higligth of the grp-milf peace talks

8/14/2019 Higligth of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks

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Why negotiate with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines(GRP) when there is already the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement ?

1. From the start of that negotiation, the MILF had adopted a supportive stance, buthalfway in the progress of the talks, things had not turned perfectly well inaddressing the centuries-old conflicts in Mindanao. So the MILF had to downgrade

its policy to “wait and see”. When finally the GRP-MNLF finally wrapped up their talks and signed the September 2, 1996 Final Agreement, having examined fully itscontent, we concluded that it would not address this problem:

•We put into question the preambular premise that has abandoned the rightof the Bangsamoro people to determine freely their political status and topursue freely their religious, social, economic and cultural development.

•Instead of giving genuine self-rule or autonomy to the Bangsamoro people,the Final Agreement has worked for the MNLF elements into total integrationincluding its armed component into the Philippine body politic in the guise of giving autonomy yet paving the way towards their eventual political defeat.

•The agreement also failed to give to our people the control over naturalresources, which are all practically classified as “strategic minerals”. TheMNLF agreed to defined these later.

•Therefore, we reject the “totality clause” providing that any conflict in theinterpretation of this Agreement is to be resolved in the light of the PhilippineConstitution and existing laws. This, in effect, gives one Party (the GRP)almost blanket authority to interpret this Agreement to the exclusion of theother Party (the MNLF) and the participation of the OIC.

(“Any conflict in the interpretation of this Agreement shall be resolved in thelight of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws”).



cont..

2. The MILF believes that the present “constitutional process” is anarrow framework for the negotiated political settlement of theMindanao conflict as well as to resolve the “permanent status”of the Bangsamoro people.

3. Current trends in the resolution of sovereignty-based conflicts inmany parts of the world such as those in South Sudan, Aceh,Bougainville, and Kosovo have proffered a new modality thathas advanced the conduct of permanent status referendum for nation-states as the viable options to armed conflicts betweendivided societies in Ireland, Montenegro, Catalan, and theBasque. It is in this context that the GRP-MILF frameworkdocuments have formulated the sequence, time periods andtransitory process the defined function, ending with thereferendum results.



MILF Deputy Chairman for Political Affairs Ghazali Jaafar and Executive Secretary Ruben Torres

met twice, one in Davao City, and second in Cagayan de OroCity on August 3 and September 10, respectively.

They agreed to form the peace panels and technical

committees of both GRP and the MILF.

Start of GRP-MILF

Peace Process

(January 7, 1997)(Domestic Stage, Without a Third Party Facilitator)



• GRP and MILF Peace Panels headed by former CEMCOMcommander and former Lt. Gen. and then AmbassadorFortunato Abat and Ghazali Jaafar, respectively.

• Committee on Agenda Setting headed for the GRP byASEC. Jovenal Lazaga and for the MILF by MonerBajunaid

• Committee on Cessation of Hostilities headed for the GRPby AFP Chief of Staff Jocelyn Nazareno, and for the MILF

by Atty. Lanang Ali.

Creation of Peace Panels and Technical Committees

(October 25, 1996)



Technical Committee on

Cessation of Hostilities• After the GRP and MILF Peace Panels formed their Technical Committees,

they directed their Technical Committee on Cessation of Hostilities tomeet, which agreed, among other things, for the declaration of an InterimCessation of Hostilities in Buldon on January 27, 1997.

– To return the municipal mayor of Buldon who was forced to go to safer places as a result of the fighting in his town.

– GRP and MILF forces to maintain “as is where is”. – All AFP troops deployed in Buldon, Maguindanao from January 1, 1997

up to 27 will be withdrawn. – AFP and MILF will refrain from provocative action against the other. – The MILF to remove and shall not establish checkpoints, roadblocks

along the road networks from Parang to Buldon.



To prevent further escalation of the fighting in many parts of Mindanao, theParties forged the

Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities

on July 18, 1997 wherein both committed their respective“Armed Forces” to the Cessation of Hostilities inMindanao, Sulu and Palawan.

• To direct their respective sub-committee on cessation of hostilities to meet on

June 30, 1997 to draw and finalize the Guidelines and Ground Rules for theImplementation of this Agreement.

• To resume and proceed with the Formal Talks in a Venue to be Mutually agreedupon by the GRP and MILF Peace Panels.

• In a secret document, the GRP agreed to sign to withdraw from Rajamuda oncondition that MILF sign this Agreement.



