1

20. Lim vs Felix

Facts:

The fiscal filed four informations for murder against petitioners in Masbate. The SC

ordered a transfer of venue to Makati. Petitioners asked the court of Makati to order the

transmittal of the records of Preliminary Investigation to enable it to determine if there

was probable cause for their arrest. The court denied the motion and issued warrants

for the arrest of the petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the warrant was proper

Ruling:

No. If a judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor when the records are

not before him, he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The

determination was made by the prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not

been satisfied. The judge does not have to personally examine the witnesses. However,

there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the certification of the

prosecutor. All these should be before the judge. The extent of the examination of the

report and the documents depend on the circumstances of each case. The judge

should exercise his sound discretion.

21. Manalili v CA

FACTS:

Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a

cemetery who seemed to be high on drugs. He tried to resist the police officers and

upon inquiry, found that the accused was possessing what seemed to be crushed

marijuana leaves.

ISSUE: WON there was an illegal search.

HELD: No. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a

police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons.

It has been held as one of the exceptions to the general rule against searches without

warrant.

The landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio provides that “x x x (W)here a police officer

observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his

experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is

dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating

this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and

where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear

for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the

2

area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an

attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a

reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may

properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.”

22. PP V SUCRO

Facts:

Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of

Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2

meters away from Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and

exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt.

Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later

identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the

area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told

Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing

in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of

marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in

front of the chapel.

The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and

Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the

chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Issue:

(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.

Held:

Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule

126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may

be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the

commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of

the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge

required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.

However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed.

The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime

from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones

3

conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of

their duties

23 . PEOPLE V. ABE VALDEZ

Facts:

Accused was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972., An

extrajudicial confession was made as to the ownership of marijuana plants.

Issue:

WON the search was illegal?

HELD:

The marijuana plants seized were product of an illegal search because of the absence

of search warrant and are therefore inadmissible in evidence. The voluntary confession

of ownership of marijuana was in violation of the custodial rights because of the

absence of competent and independent counsel, and thus, inadmissible too. In sum,

both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to the appellant’s voluntary

confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant’s guilt

failed to meet the test of constitutional competence. Without these, the prosecution’s

remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to

warrant appellant’s conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence on his favor

stands.

24. People vs Chua Ho San

Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,

Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began

patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of

Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m.

from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police

assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked

different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock

at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1

Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite,

and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat

landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a

multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and

4

Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became

suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon

seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on

to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the man

appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then

requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then

resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The

man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded

several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid

wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter

did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and

escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited

and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the

assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his men to

find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the

meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing

yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived,

through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen

asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely

showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents

were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando,

La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the

Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa

Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic

packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative

examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be

positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was

initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the

RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of

the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently

amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as

amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31

July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking

interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters

assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural

Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign

Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to

his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they

decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police,

with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to

the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an

5

officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they

presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents,

then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated

on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of

methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the

reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other

contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing

boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the

Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the

police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate

his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable

cause."

Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and

person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever

nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said

right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle

which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for

any purpose inany proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable

searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure.

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and

such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by

jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)

arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped

prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the

incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without

the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or

demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could

have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took

the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding

that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when

apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant

smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in

appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,

Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to

flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can

return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,

do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package

emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential

report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or

the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or

behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as sufficient to

justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that a

foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date

6

in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent.

The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing

boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an

offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To

reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and

the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as

already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition.

Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a

poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and

ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.

25. People v Tangliben

Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San

Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel

Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted

him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then

taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty

of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.

Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o

a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has

committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of

marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant.

Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police

officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen

that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and

there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

26. PP VS JOHNSON

Facts:

Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a

resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was

naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a

registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in

convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines

7

to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United

States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the

traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at

5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez

was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to

frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs,

prohibited drugs, contrabandgoods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a

departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt

something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained

she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a

result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the

matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang

panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for

inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina

Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by

Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same answer

she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her

girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to

Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2

grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be

methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic

packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of

the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened.

Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged

for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated

drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of §16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs

Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110,

Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.

Issue:

Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against

unreasonable search and seizure.

Held:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under

custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the

provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides

that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)

when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,

or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been

8

committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances

surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule

above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial

investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized

from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to

airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure

clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a

lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to

recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With

increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security

at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass

through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage is

routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of

suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects

are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal

intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy

expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travellers are often notified through

airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are

subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would

be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary

constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to

routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus

been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence

against Johnson. Corollary, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant,

was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her

person in flagrante delicto.

27. People vs. Malmstedt

Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was

charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of

Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,

as amended.

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third

time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and

1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in

the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for

9

two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to

Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen

Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed

at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14,

Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from

the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was

prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting

marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the

Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from

Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7)

NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the

designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles

coming from the Cordillera Region.

The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the

rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the

rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the

bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and

other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to

bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out

to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer

noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting

the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to

contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted

from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy

bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there

were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the

officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

10

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La

Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers

opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative

samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused

and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a

prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed

against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ACCUSED’S DEFENSE

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he

raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish

was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling

bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian

couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple

intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats

available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take

charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond

reasonable doubt.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime

charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it

was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were

discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC

ruling be reversed.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However,

11

where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a

search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a

private person under the following circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may,

without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing,

or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of

facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal

establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while

his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to

another.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A

crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante

delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph

(1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a

lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search

warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however,

under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said

officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a

reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,

and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to

be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been

declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the

smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where

the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.

12

The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs

against the accused-appellant.

28. Valmonte vs. De Villa

Facts:

Petitioner questioned the legality of the establishment of checkpoints pursuant to Letter

of Instruction 02/87 on the ground that they authorized illegal searches.

Issue: Whether or not checkpoints authorize illegal searches.

Ruling:

No. The setting up of checkpoints is a security measure intended to enable the military

to pursue the mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace

and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent right of the state to

protect its existence and promote public welfare and the right of an individual a

warrantless search which is reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. Where

the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a parked empty vehicle, looks into a

vehicle, or flashes a light in it, these do not constitute unreasonable searches.

29. People v De Gracia

Facts: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d''etat

staged in December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two

separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance

of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal

possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted

homicide. Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of

intelligence reports about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in

gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales

Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five

bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one

of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office

of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. The team

arrested appellant. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the

explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was

secured by the raiding team. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

13

Ruling: YES It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office

were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated

by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM.

Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the

surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.

The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a

warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the

facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being

committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant

their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no

opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge

himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court

was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant

could lawfully be dispensed with.

30. SJS VS DDB AND PDEA

Facts:

Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36

of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires

mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and

tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons

charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. According to Aquilino

Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004

elections, said mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators

beyond that which are provided by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution

authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of

candidates for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are

constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they

give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug

testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student

or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable

searches is also breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty.

Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be

struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the

right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination,

and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

Issue:

WON Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional

14

Held:

Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy

means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from

intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's

ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement as to the basic

function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract

prohibition against‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines

for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camarav

Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain

paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. The

first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy

interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec.

2, Art. III of the Constitution intrudes. Just as defining as the first factor is the character of

the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the

scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the

enabling law authorizing a search “narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? To reiterate,

RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus

protect the well- being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects

of dangerous drugs. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced

expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern

likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to

properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the

challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable

and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government

officials and employees also labour under reasonable supervision and restrictions

imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to

promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm

of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for

civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all

times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. – Authorized drug testing shall be done by any

government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited

and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take

steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to

further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others,

two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as

well as the type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive

screening test. Drug test certificates issued by accredited drug testing centers shall be

15

valid for a one-year period from the date of issue which may be used for other

purposes. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

(a) Applicants for driver's license. – No driver's license shall be issued or renewed

to any person unless he/she presents a certification that he/she has undergone a

mandatory drug test and indicating thereon that he/she is free from the use of

dangerous drugs;

(b) Applicants for firearm's license and for permit to carry firearms outside of

residence. – All applicants for firearm's license and permit to carry firearms

outside of residence shall undergo a mandatory drug test to ensure that they are

free from the use of dangerous drugs: Provided, That all persons who by the

nature of their profession carry firearms shall undergo drug testing;

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. – Students of secondary and

tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained

in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a

random drug testing: Provided, That all drug testing expenses whether in public

or private schools under this Section will be borne by the government;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. – Officers and

employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be

subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work

rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of

reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use

of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground

for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor

Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement

agencies. – Officers and members of the military, police and other law

enforcement agencies shall undergo an annual mandatory drug test;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense

having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and

one (1) day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug test; and

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the

national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be

positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of

this Act.

16

31. Pollo vs David

FACTS:

[This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government

employee who was then charged administratively and was eventually dismissed from

the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the

government employer as evidence of his misconduct.]

On January 3, 2007, an anonymous letter-complaint was received by the

respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairperson alleging that the “chief of the

Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division” of Civil Service Commission Regional

Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in

the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in

information technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the

files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal

divisions.”

The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in

the hard disk of computers at the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and the

Legal Services Division. This was witnessed by several employees. At around 10:00

p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the

computers in the PALD were sealed and secured. The diskettes containing the back-up

files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were then turned over to

Chairperson David. It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files

copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering

about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with

administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a

Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit

within five days from notice.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the

anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of

his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007

in which he informed Director Castillo of CSC-ROIV that the files in his computer were his

personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is

not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate

his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and

warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property, the

temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt

is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use

for personal purposes. In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his

computer without his consent [are] thus inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a

poisonous tree.”

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with

Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the

Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for

17

Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion (For

Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis

having proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority of the CSC

Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The CSC denied this omnibus

motion.

On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of

Appeals (CA) assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and February 26,

2007 Resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to

excess or total absence of jurisdiction. On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued a Resolution

finding petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the

Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty

of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also

brought to the CA by herein petitioner.

By a Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition

for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC

officials. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner

brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Was the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of

his personal files without his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his

constitutional right to privacy – lawful?

HELD:

[The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA, which in turn

upheld the CSC resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. The High Tribunal held

that the search on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files were both LAWFUL and DID NOT VIOLATE his constitutional right to privacy.]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet

of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure

under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a

prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and

seizures.

32. The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo

FACTS:

18

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to

the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After

18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and

Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving

them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the

Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently

filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo

petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of

amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of

the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation

reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of

two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the

Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and

the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the

decision promulgated by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the writ was proper

Ruling:

Yes. In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing

violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent

remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been

violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials

or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their

escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens

because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of

respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a

conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,

and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,

actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.

33. Robert Reyes v. Sec. Raul Gonzales

Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on

November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty

(50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to, conduct inquest proceedings to

ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

19

On December 1, 2007, upon the request of DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul

Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner

of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned

case in the interest of national security and public safety.

Later on, the case against rebellion was dismissed.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the

dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on

December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is

included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of

petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to

Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the

Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA

for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers

because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the

Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner

further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of

the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.

The petition for a writ of amparo is filed against DOJ secretary on the ground that he

violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ

Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

Issue: WON the Writ of amparo is the proper action to file in the case at bar?

Held: No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose

right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful

act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to only to two instances of "extralegal

killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof. To start off with the basics,

the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in

the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of

available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended

to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an

extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing

Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect

concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue

on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

20

34. MARYNETTE GAMBOA VS MARLOU CHAN

Facts:

Former Pres. Arroyo issued AO No. 275 creating the Zeñarosa Commision which was

forme to investigate the existence of private groups in the country in view of eliminating

and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation,

the Commission submitted a confidential report to the Office of the President.

Marynette Gamboa was the mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, Gamboa alleged that the

PNP Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides, and

classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP

forwarded the information gathered on her to the commission, causing her inclusion in

the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

Gamboa’s association with the PAG was published and released in different forms of

media. Publicly tagging her as PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was

violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of habeas data to

destroy the unverified reports from the PNP database and restrain PNP from forwarding

baseless reports against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion violates her right to privacy.

However, the RTC dismissed the petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa

failed to establish the source of information.

Issues:

WON the forwarding of information or intel report by PNP to the Commission was

violation of petitioner’s right to privacy.

Held:

Forwarding of the information or intel report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is

not an intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed

groups not recognized by the authority. It also provides for the establishment of one

police force that is national in scope in civilian in character, and is controlled by the

NAPOLCOM.

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of AO

275articulates a legitimate aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs and

ultimately dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling

PAG, the PNP gathered information on suspected PAG coddlers. One of them was the

petitioner Gamboa.

