CONSTRUCTION OF A COMBINED SEWERAGE OVERFLOW CONTROL FACILITY AND THE IMPACT ON THE PROVIDENCE FIRE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

BY: David D. Costa Providence Fire Department Providence, RI

An applied research project submitted to the National Fire Academy as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program

December 2000

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Abstract

The problem that prompted this research is that the Narragansett Bay Commission (NBC)

requested to have the Providence Fire Department (PFD) provide rescue and emergency medical

services for an underground construction and tunneling project. If PFD personnel would be

required to perform underground rescue, proper training, equipment, and procedures would need

to be provided.

The purpose of this research was to investigate the feasibility of creating a rescue team

within the PFD that has the capability to respond to underground emergencies. Descriptive

research was the method utilized for this project to answer the following research questions:

1. How are fire departments in the United States preparing for emergencies in tunnels or

mines?

2. What are the hazards and risks that have been identified for an underground construction

operation?

3. What technical rescue capabilities are required for a tunnel rescue team?

4. What are the minimum training requirements and what is the minimum number of

firefighters the PFD needs to train to operate a tunnel rescue team?

5. What specialized equipment would be required to outfit a tunnel rescue team?

6. What laws, regulations, or standards govern underground construction?

7. What training resources are available for tunnel or mine rescue?

The procedures used to prepare this project began with a literature review to establish

what laws, standards, rules and regulations govern underground construction and tunnel rescue.

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Several personal interviews followed to gather first hand knowledge from experts in the fields of

technical rescue in general and tunnel rescue specifically.

A survey was distributed to the State Fire Academies to assist in locating fire departments

that provide tunnel rescue services, determine what regulations and standards apply to tunnel

rescue, assess what training is appropriate for tunnel rescue, and ascertain what training

resources are available. In an attempt to get a better response rate, additional surveys were sent to

fire departments that had been identified as having a tunnel or mine rescue team or where they

had experienced an underground emergency.

The results indicated that tunnel rescue operations are extremely hazardous and that the

PFD would undoubtedly be called to respond to emergency incidents in the proposed tunnel.

Development and maintenance of a tunnel rescue team by the PFD would be a substantial

endeavor that would require considerable resources. Although tunnel rescue would be a new

venture for the PFD, many of the technical rescue skills currently used by the Department could

be adapted for use in a tunnel emergency.

Recommendations include appointing a project coordinator and a planning team that

would investigate and evaluate every aspect of the tunnel project. A formal proposal should be

submitted to NBC that requests the purchase of required apparatus and equipment, salary and

benefits for several new employees, overtime pay and expenses for initial and continuing

training, expenses for maintenance or replacement of equipment, and overtime for additional

operations firefighters during extended emergency operations. The final recommendation was

that a contract between NBC and the PFD should be drafted that outlines each agency's

responsibility regarding finances and services provided.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Abstract......................................................................................................………….. 2

Table of Contents......................................................................................…………... 4

Introduction...............................................................................................…………... 5

Background and Significance....................................................................………….. 6

Literature Review.....................................................................................…………… 12

Procedures.................................................................................................…………... 27

Results......................................................................................................…………… 32

Table 1, Regulations and Standards Governing Underground Construction... 43

Table 2, Organizations that have Provided Training for Tunnel Rescue……. 45

Discussion..................................................................................................…………… 47

Recommendations..................................................................................………….…... 52

References................................................................................................……………. 55

Appendix A, Project Team………………………....................................………….... 57

Appendix B, Survey ………………………………..................................…………... 58

Appendix C, Contact Information………………..................................……………... 61

Appendix D, Tunnel Wall Construction………………................................….……... 62

Appendix E, Outfall locations……...………………..................................…………... 69

Appendix F, Diversion Structures….………………..................................…………... 70

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Introduction

Narragansett Bay may be the greatest natural resource of the State of Rhode Island, and

continuing the discharge of pollutants [into Narragansett Bay] jeopardizes the

environmental integrity of the entire Narragansett Bay and creates severe and detrimental

ecological and economic impact upon the people of the State of Rhode Island

(Narragansett Bay Commission, RI General Laws § 46-25-2 (2) et seq. 1956).

Since the creation of the Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management District Commission

(NBC), the NBC has been charged with the development of strategies to combat the degradation

of Narragansett Bay (RI General Laws § 46-25-4 et seq. 1956). One of those strategies was

outlined at a meeting on April 20, 2000 by the NBC that included an underground construction

project that was scheduled to begin in July 2001. Once complete, the project would include a

tunnel approximately 16,000 feet long, 26 feet in diameter, and be situated roughly 300 feet

below the surface.

The problem that prompted this research is that during the April 20, 2000 meeting, the

NBC requested to have the Providence Fire Department (PFD) provide secondary rescue and

primary emergency medical services for the underground construction and tunneling crews. If

PFD personnel will be required to perform underground rescues, proper training, equipment, and

procedures would need to be provided.

The purpose of this research was to investigate the feasibility of creating a rescue team

within the PFD that has the capability to respond to underground emergencies. Descriptive

research was the method utilized for this project to answer the following research questions:

1. How are fire departments in the United States preparing for emergencies in tunnels or mines?

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2. What are the hazards and risks that have been identified for an underground construction

operation?

3. What technical rescue capabilities are required for a tunnel rescue team?

4. What are the minimum training requirements and what is the minimum number of

firefighters the PFD needs to train to operate a tunnel rescue team?

5. What specialized equipment would be required to outfit a tunnel rescue team?

6. What laws, regulations, or standards govern underground construction?

7. What training resources are available for tunnel or mine rescue?

Background and Significance

The PFD provides fire protection and other rescue or emergency services throughout the

City of Providence (Providence Fire Department, Rules and Regulations, 1997). The Fire

Department has 491 uniformed personnel that operate from 14 fire stations (G. Mulcahy,

personal communication, May 11, 2000). In 1999, the PFD responded to more than 35,000

emergency incidents (Providence Fire Department Annual Report, 1999).

Throughout its’ history, the PFD has expanded their services to meet the growing needs

of the community as evidenced by the addition of standard operating procedures regarding

hazardous materials response and confined space rescue (Providence Fire Department, 1994 and

1996). On April 20, 2000, the NBC requested to have the PFD expand their services further by

providing secondary rescue and primary emergency medical services for an underground

construction and tunneling project that was scheduled to begin in July 2001 (G. Hughes, personal

communication, April 20, 2000).

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The NBC was created to improve and protect Narragansett Bay, which has been

described as the greatest natural resource of the State of Rhode Island (RI General Law’s § 46-

25-2 (2) et seq. 1956). The discharge of pollutants into the bay will jeopardize the environmental

integrity of the entire Narragansett Bay and create severe and detrimental ecological and

economic impact upon the people of the State of Rhode Island. In its legislative findings, the

Rhode Island General Assembly stated:

It is further found and declared that the most effective and efficient method to combat the

discharge of pollutants in the Narragansett Bay is to create a Narragansett Bay water

quality management district commission (NBC), to be charged with the acquisition,

planning, construction, financing, extension, improvement, and operation and

maintenance of publicly owned sewage treatment facilities in the Narragansett Bay water

quality management district, with appropriate provision for a portion of the financing of

the activities to be undertaken by the pledging of the full faith and credit of the state of

Rhode Island (Narragansett Bay Commission, RI General Laws § 46-25-2 (2) et seq.

1956).

The existing sewerage system in the City of Providence is a combination system with

sewerage and rainwater being treated at the Fields Point Wastewater Treatment Facility before

being discharged into tributaries that lead to Narragansett Bay (G. Hughes, personal

communication, April 20, 2000). In an effort to carry out their mission, the NBC proposed to

construct an underground series of pipes in the City of Providence that will act as a holding tank

to capture the untreated sewerage. The purpose of the holding tank is to secure the excess

sewerage that overflows the existing system and store it underground until the treatment plant

can sustain the demand.

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According to the project timeline, actual construction would begin during the third

quarter of the year 2001 and continue for a period of five or six years (G. Hughes, personal

communication, June 5, 2000). Initial construction would begin at the Fields Point site off Ernest

Street where three shafts will be excavated along with surface buildings to be used as shops,

warehouses and utility buildings. The shafts will be utilized as:

1) a main work shaft for access to the pumping station,

2) a main drop shaft for screening sewerage and,

3) an equipment shaft.

The shafts will be 32 feet, 26 feet, and 11 feet in diameter respectively (G. Hughes, personal

communication, October 9, 2000).

The two larger diameter shafts are constructed using a slurry wall construction sequence

where a trench is excavated to approximately 300 feet below the surface with a clamshell. The

trench walls are supported by filling them with slurry (G. Hughes, personal communication,

April 20, 2000). Reinforcing rebar or steel I-beams are installed into the trench, then concrete is

pumped into the base of the shaft to displace the slurry (see Appendix D for detailed sketches).

After the concrete walls are cured, the remaining soil between the walls will be excavated.

Next, a diesel or electric powered tunnel-boring machine (TBM) will be lowered into the

shaft where it will be assembled and prepared to bore the main spine tunnel (G. Hughes, personal

communication, April 20, 2000). To support the main spine tunnel, either precast concrete

segments would be installed simultaneous to the excavation, or rock bolts, shotcrete, and steel

ribs would be used to form a cast-in-place concrete liner. Once completed, the main spine tunnel

would be approximately 16,000 feet long, 26 feet in diameter, and would have a storage capacity

of 62 million gallons.

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During the process, blasting will be conducted at the large diameter shafts, smaller

connecting tunnels, and the tunnels pumping station (G. Hughes, personal communication, June

5, 2000). Rock, soil, and other debris, sometimes called muck, would be transported back to the

main shaft by either a conveyor belt or by rail car. The muck would then be removed up the main

shaft via a vertical conveyor or by lifting the rail cars out of the shaft with a crane.

At the same time the main spine tunnel is under construction, simultaneous operations

will take place at several other locations (G. Hughes, personal communication, April 20, 2000).

Diversion structures will be built along the Providence River, Woonasquatucket River, and

Moshassuck River to divert overflows from 14 outfalls in the present sewerage system, back

through a series of tunnels that will be excavated near the surface (see Appendix E). These

tunnels will direct the sewerage to seven drop-shafts that will channel the sewerage into the main

spine tunnel for storage and processing (see Appendix F).

