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Concert or Cacophony?

In Search of a New International Order

Brad Glosserman, Peter Walkenhorst, Ting Xu

Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011

3Contents

1 Introduction 4

2 KeyFindings 6

2.1 GlobalGovernanceIsNotWorking 6

2.2 IncrementalismtotheRescue 8

2.3 RegionalPerspectives 10

2.4 AgentsofChange 16

3 Conclusions 20

4 TheWayForward 22

5 ListofParticipants 24

6 Agenda 26

AbouttheBertelsmannStiftungandthePacificForumCSIS 30

Imprint 31

Concert or Cacophony?

In Search of a New International Order Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011

Brad Glosserman, Peter Walkenhorst, Ting Xu

4 1 Introduction

TheglobalorderhasbeeninfluxsincetheendoftheColdWar.

Twofundamentaltrendsarereshapingtheinternationalsystem:

Power shifts at the global level are creating a more diverse

international order, in which emerging and resurgent players

pursue and assert their own interests. While it is not clear

whether Western economic, political, and cultural dominance

iscomingtoanend, there isnomistakingtheworld’sgrowing

pluralism.Atthesametime,theemerginginternationalconcert

–orcacophony–ischaracterizedbydeepeninginterdependence.

All major (and minor) powers are facing challenges of economic growth, energy security, and

environmentalsustainability,allofwhichareintimatelyinterconnectedandwhichnonationcan

successfullyconfrontonitsown.Moreover,thepaceatwhichchangeisoccurringisaccelerating,

requiring decision makers to move faster at the very time that problems are becoming more

complex. This creates a fundamental dilemma as managing this interdependence through

multilateralcooperationdemandsenlightenedself-interestwhenestablishedmeansofinteraction

arebeingundermined.Thus,theinteractionofshiftingpowerandincreasinginterdependenceis

transformingglobalpolitics,pushingittowardsanunprecedentedconfigurationofinternational

relations.

Effectiveglobal governance isdifficult, if not impossible,when

a new international order is emerging. The emergence of

powerssuchasChina,India,andBrazilinconjunctionwiththe

resurgenceofRussiaandtheseemingdeclineoftheUnitedStates

and Europe have increased the number of global and regional

players (including regional organizations and arrangements),

reducing the likelihood of effective policy coordination among

them. Diverging interests as well as diverse perspectives

on how to approach the growing number of emerging and

longstanding issues on the international agenda have led to

greaterfragmentationofworldpolitics.Asaresult,theprospects

foreffectiveglobalgovernance–broadlydefinedasthecollective

management of common problems at the international and

transnationallevel–aredeterioratingbecausechallengesontheglobalagendaareincreasingin

number,scale,andcomplexityattheverytimethatinternationalandnationalgovernmentsare

beinghobbledintheircapacitytoaddressthem.

Managing interdependence

through multilateral

cooperation demands

enlightened self-interest

when established means

of interaction are being

undermined.

The prospects for effective

global governance are

deteriorating because

challenges on the global

agenda are increasing

in number, scale, and

complexity at the very time

that international and

national governments are

being hobbled in their

capacity to address them.

5

Existinginstitutionsandforaofglobalgovernanceneedtoadjustquicklyandeffectivelytothe

dynamic andevolving international system.Leadersdedicated to constructive changeshave to

addressfundamentalquestions:Whatarethenewrealitiesoftheinternationalorder?Whoarethe

agentsofchange?Howcannationalgovernmentsandinternationalinstitutionsremainrelevantin

amoredynamicandinterdependentworld?Toaddresstheseissues,theBertelsmannStiftungand

thePacificForumCSISjointlyinitiatedtheworkshop“CreativeDestruction:TowardanEffective

InternationalSystem.”Theprograminaugurateda“TrilateralPractitionersWorkshop”inBerlin

onJuly7-8,2011.

ThegatheringbroughttogethertwodozenforeignpolicypractitionersandobserversfromEurope,

theUnitedStates,andAsiatodiscussthechallengesandfutureoftheinternationalsystemand

the prospects for more effective forms of global governance. The workshop aimed to explore

challenges,identifydifferences,findcommonground,andseewhetherparticipantscouldidentify

and agree on forces changing the world, and outline a process that would allow narrowing of

thediscourse,reachingconclusionsandcreatinganactionplan.Participantsrepresentednext-

generation leaders from a broad range of sectors including government, the media, business,

andthenon-profitcommunity.Inaddition,Mr.RodolfoC.Severino,HeadoftheASEANStudies

CentreattheInstituteofSoutheastAsianStudiesinSingaporeandformerSecretaryGeneralof

theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),Mr.JamesF.Hoge,Chairman,HumanRights

WatchandformerChairattheCouncilonForeignRelationsandeditorofForeignAffairs,Professor

Dr.EberhardSandschneider,OttoWolff-DirectoroftheResearchInstituteoftheGermanCouncil

onForeignRelations,Mr.RalphCossa, President, Pacific ForumCSIS, aswell asMr.Andreas

Esche,ProgramDirectorwiththeBertelsmannStiftungjoinedasseniorexperts.

ThisreportattemptstodrawtentativeconclusionsfromtherichdiscussioninBerlin.Thepaperis

notasummaryofthesediscussions.Instead,itoffersasubjectivereflectionontheinternational

system and ways to address some of its shortcomings. While our thinking has been informed

bycommentsandwrittenreflectionsofworkshopparticipants, theconclusionsareoursalone.

Consequently,wearesolelyresponsiblefortheideashere,aswellasforanymistakesthatmay

haveslippedthrough.

6 2 Key Findings

Therewasaconsensusamongparticipantsthateffective forms

ofglobalgovernanceareneededmorethanevertosolveglobal

challengeslikeclimatechange,poverty,foodinsecurity,nuclear

proliferation, or economic crises. At the same time, however,

there was a significant degree of uncertainty whether and

how this could be accomplished, primarily because of a basic

paradox: challenges are complex and interconnected while the

international system appears increasingly fragmented. The

prevailingnotionwasthatwearelivingintimesofradicaluncertaintyininternationalaffairsand

apotentiallyunstableglobalorderwithhigherrisksforstatesandindividualcitizens.Despitethis

senseofuncertainty,thefollowingkeyfindingsemergedfromthediscussion:

2.1 Global Governance Is Not Working

Thereisastrongsensethatthesystemofglobalgovernanceis

notworking.Itdoesnotseemrepresentativeofthecurrent(and

future)distributionofwealthandpower,noristhereconfidence

thatitcanrespondtomajorglobalchallenges,threats,andtrends.

Thissenseofdiscomfort,justifiedornot,isbyitselfdangerous,

becausethemerebeliefthatthesystemofglobalgovernanceis

not working is contributing to the erosion of its effectiveness.

A sense of foreboding about the future that defines opinion in

manypartsofthedevelopedworld,especiallyintheWest,risks

becomingaself-fulfillingprophecy.

Therearesignsthatthisprocessisalreadyunderway.Thefailure

of the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit is probably the most

prominent example. From a European perspective, the global

summit was not only disappointing – it was a diplomatic disaster. Although Copenhagen was

a rarecaseof theEuropeanUnionshowingsignsofglobal leadershipbyhavingameaningful

commonposition, itsvoicewasmutedand itsrepresentativesmarginalizedonthe finaldayof

theconference.Inessence,urgentproblemsweredisplacedand

remainunsolved.Moreover,theCopenhagenSummitmadeclear

thattheemerginginternationalordernolongerrevolvesaround

EuropeanorevenWesternpriorities.Asaconsequence,European

trust in the ability of the international system to successfully

cope with emergent and longstanding challenges diminished

significantly.AEuropeanparticipantatourmeetingarguedthis

erosion of trust could be fatal: “The liberal order can survive

marginalizationoftheUnitedStates,butnotthemarginalization

ofEurope.Europeprovides the ideas that form the core of the

internationalsystem.”

There is a basic paradox:

challenges are complex

and interconnected while

the international system

appears increasingly

fragmented.

The mere belief that

the system of global

governance is not working

is contributing to the

erosion of its effectiveness.

A sense of foreboding

about the future that

defines opinion in many

parts of the developed

world, especially in the

West, risks becoming a

self-fulfilling prophecy.

“The liberal order can

survive marginalization

of the United States, but

not the marginalization of

Europe. Europe provides

the ideas that form the

core of the international

system.”

