rp30-7, design philosophy fire & gas cs

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RP 30-7

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND

GAS DETECTION AND CONTROLSYSTEMS

February 1994

Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.


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Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

All rights reserved. The information contained in this document is subject to the

terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which the document was

supplied to the recipient's organisation. None of the information contained in thisdocument shall be disclosed outside the recipient's own organisation without the

prior written permission of Manager, Standards, BP International Limited, unless

the terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.


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BP GROUP RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING

Issue Date February 1994

Doc. No. RP 30-7 Latest Amendment DateDocument Title

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND

GAS DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

APPLICABILITY

Regional Applicability: International

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

This document provides guidance on the design philosophy required for fire and gas detection

systems and how this should be integrated into a facilities overall protection arrangement.

AMENDMENTSAmd Date Page(s) Description

___________________________________________________________________

CUSTODIAN(See Quarterly Status List for Contact)

Control & Electrical S stemsIssued by:-

Engineering Practices Group, BP International Limited, Research & Engineering Centre

Chertsey Road, Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex, TW16 7LN, UNITED KINGDOM

Tel: +44 1932 76 4067 Fax: +44 1932 76 4077 Telex: 296041


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RP 30-7INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS

DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGEi

CONTENTS

Section Page

FOREWORD.......................................................................................................................iii

1. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1

2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................1

3. HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS................................................................3

3.1 Steps 1-1 / 1-7 - Fire/Gas Hazard.........................................................................3

3.2 Step 1-2 - Automatic Executive Response (Fire) ..................................................3

3.3 Steps 1-3 / 1-4 / 1-5 - Operator View (Fire).........................................................3

3.4 Steps 1-8 / 1-9 - Plant Ventilation (Gas)................................................................4

3.5 Step 1-10 - Effective Detection (Gas)...................................................................4

4. HAZARD MITIGATION/PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS...................................4

4.1 General.................................................................................................................4

4.2 Step 2-1 - Manning...............................................................................................5

4.3 Step 2-2 - Means of Escape .................................................................................5

4.4 Steps 2-3/2-4 - Personnel/Asset Protection...........................................................5

4.5 Step 2-5 - Access/Escape Routes.........................................................................6

4.6 Step 2-6 - Hazard Escalation................................................................................6

4.7 Steps 2-7 - Mobile/Portable Appliances................................................................6

4.8 Step 2-8 - Manual Protection Initiation..................................................................74.9 Steps 2-9/2-10 - Automatic Protection Initiation....................................................7

5. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.........................................................................................7

5.1 General.................................................................................................................7

5.2 Step 3-1 - Manning...............................................................................................8

5.3 Step 3-2 - Fire Watch...........................................................................................8

5.4 Step 3-3 - Asset Protection...................................................................................8

5.5 Step 3-4 - Maintenance Response.........................................................................8

5.6 Step 3-5 - Spares Availability................................................................................9

5.7 Step 3-8 - Cost Benefit Analysis ...........................................................................9

6. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION...........................................................................9

FIGURE 1 ............................................................................................................................11

HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS .............................................................11

FIGURE 2 ............................................................................................................................12

HAZARD MITIGATION/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS ........................................12

FIGURE 3 ............................................................................................................................13


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PAGEii

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.....................................................................................13

APPENDIX A.......................................................................................................................14

DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................14

APPENDIX B.......................................................................................................................15LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS.................................................................15

APPENDIX C.......................................................................................................................16

LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS.......................................................................16


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PAGEiii

FOREWORD

Introduction to BP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering

The Introductory Volume contains a series of documents that provide an introduction to the BP

Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering (RPSEs). In particular, the

'General Foreword' sets out the philosophy of the RPSEs. Other documents in the Introductory

Volume provide general guidance on using the RPSEs and background information to Engineering

Standards in BP. There are also recommendations for specific definitions and requirements.

Value of this Recommended Practice

(i) There are not yet any industry or international codes or standards in existence to cover this

area.