The final shaft will be excavated at the Foundry site, opposite Okie Street between

Calverly and Calais Streets (G. Hughes, personal communication, April 20, 2000). The shaft is

26 feet in diameter and will be used to remove the TBM once the tunneling is complete. The

shaft will also serve as a ventilation shaft to assist in the flow of sewerage through the system of

tunnels.

Several potential hazards exist in an underground construction site that are unique and

unusual (G. Hughes, personal communication, June 5, 2000). The hazards identified included the

presence of flammable gases, the storage and use of explosives, the storage and use of flammable

and combustible gases and liquids, cutting and welding, collapse or engulfment, accidents with

heavy equipment or air tools, train collisions, slips and falls due to the wet environment in the

tunnel, and a variety of other medical emergencies

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Although soil samples indicate that the proposed project should not present problems

with methane or other flammable gases, the project engineers have classified the site as

potentially gassy. The OSHA definition of potentially gassy is:

Air monitoring discloses 10 percent or more of the lower explosive limit for methane or

other flammable gases measured at 12 inches to + or – 0.25 inch from the roof, face, floor

or walls in any underground work area for more than a 24 hour period: or the

geographical area or geographical formation indicates that 10 percent or more of the

lower explosive limit for methane or other flammable gases is likely to be encountered in

such underground operations (29 C.F.R. § 1926.800, 1999, p. 420).

Potentially gassy work areas require air monitoring for oxygen levels that fall between 19.5 and

22 percent, and monitoring for concentrations of carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, hydrogen

sulfide, and other toxic gases, dusts, vapors, mists, and fumes. In the event that the atmosphere in

the tunnel reaches unacceptable gassy levels, all operations shall cease except for those related to

mitigating the gassy condition.

Another concern is the size of the workforce for the project, particularly the personnel

that will be below ground (W. Giannini, personal communication, June 5, 2000).

The total labor force will vary greatly throughout the work. Approximately 160 personnel

may be typical at the S1 site (Fields Point) during excavation on the Main Spine Tunnel

(total for three 8-hour shifts). In addition, the pump station fit out may employ

approximately 50 personnel. When added to the contractor supervision and construction

management personnel the total daily work force was estimated as 250, of whom

approximately 100 to 125 will work underground (G. Hughes, 2000, p. 1)

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Problem

The hazards involved with a tunneling operation may create emergency situations that are

beyond the current training and operational capabilities of the PFD (W. Giannini, personal

communication, April 20, 2000). In order to fulfill the tunnel rescue team requirements that were

requested by NBC, even as a secondary or back up team, additional training and equipment is

needed to prepare Fire Department personnel to conduct their current emergency operations in an

underground environment.

The PFD has some equipment for conducting rescue operations at incidents involving

extrication, trench rescue and confined spaces (P. Doughty, personal communication, October

26, 2000). Unfortunately, limited personnel have the required training to remain proficient.

Although Fire Department personnel received training for confined space rescue, continued

training to remain certified was never conducted (T. Cocco, personal communication, September

6, 2000).

This research project was conducted to fulfill the requirements of the Executive

Leadership course at the National Fire Academy (NFA). The research directly relates to unit

eight, Influencing, of the Executive Leadership student manual (2000). As the NBC embarks on

their quest to complete their proposed project, the PFD will need to invoke their power and

influence over the process to insure that public safety is the highest priority. The purpose of this

research was to investigate the feasibility of creating a tunnel rescue team within the PFD so that

an informed decision can be made prior to employing any new services or garnering new

responsibilities.

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Literature Review

Kendall (1999) described the challenges faced during a tunneling project that began in

1996 that extended through the towns of Marlborough, Southborough, and Weston

Massachusetts. A portion of the aqueduct was constructed by boring tunnels through bedrock at

depths between 300 to 400 feet below ground. At the Southborough site, the only access to the

tunnel was via a 12-person cage that was lowered by crane. There was also a back up crane and a

rectangular basket capable of carrying two victims on backboards that could be used for

emergencies.

Two conveyors were installed in the tunnel and the shaft that was used to bring debris up

from the tunnel. The conveyors were outfitted with sprinkler systems that could extinguish any

fire that might compromise the shaft, similar to an incident that occurred during the Boston

Harbor project. Another feature that was installed in the shaft was an air duct that provided fresh

air out to the face of the tunnel. There was also an assortment of service lines including a 13,800-

volt electrical line that powers the TBM.

Kendall (1999) identified several hazards within the tunnel. Gases such as methane and

carbon dioxide could be present, fires, explosions, collapse, sudden flooding, equipment

accidents, electrical problems, and various entrapments could occur. Other major problems that

cause concern were high voltage electricity and large quantities of water in the tunnel. Kendall

also warned that if the train were disabled for any reason, rescuers would have to walk

considerable distances while wearing four-hour closed circuit air packs.

To test the full capabilities of the tunnel rescue team; a full-scale drill was conducted that

included a fire scenario and victims.

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Agencies involved in the exercise included Metro West Tunnelers, [a group consisting of

Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, Obyashi Ltd., Stone & Webster, Modern

Continental Corporation, and several trade unions including Local 88 “Sand Hogs,”

Local 4 engineers, and others], Southborough Fire Department [site incident command],

Framingham Fire Department [back up rescue teams], UMASS Trauma Center/Life

Flight, UMASS/Marlborough Hospital Campus, Central Mass C-MED, Southborough

Police Department, Ashland Fire Department [mobile command], Westborough and

Northborough Fire Departments [EMS], American Medical Response [EMS and Tactical

Response/Disaster Unit] (Kendall, 1999, p. 55)

The two OSHA required rescue teams consisted of five Sand Hogs on each team and the Special

Operations Team from the Framingham Fire Department provided the back up rescue teams.

Many practical lessons were learned from the exercise. First was if an emergency

happens at the head of the tunnel, the longer it will take to perform a rescue and mitigate the

situation. “The train can only move so fast, and if it becomes disabled, five miles is a long walk

carrying equipment and being ‘on air’” (Kendall, 1999, p. 58).

Kendall (1999) promotes the use of the incident command system, which will enhance

the rescue teams ability to coordinate the various disciplines involved. Cooperation for all

agencies is imperative. Good communications will assist in keeping everyone working towards a

common goal.

It is imperative that the rescue team listens to the tunnel workers because they were the

greatest source of information. They are in the tunnel daily and can provide electricians, crane

operators, Sand Hogs, and safety people 24 hours a day.

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Kendall influenced this research by providing a general overview of the environment

expected in a tunnel. He also highlighted the fact that an underground emergency could be a

large-scale incident that utilized many agencies and jurisdictions and would test the skills of even

the best train organization.

The United States Fire Administration (USFA) illustrated the continually changing role

of the fire service when it wrote:

Fire departments across the United States have assumed a major role as primary

responders to rescue incidents that involve, among other things, structural collapse,

trench cave-in. confined spaces, industrial and agricultural machinery, water

emergencies, and people trapped above or below grade level. These emergencies are

grouped into a category of rescue called technical rescue (1995, p. i).

Some technical rescue incidents can become very complex and last hours or even days

while personnel assess the circumstances, gather the appropriate rescue equipment, oversee

safety, and isolate hazards prior to reaching, stabilizing, and removing any victims. “Experience

has shown that hasty rescue operations can endanger the lives of both rescuer and victims. At the

same time, rescuers know that a victim’s survival chances are often dependent on quick

extrication and transportation to a hospital” (USFA, 1995, p. i).

The USFA promotes a tiered response to technical rescue incidents (1995). The basic

concept is to provide equipment and training throughout an organization for various levels of

response, ranging from basic rescue procedures to advanced rescue techniques. The personnel

receiving basic training would be made aware of the dangers and hazards involved with the

rescue operation and they would learn basic practical rescue skills. If a complex technical rescue

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were warranted, a request for an advanced rescue team would be made while the initial personnel

conducted measures within their capabilities.

Many considerations must be made before starting a rescue team, including whether a

team is really needed, whether local officials will support a team, whether firefighters are

committed to forming a team, what are the risks associated with a rescue team, and what

laws affect the formation of a team” (USFA, 1995, p. 2-1).

The USFA cautions that the development of a technical rescue team is a substantial

endeavor (1995). Although creation of the team, both administratively and operationally, is

extremely intensive, maintaining equipment, training personnel, and insuring technical

competence will be the most formidable.

Technical rescue tends to be staffing intensive, especially during the start-up phase. A

critical stage in the development of a rescue team is the determination of the number of

personnel to adequately staff the team.

Trench rescue and structural collapse operations may be the most intensive. Easily

requiring at least four or five specialists, overseen by command positions and assisted by

non-certified personnel. Advanced rope operations may require a sizable cadre of

personnel for raising operations. The majority of personnel operating belay lines need not

be certified personnel (but must be under the direct control of certified personnel)

(USFA, 1995, p. 3-5).

The work by the USFA influenced this research by supporting the idea that providing a

tunnel rescue team is a massive undertaking that is beyond the regular capabilities of a typical

fire department. Extensive resources need to be directed to the fire department if the decision is

made to proceed with the formation of a tunnel rescue team.

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The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) establishes minimum safety

criteria for private industry and the requirement for tunnel rescue teams is found in 29 C.F.R. §

1926.800, which specifies:

On jobsites where 25 or more employees work underground at one time, the employer

shall provide (or make arrangement in advance with locally available rescue services to

provide) at least two 5-person rescue teams, one on the jobsite or within half hour travel

time from the entry point, and the other within 2 hours travel time (1999, p. 419).

The OSHA regulation requires rescue teams to be qualified in performing rescue

procedures, the proper use and the limitations of breathing apparatus, and the use of firefighting

equipment. The qualifications of the team members must be reviewed at least once per year. In

addition, where flammable or noxious gases are expected in hazardous quantities, team members

shall practice using breathing apparatus monthly.

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) establishes minimum safety criteria

for mining operations that include mine rescue teams (30 C.F.R. § 49, 1999).

Each member of a mine rescue team shall be examined annually by a physician who shall

certify that each person is physically fit to perform mine rescue and recovery work for

prolonged periods under strenuous conditions. The first such physical examination shall

be completed within 60 days prior to scheduled initial training (MSHA, 30 CFR §

49.7[a], 1999).

The MSHA regulation outlines distinct diagnostic procedures that are required for the physical

examinations and requires specific documentation by the attending physician.

