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Building up the

Geopolitical Alliance

between

Greece and Israel.

The R&D Aspect

by Nikolaos Karampekios, PhD

(Research Fellow, Center for Security, Economics and Technology,

University of St. Gallen, Switzerland)

The Middle East Research Project

March 2015 WORKING PAPER No 61/2015

Building up the Geopolitical Alliance between Greece and Israel. The R&D Aspect

Page 1

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Working Paper Nr 61/2015

Building up the Geopolitical Alliance between Greece and Israel.

The R&D Aspect

Nikolaos Karampekios, PhD

(Research Fellow, Center for Security, Economics and Technology, University of St.

Gallen, Switzerland. Contact details: 9739600@gmail.com)

ELIAMEP offers a forum for debate on international and European issues. Its non-partisan character

supports the right to free and well documented discourse. ELIAMEP publications aim to contribute

to scholarly knowledge and to provide policy relevant analyses. As such, they solely represent the

views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Foundation.

ELIAMEP Working Paper No 61/ March 2015

Page 2

Author’s Information:

(Nikos Karampekios, PhD in European Technology Policy, works at the interface of security and R&D

policy seeking to address questions relating to the innovation capabilities of the defence and

security industries. His research papers have been published in Allgemeine Schweizerische

Militärzeitschrift, Military Power Review, Géographies, Géopolitiques et Géostratégies Régionales,

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. He co-edited the sole book on the European Defence

Agency (Routledge, 2015). He currently works on performing a network analysis on the European

defence and security industry sector. In addition, he explores the issue of science diplomacy, and

how the conduct of R&D can be incorporated into the study of international diplomacy. This

working paper falls under this category.)

Summary:

Abstract: Greece and Israel have entered into a framework of strategic cooperation in various

fields. One such field is science and technology collaboration. This paper addresses this field. To do

so, I start with tracing the motives for the two countries engaging in such collaboration. Then,

specific instances of this collaboration are put forward, with the latest empirical data put into

context. In addition, insights are provided towards establishing a still firmer collaborative

arrangement, as well the pitfalls to be avoided. Concluding, and on a theoretical level, the nexus

between the conduct of science and technology and international relations is addressed.

Key Words:

R&D, Greece. Israel, diplomacy.

Building up the Geopolitical Alliance between Greece and Israel. The R&D Aspect

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Table of Contents

1.Geopolitical Context and Shifting Alliances .................................................................. 5

2.Cementing the Change of Hearts .................................................................................. 6

3.Tracing Motives .................................................................................................................. 7

4.R&D Collaboration. The Specifics .................................................................................... 8

4.1.Joint Call for R&D Projects .......................................................................................... 8

4.2.Diagnosing and Making Proposals ............................................................................ 9

5.Discussion (I) ..................................................................................................................... 10

6.Discussion (II) .................................................................................................................... 10

7. References ...................................................................................................................... 12

ELIAMEP Working Paper No 61/ March 2015

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Building up the Geopolitical Alliance

between Greece and Israel.

The R&D Aspect1

Eastern Mediterranean is, for most, a region of acute polarization between countries, and indeed a

region, whose repercussions are disproportionately felt across the globe. More so, few as they may

be, alliances between those countries tend to be long in duration. Thus, change of sides may

represent significant events in international relations. For the best part of the last 10 years such a

shift appears to be taking place between a particular triangle of countries, that of Israel, Turkey,

and Greece (including Cyprus).

In this discursive piece, I address the growing relationship between Greece and Israel, and shed

light on a particular aspect of it, that of scientific and technological collaboration. Kept out of the

light, due to the high-profile nature of other aspects of the alliance, such as defence and energy,

the two countries incorporated the specific policy domain into the burgeoning list of collaborative

fields as of 2013. A number of reasons, such as the recognition that international collaboration (as

opposed to a more limited set of partners found in national schemes) accelerates innovation,

reduces cost, as well as the promise of additional gains are to be capitalized through direct access

to knowledge, both tacit and tangible, form the guiding principles of this aspect of the alliance.

