Buddhist Fictionalism

Mario DAmato

Published online: 6 December 2012# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract Questions regarding what exists are central to various forms ofBuddhist philosophy, as they are to many traditions of philosophy. Interestingly,there is perhaps a clearer consensus in Buddhist thought regarding what does notexist than there may be regarding precisely what does exist, at least insofar asthe doctrine of antman (no self, absence of self) is taken to be a fundamentalBuddhist doctrine. It may be noted that many forms of Mahyna Buddhistphilosophy in particular are considered to offer a quite austere ontologya ratherempty account of what exists. Continuing in this vein of ontological austerity,here I will attempt to lay out a relatively novel approach to Buddhist ontology,viz. Buddhist fictionalism.

Keywords Buddhist philosophy . Analytic philosophy . Fictionalism

Questions regarding what exists are central to various forms of Buddhist philoso-phy, as they are to many traditions of philosophy. Interestingly, there is perhaps aclearer consensus in Buddhist thought regarding what does not exist than there maybe regarding precisely what does exist, at least insofar as the doctrine of antman (noself, absence of self) is taken to be a fundamental Buddhist doctrine. It may be noted

SOPHIA (2013) 52:409424DOI 10.1007/s11841-012-0336-y

I would like to thank those who offered helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper when I presentedit at the Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy at Columbia University (special thanks to myrespondent, Jay Garfield, and to Jonathan Gold), at the National Chengchi University in Taipei (especiallyChing Keng and Hans-Rudolf Kantor), and at Emory University (especially Sara McClintock and JohnDunne).

M. DAmato (*)Rollins College, Winter Park, FL, USAe-mail: mdamato@rollins.edu

that many forms of Mahyna Buddhist philosophy in particular are considered tooffer a quite austere ontologya rather empty account of what exists.1 Continuingin this vein of ontological austerity, here, I will attempt to lay out a relatively novelapproach to Buddhist ontology, viz., Buddhist fictionalism. Since this endeavor ismore constructive than exegetical, I will not primarily focus on defending anyclaim that some historical Buddhist philosophers were actually fictionalists (orproto-fictionalists). Rather I will focus on sketching out what a Buddhist form offictionalism might look like. I will begin by offering an overview of fictionalism,relating it especially to the context in which it emerged in analytic philosophy.Then I will briefly discuss two recent papers on Buddhism and fictionalism inorder to set up my own approach to the topic. Next, I will outline what I considerto be the preferred form of Buddhist fictionalism, drawing from Yablos reworkingof Carnaps conception of frameworks, and show how this might be applied to theYogcra three-nature (trisvabhva) theoryor more precisely, to what may bereferred to as the progressive model of the three-nature theory. Finally, I willelucidate three reasons for adopting a form of fictionalism for Buddhism, viz., anti-realism, Wittgensteinianism, and self-reflexivity; I offer these three reasons as sug-gested principles that might usefully inform the task of extending, or extrapolating,the project of Buddhist philosophyspecifically, a Yogcra-inflected form ofMahyna philosophyin the contemporary context.

Fictionalism Introduced

Fictionalist positions in philosophy may be understood in some sense as a response toQuines approach to ontology. The Quinean ontological method is to accept whateverentities are posited by our strongest theory. As Schaffer explains, The elements of thedomain [of discourse] are the posits of [our] best theory, and insofar as we accept thetheory, these are the entities we get committed to (2009, 348). So if our best accountof what exists is the account offered by physics, then we must accept that theelementary particles posited by our most rigorous theories in physics actually exist.Furthermore, if physics depends upon mathematics, then we must also accept theexistence of mathematical objects.2 This latter view is sometimes referred to as theQuine indispensability argument, or the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument.Hartry Field states the argument in the following terms: (1) We need to speak interms of mathematical entities in doing science, metalogic, etc.; (2) if we need tospeak in terms of a kind of entity for such important purposes, we have excellentreason for supposing that that kind of entity exists (quoted in Price 2009, 336).Putnam himself puts the argument as follows: quantification over mathematicalentities is indispensable for science, both formal and physical; therefore we shouldaccept such quantification; but this commits us to accepting the existence of themathematical entities in question (quoted in Price 2009, 337). Thus, according to one

1 See, e.g., Tillemans (1999) for a discussion of Buddhist logic in relation to Madhyamaka thought, inwhich he considers whether it might be possible to formulate a logic without ontological commitments.2 Schaffer points out that, in adhering to this ontological method, FIndeed, Quine himself felt compelled tomove from eliminativism about numbers to realism_ (2009, 349).

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standard deployment of the Quinean ontological method, we must be committed tothe existence of at least some abstract objects, namely the objects of mathematics(whether numbers, functions, sets, etc.), and so the Quinean ontological method leadsto a form of Platonism.