At a minimum, initial training for mine rescue team members shall include a 20-hour

program in the use, care, and maintenance of the breathing apparatus that will be used. The

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minimum refresher training provided shall be not less than 40 hours and shall include sessions

underground at least every six months and the use of breathing apparatus while under oxygen for

at least two hours every two months. In addition, training shall be provided in advanced mine

rescue training and procedures, mine map training and ventilation procedures, and the use, care,

capabilities, and limitations of auxiliary mine rescue equipment, or different breathing apparatus.

The regulations established by OSHA and MSHA influenced this research by providing a

baseline of training for rescue team members.

In 1999, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) published NFPA 1670,

Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Rescue Incidents. “This standard identifies

and establishes levels of functional capability for safely and effectively conducting operations at

technical rescue incidents” (1999, NFPA, p. 1670-4). The consensus standard requires that the

authority having jurisdiction establish levels of operational capability based on hazard analysis,

risk assessment, training level of personnel, and the availability of resources, both internal and

external.

According to the NFPA (1999), standard operating procedures should establish three

levels of operations to include awareness level, operations level, and technician level. Awareness

level is the minimum capability personnel need to respond to a technical rescue incident. This

level may require personnel to provide search, rescue, or recovery operations in a limited role.

Team members at the awareness level are not usually considered as rescuers.

Operations level personnel should be capable of recognizing hazards, using equipment,

and be able to support and participate in technical rescue incidents. Personnel should be capable

of search, rescue, and recovery operations while under the direct supervision of technician-level

personnel.

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Technician level personnel need the expertise to recognize hazards, use rescue

equipment, and have a knowledge of techniques to safely and effectively coordinate, perform,

and manage or supervise a technical rescue effort. The technician may be involved with search,

rescue, and recovery operations.

NFPA 1670 (1999) divides technical rescue into seven specialized categories. The

categories include structural collapse, rope rescue, confined space, vehicle and machinery, water,

wilderness search and rescue, and trench and excavation operations. The standard outlines

specific functional requirements for each specialty and requires that the authority having

jurisdiction provide training that is appropriate for the operational capability of each team

member. Additionally, continued training shall be provided and documented, along with annual

performance evaluations.

The NFPA influenced this research by providing specific objectives for a training

program in tunnel rescue. Although NFPA 1670 is not specifically designed for tunnel rescue,

members of a tunnel rescue team would utilize many of the same technical rescue disciplines

outlined in the standard.

Nailen (1988) outlined the development of a federally certified Mine Rescue Unit by the

Milwaukee Fire Department to handle underground emergencies during a subterranean sewer

project. “A fire or an accident in a tunnel under construction, far below the surface and perhaps

miles from an access shaft, requires extraordinary rescue methods and equipment” (Nailen, 1988,

p. 32). The greatest danger to a rescuer is an unbreathable or explosive atmosphere and MSHA

has identified ten hazardous gases that are likely to be encountered by underground workers.

Rescue workers will need to grapple with these hostile atmospheres for hours at a time, out of the

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reach of fresh air, with no alternate egress, or a rapid intervention team that can reach them

quickly.

When describing the Milwaukee Fire Department’s Mine Rescue Unit, Nailen (1988)

portrays a hierarchy that is somewhat different from the usual fire department organization.

There are 54 members that are divided between the Department’s three work shifts. Members of

the team may be any rank from firefighter to battalion chief, but each team that will be working

underground would be under the direction of two team leaders or captains. The chief, the

assistant director or one of the certified mine rescue instructors chooses the team leaders at the

scene of an incident.

A major problem identified by Nailen in tunnel rescue operations is the difficulty in

maintaining adequate communications. Tunnel workers use mine telephones that may become

disabled during an emergency incident and fire department radios are unreliable when

underground. The Milwaukee Fire Department has their own sound powered telephone system

where the rescue team members can stretch up to 1000 feet of cable so they do not have to rely

on the mine telephones. As another back up, they also found that CB-type radio units work better

than regular fire department radios.

Accountability is a major concern at an underground emergency and the Milwaukee Fire

department uses a chip board that is attended by a rescue team member at all times. The chip

board has a pair of brass disks assigned to each team member and the disks are stamped with the

member’s name and number. Each member carries one disk at all times while the other disk is

hung on the side of the board labeled “out”. The “out” side of the board signifies that the team

member is topside, out of the tunnel system. When a rescue team member goes underground, the

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member’s disk is moved to the “in” side of the board, signifying the member is in the tunnel

system.

Continued training is conducted that includes roof control, tunnel lighting, earth freezing

systems, explosives storage and handling, water removal, mine gases, contracting methods,

ventilation, tunnel building and communications.

“Team members must go through at least 40 hours annually. Everyone has to spend at

least two hours under oxygen, using the mask, every other month. We have underground

drills to practice moving around tunnel obstacles, encountering unexpected hazards and

dragging victims out” (Nailen, 1988, p. 37).

Training is documented on MSHA forms and secured in personnel files for at least one year.

The environment in an underground tunnel is considerably different from a normal

construction site. The working face may be miles away from the shaft and could take up to three-

quarters of an hour to reach using the underground train. If an emergency required the 13,800-

volt feeder line to be shut down, there would be no lights or power for pumps that remove

ground water. The tunnels in Milwaukee experience water leakage as high as 1000 gallons per

minute. The rescue team may not proceed when water levels are more than knee high.

The majority of rescue incidents at that time were near the shafts, and usually involved

falling objects. There was one heart attack and a couple of fatalities. The most difficult

emergency involved a fire in the insulation on the TBM’s high voltage power cable, which

spread to heavy timbers. At the time, eight workers were working in an airlock due to excessive

water in the tunnel. When the smoke jeopardized the airlock, the workers were removed without

adequate time to decompress. All workers had to be rushed to a hospital with a hyberbaric

chamber for treatment.

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It is expected that the Mine Rescue Unit will become a permanent part of the Milwaukee

Fire department even once the tunnel project is complete. There may still be a need for

underground rescue capability due to periodic maintenance of the tunnels or pumping equipment,

or there could be a collapse of a portion of the tunnel.

“On the day before Thanksgiving in 1993, a 16-ton winch plummeted down a 480-foot

shaft in New York City, killing one worker and injuring seven others” (Downey, 1994, p. 35).

This was the twentieth worker fatality since the water tunnel project began sometime in 1970.

The falling winch had broken scaffolding, leaving six workers clinging to the damaged sections

and one holding on to a protrusion on a wall. Using a crane, a rescue bucket was lowered by

coworkers and some of the victims were rescued.

Once the Fire Department arrived, one of the first problems encountered was the lack of

communication. It is good practice to back up standard portable radio equipment with a hard-

wired system. Also the bucket almost tipped over because the operator could not see to

compensate for swinging of the bucket and movement of rescue workers in the bucket.

Downey (1994) lists several key considerations for working in a hazardous environment.

Testing the air for toxic or explosive atmospheres should be one of the first actions taken. In the

New York incident, a leaking acetylene tank was discovered. Another is determining if electrical

power supplying lighting and other equipment in the tunnel needs to be shut down. An accident

may damage electrical cables causing short circuits or electrocution hazards. Entry and egress

may be limited to a single shaft. A second crane should be provided as a back up, but use

extreme caution and maintain good communications if both cranes will be used at the same time.

It is absolutely essential to work with a job supervisor or foreman to gain valuable information

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regarding the location and number of victims, the type of work being performed, and the hazards

in the tunnel and shaft.

As with any major incident, the incident command system should be implemented to

maintain control over the scene. The safety officer and emergency medical sector should be

established and maintained. Emergency medical personnel should be consulted prior to any

victim being removed that suffered from entrapment or crush syndrome injuries.

Nailen and Downey influenced this research by providing insight into operational

problems that need to be addressed in the development of a tunnel rescue team. Well-organized

and highly trained teams are required to adapt to the hazards and problems that are common to a

tunneling operation.

While impossible to predict all possible circumstances, there are some common hazards

associated with tunneling operations (Seattle Fire Department [SFD], 1999). They include

explosive and toxic atmospheres, fires and explosions, falls, machinery entrapment and

extrication, structural collapse, electrocution, flooding, and engulfment. Many of these hazards

are mitigated throughout the City of Seattle on a daily basis. The difference is that they occur

over two hundred feet below ground and may be great distances from an access point. The

smallest incident could become a large-scale operation.

SFD noted that if the contractor decides that he will provide his own tunnel rescue team,

the Fire Department would not need to provide technical assistance. But does this really address

the problem? What intervention would take place during the half-hour it takes for the contractor

to assemble the rescue teams? Would SFD personnel just stand by helplessly while the

contractor’s rescue team conducts a rescue operation? Who oversees the contractor’s rescue

team’s to insure they were properly trained and in a state of readiness? Who takes over if the

23

contractors rescue team cannot fulfill their obligation? Who will provide basic or advanced life

support and transportation to the hospital? Who would mitigate a fire in the tunnel?

The fact is, that even if the contractor did supply a team according to the letter of the law

and they were response ready 100% of the time the Seattle Fire Department would still be

exposed to this environment in anything beyond the smallest scale incident …This tunnel

and the related transit system are in the jurisdiction of the Seattle Fire Department and we

will be responding to emergencies associated with it, we need to be trained to operate in

that environment. The alternative is for the administration to issue an order prohibiting

members of the Seattle Fire Department from intervening in one of these incidents (SFD,

1999, p. 9)

SFD (1999) reviewed the equipment needs, which focused on making conditions in the

tunnel survivable for the rescuers. Hazardous atmospheres represent the greatest hazard,

therefore atmospheric monitoring equipment and long duration self-contained breathing

apparatus (SCBA) would be essential. Conventional open-circuit SCBA do not have adequate air

supplies to be effective in a toxic environment where rescuers may have to walk several miles in

a tunnel to reach a victim. Closed circuit SCBA technology has achieve up to four hours of

actual working air and they feature positive pressure and are National Institute of Occupational

Safety and Health (NIOSH) approved. Additionally, lighting, communication systems and

individual personal protective equipment would need to be provided for the rescue teams.

Specialized fire suppression and emergency medical equipment should be provided for

tunneling operations. Lightweight hose packs, efficient means of carrying medical equipment

and supplies, methods of transporting patients and equipment over long distances underground

need to be assessed.