Supplementary agreements to strengthen theAgreement on the General Cessation of

Hostilities:

• Implementing Administrative Guidelines on the GRP-MILFAgreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of September 12, 1997• Implementing Operational Guidelines on the GRP-MILF

Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of November 14, 1997• Internal Procedure in the Conduct of the GRP-MILF Meetings

(February 17, 1999)• Rules and Procedures in the Administration of the Joint Secretariat

of the GRP-MILF CCCHs (May 18, 1999)• Agreement on Safety and Security Guarantees for MILF Members

Directly and Personally Involved in the Peace Process (March 9,2000)

• The Parties also created the Quick Response Team (QRT),Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (ICMC), and theIndependent Fact-Finding Committee (IFFC).



TheCommittee

on

Agenda Setting



“HOW TO SOLVE THE BANGSAMORO

PROBLEM”

The MILF

proposed a single talking pointagenda– and the GRP agreed:



The MILF explained that “How to solve the BangsamoroProblem” involves a variety of social, cultural, economic andpolitical issues and concerns that include, but not limited tothe following:

3. Ancestral Domain4. Displaced and landless Bangsamoro5. Destruction of properties and war victims6. Human rights issues7. Social and cultural discrimination

8. Corruption of the mind and the moral fiber 9. Economic inequities and widespread poverty10.Exploitation of natural resources11.Agrarian related issues

• The above issues and concerns are what we perceived to be the

Bangsamoro problem, which will be addressed through a negotiatedpolitical settlement in the form of a comprehensive compact.

• The late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim said: “ The most civilized and practical way of solving the BM problem is through a negotiated political settlement .”



The nine (9) talking points are later reduced to six (6) points:

1. Ancestral Domain/ Agrarian Related Issues.2. Destruction of Properties and Victims of War/

Displaced and Landless Bangsamoro.

3. Human Rights Issues.4. Social and Cultural Discrimination/ Corruption of

the Mind and Moral Fiber.5. Economic Inequities and Widespread Poverty.

6. Exploitation of Natural Resources

Si i f h



GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENT OF INTENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP)

AND THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF) on August 27, 1998 under the Estrada Administration.

• GRP and MILF Panels have renewed their commitment to pursue peacenegotiations on the substantive issues until a political settlement isreached.

• They committed for the protection and respect of human rights inaccordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

• The Parties pledge to refrain from the use or threat of force to attainundue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive issuesare ongoing.

• The Parties recognize that there will be lasting peace in Mindanao whenthere is mutual trust, justice, freedom, and tolerance for the identity,culture, way of life and aspirations of all peoples of Mindanao.

Note: The use of the word “freedom”, the most contentious issue.

Signing of the



Acknowledgement of seven (7) MILF Campsout of the 46 camps covered by the cessation

of hostilities• The acknowledgment of MILF camps is a confidence-building

measures in furtherance of the peace process.• To effectively implement the general cessation of hostilities and

thus to avoid armed encounters or confrontations between MILFand GRP forces.

3. Camp Abubak’r As-Siddique in Maguindanao4. Camp Bushra in Lanao Del Sur 5. Camp Rajamuda in Maguindanao and North Cotabato6. Camp Darapanan in Maguindanao7. Camp Omar in Maguindanao

8. Camp Bad’r in Maguindanao9. Camp Bilal in Lanao Del Norte

First acknowledgment on February 10, 1999Second acknowledgment was on October 6, 1999.



October 25, 1999

Formal Openingof the

Peace Talks in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao

• Three years in preparation• Ambassador Manuel Yan, GRP chief peace negotiator withMNLF

• Embassy officials from Manila• WAMY assistant Secretary General



Agreement on the Rules and Procedureson the Conduct of the Formal Peace Talks between the

GRP and MILF Panels(December 17, 1999)

Th e Pa rties ag reed o n the ff:• Agenda for Peace Talks• To be prepared by GRP and MILF Technical Committees• Venue and Schedule of the Peace Talks• GRP and MILF Peace Panels shall hold their talks in a venue to be previously bythe Parties.• Attendance/Quorum• Official members of each panel shall attend regularly.• In case of permanent disability or for any reason, a substitute is allowedprovided there is prior notice to the other Party.• A majority of each panel shall be present to have a quorum.• Presiding Officer

• The two panel chairmen shall act as co-presiding officer.• Permanent Secretariat• To document proceedings.• To prepare and submit agenda of meeting.• To prepare highlights of consensus points/agreements• To handle administrative requirements.



– Meeting Flow• Invocation• Opening Remarks

• Approval of Agenda for Meeting• Adoption of Reports of Previous Meeting• Discussion of Unfinished Agenda• Discussion of Agenda Items• Adoption of Consensus Points/Agreements• Adoption of Proposed Agenda, Schedule and Venue of Next

Meeting• Adoption of Joint Statement/Press Release

– Media Coverage• Mutually agreed upon by the Parties

– Confidentiality – Amendments – Safety and Security Matters – Effectively

• Usually after signing



First Round of

Formal Peace Talks(February 15, 2000)

• Acknowledged all agreements entered intoby the parties• Tasked the Technical Committees to

cluster the approved nine (9) talking points(Already stated earlier)



Second Round of Formal Peace Talks

(March 2, 2000)

• Adopted the nine (9) Agenda itemssubmitted by the MILF which was later clustered to six (6) aggrupations.



