REPUBLICACT6735, INITIATIVE ANDREFERENDUMACT R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments tothe Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. Theformer was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives onthe basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with theinitiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as withinitiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17solely, dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of localgovernment units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 andHouse Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by theSenate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

Francisco Jr. vs. House of Representatives

FACTS:The HR on its 12th Congress adopted a different rule on impeachment from that of the 11th Congress. On June 22, 2002, the HR adopted a resolution to investigate the disbursement of funds of the JDF under Hilario Davide. In June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. A day after dismissing the first impeachment complaint, a 2nd complaint was filed against Davide based on the investigation of fund disbursement of JDF under Davide. Petitions were filed to declare the 2nd impeachment unconstitutional for it violates the provision that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated twice against the same official. Petitions also claim that the legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." In summary, petitioners plea for the SC to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

ISSUE:

WON judicial review power extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings

HELD:

Power of judicial review is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. Separation of powers is not absolute. The SC is the final arbiter to determine if acts by the legislature and the executive is in violation of the Constitution. Moreover, the power of judicial review is expressly stated in the Constitution.*2nd Impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is unconstitutional.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS DigestedManila Prince Hotel v. GSIS  GR 122156, 3 February 1997

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

          Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING: 

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the

legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

PEOPLE v. POMARNovember 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.

(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation)

FACTS:Julio Pomar is the manager and person  in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.

The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or place of labor of any description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery.

ISSUE: Whether  or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.

RULING:

The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people’s law – the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed.

People Vs. Pomar [46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]Sunday, January 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory.

She was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced

on the 16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the

salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal

complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco

Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the

facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the

aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No.

3071 provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory,

shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman

employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before

and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not

discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to

her wages equivalent to the total of two months counting from the day of her discharge.”

Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The

latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with

the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or

place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,

reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial

court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of

fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case

was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.

Issues: (1) Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional; (2) Whether

or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police

Power.

Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional

for being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for

their affairs. It has been decided several times, that the right to contract about one's

affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law"

clause of the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms,

and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals

or public policy

The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power

may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the

preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster

than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of

the constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount

authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights

secured or guaranteed by the latter.

LAMBINO vs. COMELECG.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006(CARPIO, J.)•Requirements for Initiative Petition•Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision• Tests to determine whether amendment or revisionFACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to changethe 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite forratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under thepetition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentaryform of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling lawgoverning initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelecruling.ISSUES:•Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision•Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance withthe constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the peopleRULING:Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by peopleSec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to proposeamendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that thepetition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of theframers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevantAmerican jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign ona petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon apetition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means twoessential elements must be present.2 elements of initiative1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent orrepresentative can sign on their behalf.2.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments isfirst shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of thepetition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of suchattachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to thepetition had seen the full textof the proposed amendments before – not after – signing.Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature andeffect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” whichrenders the initiative void.In the case of the Lambino

Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposedchanges in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet statethat the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks aquestion whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to theUnicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to thepeople the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the peoplethe full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as agigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitutionrequires that an initiative must be“directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign ona petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue asamending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposedamendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision throughinitiativesArticle XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The firstmode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode isthrough a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to thethird mode, applies only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction wasintentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Apeople’sinitiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of theConstitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention canpropose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to aUnicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President andthe abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mereamendment. Amendment vs. RevisionCourts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of aconstitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in theconstitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of theconstitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On theother hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes withoutaltering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of theconstitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution withoutaffecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered anamendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipinoownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not arevision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for electionto the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of theConstitution other than the specific

provision being amended. These changes do not alsoaffect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or withinthe three branches.However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. Achange in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not anamendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structureof government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specificchange will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of aconstitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake arevision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the alteredprinciples with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorizedeliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertakerevisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixedand identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendmentsand not revisions. Tests to determine whether amendment or revisionIn California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to theconstitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: thequantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposedchange is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The courtexamines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of thechange. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in theconstitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reachingchanges in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whetherthere is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, achange in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamentalframework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basicgovernmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of governmentand the system of check and balances.Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revisionand not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changesoverhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposedchanges alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential toparliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.A change in the structure of government is a revisionA change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the threegreat co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of ExecutivePower alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the

Constitution.Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is onlyone of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative bodydrafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisionsbecause members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The samesubstantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments becausethe changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, orvocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framersand the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Wherethe intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.

