bp fire gas design philosophy rp30-7

RP 30-7

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE ANDGAS DETECTION AND CONTROL

SYSTEMS

February 1994

Copyright © The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

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Copyright © The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.All rights reserved. The information contained in this document is subject to theterms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which the document wassupplied to the recipient's organisation. None of the information contained in thisdocument shall be disclosed outside the recipient's own organisation without theprior written permission of Manager, Standards, BP International Limited, unlessthe terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.

BP GROUP RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING

Issue Date February 1994Doc. No. RP 30-7 Latest Amendment Date

Document Title

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLDESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND

GAS DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

APPLICABILITY

Regional Applicability: International

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

This document provides guidance on the design philosophy required for fire and gasdetection systems and how this should be integrated into a facilities overall protectionarrangement.

AMENDMENTSAmd Date Page(s) Description___________________________________________________________________

CUSTODIAN (See Quarterly Status List for Contact)

Control & Electrical SystemsIssued by:-

Engineering Practices Group, BP International Limited, Research & Engineering CentreChertsey Road, Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex, TW16 7LN, UNITED KINGDOM

Tel: +44 1932 76 4067 Fax: +44 1932 76 4077 Telex: 296041

RP 30-7INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GASDETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE i

CONTENTS

Section Page

FOREWORD ................................................................................................................. iii

1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 1

2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................................. 1

3. HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS ........................................................... 33.1 Steps 1-1 / 1-7 - Fire/Gas Hazard.................................................................... 33.2 Step 1-2 - Automatic Executive Response (Fire) ............................................ 33.3 Steps 1-3 / 1-4 / 1-5 - Operator View (Fire) .................................................... 33.4 Steps 1-8 / 1-9 - Plant Ventilation (Gas).......................................................... 43.5 Step 1-10 - Effective Detection (Gas)............................................................. 4

4. HAZARD MITIGATION/PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS............................... 44.1 General ........................................................................................................... 44.2 Step 2-1 - Manning ......................................................................................... 54.3 Step 2-2 - Means of Escape............................................................................. 54.4 Steps 2-3/2-4 - Personnel/Asset Protection...................................................... 54.5 Step 2-5 - Access/Escape Routes .................................................................... 64.6 Step 2-6 - Hazard Escalation........................................................................... 64.7 Steps 2-7 - Mobile/Portable Appliances........................................................... 64.8 Step 2-8 - Manual Protection Initiation ........................................................... 74.9 Steps 2-9/2-10 - Automatic Protection Initiation ............................................. 7

5. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................... 75.1 General ........................................................................................................... 75.2 Step 3-1 - Manning ......................................................................................... 85.3 Step 3-2 - Fire Watch...................................................................................... 85.4 Step 3-3 - Asset Protection ............................................................................. 85.5 Step 3-4 - Maintenance Response.................................................................... 85.6 Step 3-5 - Spares Availability .......................................................................... 95.7 Step 3-8 - Cost Benefit Analysis...................................................................... 9

6. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION....................................................................... 9

FIGURE 1 ...................................................................................................................... 11HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS........................................................ 11

FIGURE 2 ...................................................................................................................... 12HAZARD MITIGATION/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS ................................... 12

FIGURE 3 ...................................................................................................................... 13SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS............................................................................... 13



PAGE ii

APPENDIX A................................................................................................................. 14DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS............................................................ 14

APPENDIX B................................................................................................................. 15LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS ............................................................ 15

APPENDIX C................................................................................................................. 16LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS.................................................................. 16



PAGE iii

FOREWORD

Introduction to BP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering

The Introductory Volume contains a series of documents that provide an introduction to theBP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering (RPSEs). Inparticular, the 'General Foreword' sets out the philosophy of the RPSEs. Other documents inthe Introductory Volume provide general guidance on using the RPSEs and backgroundinformation to Engineering Standards in BP. There are also recommendations for specificdefinitions and requirements.

Value of this Recommended Practice

(i) There are not yet any industry or international codes or standards in existence to coverthis area.