21

This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained

in the Report listing her as PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the

trial court, however the forwarding of the information by the PNP to the Commission

was not an unlawful act that iolated or threatened the right to privacy in life, liberty or

security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding

the PAGs with body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence

of these notorious groups. Moreover the PNP was deputized by the Commission in the

fulfilment of the Commission’s mandate. The fact that the PNP released the information

to the Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her

the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her

privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence gathering

and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation

system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and

to ensure that data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus safeguards were put in

place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and

accuracy.

35. Navarro vs CA

Facts:

Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique “Ike” Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station

DWTI in Lucena City, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was

showing nude dancers. Jalbuena took pictures when the woman removed her

brassieres. The manager of the Club went to them together with the guards to ask why

the pictures were taken. Then , they were threatened to be killed. So they went to the

police station to report the matter. However, the police officer Navarro sided the

personnel of the club. Navarro took his firearm and point it to Jalbuena. Lingan tried to

mediate however he had heated argument with Navarro and he was shot. Navarro

told his companion that put it on police blotter that it was Lingan who provoke him to

fight. However Jalbuena was able to record the conversation between Lingan and

Navarro and presented such in court.

Issue:

WON the recorded communication between Navarro and Lingan admissible?

Held:

Yes.

22

Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,

effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein

contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of

this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or

administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communication. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not

private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is

authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the

conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that

the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the

instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the

tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were

petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the

authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.

36. Ramirez vs CA

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a

confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a

"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and

personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and

sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation. As a result of

petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the

confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional

Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable

provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation

by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers

to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those

involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance

or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts

charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that

R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private

conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with

private respondent was not illegal under the said act.

Issue: WON there is a violation of R.A. 4200

23

Ruling: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 “clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any

person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly

record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction

as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other

than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent

to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use

of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, …….even a (person) privy to a communication

who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter

(will) qualify as a “violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.”

The Supreme Court held further that the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a

violation of the statute. It held that:

“The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What

R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording

private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere

allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by

means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.

4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:

“Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,

the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be

professed.”

37. Zulueta V CA

Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta

entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her

mother, a driver and Martin’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her

husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence

between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks,

diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized

for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the

practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought

the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against

Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court

rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the

properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in

the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her

behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as

nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the

costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional

Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

24

Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and

correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.

Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional

injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]

inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself

aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional

provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if

there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,

as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained

inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The intimacies between husband

and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the

other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by

contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an

individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law

insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it

privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the

consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined

without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by

one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is

freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what

one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each

owes to the other.

38. WATEROUS DRUGS CORPORATION VS NLRC

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug

Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum

from Waterous Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to

dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the

same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum

to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting

the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases

and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the

first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act

was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines

in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a

charge slip by the Admitting Department, Catolico then asked the company to look

into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989,

Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of

medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, Waterous Control Clerk

Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and

Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but

25

she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon

conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the

check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of

fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the

check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the

amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. Forthwith, in her

memorandum dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within 24 hours,

her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her

explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990.

However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7

March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of

the company. In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file

containing Sales Invoice 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In

said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an

envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico,

through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas

gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension

was ill motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary,

Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990, Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a

memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed

before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal

dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex

Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against Waterous. Nevertheless,

he decided in favor of Catolico because Waterous failed to "prove what [they] alleged

as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted.

Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the

dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the

best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico

computed at one-half month's pay for every year of service; back wages for one year;

and the additional sum of P2, 000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days work";

for a total of P35, 401.86. Waterous seasonably appealed from the decision and urged

the NLRC to set it aside. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the

findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just

cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. And thus dismissed the appeal for

lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting

the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation

of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35, 401.86. Their motion for

reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the special civil action for certiorari

with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

26

Whether Waterous’ act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers is

contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a person’s right

to privacy of communication.

Held:

In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from

interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private

individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the

government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs.

Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and

seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true that the citizens have no

recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both

criminal and civil liabilities. Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of

communication, and Waterous was justified in opening an envelope from one of its

regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in

which it had an interest. However, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due

process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given

reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply opportunity to be heard and

defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample

opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the

employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal

representation. Although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she

was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her

Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever

conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's

memorandum spoke of "evidence in [Waterous] possession," which were not, however,

submitted. What the "evidence" other than the sales invoice and the check were, only

the Supervisor knew. Catolico's dismissal then was grounded on mere suspicion, which

in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes

provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal

of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and

not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was

not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust

and confidence" is restricted. Thus, the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed

except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence

against Catolico was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her

constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches

and seizures, which was set aside.

27

39. MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO

FACTS:

In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A.

Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of

inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the

Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The

accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman

entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al, for

violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between

the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on Section 15 of RA

6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides, among others, the following powers,

functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in

any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank

accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same

procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the

Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the

same footing as the courts of law in this regard.”

The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was

a trail of managers checks (MCs) purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in

OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that Trivinio

purchased on May 2 and 3, 1995, 51 MCs for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders

Royal Bank (TRB) UN Ave. Branch. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven 11 MCs in the amount of

P70.6M were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the UBP.

On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met with petitioner Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino

at the bank’s main office in Makati City, for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty.

Macalino to view the checks furnished by TRB. After convincing themselves of the

veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of

the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998.

However, on June 4, 1998, Marquez wrote the Ombudsman that the accounts in

question could not readily be identified since the checks were issued in cash or bearer,

and asked for time to respond to the order. Marquez surmised that these accounts had

long been dormant, hence were not covered by the new account number generated

by the UB system, thus sought to verify from the Interbank records archives for the

whereabouts of these accounts.

The Ombudsman, responding to the request of Marquez for time to comply with the

order, stated that UBP-Julia Vargas, not Interbank, was the depositary bank of the

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subject TRB MCs as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing

House. Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, the

name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account numbers where

said checks were deposited were identified in the order.

Even assuming that the accounts were already classified as dormant accounts, the

bank was still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a

certain period of time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.

On June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to produce the

bank documents relative to the accounts in issue, stating that her persistent refusal to

comply with the order is unjustified, was merely intended to delay the investigation of

the case, constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by the office

and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770.

On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief,

prohibition and injunction with the Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly

because the Ombudsman and other persons acting under his authority were

continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in

question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating

that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, Marquez

would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.

The lower court denied petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order stating that

since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the

investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of

injunction may be issued by the RTC to delay the investigation pursuant to Section 14 of

the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt.

On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion

to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the

petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no

intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be

clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law,

particularly RA 1405.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to

produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman.