Said in another way, Greece and Israel chose to collaborate in matters of science and technology

in recognition to the fact that the latter can breed enduring technological synergies and shape

common industrial trajectories, thus upholding a widely-accepted route to sustainable economic

growth.

A more theoretical treating is also an aim of this piece inasmuch it aims to position this instance of

international technological collaboration within the cadre of international relations. Neglected in

the study of how countries act in a specific manner, or why they collaborate, science and

technology, due to its pivotal role in modern society and international economic development

(Hormats, 2012), is becoming an important indicator of a country’s international behavior. Thus, this

piece aims to fulfill a two-fold objective: a) to document the specific instances of the forming

collaboration, and b) by touching upon the relevant conditions and aspirations, to generalize

upon the larger question of the relationship between science and technology and international

relations.

1 My thanks go to Professor Efraim Inbar for reading drafts of the paper and offering constructive insights. Also, to Ms. Dora

Valerianou, a GSRT Greek official, for her support in providing all the relevant material, and, Dr. Deganit Paikowsky, a a senior

fellow at the Yuval Neeman Workshop for Science, Technology and Security, Tel Aviv University.

Building up the Geopolitical Alliance between Greece and Israel. The R&D Aspect

Page 5

I start with a historical account of the geopolitical shift. This is important to address the large

picture, and understand the forces at play. Then, I trace the motives for the two countries

engaging in a science and technology collaboration. The determinants for the collaboration are

put forward here. Further, the specificities of the collaboration are described, with an up-to-date

account of the progress achieved. Here, I make use of aggregate empirical data, as well as

material and insights provided by key policy officials. Given the newness of the collaboration, this

piece concludes by pointing out certain loopholes that this collaboration should avoid for it to be

long-lived. In addition, it theorizes on the systematization of the nexus between the conduct of

science and technology and international relations.

1.Geopolitical Context and Shifting Alliances

Israel and Greece (including Cyprus), while the only countries having working democratic

institutions in Eastern Mediterranean, until very recently, had been hesitant in cooperative terms

with each other. Greece, for example, did not seek establishment of formal diplomatic relations

with the state of Israel placing a premium in maintaining its (commercial) ties with the Arab

countries. Israel, on the other, invested heavily in partnering with a moderate Islamic country, an

important North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ally, and -significantly in our case- a country with

which Greece has a lot of geopolitical frictions, Turkey. This alliance was very substantial, including

defence as well as scientific and technological cooperation, and indeed shaped a large portion

of the international relations-related past in this geographical region. As a result, the Greek-Israeli

relations could be described wary at best, with diplomatic relations on ambassadorial level

initiated only in 1991.

Motionless though international relations they are not, and two factors ruffled the aforementioned

state of affairs re-arranging the strategic calculus of both Israel and Greece. First is the realization

that the East Med sea basin contains exploitable gas and oil reserves, and the need to channel

them to the international markets via the most secure way. The latter is of importance as the Russia-

Ukraine dispute demonstrates the cross-dimensional dependencies between the producing, the

transporting and the recipient countries. A second factor refers to how Turkish elites increasingly

view Israel as a peripheral antagonist to their world-view, and feel inclined to clash with the latter.

Such incidents include the Israeli offensive in Gaza (2008), Erdogan and Peres’ public argument in

Davos (2009), and the flotilla incident (2010) where Israeli commandos killed 9 Turkish nationals.

Further instances of diverging mindsets have been the Turkish government dealing of the Gezi park

protesters (2013), the Turkey-wide blocking of Twitter, Israel’s incursion into Gaza, as well as the

current rise of Islamist terrorism in the wider region of Iraq and Syria (2014). Laid out in historical

lineage, such instances point to a semi-autocratic political system, which capitalized upon populist

anti-Jew rhetoric. As a result, Israel was forced to reconsider its long-term alliances (Guzansky,

2014).

