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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003783

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-76160)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$710 MILLION

TO THE

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

FOR A

WENCHUAN EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY PROJECT

February 27, 2017

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global PracticeEast Asia and the Pacific Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(Exchange Rate Effective May 31, 2016)

Currency Unit = Renminbi (RMB) RMB1.00 = US$ 0.15US$1.00 = RMB6.57

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFD French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)AHH Affected HouseholdsCBD Central Business DistrictCHIP Catastrophic Household Insurance PlanCPS Country Partnership StrategyCSI Core Sector IndicatorEIA Environmental Impact Assessment EMP Environment Management PlanEPP Emergency Project PaperESSAF Environmental and Social Screening Assessment FrameworkFA Force AccountFM Financial ManagementFMM Financial Management ManualGCC Gansu Construction CommissionGDP Gross Domestic ProductGFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and RecoveryGoC Government of ChinaGPG Gansu Provincial GovernmentIEG Independent Evaluations Group (of the Bank) IFI International Financing InstitutionsIOIISR

Intermediate Outcome IndicatorsImplementation Status and Results Report

KPI Key Performance IndicatorLA Loan AgreementLMGMDRC

Longnan Municipal GovernmentMunicipal Development and Reform Commission

M&E Monitoring and EvaluationMIS Management Information SystemMoF Ministry of FinanceMTR Mid-Term ReviewMu Chinese unit of land area measurement (1 ha=15mu)NCB National Competitive BiddingNDRC National Development and Reform CommissionNMP National Masterplan for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of

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Wenchuan Earthquake, State Council, August 2008O&M Operations and MaintenanceOM Operations ManualPAPs Project Affected PeoplePDO Project Development Objectives PDRC Provincial Development and Reform CommissionPFB Provincial Finance BureauPIU Project Implementation UnitPLG Provincial Leading GroupPMO Project Management OfficePOI Project Outcome IndicatorQAE Quality at EntryQAG Quality Assessment Group (of the Bank)RAP Resettlement Action PlanRCCRRC

Roller Compacted ConcreteRapid Response to Crises

SA Social AssessmentSPG Sichuan Provincial GovernmentTA Technical Assistance TF Trust FundWDS Western Development Strategy (of GoC)WTP Water Treatment PlantWWTP Wastewater Treatment Plant

Regional Vice President: Victoria Kwakwa, EAPVPCountry Director: Bert Hofman, EACCF

Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez, GSURRSector Manager: Abhas K. Jha, GSURR

Project Team Leader: Paul Procee, GSURRICR Team Leader: Wanli Fang, GSURR

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PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery Project

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DatasheetA. Basic Information.......................................................................................................ivB. Key Dates....................................................................................................................ivC. Ratings Summary........................................................................................................ivD. Sector and Theme Codes.............................................................................................vE. Bank Staff.....................................................................................................................vF. Results Framework Analysis.......................................................................................viG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs......................................................................xH. Restructuring (if any)...................................................................................................x

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design.................................................12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes................................................53. Assessment of Outcomes............................................................................................144. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome..........................................................235. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance.......................................................246. Lessons Learned.........................................................................................................28

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing............................................................................31Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................32Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis...................................................................51Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes..............61Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR.......................63Annex 6. Land Acquisition and Resettlement Experiences............................................65Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents........................................................................69Annex 8. Photos before and after the WERP project.....................................................70

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CHINA: Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery Project

DATASHEET

A. Basic InformationCountry: China Project Name: Wenchuan Earthquake RecoveryProject ID: P114107 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-76160ICR Date: 02/21/2017 ICR Type: Core ICRLending Instrument: ERL Borrower: People's Republic of ChinaOriginal Total Commitment:

USD 710.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 695.80M

Revised Amount: USD 710.00MEnvironmental Category: AImplementing Agencies: Longnan Municipal Government, Gansu Provincial Government Sichuan Provincial Construction Commission, Sichuan Provincial Health BureauCo-financiers and Other External Partners: French Development Agency

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 10/31/2008 Effectiveness: 06/17/2009 06/17/2009

Appraisal: 11/13/2008 Restructuring(s):11/19/201206/16/201401/23/2015

Approval: 02/12/2009 Mid-term Review: 05/14/2012 05/28/2012 Closing: 06/30/2014 05/31/2016

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: SatisfactoryQuality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Moderately Satisfactory

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Agency/Agencies:Overall Bank Performance: Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA): None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Energy efficiency in Heat and Power 2 2 General education sector 5 5 General transportation sector 25 25 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 55 55 Health 13 13

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Municipal governance and institution building 3 3 Natural disaster management 97 97

E. Bank StaffPositions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Victoria Kwakwa James W. Adams Country Director: Bert Hofman David R. Dollar Practice Manager: Abhas K. Jha Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez & Keshav Varma Project Team Leader: Paul Procee Mara Warwick ICR Team Leader: Wanli Fang &

Paul Procee ICR Primary Author: Geoffrey Spencer

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F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)To restore essential infrastructure, health, and education services to at least levels existing prior to the Wenchuan Earthquake, and where appropriate, to provide for expansion of services, while reducing the vulnerability to seismic and flood hazards and building capacity of local governments to manage the recovery program. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)Not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from approval

documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target

YearsIndicator 1*: Sichuan - Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural (Kilometers, Core) Value Km 0 0 200 218Date achieved 05/12/2008 06/30/2014 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

109% achievement. All roads designed and built to new seismic codes. One minor section of Lingjiang West road (1.86km), delayed because of difficulty in getting National Railway Authority approval, is now under construction and will be completed by March 31, 2017.

Indicator 2: Sichuan - Percentage of project roads with traffic restored to pre-earthquake levels (Percentage, Custom)

Value % 0 100 100 100Date achieved 05/12/2008 06/30/2014 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

100% achievement. All road subproject design and specifications were approved to not only restore pre-quake service but also to meet traffic projections. Design also included many enhanced traffic flow and control and safety features as well as enhanced features for pedestrian access and safety.

Indicator 3*: Sichuan - Number of water utilities that the project supports Value No. 0 -- 14 14Date achieved 05/12/2008 -- 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

100% achievement. In Sichuan a total of 14 utilities were supported, 6 focused on sewerage and 8 on water supply services. The project supported the reconstruction/construction of 6 WWTPs and 8WTPs as well as 116.5 km of water supply, 442.9 km of sewage and drainage pipelines, and four booster pumping stations.

Indicator 4: Sichuan - Percentage of county towns with water supply services that are at a minimum restored to pre-earthquake levels (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. The actual combined capacity of WTPs in Sichuan was +60% above pre-earthquake levels. Subproject criteria ensured that schemes were designed and built to restore and sustain services, based on 10-year population and demand protections.

Indicator 5*: Sichuan - Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped (Number, Core) Value No. 0 -- 60 60Date achieved 05/12/2008 -- 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % 100% achievement. All 60 health facilities were completed, fully equipped and are

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achievement) fully functional. Indicator 6: Sichuan - Percentage of reconstructed (a) county health facilities and (b) township

health facilities that reach bed occupancy rates not below 2007 levels (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. The total number of available beds actually increased from 3,221 before the earthquake to 5,374 as a direct result of project interventions.

Indicator 7*: Gansu - Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural (Kilometers, Core) Value Km 0 -- 35.9 36.1Date achieved 05/12/2008 -- 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

101% achievement. All roads were designed and built to new seismic codes. *Bank-wide Core Sector Indicators added in June 2014

Indicator 8: Gansu - Percentage of project roads with traffic restored to pre-earthquake levels (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. All road subproject design and specifications were approved on the basis of future traffic projections. Design also included many enhanced traffic flow and control and safety features as well as enhanced features for pedestrian access and safety.

Indicator 9*: Gansu - Number of water utilities that the project supported Value No. 0 -- 5 5Date achieved 05/12/2008 -- 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

100% achievement. In Gansu a total of 5 utilities were supported, of which 3 were sewerage and 2 on water supply. The project supported the reconstruction/construction of three WWTPs and 2 WTPs as well as 62.8 km of water supply and 109.2 km of sewage pipelines.

Indicator 10: Gansu - Percentage of county towns with water supply services that are at a minimum restored to pre-earthquake levels (Percentage, Custom)


Only 50% achievement. One of the two water treatment plants (WTP) was not yet completed and connected. Cheng County WTP is expected to be operational in June 2017, once the Moba Gorge dam reservoir has been filled. Both WTPs were designed and approved based on projected 10-year population and demand growth figures.

Indicator 11*: Gansu - Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped (Number, Core) Value No. 0 -- 7 7Date achieved 05/12/2008 -- 5/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

100% achievement. All 7 health facilities were completed, fully equipped and are fully functional.

Indicator 12: Gansu - Percentage of reconstructed (a) county health facilities and (b) township health facilities that reach bed occupancy rates not below 2007 levels (Percentage, Custom)

Value % 0 100 100 100Date achieved 05/12/2008 06/30/2014 5/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % 100% achievement. The average total number of available beds actually increased

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achievement) +35% above pre-earthquake level as a direct result of project interventions. Indicator 13*: Gansu - Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at all school levels

resulting from project interventions (Number, Core) Value No. 0 -- 186 186Date achieved 05/12/2008 -- 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

This indicator captures all schools built/completed by the project, i.e., middle, secondary and vocational level schools.

Indicator 14: Gansu - Percentage of reconstructed (a) primary and (b) secondary schools that reach enrollment rates of (a) 99% and (b) 80% respectively (Percentage, Custom)


100% achieved. This indicator captures all schools built/completed by the project, i.e., middle, secondary and vocational level schools. Primary schools were dropped from the project and funded under the domestic earthquake recovery program.

Note: Indicators marked * are Bank-wide Core Sector Indicators added in June 2014.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Infrastructure Sichuan - Percentage of total project assets (measured by sector with appropriate indicators) built to applicable government standards (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. All infrastructure subprojects, including roads, bridges, flood control and river training, WWTPs and WTPs were designed and approved to ensure compliance with relevant government seismic and flood standards.

Indicator 2: Health Sichuan - Percentage of total number of project health facilities built to applicable government standards that address flood and seismic hazards (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. All 60 health subprojects, including multi-story hospital buildings were appraised and approved to ensure compliance with relevant government seismic and flood standards.

Indicator 3: Health Sichuan - Percentage of restored project facilities that are fully equipped according to government standards (Percentage, Custom)


100% Achieved. Provincial and County Health authorities had input into and signed off on the equipment procured for each of the 60 health facilities completed.

Indicator 4: Capacity Building Sichuan - Percentage of PMO/PIU staff trained in project management processes for earthquake reconstruction (Percentage, Custom)

Value % 0 100 100 100Date achieved 05/12/2008 06/30/2014 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments 100% achievement. For the infrastructure PMO, a total of 54 training courses were

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(incl. % achievement)

organized and run during project implementation involving a total of 1621 training days. For the Sichuan Health PMO a total of 1050 training days were recorded.

Indicator 5: Infrastructure Gansu - Percentage of total project infrastructure assets (measured by sector with appropriate indicators) built to applicable government standards that address flood and seismic hazard (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. All infrastructure subprojects, including roads, bridges, flood control and river training, WWTPs and WTPs and Moba Gorge dam were designed and approved to ensure compliance with relevant government seismic and flood standards.

Indicator 6: Health Gansu - Percentage of total number of project health facilities built to applicable government standards that address flood and seismic hazards (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. All 7 health subprojects including multi-story hospital buildings were appraised and approved to ensure compliance with relevant government seismic and flood standards.

Indicator 7: Health Gansu - Percentage of restored project facilities that are fully equipped according to government standards (Percentage, Custom)


100% Achieved. Longnan Municipal and County Health authorities had input into and signed off on the equipment procured for the 7 health facilities constructed. Equipment for all facilities was procured under one large procurement package.

Indicator 8: Education Gansu - Percentage of total number of project schools built to applicable government standards that address flood and seismic hazards (Percentage, Custom)


100% achievement. All education civil works subprojects, including school buildings, laboratories, and sporting facilities, were appraised and approved to ensure compliance with relevant government seismic and flood standards.

Indicator 9: Education Gansu - Percentage of restored project schools that are fully equipped according to government standards (Percentage, Custom)


100% Achieved. Longnan Municipal education authorities had input into and signed off on the equipment for the 7 schools that were built. Equipment for all facilities was procured under one large procurement package.

Indicator 10: Capacity Building Gansu - Percentage of PMO/PIU staff trained in project management processes for earthquake reconstruction efforts (Percentage, Custom)

Value 0 100 100 100Date achieved 05/12/2008 06/30/2014 05/31/2016 05/31/2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

In Gansu, a total of 930 training days was recorded for training in a broad range of project related topics.

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G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements

(USD millions)

1 06/21/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 62.00

2 06/28/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 125.33



5 12/21/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 514.26

6 06/21/2014 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 563.29

7 12/12/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 612.46




H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructure Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratingsat Restructure Amount

DisbursedUSD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

11/19/2012 No MS MS 260

Reallocation of loan proceeds in the amount of US$8.14 million from Gansu Part 2 (a) Goods and works to the Category 1(b) Consultants’ services and training.

06/16/2014 No MU MU 563

Extension by 23 months (to May 31, 2016) approved to: (i) complete the construction of the Moba Gorge dam; (ii) complete the ancillary water treatment facility in Cheng County, Gansu; and (iii) fully utilize loan savings in Sichuan Province to finance additional infrastructure works (Batch III), purchase health equipment and conduct additional capacity building and training.

01/23/2015 No MS MU 623

Reallocated loan proceeds for Sichuan (Part 1) of project. Goods and works for Infrastructure subprojects - Part 1 (a) (i) was reduced by US7.0 million while Infrastructure Consulting Services -Parts 1(b) and 1(c) were increased by US7.0 million.

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I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. On May 12, 2008, a devastating earthquake of magnitude 8.01 struck southwestern China with the epicenter located in the mountainous Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province, approximately 80 kilometers northwest of the provincial capital of Chengdu. The effects of the earthquake were widespread, with six provinces (Sichuan, Gansu, Shaanxi, Henan, Yunnan, and Hubei) affected. The human cost was over 69,000 fatalities, 374,000 people injured, and about 18,000 remained missing, making it one of the most devastating earthquakes in modern history. Almost immediately after the earthquake2 the World Bank mobilized teams of experts to make its global experience and knowledge in addressing post-disaster challenges available to the Government of China (GoC). Exactly one month after the earthquake, the Bank organized a large workshop in Beijing that brought the world’s top experts on post-earthquake reconstruction to China. In addition, on request from the State Council and other GoC entities, the Bank provided three policy notes and seventeen sector-specific Good Practice Notes to inform the GoC3. The Bank was able to quickly mobilize a $1.5 million grant from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) which supported the involvement of international experts in the preparation of the Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery Project (WERP), and the training of teachers and school staff, as well as hospital staff, to improve emergency preparedness and response in schools and hospitals4. The GFDRR grant also supported the government to review and evaluate the implementation of the Wenchuan Earthquake Reconstruction Master Plan and six sector-specific: rural reconstruction, urban and rural housing, public services and infrastructure, industrial recovery, relocation, and organization and implementation5. The Bank also mobilized a Global Environment Facility (GEF) grant of US$1 million to support assessment of potential chemical contamination from industries affected by the earthquake.

2. In the months following the earthquake, the GoC, in preparing the National Masterplan for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Wenchuan Earthquake (NMP) assessed that 237 counties and districts with a total population of about 115 million (2006 population data) were affected by the Wenchuan Earthquake with the direct economic costs assessed at a staggering RMB 844 billion (US$123 billion).6 Asset damage was severe and wide-spread and included: 34,000 km of highways destroyed; 1,263 reservoirs damaged; 7,444 schools and 11,028 hospitals and clinics in a state of collapse; and houses of more than 4 million families either destroyed or

1 See EPP Table 1 (page 8) for a comparison of the impact of recent major earthquakes around the world. 2 The first meeting on response and recovery was held the day after the earthquake in Washington DC with Chinese officials

visiting the Bank. 3 An example of one of these notes can be seen here: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-1217387111415/Dams_Lakes_en.pdf

4 China: Restoring and Improving Education in Earthquake-Struck Areas – http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/04/10/china-restoring-improving-education-in-earthquake-struck-areas

5 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/12/04/supporting-post-earthquake-recovery-in-china .

6 Data as of November 2008. 1

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/12/04/supporting-post-earthquake-recovery-in-china

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/04/10/china-restoring-improving-education-in-earthquake-struck-areas

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-1217387111415/Dams_Lakes_en.pdf

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-1217387111415/Dams_Lakes_en.pdf

damaged.7 In addition, the earthquake and the large number of secondary disasters caused extensive ecological damage, including landslides, the formation of barrier lakes and destruction of forests.8 The GoC actively sought and utilized the Bank’s policy and good practice notes as well as lessons learned from previous experiences of the Bank, UN agencies and other countries in developing the NMP. Utilizing the NMP and associated sector, provincial and local plans, GoC developed a strategy for post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction, and this project was developed in this context.

3. The two most affected provinces were Sichuan and Gansu, with infrastructure, health and education sectors suffering the most severe damage. Since 2000, these two provinces had been targeted by GoC’s Western Development Strategy (WDS), which focused government poverty reduction and development initiatives in China’s western regions. Sichuan Province, with a then population of 87 million, accounted for one-third of China’s western region population and GDP. Before the earthquake, Sichuan had achieved significant gains through the WDS due to its high agricultural and industrial productivity centered in the Sichuan Basin area. In contrast, the achievements of Gansu Province were more modest due to topographic and resource constraints. Gansu, with a then population of 26 million was the second poorest province in China. From the outset, GoC recognized that the severity of the Wenchuan Earthquake posed a significant threat to development in both provinces and without intervention, unemployment would likely increase and large numbers of people could slip back below the poverty line. It also recognized that in order to reduce the risk of future damage to new and rebuilt infrastructure and to ensure long-term development goals could be sustained, seismic codes and standards needed to be reviewed and strengthened. The Bank’s previous work in Turkey, Pakistan and other countries in developing earthquake resistant building codes, construction methods and monitoring processes was utilized by GoC. The entire government-financed reconstruction program, including this project, was designed to elevate the earthquake disaster standard from a 6.0 event to an 8.0 event on the Richter scale, equivalent to the Wenchuan “event of record” and to inform national policy in that regard.

4. Rationale for Bank Involvement. The Bank was uniquely placed to provide international knowledge, put in place robust fiduciary, environmental, social and related project oversight systems as well as large-scale assistance to the GoC for the reconstruction process in an objective and transparent manner. GoC believed that involving the Bank and using its’ oversight systems in designing as well as implementing this large scale and wide spread reconstruction program would provide the much needed confidence to its constituents. The Bank brought to bear decades of global experience in post-disaster reconstruction, management and prevention, with particular emphasis on the key areas of rigorous oversight of fiduciary and safeguards measures, quality assurance of the overall recovery program, and capacity building and the transferring of lessons learned from past recovery operations. From the China country perspective, the Bank had successfully supported reconstruction after two previous earthquakes9.

5. With its large portfolio in China, the Bank was the only international financier that had experience in all sectors specified for international financing in the GoC’s Recovery Plan. While

7 Estimated as the sum of urban and rural housing units reported in the Masterplan as being destroyed.8 Data from the National Masterplan for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Wenchuan Earthquake.9 The North China Earthquake Reconstruction Project Cr. 2091; Hebei Earthquake Rehabilitation Project Cr. 30787.

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GoC invited other international financing institutions (IFIs)10 to support the reconstruction program, the Bank financed portion of the internationally supported recovery program was the largest and broadest, covering more sectors and geographic areas than any other program. Moreover, through many years of project experience in Sichuan and Gansu, the Bank was especially well positioned to work at the provincial and local levels to assist in this unprecedented task of reconstruction.

6. Project Contribution to Higher Level Objectives. The project was consistent with the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS 2006-2011, Report No. 35435 discussed on May 26, 2006), and was closely aligned with two of the five pillars of the CPS: reducing poverty and inequality and managing resource scarcity and environmental challenges. However, during the CPS mid-term review (2009), GoC identified disaster risk reduction and disaster management as two areas that needed intensified cooperation with the Bank during the remainder of the CPS period. As a result, the Bank formalized its specific support nationally for disaster risk management, and for earthquake reconstruction in the wake of the Wenchuan Earthquake.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

7. The PDO, in both the Loan Agreement and the Emergency Project Paper (EPP), was to restore essential infrastructure, health, and education services to at least levels existing prior to the Wenchuan Earthquake and, where appropriate, to provide for expansion of services while reducing the vulnerability to seismic and flood hazards, as well as building capacity of local governments to manage the recovery program. The four key performance indicators (KPIs) were: (i) the percentage of project roads with traffic restored to pre-earthquake levels; (ii) the percentage of county towns with water supply services that are, at a minimum, restored to pre-earthquake levels; (iii) the percentage of reconstructed county and township health facilities that reached bed occupancy rates not below 2007 levels; and (iv) the percentage of reconstructed (a) primary and (b) secondary schools that reached enrollment rates of (a) 99% and 80% respectively. (This indicator applied to Gansu only.)

