REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested

FACTS:  After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

Assoc vs. DAR

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or

things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines

Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

J. B. L . Reyes

Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s constitutionality.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted.

Ratio:The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:x x x x x x x x x(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION (1982)MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

· On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable units are used by the public, to respond to complaints by metro manila residents regarding the old dilapidated taxis, to make the commuting public more comfortable, have more convenience and safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus profits. à no car beyond 6 years can still be operated as taxi.· Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977 à applied it to succeeding years just add one year to both dates. à they had to surrender the expired taxi’s plates to the BoT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.· Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the phasing out of the taxis.· On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

The issues were in the form of questions that the petitioners presented to the SC through a query.A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.(1) Equal protection of the law;(2) Substantive due process; and(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

HELD:The court here did not answer the queries directly they just dealt with the ff issues1. WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi operators were violated à NO.2. WON their equal protection rights were violatedà NO.

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.

The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.

· PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit position papers or to attend conferences regarding the assailed circ.

o SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather data in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE VALID à the board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data.· PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set à oppressive à they want each taxi cab to be inspected regarding their condition WON it was still safe and roadworthy despite age.o Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can open the door to multiple standards and corruptiono Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on experience and based on cost and fair returns on the unitso Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair

On Equal Protection of the Law:PET allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry = violation of their equal protection rightsè Court said NO. Circs of the same kind are also being implemented in other cities like Cebu and is also in the process of conducting the same studies and policy formulations in other cities.è Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more constant use of the taxis in MM.è SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION à the traffic conditions in the various cities

CONCLUSIONS:è Manila has more traffic which means that taxis in Metro Manila are more heavily used and more likely to deteriorate.è The public has a right to convenience, comfort and safety in their public commute.è The danger posed by the dilapidated and old taxis is a valid nuisance that the Board can abate through the circular that it passed.è Absent a clear showing of any repugnancy of the circular it is deemed valid.Petition DISMISSED

G.R. No. 168770 February 9, 2011ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and CIELO OUANOMARTINEZ, Petitioners,vs.THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, andTHE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU, Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 168812MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), Petitioner,vs.RICARDO L. INOCIAN, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES, EMILIAE. BACALLA, RESTITUTA E. MONTANA, and RAUL L. INOCIAN; and ALETHA SUICO MAGAT, in herpersonal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of PHILIP M. SUICO, DORIS S. DELA CRUZ, JAMES M. SUICO,EDWARD M. SUICO, ROSELYN SUICO-LAWSIN, REX M. SUICO, KHARLA SUICO-GUTIERREZ, ALBERTCHIONGBIAN, and JOHNNY CHAN, Respondents.FACTS:

At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the issue of theright of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City torepurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties.At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized:First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decreeof expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government,i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport.Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, beenpurchased by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex.Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators,had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase theirrespective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. "No less than Asterio Uy," theCourt noted in Heirs of Moreno, "one of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airport’s expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug Airport is abandoned ortransferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their properties." In Civil Case No.CEB-20743, Exhibit "G," the transcript of the deposition of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering theassurance made had been formally offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of theRTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and laterthe CA, recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors ininterest and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and promise of the government to return the lots taken should the planned airport expansion do not materialize is whatthe Court said in Heirs of Moreno, thus:This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there existsan undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to thelandowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airport’s venue. Some acted on this assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondent’s predecessors that they would not appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase was extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when they parted with ownership of their land.ISSUES:Whether abandonment of the public use for which the subject properties were expropriatedentitles petitioners Ouanos, et al. and respondents Inocian, et al. to reacquire them.HELD:YES.Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians’ right to repurchase is what in Heirs of Moreno was referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment. In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, they wouldbe denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old properties

after the payment of the condemnation price. In essence, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without aghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. With all, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need ,an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to includeany use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]." If the genuine public necessity the very reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original ordeviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the directuse by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play, The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestrictedownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable.Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which wasabsolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by twoparti es, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simpleconcept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received. To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill toswallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield ownership to thegovernment which reneges on its assurance that the private property shall be for a public purpose maybe too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent domain were deliberately used as asubterfuge to benefit another with influence and power in the political process, including developmentfirms. The mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery. Even asthe Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to abandon Fery

Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto

Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Estrada v DesiertoGR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Ponente : Puno, J.