Fictionalism, in brief, is the view that the entities posited by some discourse neednot be considered to exist as such, but may be considered useful fictions. Sainsburystates that the starting point for fictionalism is some kind of ontological scruple: onecannot bring oneself to believe in [e.g.,]unobservable things, or abstract things. Butone has somehow to do justice to the fact that one cannot simply throw away therelated regions of discourse: [e.g.,]elementary physics, or mathematics (2010, 2).Sainsbury goes on to define fictionalism as follows: To be a fictionalist about someregion of thought is to say that the things thought are of value (are in some sense to beaccepted, esteemed, or commended), but this value does not consist in their beingtrue (2010, 2). Eklund offers a similar account of fictionalism, although he distin-guishes two separate fictionalist theses: an ontological thesis and a linguistic thesis.He states that the fictionalist ontological thesis is the thesis that the entities charac-teristic of the discourse do not exist, or have the ontological status of fictionalentities, while the fictionalist linguistic thesis is the thesis that utterances of senten-ces of the discourse are best seen not as efforts to say what is literally true, but asuseful fictions of some sort (2011).3 So fictionalism represents an attempt tocontinue engaging in certain forms of discourse without thereby committing our-selves to the existence of the entities referred to in the discourse, or without therebybelieving that the sentences we affirm in that discourse are literally true. For ourpurposes, the idea is that such an account would allow Buddhist thinkers to takeseriously the claims of conventional truth, without thereby being committed toconventionally posited entities.

Introductions to fictionalism (e.g., Kalderon 2005, 1; Sainsbury 2010, 152)sometimes point to 1980 as an inaugural year for contemporary forms of fictionalism,since this was the year of publication of two relevant seminal works: Hartry FieldsScience Without Numbers and Bas van Fraassens The Scientific Image. In ScienceWithout Numbers, Field argues that to explain even very complex applications ofmathematics to the physical world (for instance, the use of differential equations inthe axiomatization of physics), it is not necessary to assume that the mathematics thatis applied is true, [rather] it is necessary to assume little more than that mathematics isconsistent (1980, vii). Field states that the axioms of mathematics need not beviewed as truths, but may be seen as useful fictions; hence the Platonism impliedby the standard approach to the Quinean ontological method can be replaced by amore palatable nominalism (i.e., mathematical objectsnumbers, functions, sets,etc.need not be affirmed as actually existent, but may be viewed as fictionalentities). Fields work sketches out a strategy for showing how science can bereformulated without referring to mathematical objects, offering for example anominalistic approach to Newtonian physics. Field believes that such a reformulationis possible because, contra Quine, Field argues that mathematics is dispensable, sincethe conclusions we arrive at by these means are not genuinely new, they are already

3 Eklund points out that One can embrace the linguistic thesis without embracing the ontological thesis,and vice versa, but that Quite often the theses are run together (2011).

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derivable in a more long-winded fashion from the premises, without recourse to themathematical entities (1980, 1011), so the usefulness of mathematics does notnecessarily entail its indispensability.

While Field argues against the necessity of accepting the truth of mathemat-ics, van Fraassen argues against scientific realism, which he identifies as theview that Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of whatthe world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that itis true (1980, 8). In The Scientific Image, van Fraassen argues that the beliefinvolved in accepting a scientific theory is only that it Fsaves the phenomena,_ that is,correctly describes what is observable[and] to accept one theory rather thananother one involves also a commitment to a research programme, to continu-ing the dialogue with nature in the framework of one conceptual scheme ratherthan another (1980, 4). In short, accepting a scientific theory need not entail thatone must believe it to be true, but merely requires that one views the theory asempirically adequate. Since, on van Fraassens account, it is not necessary forone to believe that scientific theories are literally true, it is also not necessaryfor one to believe that the theoretical entities posited by science (e.g., elemen-tary particles) actually exist; such entities may be viewed as useful fictions.

Although not all fictionalists would necessarily agree with the projects orpositions presented by Field and van Fraassen, gaining a general sense of thesorts of views they developed provides a useful entry into what fictionalism isall about. There are fictionalist positions regarding different areas of discoursemathematics, scientific theories, ethics (moral fictionalism), possible worlds (modalfictionalism), etc.and such positions have been developed in various ways. Butagain, we may understand the common features of the variety of fictionalist positionsin the terms laid out by Sainsbury and Eklund above: not literal truth, but usefulfictions; not existent entities, but fictional ones. Also, the choice of the term fiction-alism should by now be clear, insofar as we are accustomed to affirming all sorts ofstatements about Gandalf or Sherlock Holmes without actually believing that thesepersonages actually exist, or that statements positing their existence are literally true.It should not be thought, however, that fictionalists necessarily view mathematics ason a par with literature: literature and mathematics are significantly different forms ofdiscourse, and the criteria for affirming statements in them differ in correspondinglysignificant ways.

There are a few relatively standard objections to fictionalism. While theobjection of the indispensability of mathematics was addressed by Field, followingYablo we may briefly consider two further objections to fictionalism, viz.,applicability and objectivity.4 Yablo points out that the indispensability of mathemat-ics should be distinguished from its applicability. He states, Applicability is, in thefirst instance, a problem: the problem of explaining the effectiveness of mathemat-icsor what the physicist Eugene Wigner has referred to as The UnreasonableEffectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Scienceswhich is to say, how it can bethe case that mathematics is so useful in explaining the workings of the natural world

4 There are other responses to the objections of applicability and objectivity (e.g., Balaguer 1998 and 2009),but since I will be developing a fictionalist position based partly on Yablos views, I will primarily focus onYablos responses.