7

SimilardoubtssurroundtheglobalfreetradeagendaandtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).The

DohaRoundhasbeenmarkingtimeforalmostadecade;asuccessfulconclusiontonegotiationsis

nowhereinsight.Thisdeadlockhasspurredmanystatestopursuebilateraltradeagreementsas

wellasbroaderregionalarrangements,anticipatingthatagloballegallybindingagreementwill

notbeadoptedanytimesoon(orever).Thisfragmentationissuboptimalintermsofeconomic

performanceandevenunderminesglobalnegotiationsasgovernmentsdevotelimitedtimeand

resourcestootherpriorities.

Twodistinct criticismsof the systemof global governanceemerged fromourdiscussions. The

first is a somewhatprosaic criticism that the system isnotworkingbecause its structureand

procedureshavenotkeptpacewitharapidlychangingworld.AsoneAsianparticipantargued,

“international institutions are beset by scandals, lack effectiveness, cannot provide member

countriesasenseofsecurityandthelike.Thesearethereasonswhyanumberofcountriesgofor

unilateralactions.”AnotherAsianspeakeragreed,notingthatsmallercountriestendtofocuson

theUNsystemand“ithasfailedintheperspectiveofmanysmallercountries;theyexpectittodo

more.”AEuropeanparticipantdifferentiatedamongtheseproblems,separatingthosethatleaders

donotunderstandfromthosetheylackthepoliticalwilltoaddress.

Asecondcriticismarguesthattheproblemismorefundamental

andthatthenatureoftheinternationalorderitselfisaproblem.It

isnotwhoisincharge,butthefundamentalvaluesandoperating

principlesofthesystem.AsanAmericanparticipantexplained,

we are seeing “the emergence of alternative ideologies that

threaten Western liberalism.” One US participant argued that

theclaimthatdisputesare really interest-basedmissesamore

fundamentalpoint:questionsabout thedistributionofgoodsor

powerultimatelygototheheartofhowthesystemworks.

Our participants characterized this split in a variety of ways:

one called it a clash of values vs. a clash of interests.Another

suggestedwedistinguishbetweenchallengesforthesystemand

challengestothesystem.

The problem is more

fundamental … It is not

who is in charge, but the

fundamental values and

operating principles of the

system. As an American

participant explained, we

are seeing “the emergence

of alternative ideologies

that threaten Western

liberalism.”

8 Key Findings

2.2 Incrementalism to the Rescue

Despite fears that the international system is not working, our group agreed that no radical

alternativeisconceivableorfeasible.Therearetoomanyvestedinterests,andproblems,while

evident, are slow moving. There is no crisis on the horizon that can force action. Therefore,

“creativedestruction”isnotanoption;rathergradualreformoftheexistingsystemisthegoal.A

Europeanparticipantagreed,arguingthat,“thereisnosuchthingasnewglobalgovernance.We

arenotmovingfromonesystemtoanother.Rather,thereisacontinuityofglobalgovernance.”

Thechallengethenistoidentifyandpromoteinnovativeapproachestoglobalgovernance.Two

possibilitieshaveshownpromiseinrecentyears:adhocinstitutionalarrangementssuchasthe

G20ormoreformalregionalarrangementssuchastheEuropeanUnionorASEAN.

The G20 is the most important recent innovation in global

governance.Thisgroupplayedacrucialroleindealingwiththe

immediatechallengesposedbythefinancialandeconomiccrisis.

Indeed, the finaldeclarationof theSeptember2009Pittsburgh

G20summitdeclaredthat itwouldbecome“thepremierforum

for our international economic cooperation.”1 It is tempting to

concludethatitsinitialsuccessinmanagingthiscrisisresulted

fromagenuinefearamongG20membersthataglobalfinancial

breakdownwasavery realpossibility; as soonas the senseof

urgency abated, diverging interests reasserted themselves to

dominate discussions and frustrate action. Real solutions to

the world’s financial problems remain beyond reach, and even

the legitimacy of this new organization is being contested.

Nevertheless,creationoftheG20hassignaledthattheinternationalsystemistryingtorespondto

newchallengesandfixurgentproblemsthroughnewinitiativesbasedonachangedglobalorder.

Italsoreinforcedtheperceptionthatglobalgovernanceisinessenceglobalcrisismanagement;

in other words, that a coordinated and coherentmultilateral policy is onlypossible under the

pressureofaglobalcrisisthatthreatenstohaveimmediateandsevereimpactonamultitudeof

domesticpopulations.

A second avenue for cooperation is regional institutions and arrangements. There is much to

commendinthesemechanisms.Theyareclosertoproblemstheyaretryingtoaddress,witha

betterunderstandingoflocalperspectives,challenges,resources,anddynamics.Theycanfashion

solutions that better fit local needs andminimizenegative impacts.Not surprisingly, they are

oftenseenasmore legitimateresponsesandcancommandmorerespect fromindividualsand

1 Leaders’ Statement The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24-25 2009, p. 3; URL: http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.

Global governance is

in essence global crisis

management … A

coordinated and coherent

multilateral policy is

only possible under the

pressure of a global crisis

that threatens to have

immediate and severe

impact on a multitude of

domestic populations.

9

organizations affectedby their decisions.At the same time, theyoften lack resources and the

“hardpower”toenforcedecisions.Thelowestcommondenominatorapproachtodecisionmaking

–whichmakesdecisionsmorelegitimate–canelevatenationalorregionalperspectivesabove

the“norms”theyareostensiblytryingtosupport.Inshort,therecanbe(andoftenis)atension

betweenregionalandglobalimperatives.

The growth of economic, environmental, and security inter-

dependenceiscreatingademandforarules-basedinternational

system that fosters multilateral cooperation and institutions.

Yetinternationalinstitutions,inmanycases,aremutatingfrom

organizationsfocusedonsolvingproblemsintoarenasforwaging

conflictasnewlyempoweredstatesasserttheirparticularnational

interests.Despiteagrowingsenseofinterdependence,thereisa

lackoffaithintheabilityofthesystemtoprotectthoseinterests,

eitherbecausetheinstitutionsofgovernanceareweakorbecause

theyareconstitutionallyflawed.

As a guiding principle, an effective international system must be capable of resolving (and

preferablypreventing)conflictamongstates.Thisrequisiteisalwaysimportant,butitseemstobe

increasinginsignificanceinaworldofmoreassertivestateswithdivergentinterests.Atpresent,

thereappeartobetwocompetingperspectivesonhowtoachievethatobjective.Thefirstisthe

“ASEANway”ofsoftinstitutionsandinclusive,non-coercivecollaboration.Avariantonthistheme

isChina’sproclaimedconceptofinternationalrelations–“harmony.”Thisprovidesmemberstates

withspacetoasserttheirowninterestsandmakesnationalsovereigntyanirreducibleminimum.

It draws upon a 19th-century model of statehood – ironically, a European model – that holds

nationalbordersinviolableandseemsquaint(ifnotoutdated)given21st-centurycommunications

technologies and capabilities. The second option is the (more recent) European experience of

mitigatingconflictsthroughpoliticalintegrationandrule-basedprocedures.Thisrequiresmember

statestovoluntarilyrelinquishpartoftheirsovereigntyanddelegateittosupranationalintuitions.

Most(ifnotall)emergingcountriesareunwillingtodoso.Andindeed,theEuropeanexperience

maynotbeamodelastherearerisingquestionsabouthowmuchsovereigntyEuropeancountries

arethemselveswillingtogiveup,particularlyinthewakeoftheEurozone’ssovereigndebtcrisis.

Their flaws notwithstanding, these two options outline directions in which the international

systemcanevolve.

International institutions, in

many cases, are mutating

from organizations focused

on solving problems into

arenas for waging conflict

as newly empowered states

assert their particular

national interests.

10 Key Findings

2.3 Regional Perspectives

Westernconcernsaboutthefutureoftheinternationalsystememanatefromthe“riseoftherest.”2

TheriseofEastAsiaandIndiaandarebalancingofglobalgovernance–withmorepowerflowing

toAsia–havecreatedanxietyintheWestaboutthefutureofthatsystem.Therearefearsthat“the

riseoftherest”willresultinnewglobalnorms,newoperatingprinciplesforglobalinstitutions,

anddifferentoutcomesininternationaldecision-makingthat,evenif“fair,”willdisadvantagethe

currentholdersofpowerandprivilege.

Thereisasense–indeedabelief–thatChina,inparticular,is

(orwillsoonbe)challenging internationalnorms.China insists

thatisnottrue,butthoseassertionsarenotbelieved.Asaresult,

mistrustandsuspicionpermeateChina’s relationswith theUS

andmanyotherstates, includingtheEuropeanUnionandeven

some of China’s neighbors. Against this background, the idea

of a world order dominated by a G2, i.e., an informal rather

than formal joint US-Chinese leadership in global affairs, was

dismissedasunrealisticbyall.At the same time,however, the

developmentofUS-Chinarelations,waswidelyconsidereda (if

notthe)determinantofhowtheinternationalsystemwillevolve.

