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March 1972 RESOURCE SCARCITY AND FOREIGN POLICY A SIMULATION MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT by Nazli Choucri Department of Political Science Michael Laird Alfred I! Sloan School of Management Dennis L. Meadows Alfred l? Sloan School of Management CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY C A M B R I D G E M A S S A C H U S E T T S

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Page 1: RESOURCE SCARCITY AND FOREIGN POLICY A5BChoucri%2C%2… · SCARCITY AND FOREIGN POLICY A SIMULATION MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT by Nazli Choucri Department of Political Science

March 1972

RESOURCE SCARCITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

A SIMULATION MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

by

Nazli Choucri Department of Political Science

Michael Laird Alfred I! Sloan School of Management

Dennis L. Meadows Alfred l? Sloan School of Management

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY C A M B R I D G E M A S S A C H U S E T T S

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CONTENTS*

Page

I. In t roduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

11. The System: Technological Development, Popula t ion Growth, and Resource U t i l i z a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n e q u a l i t i e s : Resource Needs and D i s t r i b u t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t : The Dual Imperat ives of Growth and C o n s t r a i n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

111. System Dynamics: A Simulat ion Approach t o Complex Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Basic Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Modeled Re la t ionsh ips : I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

I V . A Non-Linear Feedback Model of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Popula t ion Sec tor 31

. . . . . . . . Product ive C a p i t a l and Technology 35

L a t e r a l P re s su re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

M i l i t a r y Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

. . . . . . Resource Al loca t ions and U t i l i z a t i o n s 46

Ex te rna l Resource Cont ro l : Trade . . . . . . . . 50

V. Technological Development and Resource Cons t r a in t s : Cons idera t ions f o r F u r t h e r Analys is . . . . . . . . . . 55

Program L i s t i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Appendix: The U.S. Case: Some T e n t a t i v e Resu l t s and Impl i ca t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Program L i s t i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

* The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s repor ted i n t h i s paper were undertaken wi th the c o l l a b o r a t i o n of Robert C . North, Stanford Univers i ty . The energy d a t a were compiled a t S tanford Un ive r s i t y and processed a t M . I . T . by Panay io t i s Momferratos. The model formula t ion was undertaken by Michael La i rd , and t h e b a s i c r e s e a r c h f o r resource d a t a by James P. Bennett . An e a r l i e r v e r s i o n of t h i s paper was e n t i t l e d " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Imp l i ca t ions of Technological Development and Popula t ion Growth," M . I . T . , September 1971. We a r e g r a t e f u l t o Hayward R. Alker f o r i n c i s i v e comments and c r i t i c i s m s .

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This paper desc r ibes t h e i n i t i a l s t ages of an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y

research p ro jec t designed t o t r a c e the e f f e c t s of domestic resource

needs and s c a r c i t i e s i n advanced technologica l s o c i e t i e s upon

i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior. Our o b j e c t i v e is t h e development of concept-

u a l t o o l s f o r d i sc ip l ined specu la t ion concerning a l t e r n a t i v e f u t u r e

responses t h a t may be employed by na t ions faced with resource

problems. What fol lows is a s ta tement of t h e problem, a desc r ip t ion

of t h e research design and methodology used, and a d iscuss ion of our

prel iminary a n a l y s i s , wi th t h e United S t a t e s a s a t e s t case.

I. In t roduct ion

A l l s t a t e s wi th growing economies a r e confronted by increas ing

requirements f o r n a t u r a l resources , but t h e p o l i t i c a l impl ica t ions

of these requirements a r e ambiguous. I n genera l , no one has demon-

s t r a t e d empi r i ca l ly t h e l inkage ( i f any) between eco log ica l , demo-

graphic, and technologica l f a c t o r s - v i s 2 .- \-is p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n

and behavior , but the assumption of some such l inkage i s i m p l i c i t i n

contemporary analyses of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t ions . ' To map out the

boundaries of t h e problem, we addressed ourse lves (1) t o the ways

i n which n a t i o n a l behavior is i n p a r t shaped and i n p a r t constrained

1 See, f o r example, Warner R . S c h i l l i n g , "Technology: Technology

and I n t e r n a t i o n a l ?.elations," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Encyclopedia of the - -~ Soc ia l Sciences, Vol. XV, pp. 589-597.

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by la rge-sca le e c o l o g i c a l , demographic, and t echno log ica l charac te r -

i s t i c s , and (2) how t h e s e aggrega te s o c i e t a l f a c t o r s shape n a t i o n a l

dec i s ions and, i n t u r n , a r e shaped by p o l i c i e s and outcomes a t t h e

n a t i o n a l l e v e l . We seek t o broaden convent ional p o l i t i c a l d i scour se

by inco rpora t ing i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c s t hose e c o l o g i c a l and

environmental f a c t o r s which in f luence n a t i o n a l behavior and pre-

d i s p o s i t i o n s . 2 A c o r o l l a r y of t h i s concern i s t o i d e n t i f y t h e ways

i n which changes i n a n a t i o n ' s e c o l o g i c a l p r o f i l e may occasion rever -

b e r a t i n g e f f e c t s throughout t he system, s u r f a c i n g i n changes i n

p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n , i n p o l i t i c a l behavior , o r both.

The h i s t o r i c a l record p o i n t s t o t h r e e p r i n c i p a l modes of ac-

qu i r ing needed resources : (1) i n t e n s i v e i n t e r n a l development of

e x i s t i n g r e sou rces , i f t he se a r e a v a i l a b l e ; (2 ) increased commerce

and t r a d e ; and (3) m i l i t a r y expansion and conquest . Because today ' s

i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s have g r e a t e r needs f o r resource s t o c k s

ou t s ide of t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l boundar ies , and because they have the

c a p a b i l i t y t o employ coerc ive means of a c q u i s i t i o n i f i t were deemed

necessary, exp los ive p o l i t i c a l ques t ions may ensue i f r e sou rces a r e

domest ical ly s ca rce . It is t h e r e f o r e important t o d e l i n e a t e t h e

r e l a t i o n s between i n t e r n a l resource needs and e x t e r n a l behavior , and

t o i d e n t i f y those cond i t i ons which predispose a country toward

'see Harold and Margaret Sprout , The Ecologica l Pe r spec t ive on Human A f f a i r s , wi th Spec ia l Reference t o I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s - (Princeton: P r ince ton Un ive r s i t y P r e s s , 1965).

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coerc ive r a t h e r than noncoercive i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior .

A comprehensive r e sea rch des ign inc ludes : (1) a c l e a r defin-

i t i o n of t h e problem i n sys t ema t i c and empir ica l terms; (2) a con-

s i d e r a t i o n of t h e most r e l evan t empi r i ca l knowledge bear ing upon

t h e problem; (3 ) t h e cons t ruc t ion of a l t e r n a t i v e models f o r making

cons i s t en t and t e s t a b l e hypotheses; (4) t h e s e l e c t i o n of a provision-

a l l y v a l i d a t e d model f o r undertaking sys temat ic and d i s c i p l i n e d

specu la t ions about a l t e r n a t i v e outcomes; and (5) t h e development and

eva lua t ion of d i f f e r e n t pol icy d i r e c t i o n s o r p o l i t i c a l consequences

r e l evan t t o t h e problem.

The prel iminary computer-based model t h a t we developed f o r t h e

a n a l y s i s of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l consequences of e c o l o g i c a l and techno-

l o g i c a l f a c t o r s focuses upon n a t i o n a l demands, c a p a b i l i t i e s ,

p ressures , and needs. The major emph.l.sis is upon t h e ways i n which

inc reas ing populat ions and technologies p lace pressures upon i n t e r n a l

resources , occasioning needs and s c a r c i t i e s , and t h e ways i n which

such needs a r e acconunodated. Some t e n t a t i v e r e s u l t s of the s imula t ion

model, drawing upon t h e case of t h e United S t a t e s , a r e presented i n

t h e appendix. It must be kept i n mind, however, t h a t t h i s paper i s

h u t one s t e p i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of a comprehensive research design;

much s t i l l remains t o be done.

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11. - The ~ System: Technological Development, Population Growth, and Resource Utilization

Little serious thought has been given to the future consequences

and implications of heightened economic, technological, and scientific

development on the part of the advanced industrialized nations (such

as the United States) to domestic and global ecological factors and

political behavior. The conventional ethos is that economic,

technological, and military growtn are necessary correlates, if not

prerequisites, for international power. However, when viewed in a

broad ecological context, continued growth is fraught with serious

and possibly negative implications, especially if the correlates of

this growth impose severe environmental strains.

One of the most salient of these involves pressures upon avail-

able resources. This situation is further aggrevated when viewed

in the context of growing populations, which, when coupled with

advances in technology, increases the demand for critical raw

materials. Yet the pressures imposed on the environment are not a

function of population growth alone, but also of the interactive

effects of technological development, resource utilization, and

economic development.

Population growth strongly affects the quality of the environ-

ment and influences the development of social institutions. Conversely.

the growth of human populations is strongly influenced by the level of

economic activity and by the modes employed for resource distributions

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and usages. Feedback e f f e c t s l i n k popula t ion , r e sou rces , and

technology wi th p o l i t i c s , c u l t u r e , and s o c i e t y . For example, some

empi r i ca l evidence h a s t e n t a t i v e l y t r a c e d the r o o t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

c o n f l i c t t o domestic cons ide ra t ions t h a t are i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o

d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n t he rates of popula t ion growth, i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n

of and acces s t o r e sou rces , and i n l e v e l s of knowledge and s k i l l s . 3

We w i l l not r e s t a t e t h e d a t a and arguments here . We w i l l develop

i n s t e a d an a spec t of t h e problem which has thus f a r been given

minimal a t t e n t i o n hy p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s : t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s

among popula t ion growth, t echno log ica l development, and resource

u t i l i z a t i o n , and t h e r e l a t e d p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s . O f primary concern

a t t h i s po in t a r e some i n t e r n a t i o n a l consequences of technologica l

growth and resource dep le t ion . The fol lowing s e c t i o n s b r ing some

empi r i ca l d a t a t o bea r upon t h i s i s s u e .

I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n e q u a l i t i e s : Resource Needs and D i s t r i b u t i o n s

T h i r t y pe r cent of t h e wor ld ' s populat ion l i v i n g i n t h e more

i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s consume about 90 per cent of t h e t o t a l

3 ~ e e Nazl i Choucri and Robert C . North, "Dynamics of In t e r - n a t i o n a l Conf l i c t : Some Pol icy Impl ica t ions of Popula t ion , Resources and Technology," World P o l i t i c s , S p e c i a l I s sue on Theory and Pol icy i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Re la t ions [ i n p r e s s ] . -

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g loba l production of energy and mineral resource^.^ The p o l i t i c a l

imp l i ca t ions of t h i s s i t u a t i o n a r e a s y e t extremely ambiguous, but

t h i s much i s c l e a r : Elany of t h e resources v i t a l t o continuing

i n d u s t r i a l growth a r e loca ted i n low technology a reas . I n many

cases , t h i s i s n o t due t o domestic sho r t ages , but t o c o s t consider-

a t i o n s : Resources imported from overseas a r e cheaper. Moreover,

t h e ind i sc r imina te use of domestic resources r e s u l t i n g i n dep le t ion

(but n o t n e c e s s a r i l y exhaust ion) f u r t h e r predisposes a h igh ly

i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e t o continue seeking resources from low c a p a b i l i t y

o r technology d e f i c i e n t a r e a s t h a t have not y e t exp lo i t ed t h e i r own

resource endowments. I n many cases , p o l i t i c a l o r economic c o n t r o l of

small s t a t e s by major powers a s s u r e s continuing flows of needed

resources .

Without drawing undue in fe rences , one r a t i o n a l e underlying

t h e United S t a t e s ' involvement i n Southeast Asia , a s presented i n

the Pentagon Papers , i s e s p e c i a l l y i l l u s t r a t i v e of t hese p red i spos i t i ons .

The 1952 Pol icy Statement by t h e National Secur i ty Council on

"United S t a t e s Object ives and Courses of Action wi th Respect t o South

East Asia" underscored t h e necess i ty of keeping t h e a r e a out of t h e

Communist sphere of i n f luence by emphasizing t h a t "South East Asia,

e s p e c i a l l y Malaya and Indonesia , i s t h e p r i n c i p a l world source of

4M. King Hubbert, "Mineral Resources and Rates of Consumption," i n United Nations, Department of Economic and Soc ia l A f f a i r s , Proceedings of t h e World Populat ion Conference, Belgrade, August 30- September 10. 1965 (New York, 1967), p. 318.

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n a t u r a l rubber and t i n , and a producer of petroleum and o t h e r

s t r a t e g i c a l l y important c o m o d i t i e s . "5 I n a d d i t i o n , t he r i c e

product ion of Burma and Thai land a r e extremely important t o t he food

bases of Malaya, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Japan, I n d i a , and o t h e r coun t r i e s

i n t h e a rea .6 I n t hese terms, t h e importance of Southeast Asia f o r

t h e United S t a t e s (and o the r h igh ly i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s ) may

have c r i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l imp l i ca t ions .

The populat ion of t h e United S t a t e s i s now 207 mi l l i on , and

c u r r e n t l y growing about 1 per cen t pe r yea r , a l though t h i s has

r e c e n t l y been t ape r ing o f f . The United S t a t e s gross n a t i o n a l product ,

about one t r i l l i o n d o l l a r s , h a s averaged a 3 p e r cen t annual i nc rease

i n cons t an t d o l l a r s over t h e p a s t decade. Th i s added popula t ion and

growing ou tpu t genera tes r a p i d l y i n c r e a s i n g demands f o r resources

t h a t are e s s e n t i a l t o i n d u s t r i a l p rocesses .

The t r e n d s of i n c r e a s i n g needs and decreas ing supp l i e s have two

p o t e n t i a l imp l i ca t ions : (1) F.ising c o s t s a s soc i a t ed wi th raw minerals

of p o t e n t i a l l y d i f f i c u l t access may s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e t a r d t h e r a t e of

i n c r e a s e i n t h e m a t e r i a l s t anda rd of l i v i n g o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,

n e c e s s i t a t e a readjustment of our n a t i o n a l p r i o r i t i e s and a l l o c a t i o n s ;

and (2) i n conjunct ion wi th demands generated by o the r major powers,

5 ~ h e Pentagon Papers , Key Documents, 112: 1952 Pol icy Statement by U.S. on Goals i n Southeast Asia," The New York Times, 1971, p. 27.

'1bid . . P . 28.

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our needs can lead t o f u r t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l competi t ions and c o n f l i c t s .

To evalua te t h e s e developments f o r t h e United S t a t e s and o t h e r

i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s , w e have sought t o determine t h e e x t e n t of

r e l i a n c e upon fo re ign mineral resources by computing an index of

I dependency based upon Bureau of Mines da ta . The index, D I = Imports-

Exports/Consumption al lows f o r a comparative assessment of r e l i a n c e

upon e x t e r n a l sources , mineral by mineral . This measure, of course ,

is h ighly inf luenced by the Bureau of Mines' s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n s of

imports , expor ts , and consumption.8 Allowing f o r a margin of measure-

ment e r r o r i n cross-nat ional comparisons, t h e fol lowing assessments

emerge.

According t o computations based upon government d a t a , the

United S t a t e s i s h igh ly r e l i a n t upon e x t e r n a l sources f o r manganese,

n i c k e l , platinum, t i n , z i n c , baux i t e , bery l l ium, chromium, c o b a l t ,

and f luo r spa r . For each of t hese ma te r i a l s our annual domestic

product ion is l e s s than h a l f of our t o t a l annual requirements. The

United S t a t e s i s moderately r e l i a n t on o t h e r coun t r i e s f o r mercury,

t i tan ium, i ron-ore, copper, and aluminium. Major expor t e r s f o r o t h e r

7 ~ . ~ . Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1969 (Washington, D .C . : U.S. Government P r i n t i n g Of f i ce , 1971), 1-11; U.S. Bureau of Mines, Commodity Data Summaries, January 1971.

'A s ta tement of problems and caveats i n d a t a a n a l y s i s is included i n Nazl i Choucri, "Populat ion, Resources, Technology: P o l i t i c a l Impli- c a t i o n s of t h e Environment Crisis," i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organizat ion, [ i n press] . See a l s o W i l l i a m W. Behrens, "The Dynamics of Natura l Resource U t i l i z a t i o n , " Systems Dynamics Group, Sloan School of Management, M . I . T . , May 1971.

