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Xenophon's Memorabilia of SocratesAuthor(s): Bernard BosanquetSource: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Jul., 1905), pp. 432-443Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2378132 .

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432

International

Journal

of

Ethics.

XENOPHON'S

MEMORABILIA

OF

SOCRATES.

This

article s an

attempt

o put

togetherthe

thoughts

which

t

appears

to me that

Xenophon ntended

o

attribute

to

Socrates

on

the central heme

of

Wisdom

or

Science in

relation

o

Life and

Goodness.

There is

at

least a

certain

interestn

trying

o

trace n

some

detailthe

mpression hich

Socrates

had

made

on

the

mind of

a

disciple

who,

although

no

philosopher,

was

not

destitute

f

sagacity,

nd

I

do

not

conceal mybeliefthat the

slightness

of the

consideration

usuallyaccorded to the

Memorabilia'

arises from

a

deep-

seated

prejudice

against

the truth

which

appears to me

to

be

the main

thesis f that

work.

I

should ike to

combat

his

prejudice by

a

simple

statement

fwhat

it

appears to me

that

Wisdom or

Knowledgemeantfor

ocrates,or for

Xeno-

phon,

or for

the

Athenian

mind

before

Plato-whichever

it

maybe heldthatwe shallreallyhavebeendiscussing.

For I

am

not

going

to be

highly

critical.

It does

not

seem

to

me

indeed

a

dangerous

assumptionthat

on

the

whole the

best

ideas

in

the

Memorabilia

belong substan-

tially o

Socrates,

ust as

it

is

easyto see

thatthe

details

nd

arguments

hroughout

elong

in

great

measure to

Xeno-

phon. Let

the

views

and

ideas, of

which

am to

speak,

be

credited,fanyone hinks tmorecritical, o Xenophonhim-

self. The

important

oint

s

that,

s I

understand,

t is

not

suggested

that

Xenophon

could

have

borrowed

from

Plato.

For

the interest

s to see

how near

we get to

Plato,

not

by

reading

philosophy nto

Xenophon,

but

by

rectifying

he

current

onceptionof

Socrates'

simplepoint of

departure.

Perhaps

it is

not

merely

Socrates,

but the

Greek

mind

commonto Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato, that we are

really rying

o

reEstimate.

I

will set

out the

theory f

so-calledWisdom and

Knowl-

edge

as I

find t

in

Xenophon withas little

commentary

s

possible.

Wisdom

or

Science involves

rom

he earliestGreek

times

1

I have Gomperzparticularlyn mind.







Xenophon's

Memorabilia

of

Socrates.

433

what we

should

call the two

sides of theory

nd practice

n

the closest fusionwith one another. When Xenophon's

Socratesbeginsto define

ts nature,

we are inclined

o

sepa-

rate

these

aspects,

and to

say that

some

of his tests

apply

to theory

r science,

nd others

o

practice r

conduct.

But

this s just

what urge

that

we

mustnot do.

His

testsfor

thinking, amely,

iscrimination,

ight

preference,

nd true

classification,

pply

no less to conduct,

nd

the conditions

for mastery

f conductapply

equally to thinking.

Unlder-

standing

his to

be

so, and

thatwe are

distinguishing

he

two

sides of

an

indivisible

nergy,

by which

mind

deals

with

the

World,

we

may

say

that

Xenophon's

Socrates

or

the

Socratic

Xenophon

has distinct

ests

or

definitions

oth

applicable

to

the same

energy

called Wisdom

or

Science,

some

from

he

theoretical

nd some

from

hepractical

point

of

view.

As a mastery f the theory fanything, nowledgemust

fulfil he

condition

f ability

o

expound

or

define;

or

as

I

suggest

we ought

more strictly

o say,

as

the mastery

f

anything,

nowledge

r wisdom

must

fulfil

n

the one

side

the theoretical

onditionof ability

to

expound

or

define.