The rise of China to the status of a global power is one of the

most significant events of the early 21st century. There are,

however,strikingdifferences inhowthis rise isperceived.Manypeople in theUScontinue to

see the world in realist terms and assume that China’s economic rise will make it a regional

andglobalmilitarypowerthatchallengesvitalAmericanstrategicandsecurityinterests.Those

strategistssee“hegemonicambitions”inalmostanyactionthatBeijingtakesanddemandmoves

tocounterthatplan.Inrecentmonths,Chinesebehaviortodealwithterritorialdisputesinthe

SouthandEastChinaSeasseemstoconfirmthesesuspicions.3Whilethis isasimplifiedview

ofa(sometimes)morenuancedandsophisticatedassessmentofstatetrajectories,thisthinking

appears to be based upon notions of geostrategic interests and great power rivalries deriving

fromthe19thand20thcenturies. It treats international relationsasazero-sumgame inwhich

oneparticipant’sgainsarebalancedbythelossesofanother.ApplyingthisframeworktoChina’s

risereinforcesthenotionthatitistantamounttoadeclineoftheUSandEurope.SincetheUS

hasbeenaprimaryarchitectand‘supporter‘oftheinternationalorder,China’sriseisperceived

notjustasachallengetothestatusquobutasathreattothesystemitself.4Someuncertainty

aboutChineseintentionsisunderstandable.OneChineseparticipant–likemanyotherChinese

2 FareedZakaria,TheFutureofAmericanPower.HowAmericaCanSurvivetheRiseoftheRest,in:ForeignAffairs,Vol.82,No.3,May/June2008,pp.18-43.

3 Ofcourse,USviewsofChinaarenotmonolithic.AndUSpolicy,while‘hedging’againstthepossibilityofconflictwithChina,istoengageBeijingandworkwithittosolveregionalandglobalproblems.

4 Thisviewisnotwithoutprecedent.AsoneofourAsianparticipantspointedout,thereisaparallelbetweenChinatodayandJapanbackinthe1980s.

A world order dominated

by informal rather than

formal joint US-Chinese

leadership was dismissed

as unrealistic by all. At the

same time, however, the

development of US-China

relations, was widely

considered a (if not the)

determinant of how the

international system will

evolve.

11

scholarsandprofessionalswhoworkinthesefields–insistedthatChinaunderstandsthestresses

createdbyitsrise, that its leadershavestudiedhistoryandappreciatethetensionscreatedby

rising powers, and argued that China has benefited from the existing international order and

needspeaceandstabilitytocontinuetorise.Atthesametime,however,thereisanunmistakable

senseofdisenfranchisementflowingfromcriticismoftherulesoftheexistinginternationalorder

whenChineseprerogativesarechallenged.Thecallforamoredemocraticinternationalsystem

thatisbasedon“thefiveprinciplesofpeacefulcoexistence”suggestsademandfornewoperating

principlesininternationalrelations.

In contrast to theUS,Europe– theEUaswell as itsmember states–has fewer geostrategic

and security concerns in Asia. After the withdrawal of colonial powers from Asia after 1945,

Europehasre-engagedAsiancountriesinanefforttostrengtheneconomicandculturalties.Some

EuropeansapplaudtheriseofChinaasacounterbalancetoUSdominance;some,includingsome

of ourmost vocal participants, insist that the rise ofAsia shouldgive renewedvigor to trans-

Atlanticrelationstogirdaninternationalsystemthatisunderthreat.Moreover,Europeansdonot

havethesamesecuritytiestoAsiaasdoAmericans(whoseallianceswithAsianpartnersarefor

manythefoundationofregionalsecurityandstability).TheUSwouldbedirectlyinvolvedinany

instability,crisis,orconflictandisthereforemoresensitivetotheimpactofchangesinthestatus

quo.Europe’sdistanceaffordsitamorebenignperspectiveanditislessinclinedtoseeregional

changeinAsiaasdestabilizing.5

AsianperspectivesembraceelementsofbothUSandEuropeanviewsoftheinternationalsystem.

Againgeneralizationsaredifficult,sinceAsiaistoolargeanddiversetohaveasingleperspective.

Pick a dimension – size of state, population, GDP, GDP per capita, type of government, type

of economy, religion, etc–and there is anAsiannationoneverypointon thespectrum.And

whennon-Asiansmention“theriseofAsia,”AsianspeakersinsistthatthereisnosingleAsian

perspective.Indeed,theriseofAsiancountriesandtheriseofChinaareoftenusedsynonymously

butshouldnotbe.Theideathatatripolarglobalorderisemergingisbasedonthecreationofan

AsianpolethatismuchmorethanjustChina.SoutheastAsiahassome560millioninhabitants,

a“community”largerthanthatofEurope.ItseconomicdevelopmentlongpredatesthatofChina:

Japan ‘rose’ in the ‘60s and ‘70s, the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and

Taiwan) followed, whichwere in turn chased by the “Tiger Cub” economies inSoutheastAsia

(Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,andThailand).China’sriseisonlythemostrecentphenomenon

andit isbeingfollowedbygrowthinVietnamandIndia.It isthebroad-basednatureofAsia’s

growthanditspotentialforinternallysustainabledynamismthatdistinguishesthismomentfrom

itspredecessors.

5 HeretooitmustbenotedthatEuropeanviewsofChinaarenotmonolithicandtherearehawksonthecontinentwhocangotoetotoewiththeirUScounterpartswhenitcomestosuspicionofChinesemotives.

12 Key Findings

Thishastwocontradictoryimplications.Thefirstisthatdiscussionsofglobalgovernancehaveto

movebeyondafacileandsimplisticfocusonChina;Chinaispartofabiggerstory.Nocountry,

nomatterhowbig,canundo theentire internationalsystemon itsown; itmusthavealliesor

similarlyinclineddiplomaticpartners.Asianintellectualshavesuggestedthatsuchamassexists.

Concepts andvisions of “Asia” as an entity or a shared “Asian identity”have a long tradition

bothwithinandoutsidetheregion.Thelastdecadewitnesseddiscussionsof“Asianvalues”and

“Asiancapitalism.”CurrentdebatesabouttheroleofChinaandIndiaasemergingglobalpowers

substantiatedclaimsofthe21stcenturyasan“Asiancentury.”

Yet,theveryterm“Asia”isimprecise.Itsmeaningdependsoncontextandwhoisusingtheterm.

Itsgeographicboundariesareuncertain,andthusitsreferentsareunclear.Moreover,theduality

ofmodernlife,withitspenetrationofcapitalistgoods–manyofwhich,whilemadeinAsia,have

Westernorigins–contributestoasenseofconfusion.Westerngoods,values,andculturepenetrate

Asiansocietieseffortlesslyandcountriesandcitizensmustbalancetheirworthwithindigenous

valuesandgoods.AsoneAsianparticipantbemoaned,“Asianscan’ttelltheirpositioninrelation

totheliberalorder.”(Inthisreport,weuse“Asia”primarilytorefertoEastAsia(meaningthe

ASEANPlusThree)withoutdisregardingthegreatdiversityofthisregion.)

WhenreferringtotheanxietiesintheWesternworldcausedby

the “rise of Asia,” in our view, this distinction does not really

matter,becausethesefearsareas impreciseandelusiveasthe

term “Asia.” Indeed, a clear-eyed assessment of the anxiety

triggered by the rise of Asia would note that “the problem” is

not just the riseofChinabut theprospectof aworld inwhich

Westerndominancehasended.Itis“theriseoftherest”andthe

resulting loss of Western privilege that generates anxiousness.

(Nonetheless, our discussion did not include participants from

emergingpowersthatarenotinAsia,Europe,orNorthAmerica.)