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e s s e n t i a l minera ls a r e Canada, t h e United Kingdom, Thai land, Mexico,

South Af r i ca , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , Spain, and Belgium-Luxembourg. With

few except ions , expor t ing coun t r i e s a r e e i t h e r a l l i e d d i r e c t l y t o

t h e United S t a t e s o r l i e w i th in t h e c u r r e n t American sphere of

inf luence . 9

The case of t h e Sovie t Union is somewhat d i f f e r e n t : It appears

t o b e considerably less r e l i a n t upon e x t e r n a l sources than t h e United

S t a t e s . There a r e only two i n d u s t r i a l minera ls f o r which n e t imports

exceed 20 per c e n t of cu r ren t consumption: baux i t e , imported from

Greece (40 per cent) and Yugoslavia (60 per cen t ) and t i n , imported

from Malaysia (30 per cen t ) and Great B r i t a i n (68 per cen t ) . However,

s i n c e cheap s u b s t i t u t e s do e x i s t f o r t i n , t h i s metal cannot be

considered m i l i t a r i l y o r i n d u s t r i a l l y c r u c i a l . The s i t u a t i o n f o r

baux i t e is unclear .

By c o n t r a s t , Japan i s almost t o t a l l y dependent upon ex te rna l

sources of key minera ls . There a r e t h i r t e e n important minerals for

which imports equal o r exceed 80 per cent of consumption. These

inc lude both f u e l s and i n d u s t r i a l resources . Of a l l of t h e

technologically-advanced powers, Japan i s the most r e l i a n t upon

un in te r rup ted i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e t o s u s t a i n its economy. In t h i s

9 ~ o n v e r s e l y , t h e United S t a t e s i s a n e t expor ter of molybdenum, tungs ten , vanadium, c o a l , go ld , hel ium, s u l f u r , and magnesium. And, f o r o the r key mine ra l s , such a s i ron-ore, copper, petroleum, and n a t u r a l gas , t h e r e has been no t r end toward inc reas ing U.S. dependence on f o r e i g n sources s i n c e 1958.

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case , t h e motivat ion t o import i s not t h a t resources might be

acquired more cheaply elsewhere, but t h a t they a r e simply not ava i l -

a b l e i n Japan.

The same gene ra l s i t u a t i o n p e r t a i n s when cons ider ing energy

resources. Measured i n terms of me t r i c c o a l equ iva len t , the United

S t a t e s i s a n e t energy importer , along wi th Japan, B r i t a i n , France,

West Germany, Holland and t h e Scandinavian coun t r i e s . I n d u s t r i a l -

i z a t i o n , energy consumption, and t h e s tandard of l i v i n g a r e a l l

s t rong ly cor re la ted .1° These coun t r i e s a l l consume a l a r g e r sha re

of world energy than they c o n t r i b u t e i n t e r m s of domestic production.

Of t h e advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , only t h e U.S.S.R. is a n e t

expor t e r , producing cons iderably more than is consumed domest ical ly.

Although Soviet product ion and consumption amounts t o l e s s than h a l f

the energy processed by the United S t a t e s , the abso lu te l e v e l s

involved a r e still extremely high compared t o the world average. 11

The impl ica t ions of t hese d a t a a r e a s follows: The product ion

and consumption of minera l and energy resources a r e elements i n a

v i c ious cycle: Grea ter resource consumption impl ies g r e a t e r i n d u s t r i a l -

i z a t i o n . An expanded i n d u s t r i a l base genera tes f u r t h e r demands f o r

'O~era ld Manners, The Geography of Energy (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1964). The c o r r e l a t i o n between energy consumption and degree of economic a c t i v i t y has been s o c l o s e t h a t one is o f t e n used i n order t o es t imate t h e o the r .

"'u.N. S t a t i s t i c a l Of f i ce , World Energy Suppl ies , N.Y. Se r i e s J. No. 4-12, 1961-1969.

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m a t e r i a l goods and s e r v i c e s which, i n tu rn , r e s u l t i n f u r t h e r con-

sumption of resources . The impl ica t ions of these t rends f o r resource

u t i l i z a t i o n a r e i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure 1 not ing world o i l production

over time.

These r e l a t i o n s h i p s become e s p e c i a l l y p e r t i n e n t 1.7hen viewed

i n t h e context of major power/small s t a t e i n t e r a c t i o n s . The acqu i s i t ion

of r a w m a t e r i a l s from abroad by major powers may, i n some ways, de-

c rease the prospects f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n t h e developing areas .

However, t h e encouragement of t r a d e wi th developing s o c i e t i e s

provides them wi th needed c a p i t a l goods. The i s s u e i s not whether

t h e major powers a r e exp lo i t ing o r a s s i s t i n g developing s t a t e s ,

although t h i s is an important ques t ion . More t o t h e p o i n t , i n view

of t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s involved, i s t h a t these r e l a t i o n s h i p s tend t o be

unstable. With economic growth, an i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g country w i l l

i nc reas ing ly r equ i re resources. Although t h i s is an i s s u e of g rea t

debate, t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e t h a t today's coun t r i e s , i n t h e long

run, w i l l a l s o i n c r e a s e t b e i r requirements f o r access t o energy

sources and t o mineral resources. Many of these resources a r e

domestical ly a v a i l a b l e , b u t , because of technologica l d e f i c i e n c i e s ,

they a r e s t i l l not r e a d i l y access ib le . However, e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e

h o s t ' s resources by t h e advanced country in t roduces t h e needed

technology.

Growing populat ions i n developing areas a l s o p lace added

burdens upon n a t i o n a l governments and upon the e x i s t i n g resource and

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Figure 1

WORLD OIL PRODUCTION RATE

(10' bbls/yr)

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energy bases. Nat ional governments, i n turn--if t h e p a s t s e v e r a l

decades provide h e l p f u l ana logies f o r t h e unfolding s i tua t ion - -wi l l

undoubtedly express d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n wi th t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d power-

hos t s t a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s and demand readjustments . To t h e ex ten t

t h a t major powers a r e w i l l i n g t o modify p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n and

r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e imbalances may be reso lved by peacefu l means. I f

c r u c i a l n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a r e a t s t a k e , however, t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d

power may e x e r t a d d i t i o n a l p re s su re leading t o m i l i t a r y force . Thus,

b a s i c a l l y nonmil i ta ry means of c o n t r o l might g ive way t o d i r e c t

m i l i t a r y coercion.

To i n c r e a s e prospects f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace today r e q u i r e s

a t a minimum t h a t resources be t r a n s f e r r e d from poorer coun t r i e s t o - -

r i c h e r ones i n ways t h a t a r e s t a b l e and acceptable t o a l l p a r t i e s .

However, investment and t r a d e , t h e dominant contemporary mechanisms

f o r t h e t r a n s f e r , can genera te long-term e f f e c t s which might decrease

the flow of resources from low income t o h igher income coun t r i e s i n

the f u t u r e . Resource problems can l e a d t o p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . Such

r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e n o t new and t h e r e have long been competitions

among i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s t a t e s f o r i n f l u e n c e i n and con t ro l of low

c a p a b i l i t y regions. There is noth ing i n e v i t a b l e about t h i s . How-

eve r , long-range t r ends and p a t t e r n s may s t rong ly predispose a system

toward more r a t h e r than less c o n f l i c t u a l outcomes.12 The fol lowing

''we a r e profoundly aware of t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s sketchy d iscuss ion . However, by s impl i fy ing t h e problem we hoped t o br ing key i s s u e s i n t o sha rpe r focus.

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d i scuss ion summarizes t h e s p e c i f i c t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s which provide

t h e b a s i s f o r our modeling e f f o r t s .

I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t : The Dual Imperat ives of Growth Cons t r a in t s

The propens i ty t o engage i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t and v io lence

o f t en depends upon t h e ex ten t t o which a s o c i e t y meets i ts resource

needs e x t e r n a l l y , r a t h e r than through domestic e x t r a c t i o n . The

g r e a t e r a n a t i o n ' s dependency on e x t e r n a l sources , t h e h igher t h e

p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t i t s i n t e r e s t s w i l l u l t ima te ly c o l l i d e wi th those

of another power. The g r e a t e r t h e degree of competi t ion, t h e more

l i k e l y i t is t h a t c o n f l i c t w i l l i n t e n s i f y i n t o o v e r t v io lence . This

is n o t t o argue t h a t p o l i t i c s can be reduced t o economics o r t o

resource needs, bu t t o suggest t h a t cons idera t ions gene ra l ly

considered non-po l i t i ca l i n n a t u r e may genera te outcomes t h a t become

highly p o l i t i c a l . 13

A s t a t e w i l l t u r n outward i f demands cannot be met domest ical ly

because of cos t cons ide ra t ions , u n a c c e s s i b i l i t y , or u n a v a i l a b i l i t y .

H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e p red i spos i t i on t o reach ou t s ide of n a t i o n a l bound-

a r i e s f o r resources has o f t e n been a s soc ia t ed n o t only wi th populat ion

growth and advancement of i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t y and technology, but

a l s o wi th t h e environmental c o s t s and phys ica l dep le t ion of domestic

13see Choucri and North, "Dynamics of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conf l i c t ," World P o l i t i c s [ i n p res s ] .

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resources. For convenience, we s h a l l r e f e r t o t h e genera l i nc l ina -

t i o n or psychological motivat ion t o extend resource a c q u i s i t i o n

a c t i v i t i e s outward as l a t e r a l pressure . This i s t o be d is t inguished

from t h e a c t u a l manifes ta t ions of e x t e r n a l behavior--trade, inves t -

ments, m i l i t a r y expansion, and o the r means. 1 4

Further along w e s h a l l hypothesize t h a t a key cons idera t ion i n

predisposing a s t a t e toward v io lence i s the ex ten t t o which its a c t u a l

e x t e r n a l behavior is congruent wi th t h e amount of l a t e r a l pressure

generated. I n many cases , i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems a r i s e because

s t a t e s a r e prevented from engaging i n e x t e r n a l a c t i v i t i e s desp i t e

t h e i r s t rong i n c l i n a t i o n s and p red i spos i t ions f o r outward-bound

resource a c q u i s i t i o n e f f o r t s . The g r e a t e r t h e incongruence of gap

between i n c l i n a t i o n and a c t u a l behavior , t h e more aggrieved, f r u s t r a t e d ,

o r otherwise d i s s a t i s f i e d a s t a t e i s l i k e l y t o be. And, where t h e

c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e , aggrieved s t a t e s o f t e n f i n d themselves

i n t h e r o l e of aggressor .

The h i s t o r y of Japan during t h e pas t century , of European

colonia l i sm i n t h e n ine teenth and twent ie th c e n t u r i e s , or of t h e

h i s t o r i c a l U.S. expansion westward o r Russian expansion eastward

i l l u s t r a t e s these r e l a t i o n s h i p s . For purposes of t h i s d iscuss ion ,

t h e Japanese case i s perhaps t h e most reveal ing . During t h e interwar

period, Japan invaded s e v e r a l ad jacent regions t o secure raw mate r i a l s

l4we a r e indebted to Professor Robert North f o r these i n i t i a l conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n s .

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and a d d i t i o n a l food and t o provide added space f o r even tua l emigra-

t i on . A s long a s Japan concentrated h e r a c t i v i t i e s i n low c a p a b i l i t y

coun t r i e s wi th pr imar i ly ag ra r i an economies, these expansions were

r e l a t i v e l y c o s t l e s s ; however, when she came i n t o con tac t wi th o the r

i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s t a t e s , her a t tempts t o develop a "Greater Eas t Asia

Co-Prosperity Sphere" were seve re ly cons t ra ined . Eventual ly, Japan

perceived war a s t h e only v i a b l e course of a c t i o n t o secure resources

and needed markets. 15

Today, Japan ' s p o s i t i o n i s not t oo d i s s i m i l a r . Her r e l i a n c e

upon e x t e r n a l r e sources i s much g r e a t e r than before t h e war. How-

ever, o the r avenues are now open, such a s ex tens ive t r a d e wi th t h e

West and wi th c l i e n t o r h o s t s t a t e s i n Asia. A s long a s t h e s e

r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e n o t d i s rup ted , t h e r e probably w i l l be no s e r i o u s

i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems. However, i f severe obs t ac l e s - -po l i t i ca l ,

economic, o r otherwise--to resource a c q u i s i t i o n s o r access t o markets

a r i s e , Japan (along wi th o t h e r advanced i n d u s t r i a l na t ions ) possesses

the technologica l c a p a b i l i t y t o undertake a m i l i t a r i s t i c o r coerc ive

course of ac t ion . This is not t o sugges t t h a t such avenues a r e

i n e v i t a b l e , but t h a t i t is not inconceivable f o r e a r l i e r p a t t e r n s of

behavior t o reemerge i f t h e proper condi t ions a r e p resen t .

The i m p l i c i t bu t as y e t un te s t ed , hypothesis i n t h e foregoing

15?Jobutaka Ike , Japan ' s Decision -- f o r War: Records of t h e 1941 --- Pol icy Conferences (Stanford: Stanford Univers i ty P res s , 1967), p. 3 .

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is that the failure of attempts at noncoercive expansion, such as

commercial or trading activities, will lead (if the capabilities are

available) to militaristic alternatives: Industrialized states will

employ brute force before willfully accepting the economic costs of

resource scarcity. A related hypothesis--closing the feedback loop--

has been put forth by Chou En-lai in a recent interview with James

Reston. "Economic expansion is bound to bring about military expan-

sion. And that cannot be restrained by a treaty. Look at all your

nuclear bases in Japan. Even if you are to withdraw your nuclear

16 weapons, the nuclear bases are there, and they can make use of them."

These hypotheses converge around the consideration that international

conflicts may be traced to technological, economic, and ecological

differentials among nations.

When viewed in a comparative context, the profiles of nations

along with the demographic, technological, and resource dimensions,

might provide some clues into political predispositions and inter-

national behavior. Historically it has appeared that the outcomes

of expansion, conflict, and violence differ considerably whether the

population-technology-resources calculus for a particular nation

registers on the high or low end of the spectrum, or variations

thereof. Of course "high" and "low" are always relative--to a

state's own valuations, and in comparison with other states. The

16~he New York Times August 10, 1971. - -- - 9

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d i f f e r e n c e s i n modes of e x t e r n a l behavior between t h e Scandinavian

coun t r i e s on t h e one hand and t h e major powers on t h e o the r through-

out t h e p a s t century a r e i l l u s t r a t i v e of t hese i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

The Scandinavians were inc l ined t o r e l y on t r a d e r a t h e r than

upon co lon ia l expansion f o r t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of needs and demands.

There a r e many reasons why t h i s was t h e case. Not un re l a t ed , however,

was t h e cons idera t ion t h a t t h e Scandinavians r e g i s t e r e d on t h e low

population-high technology-low resources end of t h e spectrum.

By way of f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n , a comparison of twelve na t ions

i n t e r m s of popula t ion , resources , technological-development, and

e x t e r n a l behavior i s presented i n Table 1. However, t hese r e l a t i o n -

sh ips a r e specu la t ive . But, w i th appropr i a t e a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s and

empir ica l d a t a , i t may be poss ib l e t o test these and o t h e r hypotheses

concerning i n t e r n a t i o n a l impl ica t ions of popula t ion growth, techno-

l o g i c a l advancement, and resource c o n s t r a i n t s . These p a t t e r n s a r e

more i n t h e way of t e s t a b l e hypotheses r a t h e r than va l ida t ed r e s u l t s .

Indeed, they a r e sugges t ive of t h e kinds of l inkages one might look

f o r between n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior .

Subsequent s e c t i o n s of t h i s paper focus upon t h e development of a

generic p r o t o t y p i c a l model of an advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y which

w i l l then be used t o approximate t h e U.S. case.

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Table 1 national Cornparisoris*

&ations differ in terms of po~ulation levels (and prowtn rates), technolo~ical capabilities, resource needs, the extent to which they can acquire those resources (internally or externally) and the &by which they proceed to ob- tain resources externally. The fallowing comparisons summarize data on these variables for 12 nations aild i-iicates the differences in international behavior and on the degree of conflict and violence found in association. Changes in mode of external behavior usually results from high costs incurred in earlier mode or low return an investment. Generally increased costs are associated with increased resistance by other powers.

External Behavior Resources Technological (mode of resource acquisition and

Nation Population (internal) capabilities degree of conflict and violence)

Japan high, decreasing very limited and high and growing, interwar years: external colonial expansion; rate, but increas- inadequate high dependence on acquisitions of res. from colonies; perception of ing increment external resources being "blocked" bv West; reliance on militaristic

solution; military mean perceived as only viable way of assuring resource acquisitions

post-WW 11: law conflict and no violence; trade exploitation of international resources due to cheap labour (high population and high technology; same high dependence on external resource, different mode of acquisition; potential military emphasis

China high and growing constant, not low, but slowly pre WW I: low behavior output, but highly pene- commensurate with growing, not corn- trated by others (propotypical "host" state). pap. needs mensurate with Source of conflict among other powers for control

needs af China, powers with high population, technology, and resource needs.

past WW 11: increasing Chinese capabilities make it difficult for western powers to penetrate higher output behavior, high verbal conflict; light actual violence; potential military activity, but unlikely in immediate future

* These are rough approximations of major trends and patterns: "High" and "low" are relative descriptors of attributes and characteristics.