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(Yablo 2005, 92). Rather than taking the applicability of mathematics as an argumentfor the truth of mathematics, Yablo suggests that we explain the applicability ofmathematics in terms of a content-oriented make-believe, wherein our interest inworking out what is true-according-to-the-theory is by and large independent ofwhether the theory is thought to be really truei.e., independent of whether theobjects of mathematics really exist (2005, 9899). So Yablo argues that the use ofmathematics as a representational aid does not entail that one must accept the entitiesposited by mathematical discourse. In a similar vein, the physicist Lee Smolinresponds to the apparent unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics by suggestingthat mathematics be viewed as a particularly effective game (like chess), which mayhave been inspired by our most fundamental observations of nature, but which is ageneralization of observed regularities when time and particularity are removed(2009). Hence, the effectiveness of mathematics in modeling the processes of natureneed not be taken as demonstrative proof that mathematics is true.

The second objection is regarding the objectivity of mathematics, or whether afictionalist interpretation of mathematics can account for the apparent objectivity ofmathematical theories; as Yablo puts the question here, Why do some ways ofconstructing mathematical theories, and extending existing ones, strike us as betterthan others? (2005, 100). His response is that some ways of developing a theoryseem to make for an apter gamea game that lends itself to the expression of moremetaphorical truths (2005, 102). Developing this insight a bit further, Yablo statesthat we may note two different kinds of correctness in mathematical theories: insome cases a way of developing a theory seems correct because it meshes well withthe background story (the theories that are already accepted), and in other cases atheory seems correct because of its cognitive promisebecause it seems that itmight be particularly useful in the specific form of content-oriented make-believe inwhich it is deployed (2005, 103). While much more can be said regarding theobjections to fictionalism, and the defense of fictionalist views, this should sufficeto give some sense of how fictionalist positions might be worked out.

It should be noted that fictionalism should not only be viewed as a defen-sible means to carry out the negative project of minimizing ones ontologicalcommitments; it may also be seen as an attempt to work out a philosophical accountthat is committed to taking seriously the continuing evolution and development ofdifferent forms of discourse. For example, for someone who holds a scientific-realistposition (in the terms laid out by van Fraassen above), it would be odd to affirm thatthe theories put forward by the current state of science are literally true, whilealso affirming that those theories will almost certainly be revised and improvedupon in the (not too distant) future: If a theory is true, then why should it besubject to revision? Is it only partially true? Or only true by our current lights (butnot actually true)? These seem to be strange ways of using the word true. In fact, asNiiniluoto points out, Excluding naive realists, most scientists are fallibilists inPeirces sense: scientific theories are hypothetical and always corrigible inprinciple. They may happen to be true, but we cannot know this for certainin any particular case (2011).5 Fictionalism allows one to take seriously the

5 Further analysis of the debate between scientific realists (e.g., Popper) and anti-realists/instrumentalists(e.g., van Fraassen) may be found in Niiniluotos discussion of Scientific Progress (2011).

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continuing change and development of different areas of discourse, without on theone hand dogmatically upholding that the entities posited by the current state ofscience ultimately exist (or that the statements made by our current science areliterally true)6 or on the other hand falling into a form of skepticism or nihilism. Itis this middle way potential of fictionalism that, I believe, recommends it to thoseinterested in developing Buddhist philosophical positions. In the next section, Iwill provide a brief overview of two recent papers that discuss Buddhistfictionalism.

Buddhist Fictionalisms

Probably the earliest reference to Buddhism as fictionalism occurs in the work ofB.K. Matilal, who, in a discussion of Indian logic, refers to the Buddhists as taking apan-fictional approach to the world of phenomena (1970, 93). Since then, otherscholars have referred to various forms of Buddhist philosophy as fictionalist,including Sautrntika (Garfield 2006), Madhyamaka (Crittenden 1981; Garfield2006; Tillemans 2011), Yogcra (DAmato 2009a), and the Dignga-Dharmakrtischool (Yao 2009). There are certainly differences (whether subtle or significant) inthe ways in which the term fictionalism is applied in each of these cases, so to arriveat a more nuanced understanding of the senses in which Buddhism has been consid-ered to be a form of fictionalism, I will examine two recent papers in particular, oneby Garfield and another by Tillemans.

In a paper titled Reductionism and Fictionalism, Garfield offers commentson Mark Sideritss book, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. Discussingthe doctrine of antman, Garfield states that Reductionism, as Siderits points out, isnot a way of demonstrating that there is no self but, rather, that the self really issomething elsein this case, a continuum of subpersonal psychophysical phenom-ena (2006, 4). While Siderits had characterized a certain strand of Buddhist thoughtas reductionist, Garfield develops an alternative reading according to which pre-Madhyamaka schools of Buddhist philosophy (e.g., Sautrntika and Pudgalavda)mightlike Madhyamaka philosophy itselfbe characterized as fictionalist.Garfield states that on this reading, the continuity between pre-Madhyamaka schoolsand the Madhyamaka school might be better brought into focus. He points out thataccording to Siderits, Madhyamaka is radically discontinuous with earlier Buddhistschools in that while the early schools are reductionist, Madhyamaka is anti-realist;however, according to Garfield, Sautrntika and Pudgalavda philosophy could alsobe interpreted as fictionalist, insofar as they were fictionalists about persons andother conventional phenomena (2006, 5-6). The difference between the pre-Madhyamaka and Madhyamaka schools, according to Garfield, is found in how farthey are willing to go with fictionalism: while the pre-Madhyamaka schools posit thatthe fundamental entitiesthe momentary events (dharmas)that comprise

6 Which is a scientific-realist position; as Chakravartty states, most define scientific realism in terms of thetruth or approximate truth of scientific theories or certain aspects of theories. Some define it in terms of thesuccessful reference of theoretical terms to things in the world, both observable and unobservable (2011).