AsiansthemselvesaredividedaboutChina.Theyunderstandthe

geographicrealityoftheChinesestate;unliketheUS,itisphysically

situated in the region and cannot withdraw. They seek to exploit the economic opportunities

affordedbyChinesegrowthandseeitisacriticaltradeandinvestmentpartner.Atthesametime,

theyworryaboutChina’slong-termintentionsandfearthatitmaybecomeahegemonicpowerin

theregion.TheyareequallyconcernedaboutuncontrolledrivalryorconfrontationbetweentheUS

andChinathatwouldforcethemtotakesides.TheypreferagoodrelationshipbetweentheUSand

China,aslongasitisnot“toofriendly”;aG2isasworrisometothemasaworldinwhichtheyarein

conflict.Chineseparticipantsinsistedthatallfearsareunfounded,arguingthattheircountryneeds

astableregionalenvironmentsothatitcanimprovelivingstandardsandthatBeijinghasdomestic

problemsofitsownandhasnopretensiontoaG2systemthatformallyorinformallysharespower

withtheUS.Thus,itisinChina’sinteresttocontributetoandhelpmaintainapeacefulandstable

(“harmonious”)internationalenvironment.

A clear-eyed assessment

of the anxiety triggered by

the rise of Asia would note

that “the problem” is not

just the rise of China but

the prospect of a world in

which Western dominance

has ended. It is “the rise of

the rest” and the resulting

loss of Western privilege

that generates anxiousness.

13

There is no mistaking Chinese dissatisfactions with the existing system of global governance,

however;ourparticipantswerequick topointout its flaws.Andeven ifChina’s toppriority is

domesticstability,therearemanywaysthatagovernmentfocusedonsuchconcernscanthreaten

theinternationalsystem: itcandeflect theangerofadissatisfiedcitizenryontooutsideforces,

blamingthemforsetbacksordomesticproblems.Moreconcretely,thedesiretopromotegrowth

hasproducedtradeandcurrencypoliciesthathavebeenlabeled‘mercantilist’or‘predatory.’

ThedistinctionbetweenChina’sriseandthatofAsiaasawholemattersinotherways.Looking

atallofAsiadilutesChina’sroleandstatus;itismerelyone–albeitbig–countryamong13.A

regionalconstruct limitsChina’s freedomofmaneuverandcapacityto influencethesystem.A

similarlogiccanbeappliedtotheUS;forallthecomplaintsofUSunilateralisminrecentyears,

WashingtonhasbeenandcontinuestoberestrainedbyalliancesinAsiaandEuropeaswellasby

theinternationalinstitutionalorderithelpedcreateafterWorldWarII.Smallerpowershavean

importantroletoplay,constrainingpartners,supportingnorms,andprovidingthenumbersthat

createmajoritiesininstitutions.(Thiscutstwoways:smallernationscanactasabulwarkforthe

existing internationalorder, restrainingrevanchiststates,or theycanbandwith revisionists to

demandchange.)ASEANisaperfectexampleofthesmallernationsofSoutheastAsiaengaging

andcircumscribingthediplomacyofthelargerstatesofNortheastAsia.Theycanalsobringissues

totheattentionoflargernations(astheyhavewiththeSouthChinaSea).Norshoulditbeforgotten

thatemergingmiddlepowerssuchasIndonesia,arebecomingmoreconfidentplayingarolein

regionalandglobalgovernance.However,whileinsistingonmoreinputinsuchmatters,ourAsian

participantswereskepticalthatsuchchangeswouldalter“thewaytheworldworks.”Moreover,

theyconcededthatmanyofthemostpressingproblemsaretoocomplexforthemtotackle.Their

roleinanewworldorder,howeveritisstructured,willofnecessitybelimited.

In the West, there is a sense that rising powers are not being

held accountable nor are they ready to take responsibility for

globalgovernance.Onceagain,Chinaisattheforefrontofthose

criticized, although other countries are blamed as well. At the

coreofthiscriticismisthefreeriderproblem:risingpowersare

blamedfortakingadvantageoftheinternationalsystem,playing

anincreasinglyimportantrolewithinit,butareunwillingtoshare

theburdensofglobalgovernance.Theyoftenseekbilateraldeals

instead of trying to strengthen institutional capacity or playing

by the rules of international institutions. In this view, the key

issue ishowemergingpowerscanbe induced to takeonmore

responsibilitiesinglobalgovernance.Regardlessofthevalidityof

allegationsoffreeriding,theyhavedeepenedWesternanxieties

aboutthe“Asian”challengetotheglobalorder.

In the West, there is a

sense that rising powers

are not being held

accountable nor are they

ready to take responsibility

for global governance …

At the core of this criticism

is the free rider problem:

rising powers are blamed

for taking advantage of

the international system,

playing an increasingly

important role within it,

but are unwilling to share

the burdens of global

governance.

14 Key Findings

Partoftheproblemistheunderstandingoftheinternationalsystem,especiallywhenitisdefined

asa“liberalworldorder.”Formanyofourparticipants,thisisa“Western”characterization,which

raises severalproblems.First, if this is indeeda ‘Western”description, then it is implied that

Asia’srisewillchangetheorder tobetterreflect itsnewmakeupandcharacter.Second, there

arequestionswhetherAsiansare“accepted”inthis“Westernorder.”Inotherwords,regardless

ofintent,thereisasuspicion–sometimesgroundedinfact–thatAsiannationsarenotafforded

equalstatuswhentheygetaseatatthetable.

Third,therearequestionsaboutwhatthisorderis–whatvaluesarepresent,whatinstitutionsareits

backbone,andhowitshouldoperate.Atthemostfundamentallevel,thereareatleasttwodifferent

notionsordefinitions:ThefirstisthetraditionalWestphalianorderbasedontheprincipleofstate

sovereignty andnonintervention.The second,more recent idea of a “liberalworld order”gives

muchgreaterswaytoindividualhumanrights,institutionalizedmultilateralcooperationandthe

ruleoflaw.ThisnotionoriginatedafterWorldWarIIandwasinspiredbytheEuropeanexperience

ofpoliticalintegrationandpoolingofsovereigntytodealwithcommonproblems.Morerecently,

proponentsof thisnotionhavesought to legitimizearmedhumanitarian interventionunder the

conceptof“theresponsibilitytoprotect”,thusweakeningthenormofsovereigntybymakingit

conditionalonstates’conductandprotectionofhumanrights.WhileAsianstates,includingChina,

have lessdifficultiessubscribing to the first,more traditionalWestphaliannotion, theystrongly

rejectthesecond,whichisbelievedtoreflectaWesternagenda.Theydemandthatnormsbetter

reflecttheirculturesandhistories.Thisisnotarejectionofsomeofthosenorms–humanrights,for

example–buttheirredefinitionandconceptualizationtoreflectdifferentcircumstances.Without

meaningtoputathumbonthescale,therecanbeadebateabouttherightfulbalancebetween

politicalandeconomicrightsorfreedomofspeechandtheneedforsocialorder.

Whilethestatehasservedastheessentialunitofinternational

order,oneofourEuropeanparticipantsarguedthatglobalization

challengestraditionalconceptsofsovereignty.Statebordersare

being renderedporous,makingnotionsofabsolutestatepower

increasingly unrealistic. That process is complemented and

acceleratedbytechnologiesthatenableandempowernewactors.

New challenges and threats demand new forms of cooperation

thatundercutsovereigntyaswell.ManyemergingpowersinAsia,

however,arerelativelynewstates(andinmostcasesformerWesterncolonies)withastrongsense

ofsovereignty.Thisisanaturaloutgrowthofthestate-buildingproject.Theyhavelittleinterest

in giving up some national sovereignty for collective security or contributing to global public

goods.Thisattitudeisapowerfulobstacletoeffortstopromoteandactivelystrengthenregional

integrationandglobalgovernance.AsoneofourAsianparticipantsconceded,“theEUmodelis

great,butAsiaisnotyetthere,thoughmodernityisdefinitelypushingAsiainthatdirection.”In

otherwords,sovereigntyisakeyissueforanyreformoftheinternationalsystemandeffective

globalgovernancemaybeimpossiblewithoutmodificationsofit.

Sovereignty is a key issue

for any reform of the

international system and

effective global governance

may be impossible without

modifications of it.