(ii) The requirements for Fire & Gas detection and control systems need to be appropriate to

the risks inherent in an installation. This guidance gives an approach to ensure that the

design considers the risk factors and avoids the provision of overly complex systems.

Application

Text in italics is Commentary. Commentary provides background information which supports the

requirements of the Recommended Practice, and may discuss alternative options.

This document may refer to certain local, national or international regulations but the responsibility to

ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements lies with the user. The user

should adapt or supplement this document to ensure compliance for the specific application.

Principal Changes from Previous Edition

This is a first issue of the Recommended Practice. Readers should be aware that the document may

be subject to change resulting from rationalisation with other associated Recommended Practices

and Standards within the BP Group.

Feedback and Further Information

Users are invited to feed back any comments and to detail experiences in the application of BP

RPSE's, to assist in the process of their continuous improvement.

For feedback and further information, please contact Standards Group, BP International or the

Custodian. See Quarterly Status List for contacts.


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PAGE1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This document provides guidance on the design philosophy required for Fire

and Gas system design and how this should be integrated into overall

protection systems. Gas detection includes both flammable and toxic

considerations. The guidance is applicable to onshore and offshore plant

and installations (herein after referred to as installations for oil, chemicals

and production facilities.

1.2 The requirements for detection devices and logic systems are not covered

and reference should be made to BP Group RP 30-5, Section 4, 'Fire &

Gas Detection and Control Systems' for applicable recommendations.

These cover issues such as hardwired and relay systems versus logic based

systems.

Further Recommended Practices will follow outlining other areas where guidance

is required on defining performance in the field, e.g. combustible and toxic gas

detection.

1.3 The requirements for fire protection facilities are detailed in BP Group RP

24-1 'Fire Protection - Onshore' and BP Group RP 24-2 'Fire Protection -

Offshore'. Outline detail is included within this Recommended Practice for

clarity, but cross reference should be made, where detailed, for specific

requirements.

2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 The requirements for fire and gas systems has to be considered as part of

the overall health, safety and environmental protection facilities for

installations. The aim will be to ensure the inherent risks involved are

reduced to an acceptable limit, as agreed with the Business Unit responsible

for the installation, and as required by any applicable Local or National

Regulatory Authority. The risks that the safety facilities will be mitigating will

include but not necessarily be limited to:-

- Loss of life or serious injury

- Maintaining safe means of escape and refuge.

- Prevention of escalation of an incident

- Prevention of 'major' commercial loss

- Minimisation of environmental pollution

There may also be other risk criteria involved due to the market place where the

facility is installed or where the 'product' is being supplied. Risks such as Company

standing within the local community or image with customers may have an

influence on the specific installation.


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PAGE2

It needs to be stressed that setting very onerous targets for acceptable risk can

result in the requirement for complex and expensive fire and gas systems and the

whole of life costs for maintenance and test of these systems should not be under

estimated. Such targets need to be realistic and supportable.

2.2 The first step in designing protection facilities will therefore be the

identification of the overall risks involved for the installation. The business

unit responsible, will then need to set the criteria that are to be deemed

acceptable risk.

Reference should be made to BP Group RP 24-1 'Fire Protection - Onshore' and BP

Group RP 24-2 'Fire Protection - Offshore' which detail methods for front end fire

hazard assessment.

These may be qualitative or quantitative criteria and may be governed by local or

national regulation or practice. In general, criteria associated with serious risk to

life can be of a quantitative nature whereas a less rigorous approach may be

accepted for areas related to commercial or less sensitive aspects.

Having established overall risk criteria, a more detailed study can be made of the

installation to establish what contributing factors there may be from individual risk

sources which could impact on the overall risk limitation requirement. The level of

detail assessment will need to be commensurate with the stage of the design

completion at that time, however, the validity of the assessment would need review

as detail is developed.

Individual risk sources will be considered down to the primary level which could

result in release such as flanges, pump seals, vents etc.

2.3 An assessment then needs to be made to establish whether the provision of

any fire and gas detection or protection will give benefit in making a

significant contribution to reducing the risk involved. The benefits of using

alternative measures also needs to be assessed to ensure the optimum

arrangement is provided. Included within this assessment should be

consideration of any facilities that need to be provided to meet Regulatory/

Inspection Authority specific requirements.

