bosanquet 1905 xenophon's socrates

7/27/2019 Bosanquet 1905 Xenophon's Socrates

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bosanquet-1905-xenophons-socrates 1/13

"#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*, (* './012 3$-- ,( 4*&(*- 5* ,6- 7($%8

/659 #$,5:%- 59 (*- (; *-#$%& <==2=== 9:6(%#$%& >($?9 85@5,5A-8 #*8 B#8- ;$--%& #C#5%#D%- ,( -C-$&(*- 5*

,6- >($%8 D& './01E

F*(>* #9 ,6- "#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*,2 ,659 9-, (; >($?9 5*:%)8- $-9-#$:6 #$,5:%-92 *->92 %-,,-$92 #*8 (,6-$

>$5,5*@9 G)D%596-8 5* B($- ,6#* H== (; ,6- (%8-9, %-#85*@ #:#8-B5: I()$*#%9E /6- >($?9 8#,- ;$(B ,6-

B58J9-C-*,--*,6 ,( ,6- -#$%& ,>-*,5-,6 :-*,)$5-9E

7- -*:()$#@- G-(G%- ,( $-#8 #*8 96#$- ,6- "#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*, (G-*%& #*8 ,( ,-%% (,6-$9 ,6#, ,659

$-9()$:- -K59,9E L-(G%- B#& G(9, ,659 :(*,-*, (*%5*- ($ $-859,$5D),- 5* #*& >#& ;($ *(*J:(BB-$:5#%

G)$G(9-9E

1-#8 B($- #D(), "#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*, #, 6,,GMNN#D(),EI9,($E($@NG#$,5:5G#,-JI9,($N5*85C58)#%9N-#$%&J

I()$*#%J:(*,-*,E

'./01 59 # 85@5,#% %5D$#$& (; #:#8-B5: I()$*#%92 D((?92 #*8 G$5B#$& 9()$:- (DI-:,9E './01 6-%G9 G-(G%-

859:(C-$2 )9-2 #*8 D)5%8 )G(* # >58- $#*@- (; :(*,-*, ,6$()@6 # G(>-$;)% $-9-#$:6 #*8 ,-#:65*@

G%#,;($B2 #*8 G$-9-$C-9 ,659 :(*,-*, ;($ ;),)$- @-*-$#,5(*9E './01 59 G#$, (; O/P4F42 # *(,J;($JG$(;5,($@#*5A#,5(* ,6#, #%9( 5*:%)8-9 O,6#?# .Q1 #*8 L($,5:(E 3($ B($- 5*;($B#,5(* #D(), './012 G%-#9-

:(*,#:, 9)GG($,RI9,($E($@E



432 InternationalJournalof Ethics.

XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES.

This article s an attempt o put togetherthe thoughtswhich tappearsto me thatXenophon ntended o attributeto Socrates on the central hemeofWisdomor Science inrelation o Life and Goodness. There is at least a certaininterestntryingotrace nsomedetailthe mpression hichSocrateshad made on themind ofa disciplewho,althoughno philosopher,was not destitute f sagacity, nd I do notconceal mybeliefthat the slightnessof the considerationusuallyaccorded to the Memorabilia' arises froma deep-seated prejudiceagainstthe truthwhichappears to me tobe the mainthesis f thatwork. I should ike to combat hisprejudice by a simplestatement fwhat it appears to methatWisdom orKnowledgemeantfor ocrates,or forXeno-phon,or fortheAthenianmindbeforePlato-whichever itmaybe heldthatwe shallreallyhavebeendiscussing.

For I am not going to be highlycritical. It does notseem to me indeed a dangerousassumptionthat on thewhole the best ideas in the Memorabiliabelong substan-tially o Socrates, ust as itis easyto see thatthedetails ndarguments hroughout elong in great measure to Xeno-phon. Let theviewsand ideas, ofwhich am to speak,be

credited,fanyone hinks tmorecritical, o Xenophonhim-self. The important oint s that, s I understand,t is notsuggestedthatXenophoncouldhaveborrowedfromPlato.For the interests to see how nearwe get to Plato, notbyreadingphilosophy nto Xenophon,but by rectifyinghecurrent onceptionof Socrates' simplepoint of departure.Perhaps it is not merelySocrates, but the Greek mind

commonto Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato, that we arereally rying o reEstimate.

I will set out thetheory fso-calledWisdom and Knowl-edge as I find t in Xenophon withas littlecommentaryspossible.