2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the

29

questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits

(RA 1405).

HELD:

An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the

following exceptions:

1. Where the depositor consents in writing;

2. Impeachment case;

3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;

4. Deposit is subject of litigation;

5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs.

Gancayco

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending

case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly

identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the

court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be

notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the

account identified in the pending case.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that “Section 2 of the Law

on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be “absolutely

confidential” except:

(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank

that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is

reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is

being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud

or irregularity,

(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct

its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results

thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,

(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,

(4) In cases of impeachment,

(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public

officials, or

(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the

litigation”

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent

authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short,

30

what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence

to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there

was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account

for inspection.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides

that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of

his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for

meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or

employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and

liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private

communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by

an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.

Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the

Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.

Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager

Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14,

1998, and similar orders.

40. Ople vs Torres

Facts:

The petition at bar is an effort to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which is

considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized

men." Petitioner Ople prays that Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a

National Computerized Identification Reference System" be invalidated on two

important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to

legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We

grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger

barriers against further erosion.

Issue: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 is an invasion of the right to privacy

Ruling:

Yes. In striking down A.O. 308, the SC emphasized that the Court is not per se against

the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to

improve our bureaucracy. The SC also emphasized that the right to privacy does not

bar all incursions into the right to individual privacy. This right merely requires that the

law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into

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the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to

prevent unconstitutional invasions.

The right to privacy is a constitutional right, granted recognition independently of its

identification with liberty. It is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our

Constitution, specifically in Sections 1, 2, 3 (1), 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights. Zones of

privacy are also recognized and protected in our laws, including certain provisions of

the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code, as well as in special laws (e.g., Anti-

Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and the Intellectual Property Code).

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thefore, it is

the burden of government to show that A.O. 308 is justified by some compelling state

interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The government failed to discharge this burden.

A.O. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and

foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and

social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to

reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by

persons seeking basic services. While it is debatable whether these interests are

compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. 308, it is not arguable that the

broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. 308, if implemented, will put our

people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference

Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to establish a linkage among

concerned agencies” through the use of “Biometrics Technology” and “computer

application designs.” Biometry or biometrics is “the science of the application of

statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data.” The

methods or forms of biological encoding include finger-scanning and retinal scanning,

as well as the method known as the “artificial nose” and the thermogram. A.O. 308

does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics

technology shall be used.

Moreover, A.O. 308 does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological

information alone for identification purposes. The Solicitor General’s claim that the

adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the “generation of

population data for development planning” is an admission that the PRN will not be

used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to

the avowed purposes of A.O. 308. The computer linkage gives other government

agencies access to the information, but there are no controls to guard against leakage

of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular

computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make

32

use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the

system.

A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about

our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of

proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of

abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also

enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the

right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by

government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and

seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer

technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over

what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data

encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

41. Telebap v Comelec

Facts: TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of

Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without

due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television

broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the

power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period.

Issue: WON there is a violation of freedom of expression

Held: No. Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by

television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be

allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are

frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to

amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such

franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by

the Congress when the common good so requires."

Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the

franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was

brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just

compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises

for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common

good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of

the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an

election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."

Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that

broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible

33

scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can

constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to

further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be

required to give free air time to candidates in an election.

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do

not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals

and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a

franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened

with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

42. ABS-CBN VS COMELEC

Facts:

COMELEC came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during

elections for the reason that exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolution pass by the COMELEC curtails the freedom of expression?

Held:

Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of

speech and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of

such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the

COMELEC cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in

voting centers.

43. SWS vs Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout

the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as

publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election

survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without

any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:

34

Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the

dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:

No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on

the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of

expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the

governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than

suppression of freedom of expression.

It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of

public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities,

but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the

maintenance of democratic institutions.”

44. A. M. 10-04-03 SC Radio TV Coverage of the Trial in Sandiganbayan

45. Newsound Broadcasting Network v Hon. Cesar Dy

Facts: Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (“Newsounds”) and Consolidated

Broadcasting System, Inc. (“CBS”) are among the the broadcast stations operating

under Bombo Radyo Philippines. Among the stations run by Newsounds is Bombo Radyo

DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station operating out of Cauayan City, Isabela.

Upon the renewal of mayor’s permit of DZNC, for them to continue to operate on

Cauayan city by reason that the land in which the radio station operate is not a commercial land.

The DAR later on determine that the land has already been converted into commercial

lang, however, the office of the Mayor still refuses to issue permit, and upon the lapse of the previous permit, ordered the closure of the establishment.

Hence this petition.

Issue: WON the action of the Mayor infringes the right of speech and expression of the Petitioners.

Held: Yes. Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss

publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment.

There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability

whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt

35

proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the

respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing

their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of

expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. While any system of prior

restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.

The actions taken by respondents are colored with legal authority, under the powers of

local governments vested in the Local Government Code (LGC), or more generally, the

police powers of the State. We do not doubt that Local Government Units (LGU) are

capacitated to enact ordinances requiring the obtention of licenses or permits by

businesses, a term defined elsewhere in the LGC as “trade or commercial activity

regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.” However,

expression in media such as print or the Internet is not burdened by such requirements

as congressional franchises or administrative licenses which bear upon broadcast

media. Broadcast is hampered by its utilization of the finite resources of the

electromagnetic spectrum, which long ago necessitated government intervention and

administration to allow for the orderly allocation of bandwidth, with broadcasters

agreeing in turn to be subjected to regulation. There is no issue herein that calls into

question the authority under law of petitioners to engage in broadcasting activity, yet

these circumstances are well worth pointing out if only to provide the correct

perspective that broadcast media enjoys a somewhat lesser degree of constitutional protection than print media or the Internet.

46. HECTOR VILLANUEVA VS PDI

Facts:

Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, NegrosOriental during the May

11, 1992 elections.

Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent

Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following

story:

The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for

mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave

abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the

mayor’s office of Bais City.

A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

(PDI) also came out with a similar story, to wit:

36

The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for

mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave

abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the

mayor’s office of Bais City.

On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results

came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid.

Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories,

petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and

editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were

maliciously timed to defeat him.

Issue:

WON the statements issued by the Respondents falls under the protection of freedom of

expression.

Held:

This court ruled finding the respondents entitled to the protection of the rules

concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our Bill of

Rights. We cannot punish journalists including publishers for an honest endeavor to

serve the public when moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by their sense of

responsibility as news media to report what they perceived to be a genuine report. The

newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to

courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the

preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their

deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be

held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the

choice of words.

