syria following the death of Germanicus,see Tac. Ann. 2.75.281.3.

113 Tac. Ann. 13.22.1.114 R. MacMullen, How to revolt in the Roman Empire, RSA15 (1985), 6776 argues that an

aristocrat contemplating rebellion against the emperor would frequently reach out to his friends

in various cities in search of support and encouragement. See also A.J.N. Wilson, Emigrationfrom Italy in the Republican Age of Rome (Manchester, 1966), 171, obviously a noble exile,with adequate financial resources, could lord it in a provincial community.

115 Vell. Pat. 2.41.342.3; Suet. Iul. 4.12; Plut. Caes. 1.82.7.116 Suet. Iul. 4.12.117 Dio Cass. 58.25.1.


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of independence as published in Romes daily journal (diurna populi Romani).118When Nero ordered the execution of Rubellius Plautus, who was living in retire-ment in Asia, the emperor used the fabricated but apparently plausible chargethat the province of Asia was flocking to support Plautus, and Tacitus writes that

in consequence Plautus was urged by his father-in-law to use his famous lineageto gather allies and make real the false accusation of the emperor.119

Such was the magnetic power of Romes aristocracy that even senators wivescould wield substantial and unwelcome power over provincials. In A.D. 21 a debatewas held in the senate on whether senatorial wives should be banned from the

provinces because of their capacity and tendency to abuse the privileges of theirrank, and in A.D. 24 a former governors wife was indicted along with her husbandfor extortion in the provinces.120 In a speech that Dio attributes to Maecenas,Augustus is advised not merely to make use of Romes elite citizens, but also to

bring the most prestigious and important provincials to Rome in order to drain

the provinces of eminent men who might use their prestige against the interestsof the emperor.121 Claudius acted on this principle when he decided to summonan important provincial from Africa and make him a Roman senator, which asClaudius is reported to have said bound him in Rome with golden fetters. 122This phrase articulates the effectiveness of this policy of imperial control: bestowingsenatorial rank upon the most important provincials bound them to the emperor, butit simultaneously brought their mobility under imperial control by removing themfrom their home province (where their prestige was most effective) to the capitalwhere they would be under the emperors watchful eye. Claudius further attemptedto control the influence of powerful provincials by

controlling travel_senatorial mobility.pdf

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