Wisdomor Science involves rom he earliestGreektimes

1

I have Gomperzparticularlyn mind.



Xenophon'sMemorabiliaof Socrates. 433

what we shouldcall the two sides of theory nd practice n

the closest fusionwith one another. When Xenophon'sSocratesbeginsto definets nature,we are inclined o sepa-rate these aspects,and to say thatsome of his testsapplyto theory r science, nd others opractice r conduct. Butthis s justwhat urgethatwe mustnot do. His testsforthinking, amely, iscrimination,ightpreference,nd trueclassification,pplyno less to conduct, nd the conditionsfor mastery f conductapplyequally to thinking. Unlder-standing his to be so, and thatwe are distinguishinghetwo sides of an indivisible nergy,by which mind dealswiththeWorld,we maysay thatXenophon's Socrates ortheSocraticXenophonhas distinct estsor definitionsothapplicableto the same energycalled Wisdom or Science,somefrom hetheoreticalnd somefrom hepracticalpointofview.

As a mastery f the theory fanything, nowledgemustfulfil he condition f ability o expoundor define;or as Isuggestwe ought more strictlyo say, as the mastery fanything, nowledge r wisdommustfulfil n the one sidethe theoretical onditionof abilityto expound or define.This givesus definitionnd therecognized ocraticconcept,and runs us into Dialectic withall its implications,which,

however, elong npartto the practical ide. But again,asthemasteryf anything,nowledge if it is to be calledso)mustfulfil he condition hatone musthave powerto do,one mustnot makemistakes n action;a conditionwhich sexplained o demandcontinuedraining r ascesis,of whichthe elements re "learning"and "practice"or "rehearsal,"elementsequally applicableto violinplayingand to geo-

metrical easoning. It is thereforeo be observedthatournarrow ermsKnowleldge r Wisdom,thoughthey re cur-rentrenderings f the Greeknoun in question, re reallyunfitted o be the subjectof the predicates husdeveloped,whichapply equallyand alike to whatwe call knowledgeand to creative action or conduct. The craftsman's rartist's nfalliblemind, eye, and hand are, I imagine,the

originalconditions of the conceptionwith whichwe are




dealing, ndeven"skill," r,as I prefer,mastery"-themindofthemaster-would reallygive us a far truerpointofde-parture handoes ourowndepreciated erminology-depre-ciated not by so-called"intellectual" dealism,but by theviews of cognitionwhich have accompaniedempiricism.This training r ascesis,whichgives the powerto do, andinvolves nfallibilityn act,thepreferencehatnevermissesthe right, nd is testedby "right"or "fine"dealingwhetherwithsituations r witharguments,mpliesfurtherhe care

ofone'sself, henot ettingne'sselfrundown, ike n athletegetting ut of training,henotbeingignorant f one's self,but continuouslyttending o one's powersand theirappli-cation. Thus, too,wisdomor masterys one withtemper-ance and continence,nd is incompatiblewithwantof self-control,thoughthis perhaps is compatiblewith a certaintransientperceptionof the good, unconfirmedwe are to

supposeby study nd bytraining.And thuscompletedKnowledgeor Mastery s possession

ofthe artorcraft f"living." Thiswe are emphaticallyold-we are pointedto the science,the trained killor profes-sional infallibility,hoseobjectmatter, n one side (i), is"living." And this o beginwith, s thereaction fthe ndi-vidualmastery r capacity o a test at once theoreticalnd

practical,consists in the power and habit of "dialectic."Dialectic involves, s throughoutGreek philosophy,he in-tercommunionf friends,nd the discriminationfgood andbad things. Intercommunionf friends,we may observe,is itself form f ascesis or practical raining,howinghowinseparable re thesidesoftheconceptionwe are analyzing.And,on theotherhand, eriousstudy fthe most mportant

things n life s whatSocrates'man of mastery ossesses,bycontrastwiththeman of no mastery,he incontinent.Thelatterdoes not and the former oes studyor pay attentionto "themostimportanthings." I confess hat beforethissimple nd fundamentalxpression f whatwisdomor mas-teryconnoted n the Socratic circle,the controversiesfintellectualismnd pragmatismeemto me extremelyrivial