15

In addition to divergent attitudes toward sovereignty, European

anxieties about the “rise of Asia” are fueled by the fear that

Europe’s role in the international system is as contestedas that

of Asia. The shift in the balance of power from the Atlantic to

thePacificOceanseems tocomeatEurope’sexpense.Although

the institutional provisions in the Lisbon treaty to strengthen

EU foreign policy are ambitious, Europe’s future role in global

governance is in question. The Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis

andthelackofpoliticalleadershipinaddressingitscoreproblems

arenurturingperceptionsofdeclinewithinandoutsideEurope.As

aresult,theEUanditsmemberstateshavelostcredibilityinterms

ofcoherenceandefficiencyinpolicymakingandtheyare,inthe

wordsofoneparticipant,“disappearingasreferencepointsofglobalgovernance.”Europeansagree

thattheEUisunderperformingasaglobalactor,althoughithasthecapacityandresourcestoplaya

strongandinfluentialroleontheglobalstage,specificallyinthesectoroftechnology,environmental

protection,andsocialdevelopment.Theyare,however,dividedoverwhethertheEUanditsmember

statescanmobilizethepoliticalwillandleadershipthatisnecessarytoovercomeinternaldivisions

andtoplaysucharole.WhilepessimistspointtogrowingeconomicproblemsoftheEurozoneand

therelatedresurgenceofnationalisminmanyEuropeancountries,whichthreatenthecoherence

andeventheexistenceoftheEU,optimistsarguethatEuropeanintegrationhasalwaysadvanced

throughcrises.Intheirview,thecurrentsovereigndebtcrisisisnoexception,andwillserveasa

catalystfordeeperpoliticalintegrationthatinthelongrunwillallowEuropetoupgradeitsroleas

aglobalactor.

Therearefundamentalquestionsaboutthevalueandprospectsforgreaterintegrationthatfollows

theclassicEuropeanmodel.Wehadlittlediscussionofthevalueofregionalismanditsrelationship

toglobalgovernance.Thereislittleunderstandingofhowregionalandglobalinstitutionsinteract.

Regionalgovernancecouldbecomeabuildingblockofglobalgovernance.Thereis,forexample,

anincreasingconvergenceofnormsamongChinaandASEAN.ASEANhaspresseditspartner

countriestosigntheTreatyofAmityandCooperation(TAC)asaconditionforjoiningtheEast

AsiaSummit; itskey interlocutorshavedoneso,helpingpromoteTAC’scorevalueofpeaceful

resolutionofdisputes.Moreover,ASEANhasbeeninstrumentalinpushingChinatoadoptaCode

ofConductfortheSouthChinaSea;thathasbeenaslow-movingprocessbut ithaspickedup

momentuminrecentmonths.Allthesedevelopmentsareintheirearlystagesanditistooearly

totellwhatimpacttheywillhaveonglobalgovernance.Thereishope,however,thattheycanplay

alargerandmoresignificantrole,atleastincertainareas.AnAsianparticipantunderscoredhow

regionalinstitutionsplayalargersocializationrole,pointingoutthat“China’scloseinteraction

withASEAN isnot justaboutconvergenceofnorms,but the fact thatASEAN isan important

forumforChina,JapanandSouthKoreatoengageeachother.”

European anxieties about

the “rise of Asia” are fueled

by the fear that Europe’s

role in the international

system is as contested as

that of Asia. The shift in

the balance of power from

the Atlantic to the Pacific

Ocean seems to come at

Europe’s expense.

16 Key Findings

Ourdiscussionconcludedthatmajorinnovationswithintheinternationalsystemareunlikelyin

theshortterm.Blameestablishedandemergingpowersthathaveaninterestinpreservingthe

statusquoandthefactthatemergingregionalinstitutionsaretooweaktochangethewaythe

internationalsystemworks.Ifso,whowillbeagentsofchange?

2.4 Agents of Change

As international relations become more diverse and complex,

powerisnotonlyshiftingfromestablishedtoemergingcountries,

but also toward individuals and non-state actors. Modern

information and communication technologies have empowered

individualsandsocialgroups toanunprecedenteddegree.The

internetandsocialmediahaveextendedthereachandinfluenceof

individualsandorganizationsandenabledthemtodirectlyengage

ininternationalaffairs.Yet,whilerelationsbetweenthestateand

the individual are being rebalancedby information technology,

thestate remains thecentral actor in the international system.

Whilestatesmaynotbeaseffectiveinimplementingchangeas

in the past, they are extremely effective in blocking reform or

adaptation.Thus,thekeytoaffectingchangeisidentifyingways

tomovestates(ortheirorgans)toimplementchange.

Plainly,moremustbedonetofigureouthowtoutilizenon-state

actors as agents of positive change. The growing importance

and impact of non-state actors in international politics is one

distinctive political development. Transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil

society groups, social entrepreneurs, faith-based organizations, multinational corporations and

otherbusinessbodies,aswellastrans-sectoralpublicpolicynetworksareincreasinglyeffective

in framing issues,settingagendas,andmobilizingpublicopinion.At thesametime,non-state

actorssuchascriminalorganizationsandterroristnetworks,alsoempoweredbynewinformation

andcommunicationtechnologies,poseseriousthreatstotheinternationalsystem.Althoughnon-

stateactorsusuallyhavenoformaldecision–makingpoweranddonotnecessarilyalterthepolicy-

makingprocess,theirimpactonworldpoliticsissignificantandlikelytogrow.Takeyourpick–

asdidoneUSparticipant–“BillGates.vs.BinLaden.Anindividualcanhaveahugeinfluencein

aninterconnectedworld.”(Ofcourse,thatinfluencecanbelimited;anotherUSparticipatedwas

quicktonotethat“non-stateactorsdon’tnecessarilyalterthepolicy-makingprocess.Wikileaks

didn’tcracktheUSsystemanditonlyplayedaminorroleintheArabSpring.”Crudelyput,power

stillmatters.)

While relations between

the state and the individual

are being rebalanced

… the state remains

the central actor in the

international system.

While states may not be as

effective in implementing

change as in the past, they

are extremely effective

in blocking reform or

adaptation. Thus, the key

to affecting change is

identifying ways to move

states (or their organs) to

implement change.

17

Relationsbetweenstatesandnon-stateactorsarenotazero-sumgame.Thekeyquestion,therefore

is,howcantheyworktogether?TheincreasedparticipationoftransnationallyengagedNGOsand

other civil societyorganizations (CSOs) in internationalpoliticsprovidesexamplesof effective

collaboration with national governments and intergovernmental institutions. This is a mutual

process: a strong international system reinforces the actions ofNGOsand similargroups. The

growingnumberandproliferationofCSOsandsocialentrepreneurs inthe internationalpolicy

arena reflects the steady increase in resources from governments, international institutions,

corporations, and foundations, accompanied by greater reliance by state-based actors on the

outsourcingofpublicservices.Newlyempowered,CSOsfillrolesinglobalgovernancethatcanbe

broadlyseparatedintocategoriesofadvocacyandoperationsbutthatmorespecificallyinclude

workinagenda-setting,negotiationofnormsandagreements, implementationandmonitoring,

andreactiontonon-compliance.Asaparticipantfromcivilsocietynoted,stateandnon-stateactors

haveamutualrelationship,workingtogethertoachievesharedgoals.Ideally,non-stateactorshelp

governmentstackledifficultproblems.

Intheabsenceofanoverarchingapproachtoglobalgovernance,collaborativeeffortsamongstates

andCSOswillincreasinglyprovidetheframeworkforaddressingchallengesofaglobalizedworld.

However,despite theirgrowing importance,civil society isnotasilverbulletbecausenational

governmentsandinternationalinstitutionscontinuetobemorepowerfulinmanyrespects–and

insomecasesareopposedtoactionsofcivilsociety.Afterall,oneofthegoalsofthesenon-state

effortsistohelporempowerthedisenfranchisedorignored;thus,theyimplicitlychallengethe

structureofpower.

18 Key Findings

Moreover,civilsocietyisnotmonolithic,butapluralistuniverse

of values, opinions, and interests ranging across the political

spectrum. All too often, this universe resembles the Tower of

Babel,displayingahighdegreeof fragmentationthat limits its

effectiveness and undermines its legitimacy. In addition, CSOs

are not exclusively norm-driven actors but organizations that

pursue self-interested strategies to ensure their institutional

survival, often competing with each other for influence and

funding.Inotherwords:linesofconflictamongactorsofglobal

civilsocietyaremultipleandshifting.Giventhisdiversityand

political fragmentation, the only thing that can be stated with

certaintyisthatCSOscontributetothepluralizationofglobalgovernance.Theyfosterpluralism

onthegloballevelastheydoonthelocal,regional,andnationallevelbyenablingmultiplevalues,

perspectives,andintereststoberepresented,differentfunctionstobeperformed,andarangeof

capacitiestobedeveloped.