The re-calculation further took notice of Greece’s (together with Cyprus’) most south-eastern

European Union (EU) membership and the benefits of further integration to the nearest

geographical region of stability and economic growth. Israel, while not an EU member state, is in-

ELIAMEP Working Paper No 61/ March 2015

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par with EU member states in a number of policy domains. For example, in matters of Research and

Development (R&D) Israel not only can participate in any forming research partnership, but can

initiate and coordinate such a partnership (a privilege reserved only to EU member states).

Importantly, the relevant EU funds are scheduled to further increase under Horizon 2020, having

also the complimentary focus on nurturing lasting neighboring relations. The same is equally true in

the EU’s master plan for securing alternative energy supplies. Here, Israel, considered a prime

energy provider, is part of the inner core of the relevant deliberations.

Highly sensitized to its frictions with Turkey, Greece sought to exploit the growing divergences of the

former with Israel by building bridges with the latter. Placing extra burden on Turkey’s southern

borders, disrupting its defence collaboration, and placing one more dot in encircling its arch-rival

were leading, although unsaid, considerations for Greek policy makers. These hard-headed realist

premises, though, are coupled by a set of more liberal and economic-relevant considerations. The

domestic extreme economic malaise necessitated Greece to approach its international relations

from a more pro-active and economic growth-relevant angle in search of successful models to

take lessons from. Obviously, Israel fit the bill. Contributing to this, has been the inescapable

geographical reality that the national spaces of Greece (and, Cyprus) ensure unobstructed

access for Israel to Europe, something the latter could not dismiss, while the former was quick to

note. The same geographical continuum, also, provided Israel the much needed ‘strategic depth’-

space to carry out complex military maneuvers. Lastly, rapprochement was made easier by the

two countries’ long lasting cultural affinities, as well as the sustained promotion of the partnership

by both diasporas.

2.Cementing the Change of Hearts

This change of heart between the two was solidified with the Greek and Israeli prime ministers

exchanging visits for the first time in 2010, and (then on) signing and following upon a number of

agreements. Starting in ‘hard’ fields, such as defence and energy exploitation, bilateral

collaboration agreements have been signed on a range of other, ‘softer’ issues, including culture,

tourism, environmental protection and marine education. In addition to these agreements, various

high-level missions have been initiated by bringing together interested parties from both countries

in order to promote economic relations. And while the Greek side has been quite cautious in

publicizing this in-depth alliance, Israel has been forthcoming of its aspirations in engaging with

Greece with leading academics deliberating on a series of future steps (Inbar, 2014: 28-29). The

same is to be said for the recently appointed new Greek government. While still to offer a public

signal of its intentions on the bilateral relations (Kathimerini, 2015), this period of ‘silence’ can be

considered to be a period of coming to terms with the geopolitical realities, rather than retracting

on its promises. For one, Greece needs all the support it can get for counter-balancing the un-easy

position it has entered itself in relation to negotiating new pay-back terms with its lenders. Playing

the geopolitical chip-card seems only natural. A second indication lays on the micro-level. Work on

the level of various technical groups continuous to take place at a regular pace.

Building up the Geopolitical Alliance between Greece and Israel. The R&D Aspect

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This piece explores the issue of scientific and technological collaboration between the two

countries. Widely accepted as a path to sustainable development (via technologically-induced

economic growth), the two countries opted for taking up common R&D activities. Considerations

of the range of (short- and long-term) positive externalities associated with international R&D

collaboration, such as knowledge- and network-creation were constructive towards this.

3.Tracing Motives

Important elements of the alliance are revealed when examining Greece’s aspirations in signing to

it. The recognition that one of the few ways to achieve sustainable economic growth - and leave

behind a state-paternalistic economic paradigm responsible for the current economic downfall - is

through innovation, led Greek policy-makers to seek a partnership in technological development.

With a vibrant and innovation-prone social environment, vividly depicted in the Start-Up Nation

book (Senor and Singer, 2009), and reflected in a number of scientific, innovation and industrial

scoreboards placing Israel in the first positions in the world (WEF, 2012; Grant Thorton, 2013; OECD,

2014), seems to foregone the conclusion that signing an R&D collaboration agreement with Israel is

a step towards regaining lost economic ground.