Third Round of Formal Peace Talks

(March 9, 2000)

• Adoption of the highlights of the TechnicalCommittee Meeting.

• Signing of the Agreement on Safety and

Security Guarantees.



Aide Memoiré (April 27, 2000)

• Both Panels agreed that the GRP shall prepare a paper on the proposedpolitical package to be presented to the MILF within 72 hours from date of themeeting. The MILF, on the other hand, shall be given enough time for consultation and thereafter respond to the package.

• The Parties agreed to normalize the situation in Mindanao for the sake of thepeople and the peace process.

• They also agreed that there is a need to pursue the ongoing peace processbetween the GRP and MILF in order to achieve stability and development inMindanao.

• To normalize the situation along the Narciso Ramos Highway, both Chairmenagreed to study the following proposals: – PNP to takeover in ensuring security and law and order at the highway. (If

possible show a map of the highway and Camp Abubakar). – For GRP and MILF units to remain in their current positions.

Note: Barely six hours after signing, AFP attacked Camp Abubakar fromalmost all sides, a very clear example of GRP double talk and the use of outright lies in deceiving the MILF..



ALL-OUT WAR OF ESTRADA(April 27, 2000)

• All-out war was first declared by President in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on March16, 2000 after his grandson, 1st Lt. Don Alfonso Javier, was slain in battle againstMILF forces on March 15, 2000 in Inudaran, Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte.

• About one million people were displaced.• Hundreds of houses were burned by AFP troops and paramilitary forces.• Billions worth of government and private properties were destroyed including power

lines, bridges, etc.• At the height of the war, the government was spending P100 million a day in its

offensive in Mindanao.• Two-third of the entire firepower of the AFP were deployed in Mindanao.• Peace Talks collapsed completely on June 15, 2000 after the MILF disbanded its peace

panel and declared an all-out jihad against the government.• On July 19, when AFP captured the lower portion of Camp Abubakar (the upper or

forested portion still effectively under MILF control), President Estrada personally andtogether with his Cabinet came to Camp Abubakar to celebrate the “victory”. – They raised the Philippine flag in a Muslim school. – Roasted pigs and drank liquor, totally unmindful of the religious sensibilities of the Muslims.

GRP MILF



GRP-MILFPEACE TALKS

DIPLOMATIC STAGEWith Foreign 3 rd Party Facilitation

(March 24, 2001 – Present)

• In February 2001, Estrada was ousted from powers by People Power EDSA IIand Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was sworn in as the newpresident of the Philippines. – Immediately reversed the all-out war policy of Estrada and started to

establish contact with the MILF for the possible resumption of the peacetalks.

– At first, the MILF was very reluctant and seriously doubted the sincerity of the government. But after sometime and serious considerations, the MILFreplied affirmatively but with the following conditions:

• All past agreements must be respected and to be implemented.

• Talks must be held outside of the Philippines.• To be facilitated by OIC or any member state.• President Arroyo also contacted the former Malaysian Prime Minster Dr.

Mahathir Mohammad for Malaysia’s possible facilitation of the talks. To dothis, she paid an official visit to Kuala Lumpur, which so far was her firstforeign visit since she became president.

• The Malaysian Government, after consulting the MILF, facilitated the talks.

AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE



AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THERESUMPTION OF PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE GRP AND THE

MILF(March 24, 2001)

• The parties agreed to resume the stalled peace talksimmediately after signing of this agreement and shallcontinue until they shall have reached a negotiatedpolitical settlement of the Bangsamoro Problem.

• Organize the Peace Panels• MILF shall reciprocate to GRP’s SOMO• Respect and implement past agreements• Relief and rehabilitation of evacuees• Commitment to negotiate with sincerity and mutual

trust, justice and freedom, and respect for the identity,culture and aspirations of all peoples of Mindanao• Both Parties expressed gratitude for the gracious

hospitality of the Malaysian Government.



Tripoli Agreement(June 22, 2001)

• Security Aspect• Rehabilitation Aspect• Ancestral Domain Aspect

After the Agreement on Intent, this is the most important agreement signed by the Parties; it isconsidered a mother agreement which all succeeding agenda or agreements are based.

FINDING NEW FORMULA(the negotiation and peaceful resolution of the conflict must involve consultations with the

Bangsamoro people free of any imposition in order to provide chances of success and opennew formulas that permanently respond to the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people for freedom )

What does “new formula” mean?• It means, the framework of talks is no longer the shallow constitutional processes as in the

GRP-MNLF peace process but refers to International Humanitarian Laws and Human RightsLaws, and also the UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights.