Thus, a central issue in the discussion of agents of change is leadership. Any government,

international institutionor individualpolitical leaderwillingandcapableofexercisinggenuine

leadership could be an agent of change. Hence, it was no surprise that there was an almost

unanimousagreementamongworkshopparticipantsonthenecessityforanewkindofleadership

to fosteramoreeffective internationalsystem– leadership thatcanaddressglobal issuesand

engagethenecessarystakeholderslongenoughtoproducesustainablesolutions.Yettherewas

no agreement on how to define leadership, how to promote it, and how to distinguish it from

power.Consequently,therewasnoconsensusonhowtoovercometheallegedlackofleadership

in international affairs. The fundamental problem is that leaders are accountable to domestic

constituencies.Yetthesolutionofinternationalproblemsrequirespower,authority,andinfluence

beyondnationalborders.Howdo leadersengage individualswhentheirauthority issoclearly

defined? On what basis do they rally forces to tackle those pressing problems? How do they

convinceotherleaderstomakesacrificesforthepublicgood?Thereneedtobeincentivesand

accountabilitystructuresthatrewardpoliticalleaderswhoactinsupportofglobalpublicgoods;

withoutthem,globalgovernancewillfail.

There was no agreement on

how to define leadership,

how to promote it, and

how to distinguish it from

power. Consequently, there

was no consensus on how

to overcome the alleged

lack of leadership in

international affairs.

19

Insomecases, leadership is itsownpunishment.Stickingone’sheadabovetheparapet (so to

speak),invitescriticismandcondemnation.Governmentscanbeforcedtobearcoststheymight

nototherwisehavetoformerelybeingaudaciousenoughtoattempttosolveaproblem.OneAsian

participantsuggestedthatheretheASEANexamplecouldhelpsince“thekeytoASEAN’ssuccess

isthatitleadswithoutappearingasaleader.”

This raises the issue of US leadership. As long as emerging

powers are not willing and Europe is not able to provide

leadership at the international level, the US remains the only

candidate,notwithstandingthemanychallengesitfaces.Yet,its

shrinking resources and domestic constraints have forced the

UStorethinkitstraditionalleadershiprole–orassomecritics

charge,toretrenchorabandonthatrolealtogether.However,there

isasyetnosubstituteforUSleadership.Whilethegroupdidnot

addressin-depththeUSroleintheinternationalsystemandthe

implicationsofdiminishedUSinternationalactivism(nordidittacklethequestionwhetherthat

wasdesirable),USparticipantsarguedthattheUSshouldtrytoleadbythepowerofexample,

notbytheexampleofpower.Theonlyconclusionfromthediscussionswasthatintheabsence

ofproactivepoliticalleadershiponaninternationalscale,inalllikelihood,criseswillcontinueto

serveasthecatalystforchangeinglobalgovernance.

In the absence of proactive

political leadership on

an international scale, in

all likelihood, crises will

continue to serve as the

catalyst for change in

global governance.

20 3 Conclusions

Thereisagrowingsensethatthesystemofglobalgovernanceis

notentirelysuited to the21stcentury.Existing institutionsand

mechanisms cannot solve the world’s most urgent challenges.

Thatshouldnotbesurprisingsincemanyoftheseproblemsare

ofasizeandscaleneverbeforeexperienced.Asoneparticipant

explained,“themanagementofglobalplanetaryproblemsisofa

differentnatureanddimensionthantheproblemsof thepast.”

Recent attempts by the international community to address

problemslikeclimatechange,environmentalpollution,financial

regulatoryreform,tradepolicy,nuclearnon-proliferation,global

free trade, and energy security have failed. This realization is

intensifiedbytheperceptionthattimeisrunningout.Problems

areoutpacingthecapacityoftheinternationalsystemtocope.Whileweapplaudthespreadof

wealth and prosperity, there is little indication that leaders and thinkers have anticipated the

impactofthecreationofaglobalmiddleclassinaworldoflimitedresources.Asoneparticipant

suggested,perhapsitistimetostartthinkingintermsof“lose-lose”solutions.

Globalchallengesaregrowingasthemechanismsofgovernance,thetoolsweusetotacklethose

problems,arebeingundermined.Unlessthereisaradicalshiftinthewaytheworld’smainactors

approach global challenges, the situation will deteriorate. In the absence of global leadership,

politicalleadersandotherdecision-makerswillmuddlethrough,reactingtochallengesinstead

ofpreventingthem.Untilacrisiscreatesasenseofurgency,responseswilladdresssymptoms

ratherthanrootcauses.Inshort,globalgovernancewillbelimitedtocrisismanagement.

The new configuration of international relations is, by and large, inherently chaotic and

ungovernable. Power is increasingly geographically dispersed and politically fragmented. It is

shiftingfromestablishedWesternpowerstoemergingcountries,butalso,tosomeextent,tonon-

stateactorswhoassumepreviouslypublicresponsibilitiesorpursueagendasoftheirown.This

diffusionofpoweriscreatinganewinternationalenvironmentthatdefiescleardefinition.Inour

understanding,thenewglobalordercannotbeaccuratelydescribedasamultipolarworld,inwhich

afewgreatpowersaresettingtherulesofthegameanddiscipliningthosewhoviolatethem.We

seelittleagreementonwhatthosepowersare,theirwillingnesstoworktogether,northeefficacy

ofactions ifandwhen theydo.But this isnotaworld inwhich,as IanBremmerandNouriel

Roubini have argued, “no single country or block of countries has the political and economic

leverage–orthewill–todriveatrulyinternationalagenda.”6Their“G-Zeroworld”seemstoo

state-centrictograspcontemporaryglobaldynamics.NordoweacceptRichardN.Haass‘notionof

“nonpolarity:aworlddominatednotbyoneortwoorevenseveralstatesbutratherbydozensof

actorspossessingandexercisingvariouskindsofpower.”7Butwhilewedonotenvisionaconcert,

cacophonymaynotbetheonlyotheroption.

There is little indication

that leaders and thinkers

have anticipated the impact

of the creation of a global

middle class in a world of

limited resources. As one

participant suggested,

perhaps it is time to start

thinking in terms of “lose-

lose” solutions.

6 IanBremmerandNourielRoubini,AG-ZeroWorld.TheNewEconomicClubWillProduceConflict,NotCooperation,in:ForeignAffairs,Vol.90,No.2,March/April2011,pp.2-7(quote:p.2).

7 RichardN.Haass,TheAgeofNonpolarity.WhatWillFollowU.S.Dominance,in:ForeignAffairs,Vol.87,No.3,May/June2008,pp.44-56(quote:p.44).

21

Whatdoesthismean?Areweontheroadtowardaworldofanarchywithoutorderandleadership?

Howcannonpolaritybemanaged?OptimistslikeHenryKissingerbelievefunctionalnecessities

willeventuallyovercomeapowervacuumininternationalrelations:“Itissaidthatnatureabhors

avacuum;sodoestheinternationalsystem.Chaos,ifitoccurs,willsoonerorlatersettledowninto

aneworder.”8ForpessimistslikeNeilFerguson,“aworldwithoutpower,”isverywellconceivable,

albeitas“theanarchicnightmareofanewDarkAge.”9

Ourdiscussionssuggestthatneitherscenarioisordained.Global

governancewillbecomemoredifficult,butnotimpossible.Even

inaworldwithoutpowerfulorganizingforces,therearemagnetic

pulls and tugs that canalignnationsand facilitate cooperation

and collaborative efforts. Let’s call this “weak polarity.” A new

internationalorderwillnotemergespontaneously,butthereare

manythingsthatcanandshouldbedonetofosteritscreation.One

definingcharacteristicoftheemergingnewageisthatpower,at

leastinthesenseoftraditional“hard”power,andleadershipare

lesslinked.Intheabsenceofacomprehensive,unitaryapproach

toglobalgovernance,newformsofleadershipwillemerge,notas

enduringastraditionalalliancesorinternationalinstitutions,but

ratherpatchworksofoverlapping,oftenadhocand fragmented

efforts,involvingshiftingcoalitionsofstateandnon-stateactors

concentrating on specific issues. The leadership exercised by

“coalitionsof thewilling”willbemore fragmented, situational,

andvolatilethanpreviousattempts.Buttheyneverthelessmight

achieveconcreteresults.

Multi-stakeholderglobalactionnetworksconcentratingonspecific

issues are an appropriate organizational structure for today’s

world. Non-state actors, especially NGOs, social entrepreneurs

andcivilsocietygroups,canplayan importantrole increating

thesekindsofnetworksthatspangeographical,institutional,and

sectoral boundaries. Establishing more such transformational

networks,therefore,wouldbeastepforward.Althoughthiswouldnotsolveallchallengesofthe

globalizedworld,itwouldhelpmanagethemandpreventtheinternationalsystemfromcollapsing

undertheweightofitscollectivefailures.