(ii) The requirements for Fire & Gas detection and control systems need to be appropriateto the risks inherent in an installation. This guidance gives an approach to ensure thatthe design considers the risk factors and avoids the provision of overly complexsystems.

Application

Text in italics is Commentary. Commentary provides background information which supportsthe requirements of the Recommended Practice, and may discuss alternative options.

This document may refer to certain local, national or international regulations but theresponsibility to ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements lieswith the user. The user should adapt or supplement this document to ensure compliance forthe specific application.

Principal Changes from Previous Edition

This is a first issue of the Recommended Practice. Readers should be aware that thedocument may be subject to change resulting from rationalisation with other associatedRecommended Practices and Standards within the BP Group.

Feedback and Further Information

Users are invited to feed back any comments and to detail experiences in the application ofBP RPSE's, to assist in the process of their continuous improvement.

For feedback and further information, please contact Standards Group, BP International orthe Custodian. See Quarterly Status List for contacts.



PAGE 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This document provides guidance on the design philosophy required forFire and Gas system design and how this should be integrated intooverall protection systems. Gas detection includes both flammable andtoxic considerations. The guidance is applicable to onshore andoffshore plant and installations (herein after referred to as installationsfor oil, chemicals and production facilities.

1.2 The requirements for detection devices and logic systems are notcovered and reference should be made to BP Group RP 30-5, Section4, 'Fire & Gas Detection and Control Systems' for applicablerecommendations. These cover issues such as hardwired and relaysystems versus logic based systems.

Further Recommended Practices will follow outlining other areas where guidanceis required on defining performance in the field, e.g. combustible and toxic gasdetection.

1.3 The requirements for fire protection facilities are detailed in BP GroupRP 24-1 'Fire Protection - Onshore' and BP Group RP 24-2 'FireProtection - Offshore'. Outline detail is included within thisRecommended Practice for clarity, but cross reference should be made,where detailed, for specific requirements.

2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 The requirements for fire and gas systems has to be considered as partof the overall health, safety and environmental protection facilities forinstallations. The aim will be to ensure the inherent risks involved arereduced to an acceptable limit, as agreed with the Business Unitresponsible for the installation, and as required by any applicable Localor National Regulatory Authority. The risks that the safety facilities willbe mitigating will include but not necessarily be limited to:-

- Loss of life or serious injury- Maintaining safe means of escape and refuge.- Prevention of escalation of an incident- Prevention of 'major' commercial loss- Minimisation of environmental pollution

There may also be other risk criteria involved due to the market place where thefacility is installed or where the 'product' is being supplied. Risks such as Companystanding within the local community or image with customers may have aninfluence on the specific installation.



PAGE 2

It needs to be stressed that setting very onerous targets for acceptable risk canresult in the requirement for complex and expensive fire and gas systems and thewhole of life costs for maintenance and test of these systems should not be underestimated. Such targets need to be realistic and supportable.

2.2 The first step in designing protection facilities will therefore be theidentification of the overall risks involved for the installation. Thebusiness unit responsible, will then need to set the criteria that are to bedeemed acceptable risk.

Reference should be made to BP Group RP 24-1 'Fire Protection - Onshore' andBP Group RP 24-2 'Fire Protection - Offshore' which detail methods for front endfire hazard assessment.

These may be qualitative or quantitative criteria and may be governed by local ornational regulation or practice. In general, criteria associated with serious risk tolife can be of a quantitative nature whereas a less rigorous approach may beaccepted for areas related to commercial or less sensitive aspects.

Having established overall risk criteria, a more detailed study can be made of theinstallation to establish what contributing factors there may be from individual risksources which could impact on the overall risk limitation requirement. The level ofdetail assessment will need to be commensurate with the stage of the designcompletion at that time, however, the validity of the assessment would need reviewas detail is developed.

Individual risk sources will be considered down to the primary level which couldresult in release such as flanges, pump seals, vents etc.