and shadowy. With this discriminationf good and bad



Xenophon'sMemorabiliaf Socrates. 435

thingswe maycompare Herodotus' brief ummary f thespeechofThemistocles efore alamis. "Now hisargumentwas a reviewand a contrast f thebetter nd theworse inall that is possibleforman's natureand situation;and ofthese having exhorted themin everycase to choose thebetter, etoldthem ogo onboardtheir hips." The natureof theobjectmatter f thismasterynddiscrimination,bovedesignatedby the simpleverb "to live,"is often et out atgreaterlength. For example,"All learningwherebyonemay cause to live well a household or a city-statend maydeal rightlywithhumanaffairs"; nd in everythingt con-fers thepower-not as I understand,he chance or libertyor potentiality ut the positiveability-of the disciplinedmind ochoosetheright nd abstainfrom hewrong. Thus,in general,wisdom,knowledge, r masterys the attributeby whichall splendidand profitable hingsare done, and

moralitys included mongthese.I interpolate hat the distinction, ometimes nsistedon

in laterthought, etween he craftsman'sbility s a capacityofalternatives,ndmoraldispositions habituatedn a singledirection,was notstrongly resent o Xenophon'sSocrates."'So muchtheworseforhis theory,"tmaybe replied. "Itis just thisneglectbywhichhe omits,from he comparison

ofwisdom and virtue, he essentialfeature f the one-sidedmoralchoice." But itmustbe remembered hatwe are cer-tainly alsifyinghefacts fwe makethisdistinctionbsolute,as, also, perhaps, fwe maintain completedentificationnprinciple. It seems clearto me thatthecraftsman'sbilityis notreally barecapacity falternatives,ndtheinstanceswhichwe are apt to allege confuse heissue. If thedoctor

can poisonas skilfully s he can cure, even thiswouldnotmeanthathe canwhollyay hishabitual rtaside-the con-trastto provethisshouldbe between killandwant ofskill,not betweendifferentpplications f his usual skill,whichpresuppose ts retention.There is here no capacityof op-posites so faras the employmentf the art is concerned.If,however, uch an argumentweretakento meanthat to

help and to injurewere to thephysician,s such, ndifferent



436 Internationalournal f Ethics.

ends, and ifwe at the same timewere to definehis art as

the art ofhealing, henno doubt twouldbe shown, n con-

ditionour illustrationtood,thatthe craftsman'sbility andissociate tselffromhis habit n a way which would be abad model to take for the theoryof morals. But surely,ifwe thus appeal to the whole scope of the art of healing,we lie open to the answerthat the facts re otherwise, ndthe physician, husunderstood n his fullconnotation,hasnotthe allegedmoralversatility.The art, s we learn fromPlato,is a whole,and involves s its end a conception fthegood of its object. The instinct f thehealeris as normalto thephysicians his skill, nd I believe t to be absolutelybeyondquestionthat n every rt and craft hepossessor sin some degreemoralizedby its possession. Its differencefromwhatwe callmoralitysmerelyhatofpartfromwhole.It mayin certain ases be foundcapable of being subordi-

natedto bad aims,because there ie outside t unmoralizedregionsoftheman's naturewhichplaytheirpart n a totaldecisionofthe will. But so far s it goes it is ofthe natureofa moralhabit, ndthe dealization f tbytheXenophon-tic Socrates s at least as trueto humannature s the laterattempt o relegate t to a lower evel.

I repeat, hen-wisdomormasterys thequalityby which

all splendid nd profitablehings re done, and moralityscountedamongthese. Wisdomis a masterly ealingwithlife nd the mportanthings. Its main pplications,bjects,and effectsrefirst uchas happiness,welfare, rwell-being,distinguishedromgood fortune y the essentialconditionofwisdom, iz., tudy ndpractice;nextthe"royal"or "sov-ereign" art,the artofproducinghappinessforcommunities,

whichsubsequently igures ol splendidlyn Plato.and Aris-totle as the architectonicrt of life-further,Dialectic asthe discriminationf good and evil; finallyhe"good" parexcellence-the dvantageousas such-the organizationortotality hichraisesrelative dvantageousnesso the nclusiveor positiveadvantageousnesswhich is one withthe end.For this s really, think,herelation f the partial, xternal,