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Table 1 (continued)

E x t e r n a l Behavior Resources) Technolog ica l (mode of resource a c q u i s i t i o n and degree

Nation Popula t ion ( i n t e r n a l ) c a p a b i l i t i e s of c o n f l i c t and violence)

Sweden low and low growth l i m i t e d ; high de- h igh r e l a t i v e t o h i s t o r i c a l l y dependent on t r a d e ; use of r a t e (high dur ing pendence on e x t e r - needs; n e c e s s i t a t e v i o l e n c e t o p r o t e c t t r a d e ; u s e of wars; high Viking e r a ) n a l r e s o u r c e s r e s o u r c e s acquis . r e t u r n on investment a s long a s neighboring

( h i s t o r i c a l l y so) powers had low c a p a b i l i t i e s ; i n c r e a s i n g cap- a b i l i t i e s of neighbours lowered r e t u r n on investment . Increased c o s t s of v io lence r e s u l t e d i n l e s s use of v io lence lead ing t o i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on low v i o l e n c e mode and emphasis on t r a d e e t c . C r i t i c a l p o i n t s : 1814-1914: low v io lence i n resource acqui- s i t i o n s i n c e .

Great h i s t o r i c a l l y h i g h l i m i t e d ; high B r i t a i n r e c e n t l y lower dependence on

r a t e e x t e r n a l

United --

S t a t e s h igh and growing a v a i l a b l e h i s t -

o r i c a l l y ; base f o r technology develop- ment; with high technology came need and r e l i a n c e on e x t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s

h igh r e l a t i v e t o p r e WW I: emphasis on c o l o n i z a t i o n ; ex- needs; i n c r e a s i n g t remely h igh v io lence conten t ; emphasis a l s o needs f o r r e s o u r c e s on t r a d e ; h i g h r e t u r n on investment; r e s i s t - and a s s o c i a t e d ance by o t h e r s begins. inter-war: extreme demands dependence on e x t e r n a l sources for resource;

u s e of v i o l e n c e ; p o s t war 11: lowering r e t u r n on investment p lus high c o s t s i n terms of r e s i s t a n c e by o t h e r s ; adoption a £ low v i o l e n c e modes; a s w i t h France,Holland, s u c c e s s f u l expansion a s long as c o s t s a r e low, c o s t s i n c r e a s e as o t h e r s i n c r e a s e t h e i r technology and provide r e s i s t a n c e .

high and growing; h igh s u c c e s s f u l expansion; use of v io lence f o r i n c r e a s i n g demands i n t e r n a l expansion ( i . e . , vs. Ind ians e t c . ) ; on resources ; and u s e of v i o l e n c e e x t e r n a l l y ; i n i t i a l l y h igh r e s o u r c e d e p l e t i o n ; r e t u r n on investment; over e x t e n s i o n l e a d s t o r e l i a n c e on e x t e r n a l high c o s t s and lower r e t u r n ; h i s t o r i c a l l y use

of multi-mode of resource a c q u i s i t i o n ( t r a d e , investment , t r o o p s e t c . ) ; r e s i s t a n c e by o t h e r s l e a d s a l s o t o g r e a t e r c o s t s .

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Table 1 (continued)

Nation Population

Holland high and growing; very high density

France low level and low rate of increase

Germany high and growing

(same pre WW I and pre WW 11)

Resources (internal)

limited internally, extreme dependence on external resources

moderately high; available for initial development of tech- nological capabil- ities

inadequate, depend- ence on' external

(same pre WW I and pre WW 11)

Technological capabilities

high, commensurate with needs, not commensurate with resources avail- able internally, devel- opment of capabilities to acquire external re- sources: navy colonial administrations etc.

External Behavior (mode af resource acquisition and deeree of conflict and violence)

historically used exploration, caloniza- zation, trade, to acquire resources; large empire rich in resources; used violence; loss of colonies after WW I1 necessitated use of technology inter- nally, i.e. industrialization; high internal pressure, low external violence; capabilities not available for militar- istic behavior.

high and growing; history of successful expansion; high historically offset violence in acquisition of colonies and effects of relatively resources; post WW 11: resistance by stationary population colonies which were growing in techno-

logical and -mode: trade, emphasis on cultural ties; lov violence content of behavior after Vietnam and Algeria; return on investment too low, costs too high, resistance too high. Capabilities not available for militaristic behavior.

high and growing com- pre WW I: attempt different made; settle mensurately with needs; on colonial expansion; feel "blocked" by increasing resource more successful western powers; a- needs (same model war: employ trade pol., overt coloniza- during pre WW I and pre tion; high violence content; high return, WW 11) low resistance until war; post war 11:

law violence (correlate of low cap.- same as Japan) capabilities available for militaristic leanings.

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Table 1 (continued)

-

External Behavior Resources Technological (mode of resource acquisition and degree of

Nation Population) (internal) capabilities conflict and violence)

Russia high and growing high and comen- high and increas- historical expansion internally same model as US (vs. - surate with ing use of internal eastern frontier inhabitants); pre-WW I expansion population needs resources eastward with no severe resistance; inter-war years

confronted by high capability neighbours; reliance on relatively lower violence content; post WW 11: in- creased capabilities allow higher use of violence; also trade and other modes; not as expansionist and successful as US; not as great dependence on external resources; evidence of resistance by others.

Israel low but high rate relative to territory

high and grow- ing at very high rate

low and moder- ate rate low density

low but increas- high and growing; ing dependent on use of manpower ex- external tremely effective;

needs for external resources grow

extremely low; low and lagging; dependent on inadequate far pap- external re- ulation demands and sources needs; resources

and skills not available

high and low and lagging; growing adequate for popula-

tion demands, inade- quate for use of available resource; dependent on external technology

violence content (available capability offsets rela- tive shortage of manpower); reliance on expansion of territory; conversion of territory to resource devel- opment via use of technology. Fear of high popula- tion neighbour but tempered by neighbour's extremely low capabilities and resources.

historically highly penetrated by powers; last native rulers were Pharonic dynasties until Nasser; "host" state for imperialist activities of Western and of Arabs; post war 11: resistance to penetration and "host" role; increasing capabilities allow for raising costs for colonialist; low capabilities necessitate dependence on external assistance (Soviets); fear of being "hosd'again; fear of expansion of high capabil- ity and growing population neighbour (Israel)

historically highly penetrated; traditional role of "host" country; resistance to penetration and in- creasing costs for penetrator; high resources might allow far rapid acquisition of technology (given low population); external behavior unclear. Note differ- ences in profile with Egypt but similarities ta "host" role.

w w

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111. System Dynamics: - A Simulat ion Approach - t o Complex Systems

The method of a n a l y s i s employed i n our i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s known

a s System Dynamics, a r ecen t a d d i t i o n t o the t o o l s of t h e s o c i a l

sc iences . System Dynamics i s a theory of system s t r u c t u r e and a s e t

of t o o l s f o r i d e n t i f y i n g , r ep resen t ing , and analyzing multi-loop,

non-linear feedback r e l a t i o n s h i p s . A feedback system i s influenced

pr imar i ly by i t s own i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e involving elements r e l a t e d

through negat ive and p o s i t i v e feedback. Where a causa l loop e x h i b i t s

negat ive feedback, t h e system con t inua l ly a d j u s t s i t s e l f t o a t t a i n

i t s designated goals . Where p o s i t i v e feedback i s p resen t , s e l f -

genera t ing growth processes t ake p l a c e whereby a c t i o n leads t o g r e a t e r

a c t i o n and f u r t h e r growth. The behaviora l tendencies of t h e system

depend on t h e balance of p o s i t i v e and negat ive loops. Although one

can i d e n t i f y t h e cons t i tuen t elements of a complex system, t h e number

of r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e i r non- l inea r i ty , and t h e de lays inherent i n

t h e system, a l l defy i n t u i t i v e a n a l y s i s of t o t a l system behavior.

For t h i s reason, i t i s important t o analyze t h e func t iona l r e l a t i o n -

sh ips among c o n s t i t u e n t v a r i a b l e s i n a model f o r t h e purpose of

i d e n t i f y i n g the t o t a l behavior of t h e opera t ing feedback loops. 1 7

1 7 Jay W. F o r r e s t e r , P r i n c i p l e s of Systems (Cambridge, Mass.:

Wright-Allen P ress , 1968).

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Basic Assumptions

A s an approach t o t h e a n a l y s i s of s o c i a l change, System

Dynamics is based upon t h e f a c t u a l premise t h a t t h e human mind is

not equipped wi th t h e capaci ty of t r a c i n g higher-order e f f e c t s o r

impl ica t ions of changes i n a s o c i a l system. A c t i o n s i n t e n d e d t o

produce one kind of e f f e c t a t one poin t i n t h e system o f t e n r e s u l t

i n an adverse o r unant ic ipa ted outcome a t another po in t . For t h i s

reason, it becomes imperat ive t o develop formal models of s o c i a l

systems r a t h e r than t o r e l y on pure ly ve rba l o r a n a l y t i c a l

s t r u c t u r e s . 18

It is important t o emphasize t h a t System Dynamics is predica ted

on t h e a n a l y s i s of f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n a feedback system and

n o t , a s is common i n t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , on t h e a n a l y s i s of

s t o c h a s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The d i f f e r e n c e i n emphasis i s one of

i n t e r lock ing feedback with non-l inear r e l a t i o n s i n a system of d i f f e r -

e n t i a l equat ions versus (1) b e s t f i t c r i t e r i a , (2) simultaneous

s o l u t i o n of a l g e b r a i c equat ions , o r ( 3 ) opt imiza t ion of key parameters.

But t h e r e a r e no methodological reasons why s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s cannot

be undertaken wi th in a System Dynamics context . And, a s i d e from t h e

cons idera t ion t h a t t h e s t a t i s t i c a l paradigm (exemplified by c l a s s i c a l

s t a t i s t i c s a s w e l l a s by t h e Baysian approach) is based on f a i r l y

1 8 ~ a y W. F o r r e s t e r , "Counter in tu i t ive Behavior of S o c i a l Systems," Technology Review, L X X I I I (1971) , 1-16.

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rigid assumptions concerning the nature of the variables arid the

relationships examined--assumptions that are frequently violated in

the course of empirical investigations--both approaches can fruit-

fully be applied to the same problem and complementary results

obtained. This is an important point because of the possibilities

of bringing empirical data on national characteristics and capabil-

ities and external behavior to bear upon a System Dynamics approach

to international conflict.

As a simulation approach, this method is straightforward in its

application. The basic structure is a feedback loop: "A closed path

connecting in sequence a decision that controls action, and the level

of the system, and information about the level of the system, the

latter returning to the decision-making point."19 Social systems

belong to a class of multi-loop, non-linear feedback systems.

Because of the complexities involved in tracing the implications and

consequences of actions in one point in the system for other parts of

the system, it is necessary to draw upon computer simulation in

tracing the higher order and long term effects of decisions.

Forecasting future values of variables in a given system is

undertaken by modeling the interrelationships of levels and the

decision-rules which respond to them and cause them to change. No

assumptions or restrictions are necessary other than a clear

orre rester, 1968, pp. 1-7.

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concep tua l i za t ion of cause-ef fec t r e l a t i o n s involved i n t h e problem

a t hand and s u f f i c i e n t information t o a s s i g n an i n i t i a l -- value t o

each l e v e l . The modeling procedure i s b a s i c a l l y se l f -conta ined and

t h e model s t r u c t u r e can accommodate any l e v e l of in format ion about

t he system. I f t h e d a t a a r e complete and p r e c i s e and i f f u t u r e

changes i n t he s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n the exogenous in f luences

can b e f u l l y desc r ibed , very a c c u r a t e po in t p r e d i c t i o n s a r e poss ib l e .

Where f u t u r e changes a r e no t f u l l y understood and d a t a a r e poor i n

q u a l i t y , only genera l s t a t emen t s about t h e behav io ra l t endencies of

t h e system can b e made.20 The behavior of our i n t e r n a t i o n a l system

of course f a l l s i n t o t h e l a t t e r ca tegory . Although p o i n t p red ic t ions

a r e no t p o s s i b l e , System Dynamics ana lyses can provide a b e t t e r under-

s tanding of i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior t han pure ly p r o b a b i l i s t i c models,

o r models based on l i n e a r and a d d i t i v e assumptions. Th i s approach

t o s o c i a l systems is extremely u s e f u l f o r ana lyses undertaken a t h igh

l e v e l s of a b s t r a c t i o n , and i n ca ses where the cont inuous i n t e r a c t i o n

of system elements over time a r e t h e predominant focus of concern.

I n our own i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , descr ibed below, we draw upon known

o r a c t u a l va lues f o r i n i t i a l l e v e l s i n key v a r i a b l e s , such a s

popula t ion , i n d u s t r i a l ou tpu t , resource a l l o c a t i o n s and requi rements ,

''3ay W. F o r r e s t e r , World Dynamics (Cambridge, Mass. : Wright- Al len P r e s s , 1971). See a l s o Donel la H. Meadows -- e t a l . , The Limi ts t o Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972). -

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lateral pressure, commercial activities, military expansion, and

so forth. Employing the System Dynamics approach and related method-

ology, we seek to remain as close to the actual empirical domain as

possible when simulating international dynamics over a long period

of time.

An attribute of many past System Dynamics studies is that

statistical validation procedures have seldom been employed. Common

sense, past experience, or basic intuition have most often been the

primary checks against misspecification or error. 2 1

However, with

judicious use of empirical data and appropriate modification of con-

ventional statistical rules of validation, it might be possible to

develop the necessary criteria for validation and verification. For

example, a model of international behavior initialized at 1870 values

for the United States and run over a hundred-year period will yield

trends over time that can be compared with actual data for that

period, and the degree of correspondence can therefore be considered

as a validation check and, by extension, a test of the model.

Alternatively, one might begin with more recent data and employ

coefficients estimated by multi-variate statistical analysis as a

guideline for the decision rules relating levels and rates of change.

The possibilities are considerable.

2 1 ~ major exception to this generalization is a recent large- scale simulation of regional development. See Battelle Memorial Insti- tute, Systems Simulation for Regional Analysis: & Application 5 River-Basin Planninx (Cambridge, !lass.: The ?I.I.T. Press, 196'3). --

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Such procedures a r e p red ica ted , of course, on t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y

of long i tud ina l da ta f o r t h e key v a r i a b l e s of prime interest--popula-

t i o n , resources, i n d u s t r i a l ou tpu t , technologica l c a p a b i l i t y , and s o

fo r th . Extensive time s e r i e s d a t a f o r over twelve count r ies

( including i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and non- indus t r ia l ized s t a t e s ) f o r b a s i c

economic, demographic, and p o l i t i c a l d a t a a r e p resen t ly on f i l e

and can the re fo re provide important v a l i d a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a . Thus,

t h e optimal o r i e n t a t i o n i n t h e a n a l y s i s of complex s o c i a l systems i s

t h a t which combines t h e b a s i c a n a l y t i c a l and methodological approach

of System Dynamics wi th s t a t i s t i c a l and empir ica l d a t a f o r inves t iga -

t i o n s undertaken over time and ac ross count r ies .

Modeled Rela t ionships : I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conf l i c t

Before present ing t h e s imula t ion model of i n t e r n a t i o n a l con-

f l i c t a capsule s tatement of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s modelled i s use fu l

here. A more d e t a i l e d d iscuss ion of t h e underlying theory is put

f o r t h elsewhere.22 E s s e n t i a l l y we have argued t h a t major wars o f t e n

emerge by way of a two-step process: i n terms of in terna l ly-genera ted

pressures toward expansion of i n t e r e s t s and i n terms of r e c i p r o c a l

comparison, r i v a l r y , and c o n f l i c t f o r con t ro l over resources o r

valued goods, t e r r i t o r y , o r spheres of inf luence . Each process tends

2 2 ~ e e Choucri and North, "Dynamics of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conf l i c t , " i n W s P o l i t i c s [ i n press] .

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t o be c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e o t h e r , and each, t o a s u r p r i s i n g

degree, can be accounted f o r i n terms of more aggregate cons idera t ions

o r v a r i a b l e s t h a t a r e r e l a t i v e l y non-manipulable i n t h e s h o r t run.