2.3 An assessment then needs to be made to establish whether theprovision of any fire and gas detection or protection will give benefit inmaking a significant contribution to reducing the risk involved. Thebenefits of using alternative measures also needs to be assessed toensure the optimum arrangement is provided. Included within thisassessment should be consideration of any facilities that need to beprovided to meet Regulatory/ Inspection Authority specificrequirements.

The use of fire and gas detection and control systems can be very expensive toengineer install and subsequently maintain during the life of an installation. Theremay well be benefits, therefore in considering redesign of plant, layout or usingalternative measures such as passive protection. The use of Quantified Risk andCost Benefit Analyses may also be considered, however this will depend onproject/installation philosophy. The cost, time and resources required for suchanalysis can be considerable should not be under estimated when deciding on thisroute.

2.4 Having detailed the areas where fire and gas detection or protectioncontrol systems could give a significant risk reduction, it is alsonecessary to establish the effectiveness of any facilities that may beidentified as required. The configuration of the system required to meet



PAGE 3

the anticipated risk prevention contribution, will also need to bedefined.

2.5 The design process, once risks have been identified, is summarised onflow diagrams, Figures 1 to 3 and the steps involved are allocatednumbers which can be cross referred to in the following sections.

3. HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS

(Refer Figure 1)

3.1 Steps 1-1 / 1-7 - Fire/Gas Hazard

The first step is to determine whether any area of risk of gas releaseand/or fire introduces a significant hazard in the immediate area or dueto accumulation in other areas. If not, the provision of detectionshould not be necessary. For gas detection, both combustible and toxicgases have to be considered.

3.2 Step 1-2 - Automatic Executive Response (Fire)

Consideration needs to be given as to whether automatic executiveresponse to detection of fire is essential. In order to achieve this there isno alternative to the provision of fire detection to initiate the response.The applications where automatic executive response may beconsidered essential could be where rapid escalation of an incident mayoccur or where there is no operator presence at the control point whocould initiate hazard mitigating actions.

3.3 Steps 1-3 / 1-4 / 1-5 - Operator View (Fire)

If automatic executive response on detection of fire is not required, itshould be established whether the operator has free vision to fullymonitor all areas where there is a significant risk of a fire situation or ifthis can be provided by other means such as remote CCTV facilities. Itwould be essential, however that it is possible to readily identify thefact that there is a fire and that the operational philosophy is such thatan operator is always at the point where such viewing is possible andwill be in a position to be able to take corrective action in time to avoidescalation of an incident. If viewing is considered a practical approach,the provision of fire detection should not be necessary. If considerednot practical, or not of adequate reliability, fire detection should beprovided.

Having established the need for fire detection , it is necessary to determine how thefire detection will be applied. The preferred method is to develop the fire hazardsinto a 'grading' approach depending on fire, effective power and associatedperformance requirements for alarm/control actions and effective response times.No formal BP Group RPSE exists for this at present, however, internal guidelinedocuments are available which outline an approach for offshore installations. This



PAGE 4

could be applied to onshore applications, however, it should be noted that therequirement for detection is generally much less.

3.4 Steps 1-8 / 1-9 - Plant Ventilation (Gas)

Having assessed that a source of potential gas release could create asignificant hazard (this could be from a view point of flammableconcentration, toxicity or environmental concerns) the ventilation of thearea needs to be considered to decide whether any resultantconcentrations remaining will be hazardous. If there are high levels ofventilation, the release may be diluted to a level where the resultantconcentrations are so low that they do not constitute a risk due to thetoxic nature or potential for ignition of the release. Under thesecircumstances, gas detection should not be required, however,consideration will need to be given to any protection measuresnecessary in the event that the ventilation can be inhibited.

Even where free flow or forced ventilation is provided, there may be areas whereair is virtually stagnant and gas accumulation is possible. The type of release,release rate and effectiveness of the ventilation must also be considered. Detailreview will be necessary and consideration given to redesign to avoid thesestagnant areas. Where this is not possible, or practical, the provision of gasdetection may be necessary.