What is to be made by Israel’s decision to engage in a similar partnership with Greece given the

former’s superiority in the matters at hand? This imbalance needs to be accounted if we are to

accurately describe the new-found accommodation. In line with the explicit objective of Israel’s

‘‘international scientific relations’’ strategy to foster bilateral scientific and research collaboration

(MOST, 2014), engaging with Greece can be considered as part of an outward-looking national

science and technology policy. Secondly, given Greece’s traditional good relations to the Arab

countries and the hesitancy with which the latter treat Israeli products, one can hypothesize on a

market strategy (co)-branding Israeli technologies as Greek products, and thus reaching Arab

markets easier. Only a hypothesis, it is worth considering as a strategy in gaining an economic

foothold in this near-abroad (for Israel) region.

Thirdly, certain characteristics of Greece’s scientific and technological capability indicate research

quality and point to a promising future trajectory. Despite the chronic public underfunding, the

domestic science base manages to attain a decent publication track record, participates in EU

R&D projects receiving more money than Greece’s national contribution, and is a long-standing

partner in high-profile science endeavors (e.g. CERN). Similarly, recent moves point to the country

taking steps to incentivize the innovation procedure. For example, new legislation reforming the

institutional framework for the conduct of research has been inserted. Also, emphasis is paid to the

(lack of) links between academia and industry. Substantial sums of the upcoming programmatic

period (2014-2020) have been earmarked for innovation (at large), and a re-organization of the

relevant ecosystem by placing emphasis on technology clustering initiatives are steps towards the

same direction. Lastly, a common aspiration is the issue of the related positive externalities. By

nurturing knowledge networks (Paier and Scherngell, 2011; Sorenson and Singh, 2007) international

R&D collaboration brings about a number of related (tacit and tangible) benefits, such as the

ELIAMEP Working Paper No 61/ March 2015

Page 8

creation of a (social) network, research affiliations that can lead to future research collaborations,

access to third party know-how, and the forging of industrial partnerships. Importantly, the lock-in

trajectories and path-dependencies associated with the conduct of R&D (Dosi, 1982), part and

parcel of a coherent national industrial policy, is a positive externality that both countries, one must

assume, deliberated upon and would seek to capitalize on during the later phases of the

collaboration.

4.R&D Collaboration. The Specifics

As of early 2015, collaboration in matters of R&D between the two countries consists of two pillars2.

This part will present them both, and will provide an up-to-date account of the progress made.

4.1.Joint Call for R&D Projects

The first pillar is a ‘Greek and Israel bilateral R&D collaboration’ call. The call was announced end

2013 and is a public intervention measure inasmuch it was aimed towards providing funds to

conduct joint R&D projects. Issuing authorities are the respective science and technology

institutions of the two countries, i.e. the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) in Israel (MATIMOP, 2013),

and the General Secretariat for Research and Technology (GSRT, 2013) in Greece. The total

funding of the call amounts to 10 million Euros, with the two countries contributing equally. Funds,

rather than drawn into a common pool of funds, will be handed out by the two national authorities

to the respective recipients autonomously on the basis, though, of a common budget.

Interestingly, this collaboration is partially based on legal frameworks and agreements preceding

the current geopolitical approximation. It is framed within a 2006 agreement on ‘industrial research

and development’ never before activated.

The call did not prioritise between fields of interest, instead it was open to all thematic fields of R&D.

It did, though, indicate its near-market, industrial orientation, by stating that the results should

contribute to the development of commercial products, applications and/or services. In parallel to

the submission mechanism, a brokering service was activated. It was aimed towards simplifying

match-making attempts through targeted partner search inquiries.

June 2014, the bilateral committee announced the list of the successful projects under the call and

invited the relevant research consortia to finalize on the remaining technicalities. Table 1, presents

these latest data on aggregate form.