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conventional objects are not fictional, Madhyamaka philosophy is fictionalism allthe way down, because of the doctrine of emptiness (2006, 6).7

Garfields comments may lead us to further consider the difference between reduction-ism and fictionalism: viz., while a reductionist would hold that talk of conventionalobjects should be reinterpreted in philosophical terms as talk of interrelated processesof actually existent momentary events, a fictionalist would not accept that such talk ofconventional objects can be reduced to talk of ultimate objects. Kalderon makes asimilar distinction between reductionism and fictionalism, stating that according tovan Fraassens fictionalism, scientific claims are not reduced to claims about other(directly observable) phenomena, but rather science is interpreted at face value asinvolving reference to and quantification over a domain of unobservable entities;hence, the fictionalist claims, and the reductionist denies, that the target region ofdiscourse is interpreted at face value (2005, 4). While the reductionist attempts toground claims of the target discourse in some more fundamental discourse, thefictionalist does not make this move and may accept the target discourse for prag-matic purposes without believing that the entities referred to are actually existent.

The distinction between reductionism and fictionalism can be further clarified byrelating it to another distinctionone that is rather ubiquitous in Buddhist philoso-phy: viz., the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth. Even in themost general terms, the moves towards reductionism or fictionalism would entail asignificant difference in the way in which the distinction between conventional truthand ultimate truth would be developed, which may be seen in the following diagram:

As Garfield points out, the key difference between reductionism and fictionalism isregarding how far down to take the levels of analysis: for the reductionist, theconventional ontology is in some way grounded in a final ontology, while theMadhyamaka fictionalist sees the conventional ontology as free-floating.

7 It may be pointed out here that in replying to Garfields critique, Siderits emphasizes that in his Personal Identityand Buddhist Philosophy, he sees the primary distinction between pre-Madhyamaka (viz., Abhidharma)and Madhyamaka as a distinction between local and global anti-realism, specifying that he uses anti-realismin Dummetts sense, as the name of a view about meaning and truth, and not as the name of a metaphysicalview. For Dummett an anti-realist is one who denies that there are verification-transcendent truth-conditions forstatements in a given class. Now, as Dummett points out, a reductionist is a kind of local anti-realist, but this istypically against the background of global realism. Abhidharma seems to fit this pattern[while]Madhyamakamight be usefully considered a kind of global anti-realism (Siderits 2006, 18).

TWO TRUTHS IN TERMS OF REDUCTIONISM

CONVENTIONAL TRUTH: CONVENTIONALLY POSITED ENTITIES

ULTIMATE TRUTH: REDUCED TO INTERRELATED PROCESSES OF MOMENTARY EVENTS (DHARMAS)OF THE FINAL ONTOLOGY

TWO TRUTHS IN TERMS OF FICTIONALISM

CONVENTIONAL TRUTH: CONVENTIONALLY POSITED ENTITIES

ULTIMATE TRUTH: VIEWED AS FICTIONS THAT DO NOT ULTIMATELY EXIST

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In another recent paper, Tillemans (2011) discusses Madhyamaka philosophy inrelation to fictionalism. His concern in this paper is with the status of conventionaltruth, and whether the Mdhyamika must accept everything that is agreed upon in theworld to exist (2011, 151). Tillemans characterizes this formulation of conventionaltruth as a dismal position, since it would entail a trivialization of the idea of truth(2011, 152). However, he also presents Sideritss somewhat more forgiving formu-lation of conventional truth; according to this account, it is not the case that simplyeverything whatsoever that people say/believe is so is indeed so, but rather thatcustomarily accepted practices and community standardshave to be taken asgiven (2011, 155). Attempting to understand why certain Mdhyamikas (namely,Prsan:gikas like Candrakrti) were led to this position, Tillemans offers the suggestionthat this move may be understood as motivated by what we would refer to as fictionalism.

Tillemans defines fictionalism as an approach that enables people to reject commit-ment to some or even all kinds of entities by adopting a type of pretense or make-believe.They might see talk of such entities as metaphorical or might even add to truth claims likeFp is true_ a disclaimer operator that p is true Fin such and such a story_i.e.,according to some specific fiction (2011, 158). Tillemans continues by pointing outthat Prsan:gikas can be seen as revolutionary fictionalists who hold that adopting apretense stance constitutes a type of progress. Instead of saying that the world itself alreadytacitly plays make-believe (what is known as Fhermeneutical fictionalism_), they say thatthe world is completely mistaken about what it does and that it ought to learn to say thethings it says only in terms of pretend-assertions (2011, 158). So on this account, thePrsan:gika philosopher would work out the Madhyamaka rejection of intrinsic nature(svabhva) by adopting a fictionalist approach to all conventional domains of dis-course; and this implies a revolutionary fictionalism insofar as the Prsan:gika under-stands any worldly beings engagement with conventional discourse to entail a false beliefin things having an intrinsic nature.While Tillemans concludes that such a pan-fictionalismis an undesirable way to developMadhyamaka philosophystating that it is an extremelyhigh price to pay for rejecting what Mdhyamikas say they reject (2011, 163)in thenext section I will attempt to flesh out the details of a Buddhist fictionalism.