3.5 Step 1-10 - Effective Detection (Gas)

Even where concentrations of gas remain, they may not be of sufficientstrength to be detected, in which case a gas detection system would notbe effective. Under these circumstances, different methods ofproviding detection of release should be considered. If not available,alternative approaches need to be considered which may includeoperating procedures, warning signs, barriers and breathing apparatus.

Gas is necessary in selection of high detector sensitivity to ensure that spuriousalarms do not result due to detection of non-hazardous background concentrationsthat may occur during routine operation.

4. HAZARD MITIGATION/PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS

(Refer Figure 2)

4.1 General

Where it has been identified that there is significant benefit in providinghazard protection, it is necessary to consider the type to be provided.For fire protection, reference should be made to BP Group RP 24-1,'Fire Protection-Onshore', and BP Group RP 24-2, 'Fire Protection-Offshore'.

The following should then be considered before confirming the requirement:-



PAGE 5

Hazard protection may be provided by means of manual or automatic executiveactions and may include in one or more of the following depending on the risk,potential hazard and site:-

- Initiating audible/visual alarms- Emergency shutdown of equipment- Blow down and depressurisation- Stopping fans and closing dampers via the HVAC system.- Extinguishant release via the Fire Protection system.- Isolating non-certified electrical equipment in potentially hazard areas

4.2 Step 2-1 - Manning

The requirements for dealing with an incident will depend on theoperating philosophy for the installation. This would normally beconsidered as manned, where the operation is controlled, or monitored,from a control point with ready access to the installation. Thealternative of not normally manned will apply where the operation iscontrolled, or monitored from a remote location and is normally onlymanned short term for breakdown/scheduled maintenancerequirements.

Not normally manned installations will require visits for planned operation andmaintenance and unscheduled repairs and emergencies, so may still require a Fire& Gas system. It may also be necessary for detection of problems before approachto the installation is attempted.

The installation of fire and gas systems on not normally manned installations mayalso be defined as required in local or national regulations.

4.3 Step 2-2 - Means of Escape

Where an installation is deemed to be not normally manned, the periodswhen it is periodically manned need to be considered. Under thesecircumstances, if there is potential risk to these personnel, it will benecessary to assess whether there is adequate means of escape from thehazard. Provided escape from the hazard source is possible, theprovision of auto hazard protection may not be necessary. For offshoreapplications, reference should be made to BP Group RP 44-9 'DesignGuide for Offshore Evacuation and Escape'.

Escape routes require careful consideration to ensure a rapid and safe exit fromthe area. On offshore platforms this may involve enclosed and segregated routesmonitored by fire and gas detection.

4.4 Steps 2-3/2-4 - Personnel/Asset Protection

It will be necessary for the Business unit involved with the installationto establish the philosophy as to what will be deemed as acceptable riskof serious injury/loss of life or 'major' commercial loss, refer to section2.1. If asset protection is not critical, reliance can be put on mobileprotection services.



PAGE 6

Where personnel protection is not the prime consideration of a Fire & Gasdetection system, such as for not normally manned installations, protection ofproperty and the environment may become the overriding factors.

4.5 Step 2-5 - Access/Escape Routes

Throughout the installation, routes need to be available to permitescape by personnel from hazard areas. In addition, considerationshould be given to what access is available as necessary for deploymentof mobile hazard fighting appliances and personnel. For gas detection,consideration also needs to be given to the practicality of escape toensure hazard to personnel in an area is not created. This may requireautomatic response to minimise hazard.

For offshore applications reference should be made to BP Group RP44-9 ' Design Guide for Offshore Evacuation and Escape'.

The consideration of escape from gas release will be of particularconcern where toxic gases are involved or where high gasconcentrations are possible.

4.6 Step 2-6 - Hazard Escalation

Each source of hazard that is identified needs to be reviewed toestablish whether that hazard can cause problems in other areas thuscausing escalation of the event.

This will require due consideration of the type of release, the form of any fire thatmay result and what protection exists for adjacent equipment. The outcome of thisreview may be that additional alternative protection methods are required (e.g.passive protection). If the event can be contained within an area and escalationshould not occur, manned installations should be able to rely on mobile hazardprotection.