24

The SFD noted that the tunnel project would tax their current operations levels. The

smallest incident would be resource intensive. A full-scale rescue operation would have a

significant impact on the level of service to the remainder of the city.

Additional personnel will need to be available to meet the needs of this issue without

siphoning resources from the rest of the Department. Staffing levels will need to be

augmented to ensure we meet our commitments to all of our customers (SFD, 1999, p.

10).

A reasonable arrangement would be to have the contractor or owner of the project

reimburse the Fire Department for the impact on their operations. The project would be

increasing the responsibilities of the Fire Department and they should be compensated for the

commensurate duties. “This type of solution has been found to be mutually beneficial to all

parties in other cities who have found themselves in a similar situation” (SFD, 1999, p. 11).

SFD justified the expense to the contractor with the following reasons. First, the

contractor would have a tunnel rescue team available 24-hours a day that can be mobilized in

minutes, not hours, at a fraction of what it would cost from the private sector. The insurance

underwriter may provide incentives to the contractor due to the quality of the service provided by

SFD. Furthermore, the contractor would not have to negotiate with Labor and Industry or

contend with inspection and administrative issues associated with providing tunnel rescue

services.

From the SFD viewpoint, the Fire Department gets subsidized for training and equipment

that would likely have to be provided regardless of whether the contractor provided a rescue

team or not. Moreover, the Fire Department is better prepared to manage incidents in the tunnel

after construction is complete. “The end result is a safer work environment for both the Fire

25

Department and the contractor without significantly impacting the services provided to the rest

of the citizens” (SFD, 1999, pg. 11).

In the planning phase, SFD (1999) expected the owner of the tunnel project to provide for

the following: (a) Full time salary for one Deputy Chief during the construction phase only, (b)

full time salary for two administrative Lieutenants during the construction phase only, (c) salary

and expenses for initial training of operations companies and tunnel rescue teams, (d) salary and

expenses for continuing education of operations companies and tunnel rescue teams, (e) salary

and expenses for maintenance of specialty equipment, (f) salary for additional operations

firefighters.

In addition, capital was requested to purchase: (a) 28 closed circuit SCBA and support

equipment, (b) 8 thermal imaging cameras, (c) 4 litter carts, (d) 8 passport or equivalent 4 gas

monitors, (e) special air monitoring equipment, (f) ultra light 60 minute bottles, (g) mobile high

capacity ventilation fans, (h) replace or refurbish vehicle [U77], (i) replace or refurbish vehicle

[R14], and miscellaneous safety equipment (i.e. helmets, Nomex coveralls etc.). But in a critique

by SFD (2000), Lieutenant Gary Stein of the Quincy Fire Department reviewed the SFD plan

and described the conditions and work to be performed as “Scary”. In his [Stein] opinion the

proposed response and inventory of equipment was a bare minimum, if not inadequate.

Another concern of the SFD (2000) was the procedures for inspection of the tunnel site.

During a visit to a job site in New York City, an array of hazards was witnessed that would have

caused immediate action in other locations. “These included uncapped acetylene bottles tipped

on their side, large diesel tanks, cans of what appeared to be Class 1 flammable liquid and a

general accumulation of debris and combustible materials” (SFD, 2000, p. 7). At this site, there

26

was no regular inspection program by the Fire Department. “A general conclusion was that sites

that had a more regular Fire Department presence had much fewer hazards” (SFD, 2000, p. 7).

The work of the SFD influenced this research first by providing additional information

regarding the hazards involved in tunneling, and secondly by supporting the idea that any fire

department involved in a tunneling project will be expected to provide some level of rescue

service. To be prudent, training and equipment needs to be provided for the fire department

whether they are the primary rescue team or not. In addition, supplementary staffing needs to be

considered to relieve the impact the project would have on the rest of the community.

“Confined space operations are not suited to everyone; man has a built-in ‘fear’ of being

buried alive and going down a hole into the unknown is not a natural thing to do” (Allsop, 1997,

p. 11). An unbearable physiological stress can be placed on some people that are working in a

confined space. Although firefighters pride themselves on remaining calm under extremely

dangerous situations, confined spaces can cause a firefighter’s behavior to change to

uncontrollable panic. Therefore, fire departments need to develop specific training, purchase the

most reliable equipment, and choose the personnel best suited for carrying out a rescue in a

confined space.

The work reviewed by Allsop influenced this research by supporting the development of

a pre-screening process to choose potential candidates for a tunnel rescue team. A screening

process that includes practical evolutions in a confined space would help to identify potential

physiological problems with firefighters prior to expending valuable resources on training for the

tunnel rescue team.

27

Procedures

The procedures used to prepare this project began with a literature review at the Learning

Resource Center (LRC) at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland in July 2000

followed by an Internet search. Additional literature was reviewed within the PFD, including the

Fire Prevention Bureau, and the author's personal library.

Several personal communications transpired with Geoffrey Hughes during meetings and

telephone conversations on April 20, 2000, June 5, 2000, June 16, 2000, June 20, 2000, October

9, 2000 and October11, 2000. Geoffrey Hughes is the principal tunnel engineer for Louis Berger

& Associates, Inc. who was hired by NBC to be the program manager for the CSO program. Mr.

Hughes was also instrumental in arranging an actual tour of a tunnel at the Southborough, MA

site. Four members of the PFD were lowered into the tunnel via a man-cage and crane, where

they walked through several miles of the tunnel to experience the tunnel environment first hand.

Personal communications occurred with Assistant Chief William Giannini on June 5,

2000, April 20, 2000, as well as others during meetings with representatives of NBC. Chief

Giannini is the Assistant Chief of Operations for the PFD and he was consulted to verify

operational capabilities and procedures and to provide input regarding the official position of the

Fire Department.

A personal interview was conducted with Acting Assistant Chief Gary Mulcahy on May

11, 2000. Chief Mulcahy is the Assistant Chief for Administration of the PFD and he was

consulted regarding personnel issues.

A personal interview was conducted with Firefighter Paul Doughty on October 26, 2000.

Firefighter Doughty is a Providence firefighter that is assigned to the Special Hazards Unit. He is

also a member of the regional Urban Search and Rescue Team (USAR), an instructor for the RI

28

Fire Academy, and the Safety Officer for the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF)

Local 799. Firefighter Doughty was consulted on current levels of training and equipment that

may augment a tunnel rescue team.

A personal interview was conducted with Firefighter Theodore Cocco on September 6,

2000. Firefighter Cocco is a 20-year veteran of the PFD and he is assigned to the Division of

Training. He is also an instructor for the RI Fire Academy and a member of the RI Fire

Education and Training Coordinating Board. Firefighter Cocco was consulted on current levels

of training that may augment a tunnel rescue team.

A personal interview was conducted with Lieutenant Gregory Crawford on September 6,

2000 and October 25, 2000. Lieutenant Crawford is a Providence firefighter that is currently

assigned to the Division of Training and he is a member of the regional Urban Search and

Rescue Team (USAR). Lieutenant Crawford was consulted on current levels of training and

equipment that may augment a tunnel rescue team.

A personal interview was conducted with District Manager James Petrie on August 4,

2000. District Manager Petrie directs the regional MSHA office in Cranberry Township, PA.

District Manager Petrie was interviewed to clarify MSHA’s jurisdiction regarding underground

construction and tunneling. In addition, District Manager Petrie provided information concerning

training opportunities at the National Mine Health and Safety Academy in Beckley, West

Virginia.

A personal interview was conducted with David Friley on November 14, 2000. Mr. Friley

is responsible for training programs at the National Mine Health and Safety Academy in

Beckley, West Virginia and he provided information concerning training opportunities,

associated costs, and administrative procedures for use of their facility.

29

A personal interview was conducted with Mr. Scott Bateson on August 23, 2000. The

State of Rhode Island, Department of Labor and Training employs Mr. Bateson who contacted

the author in response to a letter requesting clarification of jurisdictional issues that the RI

Department of Labor may have regarding underground construction and tunneling.

A personal interview was conducted with Director Kipp Hartman on August 30, 2000.

Director Hartman manages the OSHA office in Providence, RI. Director Hartman was

interviewed to clarify OSHA’s jurisdiction regarding underground construction and tunneling. In

addition, Director Hartman provided specific information concerning a tunneling project in the

City of Boston, MA.

A personal interview was conducted with Mr. David Grafton on August 30, 2000. Mr.

Grafton is an investigator with the OSHA office in Boston, MA. Mr. Grafton provided specific

information concerning a tunneling project in the City of Boston, MA.

A personal interview was conducted with Lieutenant Gary Stein on September 28, 2000.

Lieutenant Stein is the Tunnel Rescue Coordinator for the Quincy Fire Department and he

provided information regarding the process conducted to establish a joint tunnel rescue team.

Lieutenant Stein also arranged to have their tunnel rescue response vehicle displayed for

viewing.

A personal interview was conducted with Chief James Smith of the Framingham Fire

Department on June 20, 2000. Chief Smith was able to provide background information on

establishing a tunnel rescue team for the City of Framingham, MA and to provide insight into

potential emergencies that may arise in a tunnel project. Chief Smith provided a copy of the

contract between the City of Framingham and the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority

(MWRA) that outlines the agreement to provide tunnel rescue services.

30

A personal interview was conducted with Deputy Chief David Granara of the Boston Fire

Department on June 13, 2000. Deputy Chief Granara was able to provide background

information on establishing a tunnel rescue team for the City of Boston, MA and to provide

insight into potential emergencies that may arise in a tunnel project. Deputy Chief Granara also

arranged a tour of the Deer Island construction site and to have their tunnel rescue response

vehicle displayed for viewing.

A personal interview was conducted with Lieutenant Arthur LaPorte of the Boston Fire

Department on August 2, 2000. Lieutenant LaPorte provides continued training in tunnel rescue

to the Boston Fire Department and also operates a private consulting firm, Fire & Rescue

Training Incorporated. Lieutenant LaPorte was able to provide background information on

establishing a tunnel rescue team for the City of Boston, MA and to provide insight into potential

emergencies that may arise in a tunnel project.

Personal communications transpired with Firefighter Frank Brennan, of the Seattle Fire

Department on October 11, 2000 and October 27, 2000. Firefighter Brennan has been assigned to

a technical rescue team for the past seven years and he is a member of the Metro Medical

Response Team for response to Weapons of Mass Destruction events. Firefighter Brennan was

able to provide background information on establishing a tunnel rescue team for the City of

Seattle, WA and to provide details on their tunnel rescue-training program that was established

in cooperation with MSHA.