 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:P r i v a t e   r e s p o n d e n t   A t t y .   J e s u s   D e l f i n ,   p r e s i d e n t   o f   P e o p l e ’ s  I n i t i a t i v e   f o r   R e f o r m s , Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for  hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peop le ’s in i t i a t i ve to amend the cons t i tu t ion can on ly be imp lemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision; therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. (2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:Sec.  2 ,  A r t  XVI I  o f   the  Cons t i tu t ion   i s  no t   se l f  execu to ry ,   thus ,  w i thou t   imp lement ing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatwhat  has  been  de lega ted ,   canno t  be  de lega ted   (po tes tas  de lega ta  non  de legar i  po tes t ) .  Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. The l i f t i ng o f the te rm l im i t s was he ld to be tha t o f a rev is ion , as i t wou ld a f fec t o ther  provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic

GONZALES vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967FACTS:On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3 –i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a ConstitutionalConvention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can becomedelegates themselves to the Convention.Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in theaforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at thegeneral elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action for prohibition, withpreliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter.He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers,and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation dulyorganized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisanorganization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend itsConstitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.ISSUE/S:Whether or not a Resolution of Congress—acting as a constituent assembly—violates theConstitution?May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?HELD:The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress—acting as a constituent assembly—violatesthe Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives votingseparately, said resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress, which approved theproposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are,at best,de facto  Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, noapportionment has been made been made by Congress within three (3) years since 1960.Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; thatCongress and its Members, likewise, became ade facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen);However, As a consequence, the title of ade facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally

PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFacts:Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the CordilleraAutonomous Region” was enacted into law, and pursuant to it, the City of Baguio and the provinces comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for theratification of the Organic Act. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to govern theconduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.Petitioner filed a petition, assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of said resolution becauseit violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrinedin the Constitution. Section 19 provides that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personalityshall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.COMELEC maintains that the questioned provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 doesnot violate the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather, it is a valid implementation of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods asenunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Held:The Court held that Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that what was granted to the COMELECwas the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communicationor information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, includingreasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidatesare ensured. However, it does not grant the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate theexercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.While Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnistfrom expressing his views and or from campaigning for or against the organic act because hemay do so through the COMELEC space and/or COMELEC radio/television time, it is still arestriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. This form of regulation istantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Bondoc vs. Pineda DigestedBondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence

from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

MIRASOLVSCA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]Facts:The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed theMirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. TheMirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real EstateMortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell thelatter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.(PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX'spurchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted tothe government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continuedto avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with saidbank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way ofdacion en pago still leaving an unpaidamount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had adeficiency claim.Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, ifproperly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in itsstance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earningsfrom the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government.On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damagesagainst PNB.Issue:Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without noticeto the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution ofthe Trial Court.Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.Held:It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider theconstitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests thepower of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executiveagreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,but in all Regional Trial Courts.The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General todecide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty isnecessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of hisday in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice

requirementis not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself providesthat such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Wherethere is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In allactions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, noticeto the Solicitor General is mandatory.Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating thedue process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without justcompensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, theremust be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, thequestion before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validityof the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must havebeen raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the verylis mota of the case

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVESECRETARY [421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]Facts:During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men ofthe AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders haveseized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFPand declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of thePresident, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and theofficers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both theProclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessationof the State of Rebellion was issued.In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NGMANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VIIof the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, andthat there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. ExecutiveSecretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the reportrequirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a reportto Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that thepresidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congresshas not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. PresidentMacapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there wasusurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens thedoor to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?Held:The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. ThePresident in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by

the Constitution executivepowers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armedforces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court mayexamine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constitutinggrave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported theirassertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of thereport is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts orthat military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation ofthe legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state ofrebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her ChiefExecutive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on thePresident by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powerscontemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, sinceany person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishableunder the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.Legal standing orlocus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the casesuch that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental actthat is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "suchpersonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficultconstitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJSOfficers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. Itsustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent thepowers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his officeconfers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution

JOYAVS. PCGG[225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993]Facts:On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President CorazonC. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement betweenthe Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Incconcerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings andantique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to bepart of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of NewYork to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of theRepublic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York.According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction theeighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as thesilverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines,and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted byCHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingosubmitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the ConsignmentAgreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparasto enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highlydisadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance,hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolutiondenying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks onthe ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and thatproper parties had not been impleaded.On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase"cultural treasure of the nation".Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can bedisposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress.Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutoryrequirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items.Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issuewarrant resolution from this Court.Held:This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action mustbe prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons havinginterest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined asplaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it bya party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or willsustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, asdistinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover,the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate theconstitutional right of some third and related party.There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legalstanding, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a publicduty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayerquestions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership ofthese paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, althoughthe public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they wereplaced on exhibit.The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not beunderstood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on thegovernment without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, anyconstitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must beraised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanatesfrom their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed toshow that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have becomepublicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question theiralleged unauthorized disposition.Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challengingany expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be publicproperties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverwarewere acquired from private sources and not with public money.