2 This paper deals only with governmental-led initiatives. The range of other non-governmental or business initiatives, e.g. the Greek-Israeli

Experience Sharing Workshop for start-ups, organised by the Hellenic Entrepreneurs Association (end-2014), or the Entrepreneurship and

Innovation Beyond Borders series of talks, organised by the Corallia cluster (February-2015) , were not included. While the popularity of these

initiatives only adds to the argument of this paper, that is research collaboration between the two countries is a blossoming domain of

collaboration, the focus was only on those schemes that have been governmental and for which public funds have been spent/earmarked.

Building up the Geopolitical Alliance between Greece and Israel. The R&D Aspect

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Table 1. Successful R&D Proposals under the ‘Greek and Israel bilateral R&D collaboration’ call;

(*) = each country has earmarked 10 million Euros for the project. Possible renegotiation can

lead to an increase/decrease of up to 5% of budget per project. Source: GSRT, 2014; private

communication with GSRT officials (June 2014).

No. Proposals Submitted 100

No. Successful Proposals 31

Average Budget per Country (Euros)

(*)

400.000

No. Successful Proposal per Panel

Social Sciences and Humanities 5

Physical Sciences and Engineering 21

Life Sciences 5

4.2.Diagnosing and Making Proposals

The second pillar of the R&D collaboration between the two countries is the case of a study to

reshape the Greek ‘new economy’ ecosystem. Greece commissioned a ‘study on financing tools

for innovation and new entrepreneurship’ (December 2013) (MOU, 2013) which mandated for a

comprehensive identification of the tools and mechanisms (institutional, financial, market, etc.)

relevant to the bettering of the current national ecosystem. The Israeli YOZMA, a public-private

venture capital initiative, was appointed as the contractor. The delivered study (mid-2014)

included a set of proposals towards bettering the identified gaps, such as (among others):

Institutionalizing a high-ranking governmental technology coordination position;

Setting technology transfer offices to increase market appropriability of R&D results;

Setting incubators in fields with comparative advantages;

Institutionalizing business angels geared specifically for R&D-intensive businesses.

Receiving the study symbolically took place during a meeting of the newly set-up Greek

Innovation Council, and was heralded by the Minister of Development as the first, welcome step

towards addressing the chronic weaknesses of domestic technology exploitation system (MINDEV,

2014). Significantly, he promised all the required steps to align the domestic ecosystem with the

proposals.

ELIAMEP Working Paper No 61/ March 2015

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5.Discussion (I)

Early as it may be to come forward with an evaluation of the aforementioned instances of R&D

collaboration, especially given that both pillars are still in their implementation phases, the up-to-

now account of the process does reveal a number of issues that are worthy of attention. Firstly,

appreciating deeds rather than just rhetoric, both countries have committed public funds to back

this feat. It may seem as a non-starter for most countries, but in the case of the nearly-bankrupt,

cash-deprived, Greece to come up with the money is a big indication of the significance it

attaches to this collaboration. This looks all the more so, if one is to take into account the extra fact

of the chronic underfunding of R&D activities by the Greek state.

A second point of interest is the activation of the brokering service in relation to the R&D call.

Aspiring to shorten the gestation period between interested parties, this service addressed

legitimate difficulties partners from different countries could encounter in any such occasion (e.g.

language barriers, bureaucracy), yet it also did more than that. It matched requests for

collaboration (from the Greek side) to a list of (Israeli) companies upon a pre-determined ‘fields of

activity’ check list (e.g. a Greek security firm was matched to an Israeli security firm). This practice,

however, revealed a gap. That is, the perspective R&D ‘audiences’ (i.e. firms, academia) are

ignorant of each other, and require a governmental agency to kick-start their relation. Putting

aside the possibility of achieving sub-optimal matching results, given the limited number of requests

and of firms in the respective lists, this practice strikes as strange and is quite opposite to

international norms of R&D collaboration where this collaboration takes place as a follow-up of an

existing research/industrial link.

The last point relates to the budget of the study undertaken by YOZMA. Very low for this kind of

nation-wide consultancy work, it amounted to only 15.000 Euros. Yet, this reveals a subtler truth

about the unequal position in matters of technology development between the two parties.