This gives

us definitionnd the

recognized

ocratic

concept,

and runs us into

Dialectic with

all

its implications,

which,

however, elong npartto the practical ide. But again,as

the

mastery

f

anything,

nowledge

if

it is

to

be

called

so)

must

fulfil he

condition hat

one

must

have power

to

do,

one

mustnot make

mistakes n

action;

a condition

which

s

explained

o demand

continued

raining

r

ascesis,

of which

the

elements

re "learning"

and

"practice"

or "rehearsal,"

elements

equally

applicable

to

violin

playing

and

to

geo-

metrical easoning. It is thereforeo be observedthatour

narrow

erms

Knowleldge

r Wisdom,

though

they

re

cur-

rent

renderings

f the Greek

noun

in

question,

re

really

unfitted o be

the subjectof

the predicates

hus

developed,

which

apply

equally

and alike to what

we

call

knowledge

and

to creative

action or

conduct.

The

craftsman's

r

artist's nfalliblemind, eye,

and

hand are,

I

imagine,

the

originalconditions of the conceptionwith whichwe are







434

International

Journal

of

Ethics.

dealing,

nd

even

"skill,"

r,as

I prefer,

mastery"-the

mind

of

themaster-would

really

give

us a far truer

point

of

de-

parture handoes ourowndepreciated erminology-depre-

ciated

not

by

so-called

"intellectual"

dealism,

but

by the

views

of

cognition

which

have accompanied

empiricism.

This

training

r ascesis,

which

gives

the

power

to do,

and

involves

nfallibility

n

act,

thepreference

hatnever

misses

the right,

nd is tested

by

"right"or "fine"

dealing

whether

with

situations

r

with

arguments,

mplies

furtherhe

care

ofone'sself, henot ettingne'sselfrundown, ike n athlete

getting

ut of

training,

he

not

being

ignorant

f one's

self,

but continuously

ttending

o

one's powers

and their

appli-

cation.

Thus, too,

wisdom

or

mastery

s one

withtemper-

ance and

continence,

nd

is

incompatible

with

want

of

self-

control,

though

this

perhaps

is compatible

with

a certain

transient

perception

of

the good,

unconfirmed

we

are to

supposeby study nd bytraining.

And

thus

completed

Knowledge

or

Mastery

s possession

of

the art

or

craft

f

"living."

This

we

are emphatically

old

-we are

pointed

to the

science,

the trained

kill

or

profes-

sional

infallibility,hose

object

matter, n one

side (i),

is

"living."

And this

o begin

with,

s

the

reaction

f

the ndi-

vidual

mastery

r

capacity

o

a test at once

theoretical

nd

practical,consists in the power and habit of "dialectic."

Dialectic involves,

s throughout

Greek philosophy,

he

in-

tercommunion

f friends,

nd the discrimination

fgood

and

bad

things.

Intercommunion

f

friends,

we

may

observe,

is itself

form

f ascesis

or

practical

raining,

howing

how

inseparable

re

the

sides

of

the

conception

we

are

analyzing.

And,

on the

otherhand,

erious

study

f

the most

mportant

things n life s whatSocrates'man of mastery ossesses,by

contrastwith

the

man of no

mastery,

he

incontinent.

The

latter

does

not

and the former

oes study

or

pay

attention

to

"the

most

important

hings."

I confess

hat before

this

simple

nd

fundamental

xpression

f whatwisdom

or

mas-

tery

connoted

n

the Socratic circle,

the controversies

f

intellectualism

nd

pragmatism

eem

to me extremely

rivial

and shadowy. With this discriminationf good and bad







Xenophon'sMemorabilia

f Socrates.

435

things

we

may

compare Herodotus' brief

ummary

f the

speech

of

Themistocles efore

alamis.

"Now

his

argument

was a

reviewand

a

contrast

f

the

better nd

the

worse in

all

that

is

possiblefor

man's

nature

and

situation;

and of

these

having

exhorted them

in

every

case

to

choose

the

better, e

toldthem

o

go on

board

their

hips."

The

nature

of the

object

matter f this

mastery

nd

discrimination,bove

designatedby the

simple

verb "to

live,"

is

often

et out

at

greater

length.

For

example,

"All

learningwhereby

one

may cause to live well a household or a city-statend may

deal

rightlywith

human

affairs";

nd in

everything

t con-

fers the

power-not

as

I

understand,

he chance

or

liberty

or

potentiality ut the

positive

ability-of

the

disciplined

mind o

choosethe

right nd abstainfrom he

wrong.