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

8. The PDO remained unchanged throughout implementation. A few core sector indicators (CSI) on roads, water, education and health were added to respond to a corporate mandate.

10 To further support the implementation of the Masterplan, GoC requested a total financing envelope of US$ 1.5 billion from four multilateral and one bilateral financing institutions (IFIs): IBRD, Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Investment Bank (EIB), Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Of the total, US$ 1.2 billion was allocated to Sichuan Province, US$ 200 million to Gansu Province, and US$ 100 million to Shaanxi Province.

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1.4 Main Beneficiaries

9. The project supported reconstruction and recovery in 27 of the 41 severely affected counties and directly benefitted about 12.7 million people in the project areas in Sichuan and Gansu.11 Because of the impact of the earthquake, in most counties the entire urban population in one way or another benefitted from the project’s reconstruction activities for schools, roads, drainage, water supply and wastewater treatment, flood control and solid waste management.

10. Project construction activities provided many thousands of jobs for residents of both provinces through proactive social programs to provide employment to at least one member of each affected household. This in turn helped recover livelihoods of many individuals and families, and by having some household income, helped to offset the difficulties associated with service disruptions, communications, travel and living conditions during the recovery and reconstruction period.

11. The project also benefited the provincial, municipal and county level governments of both provinces through the project support components, which provided a broad range of training and capacity building activities related to the Bank’s safeguards, financial management and procurement, as well as technical areas such as investigation, design and contract supervision.

1.5 Original Components

12. The project was divided into two parts: Part 1 involved infrastructure and health projects in Sichuan province; Part 2 infrastructure, health and education in Gansu. A framework approach was developed for the appraisal and supervision of subprojects during implementation.

13. Part 1 – Sichuan Recovery Program (US$531.5 million, 72% of total project cost) to finance investments in the infrastructure and health sectors in severely affected municipalities.

(i) Infrastructure (US$453.5 million - 85.3% of Part 1) - This component was to finance reconstruction and appropriate expansion of infrastructure in about 16 counties in the five municipalities of Mianyang, Guangyuan, Bazhong, Nanchong and Ya’an. Typical eligible infrastructure investments included roads and bridges; water supply; wastewater and drainage systems; municipal solid waste collection and disposal; flood control; slope protection and stabilization; and restoration of waterways. Given the size and number of subprojects, this component was divided into two Batches.

(ii) Health (US$ 58 million - 10.9% of Part 1) - This component was to finance the reconstruction and appropriate expansion of health services in about 19 counties in the seven municipalities of Mianyang, Guangyuan, Bazhong, Nanchong, Ya’an, Chengdu and Deyang, with primary focus on county and township level health service restoration. Eligible facilities included township health centers and county level health facilities.

11 Project direct beneficiaries in the 27 severely affected project counties amounted to 12.7 million people or 73% of the total population in all the assessed 41 severely affected counties. See EPP annex 9 for more information.

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(iii) Project support (US$ 20.0 million - 3.8% of Part 1) - This component was to finance training, capacity building and preparation costs of subprojects such as environmental and social assessments, design, surveys, procurement support, safeguards compliance, project management support, construction supervision, quality assurance and monitoring and reporting.

14. Part 2 – Gansu Recovery Program US$ 206.7 million, 28% of total project cost) to finance specific investments in the infrastructure, health and education sectors in six severely classified counties and one district in Longnan Municipality.

(i) Infrastructure (US$136.5 million – 66% of Part 2) - This component would finance reconstruction and appropriate expansion of infrastructure. Investments included roads and bridges; bus depots; water supply; wastewater and drainage systems; municipal solid waste collection and disposal; slope protection and stabilization; restoration of waterways; and district heating. This component also included the construction of the Moba Gorge dam to provide water to the Cheng County water treatment plant (WTP).

(ii) Health (US$32.6 million – 15.8% of Part 2) - This component would finance the reconstruction and appropriate expansion of health services in five counties, with a primary focus on restoration of health services and facilities at municipal, county and township level, including the provision of necessary equipment.

(iii) Education (US$33.6 million – 16.2% of Part 2) - This component would directly support the Education Sector Reconstruction Plans that aimed to restore and enhance access to public education in selected earthquake affected counties. Investments focused on the reconstruction and appropriate expansion of primary, secondary, and vocational/technical school facilities and the necessary equipment.

(iv) Project support (US$4.0 million – 2% of Part 2) - The component was to finance training, capacity building and engineering costs of subprojects such as environmental and social assessments, surveys, design, procurement support, safeguards compliance, project management support, construction supervision, quality assurance and monitoring and reporting.

1.6 Revised Components

15. The project structure did not change, but in 2014 the scope of the Sichuan infrastructure component was expanded to include six additional subprojects, referred to as Batch III, which were approved through a Level II Restructuring in February 2014. Batch III financed the rehabilitation and construction of an additional 17 roads and rehabilitation and construction of water supply facilities, including ancillary pipelines and one pump station (see Annex 2 for more details). In Gansu, based on the education sector priorities in Longnan Municipality, the education subcomponent was revised to focus on middle and senior secondary and vocational schools rather than primary schools which were rebuilt under the national earthquake recovery program due to the urgency.

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1.7 Other significant changes

16. The project underwent three Level 2 restructurings in 2012, 2014 and 2015 (see section H of the datasheet). The first and third were for minor reallocations of Loan proceeds. The goals of the second restructuring in 2014 were to enable Sichuan province to utilize loan savings of US$41 million to carry out the additional works under Batch III and to extend the Loan closing date by 23 months to accommodate both these extra works and construction delays in Gansu.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Soundness of Background Analysis

17. In the aftermath of this devastating earthquake, GOC swiftly sought information on international best practices in earthquake response. The first meeting with the World Bank on earthquake response and recovery occurred the day after the earthquake with Chinese officials who were already in Washington.

18. From early June to August 2008 GOC conducted a detailed damage and loss assessment, which totaled a staggering RMB 844 billion (US$123 billion),12 and initiated the reconstruction planning in all six affected provinces. The Bank continued to provide information and share international knowledge on demand from the GoC. This resulted in the publishing of the first draft of the NMP by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on August 12, 2008, just three months after the earthquake, with a total estimated cost of RMB 1 trillion (US$ 146 billion). While the planning exercise was a national effort, GOC was very proactive in seeking experience from other countries in drafting the reconstruction masterplan. The plan therefore reflected many of the major lessons presented by experts from other countries, the Bank and the United Nations.

19. The World Bank supported China with an initial US$1.5 million grant through the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). This grant focused primarily on providing technical assistance for the reconstruction planning, but also provided, at the request of the government, emergency tents for the relief effort. A major focus of GoC and the Bank was not only to build back better but also to ensure long-term development goals would be achieved or surpassed. Among other aspects, this required technical inputs in identification, selection and prioritizing investments to ensure optimum use of resources. Learning from past international experience, GoC believed that the Bank’s systems of technical, financial, environmental, social and economic analysis would provide the necessary rigor and help avoid misallocation of resources.

20. Technical assistance (TA) was provided by a team of international experts, many with experience in other recent earthquakes (Turkey, Pakistan), who participated in knowledge exchanges with central and local government officials charged with planning the reconstruction

12 According to the Munich RE Database, the Wenchuan Earthquake was among the three costliest earthquakes in history (https://www.munichre.com/en/reinsurance/business/non-life/natcatservice/significant-natural-catastrophes/index.html)

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efforts. On June 12, 2008, one month after the earthquake, the Bank convened a large workshop entitled “Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction: International Experience and Best Practice” in Beijing. Following that, the Bank team provided, in English and Chinese, three policy notes on housing, education and health as requested by the State Council, and 17 sector-specific Good Practice Notes to support reconstruction planning. As part of this effort, the Bank was specifically asked to rapidly provide global experience on several critical issues, the most notable being the management and safe-breaching of barrier lakes created as a result of landslides in the mountainous areas in Sichuan. This became a serious concern as numerous large lakes, often very difficult to access, were artificially created, putting downstream communities at significant risk of catastrophic flooding. GOC used the Bank’s input on this topic in its emergency actions to stabilize and safely breach the lakes. This became a key integrated part of the reconstruction plan through the inclusion of flood protection assets to safeguard communities from flooding from barrier lakes that could form in the event of a similarly large earthquake in the area.

21. In the weeks after the earthquake the World Bank also facilitated, as executing agency, a Global Environment Facility (GEF) grant of US$1 million to assess potential chemical contamination from industries affected by the earthquake. The International Finance Corporation also helped small and medium-sized businesses in the Chengdu area obtain much-needed financing in the aftermath of the earthquake.

22. In addition to the TA provided during the masterplan development stage, the Bank commissioned a number of background studies and papers including a rapid assessment of the socio-economic status of the project counties before the earthquake along with identification of potential project sites.13 Therefore the project benefited from a sound analytical foundation.

23. In responding to the NMP and in its own early assessments, the Bank built on its expertise and experience from numerous disaster management projects implemented globally. This included the Bank’s Independent Evaluations Group (IEG) Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development - Evaluations of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters, IEG 2006; Natural Disaster Hotspots- a Global Risk Analysis, World Bank 2005; and a number of quick notes that were prepared for GOC and later rewritten as Good Practice Notes in Earthquake Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction. Based on these experiences and lessons learned, multi-disaster risks considerations were later incorporated in the siting of investments and technical designs. Rehabilitation works also considered the long-term development needs of cities. TA was provided using prepared detailed designs and supervision to ensure the project-financed works fully complied with the new standards and codes approved by the GoC for the NMP.

Assessment of Project Design

24. Processed under OP/BP 8.00 on emergency lending, the project was the largest emergency recovery loan (ERL) ever provided by the Bank at the time. For the first time in China, a framework approach was used to evaluate and appraise subprojects. To ensure the quality of works and support the provinces and counties that were already stretched due to the ongoing earthquake reconstruction efforts, the project financed detailed design for the first time in China. The approach used 10 selection criteria to ensure conformity with the NMP and with provincial and local reconstruction and development plans; new and applicable seismic and 13 Assessment of Pre-disaster Conditions in Wenchuan Earthquake Impact Area. Draft Report of 10 October 2008.

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flooding codes and standards; Bank safeguard and other polices; and other technical, social and economic criteria. (See EPP paragraph 50 page 17.) Subproject selection criteria ensured a balance between reconstruction and providing the foundation for the longer-term sustainable economic recovery of project towns. While basically most investments were identified during preparation, the framework approach allowed for flexibility during implementation.

25. Inclusion of Moba Gorge dam. After thorough discussion during preparation it was decided to include the technically complex Moba Gorge dam subproject as it was a critical part of a water supply system for Cheng County in Longnan Municipality. As expected from the outset, the subproject – because of its technical complexity, resettlement issues, and inexperienced local staff – was complicated and caused various delays. In hindsight, it probably would have been better to keep this subproject out of the emergency loan as it took much efforts and energy from the team to complete it.

26. Streamlining financial management and audits. As part of project design, the task team worked with national and provincial audit offices to reduce and simplify national audit procedures to be more suitable for emergency situations. The format and content of audits reports was simplified, but instead of annual reports, semi-annual reports would be prepared to keep close supervision on the use of reconstruction funds. In addition, the GoC (particularly NDRC and MOF) tailored a project approval process, approved by State Council (SC), for this emergency response operation.

27. PDO/KPI. Aligned with the NMP and provincial and local reconstruction plans, the PDO integrated three sub-objectives: (a) restoring essential infrastructure, health and education services; (b) reducing vulnerability to future seismic and flooding events; and (c) ensuring adequate capacity building. The KPIs were clearly stated and designed to measure outcomes with respect to the restoration and/or expansion of services. It was difficult to quantify the final targets because of the framework approach, so the targets were expressed as percentages. The KPIs did not measure Objective (b) but IOIs#1-3 measured the percentage of assets built to applicable government standards. The only indicators of capacity building were IOIs #4 and #10, which could have been combined in a KPI to address PDO (c). While training definitively helped project county staff to improve project identification and supervision and strengthen the management and operation of facilities, the casual chain was less than clear.

28. Safeguards. Because a limited number of environmental Category A subprojects would likely be identified during the screening process, the project was correctly classified as Category A and six safeguard policies were triggered: (i) OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment; (ii) OP/BP 4.04 Natural Habitats; (iii) OP/BP 4.12; Physical Cultural Resources; (iv) OP/BP 4.12 and OD 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement; (v) OP/BP 4.10 Indigenous Peoples; and (vi) OP/BP 4.37 Safety of Dams. Consistent with OP/BP 8.00, an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) was prepared and incorporated into the Operations Manual (OM). The ESSAF, disclosed in the InfoShop on January 13, 2009, was designed to streamline safeguard procedures, operationalize the appropriate safeguard instruments, and ensure full compliance with Bank safeguard policies. Local disclosure of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) and Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for each subproject approved for inclusion would be done during implementation. Social

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assessments were carried out, and the Bank provided TA (especially in Sichuan) to the counties, districts and towns on relocation planning for communities.

29. Adequacy of Government Commitment. Immediately following the earthquake, GoC took a very strong leadership role in the relief effort that was widely commended by the international community for its efficiency.14 The SC was responsible for the overall strategy, planning, policy and management of the reconstruction program, while the NMP was developed by NDRC. Sector plans were jointly developed by the central line ministries and by the affected provinces. Each province quickly set up powerful Project Leading Groups (PLGs), Project Management Offices (PMOs) and Implementation units (PIUs). (See Section 5.2a below.)

Assessment of Risks

30. The overall risk rating at appraisal was substantial and was appropriate given that the framework approach used for Part I had no precedent in China and the large size of the loan. The risk assessment identified nine risks in the areas of institutional, fiduciary and safeguards and technical and rated them either substantial (5) or modest (4). All four risks identified as modest at appraisal turned out to be substantial risks in Gansu. One significant risk, rightly identified as substantial at appraisal, concerned the initial capacity of the PMOs and PIUs. While the project’s risk mitigation measures worked well in Sichuan, they were less effective in Gansu where the PMO was established at the municipal level with inexperienced staff and insufficient provincial level oversight and resources, which led to early implementation delays.

31. Quality at Entry. The project was not subject to a formal quality at entry review by the Bank’s Quality Assessment Group. The strategic relevance and context of the project as part of the NMP and provincial recovery plans and efforts were strong. Despite very rapid preparation, the flexible framework approach stood the test of time. The inclusion of very clear subproject selection criteria allowed the provinces to identify and prepare subprojects efficiently. A few risks were under-assessed but the overall “Substantial” risk rating was correct. Thus quality at entry is considered satisfactory.

2.2 Implementation

32. The project successfully contributed to the restoration of critical infrastructure and helped improve the quality of life of communities affected by the earthquake, with a focus on long-term development of affected cities. During the first year, disbursements were slow as the team focused on appraising and procuring subprojects according to the framework approach. Despite the positive impacts, implementation involved a number of challenges, which led to a period where the project was rated moderately unsatisfactory and a 23 month extension was required.

Factors outside the control of government and implementing agencies

33. Lack of experienced contractors and price increases for constructions materials. The project coincided with a construction boom to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis of 2008, which hindered the project from attracting qualified contractors who were already engaged in

14 EPP page 9 - Government response to Wenchuan Earthquake for more details on the sheer size and scope of the relief phase and the swift actions taken by GoC and local governments.

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much larger projects nationally and were not interested in smaller scale recovery subprojects. In addition, often when a contractor won a bid, some of the works were subcontracted to substandard local contractors, who could not comply with the desired level of quality, diligence and adherence to work schedules. This slowed project progress early in implementation. Also, as a result of the construction boom and the extensive post-earthquake reconstruction efforts in the region, the costs of construction materials rose considerably due to supply shortages.

34. Another factor that slowed implementation was a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that occurred on April 20, 2013 in Lushan County, Sichuan Province. The effects were confined to two project counties in Sichuan and resulted in a suspension of works on Batch II infrastructure subprojects in Lushan and Baoxing Counties for up to six months. The works already completed, however, stood up well as reported in Section 3.5 below. In addition, a number of on-site project contractors supported the government in emergency reconstruction activities in the immediate aftermath of the quake.

35. Effect of currency variations during the extended implementation period. The Loan was in US dollars and at appraisal the exchange rate was US$1 = RMB6.849. The currency steadily depreciated to its lowest point of about US$1 = RMB 6.05 in January 2014 (-11.7% of appraisal). However, at closure the exchange rate had recovered somewhat to US$1 = RMB 6.57(-4.1% of appraisal). The depreciation of the currency occurred during the peak implementation period of the project (2010-2014) and because most contracts were nationally procured, these variations did reduce the funds available and more counterpart funding had to be mobilized to fill the gaps.

Factors within the control of government or implementing agencies

36. Insufficient support from Gansu Provincial Government. Because the Gansu portion of the project took place within Longnan Municipality, the Longnan PMO was established at municipal level. As a consequence, municipal resources could not easily be supplemented with provincial expertise, experience and resources, and because of its remote location, the Municipality could not easily receive provincial level oversight. In Sichuan, by contrast, both PMOs were established at provincial level and had access to provincial level resources that facilitated implementation.

37. Weak capacity of some PMOs and PIUs. The Longnan Municipal Project Management Office (PMO) in Gansu, the Sichuan Health PMO and most of the county-level Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in both provinces had no experience with Bank projects and lacked capacity, leading to delays early in implementation. The main problem, mostly in Gansu, was the lack of capacity to prepare subproject feasibility reports, detailed designs, specifications, procurement documentation and effectively manage implementation. Financial management (FM) capacity issues arose that effectively slowed disbursements. Most issues were rectified by additional training and intensified Bank supervision. In Gansu, the Gansu Provincial Government (GPG) and the Longnan Municipal Government (LMG) were unable to fully resource the required staff positions. The result was a lack of practical knowledge and experience on many aspects of implementation, Bank procedures, contract supervision and quality control that hindered implementation.

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38. In contrast, the experienced Sichuan Infrastructure PMO provided strong leadership and close support to the county PIUs to help them overcome their initial lack of capacity. The Sichuan Health PMO and PIUs lacked initial experience at all levels, resulting in a slow start-up. However, the Sichuan Infrastructure PMO also provided the Sichuan Health PMO much support and knowledge transfer, and with good use of capacity building activities and TA, the Sichuan Health PMO quickly built its capacity and implemented the Health component smoothly.

39. Lack of coordinated resettlement action. Some subprojects, especially in Longnan Municipality in Gansu were significantly delayed because of unresolved resettlement issues. Especially the Moba Gorge dam subproject suffered from various challenges. Contrary to Bank advice, the civil works were separated into three packages, with the access road and diversion tunnel contracts awarded in separate packages to inexperienced contractors who performed poorly. Access to the dam site was delayed and constant coordination issues among the different contractors and the lack of strong local supervision hampered progress. The situation was compounded by the inability of some county governments to provide counterpart funding for resettlement in a timely manner. At loan closure, some of the resettlement issues at Moba Gorge dam remain to be addressed. (See Section 2.4 and Annex 6)

40. Mid-term Review (MTR). Separate MTRs were done for each province starting in mid-2012. In Gansu, the Bank identified three issues: (a) GPG and LMG intervention, decision-making and support, were slow, particularly for coordination and resettlement funding; (ii) coordination and communications between project stakeholders were poorly managed; and (iii) understaffing at the Longnan PMO was critical. The Bank strongly recommended reducing the number of junior support staff and replacing them with more experienced technical staff plus a staff person to handle reporting as project-wide progress reporting was largely missing. These issues were raised during the wrap-up meeting, but little staffing action resulted. Eventually the Bank downgraded the DO and IP ratings to Moderately Unsatisfactory in the December 21, 2013 Implementation Status Report (ISR). The Longnan PMO requested a restructuring to reallocate Loan proceeds in order to address short falls in consultancy services costs. The costs of design institutes were also included, as the original allocation for subproject design and supervision was insufficient.