ambiguous, r relative ood to thesingle elf-sufficinghole




or balance of ife,which s true satisfactionnd involvesthe

end of iving.This contrast etweenrelative nd positive-

not to say absolute-good is hardly, think, dmitted s arule to be present n the Memorabilia, nd the reiteratedargument rom herelativityf particular r externalgoodsis set down as a mere negative criticism,mplying hatforSocrates therewas no good beyond "the conducive" as ameans to partial ends, which a change of circumstancesmight of course turn to evil. It seems to me thatthis isa failure f dentification.The argumentn question,whichinfers hat ll particularnds and means are capable of beingnot-good qually s of being good, is surelyust the familiardoctrine f Plato (or Aristotle) hatall particular oods arerelative,iableto turn o evil, nd notstablenorself-sufficing,while the truegood alone can contain tsown context, hatis, be positive r self-sufficing;hat s to say,can possess thecharacter fa self-subsistenthole. Socrates' contentionsjust the familiar ntroduction o this argument. All par-ticular goods are "ambiguous." Even happiness, f youmisconstruetas anaggregateof "ambiguous"goods, "health,wealth, trength, lory," nd the like, s itself n ambiguousgood. It is plain thatmisconstructionsf thisnaturearemeantto be opposedthroughout ocrates'discussion o the

unity nd mastery nvolved n wisdom or the professionalscience of life. The brokenconversationswhich nsistonthemere relativityf good, as, the conduciveor expedientfortheindividual,re plainly, o myreading, rguments fwhich the conclusion is omitted;their conclusionbeingobvious from hewholespirit nd tone ofthe conversations,as importinghat, n wisdom nd mastery,bsoluterelativity

or the unambiguous nd self-sufficingood or happiness spresented s theonly omplete nd adequateend. The depthofSocrates' nsightntothe antithesis hus nvolvedbetweenthepointofview ofcharacter nd the pointof view of cir-cumstance-themainprinciple f the unambiguous nd am-biguous goods respectively-is llustrated y the fact thatheactually ointsoutthe distinctionnd connection f which

modern statisticians how but a feeble grasp, between




primary nd secondarypoverty. The jestingproposal, ndeterminingor social purposesthe

meaningof the

termpoor,to rankextravagantmonarchs elow thepoverty ineand good managersofsmall ncomesabove it, showsan ap-preciation ftheunimportance fincome as comparedwithcharacterwhichwouldthrow uite a newlighton ourmostnotoriousrecentstatistics fpoverty. Plato, of course, ssensitivenoughto thewretchednessfthe deal tyrant; uttheparticular eductionwhichSocrates so shrewdlymakesin applying heprinciple f therelativityfpoverty o theproblemof social classification, hardlyknow if we findagain either n Plato or in Aristotle. That no sharp linecan be drawnbetweenrichor poor is really social factofthe very first ruthand importance. There can be littledoubt, think, hatthe conceptionof the effective, nam-biguous,and self-sufficingood was present, s involvingthe power of character ver circumstance,o the mindofwhoeverwrote or talked in this strain. Finallyand defi-nitely, n contrastwith ignorance, the object matterofwisdom ppearsto consist nthebeautiful,hegood, and thejust. Its mastery f "the importanthings"of life, hat isto say,gives t a contentwhich s mainly thical, utperhapsrathermoretrulydefined hanthe content f Ethics in the

modern ense.So farwe have been dealingwith one side of the object

matterof the mastery, kill,or knowledgewhichwe maycall the science of life,understandinghat science is forSocratesrequired o answerat everymoment o practical swell as to theoretical ests. It is, we have said, the archi-tectonic cience, hesciencebywhichwe knowand practice

"to live,"to deal successfully ithall situations,nd to setbefore us self-sufficingnds adequate to this organizationof ife.

But our ethicalaspirations,rainedupon Kantianism, rehardlysatisfiedwith so "objective" an account,much asit really involves of the good will, of character s op-posed to circumstance,nd of the adequate conception f

the self.




Let us turn to what Xenophonhas to tell us of the

relationof Wisdom or mastery o the Perfection f theSelf.It is indeed 2) a commonplacehattheselfwas theobject

ofSocraticscience. Our onlyquestion s inwhat form heproblemwas raised and considered.

To know ne'sself, hen,sprimarilyoattend oone's elf-both n bodyand in mind;to care forone's selfor keepintraining, ot to letone's self run down-the phrase s appliedto menwho,likeAlcibiades,deterioratedn character fterparting ompanywithSocrates. Moreparticularlyne is toknow-to consider-whatgood there s in one for humanservice; nd thewhole onceptionftrainingrdiscipline, ithitscomponentsflearningndrehearsal rpractice,pplies othemastery f the self s to mastery flife.