Rather than taking the task up because of the budget, YOZMA aspired to sustain a wider political

relation by transferring much needed know-how to an ally in need. Indeed, going back to an

earlier point, both pillars contain evidence of an asymmetry between the two countries. Greece is

much more dependent upon Israel on the safe completion – not only of the aforementioned

pillars, but in general of matters relevant to the R&D collaboration between them. In the face of a

hypothetical scenario where a geopolitical alliance was not formed, Israel would have dispensed

the R&D aspect (of the alliance) much easier than Greece. On the other hand, Greece would

have to commit much more to lure Israel into signing in, or would have to settle for a partner of a

lower caliber.

6.Discussion (II)

This piece treated an aspect of the alliance between the two countries that so far has received

very little attention. In addition, it placed the aspect of R&D collaboration into historical

perspective. To cement the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in the ‘90s, the two

countries signed a protocol for scientific and technological cooperation (1993-5) that funded a

Building up the Geopolitical Alliance between Greece and Israel. The R&D Aspect

Page 11

total of 3 research projects (in the domains of cultural heritage, biotechnology, and polymers). This

agreement served as the formal institutional framework for the 2013 call for projects, yet it was a

one-off attempt void of follow-up, nor evaluation. Making use of history, this can provide useful

lessons for today’s policy makers. For example, how can a similar trajectory be avoided, and,

indeed, help design better endowed and more targeted future joint calls? The two countries

should proceed in setting a second round of R&D funding, probably with more funds, but

nevertheless proceed with such a round in order to maintain the momentum. A case in point is the

choice of future fields of priority. Should they be open-ended as is the case of the 2013 call, or

should they be geared towards a more limited set of objectives, such as defence, security and

energy, areas in which collaboration already takes place, thus initializing a virtuous, feed-in loop of

R&D into the alliance’s other pillars? Closely associated to the above is the issue whether an

increase in R&D collaboration would be directly proportional to an increase in the overall level of

bilateral collaboration, or an autonomous trajectory can be sustained. These are difficult questions

to answer at this point, especially in the given geographical context, and one would be better off

abiding to the long-tested one-step-at-a-time principle. Yet, policy-makers seeking to further

enhance this virtuous circle should assess R&D collaboration’s potential, and indeed nourish it by

removing all barriers that can endanger it. For example, positive results can sustain this positive loop

by neutralizing counter-acting institutional forces, such as bureaucratic inertia, or budget cuts.

On a more theoretical ground and closely related to the preconditions that treat the relationship

between the conduct of science and technology and international relations, work on the causality

mechanism between the two variables and attribution of a cause and effect-type analysis is

missing. In the case of R&D collaboration between Greece and Israel, the geopolitical alliance led

to the institutionalization of R&D as a discreet aspect of the latter; in time, though, R&D can

become the motor for further deepening of the relations between the two countries. While

factoring in the totality of parameters relative to this relationship is obviously a difficult task, one

cannot overstate the potential benefits of exploring the theoretical foundations between science

and technology as a distinct policy field and international affairs. Similarly, the issue of the ensuing

positive externalities needs to be further explored. Already addressed in technology management

(for example, the networks created because of the received funding), they have not been

assessed as part of a wider rapprochement between countries (for example, if/how can

technological breakthroughs be fed into the political loop, or whether the former can indeed

sustain such a loop). For a number of reasons, e.g. R&D policy considered as a ‘low’ priority theme

in (international) politics, which, themselves are traditionally considered as ‘high’ politics, too

technical for policy makers, or with too great follow-through period (as opposed to election

cycles), analyzing these reasons can contribute in a more comprehensive ex post evaluation of

international R&D agreements. In addition to obtaining a much richer image of these agreements,

theoretical work in this will also help legitimize in both academic and policy-makers mind-sets the

nexus between science and technology and international relations as a discreet and concise field

of policy (Skolnikoff, 1993).

ELIAMEP Working Paper No 61/ March 2015

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