The following have to be taken into consideration:-

(a) How probable is ignition and what would be the consequence.

(b) How probable is the spread of fire to adjoining areas.

(c) How valuable are the contents of the area, and adjoining areas if a fire islikely to spread.

4.7 Steps 2-7 - Mobile/Portable Appliances

If an incident could escalate, the practicality of being able to deploymobile/portable hazard fighting appliances should be considered. If thisis possible in time to prevent escalation of the event (effective responsetime), then it should be acceptable to rely on such facilities rather thanauto/manual fixed protection systems.



PAGE 7

The effective response time (ERT) in hydrocarbon areas, is the time taken fromreceipt of an initial fire or gas detection alarm to the completion of achieving theactivation of the necessary protection systems.

The level of experience and training of fire fighting teams and their ability to dealwith major incidents needs to be taken into account.

4.8 Step 2-8 - Manual Protection Initiation

The installation and protection arrangement being proposed needs to bereviewed to establish whether manual initiation will be effective. Thiswould necessitate that the incident is alarmed to an operator who willbe available to take effective action within the effective response time.The inherent delay which may result from the operator becoming awareof the incident needs to be included and it would need to be ensuredthat alarms will not be delayed due to other plant activities. Thepreference should be for manual initiation, to minimise the possibility ofspurious operation, unless this is determined to be ineffective.

Where manual initiation is accepted, local and remote initiation shouldalso be considered to ensure a fast protection response wherenecessary.

4.9 Steps 2-9/2-10 - Automatic Protection Initiation

Automatic initiation of protection systems must be carefully consideredto ensure that such initiation does not result in greater problems thanthe initial event. Examples could include initiation of deluge on hotequipment, release of carbon dioxide extinguishant into normallymanned rooms, or where automatic operation of the protection systemmay inhibit access for subsequent manual intervention if required.

The review should also consider the impact of spurious initiation of theprotection systems. If the consequence of spurious alarm and controlactions can result in creation of a hazard or major operationalproblems, then manual only systems should be provided. Alternativelyadditional design features should be considered to improve the systemreliability if manual initiation is demonstrated to be unacceptable.

5. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

(Refer Figure 3)

5.1 General

Having established that detection or protection is required, it isnecessary to determine the appropriate configuration of the system tomeet the required performance.



PAGE 8

5.2 Step 3-1 - Manning

A fundamental design requirement is knowing whether the installationis manned or not normally manned. With manning it may be possiblefor manned intervention for initiation of protection measures or backup in the event of failure of the fire and gas system.

Fire & Gas systems on not normally manned installations are primarily installed toprotect capital investment and the environment or to give warning prior toapproach to the facility. The system availability, however, may need to be high aspersonnel intervention can no longer be relied on. Automatic executive actions maywell be the only secure means of protection even if remote initiation capability isalso provided.

5.3 Step 3-2 - Fire Watch

The alternative approaches for maintaining safety in the event of failureof the fire and gas system need to be considered. On mannedinstallations it may be considered practical to utilise fire/gas 'watch' fora limited period of time whilst repairs to the fire and gas system arebeing made. Where a fire/gas watch is considered to be a practicalapproach, it will be necessary to patrol the installation at regularintervals to ascertain any existing or likely hazardous situations. For gaswatch, portable manual gas detection facilities would be necessary. Thefire/gas watch would need the facility to communicate with theoperator to inform him of any situations requiring remote action.

5.4 Step 3-3 - Asset Protection

Refer to section 4.4 with regard to 'critical' asset protection only.

5.5 Step 3-4 - Maintenance Response

Where maintenance response cannot be mobilised rapidly, a duplexsystem should be considered with full diagnostics to maintain therequired availability of the system. The maintenance diagnostics reportsshould be readily available at the location where maintenance effort willbe called on. This allows maintenance personnel to prepare the requiredspares so that they can be carried to the equipment requiring repair. Analternative approach, can be to carry out a cost benefit analysis, refer5.7.