Thus,

in

general,

wisdom,

knowledge, r

mastery

s

the

attribute

by which

all

splendid

and

profitable

hings

are

done,

and

moralitys included mongthese.

I

interpolate hat

the

distinction, ometimes

nsisted

on

in later

thought,

etween

he craftsman's

bility

s

a

capacity

of

alternatives,

nd

moral

disposition

s

habituated

n a

single

direction,was not

strongly

resent o

Xenophon's

Socrates.

"'So muchthe

worse

for

his

theory,"

t

may

be

replied.

"It

is

just this

neglect

by

which

he

omits,from he

comparison

ofwisdom and virtue, he essentialfeature f the one-sided

moral

choice."

But

it

mustbe

remembered hat

we are cer-

tainly

alsifying

he

facts

f

we makethis

distinction

bsolute,

as, also,

perhaps,

f

we maintain

complete

dentificationn

principle. It

seems clear

to me

that

the

craftsman's

bility

is

notreally

bare

capacity f

alternatives,

ndthe

instances

whichwe are

apt

to

allege confuse he

issue. If the

doctor

can poisonas skilfully s he can cure, even thiswouldnot

mean

thathe can

wholly

ay his

habitual rt

aside-the con-

trast

to prove

thisshould

be

between

kill

andwant of

skill,

not

between

different

pplications f his

usual

skill,

which

presuppose ts

retention.

There

is here no

capacityof op-

posites

so far

as the

employmentf

the

art is

concerned.

If,

however, uch an

argument

were

takento

mean

that to

help and to injurewere to thephysician,s such, ndifferent







436

International

ournal

f Ethics.

ends, and

if

we

at the same time

were to

definehis art

as

the art of

healing, henno

doubt t

would

be shown, n con-

ditionour illustrationtood,

that

the craftsman's

bility

an

dissociate

tselffrom

his habit n

a way which would

be

a

bad model to

take

for the theory

of morals.

But surely,

if

we

thus appeal

to the whole scope of the art of

healing,

we

lie

open to

the

answer

that the

facts re otherwise,

nd

the physician,

hus

understood

n his

full

connotation,

has

notthe alleged

moral

versatility.

The art,

s we

learn from

Plato,is a whole,and involves s its end a conception fthe

good

of its object.

The instinct f

the

healer

is as

normal

to thephysicians

his

skill,

nd

I

believe

t

to be

absolutely

beyond

question

that

n

every

rt and craft

he

possessor

s

in

some degreemoralized

by

its possession.

Its difference

fromwhat

we call

morality

smerelyhatof

part

fromwhole.

It

mayin certain ases

be

foundcapable

of being

subordi-

natedto bad aims,because there ie outside t unmoralized

regions

of

the

man's naturewhich

play

theirpart

n a total

decisionof

the will. But

so far

s

it

goes

it

is

of

the nature

of

a

moralhabit,

nd

the

dealization

f

t

by

the

Xenophon-

tic

Socrates

s at

least

as

true

to

human

nature

s

the later

attempt o

relegate

t

to a

lower

evel.

I

repeat,

hen-wisdom

or

mastery

s

the

qualityby which

all splendid nd profitablehings re done, and moralitys

counted

among

these. Wisdom

is a

masterly

ealing

with

life nd the mportant

hings.

Its

main

pplications,

bjects,

and effects

re

first uch

as

happiness,

welfare,

r

well-being,

distinguished

rom

good

fortune

y

the essentialcondition

of

wisdom,

iz., tudy

nd

practice;

next

the

"royal"

or

"sov-

ereign" art,

the art

of

producing

happiness

for

communities,

whichsubsequently igures ol splendidlyn Plato.and Aris-

totle

as the architectonic

rt of

life-further,

Dialectic

as

the

discrimination

f

good

and

evil;

finally

he

"good"

par

excellence-the dvantageous

as such-the

organization

or

totality hich

raisesrelative dvantageousness

o

the nclusive

or

positive

advantageousness

which is one

with

the

end.