The rule on privileged communication had its genesis not in the nation’s penal code but

in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the

press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that publications

which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional

guaranty of freedom of speech.

47. GSIS vs Villavisa

Facts:

37

Villaviza, et al, went to the Investigation Unit, wearing red shirts, to witness a

public hearing. They assembled at the said office to express support to Velasco,

their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by

the GSIS management. In which they considered it as an exercise of their

freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right. However Garcia,

upon learning such asked them to explain in writing why they should not be

charged of Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of

the Service. None of them replied so they were suspended.

Issue:

WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING

FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES

AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO PROTEST

THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR LEADER AS COUNSEL

IN THE SAID ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL

ASSEMBLY.

Held:

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office

wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or

mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can be

deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA

found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate

the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass

action proscribed must be coupled with the “intent of effecting work stoppage or

service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession.” Wearing

similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with

them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and

PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service

disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.

02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all

38

collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.

Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government

service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Thus, respondents’ freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and

CSC’s Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass

action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,

respondents’ actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass

action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.

48. Soriano vs MTRCB

Facts: Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang Dating Daan, a

popular television ministry aired nationwide everyday from 10:00 p.m. to midnight over

public television. The program carried a “general patronage” rating from the Movie

and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).

The Ang Dating Daan’s rivalry with another religious television program,

the Iglesia ni Cristo’s Ang Tamang Daan, is well known. The hosts of the two shows have

regularly engaged in verbal sparring on air, hurling accusations and counter-

accusations with respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices.

It appears that in his program Ang Tamang Daan, Michael M. Sandoval

(Michael) of the Iglesia ni Cristo attacked petitioner Soriano of the Ang Dating Daan for

alleged inconsistencies in his Bible teachings. Michael compared spliced recordings of

Soriano’s statements, matched with subtitles of his utterances, to demonstrate those

inconsistencies. On August 10, 2004, in an apparent reaction to what he perceived as

a malicious attack against him by the rival television program, Soriano accused

Michael of prostituting himself with his fabricated presentations.

Michael and seven other ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against

petitioner Soriano before the MTRCB.

Before us is this motion of petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano for reconsideration of the Decision

of the Court dated April 29, 2009, modifying that of the Movie and Television Review

and Classification Board (MTRCB) by imposing the penalty of three-month suspension

on the television show Ang Dating Daan, instead of on petitioner Soriano, as host of that

program.

39

Petitioner seeks reconsideration on the following grounds or issues: (1) the suspension

thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint; (2) the Court erred in ruling

that his utterances[1] did not constitute exercise of religion; (3) the Court erred in finding

the language used as offensive and obscene; (4) the Court should have applied its

policy of non-interference in cases of conflict between religious groups; and (5) the

Court erred in penalizing the television program for the acts of petitioner.

Issue: WON the petition has merit

Ruling: No. the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under the

factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of

subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the

broadcast of the program on August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner has not contested

the fact of his having made statements on the air that were contextually violative of the

program’s “G” rating. To merit a “G” rating, the program must be “suitable for all

ages,” which, in turn, means that the “material for television [does not], in the judgment

of the [MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be

viewed without adult guidance or supervision.”[3] As previously discussed by the Court,

the vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television can in no way be

characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children.

Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms, referring particularly to the

exercise of his religious beliefs and profession, as presiding minister of his flock, over the

right and duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioner’s position may be accorded

some cogency, but for the fact that it fails to consider that the medium he used to

make his statements was a television broadcast, which is accessible to children of

virtually all ages. As already laid down in the Decision subject of this recourse, the

interest of the government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioner’s

invectives must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The

public soapbox that is television must be guarded by the state, which purpose the

MTRCB serves, and has served, in suspending Ang Dating Daan for petitioner’s

statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,[4] the freedom of broadcast

media is, in terms of degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as

regards television, which reaches every home where there is a set, and where children

will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid

the basis for the classification system of the MTRCB when it stated, “It cannot be denied

though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring

for the welfare of the young.”

Contrary to petitioner’s impression, the Court has, in fact, considered the factual

antecedents of and his motive in making his utterances, and has found those

40

circumstances wanting as defense for violating the program’s “G” rating. Consider the

following excerpts from the Court’s Decision:

There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing

any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical

mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible

exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a

religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be

elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his

words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek

retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming itsveracity,

that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting

amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul

language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that

petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they

constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by

a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the

level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen

to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.

The penalty imposed is on the program, not on petitioner.

49. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. anti- terrorism council

Facts: This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An

Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of

the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary

fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an

unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

On the other hand, OSG claim that the vagueness theory and overbreadth theory

cannot be applied in the case at bar, since they are only applicable in questioning the

constitutionality or legality of laws and acts which involves freedom of speech and expression.

Issue: WON the overbreadth and void for vagueness theory are only applicable in cases involving freedom of speech and expression and not on penal statute.

41

Held: YEs. Statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at

its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two

respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties

targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers

unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the

Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a

governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state

regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free

speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. Under no case

may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is

obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes

may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against

employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed,

would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and

concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial

challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would,

essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. The

allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the

State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder

an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as

applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that

the law is clear as applied to him.

50. BAYAN KARAPATAN VS ERMITA

Facts:

The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the

Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the

rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen

implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the

Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other

human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880

requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or

absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus

repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public

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assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not

content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The

words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of

some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance”

shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are

being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14,

2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy

resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,

particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied

to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue:

Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,

specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine

Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to

peaceably assemble.

Held:

Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed

abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the

people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with

freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in

the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a

functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless

and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may

be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal

rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the

exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,”

which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,

education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply

regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows

that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference

to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to

be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to

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protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances

come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,

maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of

the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger

to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is

a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the

Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary

steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880

through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza

in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this

Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to

exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in

every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law.

Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ

from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are

ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of

maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the

constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

51. IBP vs Atienza

Facts:

IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally

at thefoot of Mendiola Bridge. The mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a

rally on givendate but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of

Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. A criminal action

was thereafter instituted against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging

a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.

Issue: Can the mayor validly change the venue of the permit without informing the

applicant?

Held:

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The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor

gravely abusedhis discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should

have been heard first onthe matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a

substantive evil that may warrant thechanging of the venue. The opportunity to

be heard precedes the action on the permit, since theapplicant may directly go to

court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate

how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear

and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification.