41. In Sichuan, the MTR found that excellent progress was being made with the implementation of both the Health and Infrastructure (Batch II) investments and with safeguards implementation. The Bank recommended that all efforts be concentrated on expediting completion of the remaining Health component subprojects and the procurement of the remaining infrastructure contracts (Batch II). The MTR noted that savings of US$41 million had accrued. The Bank agreed that savings could be used to: (i) cover variations on existing contracts, (ii) enhance the designs and complement facilities of Batch II subprojects; and (iii) include new subprojects in participating cities, as long as they contributed to the achievement the PDO. Ultimately, the project was restructured on June 16, 2014 to accommodate six additional subprojects under the Sichuan Infrastructure component under “Batch III” (See annex 2), to reallocate Loan proceeds to address shortfalls in TA costs under Part 2, and to extend the Loan closing date for both Sichuan and Gansu by 23 months.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

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42. Design. As this was an emergency project, the M&E design was kept simple and straight forward to allow the borrower to focus on reconstruction. All data required for M&E was easily available as part of the day-to-day management and easily identifiable by sector. With the framework approach, it was not possible to quantify outputs at appraisal so most indicators were couched in terms of percentage achievement of activities that would be eventually included. Seven KPIs measured project achievements toward the first sub-objective of restoring services to pre-earthquake levels or better. Ten IOIs measured, by sector, whether: (a) the reconstructed assets had been built to reduce vulnerability to future seismic and flood hazards; (b) whether the health and education assets built were fully equipped to operate in a sustainable manner; and (c) whether adequate capacity building had taken place for the client to properly manage the project. The IOIs were aimed at measuring achievement against the second and third sub-objectives of the PDO, but some could have been elevated to KPI level. The only indicator for the sub-objective of capacity building was “percentage of PMO/PIU staff trained in project management processes for earthquake reconstruction efforts”. Without some quantification of this indicator, it was difficult to establish the casual links between quantity, quality and effectiveness of training outputs and the impact of capacity building outcomes.

43. Implementation. Both Sichuan PMOs provided regular, detailed progress reports, which allowed all stakeholders to effectively monitor progress. In contrast, progress reports from Gansu were intermittent, weak, with little detail, which made it difficult for the Bank to monitor project progress. For the Gansu Education Component, an attempt was made to improve some key indicators, with the Bank strongly recommending that the Longnan PMO work with the Education Bureau to collect data covering: (a) number of new school buildings and classrooms added under the project; (b) number and type of equipment procured for project schools; (c) number of new teaching programs developed with new equipment; (d) number of teachers and principals who joined the project training programs; and (e) total enrollment of project schools from 2009 and 2011. During implementation, it was agreed to not to fund any primary schools in Gansu, so the KPI related to primary schools should have been deleted.

44. At the MTR in Sichuan, the Bank asked the client to prepare more quantitative and qualitative data on the impacts of the project, including: (a) descriptions of how the subproject designs were enhanced for infrastructure facilities and how these facilities were built to higher seismic standards; and (b) the number of patients admitted in project health facilities and the water and wastewater coverage in selected cities compared to pre-earthquake levels. Much of this data has been included in the ICR.

45. In June 2012, in response to a corporate mandate, four CSIs were added, three in each province that quantified achievements in rural road rehabilitation, support for water utilities, and construction/renovation of health facilities and a fourth in Gansu for classroom construction/rehabilitation. Output targets were also set. (See datasheet, section F.)

46. Utilization. From the very detailed records kept by the Sichuan Infrastructure PMO, they were able to track progress on infrastructure Batches I and II and identify savings. This facilitated the June 2014 restructuring which included a Batch III of infrastructure subprojects. In Gansu, the education training data was used to build the capacity and morale of principals, teachers and selected education sector administrators. Training was sequenced ahead of school completion so that teachers and administers were ready once school buildings were handed over.

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2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Environmental and Social Screening Assessment Framework

47. As stated in Section 2.1, the ESSAF was developed at appraisal and included as part of the OM. Every subproject underwent rigorous environment and social assessments that were conducted to encourage public engagement, optimize the subproject design to enhance the benefits particular to vulnerable groups, and mitigate social and environmental risks. Supervision ensured that all social action measures were implemented and the social goals were fully achieved. Where appropriate, the assessments included other safeguard policies applicable to a particular subproject (e.g., Dam Safety). For each subproject, specific EIAs, EMPs, RAPs were developed, disclosed locally and approved by the Bank. There were initial implementation problems with RAPs, EMPs and dam safety issues, particularly in Gansu. However, at loan closure, both provinces had complied satisfactorily with the Bank’s safeguard policies.

48. Environmental Assessment (O.P. 4.01). The management of environmental issues was satisfactory in both provinces. The PMOs had dedicated staff for environmental management and the appropriate mitigation and management measures were incorporated in the individual EMPs. Each PMO engaged consultants to independently monitor and supervise EMP implementation. Given the overall improvements in quality of urban infrastructure and greening, increase in wastewater treatment, proper hospital waste treatment, the environmental outcomes were positive, although not specifically quantified. (See Section 3.2)

Involuntary Resettlement (O.P. 4.12)

49. Social Safeguards - Resettlement. Each province engaged an experienced social development team as external and independent monitoring agents of social safeguards implementation. In Sichuan, the agent supplied regular M&E reports on resettlement and land acquisition. In Gansu, difficulties with resettlement required the realignment or replacement of certain roads sections and delayed progress on the Moba Gorge dam. Most issues were resolved satisfactorily except for compensation of forest land for the Moba Gorge reservoir, which was below agreed rates and is being rectified by GPG. The Longnan PMO engaged separate consultants to monitor and supervise the associated land acquisition and resettlement activities, which have been mostly completed satisfactorily with the exception of the compensation rate for the forest land.

50. Land acquisition and compensation. Close attention to design helped minimize land acquisition and house demolition. The total population affected by permanent land acquisition was 14,218 people in 3,711 households. A total of 284.ha of land were permanently acquired and another 132.6 ha of land were temporarily acquired. The total cost of land acquisition and compensation was about US$84.82 million. All land acquisition and compensation were generally dealt with in accordance with the Bank approved RAPs. Assessment reports showed that implementation was completed successfully and that the standards of living of the Project Affected People (PAPs) improved. Therefore, the implementation of this safeguard is rated satisfactory. A few issues related to the compensation rates for the acquisition of forest land to be inundated by the Moba Gorge dam were not resolved before loan closing. Actual compensation paid was based on leasing the land, while the Bank required the land to be permanently acquired

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as agreed in the RAP. The Bank is monitoring the situation to ensure compliance with the RAP. (See Annex 6.)

51. Safety of Dams. Immediately after the earthquake, the Provincial Water Resource Bureaus in both provinces carried out rapid assessments of all dams to confirm their safety. These rapid assessments were used to appraise each subproject. Only the Moba Gorge subproject involved actual construction of a new dam using roller compacted concrete -- a relatively new construction technique requiring close supervision and quality control. By December 2016, the construction was substantially completed, with the client assuring the Bank they would continue close supervision and conduct a final independent dam safety review. Because of this, compliance with the Bank’s dam safety policy at closing was satisfactory.

52. Financial management. The PMOs in Sichuan and Gansu ensured that funds were allocated to eligible activities, and audit reports did not raise any problems with mismanagement of funds. As part of project preparation, the task team worked with national and provincial audit offices to adapt national audit procedures to be more suitable for emergency situations. In addition, the GoC (in particular NDRC and MOF) tailored simplified approval processes for subprojects appraised under this unique emergency response operation. Audit reports for both provinces were conducted by independent auditors satisfactory to the Bank and reports consistently received unqualified “clean” opinions. Therefore, FM compliance was satisfactory.

53. Procurement management. Early in implementation, many procurement management problems occurred due to lack of capacity, but improvements were achieved over time and close and frequent supervision by the Bank resulted in overall satisfactory compliance with the procurement policies. The Bank’s procurement systems did not allow the much required flexibility in raising thresholds to allow appropriate national bidders to participate and which led to some delays. The Longnan PMO was at times under-resourced, with inexperienced staff that made procurement management and contract supervision challenging. Often contracts were not properly extended, and many variations were required to address various shortcomings. The Bank’s Integrity Vice-Presidency unit (INT) was involved in a total of 11 cases, all of which were satisfactorily resolved.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

54. The checking and acceptance of completed assets were completed by the responsible PMO/PIU and the receiving owner. The Provincial Development and Reform Commissions (PDRCs) and Provincial Finance Bureaus (PFBs) were also involved as representatives of GoC who is responsible for loan repayment. The county/township bureaus and/or water and wastewater have ongoing O&M responsibilities for other assets and are accountable for service provision. Some costs are being recovered from user fees in the water and wastewater sectors and from health insurance (about 30%). For roads and solid waste, O&M costs are provided from general tax revenue. In most sectors, national and provincial governments reliably provide subsidies to cover the full O&M costs.

55. Infrastructure. In Sichuan, a framework plan for O&M of infrastructure assets was adopted by each county. In Yanting County newly built roads and bridges were added to an existing private, third party performance-based contract for O&M of all roads and bridges. In

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Gansu, the Longnan PMO wrote a Handbook of As-built Inspection Procedures and Project Handover and a Handbook of Operations and Maintenance Management after Project Completion. In Cheng County, the county government entered into a long-term performance based contract with a third party private company for the O&M of the new wastewater treatment plant (WWTP). For the Moba Gorge dam, a facility specific O&M and emergency preparedness plan has been prepared with input from the dam safety panel. After completion, check and acceptance, it will be handed over to the Cheng County Water Bureau.

56. Health. The 67 hospitals and health clinics were handed over for O&M to the respective County Health Bureaus. The major hospitals at county level are managed at two levels, with: (i) a high level external oversight committee generally set up at County Party Secretary Level that provides the necessary budget to maintain standards and performance; and (ii) an internal management and administrative committee comprising the heads of medical, technical and administrative departments of the hospital. Hospital performance is actively managed through on-going staff development and training and by improving patient care and support through new, very proactive and well developed “patient centered” feedback and management systems.

57. Education. The seven new schools in Longnan Municipality were handed over to the respective County Education Bureaus who are responsible for O&M. Sustainability of these schools is highly likely because: (a) the school building and surrounds are modern, of high quality, and fully equipped with up-to-date fittings and teaching aids; (b) the principals, teachers and administrators are well trained and motivated; and (c) supporting education is a high priority.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Relevance of the PDO. Rating: High

58. The PDO was highly relevant at appraisal and remained relevant through completion. At appraisal it was closely aligned with the CPS (2006-2013) as detailed in section 1.1. At loan closure, the PDO remained highly relevant and supported strategic theme 1 of the current China CPS (2013-2016), specifically in the sub-theme area of enhancing urban environment services and a national focus on assisting other cities to build urban resilience to natural disasters. The PDO was closely aligned with GoC’s NMP and the comprehensive national sector plans that included infrastructure, urban development, housing, public services (health, education, and social protection), land use planning, disaster risk reduction and ecological restoration planning. The project was also aligned with provincial and county-level reconstruction plans, which provided more detail and focus on local reconstruction priorities and requirements.

Relevance of Design. Rating: Substantial

59. The project’s framework approach remained substantially relevant and allowed the Bank to respond quickly and flexibly. The subproject selection criteria ensured compliance with the principle “Build Back Better Plus” and project construction activities all used the higher seismic-proof standards and flood risk management codes, which together could lead to achieving the PDO. The “Build Back Better ‘Plus’” approach also recognized the need to not only replace the

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damaged infrastructure with more resilient infrastructure, but also embedded development in the project so that project counties would not be left behind compared to non-affected counties. Related to this, the project design aimed at maintaining a balance between reconstructions and providing the foundation for the longer-term sustainable economic recovery of project towns.

60. The project was designed to be implemented in three phases: first, start with subprojects that qualified for retroactive financing for emergency and immediate assistance activities; then continue with subprojects that involved reconstruction or repairs of high priority assets, which could be rebuilt in the original location to allow quick recovery of basic services; and finally more complex subprojects that typically involved construction of assets in new locations to either restore or enhance service levels to communities that were forced to relocate from dangerous affected areas. The April 2014 restructuring allowed the use of loan savings to finance a third Batch of infrastructure subprojects in Sichuan, and with the 23-month extension, these measures further enhanced achievement of the PDO.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

61. The PDO comprised three sub-objectives: (i) restoration of essential services to at least pre-earthquake levels and where appropriate, provide for expanded services; (ii) reduction of the vulnerability of seismic and flood hazards; and (iii) building capacity of the local governments to manage the recovery program. The framework approach meant that each subproject would be appraised using the criteria in the OM: (i) inclusion in and consistent with national and local reconstruction and development plans; (ii) within the targeted sectors; (iii) given priority if they targeted vulnerable groups; (iv) consistent with the Bank’s OP/BP 8.00; (v) consistent with national/provincial/local standards and codes; (vi) designed to ensure sustainability; (vii) designed rationally and efficiently, and appropriately scaled and phased; and (viii) could be completed before loan closing.

62. Anecdotal evidence suggests a number of positive environmental outcomes from the project, including reduced pollution because of increased WWTP capacity by a combined amount of 31,120 m3/day, and in particular because of the focus in both provinces on the separation of storm water from sewage in sewerage networks and, in some communities, new or increased solid waste collection in Cangxi County and Yuanba District by 42%, and improved the Yuanba disposal facilities with capacity of 77 tons/day. In the health sector, positive outcomes came from building proper disposal facilities for medical waste at hospitals and some of the larger clinics.

63. Of the 136 subprojects approved, 133 (98%) were completed before closing. Sectoral achievements were: Infrastructure 57 out of 60 subprojects (95%); Health all 67 (100%); and Education all seven (100%). Two of the three remaining subprojects relate to water supply in Cheng County, namely the construction of the Moba Gorge reservoir and the associated WTP, which should be fully operational by the summer of 2017. The only incomplete subproject in Sichuan – a 1.86 km road from Batch III – is discussed below.

PDO (a) - Restore essential infrastructure, health and education services to at least levels existing prior to the earthquake. Rating: Substantial

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Infrastructure Sector Rating: Substantial

64. Roads. The project completed the rehabilitation of 240 km of roads against the original target of 218 km, which did not include the additional Batch III investments in Sichuan. The only road not yet completed is the Lingjiang West Road in Chaotian but is expected to be completed no later than March 31, 2017 using domestic funds. (Refer to KPIs #1 and #7 on non-rural roads rehabilitated for Sichuan and Gansu respectively.)

65. Approved designs and specifications ensured that all roads and bridges were built to new seismic standards. Road widths were increased based on future design traffic volumes, and designs included enhanced features such as lane separation and the separation of slow moving push bicycles and motor bikes/scooters. Traffic control systems, including traffic lights, signage, lane marking, and street lighting were installed. Greater attention was paid to pedestrian safety with installation of walk ways and improved pedestrian flow at traffic lights. Curbing, channeling, street drainage and wide foot paths were installed and landscaping undertaken. To enhance traffic flow in downtown city areas, much attention was paid to the control and provision of both on and off street parking.

66. Per KPI #2 and #8, these works enabled traffic to be not only restored to pre-earthquake levels, but have on average increased the percentage of sealed roads by 72% in project counties in Sichuan and 18% in project counties in Longnan Municipality, Gansu. The increases in traffic are the result of project investments in road improvements, but also partially due to the overall county development that was part of the Building Better Back ‘Plus” principle (See photo display in Annex 8).

67. Water/Wastewater. The project supported a total of 19 utilities, restoring and improving water supply and wastewater services to selected counties. (See KPIs #3 and #9). In Sichuan the project restored 100% of water supply services to pre-earthquake levels (KPI #4); in Gansu only 50% of county towns had water service restored (KPI #10). A total of 10 water supply plants (combined capacity of 148,650 m3/day) and nine wastewater subprojects (combined capacity of 31,120 m3/day) were constructed. Among them, 14 were in Sichuan and five in Gansu. The water supply subprojects included the reconstruction/construction of 10 WTPs all built with enhanced capacity, based on a 20-year planning horizon of projected demand. A total of 230 km of water supply pipelines and four pumping stations (combined capacity of 36,500 m3/day) were built, which improved access, pressure and flow of water to households and commercial/industrial users, as well as for urban fire-fighting purposes. The outcome of the investments was an average increase of 25% in coverage of households and commercial buildings with a continuous 24-hour water supply compared to the pre-earthquake situation.

68. Wastewater subprojects rehabilitated or constructed nine WWTPs, all built with a combined capacity of 31,120 m3/day to service a growing population. In addition, 102.5 km of sewerage pipelines and 492.5 km of storm water drainage pipelines, which separate storm water drainage from many existing sewerage systems, were built. These subprojects improved the efficiency of the WWTPs as the concentration of the raw sewage requiring treatment increased. As a result of this project, the treatment ratio of sewage in project counties increased by 52% in Sichuan and 51% in Gansu over the pre-earthquake situation (see annex 3). At the same time, the amount of untreated effluent discharged in rivers and streams has been reduced, as they no

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longer received polluted storm water from overflows. Sichuan achieved an increase of 62% on average in the separation of sewage from storm water, while Gansu achieved a more modest 22% increase because it already had a relativity high separation rate (See annex 3).

69. For solid waste collection and disposal (in Sichuan province only), investments under this project lead to an average increase of 42% in the collection and disposal ratio of solid waste garbage compared to the pre-earthquake situation. (See detailed information in Annex 3.) All water, wastewater and solid waste subprojects were completed and are fully operational except for the WTP in Cheng County, Gansu. Because of delays in completing the Moba Gorge dam, this WTP is not operational. At closure, all works were under construction and dam construction was practically completed, while the WTP is 85% completed. Filling of the reservoir should commence early in the 2017 wet season to allow raw water to be diverted to the WTP by June 2017. The whole system should be fully operational by the end of the summer of 2017.

Health Sector Rating: High

70. The project constructed and equipped 67 health facilities (60 in Sichuan, seven in Gansu) which are fully operational, meeting KPIs #5 and #11. All county and township level hospitals and clinics can now accommodate more beds than in 2007. In Sichuan prior to the Wenchuan earthquake, the number of beds in clinics in the project area totaled 3,221. As a direct result of the project, the number of hospital beds available is 5,374, or an increase of 67%, exceeding KPI #6. Similarly, in Gansu the number of beds before the Wenchuan Earthquake was 4,532 and as a direct result of the project, the number rose to 7,767, or a 35% increase, thereby exceeding KPI#12. The new facilities house greatly enhanced diagnostic, treatment and pharmaceutical capability, new intensive care units, modernized equipment such x-ray and MRIs, modernized operating theatres and emergency rooms that provide a wider range of in-patient and out-patient medical services, now resulting in higher admissions than before the earthquake.

Education Sector (Gansu Only) Rating: Substantial

71. The project built or reconstructed a total of 186 additional classrooms, meeting the target (see KPI#13) as part of rebuilding seven middle, high and vocational schools. Originally the project was to reconstruct primary schools as well. However, due to the urgency, the rebuilding of primary schools was funded not under the loan, but under the national earthquake recovery program based on the education sector priorities in Longnan Municipality (see Section 1.6).

72. The seven new schools are fully operational, equipped with text books, computer equipment and laboratories, classroom, canteen and dormitory furniture, and sporting equipment (complete list in annex 2). To ensure the early functionality of the new schools, a trust fund (TF) from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)15 for US$410,000 was used exclusively to train principals, teachers and administrators using recognized international specialist consultants working with the Longnan Municipal Education Committee to identify training needs. This training was carried out before completion of the civil works so the new schools could quickly reach their full functionality. Training courses involved 450 teachers and covered a broad range of education topics, including new emergency management procedures.

15 GFDRR Trust Fund TF092994 CHINA: Supporting Sustainable Post-Earthquake Recovery in China (GFDRR Track III-TA).

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PDO (b) - Reducing vulnerability of seismic and flooding hazards. Rating: High

73. Seismic Standards. The entire GOC-financed reconstruction program, including this project, was designed to meet earthquake disaster standards based on an 8.0 event on the Richter scale, compared with the old standard of 6.0. Within one month after the earthquake, the Post‐Wenchuan Earthquake Restoration and Reconstruction Ordinance was approved for the Sichuan post‐disaster reconstruction by SC. Based on field surveys and studies of damage to different types of buildings, seismic design codes were revised and incorporated into the “Standard for classification of seismic protection of building constructions GB50223‐2008” and “Code for Seismic Design of Buildings GB50011‐2001.” The definition of seismic fortification for buildings was revisited, and, as a result, the seismic classifications for schools, hospitals and other buildings that house large populations (evacuation shelters, information centers) were upgraded in accordance with the GB50223‐2008 Code. The revised code included: (a) modification of the seismic intensity specified for the Provinces of Sichuan, Shanxi and Gansu; (b) revision of the conceptual design for retaining walls and building foundations in mountainous areas; (c) revised regulations for building configurations; (d) integration of masonry structures and pre‐cast reinforced concrete floors; (e) requirements for calculating and detailing stairway shafts; and (f) limiting the use of single‐bay reinforced concrete frame structures. The seismic designs of the project roads followed the revised national codes of Guidelines for Seismic Design of Highway Bridges (JTG/TB02-01-2008) and Specification of Seismic Design of Highway Engineering (JTG B02-2013).

74. All project financed civil works were designed and constructed strictly in accordance with the revised national codes and standards. During construction, consultant services for construction supervision and quality control were funded as part of the Project Support for each province to ensure that works were built in accordance with the revised standards. Special attention was given to siting buildings to reduce risks to earthquakes and floods.