The use of fire and gas detection and control systems can be very expensive to

engineer install and subsequently maintain during the life of an installation. Theremay well be benefits, therefore in considering redesign of plant, layout or using

alternative measures such as passive protection. The use of Quantified Risk and

Cost Benefit Analyses may also be considered, however this will depend on

project/installation philosophy. The cost, time and resources required for such

analysis can be considerable should not be under estimated when deciding on this

route.

2.4 Having detailed the areas where fire and gas detection or protection control

systems could give a significant risk reduction, it is also necessary to

establish the effectiveness of any facilities that may be identified as required.


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PAGE3

The configuration of the system required to meet the anticipated risk

prevention contribution, will also need to be defined.

2.5 The design process, once risks have been identified, is summarised on flow

diagrams, Figures 1 to 3 and the steps involved are allocated numbers

which can be cross referred to in the following sections.

3. HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS

(Refer Figure 1)

3.1 Steps 1-1 / 1-7 - Fire/Gas Hazard

The first step is to determine whether any area of risk of gas release and/or

fire introduces a significant hazard in the immediate area or due toaccumulation in other areas. If not, the provision of detection should not benecessary. For gas detection, both combustible and toxic gases have to beconsidered.

3.2 Step 1-2 - Automatic Executive Response (Fire)

Consideration needs to be given as to whether automatic executiveresponse to detection of fire is essential. In order to achieve this there is noalternative to the provision of fire detection to initiate the response. Theapplications where automatic executive response may be consideredessential could be where rapid escalation of an incident may occur or where

there is no operator presence at the control point who could initiate hazardmitigating actions.

3.3 Steps 1-3 / 1-4 / 1-5 - Operator View (Fire)

If automatic executive response on detection of fire is not required, it shouldbe established whether the operator has free vision to fully monitor all areaswhere there is a significant risk of a fire situation or if this can be provided

by other means such as remote CCTV facilities. It would be essential,however that it is possible to readily identify the fact that there is a fire andthat the operational philosophy is such that an operator is always at the

point where such viewing is possible and will be in a position to be able to

take corrective action in time to avoid escalation of an incident. If viewing isconsidered a practical approach, the provision of fire detection should not

be necessary. If considered not practical, or not of adequate reliability, firedetection should be provided.

Having established the need for fire detection , it is necessary to determine how the

fire detection will be applied. The preferred method is to develop the fire hazards

into a 'grading' approach depending on fire, effective power and associated

performance requirements for alarm/control actions and effective response times.

No formal BP Group RPSE exists for this at present, however, internal guideline

documents are available which outline an approach for offshore installations. This


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PAGE4

could be applied to onshore applications, however, it should be noted that the

requirement for detection is generally much less.

3.4 Steps 1-8 / 1-9 - Plant Ventilation (Gas)

Having assessed that a source of potential gas release could create asignificant hazard (this could be from a view point of flammableconcentration, toxicity or environmental concerns) the ventilation of the areaneeds to be considered to decide whether any resultant concentrationsremaining will be hazardous. If there are high levels of ventilation, the releasemay be diluted to a level where the resultant concentrations are so low thatthey do not constitute a risk due to the toxic nature or potential for ignitionof the release. Under these circumstances, gas detection should not berequired, however, consideration will need to be given to any protectionmeasures necessary in the event that the ventilation can be inhibited.

Even where free flow or forced ventilation is provided, there may be areas where air

is virtually stagnant and gas accumulation is possible. The type of release, release

rate and effectiveness of the ventilation must also be considered. Detail review will

be necessary and consideration given to redesign to avoid these stagnant areas.

Where this is not possible, or practical, the provision of gas detection may be

necessary.

3.5 Step 1-10 - Effective Detection (Gas)

Even where concentrations of gas remain, they may not be of sufficientstrength to be detected, in which case a gas detection system would not beeffective. Under these circumstances, different methods of providingdetection of release should be considered. If not available, alternative

approaches need to be considered which may include operatingprocedures, warning signs, barriers and breathing apparatus.