A survey was distributed in October 2000 to the State Fire Academies throughout the

United States. The survey was utilized to assist in locating fire departments that provide tunnel

rescue services, what regulations and standards apply to tunnel rescue, what training is

appropriate for tunnel rescue, and what training resources are available.

31

The surveys were distributed by e-mail, fax, regular mail, or conducted by telephone. The

population size for the sampling was all 50 State Fire Academies that were identified on the

United States Fire Administration’s (USFA) website. In an attempt to get a better response rate,

nine additional surveys were sent to fire departments that had been identified during the literature

review as having a tunnel or mine rescue team or where they had experienced an incident in an

underground environment. Of the 16 surveys completed, eleven were from state training

academies and five were from fire departments. The results of the survey were entered into a

Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for analysis.

The purpose of this research was to investigate the feasibility of creating a rescue team

within the PFD that has the capability to respond to underground emergencies. Historical

research was utilized in that a literature review was conducted to determine others experience

with tunnel emergencies. Descriptive research was utilized to describe the impact the CSO

project will have on the PFD.

Limitations

Survey . The assumption that the surveys would be filled out honestly and the low

response rate limit the results of the survey. In addition, the sampling may not be representative

of the fire service in general because the specific topic of this research is not widely practiced by

a majority of fire departments. The surveys should not be utilized for statistical relevance, but to

provide insight to fire departments that may want to establish a tunnel rescue team and to locate

adequate training resources for such an endeavor.

Definitions

OUTFALLS: Pipes that allow combined sewerage and rainwater to discharge into rivers when

the sewerage system overflows.

32

MAIN SPINE TUNNEL: The main tunnel that acts as a storage tank and conduit to transport

combined sewerage to the sewerage treatment plant.

TUNNEL BORING MACHINE (TBM): An electric or diesel powered machine that grinds rock

in a circular pattern to form a tunnel.

Results

Answers to Research Questions

Question 1. How are fire departments in the United States preparing for

emergencies in tunnels or mines?

Two questions on the survey were used to answer this question. The first question asked

if fire departments in their state had tunnel or mine rescue capabilities and the second asked what

resources were utilized if the fire departments were not qualified?

The survey indicated that five (31%) of the responding states, have fire departments that

operate a tunnel or mine rescue team. Of the remainder, six (38%) indicated that a variety of

technical rescue disciplines including confined space rescue, trench rescue, collapse rescue and

high angle rope rescue would be used by fire departments for underground emergencies. The

final five (31%) would rely on outside government agencies or private vendors.

Question 2. What are the hazards and risks that have been identified for an

underground construction operation?

As a general rule of thumb, tunneling projects experience one employee death for each

mile of underground construction (D. Granara, personal communication, June 13, 2000). Specific

hazards identified included the presence of flammable gases, the storage and use of explosives,

the storage and use of flammable and combustible gases and liquids, cutting and welding,

33

collapse or engulfment, accidents with heavy equipment or air tools, train collisions, slips and

falls due to the wet environment in the tunnel, and a variety of other medical emergencies (G.

Hughes, personal communication, June 5, 2000). Although soil samples indicated that the

proposed project should not present problems with methane or other flammable gases, the project

engineers have classified the CSO project as potentially gassy.

The possibility exists that conveyor systems would be installed to remove excavated

muck from the tunnel (G. Hughes, personal communication, June 5, 2000). Experience with the

Boston Harbor project identified the use of combustible conveyor belts as a potential fire hazard

(Kendall, 1999).

Other major problems identified by Kendall (1999) were potential electrocutions from

high voltage electricity and sudden flooding due to large quantities of water in the tunnel.

Kendall also warned that if the train were disabled for any reason, rescuers would have to walk

considerable distances while wearing four-hour closed circuit air packs.

A mistake almost occurred during a train collision in the Framingham, MA tunnel that

would have cost the train operator his life (J. Smith, personal communication, June 20, 2000).

Following the accident, the train operator was crushed and pinned in the cab. Tunnel workers

desperately wanted to remove the victim as quickly as possible. Due to the crushing injuries, if

the patient had been removed prior to receiving proper medical attention from paramedics, his

blood pressure surely would have dropped and he probably would have died.

“Experience has shown that hasty rescue operations can endanger the lives of both

rescuer and victims. At the same time, rescuers know that a victim’s survival chances are often

dependent on quick extrication and transportation to a hospital” (USFA, 1995, p. i). Some

technical rescue incidents can become very complex and last hours or even days while personnel

34

assess the circumstances, gather the appropriate rescue equipment, oversee safety, and isolate

hazards prior to reaching, stabilizing, and removing any victims.

“A fire or an accident in a tunnel under construction, far below the surface and perhaps

miles from an access shaft, requires extraordinary rescue methods and equipment” (Nailen, 1988,

p. 32). The greatest danger to a rescuer is an unbreathable or explosive atmosphere. Rescue

workers will need to grapple with these hostile atmospheres for hours at a time, out of the reach

of fresh air, with no alternate egress, or a rapid intervention team that can reach them quickly.

Another major problem identified by Nailen in tunnel rescue operations is the difficulty

in maintaining adequate communications. Tunnel workers use mine telephones that may become

disabled during an emergency incident and fire department radios are unreliable when

underground.

In addition, the working face of a tunnel may be miles away from the shaft and could take

up to three-quarters of an hour to reach using the underground train. If an emergency required

the 13,800-volt feeder line to be shut down, there would be no lights or power for pumps that

remove ground water. The tunnels in Milwaukee experience water leakage as high as 1000

gallons per minute. The rescue team may not proceed when water levels are more than knee

high.

The majority of rescue incidents in Milwaukee at that time were near the shafts, and

usually involved falling objects (Nailen 1988). There was one heart attack and a couple of

fatalities. The most difficult emergency involved a fire in the insulation on the TBM’s high

voltage power cable, which spread to heavy timbers. At the time, eight workers were working in

an airlock due to excessive water in the tunnel. When the smoke jeopardized the airlock, the

35

workers were removed without adequate time to decompress. All workers had to be rushed to a

hospital with a hyberbaric chamber for treatment.

During the Deer Island project in Boston, Massachusetts, OSHA conducted an

unannounced test to verify the capabilities of the contractors rescue team (D. Grafton, personal

communication, August 30, 2000). When the tunnel workers that were designated as the rescue

team were unable to properly mobilize, OSHA ordered the contractor to cease all construction.

At that point, an agreement was reached with the Boston Fire Department to provide the required

rescue teams. Although the safety of the Deer Island project increased with the establishment of

the Fire Department rescue team, several difficulties still existed.

One problem was that the contractor did not cooperate and allow access to the tunnel for

continued training of the Boston Fire Department and another was the inability to verify the

authenticity of required air quality records that were taken after blasting operations (K. Hartman,

personal communication, August 20, 2000). A fire department person needs to be at the

construction site every day to verify the contractor is following proper procedures (D. Grafton,

personal communication, August 20, 2000).

“On the day before Thanksgiving in 1993, a 16-ton winch plummeted down a 480-foot

shaft in New York City, killing one worker and injuring seven others” (Downey, 1994, p. 35).

This was the twentieth worker fatality since the water tunnel project began sometime in 1970.

The falling winch had broken scaffolding, leaving six workers clinging to the damaged sections

and one holding on to a protrusion on a wall.

Once the Fire Department arrived, one of the first problems encountered was the lack of

communication. Also the bucket almost tipped over because the operator could not see to

compensate for swinging of the bucket and movement of rescue workers in the bucket.

36

“Confined space operations are not suited to everyone; man has a built-in ‘fear’ of being

buried alive and going down a hole into the unknown is not a natural thing to do” (Allsop, 1997,

p. 11). An unbearable physiological stress can be placed on some people that are working in a

confined space. Although firefighters pride themselves on remaining calm under extremely

dangerous situations, confined spaces can cause a firefighter’s behavior to change to

uncontrollable panic.

Question 3. What technical rescue capabilities are required for a tunnel rescue

team?

“Incidents at tunnel sites will require the expertise of many disciplines in the fire service.

Often structural collapse, hazardous materials, confined space rescue, rope rescue and trench

rescue skills are needed in the hot zone of a tunnel rescue” (SFD, 1999, p. 16).

OSHA regulations require rescue teams to be qualified in performing rescue procedures,

the proper use and the limitations of breathing apparatus, and the use of firefighting equipment

(29 C.F.R. § 1926.800, 1999). In addition, where flammable or noxious gases are expected in

hazardous quantities, team members shall practice using breathing apparatus monthly.

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) establishes minimum safety criteria

for mining operations that include mine rescue teams (J. Petrie, personal communication, August

4, 2000). Although a deep tunnel project is similar to a mining operation, MSHA does not have

jurisdiction over tunnels and tunnel rescue teams. The requirements for mine rescue teams can be

found in MSHA regulations for mine rescue teams, 30 C.F.R. § 49 (1999), which could be used

as a guideline for development of a tunnel rescue team.

37

At a minimum, initial training for mine rescue team members shall include a 20-

hour program in the use, care, and maintenance of the breathing apparatus that will be used. The

minimum annual refresher training provided shall be not less than 40 hours and shall include

sessions underground at least every six months and the use of breathing apparatus while under

oxygen for at least two hours every two months. In addition, training shall be provided in

advanced mine rescue training and procedures, mine map training and ventilation procedures,

and the use, care, capabilities, and limitations of auxiliary mine rescue equipment, or different

breathing apparatus.

“A fire or an accident in a tunnel under construction, far below the surface and perhaps

miles from an access shaft, requires extraordinary rescue methods and equipment” (Nailen, 1988,

p. 32). The greatest danger to a rescuer is an unbreathable or explosive atmosphere and MSHA

has identified ten hazardous gases that are likely to be encountered by underground workers.

Rescue workers will need to grapple with these hostile atmospheres for hours at a time, out of the

reach of fresh air, with no alternate egress, or a rapid intervention team that can reach them

quickly.