For

this

s

really, think,

he

relation f the partial,

xternal,

ambiguous, r relative ood to thesingle elf-sufficinghole







Xenophon's

Memorabilia

of

Socrates.

437

or balance of ife,which s true satisfaction

nd

involvesthe

end of iving.

This contrast etweenrelative nd positive-

not to say absolute-good

is hardly, think, dmitted s a

rule to be present n the Memorabilia,

nd the reiterated

argument rom he

relativityf particular

r externalgoods

is set down as a mere negative criticism,mplying

hat

for

Socrates therewas no good beyond "the

conducive" as

a

means to partial ends, which a change

of circumstances

might of

course turn to evil.

It

seems to

me that

this is

a failure f dentification.The argumentn question,which

infers hat ll

particular

nds and means are

capable of being

not-good qually s of being good, is surely

ust the familiar

doctrine f Plato

(or

Aristotle)

hat

all

particular

oods

are

relative,

iableto turn o evil,

nd not

stable

nor

self-sufficing,

while the true

good

alone

can contain ts

own context,

hat

is, be positive r self-sufficing;hat s to say,

can possess

the

character fa self-subsistenthole. Socrates' contentions

just

the familiar ntroduction o this argument.

All

par-

ticular goods are

"ambiguous."

Even

happiness,

f

you

misconstrue

t

as an

aggregateof "ambiguous"

goods, "health,

wealth, trength, lory,"

nd the like,

s

itself n

ambiguous

good.

It

is

plain

that

misconstructions

f

this

nature

are

meantto be opposed

throughout ocrates'

discussion

o

the

unity nd mastery nvolved n wisdom or the professional

science of life. The

broken

conversationswhich

nsist

on

the

mere relativityf good, as, the conducive

or expedient

for

the

individual,

re

plainly, o myreading, rguments

f

which

the conclusion is omitted;

their conclusion

being

obvious from he

whole

spirit nd tone of

the conversations,

as importinghat, n

wisdom nd mastery,bsoluterelativity

or the unambiguous nd self-sufficingood or happiness s

presented s theonly

omplete nd adequate

end. The depth

of

Socrates' nsightntothe antithesis hus

nvolvedbetween

the

point

of

view of

character nd the pointof view of

cir-

cumstance-the

main

principle f the unambiguous

nd am-

biguous goods respectively-is llustrated

y the fact that

he

actually ointsoutthe distinctionnd connection

f which

modern statisticians how but a feeble grasp, between







438

International

Journal

of

Ethics.

primary nd

secondary

poverty.

The

jesting

proposal,

n

determiningor social

purposes

the

meaning

of the

term

poor,

to rank

extravagant

monarchs

elow the

poverty

ine

and good

managers

of

small

ncomes

above

it, shows

an

ap-

preciation f

the

unimportance f

income as

compared

with

character

which

would

throw

uite a

newlighton

our

most

notorious

recent

statistics

f

poverty.

Plato,

of

course, s

sensitive

nough

to

the

wretchedness

f

the deal

tyrant; ut

the

particular

eduction

which

Socrates so

shrewdly

makes

in applying heprinciple f therelativityfpoverty o the

problem

of

social

classification,

hardly

know if

we

find

again

either n

Plato or

in

Aristotle.

That

no

sharp line

can be

drawn

between

rich

or

poor

is

really

social fact

of

the

very

first ruth

and

importance.

There

can

be

little

doubt,

think, hatthe

conceptionof

the

effective, nam-

biguous,

and

self-sufficing

ood was

present,

s

involving

the power of character ver circumstance,o the mindof

whoever

wrote or talked in

this strain.

Finally

and

defi-

nitely, n

contrastwith

ignorance, the

object

matter

of

wisdom

ppears

to

consist

n

the

beautiful,

he

good,

and the

just.

Its

mastery f

"the

important

hings"of

life, hat is

to

say,gives

t a

contentwhich

s

mainly

thical,

ut

perhaps

rather

more

truly

defined han

the

content f

Ethics in

the

modern ense.

So far

we

have been

dealing

with one side

of

the

object

matter

of the

mastery,

kill,

or

knowledge

which

we

may

call

the

science

of

life,

understanding

hat

science is

for

Socrates

required

o

answer

at

every

moment

o

practical s

well as to

theoretical ests.