75. The application of the new standards was tested by the Lushan Earthquake (7.0 on the Richter scale) that struck Lushan County in Sichuan, a WERP-supported county, on April 20, 2013. The resilience and quality of the project financed basic infrastructure and health facilities completed under Batch I in Lushan and neighboring Baoxing County were demonstrated as all assets substantially withstood the earthquake with only minor damage. The roads, water supply networks and health facilities remained fully operational and provided critical support to the emergency response activities.

76. Flood Standards. As part of a multi-hazard comprehensive risk reduction approach, the project also supported the construction of flood risk reduction infrastructure. The existing national design standards for flood protection/dike strengthening are detailed in GB50201-94, which defines the level of urban protection required for towns and cities in the project. The provisions of this Code were included in the selection criteria for subprojects, including river flood protection systems and riverside roads and major drainage systems. During construction, consultant services for construction supervision and quality control were funded under “Project Support” to ensure works were built in accordance with the flood standards.

PDO (c) - Building the capacity of local governments to implement the project. Rating: Substantial

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77. The three PMOs designed and implemented a comprehensive training program that covered a wide range of subjects, including World Bank requirements for safeguards requirements to implement the ESSAF, procurement and financial management, as well as technical subjects such as engineering design and construction supervision. The three PMOs hired expert consultants to assist with their own and PIU capacity building to enhance their management skills. Training was provided by international and national consultants financed from the loan and from the French TF and GFDRR. Bank staff also provided much training, particularly in early in implementation. This training allowed IOIs #4 and 10 to be 100% met.

78. During the project, the Sichuan Infrastructure PMO delivered 1,621 training days; the Sichuan Health PMO 1,150 training days; and the Longnan PMO 930 training days for a total of 3,701 days. The training programs built the required capacity of the staff and project managers to carry out their mandates. In Sichuan the required management capacity was built more quickly than in Gansu as both PMOs in Sichuan had more capacity and resources to support training activities. The training programs also included subproject owners, County and Township Bureaus and utilities on O&M, and consultant supervisors, quality control and safety personnel with project implementation responsibilities. The high achievements under each subcomponent are a good indicator of the effectiveness of the capacity building activities. (See Annex 2.)

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Substantial

79. The efficiency of the project investments was assessed based on (i) cost effectiveness (through a comparison of the planned costs and physical outputs with the actual costs and physical outputs of the investments); (ii) delivery of objectives, namely, the restoration of essential infrastructure services compared with pre-earthquake levels; and (iii) the level to which the resilience and recovery of the local economies corresponds to the level of the recovery of essential infrastructure services.

80. Cost effectiveness. In Sichuan, the project supported reconstruction and recovery in 16 counties. At appraisal, total investment costs were estimated at US$531 million to be implemented over two batches, which factored in the premium for higher seismic standards. Through design optimization, competitive bidding, contract standardization and close cost-monitoring during project implementation, Batches I & II of the infrastructure investments were completed by June 2014, with the exception of a bridge in Cangxi County, according to the original plan at considerably lower cost. Loan savings of approximately US$41 million alongside additional counterpart funds were allocated toward financing a Batch III of infrastructure investments. At closing, all physical works except one small Batch III road were completed according to plan with longer roads and wastewater pipes (see Table 2.1) financed entirely with loan savings and additional counterpart funds.

81. In Gansu, where the project supported reconstruction and recovery in seven counties in Longnan Municipality, at project completion all planned physical components had been completed, except for Moba Gorge dam and the associated WTP, which proved complex and suffered delays. The two subcomponents had a combined cost of around US$31 million, most of

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which had been disbursed in spite of the delays. At closing, with the 23-month extension, the total investment costs stood at 99% of the original estimate, which also considered the revised seismic standards. The two remaining two subprojects were substantially completed and the WTP will be fully operational in June 2017. As a result, project investments in Gansu are considered generally cost effective, be it with a major implementation delay related to the dam construction and a few section of roads.

82. Restoration of essential infrastructure services. In both Sichuan and Gansu, the overwhelming evidence shows that essential infrastructure and services, such as water, sanitation, roads, health and education, have not only been restored, but also been enhanced from the pre-earthquake levels in both the project areas and in the larger statistical areas where the project resided vis-à-vis the balance of urban areas in the province. It can be concluded, with confidence, that the project improved the quality and reliability of infrastructure services and enhanced the overall development of the project counties. Moreover, directly due to project efforts, wastewater treatment coverage is approaching 100% in at least two project counties in Gansu, while five other project counties have more than 95% of their storm water network separated from the wastewater network. Annex 3 provides more supportive evidence with regard to the restoration and enhancement of essential infrastructure and service levels.

83. For project investments in the health sector, project impacts were substantial in both provinces. Existing hospitals were replaced by much larger, modern and better equipped hospitals and facilities. The buildings were designed to withstand major earthquakes and have more qualified staff to provide medical care and respond to emergencies. In Sichuan, 60 health subprojects were completed satisfactorily and are all currently in operation. After completion, a population of 9.82 million is directly benefiting from improved health care centers and hospitals. Compared to the situation in 2007, before the Wenchuan Earthquake, the total construction area of hospitals increased by 58%, and the working area in hospitals increased by 77%. The number of hospital beds increased by 67% and the number of patients treated increased by 22%. The number of in-patients who left the hospital after treatment increased by 14%. In Gansu, the number of doctors and nurses increased by 6% and 30%, respectively, although total medical personnel decreased by 19% likely due to contractual arrangements of non-core medical personnel. The number of hospital beds increased by 81%; treated patients increased by 53%; and in-patients who left the hospital after treatment increased by 138%. More importantly, patients from those counties also reported higher levels of satisfaction compared with pre-earthquake levels.

84. As for the education sector investments in Gansu, the seven schools were rebuilt at much higher standards and with much improved facilities and education materials than before. Training was provided to principals, teachers and administrators using recognized international specialist consultants and covered a broad range of education topics, including new emergency management procedures. Two schools were among the first subprojects to be completed in 2011, while all others were completed by the end of 2013, well within the original timeframe of the project. Only Wen County No.3 Middle School faced delays with the connection to the water supply network which was being built by the county and was only finished in May 2016. The five project counties in Gansu reported considerably higher middle school acceptance and graduation rates than pre-earthquake levels (see Annex 3).

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85. Recovery of the local economies. Strong evidence suggests that the restoration and enhancement of infrastructure and services have contributed to the rapid recovery of local economies, evidenced by robust growth in (i) gross regional products; (ii) employment; and (iii) per capita income during the same period in the larger statistical areas where the project resided. At the same time, the project counties also experienced unprecedented urbanization, a process without a doubt supported by the project interventions through enhancing urban infrastructure provision in those areas (Annex 3).

86. Cost-benefit of higher seismic standards. Although higher seismic standards increased the costs of infrastructure, the infrastructure built was based on realistic demand estimates and projections to avoid oversizing. The Lushan earthquake in April 2013 demonstrated the importance of improving quality and resilience of infrastructure, but it was not possible to quantify the amount the local government saved from having the infrastructure fully operational to support emergency efforts, the infrastructure only needing minimal or no repair afterwards, and reduction in disruptions to the local economy and population.

87. Administrative efficiency. Although project overhead costs were high, they were commensurate with an operation in terms of size and number of subprojects, and involving two Provinces and three different PMOs. Considerable efforts and resources were devoted to the supervision of the Moba Gorge dam and associated WTP, which was delayed by 23-months, but this did not affect the implementation of the remaining subprojects. In addition, the TA helped develop the capacity of local staff to manage assets and ensure long term sustainability.

88. Overall. Although data was limited, in terms of cost efficiency, the project investments were largely satisfactory, especially in Sichuan, where the investments had generated more outputs with loan savings. In Gansu, the main delays were the result of Moba Gorge Dam and a couple of road sections due to resettlement problems, but overall most investments were finished as planned and within budget.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

89. Justification. The PDO relevance was high and the design was substantially relevant as it supported both the reconstruction efforts as well as long-term development goals. The framework approach provided flexibility to respond to changing demands in a rapidly changing environment. Achievements for infrastructure and education restoration were substantial and high for health. The achievement of reducing vulnerability to hazards was high and achievements for capacity building were substantially met. Efficiency of the project is judged as substantial, so the overall outcome is assessed as Satisfactory.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

90. Although the project did not have a direct poverty focus, it financed infrastructure in lagging regions of both provinces, and the selection criteria for subprojects included one that

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gave priority to subprojects that addressed restoration and strengthening of destroyed or damaged services or facilities especially for vulnerable groups for which no other sources of reconstruction financing were available. In Sichuan, the SPG was so committed to increasing focus on the impoverished and vulnerable that it added a selection criterion focused on poor areas in selected counties, to make it a central part of the project design and implementation.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

91. Sichuan Infrastructure PMO is a permanent institutional fixture within the Provincial Construction Bureau. It has successfully implemented many Bank-funded projects in the past and, because of its permanent nature, is always evolving. Many procedures and processes were developed and implemented under this project, particularly with respect to (a) improving communication and data transfer in a large geographical area through an internet based MIS; (b) the importance of O&M with the development of O&M frameworks and guidance documents; and (c) development of methodologies for prioritizing, screening and appraising specific investments. These processes and procedures will be further tailored and applied widely in the province. In fact, the same very competent PMO director will be in charge of the PMO for the new Bank-financed Lushan Reconstruction and Risk Reduction Project (Ln. 8647-CH) and will adapt many of these same processes and procedures.

92. The framework approach meant that EIAs/EMPs, SAs and RAPs were prepared for each subproject in parallel with the technical designs, which allowed the project to adapt to a rapidly changing local conditions. The PIU and county level agencies also became familiar with the procedures and are starting to apply them to their own investments. The social and environmental input and particularly the community participation and consultation in the process ensured that the best technical solutions were also the most appropriate ones from a social and environmental perspective.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

93. Given the scope of the Wenchuan Earthquake and the huge cost of compensating owners of damaged homes, GoC initiated the idea of a national catastrophe insurance scheme. In May 2016, the Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission and MoF launched the Catastrophe House Insurance Plan System (CHIPS), which is a public-private partnership designed to ease the burden on public finances. At start-up, 45 insurance companies began offering insurance products especially focusing on residential property. The basic insurance coverage will be RMB50, 000 (US$7500) for urban dwellers and RMB20, 000 (US$3000) for rural ones.

94. The GFDRR funded capacity building of school teachers and administrators, which indirectly supported IOI # 9, was so successful, that it was adopted as a World Bank Institute training program for education capacity building China-wide. In addition, the program was recorded as a teaching and training video, linked with the World Bank China website.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Substantial

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95. Risks of economic shocks and financial sustainability from future disasters. (Rating: Substantial). China by nature is susceptible to frequent and severe disasters, with property damage alone estimated at US$15 billion on average each year. The introduction of the CHIPS will ease the financial burden on GOC for compensation costs for residential properties. In order to reduce the associated risks further, CHIPS should be expanded to include disaster insurance for commercial properties. Such assistance would be extremely important for reducing local economic disruptions and facilitating the rebuilding of businesses post-disaster.

96. Risk of damage to project assets. (Rating: Moderate). Even though infrastructure was rebuilt according to GOC’s upgraded seismic codes, there is always a risk that this earthquake-prone region could be affected by an even bigger event. As noted earlier, however, the infrastructure and health assets constructed in Lushan and neighboring Baoxing County withstood the 2013 Lushan Earthquake, with roads and bridges, hospitals and clinics remaining fully functional and being used during the emergency evacuation, rescue and relief operations.

97. Financial sustainability risks at county level and below. (Rating: Substantial). Provincial and national governments are concerned about the financial sustainability risks at local levels, particularly for rapidly growing small cities. Through subsidies, governments are making resources available to cities in the short term, but proper long term capital investment and asset management plans need to be developed by these cities to optimize the allocation of resources and to develop a plan for gradual reduction of subsidies by higher level governments.

98. Risk of not completing some infrastructure subprojects. (Rating: Moderate). The Moba Gorge dam was substantially completed as of December 2016, with the exception of the closure of diversion tunnel and the missing inlet pipe to the Cheng County WTP pending for counterpart fund. A moderate risk remains that the dam and WTP may not be completed as scheduled. Cheng County’s remaining counterpart funding commitment is estimated at 40 million RMB, including funds for the permanent acquisition of the forest land (see Annex 6). To reduce the risks, the County needs to fund the dam safety review committee to oversee the completion of the dam, the filling of the reservoir, and must also fund the close supervision and independent testing and control of the works.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry. Rating: Satisfactory

99. The Bank, at the highest levels, reacted decisively to the emergency, holding discussions with GoC representatives in Washington D.C. on May 13, 2008, less than 24 hours after the earthquake. GoC initially sought information and guidance and the Bank mobilized its considerable global experience and expertise in disaster response. A team was quickly assembled, supplemented with other members of the international community, and liaised closely with GoC, providing advice on international best practice in damage assessment and reconstruction planning. With its long experience in China, the Bank coordinated the other major International Financial Institutions’ efforts for disaster assistance and was able to mobilize two

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grants worth US$2.5 million to support recovery activities. It is testament to this performance that GoC turned to the Bank for support following the 2013 Lushan earthquake.

100. Following the earthquake, while providing TA to GOC on reconstruction planning and preparing the emergency project, the Bank made effective use of the Rapid Response to Crises (RRC) mechanism included in OP8.0. Regular written briefings were provided by the team to senior management, and there was close coordination at all levels within the Bank as GOC developed its proposal for the ERL. The RRC mechanism was formally used at the start of the project preparation, chaired by the Regional Vice President, to allow senior level decisions to be made quickly. Several key decisions were made that significantly enhanced project preparation and the Bank team’s ability to respond, including timely budget allocations, and enhanced delegation of authority to the Beijing office for decisions on procurement, safeguards and FM.

101. The use of a framework approach allowed the Bank to prepare and approve the project very rapidly – within five months16 – and keep pace with GoC and the two provinces as they prepared and began implementing separately funded recovery and reconstruction projects under the NMP. The framework approach was new for China, and the team prepared very detailed guidelines and procedures for the selection, appraisal and supervision of subprojects to ensure achievement of the PDO. While the project ran into early delays due to capacity issues (Section 2.2), implementation eventually ran smoothly, especially in Sichuan. Overall, the framework approach provided the necessary flexibility to respond to demands from counties and districts in a rapidly changing socio-economic environment after the earthquake.

102. Team organization. Bank performance was enhanced through the comprehensive coverage provided by a doubling of teams, with a TTL for Sichuan province and overall coordination, and a separate TTL for Gansu province. The teams combined international and national level staff and high-level consultants to facilitate having people on the ground as much as possible and expedite project preparation. For safeguards, for example, each provincial team included one Bank staff for social and one for environment, combined with at least one additional consultant from each specialization for each team. This set-up helped the team cover much ground work in a short period. A former Bank staff based in Sichuan was contracted as a procurement consultant for Part 1 of the project to ensure day-to-day assistance. The intensity of the work is evident in the Bank’s preparation expenditures, where some US$670,000 and 140 staff weeks were spent to prepare the project. The Bank team also worked effectively across sectors like education and health to ensure the best quality support.

(b) Quality of Supervision. Rating: Satisfactory

103. One reoccurring risk mitigation measure in the appraisal risk assessment was for the Bank to hold quarterly supervision missions, at least in the first two years. Over the first three years of the project, the Bank carried out a total of 25 supervision missions (10 to Sichuan, 15 to Gansu). Annex 4 shows that in FY2010 alone, the Bank spent 138.3 staff weeks and US$525,000 on supervision. After 2012, an additional 16 supervision missions were held (6 to Sichuan, 10 to Gansu). Because of its lack of capacity and continuing management problems, Gansu received

16 The Bank only received a formal request for support in September 2008 –four months after the earthquake – and the loan was approved in February 2009.

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greater supervision attention to improve its performance. The Bank continuously raised problems in Gansu with GoC and GPG, who in turn tried to pressure the LMG with limited success.

104. The Bank team’s supervision strategy involving separate missions to each province was sound. In view of the different challenges in each province, this strategy allowed the Bank to tailor the skills mix and timing of its missions to each province’s needs. The strategy also allowed the production of separate, very detailed aide-memoires and management letters that concentrated on key issues and actions necessary on a provincial/municipal specific basis. This served to enhance communications between the Bank, provincial/municipal leaders, and PMOs/PIUs. The team produced a total of 10 Implementation Status and Results (ISR) reports, which provided frank assessments of progress toward achieving the PDO.

105. Based on the continuing problems in Gansu, after the November 2013 supervision mission, both the PDO and Implementation Progress (IP) ratings were downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory. The downgrade was based on lack of progress with the Moba Gorge dam, particularly due to having to rebid the contracts, poor performances by two out of three contractors, and delays with resettlement progress. The Bank increased its supervision frequency to address these problems and as a result, gradual improvements took place such that the PDO rating was upgraded to Moderately Satisfactory (MS) in December 2014 (ISR #7) and the IP rating to MS in September 2015 (ISR#8). Meanwhile in Sichuan, no major implementation problems were identified, with the only delay related to a railroad crossing permit for one road. Sichuan saw loan savings of $43 million and sought the Bank’s concurrence to utilize these savings to finance a Batch III of subprojects, to which the Bank rightly agreed through the restructuring of June 2014.

Fiduciary, environment and social safeguards supervision was satisfactory. The Bank team consisted of senior staff specialists, supplemented with experienced consultants (environment, FM, social safeguards, procurement and dam safety) that provided the required skills both on missions and in day-to-day contacts with the client. The Bank reviewed and cleared all the safeguards documents in a timely manner. For the Moba Gorge dam subproject, which was a category “A” subproject, the team hired its own dam safety expert to provide independent advice to Bank management. Social staff continue to monitor compliance with the RAP for the Moba Gorge dam as stated in Section 2.4.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

106. The Bank’s performance in both ensuring quality at entry and supervision is rated satisfactory as discussed above.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance. Rating: Satisfactory

107. The assessment of government performance includes that of the GoC as well as the Sichuan Provincial Government (SPG), the Gansu Provincial Government (GPG) and the Longnan Municipal Government (LMG).

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108. Central Government. The performance of GoC in the relief and recovery phases was highly satisfactory and demonstrated global best practice. Using the NMP, associated sectoral, provincial and local plans, and with support from the World Bank and other agencies, GoC developed, in three months a sound, forward-looking and priority driven strategy for the post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction. More specifically, the government decided to target the Bank support to only two of the six affected provinces, namely Sichuan and Gansu, where the Bank had a long-standing relationship and portfolio.

109. GoC’s vision for reconstruction focused not only on restoring basic services and living conditions, but it also strategically embedded the reconstruction efforts in the overall development strategy for both provinces to ensure that economic development in the earthquake affected areas would be sustainable and would surpass pre-disaster levels. This approach recognized the importance of the earthquake affected area in the GoC’s long-standing national poverty reduction strategy, and the risks posed by the earthquake to previous development gains in poverty reduction and economic development. Also, given the national impact of the earthquake, GoC rightly agreed to meet the full cost of the loan and not saddle the provinces with additional financial burden. Furthermore loan funds covered the full cost of eligible expenditure for works, goods and services. However, the cost of relocation, resettlement and land acquisition and some preparation costs were borne through local counterpart funds. GoC also specifically requested the Bank’s involvement in order to bring the monitoring, safeguards and fiduciary rigor to the reconstruction program, as a positive demonstration of effective program design, implementation and management.

110. Provincial Governments. Each provincial government produced provincial and local reconstruction implementation plans, which were consistent with the overall national plans, but provided specific direction based on local reconstruction priorities. As with the NMP, the provincial plans were also completed quickly. In July 2008 Gansu Province issued a draft provincial master plan that detailed its rehabilitation and reconstruction needs in the eight severely affected counties included in the NMP. However, because of the sheer scale and scope of reconstruction needs in Sichuan, the process of developing municipal and county reconstruction implementation plans took longer. It was nonetheless completed by end 2008.

111. SPG provided high level political and bureaucratic support that helped overcome initial implementation problems, particularly in the health sector. Unfortunately, the same level of support was not evident in Gansu. Many problems surfaced in Gansu in the first half of the project as already discussed in Section 2.2, including lack of oversight by LMG; management capacity and coordination issues, problems with resettlement and timely provision of counterpart funding. Following the MTR in May 2012, however, the GPG and LMG did take actions which improved the performance of the Gansu component. On July 12, 2012, LMG issued an urgent notice to all project counties and relevant municipal line departments, with instructions to (i) resolve outstanding land acquisition and resettlement issues; (ii) justify unauthorized changes in design and the scale of the subprojects; and (iii) warning against delays in construction and poor performance of certain contractors.

112. Because of the complexities of the project, combined with the inexperience of the LMG and the Longnan PMO, the GPG should have provided much more oversight, and provincial

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level experienced technical and administrative staff should have been provided in key areas. GPG provided a small amount of resources, which were insufficient for the task.

