colombia peace talks

7/29/2019 Colombia Peace Talks

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Colombia Peace Talks – London; LSE - March 14th

Trancript Enrique Santos Calderon

I am honored to be here and thankful for the opportunity to speak on an issue so crucial to

Colombia’s present and future: the possibility of ending a conflict that has bled and ravaged our

country for more than 50 years.

I want to make very clear that I am not speaking on behalf of the government or as a spokesman

for the president.

This is important to establish, because things I’ve said in the recent past have been interpreted as

the indirect voice of the president, and led to misunderstandings on both sides of the table.

I was his personal delegate in the exploratory talks in La Havana from February to August of last

year, that led to the signing of the FRAMEWORK AGREEEMENT. Immediately after, considering

that my role had been accomplished and not being a member of the government, I publicly

retired from the delegation. I don’t participate in the talks, but remain in contact with members of

the government delegation and have personal views on the negotiated political solution for the

Colombian armed conflict. Issue with which I have been involved in one way or another since the

early 80s, when I took part in the first Committee for Dialogue and Negotiation with the M19 and

the Popular Liberation Army (PLA) under the Betancourt government.

Having said that, I will pass on to the specific points I have been asked to speak about here today:

1. Why did Santos government decide to engage the Farc in negotiations

2. What are the main challenges and outlook of these talks

It is relatively well known why and how this process started and I will talk very briefly about this,

because the real question is how the talks are developing and where can they lead to.

This process began indirectly in Uribe´s government, when he sent messages to Farc about ending

political violence. That didn’t work out but when Santos was elected he decided to pursue these

contacts is for possible peace talks. Why? For both subjective and objective reasons.

On one hand, his own vision of the historical role his presidency could play in this regard. Also, the

need to establish a different approach to social issues, domestic politics and specifically

international relations:

Primarly, the need to break the diplomatic isolation Colombia had with its neighbours.



The objective reasons are many. A Farc that was weakened militarily and with zero political

credibility after the Caguan process, but very disposed to initiate talks with Uribe´s successor.

· An international and regional climate, very favorable to a solution to the longest armed

conflict in hemisphere. From USA to Cuba, everyone agreed this was desirable.

· A crucial point was the improvement of relations with Hugo Chavez, whose influence on Farc

was very evident and who was also much in favor of negotiation. Both Cubans and Venezuelans

have played a key role in these talks.

· Now, what kind of political regime will come out of Chavez´ death is of course very relevant

to Colombia´s peace talks. In the immediate future I don’t foresee significant changes. Maduro has

been Chavez´s man in this whole process. I spoke with him on this subject last November in

Caracas and he was very emphatic in his commitment to the idea that Farc transform itself into a

legal political movement with Bolivarian objectives.

· Another factor in JMS decision was the electoral success of the left in Latin-American: in

Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, Salvador, Uruguay… The fact that many of

the presidents of these countries were former guerillas that were elected in free elections simply

confirmed that armed struggle has no political future in Latin-American. And all of them- Chavez,

Evo, Mojica- have repeatedly said this to Farc. So have Fidel and Raul Castro.

All this, and more, and the fact that Colombia itself is a very different country than 10 years ago --

more prosperous, secure, self-confident-- lead the President to think that this was a unique

opportunity for engaging the guerrillas in a successful peace process.

Now to the present: tasks and challenges.

Today, the fact is that in spite of recent polls and an evident hostile public attitude, in the last

weeks things are looking much better.

There is a new air of optimism. Progress although slow, has been made on the agrarian issue; the

tone has changed, Farc chief spokesman in LH, Ivan Marquez, now sounds more like politician than

a warrior. The Presidents attitude is also more conciliatory. Both government and Farc seem to

understand they need each other in this delicate moment, when public skepticism has reached a

high point. Personally, I have the gut feeling this can succeed and that important points will be

decided before the year is over.

But one can’t minimize all the political risks, legal problems and powerful enemies that lie ahead.