The Method of Frameworks

In what follows I will outline what I consider to be the preferred form of fictionalismfor Buddhism. The form offered here picks up from Yablos reworking of Carnapsconception of frameworks. Before laying out this account, it should be noted thataccording to the received view, the rebirth of ontology in analytic philosophy can bedated to the mid-twentieth century in a group of papers by Quine and Carnappapersinvolving arguments regarding whether the project of ontology was even possible,and if it were possible, what form it should take. According to the received view,while Quine of course takes existence questions dead seriously and believes thatontology can be carried out according to a precise method (i.e., accepting whateverentities are posited by our best theory), Carnap adopts a more quizzical attitudetowards ontology, considering it to be meaningless to ask whether, for example,numbers (really, actually) exist: Determined to pronounce from a position external tothe number-framework, all the philosopher achieves is to cut himself off from the

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rules governing the use of Fnumber,_ which then drains his pronouncements of allsignificance (Yablo 1998, 230, 232). Quine isagain, according to the receivedviewconsidered to have won this debate.

Needless to say, I am not in agreement with the received view. Following Price, Yablo,and Schaffer, I believe that Carnap and Quine should not be viewed as directly opposed toone another: though the textbooks cast Quine and Carnap as opponents, Quine is betterunderstood as an anti-metaphysical ally of his mentor (Schaffer 2009, 349); furthermore,I believe that Quines arguments did not kill Carnaps anti-metaphysical account,but rather succeeded in lopping off some inessential appendages (Price 2009, 322;cf. Yablo 1998, 232). Contra the received view of the Quinean ontological method,Yablo argues that To determine our [ontological] commitments, we need to be able toferret out all traces of non-literality in our assertions. If there is no feasible project ofdoing that, then there is no feasible project of Quinean ontology (1998, 233). So onYablos account, the standard approach to the Quinean ontological project cannot becarried out, because at the end of the day it has not proven possible to strictlydelineate literal assertions from metaphorical onesa view that is reminiscent of aposition offered by the Yogcra Buddhist thinker, Sthiramati, that all language useis metaphorical (Tzohar 2011, 234); everything is metaphorical since there is noprimary referent for a word (Kunjunni Raja 1963, 247).

Carnaps conception of frameworks is relatively straightforward. He presents the mainoutlines of his approach in a few sentences, beginningwith the basic definition of a linguisticframework: If someonewishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he hasto introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call thisprocedure the construction of a framework for the new entities in question (1950, 21).From there he explains the distinction between internal and external questions: wemust distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existenceof certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internalquestions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the frameworkitself [of the system of entities as a whole], called external questions (1950, 21-22).So, for example, returning to the question regarding the existence of numbers, Carnapwould reply that if one were asking about the existence of certain entitiese.g., whetherthere are any even prime numbersfromwithin the number framework, then the answeris clearly yes; but if one were asking about the system of entities itselfviz., whethernumbers existfrom outside the number-framework, then the question would bemeaningless. Hence, ontology is largely a misguided enterprise that attempts to askexternal questions regarding the existence of a system of entities; rather, questionsregarding the existence of certain entities can only be addressed internally.

The only interesting questions that can be asked external to a framework, on Carnapsaccount, are pragmatic ones regarding whether a particular framework should be adopted.Such pragmatic determinations, however, should not be confused with acceptance of theexistence of the entities posited by the framework: Wemay still speak (and have done so)of Fthe acceptance of the framework_ or Fthe acceptance of the new entities_ since thisform of speech is customary; but one must keep in mind that these phrases do not meanfor us anything more than acceptance of the new linguistic forms (1950, 31). Carnapemphasizes that the decision to accept a new framework is a practical matter, and nota theoretical one, and that such acceptance can only be judged as being more or lessexpedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended (1950,

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31). So on this account, accepting the number framework does not entail believingthat numbers really exist, or accepting the framework of particle physics does notentail believing that quarks really exist.8 But do quarks (for example) exist? Again,asked internal to physics, the answer is affirmative. But the only meaningful externalquestion is: Should the physics-framework be adopted?

Carnap himself did not explicitly interpret his conception of frameworks in fiction-alist terms.9 This task is taken up by Yablo in a paper in which he attempts to defendCarnap fromQuines objections to the conception of frameworks, specifically regarding thevalidity of the internal/external distinction. In brief, Yablo argues that Quine is right thatCarnaps internal/external distinction depends on the analytic/synthetic distinction (thelatter distinction being one that Quine famously argued against),10 but Yablo goes on tostate that Carnaps internal/external distinction can be freed of this dependence, and thatonce freed it becomes something independently interesting: the distinction between state-mentsmadewithinmake-believe games and thosemadewithout themor, rather, a specialcase of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction (1998, 232).While taking into consideration Quines critiques, Yablo argues that employing a frame-work can be understood in terms of an enterprise where sentences are put at the service ofsomething other than their usual truth-conditionsin a disciplined but defeasible way, anactivity that Yablo sees as paradigmatic of engaging in a form of pretense (1998, 243). SoYablo reinterprets the use of a framework as engaging in a form of pretense or make-believe; while employing a particular framework entails employing a set of (revisable)rules in a disciplined fashion, it does not entail believing that the entities posited within theframework must really exist.