(b) Implementing Agencies’ Performances. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Sichuan Province Rating: Satisfactory

113. In Sichuan, two separate PMOs were established: one for infrastructure and one for health. The infrastructure PMO, based within the Provincial Construction Bureau, had extensive experience with Bank project implementation and from the outset, had an excellent understanding of the technical requirements of civil works feasibility, design and procurement. The early engagement of TA provided by French consultants funded through the AfD grant was pivotal and strengthened the capacity of the PMO.

114. The Sichuan Health PMO was established within the Provincial Health Bureau (SPHB), but had little experience in managing Bank projects, particularly the associated fiduciary and safeguard issues. As a result, it had some early problems and needed time to develop the required capacity. However, with support from SPG, the availability of technical expertise in the health sector from the SPHB, and support from the Infrastructure PMO, the Health PMO quickly improved and operated satisfactorily. The impact of the Lushan earthquake in 2013 was reasonably isolated and did not divert the attention of the Sichuan PMOs and PIUs significantly.

Gansu Province Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

115. In Gansu Province, interventions were focused on Longnan Municipality, with only the Longnan PMO established to coordinate activities. This PMO, established within the MDRC, did not have adequate technical expertise, but was responsible for implementing subprojects in the health, education, transport and water sectors, including the very complex Moba Gorge dam subproject. The PMO also had no experience with Bank-funded projects and was understaffed both technically and in number. Moreover, the PMO did not heed the continuous and strong recommendations of the Bank, which highlighted the importance of strengthening the PMO with municipal staff and consultants to support supervision. In contrast, however, county hospital owners under the county health bureaus took real ownership of the project, as did the county education bureaus, resulting in those subprojects advancing better than the infrastructure work.

116. Of all counties, project implementation in Cheng County was particularly challenging as it had many and complex subprojects and again lacked the technical and financial capacity to support them; the two unfinished subprojects are both in this county. Contrary to Bank advice, the civil works related to the Moba Gorge dam were separated into three packages to expedite some of the earlier works while the main dam contract was still being rebid. This meant that for the access road and diversion tunnel, separate packages were awarded to inexperienced contractors who performed poorly. Access to the dam site was delayed and constant coordination issues among the different contractors and lack of strong local supervision hampered progress. Despite the problems and challenges in Longnan, however, with the 23-month extension to the project, 29 out of 31 subprojects were successfully completed and handed over.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance. Rating: Satisfactory

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117. The rating takes into account the strong performances of GoC, SPG and the two Sichuan PMOs, despite the shortcomings of the LMG and Longnan PMO and the lack of support and ownership by GPG, and the overall satisfactory outcome of the project.

6. Lessons Learned

118. Establish project implementation arrangements at the right administrative level commensurate with project complexity and resource availability. The municipal level PMO in Gansu should have included technical staff from relevant agencies throughout implementation and should have been backed by strong support by the municipal leaders and the relevant provincial government technical agencies. Complex projects should preferably be managed by provincial agencies to support supervision of the project.

119. Early mobilization of high-quality, well targeted international and national technical assistance can add immense value and considerable leverage. The TA provided by AfD was pivotal in building early capacity of PMOs so that when issues arose, the PMOs in Sichuan at least were able to respond quickly. In Gansu, the TA in the education sector added great value through the provision of training for school personnel and supported the attainment of the PDO.

120. “Build Back Better Plus” helped reduce vulnerability of infrastructure and communities to natural disasters and foster local economic development and poverty reduction. It was a visionary decision not to constrain the PDO with recovering services to pre-earthquake level. The project was implemented during a period when cities in Sichuan and Gansu were witnessing rapid urbanization. “Build-Back-Better-Plus” was based on improving the seismic engineering of infrastructure, while taking into account the poverty reduction and economic development trajectory of the affected counties and avoiding oversizing of investments. Post-disaster recovery presents an opportunity to link “Build Back Better” reconstruction plans plus poverty reduction and other longer-term development objectives.

121. The strength of national leadership at the highest level makes a difference. GOC’s speed and decisiveness in responding to the Wenchuan Earthquake demonstrated global best practice and should be documented as a case study. This was complemented by strong provincial leadership, ownership and coordination, combined with adequate resources and the flexibility to include innovative design and management elements.

122. Disaster risk assessment and sound post-disaster damage and loss assessments can make important contributions to “knowledge based” recovery and reconstruction planning, priority setting and execution. In addition, quick action is needed to revise applicable standards and codes (seismic and flooding) so that such new provisions are incorporated into the designs for reconstruction to lower the risk to development outcomes.

123. Procurement thresholds as well as packaging should balance the size and number of packages to gain better prices and improve contractor selection. When considering procurement plans, carefully consider cause and effect of procurement thresholds as well as packaging and wherever possible group smaller packages into larger packages to improve coordination of construction tasks. Adjusting procurement thresholds to match the national and situational

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context is critical for large scale and geographically widespread reconstruction projects. Also, to attract experienced bidders and generate more competition, a better pre-screening of contractors based on their relevant experience would be helpful. In addition, procurement threshold for consulting service at the time of project appraisal could have been set a proper level to expedite the availability of key technical support.

124. Framework approach helped address the most immediate needs and provided flexibility to deal with new demands. The strategy of prioritizing and phasing subprojects in WERP ensured that the most urgent needs were addressed first, and gradually expanded to more complicated subprojects that required longer preparation times and stronger management capacity. In addition, it allowed time to identify and accommodate new investment priorities in a rapidly changing environment in the aftermath of the earthquake. This approach could be more widely applied in China, especially in rapidly growing small towns, cities and provinces with extensive experience and capacity with Bank projects. Given the pace of change, many projects have been restructured to accommodate new demands and necessities. These restructuring are often quite costly and time consuming. Using a framework approach, teams could focus on appraising the first 24 months of investments during preparation and leave appraisal of future investments for later in implementation.

125. Develop more robust methodologies to assess the efficiency of investments. During preparation and appraisal, more attention should have been devoted to quantifying the costs and benefits of project investments. Much of the information was based on observations of the team and secondary data, without more quantitative information to assess the value for money invested in the project's infrastructure. Also, there is a need to develop sound indicators and methodologies to assess the impacts of the government's institutional capacity building activities on improving management efficiency and long-term sustainability of assets.

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

126. An advanced draft of the ICR was circulated for comment to the three project PMOs. Minor comments and updated cost data were received from the Sichuan Infrastructure PMO and incorporated in the final document. No other comments or issues were raised by any of the PMOs or by the borrower with respect to the ICR overall and the ratings contained therein.

(b) Co-financiersNot applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders Not applicable.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components AppraisalEstimate

Actual/LatestEstimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Part 1 - Sichuan Recovery Program

Infrastructure 453.5 506.08 112%

Health 58.0 70.48 121%

Project Support 20.0 26.28 130%

Subtotal Sichuan 531.5 602.84 113%

Part 2 – Gansu Recovery Program

Infrastructure 136.5 121.08 89%

Health 32.6 36.08 111%

Education 33.6 35.14 105%

Project Support 4.0 12.27 307%

Subtotal Gansu 206.7 204.57 99%

Total Project Cost 738.2 807.41 109%

Front-end fee IBRD (0.25%) 1.8 1.8 100%

Total Financing Required 740.00 809.21 109%

(b) Financing (in USD Million equivalent)

Source of Funds Type of Co-financing

Appraisal Estimate

Actual/LatestEstimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 30.00 113.41 378%

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 710.00 695.80 98%

Total 740.00 809.21 109%

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1. The table below summarizes the outputs by component in the two provinces:

Table 2.1 Project outputs by componentApproved targets

for subproje

cts

Achieved outputs at

Completion

% ofTarget

Component 1. Infrastructure Reconstruction and Appropriate ExpansionSichuan

RoadsTotal Number of reconstructed and newly constructed roads (No.) 255 262 103%

Total length of all roads (new and reconstructed (Length - meters) 194,005 207,361 107%

Comprising

Reconstructed Roads (Length - meters) 131,880 139,898 105%

Newly Constructed Roads (Length - meters) 62,125 68,463 110%

Other InfrastructureBridges-Length (Length - meters) 8,181 8,437 103%

Water Supply pipelines - Length (meters) 167,704 166,553 99%

Drainage pipelines (Length - meters) 418,018 442908 102%

Flood Control Embankments (Length - meters) 29,565 30,141 102%

Water Treatment Plants (No.) 8 8 100%

Water Supply Booster Pumping Stations (No.) 4 4 100%

Wastewater Treatment Plants (No.) 6 6 100%

GansuRoads

Built Roads (No.) 38 38 100%

Built Roads (Meters) 35,911 36,105 100%

Other InfrastructureBridges and major road culverts (No.) 18 18 100%

Water Supply Pipelines Length (Meters) 62,855 63,492 101%

Storm Water/Drainage Pipelines Length (Meters) 42,053 49,516 115%

Sewerage Pipelines (Length in Meters) 109,215 102,489 94%

New Water Treatment Plants (No.) 2 1* 50%

New Wastewater Treatment Plants (No.) 2 2 100%

Rehabilitation of Wastewater Treatment Plant (No.) 1 1 100%

Moba Gorge Dam 1 0 0%

* The construction of the Cheng County WTP was delayed, but is expected to be completed and fully operational by the summer of 2017.

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Component 2. Health Services Reconstruction and Appropriate Expansion

SichuanNew County and township level hospitals and Health Care Centers 60 60 100%

Gansu

County and township level health facilities 7 7 100%

Comprising

Cheng County Peoples’ Hospital 1 1 100%

Cheng County Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital 1 1 100%

Hui County Peoples” Hospital 1 1 100%

Hui County Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital 1 1 100%

Xihe County Peoples’ Hospital 1 1 100%

Xihe County Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital 1 1 100%

Liang Dang County Peoples’ Hospital 1 1 100%

One large medical equipment procurement package 1 1 100%

Component 3. Education Reconstruction of and Appropriate Expansion of Primary, Secondary and Vocational/Technical Schools

Gansu (Only)

New schools were built in four project Counties as follows: 7 7 100%

Comprising

County Level (No.1) Senior High School (Cheng and Xihe Counties) 2 2 100%

County Level (No.2) Middle High School (Kang County) 1 1 100%

County Level (No3) Junior High School (Hui and Wen Counties) 2 2 100%

County Level Vocational Schools (Hui and Kang Counties) 2 2 100%

One large equipment procurement package for all seven schools 1 1 100%

Component 4 Project Support – Training, Capacity Building and Engineering cost of sub project preparation and implementation management

Sichuan Training Days

Infrastructure 1,621 100%

Health 1,150 100%

Gansu 930 100%

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Components in Detail

Sichuan Province: Infrastructure

2. Retroactive financing. Upon strict screening, the World Bank included 15 subprojects from seven counties (cities or districts) for retroactive financing: Fucheng District, Youxian District, Santai County and Yanting County of Mianyang City, Chaotian District and Cangxi County of Guangyuan City, and Langzhong of Nanchong City. See details below in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Retroactively Financed Subprojects for a total amount of US$ 10.63 millionProject Location(Actual Costs

Sichuan Retroactive Financing Subproject Descriptions

Mianyang CityFucheng District(US$ 3.08 million)

Central Business District (CBD) road and drainage emergency engineering for reconstruction and maintenance; CBD transport node reconstruction; post-earthquake testing and assessment to downtown bridges that were subject to severe damage, and were having a profound effect on urban transportation with associated safety issues; and emergency reconstruction of Mianyang wastewater treatment plant.

Mianyang CityYouxian District(US$ 3.00 million)

Emergency repairs were carried out including: supporting facility engineering of prefabricated houses and the establishment of centralized resettlement sites; and assistance with post-earthquake reconstruction and planning.

Mianyang CitySantai County(US$ 0.29 million)

Emergency engineering repairs to WTP No. 1; emergency repair of water supply network pipelines; installation of drainage services (pipelines) and ancillary facilities at new resettlement sites for relocated/displaced people. Resettlement sites of flood-stricken people; emergency repair of downtown water supply network; replacement of sluice valve, water meter and ancillary facilities; maintenance of water supply network of Luxi WTP

Mianyang CityYanting County(US$ 0.92 million)

Emergency engineering repairs to the Sanxikou river bank to ensure its flood control capability: 360m long and 12m wide.

Guangyuan CityChaotian District(US$ 0.97 million)

Emergency engineering repairs to: Chaotian downtown roads; construction and repair of the damaged segments of Mingyue Road; and emergency repairs to the Dazhongba flood control dam.

Guangyuan CityCangxi County(US$ 0.54 million)

Emergency engineering repairs to the Xiaojiaba main line drainage system involving the repair and/or replacement of about 1,522m drainage pipeline; and; emergency repair to the Jiuquxi water regulation works, involving the repair of about 232m of retaining. .

Nanchong CityLangzhong City(US$ 1.83 million)

The emergency repairs and reconstruction to Qili Avenue pipe network; and associated road reconstruction/ maintenance. etc.

3. Batch I Subprojects. The project financed 15 infrastructure subprojects involving roads, earthworks, water supply and drainage, bridge piles, piers and bent, box girder precast, hollow slab precast, bridge reinforcing, concrete anti-collision railing, bridge plate, landscape engineering, road paving, watercourse, sanitation facilities, flood control, solid waste and transport engineering as detailed in the following table.

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Table 2.3 Details of Sichuan Infrastructure Batch I SubprojectsSubproject Location(Actual Costs)

Subproject Description

1 Fucheng District(US$ 8.51 million)

Included road network (7.02km) and associated traffic control system, roadway lighting, afforestation/beautification and road traffic engineering and the associated water supply and drainage pipe networks in the new roadway. The engineering was completed and accepted in June 2012.

2 Youxian District (US$ 13.85 million)

Included reconstruction of road network (25 roads with a total length of 15.61km), traffic control system, roadway lighting and road landscape engineering of some villages; water supply and drainage pipe network for four villages; river bank restoration and strengthening. The engineering was completed and accepted in July 2012.

3 Zitong County(US$ 1.07 million)

Included renovation and consolidation of 243m long Old Nanqiao Bridge, to make its load class reach highway II level. The engineering was completed and accepted in June 2012.

4 Yanting County(US$ 15.5 million)

Included reconstruction of six roads with total length of 18.13 km and width range of 8-30m and traffic control systems; construction of a trunk sewer 15.66km long and storm-water pipe network12.89km long. The engineering was completed and accepted in May 2012.

5 Qinglian Town/Jiang You City(US$ 6.42 million)

Included the repair and reinforcement of the 210m-long Panjiang Bridge; reconstruction and strengthening of a 2.68km-long floodwall locating at Qinglian channel segment of Tongkou River; reconstruction of two 1.48km-long roads; 1.95km-long drainage pipeline; 1.86km-long sewerage pipe. The engineering was completed and accepted in September 2012.

6 Santai County (US$ 10.01 million)

Included rebuilding 21 roads (total lengthen 7.42km and ranging in width from 5-40m; 9.76km long sewerage pipeline, 13.86km long drainage pipeline; water supply engineering included 9.2km water supply pipeline, one 27,500m3/d booster pump station; waste disposal engineering includes three refuse transfer stations. The engineering was completed and accepted in May 2012.

7 Chaotian District (US$ 4.31 million)

Included rebuilding of 6 roads (3.62km total length) in Chaotian District and Yangmu Town; water supply engineering included 10.2km long water supply pipeline; drainage engineering includes 5.32km long drainage pipeline and 5.41km long sewerage pipeline. The engineering was completed and accepted in November 2011.

8 Yuanba District(US$ 0.6 million)

Included recovering and rebuilding 15 roads (total length 7.38km) in Yuanba District; the repair and reinforcing of 5 road bridges; rebuilding 14 bus stations; 13.56km long water supply pipeline; 16km long sewerage pipeline, one 3000m3 capacity treated water storage pool. The engineering was completed and accepted in July 2012.

9 Wangcang County(US$ 6.87 million)

Included rebuilding of seven urban roads (3.95km in total); reinforcing 2 existing road bridges; rebuilding 3.9km drainage network; rebuilding 3.86km sewerage pipeline network. The engineering was completed and accepted in August 2012.

10 Cangxi County(US$ 9.09 million)

Included rebuilding 5 roads, (10.96km in total); about 12.46km sewerage pipeline; 12.46km of drainage pipeline; water supply engineering that included 17.43km long water supply pipelines, replacement and augmentation of a water supply pumping station, including two pumps and the reconstruction and augmentation of the Jiangnan WTP pump station, including two pumps. The combined pumping capacity is now 5000t/d; solid waste refuse collection and transport system including the construction of one 50 tonne compressed capacity refuse transfer station and 8 pit-type storage and transport stations. The engineering was completed and accepted in September, 2012.

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Subproject Location(Actual Costs)


11 Langzhong City(US$ 13.45 million)

Included rebuilding of five roads (6.87km total length) with lighting and beautification; rebuilding supporting drainage pipeline network beneath the road; rebuilding 16 water supply pipelines beneath the road (total length 33.58km). The engineering was completed and accepted in July 2012.

12 Nanjiang County(US$ 14.23 million)

Included rebuilding the Nanmenkou, Zhongzui, Hongsimen and Xiaohe Bridges (total length 457m); rebuilding and strengthening 5.29km long floodwall proving enhanced flood protection at Chunchangba, Wenxing channel segment, Shaxiba, Hongguang Community and Chaoyang New District. The engineering was completed and accepted in July 2012.

13 Shimian County (US$ 9.73 million)

Included rebuilding and enhancing of four roads (total length 10.28km) including road lighting, greening and traffic engineering, etc.); 15.29km of drainage pipeline network; 10.11km long sewerage pipeline network; 19.23km long water supply pipeline network. The engineering was completed and accepted in August 2012.

14 Baoxing County (US$ 8.67 million)

Included rebuilding and enhancement of roads (total 9.29km), which included subgrade, pavement, protective structure, water supply and drainage pipeline engineering, road lighting, green, road traffic engineering; and rebuilding one WTP. The engineering was completed and accepted in September, 2012.

15 Lushan County (US$ 11.82 million)

Included rebuilding and enhancement of 23 urban roads (total length11.15km), including lighting, communication cable, traffic marking and other ancillary traffic engineering; 14.6km long drainage and sewage pipeline network replacements; rebuilding 7.9km long water supply pipeline network; Construction of one new WTP, reconstructing and augmenting the old existing raw water booster pump station. This engineering was completed and accepted preliminarily in October, 2012.

4. Batch II Subprojects. The project financed a total of 24 subprojects covering the reconstruction and enhancement of roads, bridges, traffic control and engineering, drainage, sewerage and water supply pipelines, WTPs and WWTPs, flood control and solid waste management as detailed in the following table.

Table 2.4 Details of Sichuan Infrastructure Batch II SubprojectsNo. Subproject Location

(Actual Costs) Subproject Description

1 Chaotian District/ Guangyuan City(US$ 13.87 million)

(1) 8 newly built roads with a total length of 4.96km with supporting drainage pipeline network on both sides and beneath the road is 11,155m; (2) reinforce Qianhe Bridge, which is 220m long; (3) newly-built Xiaozhongba WWTP with phase 1 capacity of 2,500t/d (4,500 t/d in future); (5) newly-built 2,67km long sewage interception main pipeline and 1 external sewage pump station; and (6) New 228m2 bus dispatching station., in area.

2 Cangxi County/ Guangyuan City(US$ 11.31 million)

(1) Included a major new six lane bridge, 884m long and 25m across the Jialing River in Cangxi County. The subproject also included, substantial road embankment approach works for the new bridge involving three approach roads: (i) a 145m long approach road with width varying between 26~40m and a 48m long bridge; (ii) a 160m long approach road 9.5m wide and a 63m long bridge; and (iii) a 154 m long approach road 9.5m wide.

3 Baoxing County/ Ya’an City (US$ 9.17 million)

(1)Muping Town: A new 2.54km long- road was constructed; About 1.15km of new flood protection river embankment; Two new bridges were constructed in on Binjiang South road of Hexi District; About 2.75km of new water supply pipeline constructed; 3.04km long 200-400 mm diameter sewage pipeline and about

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No. Subproject Location(Actual Costs) Subproject Description

2.62km of water supply pipelines were constructed in Hexi District; and (2) In Lingguan Town: (i) about 1.99km of new roads were built; (ii) about 2.68km drainage and ; about 3.53km of sewerage pipelines were built; and (iii) about ; 2,015m of water supply pipelines were built.

4 Fucheng District/ Mianyang City (US$ 32.16 million)

In Wujia Town a total of: (i) 3.30km of roads were built covering three separate road activities; (ii) about 6.99km of drainage pipeline; and (iii) about 3.23km water supply pipeline. In Longmen Town: (i) a total of 4 separate roads were constructed with a total length of 2.91km; other construction included about 8.22km of drainage pipeline, two small bridges and one slab culvert. In Qingyi Town, three roads with a total length of 452km were built as well as three small bridges, concrete footpaths/pavement and about 12.12km of drainage pipeline. In Yangjia Town construction included, seven roads totaling 3.03km; about 4.61km of drainage pipeline and 3.44km of water supply pipeline were also constructed. Street lighting, afforestation/beautification, traffic control facilities, etc. supporting to all the road activities built. .