Gas is necessary in selection of high detector sensitivity to ensure that spurious

alarms do not result due to detection of non-hazardous background concentrations

that may occur during routine operation.

4. HAZARD MITIGATION/PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS

(Refer Figure 2)

4.1 General

Where it has been identified that there is significant benefit in providinghazard protection, it is necessary to consider the type to be provided. Forfire protection, reference should be made to BP Group RP 24-1, 'FireProtection-Onshore', and BP Group RP 24-2, 'Fire Protection-Offshore'.

The following should then be considered before confirming the requirement:-


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PAGE5

Hazard protection may be provided by means of manual or automatic executive

actions and may include in one or more of the following depending on the risk,

potential hazard and site:-

- Initiating audible/visual alarms

- Emergency shutdown of equipment

- Blow down and depressurisation- Stopping fans and closing dampers via the HVAC system.

- Extinguishant release via the Fire Protection system.

- Isolating non-certified electrical equipment in potentially hazard areas

4.2 Step 2-1 - Manning

The requirements for dealing with an incident will depend on the operatingphilosophy for the installation. This would normally be considered asmanned, where the operation is controlled, or monitored, from a control

point with ready access to the installation. The alternative of not normallymanned will apply where the operation is controlled, or monitored from a

remote location and is normally only manned short term forbreakdown/scheduled maintenance requirements.

Not normally manned installations will require visits for planned operation and

maintenance and unscheduled repairs and emergencies, so may still require a Fire

& Gas system. It may also be necessary for detection of problems before approach to

the installation is attempted.

The installation of fire and gas systems on not normally manned installations may

also be defined as required in local or national regulations.

4.3 Step 2-2 - Means of Escape

Where an installation is deemed to be not normally manned, the periodswhen it is periodically manned need to be considered. Under thesecircumstances, if there is potential risk to these personnel, it will benecessary to assess whether there is adequate means of escape from thehazard. Provided escape from the hazard source is possible, the provisionof auto hazard protection may not be necessary. For offshore applications,reference should be made to BP Group RP 44-9 'Design Guide forOffshore Evacuation and Escape'.

Escape routes require careful consideration to ensure a rapid and safe exit from the

area. On offshore platforms this may involve enclosed and segregated routes

monitored by fire and gas detection.

4.4 Steps 2-3/2-4 - Personnel/Asset Protection

It will be necessary for the Business unit involved with the installation toestablish the philosophy as to what will be deemed as acceptable risk ofserious injury/loss of life or 'major' commercial loss, refer to section 2.1. Ifasset protection is not critical, reliance can be put on mobile protectionservices.


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PAGE6

Where personnel protection is not the prime consideration of a Fire & Gas

detection system, such as for not normally manned installations, protection of

property and the environment may become the overriding factors.

4.5 Step 2-5 - Access/Escape Routes

Throughout the installation, routes need to be available to permit escape bypersonnel from hazard areas. In addition, consideration should be given towhat access is available as necessary for deployment of mobile hazardfighting appliances and personnel. For gas detection, consideration alsoneeds to be given to the practicality of escape to ensure hazard to personnelin an area is not created. This may require automatic response to minimisehazard.

For offshore applications reference should be made to BP Group RP 44-9' Design Guide for Offshore Evacuation and Escape'.

The consideration of escape from gas release will be of particular concern

where toxic gases are involved or where high gas concentrations arepossible.

4.6 Step 2-6 - Hazard Escalation

Each source of hazard that is identified needs to be reviewed to establishwhether that hazard can cause problems in other areas thus causingescalation of the event.

This will require due consideration of the type of release, the form of any fire that

may result and what protection exists for adjacent equipment. The outcome of this

review may be that additional alternative protection methods are required (e.g.passive protection). If the event can be contained within an area and escalation

should not occur, manned installations should be able to rely on mobile hazard

protection.

The following have to be taken into consideration:-

(a) How probable is ignition and what would be the consequence.