Yablos fictionalist reformulation of Carnaps conception of frameworks (which I willrefer to as Carnap-Yablo fictionalist frameworks) can be usefully deployed in devel-oping the Buddhist philosophical distinction between conventional truth and ultimatetruth. The key move would be to interpret the fictive operator according to fiction F(according to the conventional domain of discourse F) as identifying the fictionalistframework that specifies the parameters in terms of which some conventional truthwould be affirmed. The basic idea may be seen through the following diagram:

9 Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) also discuss Carnaps conception of frameworks, but they do not develop hisconception in explicitly fictionalist terms. On the question of whether Carnap would endorse a fictionalistinterpretation of his conception of frameworks, by viewing the internal as a form of make-believe, seeYablo 1998, 243244.10 It would take us too far away from our topic to consider the details of Yablos arguments here, but one ofthe main points Yablo concedes to Quine is that Carnaps frameworks are made up inter alia of analyticassertion rules, which while not as objectionable as analytic truths, are still objectionable: no assertion orrule of assertion can lay claim to being indefeasibly correct (1998, 237).

8 Regarding the word really here, Yablo offers the following apropos remark: The goal of philosophicalontology is to determine what really exists. Leave out the Freally_ and theres no philosophy (1998, 258).Yablo, of course, is willing to Fleave out the really._

TWO TRUTHS IN TERMS OF CARNAP-YABLO FICTIONALIST FRAMEWORKS

CONVENTIONAL TRUTH: INTERNAL TO A FRAMEWORKCONVENTIONALLY POSITED ENTITIES AFFIRMEDSTATEMENTS MADE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A PRETENSE

ULTIMATE TRUTH: EXTERNAL TO A FRAMEWORKCONVENTIONALLY POSITED ENTITIES NOT AFFIRMEDNO EXISTENCE STATEMENTS MADE

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Regarding applying this method of fictionalist frameworks to different formsof Buddhist philosophy, as indicated above, I believe this method would bebetter suited to forms of Buddhist philosophy that do not interpret the conven-tional/ultimate distinction in reductionist terms. But there are still a number ofdifferences among such non-reductionist positions: for example, some mightaffirm the doctrine of emptiness (nyat) as the ultimate truth (paramrtha-satya), while others might hold that the ultimate truth is ineffable (nirabhilpyat),and still others might put forward the view that the ultimate truth is that there is noultimate truth, or that the ultimate truth should be understood in terms of dialetheism.The method of fictionalist frameworks might also be used to articulate the doctrinethat universals (smnya) are unreal. My focus, however, will be on showing howone interpretation of the three-nature theory might be articulated in terms of Carnap-Yablo fictionalist frameworks.

The three-nature (trisvabhva) theory is central to the Yogcra school ofMahyna Buddhist philosophy and is directed towards effecting a shift inthe overall perspective on reality, altering the terms in which reality is inter-preted or envisioned; as such, it is a key aspect of the Yogcra path ofspiritual practicea theory that exemplifies the practice of philosophy as away of life, to use Hadots phrase (1995). While there are certainly differencesregarding how the three natures are elucidated in different Yogcra texts, hereI will stay within the bounds of what may be called the progressive model,wherein each of the three naturesthe imagined (parikalpita), the dependent(paratantra), and the perfected (parinis:panna)refers to a distinct, progressive levelof semiotic awareness, moving from the deluded to the fully awakened.11 Theimagined nature refers to reality as it appears to ordinary, deluded sentientbeings, the world of subject-object duality constructed through conceptualiza-tion and language, wherein a fundamental distinction between perceiving sub-jects and perceived objects is made. In terms of Carnap-Yablo fictionalistframeworks, the imagined nature may be characterized as the framework ofeveryday objects, what Carnap refers to as the world of things, encompassingthe simplest framework [kind of entities] dealt with in the everyday language:the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events (1950, 22). Thedependent nature, on the other hand, refers to the causally interdependent flowof representations, which entails the realization through spiritual practice thatthe conceptually constructed entities of the imagined nature do not actuallyexist, but are simply the effects (i.e., the misinterpretation through imputation)of the causally dependent flow of representations. In terms of Carnap-Yablofictionalist frameworks, the dependent nature may be characterized as a phe-nomenalistic framework, which describes a new kind of entitiesviz., repre-sentations (vijapti)defined in a new way, subject to new rules (Carnap 1950,21)i.e., wherein even the ordinary objects [of normal states of consciousness] arenot different from the mind, are nothing but cognition (vijapti-mtra)

11 For exegetical analyses of the progressive model of the three natures, see Sponberg 1983, DAmato2003, and DAmato 2005. It should be pointed out that the standard model of the three natures is thepivotal modelemphasizing a shift from the imagined to the perfected, with the dependent as the fulcrumwhich is more commonly presented in Yogcra scholarship. One Yogcra text that clearly offers aprogressive model is the Mahynastrlam: kra (cf. DAmato 2005).