Nothingin the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive

evil, which“blank” denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the

appellate court wouldhave it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

52. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO

ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to

assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to

the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free

exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal

protection of the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any

other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of

presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any

particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,

economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for

religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the

declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action

in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by

45

the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa

Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or

other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership

where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police

and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the

dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the

public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers

or sound system and similar changes.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be

required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public

place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or

made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in

which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is

required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational

institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational

institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as

provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the

following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or

organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof,

and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of

persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under

Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality

in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days

before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the

office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at

a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

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(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a

permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will

create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,

public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two

(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall

be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his

behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted

by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to

have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive

evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the

applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within

twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the

terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate

court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,

the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate

Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48)

hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be

required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the

applicant shall, be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)

hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the

executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the

use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road

or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public

inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or

reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue

interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

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Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the

leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps

to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in

accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the

following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from

disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end

that the public assembly may be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated

in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act

unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public

assembly.

Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement

agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to

adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command

of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one

hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and

order at all times.

Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law

enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers,

to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper

protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of

expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the

following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall

be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed

prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy

of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms

but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas

masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

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(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be

used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of

violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit

shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may

disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement

contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the

latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the

participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property

causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement

contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public

assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph

should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall

audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a

reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the

public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any

provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal

Code, as amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public

assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal.

Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is

held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be

peacefully dispersed.

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer

without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the

office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than

those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held

criminally liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the

provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.

49

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the

application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to

peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or

any person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the

area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,

bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the

use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited

acts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and

one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall

be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six

months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential

Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by

imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six

months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable

"freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall

be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be

held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

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In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall

establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this

Act.

Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or

unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be

affected thereby.

Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,

ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are

hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

53. Estrada v excritor

FACTS: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.

Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of

Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor

has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually

begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year

before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married

to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a

resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent

should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the

Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is

in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed

on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the

congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it

impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the

Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified

and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was

completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of

“gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

51

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that

gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise

Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on

religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining

among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the

OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates

how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious

freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present

evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be

discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given

an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in

opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and

punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not

prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this

would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.

Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of

religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

54. SORIANO VS LAGUARDIA

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating

Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before

the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.

Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),

against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M.

Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC

and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the

religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III? (Lehitimong

anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa

putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung

ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa

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putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra

ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito)

Held:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the

adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as

petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended

him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue

curtailment of his right to freedom of speech either as a prior restraint or as a

subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of

viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of

the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be

avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious

communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of

less offensive language.

55. Austria vs NLRC

Facts:

Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day

Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by

the other private respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his

services were terminated.Austria worked with SDA for 28 years. On various occasions

from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications from Mr.

Ibesate, treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and

responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in

his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.In his answer, petitioner said that

he should not be made accountable since it was private respondent Pastor Buhat and

Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very

sick to do the collecting at that time. Thereafter, petitioner went to the office of Pastor

Buhat, president of the Negros Mission, and asked for a convention to settle the dispute

between petitioner and Pastor Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner

because there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until petitioner

left the office. However, while on his way out, he heard Pastor Buhat saying,

"Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough)´ which prompted him to go

back and overturn Pastor Buhat¶s table, scatter books in the office, bang Buhat¶s

attaché case and throw the phone. Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife

to attend the meeting to discuss the non-remittance of church collection and the

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events that transpired between him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was

created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal

citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious

misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense

against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the

termination of his services 1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal

dismissal. = decision rendered in favor of petitioner 2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision

rendered in favor of respondent3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration =

reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter 4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision

rendered in favor of respondent Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner.

Issue:

WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as

such, involves the separation of church and state;

Held:

The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case.

The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in

the familiar saying, “Strong fences make good neighbors.”[17] The idea advocated by

this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid

encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of

their respective exclusive jurisdictions.[18] The demarcation line calls on the entities to

“render therefore unto Ceasar the things that are Ceasar’s and unto God the things

that are God’s.”[19] While the State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical

affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.[20]

The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to

bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is “one that

concerns doctrine, creed, or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and

enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the

government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations

those deemed unworthy of membership.[21] Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical

affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to

matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To

be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot

meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,

administration of sacraments and other activities with which attached religious

significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited

examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it

does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is

involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an

employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith,

worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated or

expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from

employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in

54

nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious

congregation

56. Islamic Da’was Council of the Phils vs. Exec. Sec

Facts: Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation

that operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a non-

governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,

especially to Muslim communities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic

organizations and an active member of international organizations such as the

Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The

World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited petitioner to issue halal

certifications in the Philippines. Thus, among the functions petitioner carries out is to

conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to

qualified products and manufacturers.

Petitioner alleges that, the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due

to halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and

procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection

thereof and issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue,

for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even

adopted for use on its halal certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine

Patent Office.

On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the

Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its

implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue

halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

Issue: Whether or Not EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of

Church and State.

Held: It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on

the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious

organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

According to petitioner, a food product becomes halal only after the performance of

Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter

animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore

perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without

doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards

used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power

to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim

55

organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products

are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal

certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of

the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive

Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as

halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively

protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The

protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided

for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring

that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly

labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of

Muslims.

57. Velarde v Social Justice Society

Facts:

-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-

Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,

Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F.

Soriano.

-SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of

several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and

state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of

religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or

requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specifiedcandidate.

-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact

that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action

and that there was no justiciable controversy.

-The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:

o It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for

a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents

were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the

petition has raised only a question of law.

o It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the

Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some

extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse,

the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific

candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the

separation clause."

-The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive

portion, however. Due to thisaberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate

Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.

56

-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.

Issues: May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from

endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from

campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)

Ruling: The court cannot determine the issue because of procedural and technical

errors on the pronouncement of judgment appealed from.

58. TARUC VS BISHOP DELA CRUZ

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,

1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the

Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication,

petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de

la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal

because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is

a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said

institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities

in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the

members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for

the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a

civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title,

use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in

the present case.

59. CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

Facts:

57

-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former

government official) initiated this original action seeking(1) to prohibit and “enjoin

respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or

executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.Marcos . .

. relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in

the Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and(2) to

“compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be

theyongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such

negotiations andagreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the

same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies whocommitted

unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of

thecountry's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several

newsreports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997.