(b) How probable is the spread of fire to adjoining areas.

(c) How valuable are the contents of the area, and adjoining areas if a fire is

likely to spread.

4.7 Steps 2-7 - Mobile/Portable Appliances

If an incident could escalate, the practicality of being able to deploymobile/portable hazard fighting appliances should be considered. If this is

possible in time to prevent escalation of the event (effective response time),then it should be acceptable to rely on such facilities rather than auto/manualfixed protection systems.


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PAGE7

The effective response time (ERT) in hydrocarbon areas, is the time taken from

receipt of an initial fire or gas detection alarm to the completion of achieving the

activation of the necessary protection systems.

The level of experience and training of fire fighting teams and their ability to deal

with major incidents needs to be taken into account.

4.8 Step 2-8 - Manual Protection Initiation

The installation and protection arrangement being proposed needs to bereviewed to establish whether manual initiation will be effective. This wouldnecessitate that the incident is alarmed to an operator who will be availableto take effective action within the effective response time. The inherent delaywhich may result from the operator becoming aware of the incident needs to

be included and it would need to be ensured that alarms will not be delayeddue to other plant activities. The preference should be for manual initiation,to minimise the possibility of spurious operation, unless this is determined to

be ineffective.

Where manual initiation is accepted, local and remote initiation should alsobe considered to ensure a fast protection response where necessary.

4.9 Steps 2-9/2-10 - Automatic Protection Initiation

Automatic initiation of protection systems must be carefully considered toensure that such initiation does not result in greater problems than the initialevent. Examples could include initiation of deluge on hot equipment, releaseof carbon dioxide extinguishant into normally manned rooms, or whereautomatic operation of the protection system may inhibit access for

subsequent manual intervention if required.

The review should also consider the impact of spurious initiation of theprotection systems. If the consequence of spurious alarm and controlactions can result in creation of a hazard or major operational problems,then manual only systems should be provided. Alternatively additionaldesign features should be considered to improve the system reliability ifmanual initiation is demonstrated to be unacceptable.

5. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

(Refer Figure 3)

5.1 General

Having established that detection or protection is required, it is necessary todetermine the appropriate configuration of the system to meet the required

performance.


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PAGE8

5.2 Step 3-1 - Manning

A fundamental design requirement is knowing whether the installation ismanned or not normally manned. With manning it may be possible formanned intervention for initiation of protection measures or back up in theevent of failure of the fire and gas system.

Fire & Gas systems on not normally manned installat ions are primarily installed to

protect capital investment and the environment or to give warning prior to

approach to the facility. The system availability, however, may need to be high as

personnel intervention can no longer be relied on. Automatic executive actions may

well be the only secure means of protection even if remote initiation capability is

also provided.

5.3 Step 3-2 - Fire Watch

The alternative approaches for maintaining safety in the event of failure of

the fire and gas system need to be considered. On manned installations itmay be considered practical to utilise fire/gas 'watch' for a limited period oftime whilst repairs to the fire and gas system are being made. Where afire/gas watch is considered to be a practical approach, it will be necessaryto patrol the installation at regular intervals to ascertain any existing or likelyhazardous situations. For gas watch, portable manual gas detection facilitieswould be necessary. The fire/gas watch would need the facility tocommunicate with the operator to inform him of any situations requiringremote action.

5.4 Step 3-3 - Asset Protection

Refer to section 4.4 with regard to 'critical' asset protection only.

5.5 Step 3-4 - Maintenance Response

Where maintenance response cannot be mobilised rapidly, a duplex systemshould be considered with full diagnostics to maintain the requiredavailability of the system. The maintenance diagnostics reports should bereadily available at the location where maintenance effort will be called on.This allows maintenance personnel to prepare the required spares so thatthey can be carried to the equipment requiring repair. An alternativeapproach, can be to carry out a cost benefit analysis, refer 5.7.

The 'duplex' system can relate to detectors, interface cards, logic systems and output

devices. The extent to which the elements should be duplicated depends on the

degree of redundancy already provided by area coverage and what alternative

means are available in the event that an element failure occurs. In general,

detector and interface card redundancy will be provided by detector voting and/or

secondary detection. Duplex logic systems and output devices will be required

unless secondary alarming of hazard detection is provided which independently

initiates the protection facilities.