5 In Yangjia Town, a WWTP with a stage 1 capacity of 1,000m3/d recently (ultimate capacity of 2,000m3/d) was built. Also the Yan’er River water treatment plant was constructed with a phase 1 capacity of 5,000t/d, as well as the ancillary works needed for treated water production, preparation, disinfection equipment and structures, water transportation and distribution pipeline supporting the new water plant.

6 Lushan County/ Ya’an City (US$ 10.84 million)

In Dachuan Town; Reconstruction of about 1.92km Tongyuan Avenue, and incorporating 4380m of drainage pipeline beneath the road. In Luyan Town: About 7.30km of raw water transportation pipeline network; the construction of three (3) new bridges.

7 Shimian County/ Ya’an City (US$ 16.88 million)

(1) Water transportation pipeline engineering, with two intake pipe as 455m long in total; water from pre-sedimentation tank passes two raw water transportation pipeline with diameter as DN400 and transported to plan-to-be built water plant and the water transportation pipeline is 13,98km long in total; (2) The recent scale of water purifying plant is 14,000t/d. (3) Water distribution pipeline engineering: 20.94km long main pipe of distribution; newly-built 1 water booster pump room with scale as 21,000t/d in future.

8 3.30km long newly-built roads in Xinmian Town, one 295m long newly-built Chuanxindian Bridge. Pipeline engineering: 4.33km long downspout and 3.44km long sewage pipeline.

9 Santai County/ Mianyang City (US$ 26.52 million)

Rebuilt works of water supply with capacity of 60,000t/d in Beiba Town, including two of water intake and 5.2km long raw water transportation pipeline with diameter as DN900

10 There are four roads in Beiba Town, which are 6.07km long and 20-30m wide; drainage engineering includes 8.39km long sewage main pipe with diameter as DN300-DN400; 8.51Km long downspout main pipe with diameter as DN500-d1200.

11 3.26km newly-built roads in Yunxi Town, 431m long rebuilt previous roads and supporting with 4.87km long water supply and drainage pipeline network beneath the roads; about 1.8km long newly-built river bank.

12 Songya Town/ Youxian District/ Mianyang City (US$ million)

Levee engineering of Songya river bank is 5.69km long in total. Duplex sandy gravel slope river bank style is adopted.

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13 Youxian District/ Mianyang City(US$ 48.09 million)

There are two construction locations, Shima Town and Xinqiao Town; among them, there are 2.69km long newly-built roads in Shima Town and 7.32km long supporting drainage pipelines beneath the roads; there are 1.22 km long newly-built roads in Xinqiao Town and 4.26km long rebuilt road, two rebuilt bridges and 14.44km long supporting drainage pipelines beneath roads.

14 WWTP (3000t/d) in Weicheng Town and 2.49 km long sewage main pipe and Xin Bridge WWTP (1500t/d)

15 Zitong County/ Mianyang City (US$ 33.19 million)

3 newly-built roads with total length of 3.46km; 3 rebuilt roads with total length as 4.24km; drainage engineering includes 9.37km long main sewage pipeline and 9.48km water pipeline; one newly-built Jiukuaishi Bridge with total length as 775m.

16 Newly-built 1 Lianzhi waterworks with scale as 25,000m3/d recently; water intake as 28,250m3/d; water transportation pipeline and distribution main pipe.

17 Nanjiang County/ Bazhong City (US$ 14.84 million)

The 1.95km long newly-built floodwall is divided to two segments, among which, floodwall for Jianjiaba primary school is about 514m long located on the left bank; floodwall from Guangwu Mountain middle school to Golden Bridge is about 1.43km long, locating on the left bank. One 132m long and 21m wide newly-built Golden Bridge.

18 Yuanba District/ Guangyuan City (US$ 22.37 million)

(1) 3.00km long rebuilt road (5.83km long supporting water supply and drainage pipeline network beneath the road and one 25m long base with two crosses bridge); (2) reconstruction of solid waste landfill – capacity 77t/d and one refuse transfer station capacity 40t/d.

19 Wangjiachang Town: 2.8km long newly-built road, 6.0km long blowdown network; newly-built one waterworks with scale as 900t/d and 15.1km long water supply pipeline; newly-built 1 sewage processing plant with scale as 500t/d. Hongyan Town: 2.1km long newly-built concrete road, 4.3km long blowdown network; newly-built one 250t/d waterworks and 2.1km long water supply pipeline network; newly-built one sewage processing plant with scale as 120t/d.

20 Wangchang County/ Guangyuan City (US$ 32.86 million)

1. Road engineering: 5 newly-built roads with total length as 5.73km; 2. Floodwall engineering: Newly-built 3 river banks in Xinqiao District, Binjiang Road of Hongqiba and Binjiang Road of Dazhong Dam, which are 4.69km long in total.

21 Two newly-built bridges: 221m long Putuo mountain temple bridge and 216m long Wangcang bridge; contract engineering includes traffic engineering, lighting, handrail and other ancillary facilities supporting to the bridge as well as dismantling of previous Rainbow Bridge.

22 Lizhou District/ Guangyuan City(US$ 8.47 million)

(1) One 2.29km long newly-built road (and 2.98km long drainage network newly-built road supporting to the newly-built road); 3.78km long sewage interception main pipe embedded along Sihezi north road and river bank on south of it; (2) 4.55km long river bank on both sides of Sihezi river is newly repaired and reconstructed, and 2.27km long river is renovated; (3) one 10m box culvert with double holes is built where crosses the river ditch on south road of Sihezi.

23 Langzhong/ Nanchong City (US$ 41.57 million)

In Langzhong City the main investment was a major bridge over the Jialing River. The bridge is 1.25km long and 26m wide, and includes a continuous rigid frame design for the main bridge and upper and lower structures for the approaches to the bridge. The structure also has built-in ancillary facilities such as footway on bridge, protection wall, etc.

24 Reconstruction of two roads including east of Yingbin Avenue and Taipingqiao Road (the route is 3.45km long, excluding bridge structures of Jialing River San-Bridge), of which mileage scope includes east of Yingbin Avenue-- K0+0~K0+351.847, K1+599.847~ K1+823.190 and road width as 25m;

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Taipingqiao Road K0+00~ K2+822.025 and road width as 8.5m.

5. Batch III Subprojects was added to the Sichuan component in order to utilize loan savings of about US$ 41 million. The six new subprojects complied with the PDO and met the selection criteria. At closure, five of the six subprojects had been finished and handed over. The Lingjiang West Road subproject (serial 2 below) was delayed because of delayed approval from the National Railways Authority, but is now well under construction and is expected to be completed in March 2017 and fully operational in June 2017.

Table 2.5 Details of Sichuan Infrastructure Batch III Subprojects No.

Subproject Location (Actual Costs)


1 Nanjiang County/ Bazhong City(US$ 0.83 million)

Binhe Road 2.43km long, including one 13m hollow slab bridge; Supporting afforestation, lighting and traffic ancillary facilities. Drainage and sewage pipeline networks, both 4.2km

2 Chaotian District/ Guangyuan City(US$ 1.77 million)

Lingjiang west road, 1.86km long and including 4 bridges; Supporting afforestation, lighting and traffic ancillary facilities. Drainage pipe network: 400m long;

3 Zhaohua District/ Guangyuan City(Yuanba) (US$ 13.86 million)

Road engineering: 0.56km long resettlement location for resident in Renjiawan (including Chenxiang Street and No. 1 Road), 1.98km long road on east entrance of Zhaohua District, including one bridge; and extension of Qingmei Road by about 1.49km; Supporting afforestation, lighting and traffic ancillary facilities; and Drainage and sewage pipeline networks both about 11.9km long.

4 Zitong County/ Mianyang City(US$ 9.06 million)

Road engineering: 730m long road on north of Nanbei Street, 340m long road of Branch of Wenfeng Street, 2.4km long road of Wenfeng Street and 1.11km long road of Cuiyun Road; Supporting afforestation, lighting and traffic ancillary facilities. Drainage and sewage pipeline networks, both about 13.3km long.

5 Santai County/ Mianyang City(US$ 9.07 million)

Road engineering: About 0.8km long road on north of Beiquan Road, 0.44km long road on north of Zhangshu Road; 0.12km long road on east of Beita Road and 0.69km long road on Chenghuang Road; Supporting afforestation, lighting and traffic ancillary facilities. Water supply engineering: 1 newly-built booster pump station (7000t/d and 19,000t/d in future) and 2.7km long water supply pipeline. Drainage and sewage pipeline networks both 5.4km long.

6 Yanting County/ Mianyang City(US$ 9.05 million)

Road engineering: About 1.89km long Binjiang Road, including 2 Zhong Bridges and green belt near the river, 0.19km long Huaner Road; Supporting afforestation, lighting and traffic ancillary facilities. Drainage sewage pipeline networks both 4.3km long.

Sichuan Health Component6. Sixty health facilities were constructed under the project ranging from small aid posts and township health centers and clinics, through township level hospitals to major county level general and central hospitals and maturity and child care centers. In addition, one Provincial level Hospital for Women and Children was built in Cangxi (serial 25 below).

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Table 2.6 Details of the 60 Health FacilitiesNo Subproject

LocationFacility/Description

Actual CostsUS$ million

Loan Counterpart

Total

I. Chengdu City1 Da Yi County Second People’s Hospital

Newly-built hospital of 2492.8 m2 and the purchases of 8 sets of medical equipment.

1.65 0.174 1.82

II Mianyang City2 Fenggu Town,

Fucheng District Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 2,786 m2; reinforcing an area of 3,028 m2; purchases and maintenance of 58 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.32 0.17 1.49

3 Fucheng District Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 2,400 m2; purchases and maintenance of 72 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.04 0.06 1.1

4 Youxian District Maternity and Child Health Care Center Maintaining and reinforcing business premises of 2,409 m2; purchases of 174 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.73 0.34 1.07

5 Zhonxing Town, Youxian District

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 4,741 m2; purchases of 74 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.56 0.15 1.71

6 Santai County People’s Hospital

Internal Medicine Building Newly-built business premises of 12,964 m2 6.64 1.55 8.19

7 Wenchang Town, Zitong County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 2,430 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 1,026 m2; purchases of 16 sets of medical equipment

0.79 0.11 0.90

8 Yanting County Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 3,500 m2; purchases of 34 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

2.0 0.29 2.29

III Nanchong City9 Langzhong City Qili Branch of Langzhong People’s Hospital

Newly-built business premises of 2,182 m2; purchases of 6 sets of medical equipment

1.71 0.21 1.92

10 Laoguan Town, Langzhong City

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 690 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 1,024 m2; purchases of 2 sets of equipment

0.27 0.03 0.30

11 Erlong Town, Langzhong City

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 700 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 1,260 m2; purchases of 2 sets of medical equipment

0.30 0.036 0.34

12 Hexi Town, Langzhong City

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 700 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 770 m2; purchases of 3 sets of medical equipment

0.26 0.031 0.29

13 Shuiguan Town, Langzhong City

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 800 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 660 m2; purchases of 3 sets of medical equipment

0.28 0.033 0.31

41

IV Guangyuan City14 Chaotian District Maternity and Child Health Care Center

Newly-built business premises of 4,000 m2; purchases of 50 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.83 0.11 1.94

15 Yangmu Town, Chaotian District

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 2,000 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 2,070 m2; purchases of 50 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.17 0.07 1.24

16 Zengjia Town, Chaotian District

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 2,000 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 2,710 m2; purchases of 50 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.28 0.08 1.36

17 Datan Town, Chaotian District

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 2,000 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 920 m2; purchases of 50 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.02 0.06 1.08

18 Wangcang County

Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 4,900 m2; purchases of 28 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.19 0.47 1.66

19 Huangyang Town, Wangcang County

Health Center Newly-built business premises of 2,640 m2; purchases of 12 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.56 0.37 0.93

20 Jiachuan Town, Wangcang County


1.0 0.3 1.3

21 Jingle Temple Community, Wangcang County


0.73 0.21 0.94

22 Mumen Town, Wangcang County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 2,200 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 700 m2; purchases of 5 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.76 0.035 0.79

23 Shangwu Town, Wangcang County


0.40 0.32 0.72

24 Yuanba District Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 2,700 m2; purchases and maintenance of 10 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.87 0.12 0.99

25 Cangxi Provincial Hospital for Women and Children Newly-built business premises of 6,000 m2; purchases of 234 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

3.46 0.5 3.96

26 Dongxi Town, Cangxi County


1.66 0.21 1.87

V. Deyang City27 Guanghan City People’s Hospital

Newly-built business premises of 4,717.4 m2; purchases of 5 sets of medical equipment

1.39 0.32 1.71

28 Guanghan City Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 3,040.9 m2; purchases of 375 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.39 0.14 1.53

42

29 Donghu Township, Jingyang District

Health Center Newly-built business premises of 4,493.7 m2; purchases of 11 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.41 0.06 1.47

30 Jingyang District Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 3,444.3 m2; purchases of 7 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

1.42 0.09 1.51

31 Xiaogan Town, Jingyang District


0.99 0.05 1.04

32 Dexin Town, Jingyang District


0.37 0.02 0.39

33 Shuangdong Town, Jingyang District


0.43 0.03 0.46

34 Yangjia Town, Jingyang District


0.68 0.04 0.72

35 Luojiang County Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 1,800 m2; purchases of 8 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.67 0.12 0.79

36 Jinshan Town, Luojiang County


1.5 0.28 1.78

37 Xinsheng Town, Luojiang County


0.50 0.09 0.59

38 Zhongjiang County

Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 4,827.5 m2 1.42 0.14 1.56

39 Cangshan Town, Zhongjiang County


1.52 0.09 1.61

40 Jiqing Town, Zhongjiang County


1.23 0.09 1.32

41 Longtai Town, Zhongjiang County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 3,532.62 m2; purchases of 9 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.94 0.07 1.01

42 Huilong Town, Zhongjiang County


0.76 0.07 0.83

VI. Ya’an City43 Baoxing County Maternity and Child Health Care Center

Newly-built business premises of 1,560 m2; purchases of 22 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.87 0.15 1.02

44 Mingli Township, Baoxing County

Health Centre Newly-built business premises of 260 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 165 m2; purchases of 30 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.12 0.02 0.14

45 Fengtongzhai Township, Baoxing County

Medical Aid Post and Health Center Newly-built business premises of 260 m2; purchases of 30 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.11 0.01 0.12

46 Baosheng Township, Lushan County

Health Center Newly-built business premises of 598 m2; purchases and maintenance of 30 sets (pieces) of

0.21 0.02 0.23

43

medical equipment47 Feixianguan

Town, Lushan County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 1,000 m2; purchases and maintenance of 45 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.34 0.07 0.41

48 Luyang Town, Lushan County

Health Center Newly-built business premises of 480 m2; purchases and maintenance of 30 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.17 0.02 0.19

49 Shuangshi Town, Lushan County

Health Center Newly-built business premises of 960 m2; purchases and maintenance of 30 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.29 0.05 0.34

50 Taiping Town, Lushan County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 1,873 m2; purchases and maintenance of 45 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.64 0.05 0.69

51 Shimian County Maternity and Child Health Care Center Newly-built business premises of 3,588 m2; purchases of 43 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

2.00 0.19 2.19

52 Caluo Township, Shimian County

Health Center Newly-built business premises of 746 m2; purchases of 30 sets (pieces) of medical equipment

0.18 0.02 0.20

53 Tianwan Township, Shimian County


0.18 0.02 0.20

54 Wajiao Township, Shimian County


0.19 0.02 0.21

55 Xieluo Township, Shimian County


0.16 0.02 0.18

56 Xinmin Tibetan and Yi nationality Township, Shimian County


0.4 0.04 0.44

VII.

Bazhong City

57Zhengzhi Town, Nanjiang County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 2,300 m2; purchases of 3 sets of medical equipment

0.7 0 0.7

58 Changchi Town, Nanjiang County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 1,700 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 150 m2

0.5 0 0.5

59 Shahe Town, Nanjiang County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 1,200 m2; maintaining and reinforcing an area of 161 m2

0.36 0.03 0.39

60 Yangba Town, Nanjiang County

Central Hospital Newly-built business premises of 1,100 m2 0.35 0 0.35

Sichuan: Project Support and Capacity Building 7. Capacity was built through a total of 54 different training courses covering a broad range of subjects, including project management and MISs, financial management, procurement

44

management, resettlement and environmental management and monitoring, and technical subjects including feasibility studies and design. The total number of training days was 1642. Appropriate training was given at all levels of the PMO/PIU structure, and trainees participating in the training included 15 heads of city and district level construction bureaus, persons directly responsible for financial, procurement, environmental, resettlement and engineering management. Training efficiency and effectiveness were enhanced at PIU level because the learning was aligned with the subprojects in the three Batches.

Table 2.7. Summary of Sichuan’s Comprehensive Training and Capacity Building Program for Infrastructure

Dates Training Course SubjectPerson training days

Posts of trainees/nature of work

Training dedicated to all owners1 March

2009Survey of training and capability building needs

105 Heads of construction bureaus of 15 counties (cities, districts), personnel in charge of engineering, procurement, finance, environment evaluation, and editorial commentary, as well as personnel from departments of development and reform and finance

2 May 2009

Training on WERP first batch of projects’ feasibility study, environment evaluation, resettlement, and social commentary

40 Heads of construction bureaus of 15 counties(cities, districts) in charge, and project directors; directors from China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group Co., Ltd., Southwest Municipal Engineering Design & Research Institute of China, China Huaxi Engineering Design & Construction Co., Ltd., Southwest Jiaotong University etc.

3 June 2009

Procurement management 30 Heads of construction bureaus of 15 counties(cities, districts) and procurement directors

4 DEC 2009

MIS Demonstration 150 Leaders and directors from Sichuan Urban Construction and Health sector and those from Project Management Office of Longnan City, Gansu Province; heads of 45 owner units and directors in charge of engineering and information systems

5 DEC 2009

MIS users and administrators

180 Heads of 45 owner units in charge of relevant work and directors of engineering, finance and information systems

6 April 2012

Batch II Project Resettlement and Social Impacts

45 Heads of all second batch of projects who are responsible for land requisition and demolition in all levels: housing construction and land sector of all counties (cities, districts), as well as townships (villages) where projects are located

7 August 2014

Project Management Capability Building (first phase)

107 Engineers from Sichuan Urban Construction and Environment Project Management Office, relevant directors of government departments, development and reform departments, finance departments, housing and construction departments and operation and maintenance units from Mianyang City’s Fucheng District, Youxian District, Yanting County, Zitong County, Santai County; Guangyuan City’s

8 August 2014

Project Management (second phase)

45

Dates Training Course SubjectPerson training days

Posts of trainees/nature of work

Chaotian District, Zhaohua District, Lizhou District, Cangxi County, Wangcang County; Bazhong City’s Nanjiang County; Langzhong City; Ya’an City’s Baoxing County, Lushan County, and Shimian County

WERP first, second and third batch of project-training on procurement, project management, supervision, finance and environment for owners, contractors and relevant participation units9 June

2009-through to March 2015

Procurement management 254 Relevant directors from the Construction Bureau, Development and Reform Bureau, Finance Bureau, Bid & Tender Supervision Offices of all Sichuan Project Counties

10 Dec 2010 through to May 2015

Project management and supervision, financial management, and external environment monitoring. A total of 23 training courses were also provided and again, aligned and sequenced progressively with batches I, II and II spread throughout the during implementation.

710 Project owners in all Sichuan County’s involved in the project. Training also included heads of contractors particularly with respect to contractor’s responsibilities and obligations under EMPs.

Total 1,621

Gansu Province

8. The project in Gansu focused on the seven most heavily earthquake stricken districts and counties (Wudu District, Cheng, Hui, Kang, Wen Xihe and Liangdang Counties). In all, 29 subprojects were included in the infrastructure, health and education sectors, which encompassed seven health facilities, seven schools, nine urban roads and bridges, six water supply, drainage and wastewater treatment subprojects. In addition, there were two large equipment procurement packages to ensure that the health facilities and schools were fully equipped. Thirty-one subprojects in the infrastructure, health and education sectors were implemented given priorit, plus two major equipment procurement packages for the seven hospital and clinics and for the seven schools as detailed below.

9. The selection of subproject was based on the priority needs of Longnan Municipality with emphasis on the most damaged and important municipal facilities that were key to restoring people’s livelihoods. In addition, more complex investments such as the Moba Gorge dam, were delayed because they needed more time for preparation, design and approval. Hence the priority was first given to the health and education sectors, with the inclusion of some critical infrastructure subprojects. A second group of urban infrastructure subprojects were selected

46

based on the recovery and improvement of less damaged urban infrastructure that would lay a foundation for the future sustainable development of cities/towns.

Table 2.8 Gansu Priority Reconstruction Subproject detailsNo.