The most b a s i c v a r i a b l e s i n con t r ibu t ing t o c o n f l i c t and war-

f a r e a r e populat ion, technology, and resources , where technology

r e f e r s t o t h e genera l l e v e l and r a t e of development of human knowledge

and s k i l l s i n a s o c i e t y and t h e r e l a t e d i n d u s t r i a l output . A combina-

t i o n of growing populat ion and developing technology places r ap id ly

inc reas ing demands upon resources . To meet these demands, a s o c i e t y

tends t o develop spec ia l i zed c a p a b i l i t i e s and undertakes domestic and

i n t e r n a l investments. The g r e a t e r t h e u n s a t i s f i e d demands of a

s o c i e t y and t h e g r e a t e r t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s , the h igher is t h e l ike l ihood

t h a t n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s w i l l b e extended ou t s ide of t e r r i t o r i a l

boundaries. Such e f f o r t s undertaken beyond the home t e r r i t o r y may

be expressed i n any one o r a combination of d i f f e r e n t modes--explora-

t i o n , commerce, investment , e x t r a c t i o n of minera ls , mi l i t a r i sm,

warfare , and s o f o r t h . The mode (or combinations) of such ex te rna l

behavior w i l l condi t ion both even tua l outcomes and t h e na tu re of

r e l a t i o n s among nat ions .

C o n f l i c t and war-prone systems tend t o develop when two o r more

coun t r i e s wi th high c a p a b i l i t i e s ( r e l a t i v e l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d ) and

u n s a t i s f i e d demands extend t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and psycho-pol i t ica l

borders outward and develop the f e e l i n g t h a t such i n t e r e s t s ought t o

be pro tec ted . There is then a s t rong p robab i l i ty t h a t sooner o r l a t e r

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t h e two spheres of i n t e r e s t w i l l i n t e r s e c t . The more i n t e n s e the

i n t e r s e c t i o n s , the g r e a t e r i s t h e l i ke l ihood t h a t competi t ion w i l l

assume m i l i t a r y dimensions; when t h i s happens, w e may expect t h e

competition t o become transformed i n t o c o n f l i c t and perhaps an arms

race o r cold war.

A t a more genera l l e v e l of a b s t r a c t i o n , provocation w i l l be

t h e f i n a l a c t t h a t can be considered a s the s t imulus f o r a large-

s c a l e c o n f l i c t o r v io lence . But an a c t w i l l be considered a provo-

ca t ion only i n a s i t u a t i o n which has a l r eady been cha rac te r i zed by

high l a t e r a l p re s su re , i n t e r s e c t i o n s among spheres of i n f luence ,

armament tens ions and competi t ions, and inc reas ing levels of pre-

v a i l i n g v io lence .

The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s repor ted h e r e have centered p r imar i ly around

the dynamics r e l a t e d t o e a r l i e r s t a g e s i n t h e development of c o n f l i c t

s i t u a t i o n s , namely (1) i n t e r n a l l y generated processes a s soc ia t ed

wi th t h e expansion of resource a c q u i s i t i o n and o ther a c t i v i t i e s out-

s i d e t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries , and (2) d i f f e r e n t modes of n a t i o n a l

expansion and a s soc ia t ed c o s t s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

I V . A=-Linear Feedback -- Model of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conf l i c t

I n developing a s imula t ion model of t hese dynamics, we have

decomposed t h e problem i n terms of s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t bu t i n t e r r e l a t e d

s e c t o r s : (1) popula t ion , (2) product ive c a p i t a l and technology,

(3) l a t e r a l pressure , (4) m i l i t a r y expansion, and (5) resource

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usage and a l l o c a t i o n ( inc luding domestic and e x t e r n a l resource

usages) . The s t r u c t u r e of each s e c t o r i s descr ibed below, accompan-

i e d by a causa l loop diagram. The model and t h e computer program

a r e presented i n appendices a t t h e end of t h i s paper. The e n t i r e

system i s programmed i n DYNAMO, a language designed s p e c i f i c a l l y

f o r expressing t h e s o c i a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l , and phys ica l r e l a t i o n -

s h i p s which determine t h e behavior of complex s o c i a l systems. It

need be emphasized t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e presented h e r e i s h ighly

t e n t a t i v e . Revisions a r e p resen t ly being made.

Populat ion S ,

These i n v e s t i g a t i o n s a r e based on t h e assumption t h a t i n any

given environment--whether an i s l a n d , a con t inen t , o r t h e world as

a whole--for a given s tandard of l i v i n g t h e l a r g e r t h e number of

people, t h e g r e a t e r w i l l be t h e need and demand f o r b a s i c energy and

mineral resources . It is t h i s assumption which t i e s populat ion growth

d i r e c t l y t o t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r l a t e r a l pressure . However, a s w i l l

b e apparent f u r t h e r along, o t h e r f a c t o r s , inc luding r e l a t i v e techno-

l o g i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s must a l s o be p resen t f o r t h i s p o t e n t i a l t o be

r ea l i zed .

Populat ion growth i s determined by the d i f f e r e n t i a l between

b i r t h and dea th r a t e s . The h igher t h e popula t ion , the g rea t e r w i l l

be the s i z e of t h e l abor fo rce . A t t h e same t ime, i f output i s he ld

cons tan t , i n c r e a s e s i n popula t ion l ead t o decreases i n output per

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capi ta . However, t h e h igher t h e t o t a l ou tpu t , the g r e a t e r w i l l be

the r e s u l t i n g po r t ion a l l o c a t e d t o investment, and by extens ion ,

t h e g r e a t e r the f u t u r e output a s wel l . Inc reas ing output per c a p i t a

i nva r i ab ly l eads t o g r e a t e r per c a p i t a resource usages and, i n t u r n ,

t o g r e a t e r demands f o r resources. I n these terms, t h e r e f o r e , t h e

d i f f e r e n t i a l between t o t a l n a t i o n a l output and output f o r investment

i s a l l o c a t e d t o consumer needs. These complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e

summarized i n F igure 2 .

For experimental purposes, t h e i n i t i a l va lue of t h e populat ion

l e v e l (and a l l o t h e r l e v e l v a r i a b l e s ) can be s e t t o any des i r ed value.

I n t h e runs undertaken s o f a r , we have employed 1970 United S t a t e s

values. The b i r t h and dea th r a t e s a r e a l s o empi r i ca l ly determined,

a s a r e t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . However, t h e b i r t h r a t e has been

found t o be s t r o n g l y c o r r e l a t e d wi th output per c a p i t a . There i s a

t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r assuming c a u s a l i t y and t h e dependence i s

t h e r e f o r e depic ted a s a f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i ~ n s h i p . ~ ~ The t a b l e a c t u a l l y

r e l a t i n g popula t ion growth and GNP per person i s shown i n F igure 3.

Populat ion l e v e l determines t h e s i z e of t h e l abor f o r c e , which

has been def ined a s a cons tant propor t ion of t h e t o t a l populat ion.

This procedure was employed f o r t h e sake of s i m p l i c i t y alone and

2 3 ~ o n e l l a H. Meadows, "The Dynamics of Populat ion Growth i n a T r a d i t i o n a l A g r i c u l t u r a l Society," unpublished working paper , System Dynamics Group, l;.I.T., Al f red P. Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. See t h e t a b l e s i n Meadows &., The Limits t o Growth, 1972. -

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Figure 2

industrial CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF THE POPULATION SECTOR* capital

I output per "=pita ' k +

military investment per capita

+

total invesmenr

+ per capita

I /Lp"L \ + \ x consumer

labor - \ + output merit

+

/ - A \ output inves'

\

p0pu1ation , ' \ + oer canita

leSOYrCe

usage

*A causa l loop diagram is a very aggregated r ep re sen ta t ion of t he d i r e c t i o n and s i g n of t h e in f luences which e x i s t i n a system. The arrows i n d i c a t e t h e d i r e c t i o n of in f luence . For example, Output Per Capi ta is hypothesized he re t o d i r e c t l y i n f luence t h e number of B i r th s . B i r t h s a l s o in f luence Out- put Pe r Capi ta , bu t t h i s is i n d i r e c t wi th Populat ion a s an in te rvening v a r i a b l e . The s igns i n d i c a t e t he d i r e c t i o n of response of t he inf luenced v a r i a b l e t o a change i n t h e in f luenc ing v a r i a b l e . A nega t ive s i g n denotes changes i n t h e oppos i te d i r e c t i o n ; a p o s i t i v e s i g n i n d i c a t e s change i n the same d i r e c t i o n . The s i g n s a r e based on t h e assumption t h a t a l l e l s e remains cons tan t . For example, a s Populat ion inc reases , Output Per Capi ta w i l l , c a t e r i b u s par ibus , decrease. Delays i n t h e impact of one v a r i a b l e on another a r e extremely important i n determining the behavior of t he system. They a r e no t i n d i c a t e d i n c a u s a l loop diagrams but a r e included e x p l i c i t l y i n t he DYNAMO flow diagram and t h e equat ion s e t which desc r ibe t h e r e l a t i o n - sh ips among system elements.

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Figure 3 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND CRUDE BIRTH RATE

Venezuela qx

X

CRUDE B IRTH RATE

Libya +

o ASIA + AFRICA x LATIN AMERICA q EUROPE, USSR, NORTH AMERICA $ WORLD AVERAGE

0 X

q

on USSR 0 q

USA 9 4 0 0 0 )

O m q q

q q O o 0 0 0

1 I I I I I I I I ) $ 1 0 0 0 $ 2 0 0 0 $3000 $4000

GNP PER CAPITA

USAID, Population Program Assistance, Agency for International Development, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Office of Population, 1970 as cited in Donella H. Meadows

gJ d., The Limits Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972), p. 112.

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could b e e l abo ra t ed t o i nc lude t h e in f luence of d i f f e r e n t populat ion

growth r a t e s i n a model examining l a b o r i n d e t a i l .

The demand a spec t of t h e Popula t ion Sec to r has been operat ion-

a l i z e d i n terms of t he gap o r d i f f e r e n c e between t o t a l n a t i o n a l

ou tput and investment output . Thus, t h e g r e a t e r t h e i n t e r n a l inves t -

ments, t h e lower t h e output a l l o c a t e d t o consumer needs a r e l i k e l y

t o be. A s modelled, i n c r e a s i n g output p e r c a p i t a r e s u l t s L n g r e a t e r

investments per c a p i t a g r e a t e r r e sou rce u t i l i z a t i o n s per c a p i t a .

I n sum, t h r e e equat ions--defining consumer ou tpu t , per c a p i t a

resource usages, and investments p e r capi ta - - represent t he combined

requirements imposed by a growing popula t ion .

Product ive C a p i t a l & Technology

This s e c t o r of t h e model seeks t o capture t h e b a s i c long-term

causes and consequences of t echno log ica l development and i n d u s t r i a l

growth. The t h r e e determinant v a r i a b l e s a r e l a b o r f o r c e , i n d u s t r i a l

c a p i t a l , and t h e a c c e s s i b i l i t y of minera l and energy resources .

The conversion of r e s e r v e s t o ou tpu t i s inf luenced by a resource

a v a i l a b i l i t y m u l t i p l i e r , which desc r ibes t he e f f i c i e n c y of c a p i t a l

use a s a f f e c t e d by resource s c a r c i t y . The l a r g e r t h e l abo r f o r c e ,

t h e g r e a t e r t h e i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l , and the h ighe r t he resource

a v a i l a b i l i t y m u l t i p l i e r , t h e g r e a t e r w i l l be t h e t o t a l output of t he

s o c i e t y and, by ex tens ion , t h e ou tpu t per c a p i t a . These r e l a t i o n s h i p s

a r e summarized i n Figure 4.

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e l r d e ~ lad luarn~sa~ur as103

loqe1

lay~dya~nrn d a ? ~ ? q a ~ y e ~ e

aslnosax

+ ~ e a r d e ~ 1erllsnpuy

aAlasal aalnosal aTqesn

Jylsamop

uoy~ey~axdap 1eaydea

Jyasamop

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Inc reas ing t o t a l n a t i o n a l output has two d i s t i n c t feedback

e f f e c t s : F i r s t , t h e r e is inva r i ab ly g r e a t e r domestic investments ,

and thus g r e a t e r f u t u r e output ; and second, g r e a t e r resource use

which, i f resources a r e f i n i t e , w i l l dep le t e r e sources , r a i s e t h e i r

c o s t s , and i n t h e long run reduce output because of higher cos ts .

With r e spec t t o investments: The h igher t h e populat ion and t h e

h igher t h e t o t a l per c a p i t a investment , t h e h igher w i l l be the domestic

c a p i t a l investment r a t e and, by extens ion , t h e h igher w i l l a l s o be

t h e t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l and t o t a l n a t i o n a l output . However,

whatever is inves ted i n t h e m i l i t a r y d e t r a c t s from t h e domestic cap-

i t a l investment r a t e , t hus providing c o n s t r a i n t s on continued growth

i n output . Two important r e l a t i o n s h i p s complicate t h e system f u r t h e r .

One i s the domestic c a p i t a l d e p r e c i a t i o n r a t e opera t ing on i n d u s t r i a l

c a p i t a l . The o ther is t h e resource a v a i l a b i l i t y m u l t i p l i e r dependent

l a r g e l y on t h e domestic usable resource r e se rves and e f f e c t i n g

d i r e c t l y l e v e l s of n a t i o n a l output .

With r e s p e c t t o consumption: h igher investment r a t e leads t o

lower c u r r e n t consumer output . I n o ther words, t h e propor t ion of

n a t i o n a l output a l l o c a t e d t o consumer demands has been modelled a s

a res idual - - tha t f r a c t i o n of n a t i o n a l output over and above t h e

po r t ion a l l o c a t e d t o investment .

I n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l has been def ined i n terms of c a p i t a l u n i t s

and c o n t r o l l e d by the average c a p i t a l l i f e t i m e , which, f o r exper i -

mental purposes, has been s e t a t 30 years . The domestic c a p i t a l

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investment r a t e has been generated by t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l between the t o t a l

pe r c a p i t a domestic investment and m i l i t a r y investments pe r c a p i t a mult i -

p l i e d by t h e populat ion l eve l . We have used an approximation of the Cobb-

Douglas funct ion t o r e l a t e l abor force and c a p i t a l t o output . The r e s u l t

is modified by a f a c t o r which expresses the impact of resource s c a r c i t y .

For t h e purposes of t h i s explora tory e f f o r t , we adopt t h e c l a s s i c a l

economic view of resource deple t ion . We assume t h a t a s resources a r e

used, t h e i r average q u a l i t y w i l l dec l ine . This w i l l fo rce an inc reas ing

f r a c t i o n of t h e product ive c a p i t a l t o be a l l o c a t e d t o resource loca t ion ,

e x t r a c t i o n , processing, and d i s t r i b u t i o n . Thus, a given amount of c a p i t a l

w i l l produce l e s s and l e s s i n d u s t r i a l output a s resource q u a l i t y dec l ines .

The average grade of resources a v a i l a b l e wi th in t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d coun-

t r i e s is c e r t a i n l y dec l in ing . However, t h e impact of t h i s on average

c a p i t a l output l e v e l s is ambiguous a t bes t . I f the r e l a t i o n s h i p is p resen t ,

it is masked f o r t h e moment by technologica l advance.

With f u r t h e r s tudy, w e hope t o ob ta in empir ica l va lues f o r t h e re-

source a v a i l a b i l i t y m u l t i p l i e r and f o r t h e delay f a c t o r . We a r e a l s o

drawing upon e x i s t i n g t e c h n i c a l analyses of t h e economy of t h e United

S t a t e s and o t h e r i n d u s t r i a l i z e d count r ies . 2 4

2 4 ~ e e e s p e c i a l l y Les t e r B. Lave, Technolopical Change: Its Concep- t i o n and Measurement (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J. : Prent ice-Hall , 1966); and -- Murray Brown. On t h e Theory and Measurement of Technological Change (Cam- bridge: Cambridge IJniversity P res s , 1966).

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L a t e r a l Pressure

Th i s s e c t o r of t h e model seeks t o formal ize t h e p r e d i s p o s i t i o n

t o extend n a t i o n a l i n f luence ou t s ide t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries. I n

t h i s context , it i s important t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between t h e tendency

o r psychological o r i e n t a t i o n and t h e a c t u a l mani fes ta t ion of t h a t

tendency i n some ove r t behavior . Viewed i n those terms, l a t e r a l

pressure i s a summary psychological measure, which i s determined by,

and a f f e c t s , a c t u a l mani fes ta t ions of n a t i o n a l p r i o r i t i e s .

The two most immediate f a c i l i t a t o r s of l a t e r a l pressure a r e

investments a v a i l a b l e f o r expansion, on the one hand, and domestic

usable resource r e se rves , on the o the r . The h igher t h e investments ,

t h e g r e a t e r w i l l be t h e l a t e r a l p re s su re experienced. The l i n k i s

the re fo re p o s i t i v e and d i r e c t . The lower t h e usable resource

r e se rves a r e perceived t o be , t h e g r e a t e r w i l l be a s o c i e t y ' s pre-

d i s p o s i t i o n t o extend i t s behavior outward. The r e l a t i o n s h i p is

t h e r e f o r e negat ive . This d u a l i t y is represented i n Figure 5 by t h e

two arrows l ead ing t o l a t e r a l pressure .