Beginning with a deep mistrust Colombians have of Farc: close to 70% don’t think they deserve



political benefits.

The growing opposition of expresidente Uribe is both serious and harmful. He remains very

popular and NO to the Havana talks is a cornerstone of his political speech.

Another difficulty: the risks and confusions of negotiating in the midst of war. Talking and fighting.

Dialogue in LH, combat in Colombia. But these are the rules of the game set by the government:

no ceasefire until a final agreement is reached. Public opinion doesn’t easily understand this

situation and the mounting attacks by Farc and ELN feed doubts and fears. Wasn’t peace around

the corner? It also feeds Uribe’s visceral speech: the talks are an unacceptable concession to

terrorism and a leap backwards in national security.

One aspect of his campaign is his intense use of social media networks. One graphic example: a

month ago, just minutes after I gave a radio interview explaining that the capture of members of

police intelligence in a conflict zone could not be interpreted as kidnappings, Uribe was furiously

tweeting that the President’s brother was justifying the kidnapping of policemen. They were freed

days later, but what must be kept in mind was what Farc said when they announced they would

no longer kidnap for money, but that members of the armed forces captured in combat zones

would be considered “prisoners of war”.

Armed confrontation will continue, but what could be deescalated are the verbal aggressions and

the microphone wars, in order to defuse tensions and better safeguard the Havana table from the

loud media noise that surrounds it.

Talks must remain confidential. This doesn’t mean the government can´t have a more coherent

communication strategy. The Farc has filled the information void, to the extent that they have

become victims of their own excessive media protagonism. It hasn’t helped them at all: 60% of

Colombian public don’t believe these talks will lead to peace.

Anyway, there are so many complicated issues in the agenda apart from the present agrarian one:

political participation, disarmament, victims, illegal crops…

Outside of structural problems- corruption, inequality, narco-trafficking- that are sadly three

major factors of Colombian reality.

Demobilization of 8 to 10,000 guerillas will not in itself transform this reality, but it would

certainly help very much.

Running out of time, so I’ll throw out some thoughts to be discussed later:

· Rhythm is of the essence. The agenda has to move forward at a better pace. There has been

significant progress on the agrarian point, but it has to move quicker.



Doesn’t mean drastic dates for final agreements. 50 years’ war will not be settled in 50 weeks.

Both sides seem closer in this regard. Santos now has said no precise date is essential, but that

more progress and results are necessary.

Farc has recently shown it better understands this is essential to win more open support for this

talks.

In my view, and I have said it many times, if the agrarian issue isn’t cleared by April, it will be a bad

message to Colombian society. Pessimism will remain (Caguan all over again? Endless talks and no

progress?)

· Time Factor. Also delicate in both legal in political terms. After December, with

Parliamentary elections in next March, it will be much more difficult for Congress to approve the

statutory law that will define the political participation of guerrillas.

President of Congress Roy Barrera said last week that time is becoming the worst enemy of the

peace process and that the final agreement should be signed while the government has a solid

majority. All these electoral dynamics are not necessarily coherent with the complexities

of the agenda, but should be a stimulus to move on at a faster pace. It seems that Farc is still

counting on a Constitutional Assembly that would resolve everything and make all these

procedures irrelevant. But this is simply not viable today.

Which bring us to another difficulty: Farc’s insistence on maximalistic, unrealistic demands.

Constitutional Assembly, bilateral ceasefire before agreement, radical upheaval of the present

electoral system, freezing the passage of new laws, reversal of macroeconomic policies…

Then there is the matter of Political Continuity. One of Farcs understandable concerns is: what

guarantees are there that this process will become a state policy, not merely of a passing

governments desires?.

I posed this question last month in the Wilson Center in Washington, saying that the issue of

Santos re-election is very relevant to the continuity of the process. This was superficially

interpreted in the Colombian media as if I were launching my brother’s reelection campaign. The

president of the Senate, after returning from LH 10 days ago, said that it’s not so much Santos

who needs the peace process to be reelected, as the process needs reelection to assure its

continuity.