The 'duplex' system can relate to detectors, interface cards, logic systems andoutput devices. The extent to which the elements should be duplicated depends onthe degree of redundancy already provided by area coverage and what alternativemeans are available in the event that an element failure occurs. In general,detector and interface card redundancy will be provided by detector voting and/orsecondary detection. Duplex logic systems and output devices will be requiredunless secondary alarming of hazard detection is provided which independentlyinitiates the protection facilities.



PAGE 9

5.6 Step 3-5 - Spares Availability

If maintenance response can be rapidly mobilised, and spares are readilyavailable to carry out the repairs, then a simplex system should beadequate for the installation provided temporary fire watch has beenaccepted. If spares will not be readily available the operating fire andgas system panels should include 'hot spares' so that rapid changeoutcan be done at the work site.

During the initial design phase it will be necessary to agree operating andmaintenance philosophy with the operator, and to determine the required on-lineand off-line maintenance procedures for field devices and panel equipment.

5.7 Step 3-8 - Cost Benefit Analysis

Having established that the reliability of the fire and gas system is ofconcern, due to asset protection requirements or the inability toeffectively 'fire/gas watch', the system type needs consideration. A highlevel of reliability can be achieved by use of a full duplex system,however this can introduce undesirable levels of complexity and costs.An alternative approach is to make an assessment to determine whetherthe additional complexity and cost of provision of the duplex system,will give benefit in reduction of potential operational down time ifshutdown is deemed necessary whilst repairs are being completed. Ifbenefit is not demonstrable, then simplex systems should be considered.

6. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 With the minimum system requirements established, the method ofimplementation then can be considered. This may be by stand aloneindependent system or by use of the installation control or shutdownsystem. The decision would be governed by how essential the system isto meet the overall safety risk criteria set for the installation.

For most installations the fire and gas system may well be considered as nonessential to meet the safety risk criteria but required for asset protection purposes.Provided that it is determined that the system is non essential for safety, the systemcould be incorporated into the control system, however, the ease of implementationwithin those systems and cost benefit, would need to be considered.

If the fire and gas system is designated as essential to meet the safety risk criteria,it could be incorporated into the shutdown system, but if this system wasprogrammable, due regard would need to be given to relating failure modes of suchsystems and issues of requirements for diverse hardware and software.

It should be noted that, if the control or shutdown system is used there may well bethe need to provide interface facilities which could effect the cost benefit decision.

6.2 The assessment of detection, protection and system requirementsshould be fully documented to enable demonstration of the safety casefor the plant. This documentation should be considered a live



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document for the life of the installation and the basis for designreviewed whenever there is a significant change in circumstances forthe plant such as design modification or change of operating conditions.After any such changes the safety basis should be examined, to confirmvalidity or to identify any modifications necessary to the fire and gassystem.



PAGE 11

IS FIRE ASIGNIFICANT

HAZARD( NOTE 1 )

NO

YES

1-1

ISAUTOMATIC

RESPONSE TODECTECTIONESSENTIAL

YES

NO

1-2

CAN THEPLANT BEREADILY

VIEWED BY THEOPERATOR

NO

1-3

YES YES CANREMOTE CCTVFACILITIES BE

PROVIDED1-4

NOYESWILL VISUAL

MONITORINGREVEAL

ALL SIGNIFICANTRISKS1-5

NO

1-6

PROVIDEFIRE

DECTECTION

NO FIRE / GASDECTECTION

REQUIRED

1/12

PROVIDEGAS

DECTECTION

1-11

YES

1-10

IS RELEASELIKELY TO BE SUCHTHAT DECTECTION

IS EFFECTIVE

NO

YES

1-9

NOWILL

RESULTANTCONCENTRATIONBE HAZRADOUS

YES

1-8

NOIS PLANTSUFFICIENTLYVENTILLATED

YES1-7

NO IS POTENTIALGAS RELEASE A

SIGNIFICANTHAZARD ( NOTE 1)

FIGURE 1

HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS

(To be read in conjunction with paras. 3.1 to 3.7)



PAGE 12

IS FACILITYNORMALLY MANNED

NO

2-1 YESWHEN MANNED

IS MEANS OF ESCAPEAVAILABLE( NOTE 2 )