Subproject Location

Subproject Description Completion Status

Urban Infrastructure Sector 1 Cheng County

(US$ 2.66 million)Donghe (East River) Bridge. Demolish the existing East River Bridge and reconstruct a new 200m long, 30m wide precast & pre-stressed continuous beam bridge at the same location.

Fully completed and handed over in July 2011.

2 Cheng County(US$ 2.05 million)

Nanhe (South River) Bridge. Construction of new South River Bridge (24m wide, 160 m long).

Fully completed and handed over in April 2012


Construction of a total of eight urban roads (Xixia, Longnan, Donghedong-south&north, Donghexi, Xiaochuan, Tonggu-north&south, Huanchengbei-east, Nandajie-middle, totaling 14.36km in down town areas, including traffic control through control signals and lane marking , traffic separation, pedestrian safety and access, on and off street parking, lighting, foot paths and beautification.

All works fully competed and handed over in May 2012.


Construction of Moba Gorge Roller Compacted Concrete Dam and raw water supply pipeline 10km long to new WTP.

85% competed as at May 31, 2016. Likely to be completed by December 31, 2016.


Construction of new Wastewater treatment plant of 12,500m³/day capacity; Sewerage and Drainage pipe network separation works involving a total of 49.8km (Sewers 30.8km and drainage 19km.

Fully completed and handed over in October 2011. O&M of the new WWTP involves innovative third party private operator.

Health Sector6 Cheng County

(US$ 9.76 million)County level People’s Hospital, including the demolition of the old hospital and new construction of a new 20,000m², 200 bed capacity hospital.

Fully completed and handed over

7 County level Traditional Chinese Medicine hospital including the demolition of the old hospital and the construction of a new 6,137m², 100 bed capacity facility.


8 Hui County(US$ 7.44 million)

County level People’s Hospital including the demolition of the old hospital and the construction of a new 13,500m², 200 bed capacity hospital.


9 County level Traditional Chinese Medicine hospital including the demolition of the old hospital and the construction of a new 6,258m², 60 bed capacity hospital.


10 Xihe County(US$ 5.04 million)

County level People’s Hospital, including the demolition of the old hospital and the construction of a new 10,152m², 300 bed capacity hospital.


47

11 County level Traditional Chinese Medicine hospital, including the demolition of the old hospital and the construction of a new 6,188m², 100 bed capacity hospital.


12 LiangDang County(US$ 3.31 million)

County level People’s Hospital including the demolition of the old hospital and the construction of a new 6,500m² 120 bed capacity hospital.

Completed and handed over and is functional

Education Sector13 Chengzhou- Cheng

County(US$ 11.9 million)

Senior Secondary High School including the demolition of the old school and construction of a new school of 33,362m² and dormitories, auxiliary and sporting facilities etc.

Completed in December 2013

14 Hui County(US$ 4.45 million)

No. 3 Senior Secondary High School, including the demolition of the old school and construction of a new school of 21,109m² and dormitories, sporting facilities etc.

Completed in July 2011

15 Vocational Secondary School, including the demolition of the old school and construction of a new school of 11,520m² and auxiliary facilities, boiler room, teacher rooms, sporting facilities etc

Completed in October 2013

16 Kang County (Chang Ba Township)(US$ 7.09 million)

No. 2 Middle Secondary School, including the demolition of the old school and construction of a new school of 5,882m² and new administration and teacher offices and sporting facilities.


17 Vocational Secondary School, including the demolition of the old school and construction of a new school of 21,109m² and dormitories, sporting facilities, administration and teacher offices and auxiliary facilities.

Completed in October 2013


No. 1 Middle Secondary School, including the demolition of the old school and construction of a new school of 17,647m² and administrative and teacher offices, sporting facilities etc.


19 Wen County(US$ 3.72 million)

No3 Middle School including the demolition of the old school and construction of a new school of 11,284m² and administrative and teaching staff offices and sporting facilities.

Completed in December 2013, but without proper water supply until May 2016

Table 2.9 Gansu Urban Infrastructure Subproject detailsSubproject Location

Subproject Description Completion Status

Urban Infrastructure1 Hui County

(US$ 10.15 million)

Urban Road construction of two roads (total length 2.96km), including 1.26km long Binhexi Road, and 1.7km long Dongguan Binhe Road, traffic control, separation, lighting, lane marking, signage, pedestrian safety and access, footpaths and beautification.

Fully completed and handed over in December 2012.

2 Wastewater treatment plant. New construction of one wastewater treatment plant with the capacity of 5,000m3/day; restoration (10km) and the new construction (30km) of sewers.

Completed and handed over August 2012.

3 Kang County(US$ 9.46 million)

Urban roads, bridges and drainage pipeline. Construction and widening of No.1 Road, West (1.51km x 12m wide), including construction or rehabilitation of three bridges as follows: Sujiayuan Bridge (2x20m long spans and 12m wide); unnamed road bridge (20m long and 12m wide); and

Completed and handed over in September 2012

48

rehabilitation and upgrading of Renmin Bridge (3x11m long spans and 16m wide)

4 Urban water supply pipeline network (3km), and additional WTP capacity of 6,000 m3/day.

Fully completed and handed over August 2012.

5 Wastewater treatment plant. New construction of a 5,000m3/day capacity WWTP and the construction of a 2km long connecting waste water pipeline.

Competed and handed over in September 2012


Urban Roads. Construction of a total of 3.67km urban roads, including traffic control systems, lane separation, lighting, pedestrian safety and access, foot paths, beautification and drainage: Binhedong Road (3.3km), and two branch roads for 370m long).

Completed and handed over December 2011.

7 Liangdang County(US$ 4.76 million)

Urban Roads - Construction of four new roads (No. 8, 15, 17, 19) in Longnan City, Dongjiang new district Resettlement Zone: Four new urban Class-II roads (total length of 3.9km and12m wide -#8 Road 2.2km, #15 Road 1km, #17 Road 194m, #19 Road 540m), including drainage network, greening, lighting, sidewalks and traffic signs.

Fully competed and handed over January 2012

8 Wudu District(US$ 9.65 million)

Dongjiang. Resettlement area roads and streets. Road reconstruction and pavement widening works over a total of 7km of roads with an average width of 6m. Included associated drainage works, traffic control lighting and pedestrian safety aspects.

Fully completed and handed over December 2011

9 Jiangnan. Resettlement area roads and streets Construction of 11 roads and streets for total length 5.2km in Jiangnan New Resettlement Zone, including lighting, drainage, signage, lane marking, traffic control, parking and beautification.

Completed and handed over in February 2012


Urban Water Supply Improvements including: (i) construction of new WTP (35,000 m3/day); and (ii) replacement of 9.43km of distribution and 27km of reticulation pipelines ranging in diameter from 100mm-1000mm.

85% completed as at May 31, 2016. Raw water supply to WTP is dependent on the filling of Moba Gorge

49

Table 2.10 Details of Education Equipment for Gansu SchoolsNo. Equipment Description Procured Under the

Project1 Text Books 191,300 2 Bookshelves 524 No.3 Reading tables 177 No.4 Bunk beds for student dormitories 3,945 No.5 Lockers for student dormitories 1,970 No.6 Desks and chairs for class rooms 7,631 sets7 Canteen tables and chairs 900 sets8 Desks/benches and chairs for physics laboratories 12 sets9 Desks/benches and chairs for chemistry laboratories 8 sets10 Desks/benches and chairs for biology laboratories 7 sets11 Scientific instruments for 6 sets12 Materials for physics, chemistry and biological laboratories 6 sets13 Wide range of Sports equipment 7 sets14 Computer projector, network controller, multi-media central control platform,

sound booth, and PA system145 sets

15 Infrared wireless microphone system 145 sets16 Electric Curtains 145 sets17 Wiring specialist class rooms and laboratories 145 sets18 Specialist computer training equipment for technology application 3 sets19 Specialist training equipment of mechanical and mechatronics applications 3 sets20 Specialist training equipment for electronic technology applications 2 sets21 Specialist training equipment for accounting simulation 4 sets

Note: All the equipment detailed in the table was procured at a total cost of (US$3.67) for all seven of the schools built and funded by the project under on large procurement package.

Table 2.11 Details of Medical Equipment for Gansu Health Facilities No. Medical Equipment1 Color doppler ultrasonic diagnosis apparatus 7 sets2 Automatic biochemical analyzer 73 Electronic colonoscopies equipment 74 Automatic blood cell analyzer 3.5 Ventilator (non-invasive) equipment 146 Anesthesia equipment 7 sets7 Computer based radiography imaging system 38 ECG monitor 289 Fully fitted out Intensive care ambulances 710 Medical X-ray apparatus (HF81-5) for digital gastrointestinal diagnosis 7

Equipment SubtotalSpecialist Equipment and fit out for Operating theatres

11 Surgery room equipment, oxygen generation/supply/reticulation equipment, medical waste collection and treatment equipment in the seven hospitals

7 sets

50

Specialist Operating Room Fit outGrand Total

Note: The Operation Room fitting costed US$ 5.74 million, while equipment costs totaled US$ 4.79 million, which including operations room fit-out, oxygen generation and reticulation systems and medical waste collection and disposal systems

Project Support

Table 2.12 Summary of Gansu’s Training and Capacity Building ProgramNo. Date Training Topics Training

daysPosts of Trainees/Nature of Work

1 Mar 2013 Project financial management

80 Financial personnel of Municipal Project Management Office, Project Owners, County Education and Construction Authorities

2 Aug, 2012 World Bank Project changes and approval training

116 The Municipal Project Management Office, Project Owners and Supervision Organizations

3 Sep 2012 Construction management

107 Directors of Municipal Project Management Office, Project Owners and Supervision Organizations and Task Team Leaders of construction organizations

4 Oct 2012 Education and health project component management

80 Task Team Leaders from 7 hospitals, education bureau, 7 schools and related Task Team Leaders

5 Apr 2013 Project management 54 Responsible personnel of the Municipal Project Management Office and 23 project owners

6 May 2013 Change training 140 The Municipal Project Management Office, Project Owners, Supervision Organizations and Design Institutes

7 Jun 2013 World Bank Procedures

147 The Municipal Project Management Office and Project Owners

8 Nov 2012 Construction Management

127 Responsible personnel of 23 project owners and Task Team Leaders of general contractors

9 May 2012 Project Financial Management

80 Financial director of 23 project owners, general contractors and supervision organizations

Total 931

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. Due to the emergency nature of the project, a formal economic analysis was not carried out at appraisal. To access the economic impact of the project investments, this analysis proceeds in three steps: (i) first assessing the cost efficiency of the project investments through the planned costs and physical outputs with the actual costs and physical outputs of the investments; and then (ii) assessing the effectiveness of the project intervention through its delivery of the set objectives, namely, the restoration of essential infrastructure services compared with pre-earthquake levels; and (iii) examining whether the level of resilience and recovery of the local economies correspond to the level of recovery essential infrastructure services.

Figure 1. Assessment framework

I. Cost effectiveness

2. The cost effectiveness of the project investment was measured through comparing the planned costs and physical outputs with the actual costs and physical outputs of the investments.

Sichuan

3. In Sichuan, the project supported reconstruction and recovery in 16 counties. At appraisal, total investment costs were estimated at US$531 million to be implemented over two batches. Through design optimization, competitive bidding, contract standardization and close cost-monitoring during project implementation, Batch I & II of the infrastructure investments were completed by August 2015 according to the original plan at considerably lower cost. A loan saving of approximately US$42.3 million alongside additional counterpart funds were allocated toward financing a third batch of infrastructure investments. At completion, nearly all17 physical components in the province were completed according to plan with longer roads and wastewater pipes (see Table 2.1) financed entirely with loan savings and additional counterpart funds.

Gansu

4. In Gansu, where the project supported reconstruction and recovery in seven counties in Longnan Municipality, at project completion almost all planned physical components had been completed, with the exception of Moba Gorge dam and the associated WTP in Cheng County.

17 With the exception of a small 1.8km section of the Lingjiang West Road in Chaotian District, which was delayed due to delays in getting a permit for a railroad crossing. The civil works is expected to complete in March 2017 and will be put in operation in June 2017.

52

1. Cost Effectiveness

2. Restoration of essential infrasture service (PDO)

3. Local economic recovery

As expected, the dam construction proved to be complex and construction delays also affected the completion of the WTP. The two subcomponents had a combined cost estimate around US$31 million, majority of which had been disbursed as planned in spite of the implementation delay. At completion, the total investment costs stood at 99% of the originally planned amount. The financing needed to complete the remaining two subprojects was ensure and the subprojects have been completed. As a result, project investments in Gansu are considered generally cost effective, be it with some implementation delays.

II. Restoration of essential infrastructure service

5. Aligned with the national objectives of “Build Back Better,” the PDO of the Project focuses on restoring and enhancing access to essential public infrastructure and services, such as water supply, wastewater and drainage, solid waste, roads, and core health and education services in the affected counties in Sichuan and Gansu.

6. This section examines whether the levels of essential infrastructure provisions in the project area had indeed be restored to the pre-earthquake levels. Two type of changes are recorded in this section: (i) in the project area, changes directly resulted from the project interventions; and (ii) in a larger statistical area where the project areas reside, changes resulted from a wide array of interventions of which the project was only a part. In the latter case, the project-specific impact would be inevitably smaller than the recorded level.

Water and sanitation

7. Before the earthquake in Sichuan, access to clean water supply in most project counties stood between 50%-80%, well below the provincial urban average of 88%. By project completion, majority of the project counties achieved universal or near-universal access to clean water supply; and access level in all project counties exceeded provincial urban average of 91%.

Nanjiang Cangxi Lushan Shimian Yanting Shaohua Wangcang Baoxing Santai Urban Sichuan

Sichuan: 24 hour non-interrupted water supply

8. According to Sichuan Statistical Year Book, in the five cities where the 16 project counties reside, from the pre-earthquake level, the length of water supply network increased between 56% and 169% compared with the provincial urban average growth of 56%.

53

Guangyuan Mianyan Bazhong Nanchong Ya'an Urban Sichuan0

50

100

150

200

250

Sichuan: Length of water supply pipes (index)

Source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015;

9. On the sanitation front, coverage of wastewater treatment and solid waste treatment in most project counties prior to the earthquake was rather limited at levels well below the provincial urban average of 65% and 88% respectively. At project completion, most project counties had either caught up or exceeded the provincial urban average level of wastewater treatment coverage (85%) and solid waste treatment coverage (97%).


Sichuan: Wastewater treatment (%)

Source: Sichuan PMO and Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015;

54


Sichuan : Solid waste (%)

Source: Sichuan PMO and Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015;

10. Moreover, according to Sichuan Statistical Year Book, compared with pre-earthquake levels, the length of sewage network in four out of five project cities increased between 108-173% while on average, the length of urban sewage network increased 65% over in urban Sichuan over the same period.

Guangyuan Mianyan Bazhong Nanchong Ya'an Urban Sichuan

Sichuan: Length of sewage network (index)

Source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015;

11. In Gansu, thanks to the project’s direct efforts, wastewater treatment coverage is approaching 100% in at least two project counties in Gansu. Five project counties have more than 95% of their storm water network separate from the wastewater network.

55

Chengxian Kangcheng

GansuWastewater treament cov-

erage (%)

Chengxian Xihe Laingdang Wudu Kangcheng

GansuSeparate storm & waste water networks (%)

Data source: Gansu PMO

Roads

12. In Sichuan, prior to the earthquake, few roads (2-50%) in the project counties were paved. At completion, all project counties had made remarkable strides expanding the coverage of paved roads to percentages between 72-100%.

Nanjiang Cangxi Lushan Shimian Yanting Shaohua Wangcang Baoxing Santai

Sichuan - Paved Road (%)

Data source: Sichuan PMO

13. Moreover, according to Sichuan Statistical Year Books, compared with pre-earthquake levels, in cities where the project counties reside, length of paved roads increased across the board between 25% and 96%; and per capita road area increased between 10% and 58%. These improvements can be attributed in part to the project interventions.

56

219

398 396

122

363

781

495

180

Length of paved roads (km)

10.1 11.8 12.3

8.2

13.9 13.0

13.9 13.0

Per capita road area (m2)

Guangyuan Mianyang Nanchong Ya'anBefore 219 398 396 122 After 363 781 495 180 Index 166% 196% 125% 147%

Guangyuan Mianyang Nanchong Ya'an 10.1 11.8 12.3 8.2 13.9 13.0 13.9 13.0 137% 110% 113% 158%

Data source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015;

14. In 4 out of the 7 project counties in Gansu, paved roads as percentage of total roads increased from in the range of 70-80% pre-earthquake level to well above 90% at project complete. This change can be mostly attributed to project-specific interventions.

Chengxian Xihe Laingdang Wudu Kangcheng

Gansu - Paved road (%)

Data source: Gansu PMO

Health

15. In Sichuan, 60 health subprojects have been completed in satisfactory quality and currently in operation. After completion, a population of 9.82 million in a land area of 32,039 km2 is benefiting from the Project’s investments. Compared with pre-earthquake levels, the total constructed area of hospitals increased by 58%, and the working area in hospitals increased by 77% ; beds increased by 67%; treated patients increased by 22％; the number of in-patients who left the hospital after the treatment increased by 14％. In Gansu, beds increased by 71%; doctors

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and nurses increased by 6% and 30%, respectively although total medical personnel decreased by 19% likely due to contractual arrangements of non-core medical personnel.

Table 3.1. Health indicators in the project area in SichuanIndicators Before After %Beds 3,221 5,374 167%Constructed area (100 m2) 2,707 4,274 158%Working area (100 m2) 2,039 3,606 177%Medical personnel (persons) 3,709 5,201 140%Professional doctors (persons) 1,363 1,775 130%Registered nurses (persons) 1,124 1,547 138%Patients treated (million patients) 2.73 3.34 122%ER patients treated (million patients) 2.01 2.43 121%In patients treated (million patients) 0.14 0.16 114%

Source: Sichuan PMO

16. In Gansu, 4 out of 7 project counties had reported project-specific data. Compared with pre-earthquake level, beds increased by 81%; medical personnel increased 67%; treated patients increased by 53％; in-patients who left the hospital after the treatment increased by 138％. Moreover, patients from those counties also reported higher level of satisfaction compared with pre-earthquake level.

Table 3.2 Health indicators in the project area in Gansu (4 counties only)Before After %

Beds 840 1520 181%Medical personnel (persons) 990 1650 167%Patients treated (million patients) 0.397 0.606 153%In patients treated (million patients) 0.029 0.069 238%Patient satisfaction 90% 98% +8%

Source: Gansu PMO

Education in Gansu

17. Compared with pre-earthquake levels, 5 project counties in Gansu reported considerably higher middle school acceptance and graduation rates.

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Hui xian Cheng xian

Xihe Wenxian Kang cheng

Middle school acceptance (%)

Hui xian Cheng xian

Xihe Wenxian Kang cheng

Middle school graduation (%)

Source: Gansu PMO

18. In summary, the overwhelming evidence suggest that the provisions of essential infrastructure and services, such as water, sanitation, roads, health and education, etc., had not only been restored but also greatly enhanced from the pre-earthquake levels in both the project areas the larger statistical areas where the project areas reside in both Sichuan and Gansu. Due to data availability challenges, project-specific impact may not be singled out in every sector, however, wherever it can, the effect is evidentially substantial.

III. Local economic recovery

19. Gross Regional Product. Compared with pre-earthquake level, GDP between 117% and 198%, primarily driven by growth in the non-agricultural sectors, i.e., secondary industries (including both industrial and construction sectors) increased between 116% and 286%; and tertiary, i.e., service sectors, increased by 135% and 201%. Overall, Sichuan saw faster growth than Gansu.

Table 3.3 GDP growth in Sichuan and GansuSichuan GansuGuangyuan Mianyang Bazhong Nanchong Longnan

GDPBefore 20.8 67.4 17.6 50.8 12.1After 60.5 170 50.1 151.6 26.3% 291% 252% 285% 298% 217%

Secondary Before 7.4 30.2 4 20.3 3.2After 28.6 85.9 23.4 74.1 6.9% 386% 284% 585% 365% 216%

Tertiary Before 7.3 22.7 6.3 15.3 5.4After 22 58.1 18.4 44 12.7% 301% 256% 292% 288% 235%

Data source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015; Longnan Gansu Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008-2015

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20. Employment. Compared with pre-earthquake level, total employment increased in 4 out of 6 project cities. In Bazhong and Nanchong, total employment decreased by 5% and 9%, respectively due to decreases in agricultural employment. In non-agriculture sectors, employment increased crossed the board between 23% and 68%.