I frankly don´t know if JMS will or, even wants to be reelected, nor if his eventual successor will be

a friend or foe of these talks. What I do believe is that he has a personal, political and even moral

obligation of doing everything possible to consolidate this crucial process to which he has

committed himself and his country.



· Transitional justice and the military. This is a specially delicate point. The participation of Farc

in open politics and solid guarantees for their security are fundamental. But what about the

military?

There is, I can assure you, a widespread institutional concern in the Armed Forces about their

imprisoned members, condemned to long jail sentences. They are expecting a more equivalent

treatment.

In the matter of transitional justice, there has to be a certain symmetry, if peace is to be built on

solid ground. This may outrage many NGO’s but it is an illusion to think that only the guerillas can

receive benefits, but not the military.

I know that the Armed Forces of Colombia do not care if Farc leaders don’t pay jail, even if they all

ready a have long sentences; and don’t even mind if they go to Congress. Their concern is about

their officers and soldiers. Are they to rot in jail while the guerrillas go free?

Large segments of Colombian society would not accept that. The Controller General (Procurador)

has repeatedly stated that he will not permit “the military to be sacrificed in the Havana table”.

The Farc, as a military organization, understands that their adversaries in the battlefield need to

receive an acceptable treatment. It would be very positive if they said it more explicitly. An

interesting idea is if guerilla leaders and generals could, at a certain point, sit together alone, to

visualize among themselves the post-conflict in Colombia. “Pardon is a necessary evil” said father

Francisco de Roux, head of the Jesuits in Colombia two weeks ago

· Is there a Plan B?

Some analysts have said there is no plan B for the President nor for Timochenko, Farc’s top

leader, suggesting that these talks may be doomed if they both don’t get more actively involved in

better explaining their importance and publicly rebutting the ever louder enemies of the process.

I tend to agree. Both government and Farc have to be more clear, insistent and persuasive in

explaining why this process is so crucial to Colombia’s future. Just imagine the implications ---

social, economic, human- if decades of armed conflict with guerrillas could come to an end. The

violence generated by the criminal bands is another story, as Claudia Lopez will surely explain here

today.

In general, the President has to be less reactive or defensive to all Uribe says or does, and more

forward looking and pedagogical in regards to all the bright perspectives of a successful

negotiation. A recent positive sign is that both the government and the Marcha Patriotica, a



movement close to the Farc, have called for a peace march on the same day, the 9th of April.

So, there it goes. Slowly but surely. Talking and fighting. Between public confrontation and private

dialogue.

And as the Havana talks enter their 7th cycle which began last Monday, hopefully government and

guerrilla avoid playing into the hands of the enemies of this peace process, which are not few. In

the measure in which it advances, so will the temptations to sabotage it. In Colombia we have too

many historic examples of how monstrous these provocations can be.

That’s why leadership on both sides of the table have to do the outmost to clear the present

agenda, to sign the final agreement, so we can reach the third and final stage.

The really complex, decisive and long one, that can take years. The reality of how all that has been

agreed will be applied and verified.

The State coming through on its engagements.

The demobilization and incorporation into civil and political life of the guerrillas.

That’s the real challenge and where the present talks have to lead to, better sooner than later.

The Framework Agreement states that: “nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed” and

that “implementation of the agreements will be simultaneous and verifiable”.

An enormous and complex task.

But such is the challenge we have before us. Specially the Colombians that believe this is a historic

and golden opportunity.

Those of us that do not think a purely military solution is possible or even desirable. Those that

feel this hope beyond mere electoral or tactical calculations.

Beyond cautious optimism, or moderate pessimism, or intelligent skepticism, --all understandable

attitudes in the present circumstances-- what the Colombian peace talks need is a lot of patience,

a lot of realism, a lot of perseverance and - –why not?—a little bit of faith.

Thank you

colombia peace talks

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