G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986EVELIO B. JAVIER,petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR,respondents.Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.CRUZ,J.:The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Electionsen bancas required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the people.Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein.1Specifically, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador."2Particular mention was made of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or Manila paper.On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders.3On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.4Oncertioraribefore this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made.5Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition whichinter aliaproclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique.6This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused.7The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.Section 3 provides:The Commission on Elections may siten bancor in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decideden banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession of the law-despite all the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Electionsen banc.This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard and decideden bancand all other cases can be-in fact,shouldbe-filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point.8Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,9not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office."10No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission on Electionsen banc.In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decideden banc.11The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election cases."As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arisingbeforethe proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters arisingafterthe proclamation, which could be heard and decided onlyen bancin the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the Commissionen banccould not do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and city officialsfrom start to finish,including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commissionen banc, its jurisdiction would beginonly after the proclamation was made and a contest was filedand not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power.This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while denying to thebanc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give itfull authorityto hear and decide these casesfrom beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may,motu proprioor upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative and the second judicial.Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included thequo warrantopetition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved.12The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in aquo warrantoproceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it onlyen banc.We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decideden banc.As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could acten banconly after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commissionen banc.After that, the delay. The Commissionen bancmight then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would have already expired.It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commissionen bancfrom exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commissionen bancas sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission A decision made on the contest by less than the Commissionen bancwould not meet the exacting standard of care and deliberation ordained by the ConstitutionIncidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175,supra, the law was obviously referring to the body sittingen banc.In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved inAratuc vs. Commissionon Elections,13where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased.14Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process.15To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.16The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense ofdelicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null and void.17Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which was the February revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without reason, to send the recrds of this case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.But not yet.Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly say that the case is finished and the book is closed.WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000]ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.The Case and the FactsBefore us is a Petition forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec)en bancResolution No. 98-1419[1]dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same."The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."[2]The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.On May 9, 1998, this Court issuedthe Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.The IssuesPetitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections."[3]In his Memorandum,[4]the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1) mootness and (2) prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.The Court's RulingThe Petition[5]is meritorious.Procedural Issues:Mootness and PrematurityThe solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.[6]In any event, inSalonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."[7]Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.This Court, however, has ruled in the past thatthis procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,[8]when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,[9]when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,[10]or when the need for relief is extremely urgent andcertiorariis the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[11]The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelecen bancon April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action forcertiorariis therefore justified.Main Issue:Validity of Conducting Exit PollsAn exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media, committed to report balanced election-related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather Station (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen administrative regions."It argues that the holding of exit polls andthe nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. It submits that, in precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional rights.Public respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denies that, in issuing the assailed Resolution, it gravely abused its discretion. It insists that the issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers] in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution;[12]and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.[13]It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in general be manipulated easily. He insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission, as well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding andthe reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms of speech and of the press.Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the PressThe freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. x x x [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."[14]Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.[15]In the landmark caseGonzalesv. Comelec,[16]this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.[17]It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.[18]It means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,[19]we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we agree with.LimitationsThe realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such freedoms could not remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances.[20]They are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.[21]While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds has limitations.InCabansag v.Fernandez[22]this Court had occasion to discuss two theoretical tests indetermining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. x x x"[23]"The 'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, x x x may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent."[24]Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly did inits earlier decisions inPrimicias v. Fugoso[25]andAmerican Bible Society v. City of Manila;[26]as well as inlater ones,Vera v. Arca,[27]Navarro v. Villegas,[28]Imbong v. Ferrer,[29]Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec[30]and, more recently, inIglesia ni Cristo v. MTRCB.[31]In setting the standard or test for the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."[32]A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of suchsubstantivecharacter that thestate has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.[33]The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument.[34]Justification for a RestrictionDoctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity.[35]And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows,[36]so it has been said.To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown.[37]Thus:"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."[38]Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly, stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved.[39]The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.[40]We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech."[41]When faced with borderline situationsin which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.[42]True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and accessible. It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them.These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research datawhich may be used tostudy influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election-day projections, but also for long-term research.[43]Comelec Ban on Exit PollingIn the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the broadcast of the results thereof [are] x x x an exercise of press freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled.Second, the survey result is not meantto replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of theopinionof the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application iswithout qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44]Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45]There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices.InDailyHerald Co. v. Munro,[46]the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposesof which was to prevent the broadcasting of early returns, was unconstitutionalbecause such purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly tailored to advance a state interest nor the least restrictive alternative. Furthermore, thegeneralinterest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify speech regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for the reason that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is regulating speech via an exit poll restriction.[47]The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters that the latter may refuse to be interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may further be required to wear distinctive clothing that would show they are not election officials.