These news itemsreferred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos

assets deposited in variouscoded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported

execution of a compromise, between thegovernment (through PCGG) and the Marcos

heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make

public any and all negotiations and agreementspertaining to PCGG's task of

recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that anycompromise on

the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount publicinterest,"

since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be

greatlyprejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in

general have aright to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by

the government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise

agreement with theMarcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is

premature, because there is noshowing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the

negotiations and the Agreements. And evenif he has, PCGG may not yet be

compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms andconditions of the

Agreements have not become effective and binding.-PETITIONER INVOKES

Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall berecognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers

pertaining to official acts,transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research

data used as basis for policy development,shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such

limitations as may be provided by law.Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable

conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public

disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed

andoperative official acts, not to those still being considered.

Issue:

58

Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details

of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

Ruling: “

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreementdated

December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby

declaredNULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent

PCGG, its officers andall government functionaries and officials who are or may be

directly ot indirectly involved in therecovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the

Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED todisclose to the public the terms of any

proposed compromise settlment, as well as the finalagreement, relating to such

alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussionsembodied in this Decision.

No pronouncement as to cost.”

RD:-

The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of

the Constitutionhave as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws

prescribing the exactlimitations within which the right may be exercised or the

correlative state duty may be obliged.However, the following are some of

the recognized restrictions:(1) national security matters and intelligence information-

there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state

secretsregarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where

there isno need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to

withholddocuments and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in

strictconfidence" and given "scrupulous protection."(2) trade secrets and banking

transactions-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27

and other relatedlaws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank

Deposits Act 28)are also exempted from compulsory disclosure(3) criminal matters- Also

excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating

to theapprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts

neither maynor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at

effective lawenforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for

example, policeinformation regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives,

or leads on covertcriminal activities.(4) other confidential information.

60. Chaves vs Public Estates Authority

Facts: President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was

tasked with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all

59

kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore

lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then,

years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom

Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public

bidding.

Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda

denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted

and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of

the public domain; the certificates of title over the

Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form

an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.

Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions

by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for

the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.

Issue: WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL

INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT

Ruling: Yes. AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before

petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their

deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in

government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments

during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions,

putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.

We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to

disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to

release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own

and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the

disposition of its property. These include the size, location, technical description and

nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition,

the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must

prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition

process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government

Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen

can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.

Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being

undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under

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the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no

“official acts, transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals. However, once the

committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a “definite proposition” on

the part of the government. From this moment, the public’s right to information

attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to

such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,[33] the Court ruled as follows:

“Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is

incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government

representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement

they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten

wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the

government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or

communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of

being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is need, of course, to observe

the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier – such

as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence

and other classified information.” (Emphasis supplied)

Contrary to AMARI’s contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission understood that the right to information “contemplates inclusion of

negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a

consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to

information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is

consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose

its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract,

which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes

a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public

concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have

intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public

discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in

the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a

retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving

public interest.”

The right covers three categories of information which are “matters of public concern,”

namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts,

transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating

policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in

the custody of government agencies or officials. The second category refers to

documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting,

61

justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or

officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or

processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies.

The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes

evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings,

terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all

relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare

lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.[34] The

right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the

opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the

records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject

to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize

disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct

the inspection and copying.[35]

The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going

negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite

propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like

privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting

national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on

the right to information in several legislations.

61. Neri v Senate committee on accountability

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)

for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)

Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project

was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,

2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and

power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the

NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He

appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he

admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his

approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,

petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to

answer the questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

62

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate

averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the

jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of

respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and

abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the

case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of

legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is

because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of

inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such

as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the

repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.

Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these

powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications

privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor

of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely

contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by

an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege

on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under

conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials”

necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the

information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic

relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential

communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or

foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications

elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications

63

privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other

countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the

concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine

jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the

President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close

advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate

showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the

unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of

executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to

information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such

contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself

available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for

eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more

questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of

Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.

Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,

transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for

policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be

provided by law.

62. CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT VS COMELEC

Facts:

COMELEC failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of identified canvass

machines despite repeated requests and demands. CenPEG is now praying for the

issuance of a writ of mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections, claiming

that the

sourcecode remained important and relevant "not only for compliance with the law, a

nd thepurpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors

and claims of fraud."

Issue:

WON COMELEC could be compelled to release the source code to CenPEG.

Held:

64

YES. Pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an AES technology

is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of

that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which

may conduct their own review thereof."- The COMELEC has offered no reason not to

comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the

source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and,

subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security

reason, "under a controlled environment." The elections had passed and that reason is

already stale.

(SECTION 12. "Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission

shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any

interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.")

63. In Re: Edillon

Facts:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the

name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his

membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.

Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of

his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to

maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to

pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial

support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is

being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the

Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule

and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:

WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO

Held:

All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally

sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed

with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but

65

also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in

one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an

officer of the court.

When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and

his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)

subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations

as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the

extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such

reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an

interest in his concerns.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to

attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to

vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the

payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate

interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost

of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of

the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The

right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject

to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is

recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be

avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

64. Malabanan vs Ramento

Facts: hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such

permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary

Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such

permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At

such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to

the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture.

The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally.

It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period

allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held

liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed

that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an

66

illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the

Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of

Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the

charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit

granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was

suspension for one academic year.

Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the

penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its

cognate right of free speech.

Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be

ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the

academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the

daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without

prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork

or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of

educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their

welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or

subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a

substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway

and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The

peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of

disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being

susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in

school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of

the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit,

there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of

classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be

violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the

offense.

65. United Pepsi Cola v Laguesma

FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995

the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at

Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the

med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on

the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore,

ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code,

which provides:

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Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any

labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in

a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form

separate labor organizations of their own.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that

the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial

employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, 8 of the

Constitution which provides: The r ight of the people, including those employed

in the publ ic and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for

purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUES

1) whether or not the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are

managerial employees and

2) whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming,

joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, 8 of the Constitution.