It

is,

we have

said,

the archi-

tectonic

cience,

he

science

bywhichwe

know

and

practice

"to live,"to deal successfully ithall situations,nd to set

before us

self-sufficingnds

adequate to

this

organization

of ife.

But

our

ethical

aspirations,

rained

upon

Kantianism, re

hardly

satisfied

with

so

"objective"

an

account,

much as

it

really

involves

of the

good

will,

of

character s

op-

posed

to

circumstance,

nd of

the

adequate

conception

f

the self.







Xenophon's

Memorabilia

of Socrates.

439

Let

us

turn to

what

Xenophon

has

to tell

us of

the

relationof Wisdom or mastery o the Perfection f the

Self.

It is

indeed

2)

a

commonplace

hatthe

selfwas the

object

of

Socratic

science.

Our

only

question

s

in

what form he

problem

was

raised and

considered.

To know ne's

self,

hen,

s

primarily

o

attend

o

one's

elf-

both

n

body

and in

mind;

to

care for

one's self

or

keep

in

training,

ot to

let

one's self run down-the

phrase

s

applied

to menwho,like

Alcibiades,

deterioratedn character

fter

parting

ompany

with

Socrates.

More

particularly

ne is

to

know-to

consider-what

good

there

s

in

one for human

service; nd the

whole

onception

f

training

r

discipline,

ith

its

components

f

learning

nd

rehearsal r

practice,pplies

o

the

mastery

f the self s to

mastery

f

life.

This

metaphor

f

the athlete nd his

training

s one

of

the

greatspiritualmetaphors f thewesternworld. We know

it

in

Plato's

champions-the

Knights

of the

Spirit

in

the

Commonwealth-who

are

athletes,

ompetitors, rize

win-

nersin

the

greatestof all

contests;whose

carnal

weapon is

but

a

type

of

their

piritual

watch

and

ward.

We know

it

again

in

the

New Testament:

"Now

theydo

it to

obtain

a

corruptible

rown,but we an

incorruptible."

"We wrestle

notwithflesh nd blood, butwithprincipalities-withpir-

itual

wickedness

n

high

places."

And

last and

best

of all,

for

those

who

delight

o

recognize

the

meeting

f

extremes

in

the

spiritual

world, he

same

deahas

been

impressed

pon

us all

from

boyhood

n

the

figure f

Mr.

Greatheart f

the

Pilgrim's

Progress. This,

then,was

Socrates'

primary

iew

of

Wisdom

and

Mastery

n

relation to

the

Self.

If

men

would take care of themselves-attend to themselves-

Socrates

seemsto

have

insisted, n

the

simple,direct

Greek

phrases

which o

my

mind re

so

extraordinarily

mpressive,

there

was

hope

that

they

mightturn

out

good.

"Those

have

lived

best

who have

best

given

attention o

becoming

perfect."

And

distinct

s

is the

note of

discipline

nd

self-

culture

nd

attention

o

the aim

of

goodness, we

have yet

no individualism,f ndividualism eansseparation rom he







440

InternationalJournal

of

Ethics.

common ife. The warning, Do not be

uncritical f

your-

self,"goes hand in hand, n a remarkable

arallelism,with

the exhortation,Do not neglectthe serviceofyour com-

monwealth."

And so we

have

here the

distinct

basis

of

perhaps

the

greatest

thought

n Greek

Philosophy,

he

thoughtwhich

connects

he intercourse

f souls

in

friendship

t

once with

the

attainment

f

truth

n

discussion

nd

with

he

realization

of

the

highest

ife.

It

is

reported

o us in

simple

nd

prosaic

words;the"becoming etter" s constantlyiewed s a social

activity;we have seen that

ascesis

itselfhas

intercoursewith

the

good

for

one of

its

forms.

And

we

naturally

onnect

with

this

the

well-known

ccount, already

referred

o,

of

the

meaning

which

n

Socrates' circle attached

tself

o

the

term

dialectic."