• New formula may also mean the exclusion of autonomy as envisaged IN THE ARMM BUT FORSOME HIGHER FORM OF SELF-GOVERNANCE.

• It can also mean an invitation for the Parties to examine CURRENT TRENDS IN CONFLICTRESOLUTIONS IN THE WORLD TODAY, as in South Sudan, Kosovo, Bougainville, Ireland, andeven Aceh.

• It is a process by which the Parties, after they diagnosed the Moro Problem thoroughly, willassemble all the negotiated parts to form a new political entity of its kind.

Security Aspect



Security Aspect• International Monitoring Team (IMT)

Note: Japan joined the IMT socio-economic monitors on July 23, 2006. Sweden has already joined; Canada has also applied.

• Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH)• Local Monitoring Team (LMT)• Ad-hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG)

The Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement is basically about human security and ceasefire.

THE CCCH:• Monitors and supervises the ceasefire.• Conducts inquiry on alleged violation by either side.• Visitations and inspections of conflict-affected areas (CAAs).

THE IMT:• 60-man: 42 Malaysian, 10 Bruneians, and 7 Libyans, Japan, 1; has five team sites: TS-1 in

Cotabato City, TS-2 in Iligan City, TS-3 in Zamboanga City, TS-4 in Davao City, and TS-5 inGeneral Santos City. IMT GHQ is also situated in Cotabato City.

• On July 23, 2006, Japan joined the IMT in its socio-economic monitoring functions.• IMT has practically reduced the fighting into zero-level since it arrived on October 10, 2004.

THE LMT:• Serves as the principal ceasefire monitors at the local level.• Composed of Representatives from LGUs, MILF, NGO-GRP, NGO-MILF, and Religious

Sectors.

THE AHJAG:• “To interdict and isolate criminal syndicates and other similar criminals in or near MILF

communities or areas.• MILF signed to show that it is not a terrorist organization but a truly revolutionary

organization with a clear and legitimate political agenda.

R h bili i A



Rehabilitation Aspect• Affirms the Parties’ observance of International Humanitarian Law and

respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedomfor all persons in Mindanao.

• Cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian laws and human rights as well as violations of thisAgreement.

Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA)

(Development agency of the MILF tasked “to

determine, lead and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict affected areas”).



Ancestral Domain Aspect

• What is ancestral domain or ancestral land?

“They are those held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves or throughtheir ancestors of the Bangsamoro people, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present, except when prevented by war, civil disturbances, force majeure, or other

forms of possible usurpations or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, as a consequence of the

government project or any other voluntary dealing entered into by the government and privateindividuals, corporate entities o institutions.”

• Divided into four (4) Strands: – Strand on Concept – Strand on Territory

– Strand on Resources – Strand on Governance

• All in all the Parties have signed 29 consensus points



Remaining agenda for the

GRP-MILF Peace Talks• MOA on Ancestral Domain

• Finding a political settlement of theBangsamoro problem, which will bein the form of comprehensivecompact.

SUMMARY OF THE PEACE



• Ten (10) years in the making: January 7, 1997 to Present (2007).

• GRP, MILF Signed 72 Documents: – 45 documents in Mindanao w/o a 3 rd Party Facilitator (January 7, 2000 to June

15, 2000)4 Formal Talks

10 Informal Talks31Technical Committee Meetings

– 27 documents signed outside of the Philippines w/ 3 rd Party Facilitator, mainlyby Malaysia and only once by Libya (March 24, 2001 to July 2006)

4 Formal Talks13 Exploratory Talks

1 Backchannel talks1 Indirect Talks (Signing of IMT TOR on September 28, 2004).

• Thousands of armed confrontations, two major, scores of medium, and countlessminor .

• GRP chief peace negotiators: Lt. General Fortunato Abat, Major General OrlandoSoriano, Major Gen. Edgardo Batenga, Col. and Executive Secretary EduardoErmita, Atty. Jesus Dureza, and Secretary Silvestre Afable, Jr.; MILF chief peacenegotiators: Vice Chairman Ghazali Jaafar, Vice Chairman Abdulazis Mimbantas,Vice Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, and Mohagher Iqbal, MILF chief informationofficer.

SUMMARY OF THE PEACEPROCESS



Present Status of the Peace Talks

• The 13 th GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks, September 6-7, 2006

• Talks bogged down on the issue of territory andconstitutional processes

• GRP peace panel has no mandate• GRP asked for more time to present new proposal

• September 30; October 31; November 15.

•On Nov. 9 the GRP has submitted a newproposal with right to self-determination as themain sweetener.

• War almost ensued

•December 1: Q&A Session



End of presentation