OPOSAVS. FACTORAN, JR.[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]Facts:Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging inconcerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The originaldefendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the newSecretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by thepetitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, useand enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." Thesame was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation ofsaid resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss thecomplaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and,the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative orexecutive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitionersmaintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion isdilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse ofdiscretion.On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion todismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no causeof action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judgefurther ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contractswhich is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rulesof Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that therespondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents ofthe plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

AGANJR. VS. PIATCO[402 SCRA 612; G.R. No. 155001; 5 May 2003]Facts:Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIAairport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDAapproved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples AirCargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo,but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl.Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreementin 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended inthe matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the concessionaire,development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. SinceMIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contractwith several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that theywould lose their job, and the service providers joined

 them, filed a motion for intervention.Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will nothonor PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.Issue:Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for beingcontrary to the constitution.Held:The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The amendmentshave the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon.The amendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCOwhich may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had theyknow that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments andsupplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as theirlivelihood is to be taken away from them.

UMALIVS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]Facts:Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of InternalRevenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15,1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramosreceived a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internalrevenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, moreparticularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the saidconfidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for thepreventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latterto the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in hisanswer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), andPersonal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGCOffice. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence onrecord, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidenceto support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting uponthe recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.Issue: San Beda College of Law – AlabangConstitutional Law 2 Case DigestsPage 18Section 1-C, SY ’06-‘07 Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of lawWhether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether thepetitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of thetrial courts decision.Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against

the petitioner is stillbasis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152Held:Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for causeand under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes orgrounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidenceviolated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of theirresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure,petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that thepetitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internalrevenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It isthus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of anyfactual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts ashis security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of InternalRevenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESOeligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESOeligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to doso is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitionerin his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too lateto raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to notethat in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was takenprior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminalcharges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issueposited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding andconclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent factsand circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided toconsider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct andunmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that hisoffice is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General,that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantivesupervening events that cannot be overlooked.

INRECUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]Facts:Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the ―Bar Flunkers‘ Act of 1953.‖In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar thosecandidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission tothe bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination paperswere still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There arealso others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewedthe motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.972.Issue:Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.HeldINRECUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]Facts:Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the ―Bar Flunkers‘ Act of 1953.‖In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar thosecandidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission tothe bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination paperswere still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There arealso others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewedthe motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.972.Issue:Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.Held

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates whosuffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarmentand reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision havebeen indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial systemfrom which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement ofattorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial andlegislative departments of the government.It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongsexclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissivecharacter, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OFTHE STATE THE POLICE POWER

AGUSTINVS. EDU [88 SCRA 195; G.R. No. L-49112; 2 Feb 1979]Facts:President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users ordrivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire fromany source depending on the owner‘s choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitionerLeovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu,Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon.Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister ofPublic Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation wasordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessarybecause vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device.Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power becauseit is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD willbecome instant millionaires because of such law.Issue:Whether or not Petitioner‘s contentions possess merit. Held:Petitioner‘s contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere withpersonal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State.Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rareoccurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioneralso failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter ofinstruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed thatconstitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 ViennaConventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the standards given asstated in our Constitution that ―the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of 

International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention alsorequires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personallycreate a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioner‘sallegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfoundedspeculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding theimplementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.

ICHONGVS. HERNANDEZ [101 Phil 1117; G.R. No. L-7995; 31 May 1957]Facts:Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business‖ was passed.The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned byforeigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner inthis case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippinestherefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and Chinawas violated according to him.Issue:Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.Held:According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided thatpolice power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Courtalso provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economyposed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter isalways subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may nevercurtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

LUTZVS. ARANETA [98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955]Facts:Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma,seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of moneypaid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act,taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation ofsugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aidand support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter ofpublic concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court ofFirst Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme Court.Issue:Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) isunconstitutional.Held:The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is leviedwith a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of thethreatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, itspromotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows thatthe Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection andexpedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason isseen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.Taxation may be made with the implement of the state‘s police power. In addition, it is onlyrational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the taxlevied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

TIOVS. VIDEOGRAMREGULATORYBOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]Facts:The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected byPresidential Decree No. 1987, ―An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broadpowers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the NationalInternal Revenue Code provided that:"SEC. 134. Video Tapes.—There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax." Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.— Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.”  “Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to theprovince, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.”  The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation ofvideograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvementor variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Suchunregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least fortypercent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusementand other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually ingovernment

revenues.Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, salesand disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, therebydepriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of themovie industry.Issue:Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .Held:Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is fora public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights,and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of theDECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing PresidentialDecree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE isto protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of itsenactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of themoral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewedvideo tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses ingovernment revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that theactivities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit andmunicipal license fees are required to engage in business."WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

ASSO. OFSMALLLANDOWNERSVS. SEC. OFDAR[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL1989]Facts:Several petitions are the root of the case:a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by fourtenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s

power.b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidentalagainst Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of AgrarianReform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage ofOperation Land Transfer.d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn landsnot exceeding seven hectares.Issue:Whether or Not the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional. Held:The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power andeminent domain.The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorizedunder Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exerciseof Police Power and Eminent Domain.RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary todeprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there isdefinitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation isimperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What isrequired is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficialrights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawfulsubject and the method.Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is themethod employed to achieve it.