The r e l a t i o n s h i p s of resource needs t o e x t e r n a l expansion a r e

t h e r e f o r e extremely complex: The a v a i l a b i l i t y of resources is

c r u c i a l t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l process. Thus a s increas ing i n d u s t r i a l -

i z a t i o n p laces commensurate p re s su res on the resource base , dep le t ing

domestic r e se rves t h e r e a r i s e s t h e tendency t o seek e x t e r n a l re-

sources and t o c o n t r o l access t o c r i t i c a l minerals .

Reserves, expressed i n time u n i t s , i s a measure of how long

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Figure 5

CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF LATERAL PRESSURE SECTOR

domestic military force

lateral I pressure

mobilized fraction of domestic

investments available for

I

expansion

domestic usable resource reserve

+

expected resource

forecasted resource demands

internal usable resources

imports

average resource import rate

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t h e r e sou rces c u r r e n t l y c o n t r o l l e d can be expected t o s a t i s f y

product ion requirements . The domest ic u sab le r e sou rce r e se rve i s

condit ioned by t h r e e f a c t o r s : one d e p i c t i n g a s o c i e t y ' s forecas ted or

planned f u t u r e resource demands, t h e second d e p i c t i n g the s i z e of

t h e i n t e r n a l u sab le resource base , and t h e t h i r d i n d i c a t i n g expected

resource imports . Th i s l a s t v a r i a b l e provides an important l i n k be-

tween i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l resources . The l a r g e r t he e x i s t i n g

domestic resource base , t h e g r e a t e r w i l l be t h e domestic reserves .

A s a r e s u l t , t he p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s f o r e x t e r n a l expansion w i l l be lower

than would be the case i f t h e i n t e r n a l u sab le resources were low

and, by ex tens ion , t h e domestic r e sou rce r e se rves low a s we l l .

For o p e r a t i o n a l purposes, we have def ined l a t e r a l p ressure a s

a dimensionless v a r i a b l e be ing t h e product of an i n i t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t ,

a r b i t r a r i l y normalized t o (I), investment f o r expansion m u l t i p l i e r on

l a t e r a l p re s su re , and usab le r e sou rce r e se rve m u l t i p l i e r on l a t e r a l

p ressure . These r e l a t i o n s h i p s cannot b e r e a d i l y t e s t e d aga ins t

empi r i ca l d a t a ; however, i t i s p o s s i b l e , w i th f u r t h e r experimentat ion,

t o d e r i v e some measure of v a l i d a t i o n from empi r i ca l d a t a by not ing

the congruence between t h e curve generated by the model s imula t ions

and empi r i ca l measures of r e l a t e d v a r i a b l e s . Because of t he psycho-

l o g i c a l n a t u r e of t h e l a t e r a l p re s su re concept , t h e correspondence

between empir ica l d a t a and t h e under ly ing concept w i l l be d i f f i c u l t

t o e s t a b l i s h . Nonetheless , i t should be p o s s i b l e t o ob ta in some

measure of v a l i d i t y , i f t he concept is appropr i a t e t o t h i s system.

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In the simulation model the actual manifestation of lateral

pressure is defined as a continuum from military expansion to com-

mercial activities, depicting the extreme ways in which lateral

pressure is overtly expressed. There are, of course, other modes

with numerous implications for international relations, but the more

basic distinction is in terms of the militarylnon-military dimensions.

Military Expansion

The extension of national behavior outside of territorial

boundaries often assumes military proportions when objectives cannot

be attained by non-military means, or when military options involve

lower human and monetary costs. History provides many examples of

nations adopting a military posture following the failure of other

modes of expansion. On the other hand, where the costs of maintain-

ing a military posture became too high, nations have either shifted

to non-violent means of attaining their goals or have remained

frustrated. The history of Sweden over the past several centuries

is illustrative of shifts between militaristic and non-militaristic

postures. A major objective of our investigations in the long run

is to identify the conditions associated with resource needs which

predispose a state toward a coercive or non-coercive orientation

in the international system and those which necessitate a shift from

one to the other. At this point we seek only to map the linkages

between military variables and other sectors of the model.

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We have formulated the military expansion sector in such a way

as to take into account the costs incurred in the process of expan-

sion as well as the two alternative modes of expansion: trade and

conflict. One option is to increase investments in the military; the

other is to abandon this mode of expansion and to adopt an alternative

to militarism. Two processes are involved. One is prowth in mili-

tary and/or in trade and the other is a shift from one mode of expan-

sion to another. For the time being we emphasize the first,

touching indirectly upon the second. Later on we plan to specify

further the other possibilities and alternative modes and shift

problems and develop the appropriate sectors.

As presently constituted, the rate of investment in the military

establishment is determined by a society's output per capita and the

level of its population. The higher the output per capita and the

larger the population, the more likely it is that military investment

rates will also be high. The greater the investments and allocations

to the military, the larger a society's military force is likely to

be, and the higher will be the mobilized fraction of the total

defense force. In this fashion, a self-generating process involving

what is called the military-industrial complex--controlled by a

series of positive feedback loops--serves to predispose a state

toward an expansionist external posture.

The second major impetus toward greater mobilization of

military resources is provided by the balance between resource

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a v a i l a b i l i t y and resource use. The g r e a t e r t h e resource p res su re ,

t h e higher i s the l i ke l ihood of increased investment i n m i l i t a r y

c a p a b i l i t y . Thus, p red i spos i t i ons toward m i l i t a r y expansion

modify e x i s t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s t o t r a n s l a t e tendencies i n t o ove r t

behavior (see F igure 6 ) .

I n these terms, a soc ie ty w i l l pe rpe tua te i ts r e l i a n c e on

m i l i t a r y modes of expansion a s long a s domestic output per c a p i t a i s

sus ta ined and e x t e r n a l c o s t s do not become excess ive . However,

na t ions do not opera te i n a vacuum. The c o s t s of maintaining and

i n t e n s i f y i n g a m i l i t a r i s t i c pos ture a r e o f t e n increased a s a r e s u l t

of r e s i s t a n c e by o t h e r s t a t e s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.

Thus, t h e higher t h e e x t e r n a l r e s i s t a n c e t o a s t a t e ' s m i l i t a r y

expansion, and t h e l a r g e r t h e t o t a l fo re ign m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s t h a t

confronts i t , t h e h igher w i l l be t h e c o s t s incurred and t h e g r e a t e r

a r e the p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t a s t a t e may choose t o decrease i ts emphasis

upon a m i l i t a r y pos ture . When t h i s occurs we may expect a s t a t e t o

opt out of a m i l i t a r i s t i c mode and adopt l e s s c o s t l y means of

expansion and of acqu i r ing needed resources . I n t h i s manner a s h i f t

from one mode t o another t akes p lace .

Most of t h e v a r i a b l e s i n t h i s s e c t o r a r e def ined on the b a s i s

of empir ica l observa t ion . Data a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r most technologica l ly

developed s t a t e s (and many less-developed s o c i e t i e s a s wel l ) and i t

becomes a r e l a t i v e l y s t r a igh t fo rward procedure t o employ empir ica l

l e v e l s and r a t e s of change f o r each case modeled. More complex,

however, a r e t h e procedures f o r de r iv ing empi r i ca l ly t h e m u l t i p l i e r

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relationship of lateral pressure on military mobilization and the

multiplier converting domestic military force to its mobilized

counterpart. In each case, we have employed functions based on

judgmental rather than empirical relationships. This method is

employed for experimental purposes only. In subsequent analysis, it

will be necessary to ground these relationships in empirical data.

This first conceptualization of potentials for violence is an

economic one. The tendency to expand resource acquisition activities

outside a nation's legal boundaries increases with the capital cost

of domestic resources. The mode of expansion, lying on the continuum

between equitable trade and outright conquest depends on the relative

costs inherent in each mode. Costs, in turqdepend upon a nation's

capabilities relative to the capabilities of the state or states

that control external resources. lie have not yet developed the mili-

tary sector of the model sufficiently to formulate various alterna-

tives adequately. Nonetheless, despite the simplified structure of

this sector, it is possible to account tentatively for the shift

from military to non-military modes of expansion as illustrated in

the resource utilization and allocation sector.

Resource Allocations and Utilizations

The resource needs of a society have been modeled as two

separate sectors. One focuses on the domestic reserves, and the

other on resource acquisitions from the international system. This

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s e c t i o n is concerned wi th domestic needs and demands. Later on we

s h a l l l i n k these t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l cons idera t ions .

The key v a r i a b l e s i n the domestic resource s e c t o r of the model

a re : i n t e r n a l usable resources , demanded resource usage, forecas ted

o r des i red resource demands, des i r ed i n t e r n a l coverage, i n t e r n a l

resource usage r a t e , and the f r a c t i o n of usable resources obtained

from t h e e x t e r n a l environment.

Tota l resources a v a i l a b l e f o r use a r e defined a s emanating

from t h r e e sources: domestic r e se rves , e x t e r n a l resources from

developed coun t r i e s , and the e x t e r n a l resources of l e s s developed

(or developing) coun t r i e s . The g r e a t e r the supply of resources from

these t h r e e sources , t h e h igher a s o c i e t y ' s t o t a l usable resource

r e se rve w i l l be. However, r a t e s of resource u t i l i z a t i o n impose

s t r a i n s on i n t e r n a l r e se rves and serve t o inc rease demands f o r

a d d i t i o n a l resources .

For ope ra t iona l and experimental purposes, we have defined

resources gene ra l ly i n terms of resource u n i t s per year. Since i t

is d i f f i c u l t t o aggregate over d i f f e r e n t resources , we proceeded

i n i t i a l l y by t r e a t i n g these a s devoid of b a s i c metr ic or subs tant ive

u n i t s . This i s only a rough approximation. I n subsequent s t u d i e s

we employ subs tan t ive measures f o r ind iv idua l resources .

The causa l loop diagram of t h i s s e c t o r of the model i s

presented i n Figure 7 . Coverage, expressed i n yea r s , i s a measure

of how long a s p e c i f i c s tock w i l l supply a given r a t e of demand.

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The concepts of time, resource quan t i ty , and space a r e thus i n t e r -

r e l a t e d i n such a way as t o cap tu re t h e dual e f f e c t s of l i m i t a t i o n s

on i n t e r n a l resource and a c c e s s i b i l i t i e s of resources from e x t e r n a l

sources .

Resource usage i n a s o c i e t y i s modeled a s a funct ion of per

c a p i t a resource usage, l i n k i n g t h e resource s e c t o r of the model t o

t h e populat ion and l a t e r a l p res su re s e c t o r s . The forecas ted demands

f o r resource usage ( s e t a s an exogenously defined resource margin)

is based on present resource usage.

The domestic usable resource r e se rves of a s o c i e t y a r e speci -

f i e d a s a func t ion of (1) i n t e r n a l usable resources , (2) resource

a c c e s s i b i l i t y averaging t i n e and (3 ) forecas ted resource demands. The

i n t e r n a l resource usage is based on t h e usage r a t e , defined i n tu rn ,

a s the product of domestic resource usage, t h e f r a c t i o n of resources

supplied from i n t e r n a l sources , and a usage m u l t i p l i e r from i n t e r n a l

coverage. We modeled r e l a t i v e i n t e r n a l resource coverage a s a

func t ion of i n t e r n a l usable r e sources , t h e average resource usage

r a t e , and t h e des i r ed i n t e r n a l coverage. F i n a l l y , the l i n k from

coverage v a r i a b l e s t o t h e i n t e r n a l resource usage r a t e i s provided

by t h e usage m u l t i p l i e r from i n t e r n a l coverage.

The l inkage between i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l usage i s s p e c i f i e d

as follows: t h e g r e a t e r t h e e x t e r n a l supp l i e s r e l a t i v e t o i n t e r n a l

supp l i e s , t h e g r e a t e r w i l l be t h e e x t e r n a l resource use r a t e r e l a t i v e

t o i n t e r n a l usage. D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g t h e e x t e r n a l resource base i n

terms of developed and l e s s developed coun t r i e s alloried us t o

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incorporate different power aspects of trading relations.

External Resource Control: Trade

Trade is an important non-military mode of acquiring resources

from the external environment. In trading we have assumed that

nations operate on the basis of a cost minimization calculus. As

noted in Figure 8, the process of external resource acquisition can

be depicted as a parallel structure covering resources obtained

from developed as well as those obtained from less-developed societies.

This distinction is important because of the differential power

implications of trading relations. 25 Furthermore, while it is

traditionally the case that industrialized societies tend to trade

with other industrialized societies, raw materials and resources

critical to the industrial process are often located in less-developed

economies or might otherwise be obtained from them more cheaply than

from technologically advanced states.

When modeling the relationships between an importing state

and its supplier state (whether developed or developing), it is

necessary to take into account the internal economic situation in

the host or supplier country. In those terms, the raw materials

25~ee Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1969).

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Figure 8

CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF THE EXTERNAL RESOURCE CONTROL: TRADE SECTOR LDC's

DC'S e x t r a c t i o n T + DC's extraction LDC's extractio-L. extraction

capital investment capital + capital investment u capital

+/' __r_

LDC ' s DC ' s capital

+- resource depreciation depreciation LDC ' s base

ratio in LDC's raw

materials materials production production

DC's rate desired LDC ' s raw desired

raw inventory materials

inventory + DC ' s LDC's

raw materials raw materials inventory - + inventory

fraction of average resource external demand usage rate supplied by LDC's in DC's

average resource usage rate in LDC's

import rate resource from DC's -

demanded average resource external + import rate

resource use

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inventory of the supplier state, the desired inventory, the capital

investment rate, and the total industrial capital are all important

variables in a trading relationship.

The linkage between military and non-military modes of external

resource acquisition have been modeled as follows: when costs of

military mobilization increase or when they become too great, a

retrenchment along the military dimensions ensues--with reverberating

effects--resulting in increased demands for external resources through

means other than military. The complex structures depicting these

relationships are noted in Figure 9 presenting the combined model.

The computer program is listed in Table 2.

In a world of finite resources, tile net effect of increasing

demands for external resources is to provide unavoidable limitations

on the availability and accessibility of raw materials for all

states. Where resources are plentiful, this situation is not likely

to have serious implications for the conduct of international rela-

tions. However, when resources become more scarce and costly,

competition may take on a distinctly political complexion tending

potentially toward conflict both among industrialized societies or

between technically-advanced and less-advanced societies, or both.

For operational purposes, we have found it necessary at this

stage to employ homogeneous units of measure when defining resource

base, raw materials inventory, and desired inventory. However, as

with other sectors of the model, industrial capital, investment

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r a t e , and r a t e s of imports a r e ope ra t iona l i zed according t o appro-

p r i a t e u n i t s and s c a l e s . A s p r e s e n t l y c o n s t i t u t e d , we have

d i s t i ngu i shed between resources acqui red from developed and l e s s -

developed c o u n t r i e s (DC and LDC) and summed t h e s e t o t he t o t a l

resources acqui red from e x t e r n a l sources . Spec i fy ing t h e i n t e r n a l

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t r a d i n g p a t t e r n s has allowed u s t o model i n t e r -

a c t i o n s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e state seeking resources

and the s u p p l i e r c o u n t r i e s . Those i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e important i n

providing t h e a rena f o r p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t among c o u n t r i e s competing

f o r c o n t r o l over s u p p l i e r s . To f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e t he s i g n i f i c a n c e and

imp l i ca t ions of t r a d e p o l i c i e s and p re fe rences , i t is necessary t o

o b t a i n d a t a not on ly on the t o t a l va lue of commodities t r aded , bu t

a l s o on the n a t u r e of t h e goods and t h e i r r e l a t i v e importance t o

t h e i n d u s t r i a l process .

An a l t e r n a t i v e procedure which w e a r e c u r r e n t l y experimenting

wi th i s t o omit t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between developed and l e s s developed

s t a t e s and t o cons ider r e sou rces acquired from e x t e r n a l sou rces i n

t h e aggregate . For modeling purposes and i n t h e a n a l y s i s of s p e c i f i c

cases t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e approach might be more r e a d i l y amenable t o

comparison of s imu la t ion ou tpu t w i th a c t u a l da t a . The important

po in t i s t h a t t hese modi f ica t ions r e p r e s e n t re f inements on a b a s i c

model which might b e in t roduced t o analyze an i n d i v i d u a l case.

Curren t work on Japan--where over 90% of a l l energy f u e l r equ i r e -

ments a r e met by imports--omits t h e DC/LDC d i s t i n c t i o n .