[48]Additionally, they may be required to undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the results to be obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly election.For its part, Petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as follows: (1) communities are randomly selected in each province; (2) residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at random; (3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown by the indelible ink on their fingers, are interviewed; (4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results are released to the public only on the day after the elections.[49]These precautions, together with the possible measures earlier stated, may be undertaken to abate the Comelec's fear, without consequently and unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.With the foregoing premises, we conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.Violation of Ballot SecrecyThe contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so asto minimize or suppressincidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED,and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9, 1998ismadePERMANENT.Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelecen bancon April 21, 1998 is herebyNULLIFIEDandSETASIDE.Nocosts.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,petitioner,vs.BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO,J.:Can a provision of law, initially valid, becomesubsequentlyunconstitutional, on the ground that itscontinuedoperationwould violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the lastprovisoof Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the2,994 rank-and-file employeesof theBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas(BSP).I.The CaseFirst the facts.On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.On June 8, 2001, almosteight years afterthe effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the lastprovisoin Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:Section 15.Exercise of Authority- In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:xxx xxx xxx(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of theBangko Sentralin accordance with sound principles of management.A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of theBangko Sentral'shuman resource development program:Provided,That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.[emphasis supplied]Thethrust of petitioner's challengeis that the aboveprovisomakes anunconstitutionalcutbetween two classes of employees in the BSP,viz: (1) the BSPofficersor those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) therank-and-file(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellenceat all levelsin the BSP.1Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questionedprovisodoes not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235;2b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3of establishing professionalism and excellenceat all levelsin the BSP;4(emphasis supplied)c. the assailedprovisowas the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;5d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6ande. the assailedprovisohas caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7In sum,petitioner positsthat the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.8Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of theprovisoin question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some2,994 BSP rank-and-file employeeshave beenprejudiced since 1994when theprovisowas implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitableprovisohas no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.9RespondentBSP, in its comment,10contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."TheSolicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.11II.IssueThus, thesole- albeit significant -issueto be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."12III.RulingA. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questionedproviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held inVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,13and reiterated in a long line of cases:14The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.16If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.17The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.19That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.21An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEESOF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUEDAPPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONA VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that theenactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challengedproviso.1. The concept of relative constitutionality.The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.24A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because ofaltered circumstances.25Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light ofchanged conditions.26Demonstrative of this doctrine isVernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted.By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatorysuch, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case.28(citations omitted, emphasis supplied)In the Philippine setting,this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence ofsignificant changesin circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power30- but also ruled that thecontinued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive.It noted thesubsequent changesin the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:31The question now to be determined is, is the period ofeight (8) yearswhich Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1).But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.xxx xxx xxxIn the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us underthe present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect.(emphasis supplied, citations omitted)2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case ofAtlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they werenot yet in existencewhen the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view ofchanged conditions since their enactment.In another U.S. case,Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars.This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. Thesubsequentinauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights of way.The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied.The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the law."34(emphasis supplied)Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law,viz:[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect.A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.35(emphasis supplied, citations omitted)[W]e seeno difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial.A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .36(emphasis supplied, citations omitted3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challengedproviso.According to petitioner, the lastprovisoof Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL.37Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004,viz:1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38and7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out,that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this commonproviso:a blanket exemption ofall their employeesfrom the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:Section 90.Personnel.-xxx xxx xxxAll positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability.The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)xxx xxx xxx2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:xxx xxx xxx(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act:Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS President:Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission;Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations:Provided, finally,That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430.(emphasis supplied)3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:xxx xxx xxxThe Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:xxx xxx xxx(e)notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989issued by the Department of Budget and Management,the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions.(emphases supplied)4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].xxx xxx xxxSec. 43.Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. -The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and functions:xxx xxx xxx(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and administration of theGSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law.(emphasis supplied)xxx xxx xxx5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:Section 13.Other Officers and Employees.- The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability.The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended).(emphasis supplied)6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)Section 9.Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions and duties:xxx xxx xxx(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the Corporation:Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities:Provided, further,That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations;and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)xxx xxx xxx7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:xxx xxx xxx3.xxx xxx xxxA compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's human resource development program:Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities.The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutionsand shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability.The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP.And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 wasconfined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP,found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however,constitute significant changes in circumstancethat considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the lastprovisoof Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing theprovisoto more serious scrutiny.This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws -between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs.The classification must not only be reasonable,but must also apply equally to all members of the class.Theprovisomay be fair on its face and impartial in appearancebut it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.40Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs?Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluationvis--visthe grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?In thissecond levelof scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature."All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination- even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.Infine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in thesecond level of scrutinyis not thedeclaredpolicy of each lawper se, butthe oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policytowards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination,directly or indirectly.If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.41It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary,our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.Before the SSL,Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976)declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees.But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among government employees.Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies."42The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the SSL,43but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:46(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;(3) the kind of supervision received;(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;(6) kind of supervision exercised;(7) decision-making responsibility;(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP,implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authorit