YES

2-2

NO

NOIS PERSONNELPROTECTECTION

CRITICAL(NOTE 1)

2-3

ASSETPROTECTION

CRITICAL( NOTE 1 )

2-4

NO

YESYES

IS ACCESS /ESCAPE READILYAVAILABLE AND

PRACTICAL( NOTE 2 )

YES

NO

2-5

NO

IS HAZARDLIKELY TOESCALATE( NOTE 1 )

YES

2-6

NO

YES

CAN MOBILEHAZARD FIGHTING

APPLIANCES BE READILYDEPLOYED( NOTE 1 )

2-13

RELY ON MOBILEHAZARD PROTECTION

2-12

PROVIDE MANUAL ONLYHAZARD PROTECTION

2-7

PROVIDE AUTOHAZARD PROTECTION

2-11

2-10

YES

YES

NO

2-9

CAN AUTOHAZARD

PROTECTIONBE IMPROVED

CAN AUTOPROTECTION

CAUSEMORE PROBLEMS

THANIT SOLVES

NO

2-8

YESCAN MANUALINITATION OF

HAZARDPROTECTION BE

EFFECTIVE

FIGURE 2

HAZARD MITIGATION/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS




PAGE 13

ISFACILITY NORMALLY

MANNED

YES NO

3-1

YES NO

3-2 3-3YES

NO

NO

YES3-4

YES

NO3-5

YES

NO3-8

3-6 3-10

3-7 3-9

WILL RISKPERMIT FIRE / GAS

WATCH

IS ASSETPROTECTION

CIRITCAL

CAN RAPIDMAINTENANCE

REPONSEBE MOBILISED

ARE SPARESREADILY

AVAILABLE

IS COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS

TO BE DONE

PROVIDE SIMPLEXSYSTEM WITH HOT

SPARES

PROVIDE DUPLEXSYSTEM WITH DIAGNOSTIC

CAPABILITY FROMMAINTENANCE BASE

PROVIDE SIMPLEXSYSTEM

PROVIDE SYSTEMAS DETERMINED BY

COST BENIFITANALYSIS

FIGURE 3

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS




PAGE 14

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Definitions

Standardised definitions may be found in the BP Group RPSEs Introductory Volume.

Abbreviations

CCTV Closed Circuit TelevisionERT Effective Response TimeHVAC Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning



PAGE 15

APPENDIX B

LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS

A reference invokes the latest published issue or amendment unless stated otherwise.

Referenced standards may be replaced by equivalent standards that are internationally orotherwise recognised provided that it can be shown to the satisfaction of the purchaser'sprofessional engineer that they meet or exceed the requirements of the referenced standards.

BP Group Documents

BP Group RP 24-1 Fire Protection - Onshore(replaces BP CP 15)

BP Group RP 24-2 Fire Protection - Offshore(replaces BP CP 16)

BP Group RP 30-5 Section 4 - Fire and Gas Detection and Control Systems(replaces BP CP 18 Part 5 Section 4)

BP Group RP 44-9 Design Guide for Offshore Evacuation and Escape



PAGE 16

APPENDIX C

LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS

The following legislation and Standards are applicable to the UK. In other Countries wherelocal or national equivalents exist for the area of application, these must be used. Where noneexist, however, the Standards should be applied subject to agreement with the business unitresponsible for the installation.

GENERAL

Legislation

Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963

Fire Precautions Act 1971

Standards

BS 5839 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems in Buildings.

BS 6266 Code of Practice for Fire Protection for Electronic DataProcessing Installations.

Health and Safety Executive Occupational Exposure LimitsGuidance Note EH 40

NFPA 72E Automatic Fire Detectors

OFFSHORE UK

Legislation

UK Statutory Instrument No. 611 The Offshore Installations Regulations (Fire FightingEquipment)

No. 1218 The Merchant Shipping Regulations (FireProtection)

Standards

SOLAS 1974 Solas Convention1978 Solas Protocol1981 and 1983 Solas Amendment