While impossible to predict all possible circumstances, there are some common hazards

associated with tunneling operations (Seattle Fire Department [SFD], 1999). They include

explosive and toxic atmospheres, fires and explosions, falls, machinery entrapment and

extrication, structural collapse, electrocution, flooding, and engulfment. Many of these hazards

are mitigated throughout the City of Seattle on a daily basis. The difference is that they occur

over two hundred feet below ground and may be great distances from an access point.

SFD reviewed the equipment needs for a tunneling operation, which focused on making

conditions in the tunnel survivable for the rescuers. Hazardous atmospheres represent the

38

greatest hazard, therefore atmospheric monitoring equipment and long duration self-contained

breathing apparatus (SCBA) would be essential.

Question 4. What are the minimum training requirements and what is the minimum

number of firefighters the PFD needs to train to operate a tunnel rescue team?

Two questions from the survey instrument were used to answer this question. Question

number seven of the survey asked the number of hours required to provide initial and continued

training for a tunnel rescue team and question number five from the survey asked for the

minimum number of personnel needed to perform a tunnel or mine rescue.

The survey indicated that two (12.5%) fire departments provided a minimum of 24 hours

of initial training. An additional one (6%) provided 20 hours of initial training while one (6%)

provided 40 hours of initial training. Two (12.5%) of the responding state training academies

indicated that the actual training hours varied within individual fire departments.

The survey also indicated that one (6%) provided continued training for four hours each

month while one (6%) indicated monthly training, but with no specific hourly requirement. Two

(12.5%) of the responding state training academies indicated that continuing training hours

varied within individual fire departments.

Only two (12.5%) responded to question number five of the survey and both indicated

that two teams of eight firefighters would be needed to perform a tunnel rescue.

“Incidents at tunnel sites will require the expertise of many disciplines in the fire service.

Often structural collapse, hazardous materials, confined space rescue, rope rescue and trench

rescue skills are needed in the hot zone of a tunnel rescue” (SFD, 1999, p. 16). NFPA Standard

1670 (1999) divides technical rescue into specialty categories and outlines specific functional

39

requirements for each. The standard requires that the authority having jurisdiction provide

appropriate training for the operational capability of each team member. Additionally, continued

training shall be provided and documented, along with annual performance evaluations.

OSHA regulations require rescue teams to be qualified in performing rescue procedures,

the proper use and the limitations of breathing apparatus, and the use of firefighting equipment

(29 C.F.R. § 1926.800, 1999). The qualifications of the team members must be reviewed at least

once per year. In addition, where flammable or noxious gases are expected in hazardous

quantities, team members shall practice using breathing apparatus monthly.

Since training standards specific to tunnel rescue is not available; the Mine Rescue

standard provides a conservative estimate for training time requirements. A realistic

estimate for initial training would be significantly higher to allow for training in basic

tunnel shoring and equipment. These are topics that members of Mine Rescue teams in

the mining community posses as common knowledge of their trade and are not covered in

detail in the initial 20 hours of training they receive (Seattle Fire Department, 1999, p. 9).

At a minimum, MSHA regulation 30 C.F.R. § 49 (1999) states that initial training for

mine rescue team members shall include a 20-hour program in the use, care, and maintenance of

the breathing apparatus that will be used. The minimum refresher training provided shall be not

less than 40 hours and shall include sessions underground at least every six months and the use

of breathing apparatus while under oxygen for at least two hours every two months. In addition,

training shall be provided in advanced mine rescue training and procedures, mine map training

and ventilation procedures, and the use, care, capabilities, and limitations of auxiliary mine

rescue equipment, or different breathing apparatus.

40

Forty hours of tunnel rescue training was initially provided to the technicians at the

Quincy Fire Department (G. Stein, personal communication, September 28, 2000). The training

included atmospheric monitoring, use of SCBA, ropes and knots, and basic shoring. Continued

training is provided at the rate of four hours per month. In addition, there are eight instructors

available to respond to emergencies that have been trained in confined space rescue, high angle

rope rescue, trench rescue and structural collapse.

The minimum personnel required for tunnel rescue teams is found in OSHA regulations

for underground construction, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.800 (1999) which specifies:

On jobsites where 25 or more employees work underground at one time, the employer

shall provide (or make arrangement in advance with locally available rescue services to

provide) at least two 5-person rescue teams, one on the jobsite or within half hour travel

time from the entry point, and the other within 2 hours travel time (p. 419).

Although OSHA requires two, five person rescue teams, a recommendation was made to

assemble a minimum of two, eight person rescue teams before entering any tunnel for a full-scale

tunnel emergency while using SCBA (G. Stein, personal communication, September 28, 2000).

Stein described the use of a regional tunnel rescue team for the Quincy and Weymouth

Fire Departments. A total of 72 tunnel rescue technicians were trained throughout the

communities. All technicians were issued pagers that are utilized to summon additional team

members when a tunnel emergency arises.

Assistant Chief Giannini (personal communication, September 25, 2000) suggested that

at least 25 firefighters per shift should be trained as tunnel rescue technicians. With a total of 100

technicians, the PFD should be able to assemble the two required rescue teams within the time

limits established by OSHA. Tunnel rescue technicians should also be issued personal pagers so

41

notifications can be made if additional personnel would be required at tunnel emergencies. All

other response personnel should be trained to the operations level, including incident command

training for all Chief officers.

The Seattle Fire Department’s tunnel rescue team was moving into the implementation

phase of tunnel rescue which calls for training a total of 100 tunnel rescue technicians (F.

Brennan, personal communication, October 11, 2000). The theory was that at least 20 tunnel

rescue technicians would be available on each working shift, 24 hours per day, seven days per

week. In addition, all response personnel would be trained at the operations level to provide

support for all tunnel emergencies, including entry into a tunnel where there are no atmospheric

problems.

Question 5. What specialized equipment would be required to outfit a tunnel rescue

team?

In order to fulfill the tunnel rescue team requirements that were requested by NBC,

additional training and equipment is needed to prepare PFD personnel to conduct their current

emergency operations in an underground environment (W. Giannini, personal communication,

April 20, 2000). Although the Fire Department has equipment to perform confined space rescue,

trench rescue, and rope rescue evolutions; additional equipment would be needed to supplement

the present inventory (P. Doughty, personal communication, October 26, 2000). Otherwise, a

tunnel rescue incident would reduce our current capabilities to the rest of the community.

Nailen (1988) wrote that the Milwaukee Fire Department uses a sound powered

telephone system where the rescue team members stretch up to 1000 feet of cable so they do not

rely on the mine telephones. As another back up, they found that CB-type radio units work better

42

than regular fire department radios. Stein (2000) requires his personnel to use fire department

radios using the direct mode.

Accountability is a major concern at an underground emergency and a chip board is used

at all times (Nailen, 1988). The chip board has a pair of brass disks assigned to each team

member and the members whereabouts are tracked by hanging the disks on the appropriate

location of the board.

SFD (1999) reviewed equipment needs, which focused on making conditions in the

tunnel survivable for the rescuers. Atmospheric monitoring equipment and long duration SCBA

would be essential. Closed circuit SCBA technology can achieve up to four hours of actual

working air; they feature positive pressure, and are NIOSH approved. Additionally, lighting and

individual personal protective equipment would need to be provided for the rescue teams.

Specialized fire suppression and emergency medical equipment should be provided for

tunneling operations (SFD, 1999). Lightweight hose packs, efficient means of carrying medical

equipment and supplies, methods of transporting patients and equipment over long distances

underground need to be assessed. In addition, consideration should be given to purchasing a

Foam Pro-Pack, which is a portable device for applying Class A or Class B firefighting foam (F.

Brennan, personal communication, October 11, 2000).

The equipment requested by SFD (1999) to outfit the tunnel rescue team included: (a) 28

closed circuit SCBA and support equipment, (b) 8 thermal imaging cameras. (c) 4 litter carts, (d)

8 passport or equivalent 4 gas monitors, (e) special air monitoring equipment, (f) ultra light 60

minute bottles, (g) mobile high capacity ventilation fans, (h) replace or refurbish vehicle [U77],

(i) replace or refurbish vehicle [R14], and miscellaneous safety equipment (i.e. helmets, Nomex

coveralls etc.). If a fire department were not equipped for structural collapse, hazardous

43

materials, confined space rescue, rope rescue and trench rescue additional equipment would be

required for those disciplines (F. Brennan, personal communication, October 27, 2000).

Question 6. What laws, regulations, or standards govern underground

construction?

Question number four of the survey was utilized to identify laws, standards and

regulations that fire departments were aware of that may impact the operation of a tunnel rescue

team. In addition to the survey, several regulations were identified during interviews and through

the literature review. Table 1 provides a list of the regulations identified by the survey.

Table 1

Regulations and Standards Governing Underground Construction

OSHA Standards – 29 CFR 1926.800 Underground Construction

OSHA Standards – 29 CFR 1910.134 Respiratory Protection

MSHA Standard – 30 CFR 49 Mine Rescue Teams

NFPA 1500 Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program

NFPA 241 Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations

OSHA Standards – 29 CFR 1910.146 Permit Required Confined Spaces

Other State Standards

OSHA establishes minimum safety criteria for private industry at underground

construction sites (K. Hartman, personal communication, August 30, 2000). The requirement for

rescue teams is found in OSHA regulations for underground construction, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.800

44

(1999). In addition, if confined spaces were encountered during the tunnel construction, 29 CFR

1910.146 Permit required confined spaces would apply.

Although OSHA does not have jurisdiction over a public sector fire department, the

requirements outlined in OSHA Underground Construction (1999) would be enforced upon the

contractor (K. Hartman, personal communication, August 30, 2000). The contractors rescue

team, whether supplied by a local fire department or by tunnel workers, would be required to

follow the training and operational requirements established by OSHA.

The State of Rhode Island, Department of Labor has jurisdiction over public sector

employees (S. Bateson, personal communication, August 23, 2000). The Department of Labor

would enforce the provision of NFPA 1500, Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health

Programs, and they would assist and cooperate with OSHA.

MSHA establishes minimum safety criteria for mining operations that include mine

rescue teams (J. Petrie, personal communication, August 4, 2000). Although a deep tunnel

project is similar to a mining operation, MSHA does not have jurisdiction over tunnels and

tunnel rescue teams. The requirements for mine rescue teams can be found in MSHA regulations

for mine rescue teams, 30 C.F.R. § 49 (1999), which could be used as a guideline for

development of a tunnel rescue team.

In 1999, the NFPA published NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for

Technical Rescue Incidents. “This standard identifies and establishes levels of functional

capability for safely and effectively conducting operations at technical rescue incidents” (1999,

NFPA, p. 1670-4). The consensus standard requires that the authority having jurisdiction

establish levels of operational capability based on hazard analysis, risk assessment, training level

of personnel, and the availability of resources, both internal and external.

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Question 7. What training resources are available for tunnel or mine rescue?

Question number six of the survey was utilized to identify possible resources for tunnel

training programs. In addition to the survey, some resources were identified during interviews.

Table 2 provides a list of the organizations identified by the survey. Refer to Appendix C for

contact information.

In addition to the organizations listed in Table 2, three fire departments indicated that

they conducted some of their training in-house, particularly continued training.

Table 2

Organizations that have Provided Training for Tunnel Rescue

Discipline

National Mine Health and Safety Academy in Beckley, West Virginia Mine Rescue

West Virginia University Tunnel Rescue

LSU Fire & Emergency Training Institute, Baton Rouge, LA Confined Space &

Ropes

Cleveland State University Confined Space

John O’Connell, FDNY Building Collapse

National Tunnel Institute, Inc., Milwaukee, WI Tunnel Rescue

Keer-McGee Tunnel/Mine Rescue

MSHA operates the National Mine Health and Safety Academy in Beckley, West

Virginia for the purpose of training mine safety and health inspectors (J. Petrie, personal

communication, August 4, 2000). The training academy has both classroom facilities and a

46

simulation laboratory for executing practical skills. Customized training programs for tunnel or

mine rescue can be developed and delivered at the MSHA training academy. There is no cost to

state and local governments for the use of the National Mine Health and Safety Academy (D.

Friley, personal communication, November 14, 2000).

The Seattle, WA Fire Department, in conjunction with MSHA, has developed a train-the-

trainer course that was scheduled to be delivered on December 5, 2000 through December 7,

2000 (F. Brennan, personal communication, October 11, 2000). In addition to the Seattle Fire

Department, representatives of both the Boston, MA Fire Department and the Quincy, MA Fire

Department have utilized the MSHA training academy to train some of their personnel (G. Stein,

personal communication, September 28, 2000).

Barnstable County Fire & Rescue Training Academy (BCFRTA) in MA provides

training in several technical rescue disciplines that may be applicable for tunnel rescue (G.

Crawford, personal communication, October 25, 2000). BCFRTA uses numerous instructors that

are members of various fire departments in New England and they would customize training

programs to fit an organizations need.

Lieutenant Arthur LaPorte of the Boston Fire Department operates a private company

that provides specific training for tunnel rescue (A. LaPorte, personal communication, August 2,

2000). A 40-hour curriculum was developed that would provide basic training for the tunnel

rescue technician. Additionally, a train-the-trainer program could be provided to give an

organization the resources to provide continued training to remain competent over time.

Unexpected Findings

The results of this research indicated that a relatively small percentage of fire

departments were specifically trained for tunnel or mine rescue emergencies. For those fire

47

departments that have identified a potential or probable need to respond to tunnel or mine rescue

incidents, there are no specific standards or laws that govern fire department operations at these

underground emergencies. Although NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for

Technical Rescue Incidents addresses some of the technical rescue disciplines required for a

successful underground rescue operation, the standard does not adequately address operations

that require personnel to be operating in toxic or oxygen deficient atmospheres for up to four

hours.

Discussion

The problem that prompted this research is that the NBC requested to have the PFD

provide rescue and emergency medical services for tunnel crews at an underground construction

site. If PFD personnel will be required to perform underground rescues, proper training,

equipment, and procedures would need to be provided.

Although tunnel rescue is not provided by a large number of fire departments, this

research uncovered a number of tunneling projects around the country that have relied on the

local fire department for some level of service. In addition, it became clear that with the proper

training and equipment, many of the technical rescue disciplines already used by fire

departments could be adapted to address emergencies in an underground environment.

The first question that has to be answered is what impact will the CSO project have on

the PFD? As the provider of fire protection and emergency medical services in the City of

Providence, the PFD would be responding to emergency incidents at the CSO project. Even if

the contractor provided a tunnel rescue team, the contractors personnel would not be sufficiently

trained to mitigate a major fire or perform emergency medical procedures other than advanced

first aid (G. Hughes, personal communication, October 11, 2000). Therefore, proper training and

48

equipment needs to be provided to insure Fire Department personnel would be able to operate

safely while underground.

Downey (1994) described a rescue operation in New York City that took 24 hours before

a missing worker, trapped under a winch, was discovered at the base of a pumped out shaft. His

account suggests that rescue operations may take a considerable amount of time and resources

would be put to use for an extended period. USFA (1995) supported this position when they

wrote that some technical rescue incidents can become complex and last hours or even days

while personnel assess the circumstances, gather the appropriate rescue equipment, oversee

safety, and isolate hazards prior to reaching, stabilizing, and removing any victims.

The SFD (1999) noted that even the smallest incident during their tunnel project would

be resource intensive and would tax their current operations levels. A full-scale rescue operation

would have a significant impact on the level of service to the remainder of the city. The PFD

would need a contingency plan in place in the event there was a full-scale incident in the CSO

tunnel. Additional personnel would have to be called back to duty if the Fire Department were to

maintain their current service levels throughout the rest of the City.

As suggested by Stein (personal communication, September 28, 2000), Smith, (personal

communication, June 20, 2000), Granara (personal communication, June 13, 2000), and the SFD

(1999), a reasonable arrangement would require the contractor or owners of the project to

reimburse the fire department for the impact on their operations. The project would increase the

responsibilities of the PFD and the Department should be compensated for the commensurate

duties. This arrangement has been found to be mutually beneficial to all parties in other cities

with similar projects (G. Stein, personal communication, September 28, 2000).

49

Why would NBC or the contractor agree with this arrangement? The Fire Department

would provide a tunnel rescue team 24-hours a day that could be mobilized in minutes (F.

Brennan, personal communication, October 27, 2000). In addition to the two rescue teams, the

resources and experience of the entire Fire Department would be at the contractor’s disposal.

Furthermore, the contractor would not bear the expense and responsibility of inspection,

equipment, and administrative issues associated with providing tunnel rescue services.

How does the PFD benefit from providing a tunnel rescue team? First, because the Fire

Department would respond to incidents in the tunnel anyway, they would have the training and

equipment that should be provided regardless of whether the contractor provided a rescue team.

Secondly, the Fire Department is better trained and prepared to manage a variety of technical

rescue incidents that may occur elsewhere in the City. As indicated by the SFD, “The end result

is a safer work environment for both the Fire Department and the contractor without significantly

impacting the services provided to the rest of the citizens” (1999, pg. 11).

In the planning phase of their tunnel project, SFD (1999) expected the owner of the

tunnel to provide for the following: (a) Full time salary for one Deputy Chief, (b) full time salary

for two administrative Lieutenants, (c) salary and expenses for initial training of operations

companies and tunnel rescue teams, (d) salary and expenses for continuing education of

operations companies and tunnel rescue teams, (e) salary and expenses for maintenance of

specialty equipment, (f) salary for additional operations firefighters. In addition, capital was

requested to purchase a multitude of equipment to properly outfit and refurbish their heavy

rescue vehicles. In order for the NBC to proceed with the CSO project, it would be essential for

them to provide similar resources to the PFD.

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Another major concern that needs to be addressed is one of inspection and prevention.

All fire department personnel that were interviewed for this research insisted that the fire

department must maintain a rigorous inspection program to prevent an environment for tragedy.

The SFD (2000) stressed that during a visit to a job site in New York City, an array of hazards

was witnessed that would have caused immediate action in other locations. “These included

uncapped acetylene bottles tipped on their side, large diesel tanks, cans of what appeared to be

Class 1 flammable liquid and a general accumulation of debris and combustible materials” (SFD,

2000, p. 7). At this site, there was no regular inspection program by the Fire Department. “A

general conclusion was that sites that had a more regular Fire Department presence had much

fewer hazards” (SFD, 2000, p. 7).

The PFD needs to have a representative on-site on a regular basis. This representative

would insure that the contractor is maintaining the site in accordance with recognized fire

prevention practices and is not creating a situation that will unnecessarily jeopardize workers or

fire department personnel that would respond to the CSO tunnel. The Department representative

would also be able to provide accurate information regarding the progress of the tunnel,

including conditions in the tunnel, location of workers, and hazardous conditions. Additionally,

having a regular presence should increase communication and cooperation between the City, the

contractor and owners of the project.

From the surveys and interviews, over two-thirds of the fire departments rely on various

technical skills including confined space rescue, trench rescue, collapse rescue and high angle

rope rescue, or private contractors and outside government agencies to provide rescue services

for underground emergencies in their jurisdictions. In the remainder of the communities that

51

actually created tunnel or mine rescue teams, there seemed to be a major construction project and

funding mechanism that was the impetus.

The USFA cautions that the development of a technical rescue team is a substantial

endeavor (1995). Although creation of the team, both administratively and operationally, is

extremely intensive, maintaining equipment, training personnel, and insuring technical

competence will be the most formidable. If the PFD proceeds with the request of the NBC,

extensive resources would need to be allocated to the creation of the tunnel rescue team.

How would a tunnel rescue team be staffed and how would the team be maintained?

Assistant Chief Giannini (personal communication, September 25, 2000) suggested that at least

25 firefighters per shift should be trained as tunnel rescue technicians. With a total of 100

technicians, the PFD should be able to assemble the two required rescue teams within the time

limits established by OSHA. Tunnel rescue technicians should also be issued personal pagers so

notifications can be made if additional personnel would be required at tunnel emergencies. All

other response personnel should be trained to the operations level, including incident command

training for all Chief officers.

Such an endeavor, although similar to the team created by the SFD, seems quite

aggressive. Initially, forty hours of tunnel rescue training would need to be provided to all 100

team members (G. Stein, personal communication, September 28, 2000). The training should

include atmospheric monitoring, use of SCBA, ropes and knots, and basic shoring. Continued

training would need to be provided at a rate of approximately 40 hours per year if the MSHA

standard was used as a guideline. Refresher training should include sessions underground at least

every six months and the use of breathing apparatus while under oxygen for at least two hours

every two months.

52

Initial training for technicians would total 4000 hours. In addition, approximately 391

personnel would require training to an operations level as provided for in NFPA 1670. In order

to administer a tunnel rescue team properly, adequate funding, facilities, administrative

personnel and training officers would need to be allocated.

Recommendations

The results of this research indicate that the CSO project proposed by NBC would have

an extensive impact on the PFD and that the Department should immediately prepare for

emergencies at the CSO work sites. The first step should be to appoint a project coordinator that

would be the single point of contact for the Fire Department regarding the CSO project. The

project coordinator should establish a planning team that can investigate and evaluate every

aspect of the CSO project. The planning team should include personnel from the Operations

Division, Emergency Medical Services, Special Hazards Unit, Fire Prevention Bureau, Division

of Training, Automotive Maintenance, Communications Department, Finance Department, and

the Law Department.

The project coordinator’s duties should include the following: (a) Establish a dialogue

with NBC and effectively communicate our needs, (b) coordinate with the Fire Prevention

Bureau and the State Fire Marshal’s Office to ensure compliance with the Rhode Island Fire

Safety Code, (c) coordinate with the Director of Public Works to ensure compliance with City

Ordinances regarding blasting regulations, (d) develop and implement a training program for

tunnel response to the CSO project, (e) evaluate and recommend equipment appropriation, (f)

develop a budget for the duration of the project, (g) make recommendations to the Chief of

53

Department concerning resource requirements for the CSO project, (h) develop a response plan

and Standard Operating Procedure for incidents at the CSO project, (i) attend meetings with

NBC on all matters concerning tunnel construction that effect PFD operations, (j) act as the

liaison to for the Fire Department with all outside agencies concerning the CSO project, (k)

ensure that inspections are conducted at all tunnel work sites for compliance with applicable

codes and standards and that personnel accountability, shift journals and hazard logs are

maintained, (l) provide appraisals to operations personnel of conditions at all tunnel work sites,

and (m) coordinate full-scale disaster drills at the tunnel work sites.

To meet the timeline that was established by NBC, a formal proposal should be drafted

by the middle of January 2001 that establishes the parameters by which the Fire Department

would provide the requested services. Included in the proposal should be: (a) An estimate of all

apparatus and equipment that will have to be purchased, (b) salary and benefits for one Deputy

Assistant Chief to act as the project coordinator, (c) salary and benefits for two Lieutenants to be

full time training instructors, one full time inspector, and a full time clerk, (d) overtime pay and

expenses for initial training of tunnel rescue teams, (e) overtime pay and expenses for continuing

education of tunnel rescue teams, (f) expenses for maintenance or replacement of specialty

equipment, (f) overtime for additional operations firefighters during extended emergency

operations at any CSO work site. The proposal should be reviewed by the Law Department prior

to being submitted to NBC.

The final recommendation is that a contract between NBC and the PFD should be drafted

that outlines each agency's responsibility regarding finances and services provided. Also,

language should be included that specifies what laws, standards, and regulations apply to the

CSO project and any additional regulations imposed by agreement upon NBC and the

54

contractors. The contract should delineate a responsible party that has ultimate authority to stop

any construction that has been deemed unsafe or dangerous and a procedure should be in place to

address grievances that may occur by an aggrieved party.

55

References

Allsop, E. (1997). Confined space rescue and collapse tunnel course. Fire Engineers

Journal, 57, 10-11.

Downey, R. (1994). Water tunnel rescue. Fire Engineering, 147, 35-43.

Hughes, G. (2000, June 16). Notes of Meeting - NBC CSO abatement program - Phase I,

p. 1. (Available from The Louis Berger Group, Inc., 295 Promenade Street, Providence, RI,

02908).

Mine Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor, 30 C.F.R. § 49 (1999)

MMA Consulting Group, Inc. (1997, May). Providence, Rhode Island Fire Department

Study. Boston, MA: Author

Nailen, R. (1988). Urban mining leads to unique rescue unit. Fire Chief, 32, 32-37.

Narragansett Bay Commission, RI General Laws § 46-25-2 (2) et seq. (1956).

National Fire Academy. (2000). Executive Leadership (student manual). Emmitsburg,

MD: Author.

National Fire Protection Association. (1999). Standard on Operations and Training for

Technical Rescue Incidents. Quincy, MA: Author.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor, 29 C.F.R. §

1926.800 (1999).

Providence Fire Department, (1994). Standard Operating Procedure 27: Hazardous

Materials Procedure & Operating Guide, (Available from the Providence Fire Department, 209

Fountain Street, Providence, RI, 02903).

56

Providence Fire Department, (1996). Standard Operating Procedure 30: Confined Space

Rescue, (Available from the Providence Fire Department, 209 Fountain Street, Providence, RI,

02903).

Providence Fire Department, (1997). Rules and Regulations, (Available from the

Providence Fire Department, 209 Fountain Street, Providence, RI, 02903).

Providence Fire Department, (1999). Annual Report, (Available from the Providence Fire

Department, 209 Fountain Street, Providence, RI, 02903).

Seattle Fire Department, (1999). Construction of the Sound Transit Light Rail Tunnel and

it’s Effect on the Seattle Fire Department Operations, (Available from the Seattle Fire

Department, 301 Second Avenue South, Seattle, WA, 98108).

Seattle Fire Department, (2000). Critique of Travel, (Available from the Seattle Fire

Department, 301 Second Avenue South, Seattle, WA, 98108).

Stein, G. (2000). Tunnel Rescue Standard Operating Guideline, (Available from Quincy

Fire/Rescue Department, 26 Quincy Avenue, Quincy, MA, 02169).

U.S. Fire Administration (1995). Technical rescue program development manual.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

57

Appendix A

The Narragansett Bay water quality management district commission (NBC), is

charged with the acquisition, planning, construction, financing, extension, improvement,

and operation and maintenance of the proposed improvements outlined in the NBC

Combined Sewerage Overflow (CSO) Program. The following is the project team that

has been assembled by NBC:

Project Team

Responsibility Organization Contact Telephone

Owner NBC Executive Director Paul Pinault

401-222-6680

Program Manager The Louis Berger Group

Joseph Pratt * 401-521-5980

Program Manager Technical Support

The Louis Berger Group

Geoff Hughes ** 401-521-5980

Construction Manager Gilbane/Jacobs Associates

The Louis Berger Group Γ

401-521-5980

Engineering (pump station)

Black & Veatch The Louis Berger Group Γ

401-521-5980

Engineering (tunnel)

Sverdrup The Louis Berger Group Γ

401-521-5980

General Contractor Yet to be Determined ΓΓ * Joseph Pratt is the contact person for administrative decisions for The Louis Berger Group. ** Geoff Hughes is the contact person for any question related to technical matters. Γ The construction manager and engineering specialists are subcontractors for The Louis Berger Group. The subcontractors are responsible to The Louis Berger Group. ΓΓ The general contractor is selected through the competitive bidding process. The general contractor will have a contract directly with NBC.

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APPENDIX B

TUNNEL OR MINE RESCUE CAPABILITIES

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE The Providence Fire Department has been solicited to provide a tunnel rescue team for a local tunneling project that will begin in June 2001. This survey is being conducted to aid the Providence Fire Department in the appropriate risk analysis and the possible development of a tunnel rescue team. Could you please assist our department by filling out the survey and returning it by either fax or mail to: Fire Marshal David Costa Providence Fire Department 209 Fountain Street Providence, RI 02902 Tel (401) 421-8290 Fax (401) 274-8508 Email: DDDD5555@aol.com Please fill in the blanks or check off the appropriate responses for each of the following questions regarding tunnel or mine rescue teams: Name of the person filling out this survey: ___________________________________________ Rank/position of the person filling out this survey: _____________________________________ Department: ___________________________________________ Address: ___________________________________________ ____________________________________________ Telephone/Fax/email: ___________________________________________________________ 1. Do any fire departments in your state have tunnel or mine rescue capabilities? Tunnel Rescue Team ____ Yes ____ No Mine Rescue Team ____ Yes ____ No

59

2. If the answer to both questions is no, what resources (internal or external) does your state have to respond to an incident involving tunnel, mine, or underground emergencies?

______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ • If your state does not have tunnel or mine rescue capabilities, you may disregard the

remainder of this survey. 3. Are your tunnel/mine rescue personnel certified by your department or any other

regulatory authority? ____ Yes ____ No If yes, who is the regulatory authority(s)? ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ 4. Please check any of the following regulations that tunnel or mine rescue teams are

required to follow: ____ OSHA Standards - 29 CFR Part 1926.800 Underground Construction ____ MSHA Standards - 30 CFR Part 49 Mine Rescue Teams ____ OSHA Standards - 29 CFR 1910.134 Respiratory Protection ____ NFPA 1500 Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program ____ Other ____________________________________________________ ____ Other ____________________________________________________

60

5. What is the minimum number of personnel that must be assembled to perform a tunnel or mine rescue?

______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

6. Who provides the training for tunnel or mine rescue personnel (name of company or

individual with appropriate teaching credentials)?

______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________

7. What is the initial number of training hours provided to each tunnel or mine rescue team member and how many hours of training are provided to maintain competence?

Initial training _________ Continued training _________ 8. Are annual medical evaluations required for tunnel or mine rescue team members?

Yes _________ No _________ If obtainable, could you send me copies of any Standard Operating Procedures you may have for tunnel/mine rescue incidents?

61

Appendix C

Organizations that have Provided Training for Tunnel Rescue

Organization Discipline Telephone Number Barnstable County Fire & Technical Rescue (508) 771-5391 Rescue Training Academy (508) 790-3082 [fax] P.O. Box 746 Barnstable MA 02630 Cleveland State University Confined Space John O’Connell, FDNY Collapse Rescue Keer-McGee Tunnel/Mine (307) 464-5550 Contact – Lynn Busskohl Arthur LaPorte Technical Rescue (617) 689-3098 Fire & Rescue training Inc. LSU Fire & Emergency Training Institute Confined Space & (225) 766-0600 6868 Nicholson Dr. Ropes (225) 256-3473 [fax] Baton Rouge, LA 70820 National Mine Health and Safety Academy Mine Rescue (304) 256-3343 Beckley, West Virginia National Tunnel Institute, Inc. Tunnel Rescue (414) 873-7283 Milwaukee, WI West Virginia University Tunnel Rescue (304) 293-2106

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Appendix D

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

Appendix E

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Appendix F