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PAGE9

5.6 Step 3-5 - Spares Availability

If maintenance response can be rapidly mobilised, and spares are readilyavailable to carry out the repairs, then a simplex system should be adequatefor the installation provided temporary fire watch has been accepted. Ifspares will not be readily available the operating fire and gas system panelsshould include 'hot spares' so that rapid changeout can be done at the worksite.

During the initial design phase it will be necessary to agree operating and

maintenance philosophy with the operator, and to determine the required on-line

and off-line maintenance procedures for field devices and panel equipment.

5.7 Step 3-8 - Cost Benefit Analysis

Having established that the reliability of the fire and gas system is ofconcern, due to asset protection requirements or the inability to effectively

'fire/gas watch', the system type needs consideration. A high level ofreliability can be achieved by use of a full duplex system, however this canintroduce undesirable levels of complexity and costs. An alternativeapproach is to make an assessment to determine whether the additionalcomplexity and cost of provision of the duplex system, will give benefit inreduction of potential operational down time if shutdown is deemednecessary whilst repairs are being completed. If benefit is not demonstrable,then simplex systems should be considered.

6. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 With the minimum system requirements established, the method of

implementation then can be considered. This may be by stand alone

independent system or by use of the installation control or shutdown system.

The decision would be governed by how essential the system is to meet the

overall safety risk criteria set for the installation.

For most installations the fire and gas system may well be considered as non

essential to meet the safety risk criteria but required for asset protection purposes.

Provided that it is determined that the system is non essential for safety, the system

could be incorporated into the control system, however, the ease of implementation

within those systems and cost benefit, would need to be considered.

If the fire and gas system is designated as essential to meet the safety risk criteria, it

could be incorporated into the shutdown system, but if this system was

programmable, due regard would need to be given to relating failure modes of such

systems and issues of requirements for diverse hardware and software.

It should be noted that, if the control or shutdown system is used there may well be

the need to provide interface facilities which could effect the cost benefit decision.

6.2 The assessment of detection, protection and system requirements should be

fully documented to enable demonstration of the safety case for the plant.


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PAGE10

This documentation should be considered a live document for the life of the

installation and the basis for design reviewed whenever there is a significant

change in circumstances for the plant such as design modification or change

of operating conditions. After any such changes the safety basis should be

examined, to confirm validity or to identify any modifications necessary to

the fire and gas system.


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PAGE11

IS FIRE A

SIGNIFICANT

HAZARD

( NOTE 1 )

NO

YES

1-1

IS

AUTOMATICRESPONSE TODECTECTION

ESSENTIAL

YES

NO

1-2

CAN THE

PLANT BEREADILY

VIEWED BY THE

OPERATOR

NO

1-3

YES YES CANREMOTE CCTVFACILITIES BE

PROVIDED1-4

NO

YESWILL VISUALMONITORINGREVEAL

ALL SIGNIFICANT

RISKS1-5

NO

1-6

PROVIDEFIRE

DECTECTION

NO FIRE / GASDECTECTION

REQUIRED

1/12

PROVIDE

GASDECTECTION

1-11

YES

1-10

IS RELEASELIKELY TO BE SUCHTHAT DECTECTION

IS EFFECTIVE

NO

YES

1-9

NOWILL

RESULTANTCONCENTRATIONBE HAZRADOUS

YES

1-8

NOIS PLANTSUFFICIENTLYVENTILLATED

YES1-7

NOIS POTENTIAL

GAS RELEASE A

SIGNIFICANT

HAZARD ( NOTE 1)

FIGURE 1

HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS

(To be read in conjunction with paras. 3.1 to 3.7)


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PAGE12

IS FACILITY

NORMALLY MANNED

NO

2-1YES

WHEN MANNED

IS MEANS OF ESCAPEAVAILABLE( NOTE 2 )