Facts :

1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines, while Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo was elected Vice-President. The president was accused with corruption, culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor ChavitSingson’s accusations that the president received millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

2. The Senate and the House of Representatives began early investigations regarding the accusation, while key socio-political figures like Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos, the vice president, senior advisers and cabinet members called on the president to resign, and resigned from their cabinet posts themselves.

3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over by Chief Justice HilarioDavide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled against opening a second envelope of evidence showing the president’s P3.3 billion bank account under the name “Jose Velarde”, the public prosecutors resigned and a mass demonstration at EDSA began.

4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Roco’s motion to postpone the impeachment trial until the House of Representatives resolved the lack of public prosecutors.

5. With the defection of more officials and of the army and police from the Estrada administration, the president attempted to appease public sentiment by announcing a snap election and by allowing the second envelope to be opened. The measures failed, and the calls for resignation strengthened.

6. On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vice-president. News broke out that Chief Justice HilarioDavide would administer the oath of presidency to the vice president at EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements - one stating reservations on the constitutionality of Arroyo’s presidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensing his responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president.

7. The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of government, by majority of the public, and by the international community. The impeachment trial was closed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor- Santiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve the case, leaving open questions regarding Estrada’s qualifications to run for other elected posts.

8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings until his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an acting president only.

9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the Office of the President vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from discussing in

public the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against Estrada for 30 days.

Issues:

I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still president, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity

Ruling:

I. The petitions present a justiciable controversy because the cases at bar pose legal, and not political, questions. Hence, the cases are within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

· Definition of ‘political questions’: “...those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.” --Former CJ Roberto Concepcion

· Arroyo’s government is NOT revolutionary in character, since her oath was taken under the 1987 Constitution.

· EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and the right to assembly. It is intra constitutional in this regard (within the scope of the Constitution). The resignation of Estrada that it caused and the subsequent succession of of Arroyo are subject to judicial review. II. Estrada is NOT a President on leave while Arroyo is Acting President.

· Under Section 11 Article VII, Estrada says that only Congress has the ultimate authority to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided by said provision.

· Hence, Arroyo has no power to judge Estrada’s inability to do his job as President.

· However, both houses of Congress expressed their recognition and support of Arroyo as the new President, and it is implicitly clear in this recognition that Estrada’s inability is no longer temporary. Thus, Congress has rejected Estrada’s claim of inability.

· Furthermore, Court cannot exercise its judicial power to revise decision of Congress in recognizing Arroyo. To do so would be to transgress principle of separation of powers, since this is a political issue. III. Estrada contends that he has not been convicted in the impeachment case and that he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit.

· Executive immunity provision of 1973 Constitution was no longer included in the 1986 Constitution. This is in accordance with SC ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond.

· When the president has resigned, then proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him ·IV. Estrada argued that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him because of prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and that respondent has also developed bias.

· In People v Teehankee, Jr. and Larranaga v Court of Appeals it was laid down that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible press.

· Our judges are smart enough to know the law and to disregard camera drama and off-court evidence. Their exposure to media does not affect their impartiality.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

In re: Edillon

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA AND OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI vs. THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

Facts:Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.

Petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with the SC a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.

Issue:Whether or not the publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is sufficient compliance of the publication requirement prior to the effectivity of the laws and other issuances.

Held:The petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

-Amendment and revision

-Republic vs castelvi

-Assoc. Of small land owners vs. DAR

-right to bail in cases of cap. Punishment.

-warantles arrest how is it effected

-searches and seizure (citizens arrest / public officer and private individual

-art 3 sec 2 bill of rights.

-probable cause (determination by judge and or fiscal)

-right of employees/yers re: salary and incentives

-due process

-police power (requirements)

-equal protection clause (himagan vs people) regarding public officials suspended from duty under

consti and Civ service com

-right to counsel

-doj sec. Vs lantion

-rights of accused (re: televised prosecution/hearing)

-people vs fajardo (eminent domain/ obstruction of plaza view?)

-taxi operators vs bot.

-ouano vs republic

-estrada vs desierto

-kapisanan ng broadkasters case

-manglapus vs marcos

-in re edillon

-agcaoli vs senate (judicial inquiry requisite. Favorite daw nya to)

Try focusing on these one. Eto daw usually paulit ulit na lumalabas sa exams ni sir. Magkakaiba

lang facts ng cases sa questions na presented.