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Dynamics of a c t u a l c o n f l i c t have not been modeled here

e x p l i c i t l y . A s p re sen t ly c o n s t i t u t e d t h e model s p e c i f i e s i n con-

s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l t h e dynamic processes which s e t the s t a g e f o r

c o n f l i c t and v io lence . Ve a r e c u r r e n t l y experimenting wi th these

dynamic processes i n order t o i d e n t i f y the l inkages and processes

which enhance o r d e t r a c t from p r o p e n s i t i e s f o r c o n f l i c t and

violence. A next s t e p would be t o model e x p l i c i t l y t h e condi t ions

f o r c o n f l i c t reduct ion and r e s o l u t i o n . Our pre l iminary s imula t ion

experiments wi th t h e model adapted loose ly t o U.S. d a t a a r e repor ted

i n t h e appendix t o t h i s paper. Fur ther work focuses i n more d e t a i l

on t h e s p e c i f i c case of Japan. 2 6

V. Technological Development and Resource Cons t r a in t s : Considerat ions - fo r Fur ther Analysis

We have developed a model based on t h e assumption, supported

i n e a r l i e r empir ica l work, t h a t popula t ion growth, economic and

technologica l development, resource u t i l i z a t i o n , n a t i o n a l expansion,

and i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior a r e i n t e n s e l y interdependent and l inked

L 1 with requirements f o r b a s i c r e sources . To t h e e x t e n t t h i s

2 6 ~ e e Michael La i rd , " ~ n e r g ~ Resources and Foreign Rela t ions : A Japanese Case Study," ( t e n t a t i v e t i t l e ) M.S. t h e s i s , Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., i n prepara t ion .

2 7 ~ o r a more ex tens ive s ta tement , s ee Robert C . North and Nazl i Choucri, "Population and t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l System: Some Impli- c a t i o n s f o r United S t a t e s Pol icy and Planning," prepared f o r t h e Commission on Populat ion Growth and t h e American Future , August 1971.

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assumption i s v a l i d , a t tempts t o reduce p r o p e n s i t i e s f o r i n t e r -

n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t w i l l f a i l i f popula t ion growth remains unchecked.

With r e spec t t o t h e fo re seeab le f u t u r e , t h e d r a i n s on r e sou rces

imposed by popula t ion and t echno log ica l development do no t involve

complete d e p l e t i o n i n an a b s o l u t e sense . The problem is no t one of

exhaus t ion b u t of ---dollar c o s t s , c o s t s t o t h e environment,

and o t h e r r e a l c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d wi th u n i t s of output pe r u n i t s of

i npu t . A r e l a t e d problem, e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l , is t h e uneven d i s t r i b u -

t i o n of r e sou rces from one l o c a l i t y t o another .

Despi te t he mob i l i t y of c a p i t a l , uneven resource d i s t r i b u t i o n

imp l i e s t h a t c o s t s a r e unequal. For example, t h e c o s t of o i l t o t he

people l i v i n g i n a count ry where d e p o s i t s a r e p l e n t i f u l should b e

much less than c o s t s t o t hose t h a t l i v e f a r from sources of o i l .

But the c o s t s of acqu i r ing and process ing o i l a r e s t r o n g l y dependent

upon the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a p p r o p r i a t e technologies . Where knowledge

and s k i l l s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t , o i l d e p o s i t s below t h e s u r f a c e of t h e

e a r t h a r e not only c o s t l y , bu t a l s o unava i l ab l e . Conversely, s t a t e s

possess ing h igh l e v e l s of technology can acqu i r e r e sou rces l oca t ed

thousands of m i l e s away.

I n t h i s r ega rd , i t is a l s o extremely probable t h a t compet i t ion

f o r resources w i l l extend t o mining seabed minera ls and r e l a t e d

ocean-based resources . The ambiguity of p re sen t i n t e r n a t i o n a l

law regard ing ownership and e x t r a c t i o n r i g h t s p r e s e n t s added compli-

c a t i o n s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n t h e coming decades. Advanced

s o c i e t i e s have a c l e a r edge i n e x p l o i t a t i v e and e x t r a c t i o n technologies ,

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which will intensify competition among the rich and widen the gap

between advanced societies and technologically-deficient areas. 28

This in turn would also affect the attitudes and economic policies

of major producers and their stance on international legal issues. 2 9

Because of these considerations and uncertainties, it is

important that we apply, further develop, and refine existing

methodologies now for determining and analyzing the relationships

and interdependencies involving social organization and habit

structure, the generation of demands, acquisition of resources and

the pricingsystem, major allocations for specialized capabilities,

economic and population growth, international competition and

conflict, and so forth. It is necessary to assess the comparative

advantages and costs and alternative technologies drawing upon

particular deposits of resources, and to design alternative strat-

egies for meeting human demands in viable and non-violent ways.

In closing, we reiterate our opening remarks: This paper

represents only a statement of the problem and some initial attempts

to map out the linkages between population dynamics, resource

utilization, technological advancements and the implications for

national behavior and international relations in ways that are

28~olfgang Friedman, The Future of the Oceans (New York: -- George Braziller, 1971), pp. 22-23.

29~ony Loftas, The Last Resource: Man's Exploitation of the -- -- Oceans (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1970), p. 233.

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- s2ep

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sdyqsuoy2e~ax Teuoy2sunj ay2 Buy3E~da l pue 'suua2 s y j r s a d s asxnosax

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'alnxxadap 30 2uyod e ST s y y ~ - s y s L ~ e u e Iesyxydola 02 aIqeuame

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INTCON2 NOTE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 2

NOTE POPULATION SECTOR T a b l e 2

NOTE POPN=POPULAT I ON PEOPLE L POPN.K=POPN.J+(DT) (BIRTHS.JK-DEATHS.JK) PEOPLE NOTE POPNI=POPULATION, INIT IAL N POPN=POPN I c P O P N I = Z O O E ~ NOTE BIRTHS=BIRTHS R BIRTHS.KL=(OPCECBR. K) (POPN.K) / IOOO NOTE OPCECBR=OUTPUT PER CAPITA EFFECT ON CRUDE B I R T H RATE A OPCECBR. K=TABHL (THR.OUTPCAP. K , 0 , 4 0 0 0 , 5 0 0 ) B I R T H S / 1 0 0 0 PEOPLE T TBR=55/30/23/20/19/ l8 .5/18/17.5/17 NOTE DEATHS=DEATHS PEOPLE/YEAR R DEATHS. KL=POPN. K/AVGLT PEOPLE/YEAR NOTE AVGLT=AVERAGE HUMAN L I F E T I M E C AVGLT=70 NOTE LABOR=LABOR FORCE A LABOR. K= (LFP) (POPN. K) NOTE LFP=LABOR FRACTION OF THE POPULATION C LFP=O.3 NOTE CONSOUT=CONSUMER OUTPUT S CONSOUT. K=OUTPUT. K- I NVOUT. K NOTE INVPCAP=INVESTMENT PER C A P I T A

YEARS YEARS PEOPLE PEOPLE DIMENSIONLESS DIMENSIONLESS

A INVPCAP. K=TABHL ( T I NVCAP,OUTPCAP. K ,0 ,5000 , IOOO) T T I NVPCAP= NOTE PCRU=PER C A P I T A RESOURCE USEAGE RESOURCE UNITS/PERSON A PCRU.K=TABHL(TPCRU,OUTPCAP.K ,O,~OOO, 1 0 0 0 ) RESOURCE UNITS/PERSON T TPCRU=0/.05/.10/.20/.30/.40/.47/.50

NOTE PRODUCTIVE C A P I T A L AND TECHNOLOGY SECTOR

NOTE IC=INDUSTRIAL C A P I T A L C A P I T A L U N I T S L IC.K=IC.J+(DT) (DCIR.JK-DCDR.JK) CAPITAL UNITS N I C = I C I NOTE I C I = I N D U S T R I A L C A P I T A L , I N I T I A L C A P I T A L U N I T S C I C I = 3 E 1 2 C A P I T A L U N I T S NOTE DCDR=DOMESTIC C A P I T A L DEPRECIATION RATE C A P I T A L UNITS/YEAR R DCOR.KL=lC.K/ACL C A P I T A L UNITS/YEAR NOTE ACL=AVERAGE C A P I T A L L I F E T I M E YFAR? - -

C ACL=30 NOTE DCIR=DOMESTIC C A P I T A L INVESTMENT RATE R DCIR.KL=(INVPCAP.K-MIPC.K) (POPN.K)

. - . . . . . YEARS C A P I T A L UNITS/YEAR

. . NOTE INVOUT=INVESTMENT OUTPUT 5 INVOUT. K= I NVPCAP. WPOPN. K NOTE OUTPUT=NATIONAL OUTPUT A OUTPUT. K=(K) (EXP(ALPHA'cLOGN( 1 C . K ) ) ) (EXP(BETA"LOGN(LAB0R.K))) ' (RAM. K) C K=2 3 C ALPHA=O. 6 C BETA=0.4 NOTE OUTPCAP=OUTPUT PER C A P I T A A OUTPCAP. K=OUTPUT. K/POPN.K NOTE RAM=RESOURCE A V A I L A B I L I T Y M U L T I P L I E R DIMENSIONLESS A RAM.K=SMOOTH(TABHL(TRAM.DURR.K,O, 1 0 , 2 ) ,RAD) NOTE RAD=RESOURCE A V A I L A B I L I T Y DELAY ( Y E A R S )

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C NOTE

T NOTE A

NOTE

NOTE A NOTE C NOTE

NOTE A T

NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE R NOTE A NOTE A NOTE R NOTE C NOTE s NOTE A NOTE A T NOTE A

NOTE

NOTE

NOTE A NOTE A NOTE C

RAD=3 YEARS RAMI=RESOURCE A V A I L A B I L I T Y M U L T I P L I E R , I N I T I A L D IMENSIONLESS RAM=RAM l R A M I = I TRAM=0/0.3/0.6/0.8/0.95/l.O IAE=INVESTMENT A V A I L A B L E FOR EXPANSION

LATERAL PRESSURE SECTOR

LP=LATERAL PRESSURE DIMENSIONLESS LP.K=(LPC) (1EMLP.K) (URRMLP,K) D IMENSIONLESS LPC=LATERAL PRESSURE C O E F F I C I E N T DIMENSIONLESS L P C = I IEMLP=INVESTMENT FOR EXPANSION M U L T I P L I E R ON LATERAL PRESSURE IEMLP.K=TABHL(T IEMLP, ( I A E . K/OUTPUT. K) , O , 0 I ) DIMENSIONLESS TIEMLP=0/1.0/2.0/2.75/3.0 URRMLP=USEABLE RESOURCE RESERVE M U L T I P L I E R ON LATERAL PRESSURE URRMLP. K=TABHL (TURRMLP,DURR.K ,O,ZO,~ ) T U R R M L P = 3 / 1 . 4 / 1 / 1 / 0 . 8

M l L l T A R Y SECTOR

DMF-DOMESTIC M I L I T A R Y FORCE DMF.K=DMF.J+(DT) (MIR.JK-MDR.JK) OMF=DMF I DMFI=DOMESTIC M I L I T A R Y F O R C E , I N I T I A L DMFI= M I R = M I L I T A R Y INVESTMENT RATE MIR.KL=(MIPCAP.K) (P0PN.K) M I P C = M l L I T A R Y INVESTMENT PER C A P I T A MIPC.K-(.03) (0UTPCAP.K) (MM.K) MM=MOBIL IZATION M U L T I P L I E R MM.K=TABLE(TMM,MFDMF.K,O,I .o,o. I ) MDR=MIL ITARY D E P R E C I A T I O N RATE MDR. KL=DMF. K/AMEL AMEL=AVERAGE M I L I T A R Y EOUIPMENT L I F E AMEL=2O MMF=MOBILIZED M I L I T A R Y FORCE MMF. K=(DMF. K) (MFDMF. K ) MFDMF=MOBILIZED FRACTION OF DOMESTIC M I L I T A R Y FORCE MFDMF. K= (DMF. KITFMF. K) (MMMLP.K)