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(Schmithausen 1976, 241). Hence, in the terms of this new, phenomenalisticframework, any move from a mental representation to positing the existence ofan external object is not warranted, or as Hall states, Stop at the bare percept;no need to posit any entity behind it, since in the terms of the framework ofthe dependent nature, the concept of vijapti suffices to make sense of percep-tion, and the concept of an external referent (artha) is logically superfluous (1986,14, 18). Finally, the perfected nature refers to the awakened vision of reality: theultimate (paramrtha), reality as-it-is (yath-bhta), thusness (tathat), theinexpressible (anabhilapyat), the signless (animitta).12 The perfected nature isthe vision of reality unmediated by conceptualization and language. Through therealization of the perfected nature, awakening is attained, an attainment that isinterpreted in the Yogcra tradition as a nonconceptual awareness (nirvikalpa-jna) of thusness (tathat). In relation to Carnap-Yablo fictionalist frameworks, theperfected nature would be characterized as the leaving-off of all frameworks whatsoever.So according to this progressive model of the three-nature theory, the aim is to move fromthe deluded framework of the imagined, through to the more refined framework of thedependent, wherein the only posits are interdependent flows of representations (represen-tation-only, vijapti-mtra)a framework that serves to break attachment to externalobjects, as well as to the view that there is an unchanging self; and ultimately to theperfectedwhich is a direct apprehension of thusness, without the mediationof conceptualization and language, and hence without any framework at all.

We may recapitulate this interpretation of the three-nature theory through thefollowing diagram:

I will conclude this section with two brief observations. First, we maynotice that on this reading of the three-nature theory, Yogcra thought wouldbe able to account for the shifting from one framework to another, throughcharacterizing different frameworks as hierarchically ordered descriptionswithin the domain of what is understood to be conventional truth (Tzohar2011, 244), in which some conventional frameworks might be judged as beingmore or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the languageis intended (Carnap 1950, 31), viz., the aim of spiritual realization, or movingtowards awakening (bodhi). Second, while it might seem somewhat odd to

12 Sthiramati, in his subcommentary to the Madhyntavibhga, offers a list of various Yogcra terms forultimate reality (see Yamaguchi 1934, 50).

THREE NATURES ( ) IN TERMS OF CARNAP-YABLO FICTIONALIST FRAMEWORKSCONVENTIONAL TRUTH

IMAGINED NATURE ( - )reality viewed in terms of conceptual construction and subject-object dualityreferential objects posited as distinct from the mind that confronts themthe framework of ordinary, deluded sentient beings

DEPENDENT NATURE ( - )reality viewed as a causally interdependent flow of representations ( )referential objects not affirmed, but representations themselves are positedthe framework of representation-only (vijapti- ), adopted by bodhisattvas

ULTIMATE TRUTHPERFECTED NATURE ( - )non-conceptually-constructing awareness of thusness ( )not even mind taken to exist, not even representations positedthe absence of frameworks of fully awakened buddhas

S

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characterize the perfected nature as the absence of any framework, this char-acterization is quite consistent with the Carnap-Yablo account of fictionalistframeworks, since a framework is understood to be a system of new ways ofspeaking (Carnap 1950, 21), and insofar as the perfected nature, after all, isunderstood as a domain beyond conceptualization and language.

Reasons for Adopting Buddhist Fictionalism

To conclude, I will present three reasons for adopting a fictionalist approach indeveloping Buddhist philosophy. As indicated earlier, by Buddhist philosophyI mean more specifically a Yogcra-inflected form of Mahyna Buddhistphilosophy, one that would incorporate the insights of what may be referredto as the Yogcra-Vijnavda,13 but which would also extend this tradition intothe contemporary context, taking into account the not inconsiderable advances invarious domains of thought (e.g., logic, mathematics, quantum mechanics, etc., aswell as the semiotic sciences of linguistics, cultural anthropology, history of reli-gions, etc.). Again, the three reasons are offered as recommended principles thatmight usefully guide the project of extrapolating Buddhist philosophy into a modernmilieu. The three are anti-realism, Wittgensteinianism, and self-reflexivity.14

(1) Anti-realism: Regarding the meaning of the term, Chalmers states that thebasic question of metaontology is: are there objective answers to the basic questionof ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and ontological anti-realists say no(2009, 77). Siderits contrasts anti-realism with metaphysical nihilism, pointing outthat while according to metaphysical nihilism it is ultimately true that nothingwhatsoever exists, According to global anti-realism, on the other hand, the verynotion of an ultimate truth, of there being an ultimate nature of reality, is incoherent(2003, 132). So anti-realism is the view that there are no objective, ultimate answersto ontological questions (which is clearly quite different from affirming that nothingexists).15 There is a long and hallowed tradition within Mahyna Buddhism ofeschewing ontological-realist positions, and while it may seem rather unusual for areligious tradition, there is a strong tendency in many forms of Mahyna Buddhistthought of dispensing with the project of articulating a final ontology as a foundation.