Even in a world without

powerful organizing

forces, there are magnetic

pulls and tugs that

can align nations and

facilitate cooperation and

collaborative efforts. Let’s

call this “weak polarity”

… In the absence of a

comprehensive, unitary

approach to global

governance, new forms

of leadership will emerge,

not as enduring as

traditional alliances or

international institutions,

but rather patchworks of

overlapping, often ad hoc

and fragmented efforts,

involving shifting coalitions

of state and non-state

actors concentrating on

specific issues.

8 Dr.HenryA.Kissinger,KeynoteAddressforthe8thIISSGlobalStrategicReview“GlobalSecurityGovernanceandtheEmergingDistribution of Power,” Geneva, Friday 10 September 2010; URL: http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-review/global-strategic-review-2010/plenary-sessions-and-speeches-2010/keynote-address/henry-kissinger/.

9 NiallFerguson,AWorldWithoutPower,in:ForeignPolicy,July/August2004;URL:http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/vac.htm.

22 4 The Way Forward

Thereisathicklayerofoverlappingandcompetingauthoritiesintheexistingsystemofglobal

governanceandmostemergingcountrieshavenointerestinupendingthissystem;theyprefer

tomakeadjustments.But, thefuture internationalorderwillbenomereoutgrowthofexisting

mechanisms. Planetary problems pose new challenges and require new problem-solving

mechanismsasmanagementofthemisofadifferentnatureanddimensionthanpastchallenges.

Thelowestcommondenominatorisnolongerasufficientstartingpointformeaningfulcoordinated

actionontheglobal level.Whetherthismeansthecreationofnewinstitutionsisofsecondary

importance.Eitherexistingintuitionsmaytakeupthechallengesornewoneswillbecreated.

Thereisalackofvisionaboutthefutureoftheinternationalsystemandtheemergingglobalorder.

Tofacilitatethecreationofsuchavision,thefollowingquestionsneedtobeexploredingreater

depth:whoisrisingandwhatsortofinstitutionalstructuresandvaluesdothesenationssupport?

HowcantheEUandUSadapttheinternationalsystemtoaccommodatetheviewsandpreferences

ofrisingcountrieswithoutsacrificingfundamentalinterestsandvalues?Howcanrisingcountries

contributetoglobalpublicgoodswithoutsacrificingtheir fundamental interests insovereignty

anddomesticdevelopment?Whatare themutual interestsandsharedchallenges that theEU,

theUS,andrisingcountriescanjointlyaddress?Howdotheregionalandgloballevelsinteract?

Finally,howcanthecontributionsofnon-stateactorsbeenhancedandleveraged?Futureiterations

oftheBerlinworkshopwillfocusonthesequestions.

ConcretemeasurestoovercomethelackoftrustamongtheEU

and US and emerging countries are essential. This applies not

only to theUSandChina–although thisbilateral relationship

willbepivotalfortheentireworld–butalsotoEuropeandAsia.

AsthediscussionsinBerlincrystallized,thereisanurgentneed

for a more dynamic dialogue between Europe and Asia. While

thereisastrongtrans-Atlanticpolicycommunitythat joinsthe

USandEurope,asimilarpolicycommunitybetweenEuropeand

AsiabeyondtheformalAsia-EuropeMeeting(ASEM)isneeded

to keep pace with the agendas discussed in the myriad policy

dialoguesandtrackIIforumsintheAsia-Pacificcommunity.

A policy community

between Europe and Asia

beyond the formal Asia-

Europe Meeting (ASEM) is

needed to keep pace with

the agendas discussed in

the myriad policy dialogues

and track II forums in the

Asia-Pacific community.

23

ThecontinuationofthetrilateraldialogueinitiatedbytheBertelsmannStiftungandthePacific

ForumCSIScancontributetothedevelopmentofsuchanAsian-European-USpolicycommunity

bycreatinganetworkofdistinguishedpractitionersandexperts.Moreover,itcanandshouldfocus

ontrilateralrelations:Whatdoes“Asia”meanforthetrans-AtlanticallianceandwhatdoesEurope

meanfortrans-Pacificrelations?Thesequestionsarenotyetsufficientlyunderstoodanddebated.

Atrilateraldialoguecanprovideaforumfordoingexactlythat.

Thus,goingforward,futuremeetingswillpaygreaterattentionandfocusmoredeeplyonthese

questions as well as on emerging issues that transcend traditional concerns. Of particular

importanceisthegrowinginfluenceof innovativetechnologies,suchastheinternetandsocial

media thathave thecapacity todestabilizeanddisrupt the internationalsystem.Likewise, the

conceptofglobalpublicgoodsandthesharingoftheburdenstocreateandmaintainthemareof

paramountimportance.

At the core of thesenon-traditional issues are very often emergentnon-state actors, agents of

change,activists,andagitatorsthattheBerlinworkshopoutlined,butdidnotexploreinfulldetail

anddepth.Thereisaneedfordialoguethatfocusesontheroleofthesenon-stateactorsandtheir

implicationsfortheinternationalsystem.Thenextsetofdiscussions,therefore,shouldinclude

theseemergingactorsaswell.

It isespecially important thatwe identifyand reachout to thenextgenerationof leadersand

decisionmakers.Wemustgetinfrontofthecycleofchange,toheartheviewsofthosewhowillbe

inpositionsofpowerandauthoritysothatweunderstandtheirthinkingandanticipatethefuture

contoursofourworld.Equallyimportantweneedtofacilitateadialogueamongtheseleadersthat

buildsfamiliarityandconfidenceamongthemsothattheybeginbuildingacommunityofthinkers

anddoersthatisreadytoaddress–andhopefullysolve–futurechallenges.

24 5 List of Participants

This report has benefited tremendously from the contributions of all those who participated

in the gathering “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System. A Trilateral

PractitionersWorkshop”heldinBerlinonJuly7-8,2011.Wearedeeplyindebtedtoallparticipants

andwouldliketoexpressourgratitudeforsharingtheirinsightsandsuggestions:

Mr.HusainiALAUDDIN

DeputyDirector,MinistryofForeignAffairsandTradeofBruneiDarussalam,

BandarSeriBegawan

Mr.ThorstenBENNER

AssociateDirector,GlobalPublicPolicyInstitute,Berlin

ProfessorAxelBERKOFSKY

SeniorAssociateResearchFellow,InstituteforInternationalPoliticalStudies,Milan

Mr.I.B.MadeBIMANTARA(Sade)

DeputyAssistanttotheSpecialStaffofthePresidentofIndonesia,OfficeoftheSpecialStaffof

thePresidentforInternationalAffairs,Jakarta

Mr.RalphCOSSA

President,PacificForumCSIS,Honolulu,Hawaii

Mr.AbrahamDENMARK

Asia-PacificSecurityAdvisor,CenterforNavalAnalyses,WashingtonD.C.

Mr.LucaDIPRESO

Official,EuropeanParliament,CommitteeonForeignAffairs,Brussels

ProfessorJoernDOSCH

Head,DepartmentofEastAsianStudies;DeputyHead,SchoolofModernLanguagesand

Cultures,UniversityofLeeds,Leeds

ProfessorDanielW.DREZNER

ProfessorofInternationalPolitics,TheFletcherSchoolofLawandDiplomacy,TuftsUniversity,

Medford,Massachusetts

Mr.AndreasESCHE

Director,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung,Gütersloh

Mr.L.GordonFLAKE

ExecutiveDirector,TheMaureenandMikeMansfieldFoundation,WashingtonD.C.

Mr.BradGLOSSERMAN

ExecutiveDirector,PacificForumCSIS,Honolulu,Hawaii

Mr.LutzGÜLLNER

PolicyCoordinator,EU-USEconomicRelations,EuropeanCommission,DirectorateGeneralfor

Trade,Brussels

25

Mr.WolframvonHEYNITZ

PolicyPlanningStaff,FederalForeignOffice,Berlin

Mr.JamesF.HOGEJr.

Chairman,HumanRightsWatch;FormerEditor,ForeignAffairs,NewYork

Mr.MarkLEONARD

Director,EuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations,London

Ms.FanLI

ExecutiveDirector,GlobalLinksInitiative,Shanghai

Mr.JinsongLIU

DeputyDirector-General,PolicyPlanningDepartment,TaiwanAffairsOfficeoftheStateCouncil,

Beijing

Mr.DewardricL.MCNEAL

SpecialAssistanttoDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefense,EastAsiaandChinaCountry

Director,UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,WashingtonD.C.

Mr.ElyRATNER

AssociatePoliticalScientist,RANDCorporation,WashingtonD.C.