Thismetaphor fthe athlete nd histrainings one ofthegreatspiritualmetaphors f thewesternworld. We knowit in Plato's champions-the Knightsof the Spiritin theCommonwealth-whoare athletes, ompetitors, rizewin-nersin thegreatestof all contests;whose carnalweapon isbut a typeof their piritualwatchand ward. We knowitagain in theNew Testament:"Now theydo it to obtainacorruptiblerown,but we an incorruptible." "We wrestle

notwithflesh nd blood, butwithprincipalities-withpir-itualwickednessn highplaces." And last and best of all,forthosewhodelight o recognizethemeeting fextremesinthespiritualworld, hesame deahasbeenimpressed ponus all fromboyhood n the figure fMr. Greatheart fthePilgrim'sProgress. This,then,was Socrates'primary iewof Wisdom and Mastery n relation to the Self. If men

would take care of themselves-attend to themselves-Socratesseemsto have insisted, n the simple,directGreekphraseswhich o mymind re so extraordinarilympressive,therewas hope that theymightturnout good. "Thosehave livedbestwho have best givenattention o becomingperfect." And distinct s is thenote ofdiscipline nd self-culture nd attention o the aim ofgoodness, we have yet

no individualism,f ndividualism eansseparation rom he




common ife. The warning, Do not be uncritical fyour-self,"goes hand in hand, n a remarkable arallelism,withthe exhortation,Do not neglectthe serviceofyour com-monwealth."

And so we have here the distinctbasis of perhaps thegreatestthought n Greek Philosophy, he thoughtwhichconnects he intercourse f souls in friendshipt once withtheattainmentftruthndiscussion ndwith herealizationofthehighest ife. It is reported o us in simple ndprosaic

words;the"becoming etter" s constantlyiewed s a socialactivity;we have seen thatascesisitselfhas intercoursewiththe good forone of its forms. And we naturally onnectwiththis the well-known ccount, alreadyreferred o, ofthemeaningwhich n Socrates' circle attached tself o theterm dialectic." On theone hand twas spiritual discern-ment"-the discriminationf"themost mportant hings n

life," teady ttention o which s the mark nd condition fthe attainment f self-mastery.On the other hand it was"conversation," he meeting togetherto take counsel, anactivity haracteristic f thebettermind, nd all-importantfor hepromotion fthe ettermind.

In appreciating locrates' dea of the self,we must bearin mindthat his attention ad been caughtby the natureof

the nvisible. He is aware of the generalfacts f symbolism,and notes thatmind, tself nvisible,s somethingwhichbe-comes real forus in the look and action of thebody. Asa first ontributionlike to thetheory f expression n art,and to the analysisof what Hegel would call "the actualsoul," his ideas on thispointare significant. And further,he is aware of soul or mindnot only as itself nvisible, ut

as a linkwith the invisibleworld, and a testimony o itsvalue. "Do not despise the invisible,"Xenophon makeshimsay, withnaive earnestness. The mind, nvisible s itis, is our bosom's lord, our monarch. I do not know f wehave an earlierexpression n Greek thoughtfor the con-ception f theroyalor sovereign eason,whichwas to be sofatefuln Platonicand laterphilosophy; gain surelyone of

thegreat metaphors f the world. And it is to be remem-



Xenophon'sMemorabiliaof Socrates. 44I

bered that this link withthe invisible, his sovereignty f

mind,does not stop at itself. Here, as withPlato, the kin-ship of the whole invisibleworldhas attracted he thinker'sattention; nd we are pointedfrom he soul to theworshipof the gods, and brought ack again fromthe gods to thelaw of our State,whichis the sanctioned nd wholesomelinkbetweenthe deityand;ourselves. We seem in thistocatchthevoice of Plato whenhe tellsus thatmatters fre-ligion are best settledbythe Delphic oracle,to whose sanc-tion twas thatSocratesappealed,or whenagainhe warnedtheworld thatthe establishmentf a religious ervice s notrivialmatter, nd shouldnot be leftopen to the personalcapriceof women ndinvalids. There is something trange,of course, n readingthe reiteration f Xenophon's strongimpression hatthe City'suse and wontwas the guide whichSocrates recommendedn religiousmatters. We recall the

non-natural arning, heprivaterelation o God, whichwaspartat least of theinnovation hat drew hostility pon Soc-rates. I could fancy hat detect, hroughoutXenophon'sjottings, henote so commonwithgreat reformers,I comenot to destroy ut to fulfil,"with ts undertone, you havenot the right o claimthe new privilege;for you have notexhausted he old formula." The non-naturalign, Socrates

is always desirous o impress pon us, is not a thing hat slikely o happen to anyone else.