13 The usage of this term is drawn from Bueschers The Inception of Yogcra-Vijnavda and clarified inmy review of that work: First, by FYogcra-Vijnavda_ Buescher means to exclude other branches ofBuddhist doctrinal thought (e.g., Sarvstivda, Sautrntika, and Madhyamaka), while at once including anddistinguishing the original and earlier stages of the broad stream of thought that would come to be variouslyreferred to as Yogcra, Cittamtra, or Vijnavda (three terms that occur in classical Indian and Tibetanworks). Second, Buescher takes the defining feature of Yogcra-Vijnavda thought to be the employ-ment ofthe three concepts of svabhvatraya (threefold nature), vijaptimtra(t) (representation-only, orpurely noetic constitution in Bueschers terms), and layavijna (store consciousness, as this is oftenrendered, or latent consciousness in Bueschers translation) (DAmato 2009b).14 For those who properly interpret Hegels Aufhebung, my three reasons attempt to articulate the threemoments of the dialectic: (1) universality (Allgemeinheit), (2) particularity (Besonderheit), and (3) indi-viduality (Einzelheit).15 Tillemans states that Madhyamaka Buddhist anti-realism rejects the view that things are what they arebecause of the properties they have intrinsically, independently of our conceptions (kalpan) of them, ourlinguistic designations (prajapti), and our actions upon (pravr: tti) them (2011, 163).

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Although there are certainly other ways to work out the Buddhist commitment to anti-realism, fictionalism recommends itself as an elegant and defensible approach.

(2) Wittgensteinianism: The resonances between Buddhism and Wittgenstein havebeen remarked upon by many, and it is with good reason that in his study ofComparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship, Tuck devotes an entirechapter to Buddhism after Wittgenstein.16 Tucks aim is to call our attention to theprocess of isogesis (as opposed to exegesis); he defines isogesis as the act ofproductive understanding whereby contemporary interpreters of Buddhist textsmust employ their personal and cultural perspectives if they are to find what theyread intelligible (1990, 16), and believes that all interpretations are in some senseisogetical. In the spirit of embracing the inexorability of isogesis, I would affirm that acontemporary Buddhist philosophy should develop along Wittgensteinian lines,primarily because of the Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy as therapy: Thereis not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like differenttherapies (Philosophical Investigations 133; Wittgenstein 1953).17 As Fogelinarticulates Wittgensteins approach, Philosophers are led into confusion becausethey are antecedently disposed to view various uses of language in ways inappropri-ate to themThe proper task of philosophyindeed, its whole taskis to induce usto abandon such improper perspectives (1996, 34). Such an approach to philosophyas therapy resonates well with the tenor of Buddhism as a soteriology. Furthermore,the project of developing a Wittgensteinian Buddhist philosophy would be bestsupported by adopting a fictionalist approach to ontologyan approach that leavespractices as they are without attempting to be the final arbiter regarding what entitiesshould be posited as existent: Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual useof language; it can in the end only describe it (PI 124). In taking such aWittgensteinian approach, Buddhist thinkers might address a number of issues thatwere not specifically discussed by traditional forms of Buddhist philosophye.g.,issues in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics, etc.while stillupholding the spirit of Buddhist teachings.

(3) Self-reflexivity: It strikes me that Buddhisms strength as a tradition of thoughtlies in its capacity for self-reflexivity, in its ability to incorporate even Buddhismitself in any analysis of the possible ensnarement of concepts and language.18 Such alevel of self-reflexivity is, I believe, a necessary condition for any mode of religiosityto be taken seriously in an era informed by psychoanalysis and the historical methodinsofar as depth psychologys analysis of the psyche and the historical methodsanalysis of cultural phenomena have so deeply impacted our fundamental under-standing of religion. Adopting a fictionalist approach to ontology allows for thepossibility of furthering Buddhisms forms of philosophical analysis while

17 Cf., Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (PI 109).The philosophers treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness (PI 255).18 FThe tendency may be seen, for example, in the trope of the dharma as a raft, the view of the dharma asgiving up all views, the claim that Buddhist doctrine is like one illusory king defeating another, thestatement found in many Mahyna stras that the Buddha never uttered a word, the Madhyamaka accountof the ultimate goal as the cessation of all conceptual proliferation (sarva-prapaca-upaama) or theMadhyntavibhgas claim that when the Buddhist analysis of the nature of things has done its work it willitself be consumed in the flames of non-conceptualization_ (DAmato2008, 28).

16 Tuck (1990, 7879) points out that the interpretation of Ngrjuna in Wittgensteinian terms may even beseen in the 1960s, in the work of Frederick Streng.

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maintaining the capacity for self-reflexively superseding previous forms of analysisfurther revising, refining, and replacing previous fictionalist frameworks whileasymptotically approaching a goal that is never quite reducible to conceptual terms.Furthermore, while I take the attainment of a non-conceptual awareness to besoteriologically significant to Mahyna Buddhism, I do not believe that this shouldbe interpreted as cutting off conceptualization (which is semiotically regressive), butrather as changing ones relation to it (which is semiotically progressive).19 It is mycontention here that the details of such a project might be helpfully worked out interms of fictionalism.

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Buddhist FictionalismAbstractFictionalism IntroducedBuddhist FictionalismsThe Method of FrameworksReasons for Adopting Buddhist FictionalismReferences