RULING:

1) YES. The route managers cannot thus poss ibly be classified as mere

supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the

simple direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by

those above them. They are not mere functionaries with simple oversight functions but

business administrators in their own right.supervisory employees are those who, in

the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if

the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires

the use of independent judgment." Thus, their

only power is to recommend. Certainly, the route managers in this case more

than merely recommend effective management action. They perform operational,

human resource, financial and marketing functions for the company, all of which

involve the laying down of operating policies for themselves and their teams

2)NO. The real intent of Art. I I I , 8 is evident in Lerum’s proposal . The

Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers,

supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By

implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should

be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor is the

guarantee of organizational r ight in Art. I I I , 8 infr inged by a ban against

managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject

to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law."

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66. ACOSTA VS CA

Facts:

Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various dates

in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead,

participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for

the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their grievances. Petitioners

were administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of

duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office

regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to

the best interest of the service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to

answer these charges. Following the investigations conducted by the DECS

Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as charged and

ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC

modified the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six (6) months suspension without pay.

Appeal to CA: Denied

ISSUE:

Whether Petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their

constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of

grievances

HELD:

These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a

concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the

teachers’ sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute,

public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for

any purpose.

Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of

peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their

successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects

upon their students for whose education they are responsible.

As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their

constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which

they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of

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public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there

are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question,

whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.”

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably

derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied

government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances

and noble intentions in staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences

to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not

legalize an illegal work stoppage.

67. PACIFIC WIDE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION vs. PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC.

Facts:

Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex

situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the development of Puerto Azul into a

satellite city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers with

recreational areas. In order to finance

its operations, it obtained loans from various banks.

PALI and its accommodation mortgagors, However Problems occurred in stock

exchange that PALI could not pay their debts. One of its creditors, the Export and

Industry Bank (EIB), later substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development

Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure proceedings on PALI’s mortgaged properties.

The Decision provides: (1) The creditors shall have, as first option, the right to be paid

with real estate properties being offered by the petitioner in dacion en pago; (2)

Creditors who will not opt for dacion shall be paid in accordance with the restructuring

of the obligations as recommended by the

Receiver.Finding the terms of the rehabilitation plan and thequalifications of the appoin

ted rehabilitation receiver unacceptable, EIB appealed and demand for foreclosure

to CA but denied.

Issue:

Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the

non-impairment clause.

Held:

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We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALI’s rehabilitation plan. The Interim Rules

on Corporate Rehabilitation provides for means of execution of the rehabilitation plan,

which may include, among others, the conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to

equity, restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling

interest.

The restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation. The

restructuring of the debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the interest of PWRDC as a

secured creditor. Enlightening is the observation of the CA in this regard, viz.:

There is nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50% reduction

of the principal amount when, as found by the court a quo, a Special

Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquired the credits of PALI from its creditors at

deep discounts of as much as 85%. Meaning, PALI’s creditors accepted

only 15% of their credit’s value. Stated otherwise, if PALI’s creditors are in a

position to accept 15% of their credit’s value, with more reason that they

should be able to accept 50% thereof as full settlement by their debtor.

We also find no merit in PWRDC’s contention that there is a violation of the

impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law

impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law

or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor

PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause

may not be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that

the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of

the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional

guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power

of the State for the common good of the general public.

Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors,

creditors, employees, and the economy in general. The court may approve a

rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total

liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and

the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once

approved, is binding upon the debtor and all persons who may be affected by it,

including the creditors, whether or not such persons have participated in the

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proceedings or have opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have been

scheduled.

68. Alvarez vs PICOP Resource Inc.

Facts:

PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA)

No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for

Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to

sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all

the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an

IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus

with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document

signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest

Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

Issue:

Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause

by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)

Held:

NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract

within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is

not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the

Constitution.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC.

10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual

undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession

areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in

favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration,

development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

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69. Renato Diaz v sec. of Finance

Facts: Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol (petitioners) filed this petition

for declaratory rel ief assail ing the val idity of the impending imposition of

value-added tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on

the collections of toll way operators. Court treated the case as one

of prohibition. Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC,

intend to include toll fees within the meaning of "sale of services" that are subject to

VAT; that a toll fee is a "user's tax," not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on

toll fees would amount to a tax on publ ic service; and that, since VAT was

never factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its imposition would violate the

non-impairment clause of the constitution. The government avers that the NIRC imposes

VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees, including toll way operations;

that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from the words used in

the statute; and that the imposition of VAT on toll way operations has been the subject

as early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars. The government also argues that

petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since they

clearly have no personal interest in existing toll

operating agreements (TOAs) between the government and toll way operators. At

any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit the State's sovereign taxing power which is generally read into contracts.

Issue: May petitioners have a right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause

Ruling: No. Petitioner has no personality to invoke the non-impairment of contract clause

on behalf of private investors in the tollway projects. She will neither be prejudiced by

nor be affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments that may result from

the VAT imposition. She has no interest at all in the profits to be earned under the TOAs.

The interest in and right to recover investments solely belongs to the private tollway

investors.

Besides, her allegation that the private investors’ rate of recovery will be adversely

affected by imposing VAT on tollway operations is purely speculative. Equally

presumptuous is her assertion that a stipulation in the TOAs known as the Material

Adverse Grantor Action will be activated if VAT is thus imposed. The Court cannot rule

on matters that are manifestly conjectural. Neither can it prohibit the State from

exercising its sovereign taxing power based on uncertain, prophetic grounds.

When a toll way operator takes a toll fee from a motorist, the fee is in effect for the

latter's use of the toll way facilities over which the operator enjoys private proprietary

rights that its contract and the law recognize. In this sense, the toll way operator is no

different from the service providers under Section108 who allow others to use their

properties or facilities for a fee. Toll way operators are franchise grantees and they do

not belong to exceptions that Section 119 spares from the payment of VAT. The word

"franchise" broadly covers government grants of a special right to do an act or series of

acts of public concern. Toll way operators are, owing to the nature and object of their

business, "franchise grantees." The construction, operation, and maintenance of toll

facilities on public improvements are activities of public consequence that necessarily

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require a special grant of authority from the state. A tax is imposed under the

taxing power of the government principally for the purpose of rais ing

revenues to fund publ ic expenditures. Toll fees, on the other hand, are

collected by private toll way operators as reimbursement for the costs and

expenses incurred in the construction, maintenance and operation of the toll ways, as

well as to assure them a reasonable margin of income. Although toll fees are charged

for the use of public facilities, therefore, they are not government exactions that can be

p r o p e r l y t r e a ted a s a ta x . Ta x e s m a y b e im p o s e d o n l y b y th e

g o v e r nm en t u nd er i t s s o v e r e i g n authority, toll fees may be demanded by either the government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership.