climate change, resource scarcity & conflict change... · climate change, resource scarcity...

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Climate change, resource scarcity & conflict

Global Resource Observatory

www.anglia.ac.uk/gsi

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GRO RePORT/

Disclaimer

Anglia Ruskin University east Road, Cambridge CB1 1PT

www.anglia.ac.uk/gsiSeptember 2014

The views expressed in this paperare those of the author(s) and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policiesof Anglia Ruskin University

The Global Resource Observatory (GRO) report series is a forum for stimulating discussion and eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies undertaken by the Global Sustainability Institute staff.

The series deals with the impact of resource constraints on economic and political stability .The series aims to enhance the knowledge on respource scarcity challenges and enable wider public discussion on the topic.

The Global Resource Observatory (GRO) report series is a quick-disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as articles in professional journals or chapters in books.

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/ ClImATe ChAnGe, ReSOURCe SCARCITy & COnflICT

Glossary

Arab springs A revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests, riots, and civil wars in the Arab world that began on 18 December 2010 and spread across the middle east in early 2011.

Climate change Change in average global or regional weather patterns from longer-term average conditions (i.e., more or fewer extreme weather events).

food subsidy A financial aid supplied by a government, as to industry, farmers, or consumers, in order to make low-cost food available to the poor

fresh water naturally occurring water in ice sheets, ice caps, glaciers, lakes, rivers and streams, and underground groundwater in aquifers with low concentrations of dissolved salts and other total dissolved solids.

Irrigation The artificial application of water to the land to assist in the growing of agricultural crops.

natural resources Resources derived from the natural environment.

non-renewable A resource that does not renew itself at a sufficient rate for sustainable economic extraction in meaningful human time-frames.

River basin/catchment The land that water flows across or under on its way to a river.

Water management The activity of planning, developing, distributing and managing the optimum use of water resources.

Water stress / deficit / scarcity The lack of sufficient available water resources to meet the demands of water usage within a region.

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executive Summary

limits to the availability of key natural resources (such as land, food, water and oil) and climate change have been linked to social unrest and violent conflict. Analysis that ignores the reliance of society and the economy on natural resources underestimates the exposure to systemic risks. Conflict over natural resources can occur both over the fair distribution of an abundant high value resource, or access to a scarce resource (Brown & Jensen, 2009; Bleischwitz et al, 2014). This report focuses only on the latter i.e. where local demand for a resource is greater than available supply, either due to access, distribution or affordability.

Demand for food, water and energy is growing as numbers of people, and the amount we consume per person, increases globally. Climate change and resource scarcity are themselves often linked; climate change may alter the availability of resources (e.g. water) and therefore changes

ClImATe ChAnGe, ReSOURCe SCARCITy AnD The RISk Of hUmAn COnflICT: CASe STUDIeS Of ShAReD WATeR ReSOURCeS In The InDIAn SUBCOnTInenT SePTemBeR 2014

in access can result in disputes over allocation (hsiang et al., 2013). Unless pro-actively addressed we will face scarcity of food, water and energy resources in the future (nIC, 2012).

Scarcity of key nonrenewable natural resources and climate change are ‘threat multipliers’ to violent conflict. They can increase the likelihood of conflict when other social, political, institutional, economic and ecological weaknesses are present (evans, 2011). however, because of the complexity of the issue causation cannot be confidently claimed for any one particular past event but a correlation certainly can.

In this report resource scarcity and climate change are applied to the risk of water scarcity related conflict within India, and between India and Pakistan. The report specifically focuses on the socio-political, economic, cultural and environmental characteristics of the Cauvery and Indus catchment regions and the potential for climate change and scarcity of natural resources to destabilise social and political systems.

SCARCITy Of key nOn-ReneWABle

nATURAl ReSOURCeS

AnD ClImATe ChAnGe

ARe ‘ThReAT mUlTIPlIeRS’

TO vIOlenT COnflICT

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The Perfect Storm: Climate change, resource scarcity and human conflict

lagi et al. (2011a) and natalini & Jones (2014) found quantifiable evidence that global food price increase was a factor in the social unrest seen in the middle east and north Africa in 2008 and 2011 (commonly known as the Arab Spring). In particular, there is a threshold in global food prices above which violent conflict in some regions is more likely to occur.

While many factors influenced the food price increases in 2008 and 2011 climate change has been linked to increasing food prices now and in the future, as a result of increases in the frequency and intensity of droughts and floods (Carty, 2011; fAO, 2001; Wheeler & Braun, 2013). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fifth Assessment Report (2013) linked rising global average temperatures, disruption to rainfall patterns, and increased likelihood of drought and extreme heat to climate change (Stocker et al, 2013). Changes to rainfall patterns and temperature rises have been found to increase the risk of conflict (hsiang et al., 2013).

high levels of complexity and uncertainty make the processes linking social, cultural, political, economic and environmental systems difficult to comprehend. failure to predict such wide spread instability as the Arab Spring is attributed not to an oversight of the causes of the unrest but to the oversight of

the inter-connectivity of those causes (Gaub, 2012).

figure 1 is a theoretical framework to explore the mechanisms that link climate change, resource scarcity and human conflict. The framework does not include all factors that may be involved in the connection between climate change and conflict, but is based on plausible relationships that have been identified through qualitative and quantitative research (evans, 2011; natalini & Jones, 2014; nIC, 2012; lagi et al., 2011a; lagi et al., 2011b; hsiang et al., 2013; Wheeler and Braun, 2013). It is in line with the theory that climate change is not the sole determinant of instability, but can be a multiplying factor where other vulnerabilities to conflict are present. It shows that the risk of conflict from climate change and resource scarcity is systemic and can be self-reinforcing.

We can picture a country with poor water management practices that experiences drought conditions having less freshwater for agriculture and therefore seeing a reduction in the amount of food produced locally. The situation is likely to be worse in water stressed countries which are reliant on irrigation.

Rural farmers who can no longer make a living on their farms may relocate to cities in search of work. The displaced rural population then puts an increased demand on food in the city. In that situation if the government is either not able to provide direct food aid, or to subsidise imported food,


fOOD PRICe InCReASe WAS A fACTOR In The SOCIAl UnReST Seen In The mIDDle eAST AnD nORTh AfRICA

A farmer walks through a dry, cracked paddy-field on the outskirts of Jammu. The monsoon, which usually starts to arrive in June, had barely come in July 2012. Source: AP

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people would be exposed to food shortages. If this occurs at a time when global food prices are high (perhaps due to drought in other regions) food may become unaffordable to the people of that country.

Drivers of rises in global food price include supply disruption, population increase and changing diets in the growing global middle class increasing demand, biofuel production, food commodity speculation and increases in the price of other commodities such as oil on which agricultural inputs such as fertilizers are reliant

People rely on their government for public goods and matters that cannot be dealt with on an individual or household level, such as security of food and water supply,

education and healthcare. People’s dependence on the government to provide these services reinforces public support for the political system. When the government are unable to deliver these basic services public support for the political system can be lost (lagi et al., 2011a).

Where there are existing social and political issues (such as inequality and sectarian tension) further loss of support for the government has the potential to increase the likelihood of internal political instability and promotes social unrest. Instability impacts both the country’s economic outlook and the strength of government institutions; this in turn may weaken governance of natural resources and further exacerbate pressure on natural systems (Brown & Jensen, 2009).

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figure 1: A preliminary systems view of the interconnected social cultural, political economic and natural systems involved in the links between social unrest and political instability, climate change and water scarcity.

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figure 2: framework for analysing the threat of instability (Gaub, 2012)

DevASTATInG DROUGhT hIT SyRIA’S AGRICUlTURAl lAnD BeTWeen 2006 AnD 2011; CROPS fAIleD AnD lIveSTOCk WAS lOST WITh mORe ThAn 800,000 PeOPle lOSInG TheIR lIvelIhOODS By 2009

In the report Understanding instability: lessons from the ‘Arab Spring’, florence Gaub presents a framework of four interconnected aspects of vulnerability to violent conflict (figure 2) in which the importance of the interconnectedness of risks is highlighted.

1. Conditions; these are the underlying root causes for instability, this includes scarcity of natural resources as well as historical experiences, politicisation of regional, ethnic or religious identities, social stratification, growth of population and economy, urbanization, distribution of wealth and income, access to education and opportunity, and unemployment rates.

2. Catalysts; agents of change which when attached to the conditions detailed above will have a multiplying effect on the risk of tensions erupting for instance climate change, but also a worsening of the economic situation, erosion of existing management tools and even discovery of high value natural resources.

3. Triggers; one-off events that activate the underlying vulnerability, for instance in the case of the Arab Spring; a Tunisian vegetable seller setting himself on fire in protest.

4. Ability of the state to manage the potential instability; this is a decisive factor which includes the state’s ability to manage conditions before or after unrest breaks out for instance food subsidies.

lessons from instability in the middle east and north Africa

In a 2013 report on climate change and the Arab Spring Johnstone & mazo identified climate change as a “stressor” which “ignite[d] a volatile mix of underlying causes that erupt[ed] into revolution.” events leading up to the uprising in the middle east and north Africa included drought and extreme weather in the US, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, kazakhstan and China that severely affected grain production. Russia then imposed a ban on wheat exports and the global price of wheat rose from $4 a bushel in July 2010 to $8.50 - $9 in february 2011 (additional drivers of rising food price also included those previously mentioned). The middle east and north Africa are reliant on imports of wheat, particularly from Russia, so the region was particularly vulnerable to these series of events.

Johnstone and mazo (2013) do not claim that climate change caused the Arab Spring but instead refer to “complex causality” in that it “contributed to a complex interaction of other political, social, and economic factors underlying conflict.”

The crisis in Syria is in line with the theory that climate impacts worsen existing social, political and environmental vulnerabilities to instability: Devastating drought hit Syria’s agricultural land between 2006 and 2011; crops failed and livestock was lost with more than 800,000 people losing their livelihoods by 2009 (femia & Werrell, 2013).

Drought conditions were compounded by poor management of water resources, massive over extraction of aquifers, overgrazing of cattle and population growth. This led to a mass migration, hundreds of thousands moved from rural agricultural areas into the cities, placing strain on cities already under pressure from Iraqi refugees.

Once violence ignited in Syria people began to flee the cities. To date nearly 3 million Syrians have been displaced to neighbouring countries. The United nations Refugee Agency estimated that there are 139,000 Syrians in egypt, 215,000 in Iraq, 613,000 in Jordan, 833,000 in Turkey and 1,177,000 in lebanon (UnhCR, 2014). Displaced people put pressure on public services in their host nation and pressure from refugees is a pathway for internal unrest to cascade regionally.

Strong observable evidence has linked recent drought in the middle east to climate change (nOAA, 2011). further drought and crop failure is predicted in the next 25 years (Dai, 2011). The role of climate change in exacerbating the locally specific political, social and cultural factors and precipitating unrest is clear in the case of Syria; displacement of rural communities and the violent response to the uprising by the Syrian government were central to the intensification of unrest in the country.

State ability to manage instability

potential

Conditions

Triggers Catalysts

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Water Security

freshwater is fundamental to food production; 71% of global water withdrawals are used in agriculture (Addams et al, 2009). Water security links food production, energy, the climate, economic growth, and human security (WefWI, 2011).

Water is unevenly distributed globally with many regions of the world already experiencing extreme water stress (Gassert, 2013). further pressure on water resources is expected from climate change, population increase, and rising demand due to improved standards of living and economic growth in developing countries (Gleick, 1993; Addams et al, 2009).

Assuming no water efficiency gains and an average economic growth scenario, global water requirements could be 40% higher than current accessible, reliable supply by 2050. There will be regional variations in levels of water deficit with some of the biggest problems (river basins with a deficit larger than 50%) occurring in developing countries (Addams et al, 2009).

The US Intelligence Community Assessment on Global Water Security (2012) found that there will be increased risk of instability, state failure and regional tensions before 2022 due to water security problems in countries important to the US. In the long term (to 2040) they expect demand for freshwater to outpace available supply posing a threat to local food production in affected countries, to global food production and therefore, global economic growth.

Conflict over a shared water resource is not new; the word ‘rival’ is derived from the latin word ‘rivalis’-meaning ‘one using the same river’ (ORf, 2011).

The trans-boundary nature of water resources means it has been linked to conflict between countries sharing a freshwater resource (evans, 2010). however, shared water resources are often drivers for peace and once cooperative water agreements are established they can be persistent over time (ICA, 2012.; Woolf, 1999).

India Case Study

Inequality in IndiaIndia is the world’s largest democracy with a decentralised political system and strong state powers. India has experienced rapid economic growth over the past 15 years, yet despite economic success India is a country of contrasts; where vast wealth coexists with abject poverty. The level of inequality between the wealthy elite and the numerous poor has led to the concept of “two India’s”, with the latter threatening prosperity and growth of the former.

In a country of 1.19 billion people, 48 Indians made it on to the forbes’ 2012 list of billionaires, while in 2009–10 30% of the population were living on less than $0.44 per day in rural areas and $0.56 per day in urban areas (Sahni, 2012). The poorest rural Indians spend 65% of their total expenditure on food (Sharma, 2012). Income inequality is well recognised as a leading indicator for social unrest.

ShAReD WATeR ReSOURCeS

AlSO hAve The POTenTIAl TO

Be A DRIveR fOR PeACe, OnCe

COOPeRATIve WATeR

AGReemenTS ARe

eSTABlISheD They CAn Be

PeRSISTenT OveR TIme

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farms in l valleys of madhya Pradesh, India during monsoon season

Down on the farm... © CC Image

Cortessy of Rajarshi mITRA

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Water in India: Growth in demand exceeds supplyIndia is crisscrossed by numerous rivers yet rapid economic and population growth means demand for water is growing faster than available supply. The result is falling per capita freshwater resources. The country is also experiencing high levels of baseline water stress (Gassert et al., 2013) driven by its growing populations, growing middle class population and therefore growing domestic demand for rice, wheat, and sugar. Indian water withdrawals are expected to reach 1,195 billion m3 by 2030 (Addams et al, 2009) which is a 50% increase from 2012 withdrawals (Worldbank, 2014b).

Despite national water withdrawals being below the total potential water resource available in India individual river basins face physical water scarcity. This includes agriculturally important basins, such as the Indus, Ganges, Cauvery and krishna (Addams et al, 2009). Together these basins represent two-thirds of the total irrigated area in India. Other basins do have the potential to be developed as water sources however their establishment is constrained by the massive infrastructure and financial cost needed (Saleth, 2011).

India’s waters are monsoon and glacial melt dependent so most of the country is subject to extremely high levels of seasonal variability in freshwater availability (Gassert et al, 2013). Therefore India’s water resources are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change such as changes in seasonal rainfall (Stocker at al., 2013; Turner and Annamalai, 2012) and retreating glaciers (laghari, 2013). In June 2014 India’s monsoon rainfall was 43 percent below average, the weakest first month of the season in five years (Ratnajyoti, 2014a). Although there was some recovery, the overall deficit remained at 18% by the end of the summer (Bhattacharya, 2014).

food subsidy programmeIndia has one of the largest food subsidy programmes in the world. The government subsidies for rice and wheat were equal to 0.72% of GDP between 2004 and 2007 (Jha & Ramaswami, 2010). In August 2013 India’s national food Security Programme, which extended the food subsidy programme to an estimated cost of $20 Billion, equal to 1.1% of GDP, was enacted into law (Gayathri, 2013).

India’s Prime minister narendra modi’s is under pressure to narrow the country’s financial deficit, yet in his first budget in July 2014 the government’s budget deficit target was not reduced from its current 4.1% of GDP (Reuters, 2014). Savings need to be made from the growing cost of the country’s food subsidy programme however, as has been highlighted above, food subsidies are key to maintaining political stability should food supply be disrupted in a country with hundreds of millions living in poverty.

furthermore, despite international controversy Prime minister modi has so far blocked world trade reforms at the


World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to protect India’s food security. modi’s adamant protection of India’s ability to subsidise and stockpile food grains beyond what is currently allowed by WTO rules is perhaps more understandable when the significance of food security to India’s national security is considered.

Specific examples, one inter state and one intra state:1. Cauvery River water dispute The monsoon fed Cauvery River in southern India is vital to farming in Tamil nadu and karnataka states. The river has a long history of water sharing agreements dating back to 1892 (updated in 1924). Between Indian independence in 1947 and the 1970s the States of Tamil nadu and karnataka came into political conflict (i.e. disputes between politicians) over their shared water resource, for three main reasons:

1. Dispute over the validity of the 1924 agreement; 2. Uneven rain across the regions resulting in the

agricultural and economic benefit received from the river being unequally distributed;

3. Irrigation and water projects, such as the building of reservoirs and hydroelectric plants, hampering water supplies in other regions.

Political wrangling between the two regions over allocation of water from the Cauvery intensified from the 1970’s onwards, particularly when the monsoons failed in 1994-5 and 2002. violence erupted in 2002 when thousands of farmers took to the streets of mandya town in karnataka. Protestors were reported to have hurled stones, and the police to have deployed tear gas to disperse the protestors (The hindu, 2002). non cooperative sentiment remains between the populations of the concerned regions (Bhattacharya & Poddar, 2012). The most recent agreement in 2007 was for karnataka to release 192 thousand million cubic feet of water to Tamil nadu in a normal monsoon year (June-may). no plan was established for a weak monsoon year.

In June 2014 the Tamil nadu Chief minister Jayalalithaa called for Prime minister modi to establish the Cauvery management Board to action the 2007 water sharing plan. meanwhile the karnataka Chief minister Siddaramaiah urged the Prime minister not to set up the Board until the Supreme Court decides on appeals made to the 2007 agreement (Seetharaman, 2014).

July 2014 saw public protests from farmers from both Tamil nadu and karnataka about the water sharing agreement between the two states (Bureau, 2014; Shiva kumar, 2014; Rajaram & Srividya, 2014). Tensions thankfully eased as the monsoon strengthened and water returned to the Cauvery.

The natural resource, environmental, economic, political and demographic characteristics of the Cauvery River basin appear to be consistent with a risk of violent conflict.

WITh GROWInG DOmeSTIC

DemAnD fOR RICe, WheAT, AnD SUGAR

InDIAn WATeR WIThDRAWAlS ARe exPeCTeD

TO ReACh 1,195 BIllIOn m3 By

2030

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According to the framework in figure 2, conditions (inequality, resource scarcity, historical experiences, population and economic growth) and catalysts (the potential for climate change impacts) for unrest are present. Therefore given the wrong timing, a trigger event could precipitate unrest.

2. Indus River Basin The Indus catchment has a population of more than a quarter of a billion people, some of the world’s lowest human Development Indicator scores and geopolitics characterised by international, subnational, and local conflict. This would-be desert is kept alive by the life blood that is the Indus River.

Straddling both northern India and Pakistan the Indus river basin is affected by water stresses due to poor water management, inefficient agricultural practices, soil salinization, inadequate infrastructure, variability in water availability and water pollution.

The Indus River relies on glacial melt from the himalayas for up to half of its flow making it highly sensitive to climate change. Alongside future potential water shortages there is increasing risk of massive flooding due to rapid glacial melting. Seasonal melt waters also feed critical hydroelectric power stations (laghari, 2013).

To meet its growing population and surging energy demand, and to bring electricity to the more than 400 million Indians living without it, the government of India plan to build 292 dams throughout the Indian himalayas (Grumbine, 2013).

Some Pakistani officials hold India’s construction of dams responsible for the country’s water shortages (Ghosh, 2013). They claim the dams reduce the flow of water in the Indus from India to Pakistan. The federal minister for Water and Power, khawaja muhammad Asif, is quoted as saying in 2013 “We are on the verge of facing a life and death situation.”

Severe mismanagement of water is central to water challenges in Pakistan (Ghosh, 2013). nevertheless, deadly clashes in 2013 along the boarder between Indian and Pakistan held kashmir territory demonstrate the potential for military dispute between the two nations (Curtis, 2013). Climate change, population increase and water mismanagement stresses on the Indus, are therefore pertinent to the ongoing peace process between the two nations.

India and Pakistan have a history of violent conflict following the partitioning of British India in 1947. yet their ability to negotiate, establish and maintain a treaty over their shared water resource of the Indus River basin, even in the face of major wars between the two counties, demonstrated the potential for peaceful cooperation

over an internationally shared water resource (Woolf, 1999; nRDC, 2002; Zawahri, 2009; evans, 2010; ORf, 2011; ICA, 2012).

Conclusions

The growing global population and rapid economic development require increasing amounts of food, energy and water, yet availability of these essential resources is constrained by the boundaries of natural systems and the planet. There is increasing evidence that the rapid growth in human demand for resources is exerting mounting pressure on natural systems and therefore their ability to continue to support human development.

Although unlikely to be the primary cause of violent conflict, natural resource scarcity and climate change can be a catalyst that exacerbates simmering tensions and existing conditions for instability. In particular a decreased availability of water and increased price of food commodities can increase the risk of violent conflict where the conditions for instability exist in a region.

Social and economic condition for instability such as poverty and inequality are present in India, as are the possibility of environmental factors such as climate change and mismanagement of water resources exacerbating vulnerability.

At present strong government backing of food security policies protect India’s vulnerable populations from unaffordable food prices. however pressure to curb the cost of India’s food subsidy programme could have repercussions for stability in the country. Should the perfect storm of challenges impact India (drought, reduced water availability, crop failure, migration, the inability of the government to subsidise food) conflict over India’s water resources is possible in the future. however, due to the strength of international water sharing agreements to preserve peace the threat of instability is more likely to be internal conflict, potentially in the Cauvery catchment, than with neighbouring Pakistan.

more research is required into trends, connections and leading indicators that link natural resource scarcity, climate change and the risk of violent conflict. furthermore, research into the potential for regional conflict to cascade globally, particularly through migration, supply chain disruptions and risks to the global finance sector through insurance or investment exposure, should be explored further.

A better understanding of the systemic risks posed by resource scarcity and climate change will improve our insight into where conflict may arise in the future and potentially allow society to build resilience and proactive responses to these challenges.

A BeTTeR UnDeRSTAnDInG Of The SySTemIC

RISkS POSeD By ReSOURCe

SCARCITy AnD ClImATe ChAnGe

WIll ImPROve OUR InSIGhT InTO WheRe

COnflICT mAy ARISe In The

fUTURe

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