YES

2-2

NO

NOIS PERSONNELPROTECTECTION

CRITICAL(NOTE 1)

2-3

ASSETPROTECTION

CRITICAL( NOTE 1 )

2-4

NO

YES

YES

IS ACCESS /ESCAPE READILY

AVAILABLE ANDPRACTICAL( NOTE 2 )

YES

NO

2-5

NO

IS HAZARD

LIKELY TOESCALATE( NOTE 1 )

YES

2-6

NO

YES

CAN MOBILEHAZARD FIGHTING

APPLIANCES BE READILY

DEPLOYED( NOTE 1 )

2-13

RELY ON MOBILEHAZARD PROTECTION

2-12

PROVIDE MANUAL ONLYHAZARD PROTECTION

2-7

PROVIDE AUTO

HAZARD PROTECTION

2-11

2-10

YES

YES

NO

2-9

CAN AUTOHAZARD

PROTECTIONBE IMPROVED

CAN AUTO

PROTECTIONCAUSE

MORE PROBLEMSTHAN

IT SOLVES

NO

2-8

YESCAN MANUALINITATION OF

HAZARDPROTECTION BE

EFFECTIVE

FIGURE 2

HAZARD MITIGATION/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS



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PAGE13

IS

FACILITY NORMALLY

MANNED

YES NO

3-1

YES NO

3-2 3-3

YES

NO

NO

YES3-4

YES

NO

3-5

YES

NO

3-8

3-6 3-10

3-7 3-9

WILL RISK

PERMIT FIRE / GAS

WATCH

IS ASSET

PROTECTION

CIRITCAL

CAN RAPIDMAINTENANCE

REPONSEBE MOBILISED

ARE SPARESREADILY

AVAILABLE

IS COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS

TO BE DONE

PROVIDE SIMPLEX

SYSTEM WITH HOT

SPARES

PROVIDE DUPLEXSYSTEM WITH DIAGNOSTIC

CAPABILITY FROMMAINTENANCE BASE

PROVIDE SIMPLEX

SYSTEM

PROVIDE SYSTEMAS DETERMINED BY

COST BENIFITANALYSIS

FIGURE 3

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS



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PAGE14

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Definitions

Standardised definitions may be found in the BP Group RPSEs Introductory Volume.

Abbreviations

CCTV Closed Circuit TelevisionERT Effective Response Time

HVAC Heating, Venti lating and Air Condit ioning


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PAGE15

APPENDIX B

LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS

A reference invokes the latest published issue or amendment unless stated otherwise.

Referenced standards may be replaced by equivalent standards that are internationally or otherwise

recognised provided that it can be shown to the satisfaction of the purchaser's professional engineer

that they meet or exceed the requirements of the referenced standards.

BP Group Documents

BP Group RP 24-1 Fire Protection - Onshore

(replaces BP CP 15)

BP Group RP 24-2 Fire Protection - Offshore(replaces BP CP 16)

BP Group RP 30-5 Section 4 - Fire and Gas Detection and Control Systems

(replaces BP CP 18 Part 5 Section 4)

BP Group RP 44-9 Design Guide for Offshore Evacuation and Escape


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RP 30-7INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL PAGE 16

APPENDIX C

LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS

The following legislation and Standards are applicable to the UK. In other Countries where local or

national equivalents exist for the area of application, these must be used. Where none exist,however, the Standards should be applied subject to agreement with the business unit responsible

for the installation.

GENERAL

Legislation

Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963

Fire Precautions Act 1971

Standards

BS 5839 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems in Buildings.

BS 6266 Code of Practice for Fire Protection for Electronic Data

Processing Installations.

Health and Safety Executive Occupational Exposure Limits

Guidance Note EH 40

NFPA 72E Automatic Fire Detectors

OFFSHORE UK

Legislation

UK Statutory Instrument No. 611 The Offshore Installations Regulations (Fire Fighting

Equipment)

No. 1218 The Merchant Shipping Regulations (Fire Protection)

Standards

SOLAS 1974 Solas Convention

1978 Solas Protocol

1981 and 1983 Solas Amendment