The sayingthat thebodyis to be trained s a servant othe mind, he root of Plato's applicationof gymnastics,sgiven to Prodicus,but to Prodicus as repeatedby Socrates.It is indeed a thoughtwhichfollows n a completerformfromthe whole of Socrates' conception f training;for in

the apologue of Prodicus it is mainly directionfor theattainment f success in bodily tasks, though,especially nthisconnection, veryshrewdpiece ofadvice.

Withthis ide ofwisdom rmastery,hecare of one's self,theaspiration o better ife, hesovereignty f mind,we mayconnectthe striking pplication f thenotionof "slave" totheman who findshimself evoid of theprinciple f "mas-

tery." Especially "slavery" s the term for the conviction



442 InternationalJournal of Ethics.

ofsin-we cancall t no less-produced ina man notwithoutpromise nd good meaning, nd havinggreatpossessions n

theway of books and study,by the dialecticof Socrates."He went away grieved,and despisinghimself, nd con-vinced hat n good truthhe was a slave." "He went awaygrieved,forhe had greatpossessions." In both cases, thepossessionswere inadequate to the spiritualneed. Is itpossiblenot to recognizehere, s so oftenn the shrewd ndsimplehome-truthsf Greek thought,the logical frame-

workand substantive nticipation f the more intenseandpassionateutterance fthe New Testament? Just o, surely,we have the logical frameworkf the storyof theTempta-tion n the legendof how Crcesusthe rich claimedadmira-tion fromSolon the wise forthe contentsof his treasurehouses,and howthe admirationwas refused.

We have had alreadythe metaphorof the athleteand

asceticof the spiritualife,and the metaphor f the royaltyofreason;havewenot here thethird fthegreatmetaphorswhich n all subsequentages have appealed to the higherself-consciousnessfman? Man is bornforfreedom, aysRousseau; to renounceone's freedom s to renouncethequalityofhumanity,o repudiate venits duties. Freedomis to think, aysHegel; he who rejectsthinkingnd speaks

offreedomknows not what he says. To think, suppose,is to breakdownbarriers, o exhibitthisand the otherasa unityn spiteof theirdifference,o let themindfeel tselfin the world,and remodelthe world as an unobstructedexpressionof the mind. This is why thinkings freedom,andwhy he nstinct fages has followed ocrates nholdingthat essentially nd in principle o be reasonableis to be

free, ndbe irrationals to be a slave.By what right,t maybe asked in conclusion, oes Xeno-phonor his master,whichevertmay havebeen, couple thescienceand method of life withthe scienceand method ofethicalperfection? The answerlies close at hand in theverymeaningfor a Greekof suchwordsas life and good-ness; and we hardlyneed Plato to draw t out forus, and to

exhibitthemind as thecentre nd focusof all things, uch



Xenophon's Memorabiliaof Socrates. 443

thatcontradictionsn our environmentre also ofnecessity

contradictions ithin urselves.I suppose t might erynaturallye saidthat havemerelytakencommonplaces ut of Platonic or laterthought, ndread themintoXenophon by help of the common Greekphrases and notions through which Greek Philosophy sintimatelyooted n the every-daymind and lifeof Greece.And I submit,fthatwere all, the process s stillnot alto-getherwithout ts interest. If we were

reading Plutarch,indeed, it would be of less importance, ecause thenweshouldbe dealingwiththe debris f the greatsystems, ndthe onlyquestionwouldbe how muchtheGreek anguage,and thepopularphilosopher vailinghimself f it,had suc-ceeded in preserving. But here, as I understand,we arebeforethegreatwritten ystems, nd thingswhichbecamecommonplaces fterthemare of considerable nterest ndvaluewhenhintedbefore hemwithany degree of definite-ness,whether wing to Socrateshimself r to Xenophon'sshrewdness nd the highlevel of Athenianculture n gen-eral; or not improbably,n part to Socrates, and in parttothat extraordinarynspiration y whicheven average dis-ciples seem to push forward rom he positionbequeathedthemby theirmaster. Great deas almost pplythemselves,andvery ikelymuchofXenophon'ssuggestivenesswas dueto a communication fthe Socraticferment fwhichXeno-phon himself ould nothave told the origin. At any rate,I have mademyprotest, nd tried o show that he Memora-bilia deservesbettertreatment hanof late it has received,and that the connectionof virtuewithknowledge, o farfrom eing an obsoleteplatitude,meanssomething o which

our age is blind because thought nd knowledgehave lostforus the depth and sting of meaningwhichthey had forXenophon's Socrates.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

bosanquet 1905 xenophon's socrates

Documents