Table 3.4 Employment by categorySichuan GansuGuangyuan Mianyang Bazhong Nanchong Ya'an Longnan

Total (‘000)

Before 1,453 2,556 1,768 3,225 900 1,464After 1,641 3,007 1,682 2,941 1,024 1,570% 113% 118% 95% 91% 114% 7%

Secondary(‘000)

Before 227 665 239 568 193 After 383 945 367 888 248 % 168% 142% 154% 156% 129%

Tertiary (‘000)

Before 360 693 373 672 251 After 464 1,001 460 915 318 % 129% 144% 123% 136% 127%

Data source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015; Longnan Gansu Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008-2015

21. Income. Ccompared with pre-earthquake level, per capita income across the board increased between 90% and 154% in project cities.

Table 3.5 Income growth in Sichuan and GansuSichuan Gansu

Guangyuan Mianyang Bazhong Nanchong Ya'an Longnan

Per capita Income (RMB)

Before 8,253 10,473 8,220 8,480 10,980 8,969After 20,547 25,341 20,887 21,223 24,435 17,001% 249% 242% 254% 250% 223% 190%

Data source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015; Gansu Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015

22. Income Distribution. In Sichuan, the Gini coefficient had stood relatively stable between an estimated 0.35 and 0.37 over the period of 2007-2014. No such data are available for Gansu.

Table 3.6. Estimated Gini coefficient2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Sichuan 0.351 0.355 0.353 0.365 0.365 0.366 0.364 0.364 Data source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015;

23. Urbanization. Over the project implementation period, the project cities had under gone considerable urbanization, partly enabled by the Project intervention.

Table 3.7 Urban expansion in Sichuan and GansuSichuan GansuGuangyuan Mianyang Bazhong Nanchong Ya'an Longnan

Build-up area (km2)Before 31.8 80.5 16.1 61.2 20.1 After 53.8 118.0 33.7 113.0 30.5 10.4% 169% 147% 209% 185% 152%

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Sichuan GansuGuangyuan Mianyang Bazhong Nanchong Ya'an Longnan

Urbanization (%)

Before 20.4 n.a. 25.3 20.4 41.7 12.1[1]

After 25.3 n.a. 37.5 23.3 42.6 26.7Diff. +4.9 - +12.2 +2.9 +0.9 +14.6

Data source: Sichuan Provincial Statistical Year Books 2008-2015; Longnan Gansu Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008-2015 [1] 2012 data

24. The above analysis demonstrates that the Project intervention has likely contributed to (i) the post-earthquake economic recovery and development; (ii) urbanization; (iii) increasing urban employment; (iv) growing income with minimum adverse effect on income disparity.

IV. Conclusion

25. In terms of cost efficiency, the project investments is satisfactory, especially in Sichuan, where the investments had generated more outputs with loan savings. 26. In both Sichuan and Gansu, overwhelming evidences suggest that the provisions of essential infrastructure and services, such as water, sanitation, roads, health and education, etc., had not only been restored but also greatly enhanced from the pre-earthquake levels in both the project areas the larger statistical areas where the project areas reside. Due to data availability challenges, project-specific impact may not be singled out in every sector, however, wherever it can, the effect is evidentially substantial.

27. Strong evidences suggest that the restoration and enhancement of infrastructure and service had happened alongside rapid recovery of the local economies, evidenced by robust growths in (i) gross regional products; (ii) employment; (iii) per capita income during the same period in the larger statistical areas where the project resided. Moreover, there is no evidence of unfavorable distributional impact alongside this economic recovery. Over the same period alongside rapid economic recovery and growth, the larger statistical areas where the project resided also experience unprecedented urbanization. The project intervention would have inevitably facilitated this process through enhancing urban infrastructure provision in those areas.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending Carter J. Brandon Lead Economist GENGE Economic analysis Peter Leonard Regional Safeguards Adviser OPSPF Safeguard reviews Ian P. J. Nightingale Lead Procurement Specialist OPSPF Procurement John Carter Scales Lead Transport Specialist EASCS co-Task Team Leader Chongwu Sun Sr Environmental Specialist GEN02 Environmental Safeguards Zoe Elena Trohanis Sr Urban Specialist GSU10 Urban development strategies Chaogang Wang Sr Social Development Spec GSU05 Social Safeguards Mara K. Warwick Country Director EACPF Task Team Leader Ji You Urban Specialist GSU08 Water and Sanitation Investments Chaohua Zhang Lead Social Development Specialist GSU06 Social Safeguards Wenlai Zhang Sr Transport. Specialist EASCS Transport infrastructure Dan Xie Program Assistant EACCF Program AssistantSupervision/ICR Paul Procee Program Leader LCS5S Task Team Leader Syed I. Ahmed Lead Counsel LEGAM Legal Counsel Sing Cho Sr Water & Sanitation Specialist GWA02 Water & Sanitation Infrastructure Yi Dong Sr Financial Management Specialist GGO20 Financial Management Eleanor Dougoud Consultant EASCS Management Support Gailius J. Draugelis Lead Energy Specialist GEE02 Energy Efficiency Vellet E. Fernandes Temporary GTI02 Project assistant Betty Hanan Consultant GSP01 Technical review and advisory David I Sr Financial Management Specialist GGO22 Financial Management Haixia Li Sr Financial Management Specialist GGO20 Financial Management Xujun Liu Consultant GSURR Consultant Ian P. Morris Consultant GHN02 Technical review and support Ian P. J. Nightingale Lead Procurement Specialist OPSPF Procurement Emmanuel Py Infrastructure Specialist GEE02 Project management support James A. Reichert Senior Infrastructure Specialist GTI02 Senior Infrastructure John Carter Scales Lead Transport Specialist EASCS Lead Transport John Smithson Consultant EASIN Technical expert Chongwu Sun Sr Environmental Specialist GEN02 Environmental Safeguards Zoe Elena Trohanis Sr Urban Specialist. GSU10 Urban infrastructure Chaogang Wang Sr Social Development Specialist GSU05 Social Safeguards Shiyong Wang Sr Health Specialist GHN07 Coordinator health component Lei Wu Program Assistant EACCF Program Assistant

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Dan Xie Program Assistant EACCF Program Assistant

Liping Xiao Sr Education Specialist GED02 Coordinator education component

Ning Yang Sr Environmental Engineer GEN02 Environmental Safeguards Hongkun Yang Consultant GSU08 Procurement Songling Yao Sr Social Development Specialist GSU02 Social Safeguards Ji You Urban Specialist GSU08 Urban infrastructure Xiaoke Zhai Sr Transport. Specialist GTI02 Transport infrastructure Wenlai Zhang Sr Transport. Specialist EASCS Transport infrastructure Chunxiang Zhang Operations Analyst GFDRR Project support Shuo Zhang Senior Health Specialist GHN02 Health investments Chaohua Zhang Lead Social Development Specialist GSU06 Social Safeguards Jianming Zhao Local Consultant ST GTIDR Technical support Wanli Fang Urban Economist GSU08 ICR Task Team LeaderYan Li Consultant GSU08 Economic AnalysisGeoffrey Spencer Consultant ICR Primary AuthorYanling Zang Consultant Interpreter

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of Staff Weeks US$, thousands(including variable costs)

Lending

FY2009 139.83 668.78

Total: 139.83 668.78

Supervision/ICR

FY2009 11.60 91.10

FY2010 138.32 525.02

FY2011 76.51 286.83

FY2012 42.01 272.44

FY2013 20.45 154.70

FY2014 25.39 179.59

FY2015 12.78 104.73

FY2016 18.74 107.01

FY2017 3.01 22.61

Total: 348.81 1744.03

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Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. The Borrower prepared three separate ICRs, one from each PMO as summarized below. Relevant sections of the respective ICRs were translated into English. A lot of very useful information was contained in these ICRs and was drawn on extensively in compilation of the Bank’s ICR. Both the full Chinese and abbreviated English versions of each of the ICRs are in the project files.

Sichuan Infrastructure PMO

2. The Sichuan Infrastructure PMO prepared a very comprehensive ICR that contained a lot of data and information on outputs and impacts of the infrastructure investments in Sichuan. Key sections of the document were translated covering the following topics:

(a) Project Overview

(b) Project Activities and Objectives

(c) Project Design, Innovations and Case Study examples of Project Impacts including Project Defining Principles, Project Objectives, Project Selection Criteria, Definition of Project Batches, Differences between the traditional World Bank Loan Projects versus the framework approach adopted with this project; the Management Information System developed and used by the project; Operations and maintenance of infrastructure assets created; Project implementation Risk Management; Three case studies in Lushan, Yanting and Baoxing Counties.

(d) Evaluation of Project Results and Outputs, including achievement of results and PDOs; Analysis of the Project’s Outputs; Analysis of Project Development Objectives; Project impact on promoting regional economic growth; Project impact on institutional development; Project environmental Benefits; project social benefits from improved infrastructure and livelihoods.

(e) Factors that influenced implementation and achievement, including factors outside and within the control of government; factors within the control of the PMO and PUIs.

(f) Sustainability of the project

(g) The Borrower and Bank Performance

(h) Lessons Learned

(i) Comments and Suggestions.

Sichuan Health PMO

3. The Sichuan Health PMO also prepared a very comprehensive Chinese version of ICR on the Sichuan Health Component with a lot of usual information and data and a very good pictorial overview of some of the achievements. Key sections of the document were translated and covered the following topics:

(j) Overview of Damages to the Health Sector in Sichuan as a result of the earthquake;

(k) Detailed output data on all 60 health facilities completed;

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(l) External Monitoring of Social and Environmental aspects of Project Implementation;

(m)Capacity Building as an integral part of the project;

(n) Sustainability of the investments and post project Operations and Management, including a transformation in the approach to the management of operations at each facility through a focus on strengthened and improved quality of medical management and of service quality; more attention on team building of health care professional.

(o) Project implementation incentives, innovations and achievements.

(p) Project effectiveness and impact, including comparison of key medical and health care indicators before and after the earthquake.

Longnan PMO (Gansu)

4. The Longnan PMO also prepared an ICR and although not as comprehensive as the two in Sichuan was nevertheless useful. Again, key sections of the ICR were translated and covered the following:

(q) Project Background (background, location and key milestones)

(r) Project Content and Objective (original and revised project content, achievement of objective)

(s) Implementation Arrangements (organization, procurement, safety, quality, progress, costing, safeguard and financial management)

(t) Innovation and case studies (determine objective, selection of subproject, features of WB project vs. local project, case studies)

(u) Results and Evaluation (achievement of objective, performance and benefit assessment, project environment benefit, project social benefit)

(v) Key Factors Affecting Project Implementation and Results (Unforeseen factors, factors due to Government and Project Owners)

(w)Project Sustainability

(x) Performance of the WB and the Borrower

(y) Lesson Learnt

(z) Comments and Suggestions

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Annex 6. Land Acquisition and Resettlement Experiences

5. The project supported subprojects with involuntary resettlement (land acquisition), including mainly the construction or restoration of infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, embankment, water supply, wastewater treatment and sanitation facilities in a number of villages in 23 counties/districts (Sichuan 16 and Gansu 7). Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and social assessment (SA) reports were prepared in accordance with Bank policy OP4.12 and approved by the Bank at appraisal stage for each subproject. During implementation, detailed semi-annual external monitoring reports were prepared by all PMOs to evaluate progress against the RAPs and social action plans. All work related to involuntary resettlement of the project was fully completed before the end of October, 2016 in accordance with the respective RAPs.

Social Benefits

6. Social assessments were conducted to ensure the project activities directly benefitted disaster victims, and social monitoring showed that 53 disaster affected communities were provided with access to project constructed public facilities and services. In addition, where it was unsafe to rebuild existing communities at existing locations, about 5000 households from the worst affected communities were resettled as communities in new housing. For this group, surveys conducted by the external monitoring team consistently showed a high level of satisfaction with the relocation arrangement put in place.

Resettlement Impacts and Budgets

7. The acquisition of land was minimized to avoid house demolition as part of the design of infrastructure subprojects. The total population affected by permanent land acquisition was 14,218 people (5,882 in Sichuan and 8,336 in Gansu), in a total 3,711 households. To support the project investment, a total of 284 ha (4,266 mu) of land was permanently acquired (119 ha/1793 mu in Sichuan and 165 ha/2473 mu in Gansu). A further 132.1 ha (1980.8 mu) of land were temporarily acquired during construction. The total cost for land acquisition and compensation was about US$84.82 million/RMB 557.29 million (Sichuan US$55.97 million/RMB 367.72 million, and Gansu US$28.85 million/RMB189.57 million). All land acquisition and compensation were dealt with generally in accordance with the Bank approved RAPs, except for the permanent acquisition of forest land of 42.3 ha (635.5 mu) for the Moba Gorge dam. Assessment reports showed that implementation was completed successfully and that the standards of living of the Project Affected People (PAPs) improved. Therefore, the overall implementation of this safeguard is rated satisfactory. More details by province are shown below.

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Actual Completed Land Acquisition and Impacts

Province/Subprojects

House Demolition Land Acquisition Total Actual Impacts

Total Budget

Area(m²) AHHs PAPs Mu AHHs PAPs AHHs PAPs RMB

millionSichuan Batch 1 3,850.8 20 95 64.95 59 199 71 266 9.03

Batch 2 107,014.6 515 1347 1728.31 1515 5245 1620 5604 267.08Batch 3 608.0 4 12 0 0 0 4 12 91.65

Subtotal 111,473.4 539 1,454 1,793.26 1,574 5,444 1,695 5,882 367.72

Gansu Longnan 101,203.63 539 1965 1,455.208 1502 6,471 1,950 8,023 178Moba Gorge Dam

696.59 3 16 1018 66 313 66 313 11.57

Subtotal 101,900.22 542 1,981 2,473.21 1,568 6,784 2,016 8,336 189.57

GRAND TOTAL 213,373.62 1,081 3,435 4,266.47 3,142 12,228 3,711 14,21

8 557.29

Note: The Chinese unit of area is the mu. 15mu =1 hectare or 666 m²

Resettlement Policy and Compensation

8. In accordance with the approved RAPs, the project resettlement objective was to achieve equal or better income and living standards in line with both Chinese laws and regulations and Bank Resettlement Policies. The compensation rates for permanent land acquisition, consisting of land compensation fees, resettlement subsidies and if applicable, agricultural crops were calculated on the basis of the latest local government policies in close consultation with the affected villages and/or PAPs. The rate for house compensation was calculated to include the value of the house to be acquired, removal/moving house costs and compensation for any permanent attachments such as sheds, outbuildings, etc. The external monitoring showed that all PAPs were fully compensated in accordance with the RAPs. Compensation standards for the temporary use of land during construction were equal to or exceeded those stipulated in the RAPs. All permanent and temporary compensation was paid on time and all PAPs were consulted during the entire resettlement process.

9. For the Moba Gorge dam, the Bank approved RAP required the permanent acquisition of 635.49 mu of forest land to be inundated by the reservoir at an approved compensation rate varying between RMB 3160/mu and RMB1744/mu based on whether the land was designated as forested (188.9 mu) or unutilized waste land (554.55 mu). However, the actual compensation paid was much less and based on the lease value of the land (RMB 10 per mu per annum for 65 years i.e. RMB650/mu). At loan closure, the Bank insisted and the LMG agreed to permanently acquire the land in accordance with approved RAP and the Bank will continue to monitor the situation to ensure compliance with the RAP.

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Resettlement Livelihood Restoration

10. Since the resettlement impacts of each subproject were small, the affected villages and PAPs were directly compensated in cash. In addition, different schemes for income restoration were carried out on the basis of their economic characteristics and opportunities of affected villages. The measures for income restoration mainly included: (i) Land adjustment or compensation using collective reserved lands; (ii) provision of job opportunities for affected labors during the project construction and operation stage; (iii) provision of social security programs for farmers who lost their land and hence their livelihoods. Where residential housing was demolished, the affected households received compensation at replacement cost for the lost structures and attachments without considering depreciation. The affected families had the option of either a cash settlement, a property exchange or self-reconstruction within the selected resettlement area. A sampling survey conducted in December 2015 as part of the independent resettlement monitoring reports in both provinces confirmed that the livelihoods of all affected persons had indeed been recovered.

Institutional Arrangements

11. Within each PMO in Sichuan province and Longnan Municipality and each county level organization responsible for land acquisition and resettlement, one staff position was created with responsibility for all social and resettlement activities. Provincial and Municipal PMOs took overall responsibility for managing resettlement, while the PIUs of each county were responsible for detailed implementation including community and individual resettlement consultations, implementation, financing and timely delivery of entitlements. Participation and Consultation

12. During the preparation and resettlement implementation stages, local governments and resettlement implementing agencies conducted participatory consultations to disclose resettlement policies, negotiate with PAPs, and mobilize their participation. A number of consultations were held in affected communities with the active participation of government agencies. Local communities held numerous consultations with PAPAs on the allocation of compensation and income restoration strategies. All resettlement related information was made public through the distribution of resettlement information handbooks, local government internet websites and/or the public disclosure of communities and villages information. In addition, the resettlement implementation institutions at each level established and maintained a grievance and appeal system to guarantee transparency and improve effectiveness.

Resettlement Monitoring and Evaluation

13. Sichuan and Longnan PMOs had dedicated staff members to monitor and evaluate resettlement implementation under the guidance of social and resettlement consultants. For all land acquisition activities, the province and municipal PMOs and the PIUs closely

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monitored all activities and kept records as part of project progress reporting. Additionally, external monitoring was undertaken by independent consultants (Sichuan- South-West Communication University and Longnan, the National Research Center for Resettlement) appointed in 2012. A total of seven external monitoring reports for both Sichuan and Longnan were prepared and submitted to the Bank.

14. Because of the relative complexities of the RAP for the Moba Gorge dam, the, North-West Design Institute was assigned in 2014 to conduct the independent supervision and monitoring of the RAP to ensure compliance with the requirements of both the Bank and national policies. At loan closure three monitoring reports had been prepared and submitted to the Bank.

Conclusion

15. Overall, the resettlement objective was realized and resettlement results were satisfactory. The project acquired only a very small portion of affected people’s land, the adverse impacts on their livelihoods were consequently very little. The external monitoring consultant team conducted random investigations of livelihood restoration every year during implementation and the results showed that the livelihoods of the PAPs were fully restored and their average annual income had actually increased year by year. The living environment of the PAPs and disaster victims, including provision of public facilities and services, such as drinking water and wastewater, solid waste, health the education facilities, improved significantly as part of the project and overall improvements in these counties.

Satisfactory Resolution of Land Compensation Issue at Moba Gorge Dam

16. The compensation of forest land to be inundated by the reservoir behind the Moba Gorge Dam in Cheng County of Longnan Municipality was only RMB 650/mu based on a 65 year lease agreement. The approved RAP was for the permanent acquisition of this land at a compensation rate of RMB 3160mu or RMB1744mu depending on land classification. The Bank advised LMG who agreed that it has a clear obligation to complete the permanent acquisition of forest land in accordance with the approved RAP. However, as of January 2017, such an action is still pending and is expected to be resolved by end of 2017 according to the fourth external monitoring report for Moba Gorge Dam.

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery Project Emergency Project Paper.

2. Project Loan Agreement.

3. Project Agreements (Sichuan and Gansu).

4. Project Restructuring Papers and official notifications.

5. Supervision and MTR Aide Memories and Management Letters.

6. Project Implementation and Status Reports.

7. Project Operations Manual.

8. Borrower’s ICR reports (Chinese) for Sichuan Infrastructure, Sichuan Health and Longnan Infrastructure, Health and Education.

9. Extracts of Borrower’s ICR reports (English).

10. Implementation Completion Memorandum or Trust Fund Number: TF092994 CHINA: Supporting Sustainable Post-Earthquake Recovery in China (GFDRR Track III-TA).

11. Final World Bank Report on the Implementation of the Longnan Education Capacity Building Project under the Wenchuan Earthquake Recovery Project (Gansu Part)-undated.

12. Supporting Sustainable Post Earthquake Recovery in China. Joint report by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, GFDDR and the World Bank 2012 – ISBN 978-7-5095-3725-1/F 3054.

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Annex 8. Photos before and after the WERP project

Note: The photos on the left were taken before the implementation of the project while the ones on the right were shot after the completion of the subcomponents.

1. Sichuan Province

1.1 Infrastructure

YT1-1. Mijiang Road Maozuier Section

ZT1-1.Zitong South Bridge

NJ1-1. Flood levee

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NJ1-1. South Gate Bridge

YB1-1.Qingmei Road

YB1-1.3 Bridge #762

ST1-1. Xue Street

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FC1-1. Fenggu Township South Street

YX1-1.Bolin Township Ring Road

JY1-1.Fengzhu Road

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JY1-1.Jiangyou Bridge

1. 2. HealthThe photos below illustrate the damage right after the earthquake:

The photos below shows the new hospitals constructed under the WERP project:

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2. Gansu Province

2.1 Education

Kang County Vocational School-before Kang County Vocational School-before

No.3 Middle School in Hui County-before No.3 Middle School in Hui County-after

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2.2 Health

Hui County People’s Hospital Cheng County Chinese Medicine Hospital

2.3 Infrastructure

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Hui County Urban Roads

Sewage treatment plan in Kang County

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