D IMENSIONLESS

MMMLP=MILITARY M O B I L I Z A T I O N M U L T I P L I E R FROM LATERAL PRESSURE MMMLP.K=TABLE(TMMMLP.LP.K.0.3.0.5) . ~

~~~~~~=0/.~5/.10/.20/.40/.90/1 .O TFMF=TOTAL FOREIGN M I L I T A R Y FORCE TFMF. K=DCMF. K tLOCMF, K

RESOURCE USEAGE AND A L L O C A T I O N SECTOR

DOMESTIC RESOURCE USAGE

ORJ=DEMANDED RESOURCE USEAGE DRJ.K=(PCRU.K) (P0PN.K) FRD=FORECASTEO RESOURCE USEAGE DEMAND FRD.K=( I+RM) (DRU.K)

RESOURCE U N I T S / Y E A R

RESOJRCE J N . T S / Y E A R RESOURCE L h l T S l I E A R DIMENSIONLESS

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NOTE A NOTE C NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE R NDTE A NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE C NOTE A NOTE A

NOTE

NOTE

NOTE A NOTE R NOTE L N NDTE C NOTE R NOTE A T NDTE R NOTE

NOTE C NDTE R NOTE C NOTE R NOTE

DURR=DDMESTIC USABLE RESOURCE RESERVE DURR.K=(IUR.K+(ARIR.K"RAAT)) /FRD.K

YEARS

RAAT=RESOURCE A C C E S S I B I L I T Y AVERAGING T I M E YEARS RAAT=5 6 1 IUR=INTERNAL USEABLE RESOURCES IUR.K=IUR.J+(DT) (- IRUR.JK)

RESOURCE U N I T S RESOURCE U N I T S

I U R = I U R I I U R I = I N T E R N A L USABLE RESDURCES, IN IT IAL RESOURCE U N I T S I U R I = 6 E 9 RESOURCE U N I T S IRUR=INTERNAL RESOURCE USEAGE RATE RESOURCE UN ITS/YEAR IRJR.KL=(DRU.K) ( F R D ~ I S . K ) (UMIC.K) FRDSIS-FRACTION OF RESOURCE DEMAND SUPPLIED FROM INTERNAL SOURCES FRDSIS.K=IUR. K/TUR.K AIRUR=AVERAGE INTERNAL RESOURCE USEAGE RATE RESOURCE UNITS/YEAR AIRUR.K=AIRUR.J+(DT) ( I / IRAT) (IRUR.JK-AIRUR.J) RESOURCE UNITS/YEAR AIRUR=AIRURI AIRURI=AVERAGE INTERNAL RESOURCE USEAGE R A T E , I N I T I A L AIRURI=49DODDOD RESOURCE UNITS/YEAR IRAT=INTERNAL RESOURCE AVERAGING T l M E I RAT=5

YEARS YEARS

PIRC=RELATIVE INTERNAL RESOURCE COVERAGE DIMENSIONLESS R I R C . K = ( I U R . K / A I R U R . K ) / ( D I R C . K ) DIMENSIONLESS DIRC=DESIRED INTERNAL RESOURCE COVERAGE YEARS D IRC. K=D I RCCDN YEARS DIRCCON=5 DESIRED INTERNAL COVERAGE CONST. YEARS UMIC=USEAGE M U L T I P L I E R FROM INTERNAL COVERAGE DIMENSIONLESS UMIC.K=TABHL(TUMIC,RIRC.K,O,I , 0 . 2 ) D IMENS l ONLESS TUMlC=0/0.40/0.65/0.85/0.95/1 .O

EXTERNAL RESOURCE TRADE

DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SECTOR

DERU=DEMANDED EXTERNAL RESOURCE USE DERU.K=(DRU. K ) ( I -FRDS1S.K) RIRDC=RESOURCE IMPORT RATE FROM D C ' S RIRDC. KL=(DERU. K) ( I -FED5LDC.K) OCRMI=DC~ S RAW MATERIALS INVENTORY DCRMI .K=DCRMI .J+(DT) (DCRMPR.JK-R IRDC.JK-DCXOC.JK) DCRMI=DCRMlI DCRMI I=DC'S RAW MATERIALS I N V E N T O R Y , I N I T I A L DCRMI I = DCRMPR=DCIS RAW MATERIALS PRODUCTION RATE DCRMPR.KL=MIN( ((DCDRMI .K-DCRMI . K ) / 3 ) , (DCXC.K*OCRDC.K)) OCRDC=OUTPUT-CAPITAL R A T I O I N D C ' S OCRDC.K=TABLE(TOCRDC, (DCRB.K/DCRBI) ,O,I ,0 .2 ) TOCRDC= DCXOC=DCIS EXPORTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES DCXOC. KL= DCXC=DCIS EXTRACTION C A P I T A L DCXC.K=OCXC. J+(DT) (DCCIR. JK-DCCDR. JK) DCXC=DCXC I DCXCI=DCIS EXTRACTION C A P I T A L , I N I T I A L DCXC I= DCCIR=DCIS EXTRACTION C A P I T A L INVESTMENT RATE DCC I R. KL=((DCDRMI. K) (L/DCRDC. K)-DCXC. K)/DCCAO DCCAO=DCIS C A P I T A L A C Q U I S I T I O N DELAY DCCAD=7 DCCDR=DCIS C A P I T A L DEPRECIATION RATE DCCDR.KL=DCXC.K/DCCLT DCCLT=DCIS C A P I T A L L I F E T I M E

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DCCLT=25 DCDRMI=DCIS D E S I R E D RAW M A T E R I A L S INVENTORY

C NOTE A NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE L N C

NOTE

NOTE R NOTE A NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE R NOTE A NOTE R NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE R NOTE C NOTE R NOTE C NOTE A NOTE L NOTE C NOTE L N NOTE C

DCDRMI .K=(I. 10 ) ( A R I R D C . K ) ARIRDC=AVG.RESOURCE IMPORT RATE FROM D C ' S ARIRDC.K=ARIRDC.J+(DT) ( I / I R A T D C ) (RIRDC.JK-AR1RDC.J) ARIRDC=ARIRDCI ARIRDCI=AVG.RESOURCE IMPORT RATE FROM D C I S , I N I T I A L A R I R D C I = DCRB=DCIS RESOURCE BASE DCRB. K=DCRB. J+ (DT) (-DCRMPR. J K ) DCRB=DCRB I DCRB I=

LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SECTOR

RIRLDC=RESOURCE IMPORT RATE FROM L D C ' S R I RLDC. KL= (DERU. K ) (FEDsLDc. K ) FEDSLDC=FRAC OF EXTRNL DEMAND SUPPLIED FROM L D C ' S FEDSLDC. K=LDCRB. K/ (LDCRB.K+DCRB.K) LDCRMI=LDCIS RAW M A T E R I A L S INVENTORY LDCRMI .K=LDCRMI . J + ( D T ) (LDCRMPR. J K - R I R L D C . JK-LDCX0C.JK) LDCRMI=LDCRMI I L D C R M I I = L D C I S RAW M A T E R I A L S I N V E N T O R Y , I N I T I A L LDCRMl I= LOCRMPR=LDC'S RAW M A T E R I A L S PRODUCTION RATE LDCRMPR. KL=M I N ( ( (LDCDRM I . K-LDCRM I . K) / 3 ) , (LDCXC. K*OCRLDC. K) ) OCRLDC=OUTPUT-CAPITAL R A T I O I N L D C ' S OCRLDC. K=TABLE (TOCRLDC. (LDCRB.K/LDCRBI) .O. 1 . 0 . 2 ) L D C X O C = L D C ~ s EXPORTS TO 'OTHER COUNTRIES LOCXOC. KL= LDCXC=LDCIS EXTRACTION C A P I T A L

LDCXCI=LDCIS EXTRACTION C A P I T A L , I N I T I A L LDCXCI= LDCCIR=LDCIS EXTRACTION C A P I T A L INVESTMENT RATE LDCC IR .KL=( (LDCDRMI .K) ( I /OCRLDC.K) -LDCXC.K) /LDCCAD LDCCAD=LOCIS C A P I T A L A C Q U I S I T I O N DELAY LDCCAD= LDCCDR=LDCIS EXTRACTION C A P I T A L D E P R E C I A T I O N RATE LDCCDR.KL=LDCXC. K /LDCCLT LDCCLT=LDC'S C A P I T A L L I F E T I M E LDCCLT=30 YEARS LDCDRMI=LDCIS DESIRED RAW M A T E R I A L S INVENTORY LDCDRMI.K=(I . IO) (ARIRLDC.K) ARIRLOC=AVG.RESOURCE IMPORT RATE FROM L D C ' S ARIRLDC.K=ARIRLDC.J+(DT) (IIIRATLDC) (RIRLDC.JK-ARIRLDC.J) IRATLDC=IMPORT RATE AVERAGING T I M E I N L D C ' S I RATLDC= LDCRB=LDCIS RESOURCE BASE LDCRB. K=LDCRB.J+(DT) (-LDCRMPR. J K ) LDCRB=LDCRBI L D C R B I = L D C I S RESOURCE B A S E , I N I T I A L LDCRBI=

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APPENDIX

THE U.S. CASE: SOME TENTATIVE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

I n view of t h e pre l iminary n a t u r e of t h e s imula t ion model as

p r e s e n t l y c o n s t i t u t e d , we have experimented cons iderably with t h e

b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s o a s t o gain some understanding of t h e long-term

impl i ca t ions of t h e model and t h e assumptions upon which i t i s based.

We focused s p e c i f i c a l l y on t h e i n t e r n a l s e c t o r s of t h e model, a l though

consequences f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l behavior were a l s o taken i n t o account .

The i n i t i a l va lues were set so a s t o approximate t h e United S t a t e s

a t t h e p r e s e n t time. See t h e a t t a c h e d program l i s t i n g i n Table 3

f o r i n i t i a l va lues i n t h e Popula t ion Sec to r , t h e Technology and

Product ive C a p i t a l Sec to r , t h e L a t e r a l P re s su re Sec to r , and t h e

Resource Usage and Al loca t ion It need ha rd ly be emphasized

t h a t t h e model a s i t now s t a n d s has zero p r e d i c t i v e va lue f o r any

s p e c i f i c na t ion . The s imu la t ion runs a r e u s e f u l only a s they may b e

compared wi th h i s t o r i c a l t r e n d s and i n t u i t i v e expec ta t ions f o r c l u e s

t o t h e mis - spec i f i ca t ion o r omission of important r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

S i x s imu la t ion runs were undertaken over t h e per iod of a

cen tu ry , w i th t h e fo l lowing r e s u l t s .

30 The d i f f e r e n c e s between the program l i s t i n g s i n Table 2

and Table 3 a r e q u i t e minor. However, we inc lude bo th l i s t i n g s i n t h e event t h a t o t h e r s might s eek t o r e p l i c a t e our work o r develop i n novel d i r e c t i o n s .

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(1) The f i r s t run represented t h e b a s i c United S t a t e s model

with a popula t ion base of 200 m i l l i o n and o t h e r l e v e l and r a t e

v a r i a b l e s i n i t i a l e d a t "reasonable" United S t a t e s approximations.

The r e s u l t s i nd ica t ed t h a t over an i n i t i a l per iod of 100 years

(base 1970) l a t e r a l pressure increased sha rp ly f o r 45 years and

then leve led of f dur ing t h e remaining yea r s ; e x t e r n a l usable

resources increased exponen t i a l ly dur ing t h e f i r s t 20 yea r s and then

dropped o f f sha rp ly a s r e t u r n s on e x t e r n a l investments decreased and

a s t h e e x t e r n a l resource e x t r a c t i o n r a t e decreased. See Figure 10

f o r p l o t s of key v a r i a b l e s over the next 100 yea r s .

(2) I n t h e second run , t h e same i n i t i a l United S t a t e s para-

meters were employed, but t h e model was changed s o a s t o suppress

the e x t e r n a l resource base o r , i n o t h e r words, t o c u t o f f e x t e r n a l

resources . The r e s u l t s were a s fol lows. I n gene ra l , no apprec iab le

d i f f e rences were found between t h i s run and t h e previous run over

t h e 100 year per iod . The reason f o r t h i s was t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l

resources i n t h e United S t a t e s were s e t s o high a s t o m i t i g a t e

aga ins t t h e e f f e c t s of suppressing e x t e r n a l resources o r of making

i t impossible t o e x t r a c t resources from t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l environ-

ment.

(3) I n t h e t h i r d run, we increased t h e f o r e i g n c o s t s , t h a t is,

t h e c o s t s incurred i n t h e process of extending in f luence ou t s ide of

t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries and, a t t h e same t ime, allowed t h e United

S t a t e s t o e x t r a c t resources from t h e e x t e r n a l environment. We found

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Table I 0 (continued)

-

U

U = Useable Resource Reserve Multiplier on Latera l Pressure

D -

L= Lateral Pressure R= Usable Resource Reserve D = Demanded Resource Usage I = Investment for External Expansion

Multiplier on Lateral Pressure

0 20 40 60 80 10 0 Years

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Table I0 (continued)

I = l nterna l Usable Resources T E = External Usable Resources B = Internal Resource Base E = Externa l Resource Base V = External Investment T = Total Usable

- Resources

0 20 4 0 60 80 100 Years

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t h a t very s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s i n behavior over t i m e emerge when

fo re ign c o s t s a r e increased . L a t e r a l p re s su re t a p e r s o f f ; g r e a t e r

emphasis i s placed on i n t e r n a l investments and investments i n

i n t e r n a l c a p i t a l ; output per c a p i t a i nc reases apprec iably a s

the s imula t ion i s run over t h e 100 year pe r iod , and t h e n e t e f f e c t

of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s t h a t output per c a p i t a is h igh enough t o

a l low the populat ion t o cope with inc reas ing e x t e r n a l c o s t s of

e x t e r n a l resource e x t r a c t i o n . Thus, while an i n i t i a l drop i n

l a t e r a l pressure and e x t e r n a l investments occurs ( r e s u l t i n g i n

g r e a t e r emphasis on i n t e r n a l investments) , i n t h e long run t h e

outcome is such t h a t i nc reases i n output per c a p i t a would enable

t h e United S t a t e s t o cope with increased fo re ign c o s t s .

I n s h o r t , t h e same behavior i n runs 1 and 2 emerges aga in , but

dur ing t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h e 100 year period r a t h e r than ( a s has

been the case i n e a r l i e r runs) dur ing t h e f i r s t 20 t o 40 yea r s .

I n run 3 , increased output per c a p i t a occurs d e s p i t e i nc reas ing

fo re ign c o s t s because of a comensura t e inc rease i n i n t e r n a l i nves t -

ments which, over long pe r iods , a l low t h e United S t a t e s t o cope wi th

inc reas ing fo re ign c o s t s and t o resume a high l e v e l of l a t e r a l

expansion. See Figure 11 f o r p l o t s of key v a r i a b l e s .

( 4 ) I n t h e f o u r t h run , we c u t of f e x t e r n a l usable r e sources

a v a i l a b l e t o t h e United S t a t e s by a f a c t o r of f i v e ( i n comparison

wi th t h e i n i t i a l run wi th "reasonable" United S t a t e s va lues ) . The

r e s u l t s a r e b a s i c a l l y the same a s when suppressing t h e e f f e c t s of

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Table I I Example 3

INCREASING THE COSTS OF FOREIGN EXPANSION

P = Output per Capita E = Investment Available for Expansion F = Fraction Invested Internally

C = Industrial Capital I = Domestic Capital

Investment Rate

-

0 20 40 60 80 100 Years

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Table II (continued)

I I I I

R

-

U U

-$-

-

L

I

L= Lateral Pressure R = Usable Resource Reserve D = Demanded Resource W sage I = Investment for External Expansion

Multiplier on Lateral Pressure U = Useable Resource Reserve Multiplier

, on La tera l Pressure I

0 20 40 60 80 100 Years

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t h e e x t e r n a l resource base. However, t h i s run y i e l d s a lower degree

of l a t e r a l pressure and g r e a t e r evidence f o r a switch from depend-

ence on ex te rna l resources t o dependence on i n t e r n a l resources .

It needs t o be r e c a l l e d t h a t i n t e r n a l investments a r e p o s s i b l e

because t h e United S t a t e s is s e t a s r i c h i n resources . When ex te r -

n a l usable resources a r e cu t o f f , t h e United S t a t e s has no op t ion but

t o switch t o i n t e r n a l investments d i r e c t l y , r e s u l t i n g i n a l e s s e r

expression of l a t e r a l pressure . However, i n run 3 (where t h e ex te rna l

base of resources was c u t ) , t h e switch t o i n t e r n a l investments was

more gradual s i n c e a c e r t a i n amount of usable resources were s t i l l

a v a i l a b l e and could be employed, and t h e i n t e r n a l switch occurred

when usable resources were deple ted and could not be rep lenished .

I n run 4 , however, t h e switch t o i n t e r n a l resources was immediate.

(5) I n t h e f i f t h run, we increased fo re ign c o s t s incurred i n

t h e course of e x t e r n a l resource e x t r a c t i o n and, a t t h e same time,

decreased cons iderably t h e amount of e x t e r n a l usable resources.

Because of t h e r e s u l t i n g decreases i n r e t u r n s on e x t e r n a l i nves t -

ments, the switch t o i n t e r n a l resource usage and t o i n t e r n a l inves t -

ment came about very r a p i d l y , l ead ing t o l e s s l a t e r a l pressure .

I n genera l , t h e same p a t t e r n s emerged, but were g r e a t l y dampened.

I n sum, higher c o s t s , lower l e v e l s of a v a i l a b l e e x t e r n a l r e sources ,

and accompanying decreases i n r e t u r n s on e x t e r n a l investments lead

t o a focus on i n t e r n a l investments , cons iderable dampening of

l a t e r a l p re s su re , and lower investments e x t e r n a l l y (o r a lower