ProfessorDr.EberhardSANDSCHNEIDER

OttoWolff-DirectoroftheResearchInstituteoftheGermanCouncilonForeignRelations,Berlin

Ms.HarukoSATOH

SeniorResearchFellow,OsakaSchoolofInternationalPublicPolicy,OsakaUniversity,Osaka

Ms.AmySEARIGHT

SeniorPolicyAdvisor,BureauforAsia,U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,WashingtonD.C.

Mr.RodolfoSEVERINO

Head,ASEANStudiesCentre,InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies,Singapore

Mr.AndreOmerSIREGAR

AssistanttotheSpecialStaff;InterpreterofthePresidentofIndonesia,OfficeoftheSpecialStaff

ofthePresidentforInternationalRelations,Jakarta

ProfessorMinhTuanTA

Head,OfficeforResearchProjectsManagement,DiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi

Mr.DamianOmarVALDEZ

President,TheEvolutionGroupInc.,NewYork

Mr.PeterWALKENHORST

SeniorProjectManager,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung,Gütersloh

Ms.TingXU

SeniorProjectManager,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannFoundation,WashingtonD.C.

26 6 Agenda

Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System

A Trilateral Practitioners Workshop – Berlin, July 7-8, 2011

AttheGlobalPolicyCouncilhostedbytheBertelsmannStiftunginBerlinin2009,HenryKissinger

declared that“Wewillbe forced to -andweshouldanyway– thinkaboutanew international

system”. As we think about creating a governance system for an increasingly dynamic and

interdependentworld,whatmustcomenext?Thisworkshoplooksforpracticalanswerstothis

questionandexaminesrealisticsolutions.

July6 Arrivalofparticipants

7:00pm OpeningDinner

July 7 The Three Step Process Toward Global Governance

Conferencevenue: Bertelsmann

UnterdenLinden1

10117Berlin

9:00am–9:20am WelcomeRemarks

AndreasEsche

Director,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung

RalphCossa

President,PacificForumCSIS

9:20am–12:00pm Identifyingthetopglobalrisks

Within a 10-year time frame, what are the 3-5 greatest challenges to international order and

stability?Whyandhowaretheythreatening?Howarethesechallengesevolvingovertime?Isthe

worldaddressingthechallengeseffectively?Howdoweprioritizetheseconcerns?

Moderator: BradGlosserman

ExecutiveDirector,PacificForumCSIS

IntroductoryRemarks: MarkLeonard(EU)

ElyRatner(US)

MinhTuanTA(Asia)

27

12:00pm–1:30pm WorkingLunch

1:30pm–3:30pm IdentifyingAgentsofChange

Whoarethemajoractorsintheinternationalsystem?Isthisstillastate-centeredworld?Whoare

thekeynon-stateactors?Whatistheirimpactandinfluence?Whatischanginginthewaythe

worldisgovernedandwhy?Whatforcesareatworkontheinternationalsystem?Whatimpactdo

thesechangeshaveonnationalsecurity,internationalstability,ontheabilityofstatestocontrol

theircitizens,ontheeffectivenessofnon-stateactors?

Moderator: BradGlosserman

ExecutiveDirector,PacificForumCSIS

IntroductoryRemarks: AxelBerkofsky(EU)

DanielDrezner(US)

FanLI(Asia)

3:30pm–4:00pm Break

4:00pm–5:30pm Identifyingelementsofnewglobalgovernance

Arethereorshouldtherebeuniversalnorms?Howcanwecreateasustainablebalancebetween

nationalpoliticalpoliciesandglobaleconomicpolicies?Howshouldweaddresstheimbalance?

Shouldsomecurrentinstitutionsbeterminated?Whichinstitutionsshouldbereformedandhow?

Isthereaneedfornewinternational/multilateralInstitutions?Whatkindofnewsystemshouldbe

inplaceandwhoshouldbedesigningit?

Moderator: TingXU

SeniorProjectManager,BertelsmannFoundation

IntroductoryRemarks: JoernDosch(EU)

AmySearight(US)

AndreOmerSiregar(Asia)

7:00pm Dinner

28 Agenda

July 8 Three Regional Views of Global Governance

Conferencevenue: Bertelsmann

UnterdenLinden1

10117Berlin

9:00am–10:30am RegionalviewsoftheInternationalSystem

Aseniorexpertfromeachregionprovidesanassessmentofinternationalchallengesandtherole

thathis/herregionplaysinresolvingthem.(90minutes)

Moderator: RalphCossa


Panelists: JamesF.HogeJr.

Chairman,HumanRightsWatch;FormerEditor,ForeignAffairs

RodolfoC.Severino

Head,InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies

Prof.Dr.EberhardSandschneider

OttoWolff-DirectoroftheResearchInstituteoftheGermanCouncil

onForeignRelations,Berlin

10:30am–11:00am Break

11:00am–1:00pm WorkingGroupdiscussioncontinued:

reflectionoftheearlierpresentation

Whatistheemergingglobalpoliticalorder?Whataretheimplicationsofthetrendsidentifiedin

Day1?HowdoAsiansviewtheUSandEUandtheirroleinglobalgovernance?HowdoAmericans

viewtherolesofEuropeansandAsiansinglobalgovernance?HowdoEuropeansviewtheroles

ofAmericansandAsian inglobalgovernance?What futurescanweenvision: is thereaworld

withouttheWest?Isthetransatlanticconceptrelevanttothefuture?WheredoesAsialieinthe

newglobalorder?WasUSgloballeadershipeverreal?Whatisitsfuture?Whatisthemeaning

and significance of American exceptionalism? What role do “middle powers” play in the new

internationalsystem?

Moderator: RalphCossa


29

1:00pm–2:00pm Lunch

2:00pm–3:00pm Assessmentsandwrapup

Inthefinalsession,nextgenerationparticipantsassesstheviewsoftheseniorexpertsinlight

ofthediscussionsofthefirstday.Towhatextentdothosethreatassessmentscorrespondtothe

viewsexpressedinsession1?Dotheassessmentsofstaterolesmatchnextgenerationviewsof

theinternationalsystem?Dogenerationaldifferencesyieldsignificantdifferencesinperspectives?

Do regional perspectives differ? What are the key areas of divergence and agreement in our

discussions?Whatarenextstepsforthegroup?

Moderator: PeterWalkenhorst

SeniorProjectManager,BertelsmannStiftung

3:00pm–3:15pm ConcludingRemarks

RalphCossa


AndreasEsche

Director,ProgramShapingtheGlobalFuture,BertelsmannStiftung

30About the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Pacific Forum CSIS

The Germany-based Bertelsmann Stiftung, founded in 1977, is a private, independent and

nonpartisan foundation that aims to identify societal challenges at an early stage and develop

solutionstothem.Thefoundationisbothathinktankandanagentforsocialchange.Itsprograms

aregearedtowardsimprovingeducation,strengtheningajustandsustainableeconomicsystem,

promotingpreventativehealthcaresystem,andenhancingcivilsocietyandgreaterinternational

understanding.IntheareaofinternationalpoliticstheBertelsmannStiftunghasgainedexperience

infieldssuchasdemocracy,transformation,andmigration,aswellasEuropeanintegrationand

globalgovernance.

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of

the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum’s programs

encompasscurrentandemergingpolitical,security,economic,business,andoceanspolicyissues

throughanalysisanddialogueundertakenwiththeregion’sleadersintheacademic,government,

andcorporateareas.Foundedin1975,itcollaborateswithabroadnetworkofresearchinstitutes

fromaroundthePacificRim,drawingonAsianperspectivesanddisseminatingprojectfindings

andrecommendationstoopinionleaders,governments,andmembersof thepublicthroughout

theregion.

www.pacforum.org

Imprint

©2012BertelsmannStiftung

BertelsmannStiftung

Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße256

33311Gütersloh

Germany


Responsible

Dr.PeterWalkenhorst

Design

MarkusDiekmann,Bielefeld

Printing

Matthiesen-Druck,Bielefeld

Address | Contact

Brad Glosserman

Pacific Forum CSIS

1003 Bishop Street, Pauahi Tower 1150,

Honolulu, HI 96813

USA

Phone +1-808-521-6745

E-Mail [email protected]

Dr. Peter Walkenhorst

Bertelsmann Stiftung

Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256

33311 Gütersloh

Germany

Phone +49 5241 81-81172

Fax +49 5241 81-681172


Ting Xu

Bertelsmann Foundation

1101 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 901

Washington, D.C. 20005

USA

Phone +1-202-621-1721

Fax +1-202-384-1984



www.shaping-a-globalized-world.org