LOZANOVS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986]Facts:A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion wasdenied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. TheSolicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the SupremeCourt the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiableto intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.Issue:Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.Held:The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to theconstitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a checkthat is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligationwhich the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checksand putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can beoutlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise ofits police power.

KWONGSINGVS. CITYOFMANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]Facts:Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the sameinterest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity ofenforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receiptbe in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articlesdelivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction wasdenied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of classlegislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates betweenpersons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of propertyrights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope oftheir police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.Issue:Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police powerWhether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.Held:Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the policepower. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxxxxxxxlaundries xxxx.(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitationand safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality,peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and itsinhabitants.The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes betweenlaundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipherChinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manilaare more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court

held that the ordinance invades nofundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, anattempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatorynor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether theybelong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and eachevery one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection forthe implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by theordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, butmostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens arecast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, andeven if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficientground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the policepower is the control of private interests for the public welfare.Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminaryinjunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.

TABLARINVS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]Facts:The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board ofMedical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securingcertificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking theNMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. Thetrial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered aspreviously scheduled.Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "MedicalAct of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:"SECTION 1. Objectives.—This Act provides for and shall govern (a) thestandardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination forregistration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of thepractice of medicine in the Philippines."The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specifiedin Section 5 of the statute include the following:"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into arecognized college of medicine;x x x(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical schooland keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from saidapplicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to theoperating fund of the Board of Medical Education;‖ Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:"Admission requirements.—The medical college may admit any student whohas not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offenseinvolving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of abachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to amedical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of goodmoral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and(d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college ofmedicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrancerequirements that

may be deemed admissible.‖ MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports anddated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility foradmission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. ThisOrder goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrumenttoward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and itscalculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for thesuccessful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by theBoard of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presentlycalled for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificateof eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.Issue:Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.52, s. 1985 are constitutional.Held:Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as acondition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutionalimposition.The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power andauthority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs—in aword, the public order—of the general community. An important component of that public orderis the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no onecan deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issuethat needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between theprescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand,and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. Thisquestion is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice ofmedicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting thehealth and safety of the public.MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvementof the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading thequality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought byselectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limitingadmission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies andeventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, highstandards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the currentstage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that thegovernment is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving itsstated objective

of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that theNMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in thisarea. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadlyeffects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies andminds for disease or trauma.WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trialcourt denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs againstpetitioners.

CITYGOVERNMENTOFQUEZONCITYVS. ERICTA [122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983]Facts:Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment,Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within TheJurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides:Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemeteryshall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers andhave been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to bedetermined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shallimmediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than sixmonths from the date of approval of the application.For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven yearsafter the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request theCity Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots inQuezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended forpaupers burial.The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing thatSection 9 of the ordinance would be enforced.Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition andmandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question.Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, theLocal Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.Issue:Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.Held:Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, andregulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be

established or practiced in theCity.Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due processof law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are threeinherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that readsas follows:―To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may benecessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred bythis act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the healthand safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obediencethereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribeunder the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.‖ The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does notinclude the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibitsthe operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance,'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that uponconviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked orcancelled‘. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating amemorial park cemetery.Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare byrestraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merelyregulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright,it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not amere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private propertywithout due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village[328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]Facts:Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agencytasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA),respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe andconvenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This waspursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent wasappraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would bedemolished.The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed apreliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA hadno authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealedthe decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street topublic traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery ofbasic services in Metro Manila.Issue:Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant toits regulatory and police powers.Held:The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police poweris primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated togovernment units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political governmentunit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDAto enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of theinhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with variousnational government agencies, people‘s organizations, non-governmental organizations and theprivate sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitanarea.

TATELVS. MUNICIPALITYOFVIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]Facts:Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by theoperation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner‘s warehouse. A committee was thenappointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that anaccidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and propertiesof the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal councildeclaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New CivilCode. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner‘s warehouse was constructed inviolation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near ablock of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Onthe other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.Issue:Whether or not petitioner‘s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the CivilCodeWhether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutionaland void.Held:The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner‘s warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the MunicipalCouncil of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for avalid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not beunfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulatetrade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. Thepurpose of the said ordinance is to

avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is oneof the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.