mani fes ta t ion of "successful" l a t e r a l p r e s s u r e ) .

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( 6 ) I n t h e l a s t run , we s e t up t h e s imula t ion s o a s t o

r e f l e c t a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e United S t a t e s would b e faced with

low i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l usable resources and t~&& fo re ign c o s t s -

( t h i s is a s i t u a t i o n i n which almost by d e f i n i t i o n t h e r e t u r n s on

investments would be low). The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t i n i t i a l l y

consumption per c a p i t a i n c r e a s e s cons iderably and then drops of f

sharp ly . This drop i s occasioned by a decrease i n output , r e s u l t i n g

from severe shor tages of resources . Output per c a p i t a a l s o f a l l s

o f f , a s does t h e amount of investment a v a i l a b l e f o r expansion. I n

t h e longer run , however, investment a v a i l a b l e f o r expansion i n c r e a s e s ,

fol lowing t h e i n i t i a l drop.

This longer range inc rease is occasioned by t h e f a c t t h a t con-

sumption per c a p i t a has dropped, al lowing remaining resources and

output t o b e devoted t o e x t e r n a l investments and t o expansion. The

n e t e f f e c t is t h a t a t f i r s t l a t e r a l p re s su re e x h i b i t s a sharp i n c r e a s e

and then, because of resource shor t ages and because of a l a c k of

i nc rease i n ou tpu t , i t t a p e r s o f f . However, a s consumption drops,

investments a v a i l a b l e f o r expansion inc rease , and t h e r e s u l t i s

a l e v e l i n g of l a t e r a l p re s su re . But, with a shor tage of resources ,

l a t e r a l p re s su re drops even f u r t h e r . See Figure 12 f o r p l o t s of

key v a r i a b l e s over a 100 year per iod .

An apprec ia t ion of why t h e model behaves t h e way i t does under

d i f f e r e n t i n i t i a l condi t ions can be obtained by a c a r e f u l s c ru t iny

of i t s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e a s noted i n t h e program l i s t i n g . However,

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Table 12 Example 6

INCREASING THE COSTS O F FOREIGN EXPANSION AND DECREASING INTERNAL

EXTERNAL AVAILABLE RESOURCES

E

-

E = lnvestment Avoiloble for

F = Froction Invested Internally

C = Industrial Copitol I = Domestic Capitol lnvestment Rote 0

0 20 40 60 80 100 Years

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Table 12 (continued)

I = Internal Usable Resources E = External Usable Resources R = External Resource Base B = Internal Resource Base V = External Investment T = Total Usable Resouces

-

0 20 40 60 80 100 Years

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Table I2 (continued)

L = Lateral Pressure R= Useable Resource Reserve D = Demanded Resource Usage I = Investment for External Expansion

Multiplier on Lateral Pressure U= Useable Resource Reserve Multiplier

on Lateral Pressure

L

0 20 40 60 80 100 Years

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assessing these results is a difficult task. Technically speaking,

it is not possible to validate a simulation model run beyond the

data base other than in retrospect. That is, we can validate the

structure of the model by comparing simulated values, parameters,

rates, and levels with actual values during a period for which

empirical data are available. In the case of the United States

runs, it is possible to validate the structure of the basic model

by setting initial values at 1870, for example, rather than at 1970,

and observing the degree of congruence between values generated by

the model and known values of key variables. In this way it would

be possible to obtain empirically based assessments of the robustness

and performance of the model.

Equally, if not more important, is the need to experiment ex-

tensively with alternative values and with modifications in different

sectors of the model. The objective is to understand the performance

of complex systems and to appreciate the ramifications of change.

In statistical parlance, therefore, it is necessary to undertake

sensitivity analyses of key relationships so as to evaluate the

implications for one part of the system of change in another part.

When this is done, it will then be possible to experiment with

alternative policy options and alternative decision-rules, and to

observe both long and shorter-range consequences. The results of

that phase compared with the critical response of others to this

preliminary effort should lead to the development.of an improved

theory relating resources to conflict.

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YOTF NOTF NOTE NOTE NOTE NOTE NOTF L NOTE N C NOTE R NOTE A T NOTE Q NOTE C NOTE A NOTE C NOTE S NOTE A T NOTE A T NOTE NOTE NOTE NOTF: NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE P NOTE C NOTF U NOTE A NOTE 4 (RAM.I

C NOTE A NOTF A NOTE

78 IhlTCONZ TABLE 3

INTFYMATlOUAC CONFLICT 2 PROGRAM L ISTING

PODULATION SVCTOW

POPN=POPULATION PEQPLE POPN.K=POPN.J+(OT) 1 9 R . J K - O R . ) PEOPLE PUPNI=POPULATION.INIrIPL PUPN=POPMI POPNI=ZOOE6 R h = n I H T H R l T E PEOPLE/YEAk R K ~ ~ L = I O P C E C 9 ~ ~ K ) l P O P N ~ K ~ / 1 0 0 0 PEOPLE/YEAV OPCECRR=OVTPIJT PEc CAPITA EFFECT 01.; CPllOE R I R T t i RATE OPCECHR.K=TAB~LITPR.0UTPCAPPYYO04000~5001 91QTP4S/lOOOPEOPtE TdR=55/30/?3/?0/19/18.5/1R/17.5/17 OK=UEATH RATE PEOPLE /YEAR DH.KL=POPN.K/AVGLT PEOPLE/YEAH AVSLT=AVEHAGE HUMAN LIFE r I M E A V G L T = ~ O Ln3OR=LAROR FOHCE LABOR.K=(LFP) (P0Ph.K)

PEOPLE PEOPLE

LFP=LAROQ FRACTIOM OF THE POPIJLATIOU D IMEhSIONLE+S LF?=O.3 CONSOUT=CONSUMER OUTPUT COYSOUT.K=OUTPUT.K-1NVOUT.K INVPCAP=INVESTMENT PEU CAPITA I N V P C A P . K ~ ~ 9 B H L I T I Y V C A P ~ O O T P C b P P K ~ O ~ 5 0 0 0 ~ I O O O ~ T IVVPCAPz PCRU=PER CAPITA RFSOUWCE USEAGE RESOURCE UNITS/PERSON P C Q U . K ~ T A R Y L ( T P C R U ~ 0 U T P C A P . K ~ O ~ 7 0 0 0 ~ 1 0 0 0 RESOURCE UNITS/PEHSON T P C R U = 0 / . 0 5 ~ . 1 0 / . ~ 0 / . 3 0 / . 4 0 / . 4 7 / . 5 0

PRODIJCTIVE C A P I T A L AND TECHNOLOGY SErTOR

I C = I N D U S T R I A L CAPITAL CAPITAL Utv ITS I C . K = I C . J + ( D T ) ( O C I R . J K - D C O R . J I 0 I C = ( C P P I ) ( P O P N I ) C l " I=CAPITAL PER P E R S O N I I ~ ~ I T I A L C A P I T A L UNITS/PERSON CPP l=15Ooo DCDd=DOMESTIC C A P I T A L DEPeECIATIOM 4ATE C A P I T A L UNITS /YFLR DCDU.KL=IC.K/ACL CAP1 TAL. UNITS/YEAR ACLIAVERAGE C A P I T A L L I F E T I H F YEPUS ACL=SO YEARS DCIR-DOMESTIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT R A T E CAPITAL UNITS/YEAR DCIH.KL=IMVOUT.U INVOVT-INVESTMENT OUTPUT ThVOUT.K=TYVPCAP.K*POPN.K

K = 2 3 ALPHA=O.h 8ETA=0.4 OUTPCAP=OI.ITPUT PEP CAPITA GUTPCAP.K=OUTPUT.K/?OPN.K RA'4=RESOURCE A V A I L A R I L I T Y M U L T I P L I E 9 O ~ V E N S I O ~ L F ~ S H A H . U = S M O Q T ~ l T A H ~ L ( T l ) A M . T l l ~ ~ . K ~ O r l O . ? ) . P A n l HAO=*FSOURCE D V A I L A S I L I T Y DELAY l Y F 4 H S )

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C NOTF

C T NOTF A NOTF NOTE NOTF NOTE NOTE A NOTE C NOTE A

T NOTF A T NOTE NOTE NOTE NOTE NOTE NOTE A NOTE A NOTE C NOTE A NOTE A NOTE A NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE D , . NOTE A NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE

A NOTF 4 C NOTF A T NOTE

HAD=? ( Y F A R S ) RAYI=HFSOURCE A V A l L A H I L I T ~ M U L T I D L I E U . I N I T I A L D IMENSTONLFSS RAY=RAMI I ) A Y I = I 79

L A T E R A L P3ESSURF SECTO*

LP=LATERAL PRESSUQE D I M E N S I O N L E S S L P . K = ( L P C ) ( I E M L P - K I (U*GMLP.K) D I M E N S I O N L E S S L p C = L A T E R A L PRES51JYF C O E F F I C I E N T D I M E N S I O N L E S S L P C = 1 I E Y L P = I N V E S T M E N T FOa E X P A N S I O N M U L T I P L I F R ON L A T E R A L PUESSURE I t Y L P . K = T A q H L ( T I F Y L P I ( I I E . K / O U T P U T . K ) 1 O I 0 . 4 * 0 . 1 ) D I M E N S I O N L E S S TIEMC~=0/1.0/2.0/2,75/3.0 UkRYLP=USEAHL.E UESOURCE RESERVE Y U L T I P L I E R ON L A T E R A L PRESSUKE UHRMLP.K=TAHHL(TUQRMLPtDUURRKt0~ i !O~5 ) TuRRYLP=3/1 .4 /1 /1 /0 .8

RESOURCE USEAGE AN0 A L L O C A T I O N SECTOR

DOMESTIC RESOIIRCE USAGE DKU=DFMANDED RESOIIRCE USEAGE RESOIJPCE U N I T S / Y E A Y DH!l.K= (PCRN.U) (P0PN.K) FHD=FORECASTED RE'OURCE USEAGE DEMAND RESOURCE U N I T S / Y E A R FHD.K=( l+RM) (DI3U.u) RESOURCE U N I T S / Y E A H RM=RESOURCE M A R G I h O I M E N S I O N L E S S RM=0.25

YEARS

TUQ=TOTAL USEA.HLE RESOURCES RESOURCE U N I T S TL)R.K=ILIR.K+DCRM1.K*Lf)CRYI IU DURR-DOMESTIC USAMLE RESOURCE RESERVE YEARS DURR.K=IUR.K/FRO.r I U R = I N T E R N A L U S E A R L E RESOURCES RESOURCE U N I T S IUQ.K=I I1R.J*(DT) ( - IQ1JQ.JK) YESOIJaCE U N I T S I U R l ( 1 U R P P I ) ( P O P N I ) I U R P P I = I h l T N L IJSEAhLE RES. /PERSON. IN IT IAL RESOURCE U N I T S / P E R S O N I ! . J R P P I = 3 0 RESOORCE U N I T S / P E R S O N I H U R = I N T E R N A L RESOIJaCE VSEAGE RATE IHUR.KL=(@RU.U) ( F * D S I S . K ) (UM1C.K) F H O S I S - F R A C T I O N OF RESOURCE OEMAND S U P P L I F O FQOM I N T E R N A L SOURCES FRDSIS.T=I( lR.K/TLJS.K PIRUR=AVERAGE I N T F ~ R N L L RESDIJRCE USEAGF RATFRE5OURCF U N I T S / Y E A R AIQL)R.K=AIRUR.J+(OT) ( l / I R P T ) ( 1 Q U R . J K - A I R J RESOURCE U N I T S / Y E A R A l R U U = b I R U R I A I 2 U R I = A V E R A G E I N T E R N A L RFSOUGCE USEAGF l + A T E ~ I N I T I A L A l R U R I = 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 RESOURCE U N I T S / Y E A H I K A T = I N T E U N A L RESOURCE AVERAGING T I Y E YEARS I H A T = 5 YEAUS R I R C = R E L A T I V F I N T E R N A L RESOURCE COVERAGF D I U E N S I O N L E S S PIUC.K=(IIIR.C/AIRIlH.K)/(DIRC.Kl O I M E N S I O N L E S S D I " C = D E S I Y E D I Y T E 4 N 4 L wESOi!i*C1. COVEXA1;F YEARS l ) lRC.K=DJUCCON YEAHS OIRCCON=5 O F S I R E D INTFRNAL. COVFRAhF. CONST. YFARS UMIC=USEA(;F MU[. T I Pl . . IE2 FROM I ~ U T E U Y P L COVEUAGE OIMENSTONLFSS I J M I C . U = T A 9 H L ( T U M I C ~ R I P C C I ( ~ O ~ 1 t 0 . Z ) n I ' 4 E N S I O N L F S S T U Y I c = ~ ~ 0 ~ 4 0 ~ 0 ~ 6 5 / 0 ~ H S ~ O ~ ~ 5 ~ 1 1 0

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NOTE NOTE NOTE A NOTF u NOTE L N NOTE c NOTE R NOTE C NOTE R NOTE L N NOTE C NOTE R NOTE C NOTE A NOTE L N NOTE C NOTF L

NOTE A NOTF

NOTF L N NOTF C NOTF

NOTF C NOTE P NOTE L N NOTF C NOTE 0

NOTE C NOTF

EXTERNAL RESOURCE TQADf AND USAGE

CtRU=DEMANI)ED E X T i U Y 4 L RESOIJRCE USE DEQu.U=(DVU.C) ( I - F N r ? S I S , U ) RISDC=RESOURCE I Y P O P T RATF FUOM O C * S RIRDC.KL=(DERU.K) (1-FE.DSLDC.K) DCRMI=DC'S QAW M A T k 9 l A L S IYVENTOUY DCRMI .K=DCQYI .J t (DTJ (3CRMPR.JK-UIRDC.JK-DCXOC.Jl0 D C Q M I = O C R M I I D C Q M I I = D C * S R A W M A T E R I A L S INVENTORY . I h I I T I A L D C R Y I I = DCQMPUsDClS RAW M A T E R I A L S PRODUCTION UATE DCRMPU.UL=(DCIC.K) (OCRDC) OCRDC=OUTPUT-CAPITAL R A T I O I N DC'S OCRDC= OCXOC=UC*S EXPORTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES DCXOC.KL= DCIC=DC"S I N D U S R I A L C A P I T A L DCIC.K=DCIC.J+(DT! ( D C C I R . J I 0 n C I C = O C I C I D C I C I = D C ' S I N D U S T P I A L C A P I T A L v I N I T I A L O C I C I = O C C I P = D C * S C A P I T A L INVESTMENT RATE DCCIR.KL=(DCDUMI,K-DC4MI.U) ( I / O C Q O C ) / D C C A O OCCAD=OC*S C A P I T A L A C Q U I S I T I O Y D E L A Y DCCAD= D C D & M I = D C * S D E S I R E D RAW M A T E R I A L S INVENTOQY D C D ~ M I . K = ~ ~ . ~ O I ( A W I Q D C . I O AHIRDC=AVG.RESOURCE IMPORT RATE FWOY D C l S AHIYDC.U=APIRDC.J+(OT)~l/IRATDC) (RIRDC.JK-AR1QDC.J) A ~ I R D C = A R I R D C I ARIkDCI=AVG.RESOURCE IMPOYT RATE FROM D C ' S r I N I T I A L A R I H D C I = DCRt l=OC*S RESOURCE RASE DCQM.K=DCQR.J+(DT) (-DCRMP9.JK) RIQLDC=RESOURCE IMPORT R A T E FROM L D C I S R1QLDC.KL=(OEHU.U) (FEDSLDC.K) FLDSLDC=FPAC OF EKT?NL OEMANO S U P P L I E D FROM L R C ' S FE~SLDC.K=(LDCPR.K/(LDCYR.U+OCRR.K)) (LPM1A.K) L P Y ~ A = L A T E R A L P ~ E S S U R E MULTIPLIER ON TPADF ALLOCATION L P M ~ ~ . K = T 4 B H L ( T L P ~ T b * L P . U t O ~ 1 0 t l 1 O ) T L P M T A = LUCNMI=LDC*S RAU M A T E R I A L S INVENTORY L U C e U I . U = L D C R M I . J + ( O T ) ( L O C R M P R . J K - R I l i L 0 C . J ~ - L O C X O C . J K ) L O C R M I = L C C H M I I L U C Q M I I = L O C * S HAW M 4 T E R I A L S I N V E N T O 4 Y . I N I T I A L I UCk'MI I= l.UCUMPQ=LDC'S R A k MATEWIALS PQODUCTION # A T € LUC!-'MtJW.UL= ( L D C I C . 6 ) (OCRLDC) (~CF?LDC=OI~TPIJT-CAP~TPL RATIO IN L ~ c * : , OCRCI)C-- LDCXOC=LDC"i F-XPOMTS TO OTdER COUNTWIES LUCb.OC.KL= L U C I C = L D C ' S I N D U S T H I A L C A o l T A L

L U C I C I = L D C ' S I N D U S T a 1 4 L C A P I T A L I I N I T I L L L . l JC ICI= L U C C I U = L D C * S C A P I T A L INVESTMENT UATE L U C C I U . K L = ( (1.0CORMI .K-L0CL)Wl .k) ( l / O C i r L l ) C ) ) / L D C C A D LUCCAD=LDC@S C A P I T A L A C Q U I S I T I O N OFLPY L U C C 4 0 = L U C U P M I = L D C * S D E S I * E D UAN M A T E R I P L S INVFNTOQY

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A NOTE L NOTE

L NOTE NOTE NOTF NOTE NOTE L N NOTE L

NOTE R NOTE A NOTE

NOTE R NOTE C NOTE S NOTE A NOTE A T NOTF A NOTF A NOTE C NOTE A NOTE C

L u C U P M I . K = ( l . I O ) (AQIRL. i)C,KI AKIMLDC=AVG.RESOU~+CF I M P O e T U P T E FROM L D C * S AUIRLDC.K=ARIkLDC.J*(OT)(l/IRATLDC) ( H I R L D C . J s - A R I R L 0 C . J ) IKATLCIC= IMPORT R A T E A V E R P 5 I N G T I M E I N L D C l S I k 4 T L r ) C - LDCKH=LOC*S UESOUQCF d A S E LUCPY.K=LOCRf l . J * (>T) ( - L r ~ C ~ H P U . J K )

M I L I T A R Y SECTOR

DMF=OOMESTIC M I L I T A R Y FORCE DMF.K=UMF.J+(DT) fM IP .JK-MOR.JK) DMF=OMFI D M F I = D O M E S T I C M I L I T P R Y F O R C E I I N I T I A L DMF I = M I P = M I L I T A R Y I N V E S T M E N T P A T E MIR.KL=(MTPCAP.K) fPOPt4.K) M I P C = M I L I T A R Y I N V E S T M E N T P E u C A P I T A M I P C . K = ( . 0 3 ) ( O U T P C A P . K ) ( M M M K ) M M = M O H I L I Z A l I O N M I I L T I P L I E R MM.K=TARLE(TMM.MFOMF.K .O .1 .0 *0 . l ) M D Q = M I L I T A R Y D E P R E C I A T I O N R A T E MUQ.KL=DMF.K/AMEL AMFL=AVERAGE M I L I T A U Y E G l l I P M E N T L I F F PMEL=ZO M M F = H O H I L I 7 E D M I L I T A R Y FORCE MMF.K=(DMF.K) ( M F 0 r F . K ) M F D M F = M O B I L I Z E V F U A C T I O N OF D O M E S T I C M I L I T A R Y FOUCE MFDMF.K=(OMF.K/TFUF.K) (M'4MLP.K) M M Y L P = H I L I T A R Y M O H I L I Z A T I O N M U L T I P L I E U FROM L A T E R A L PRFSSIJRE M M Y L P . K = T A R L E ( T M Y M L P ~ L P P K ~ O * 3 + O 0 5 ) T M M M L P = 0 ~ ~ 0 5 ~ ~ 1 0 ~ ~ 2 0 ~ ~ 4 0 ~ ~ 9 0 ~ 1 ~ 0 T F Y F - T O T A L F O R E I G N M I L I T 4 R Y FORCE TF YF.K=DCMF.K +LDCMF.K D C Y F = V C * S M I L I T A R Y FORCE DCW.K=OCMFC DCWFC=DC*S M I L I T A P Y FORCE CONSTANT DCCIFC= L D C M F = L V C t S M I L I T A U Y FORCE LUCMF.K=LDCMFC LUCMFC=LOC'S M I L I T U Q Y FORCE CONSTANT LDCMFC-

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