On the

one

hand t

was

spiritual

discern-

ment"-the discriminationf

"the

most

mportant hings

n

life," teady ttention o which s the mark nd condition f

the attainment f

self-mastery.On

the other hand it

was

"conversation,"

he

meeting togetherto take

counsel, an

activity

haracteristic f the

bettermind, nd all-important

for he

promotion

f

the

ettermind.

In

appreciating locrates' dea of the self,we must bear

in

mindthat his

attention ad been caught

by the natureof

the nvisible. He is aware of the generalfacts f symbolism,

and

notes that

mind,

tself

nvisible,

s

somethingwhich

be-

comes real for

us

in

the look and action of the

body. As

a

first

ontribution

like to the

theory f

expression

n

art,

and to

the

analysis

of

what Hegel would

call "the actual

soul,"

his ideas

on

this

point

are

significant. And further,

he is

aware of

soul

or mind

not only as itself

nvisible,

ut

as a linkwith the invisibleworld, and a testimony o its

value. "Do not despise the invisible,"

Xenophon makes

him

say, with

naive earnestness. The

mind, nvisible s it

is,

is

our

bosom's lord, our monarch.

I

do not know f we

have

an

earlier

expression

n

Greek

thoughtfor the con-

ception

f the

royalor sovereign eason,whichwas to be so

fateful

n

Platonic

and

later

philosophy; gain surelyone of

thegreat metaphors f the world. And it is to be remem-







Xenophon's

Memorabilia

of

Socrates.

44I

bered that

this link with

the

invisible,

his

sovereignty

f

mind,does not stop at itself. Here, as withPlato, the kin-

ship of the whole invisible

world

has attracted he thinker's

attention; nd we

are

pointed

from he soul to

the

worship

of the

gods,

and

brought

ack

again

fromthe

gods

to

the

law of

our

State,

which

is

the

sanctioned

nd

wholesome

linkbetween

the

deity

and;

ourselves. We

seem in

this

to

catchthevoice

of Plato when

he

tells

us that

matters fre-

ligion are best settledby

the Delphic oracle,

to whose

sanc-

tion twas thatSocratesappealed,or whenagainhe warned

theworld thatthe establishmentf a

religious ervice

s

no

trivialmatter,

nd should

not

be left

open to

the

personal

capriceof women

nd

invalids. There is something trange,

of

course,

n

reading

the

reiteration f

Xenophon's strong

impression hatthe City's

use and wontwas the guide which

Socrates recommended

n

religiousmatters. We recall the

non-natural arning, heprivaterelation o God, whichwas

part

at

least of theinnovation hat drew hostility pon Soc-

rates. I could fancy hat

detect, hroughoutXenophon's

jottings,

he

note so

commonwithgreat reformers,I come

not to destroy ut to

fulfil,"with ts undertone, you have

not the right o claim

the new privilege;for you have not

exhausted he old

formula." The

non-natural

ign, Socrates

is always desirous o impress pon us, is not a thing hat s

likely o happen to

anyone else.

The

sayingthat the

body

is

to be trained s a servant o

the

mind, he root of

Plato's applicationof gymnastics,

s

given to Prodicus,but to

Prodicus as repeatedby Socrates.

It

is

indeed a thoughtwhichfollows

n

a completerform

fromthe whole of

Socrates' conception f training;for in

the apologue of Prodicus it is mainly directionfor the

attainment f success

in

bodily tasks, though,especially n

this

connection, very

shrewd

piece

of

advice.

With

this ide of

wisdom

r

mastery,

he

care of one's

self,

the

aspiration

o better

ife,

he

sovereignty f mind,we may

connectthe

striking pplication

f the

notionof "slave" to

the

man who

finds

himself evoid of the

principle f

"mas-

tery." Especially "slavery" s the term for the conviction







442

International

Journal of

Ethics.

of

sin-we can

call t no

less-produced

in

a man not

without

promise

nd good

meaning,

nd

havinggreat

possessions

n

theway of books and study,by the dialecticof Socrates.

"He went

away grieved,

and

despisinghimself,

nd con-

vinced

hat n good truth

he was a slave."

"He

went away

grieved,

for

he had

great

possessions."

In both cases, the

possessions

were

inadequate

to the

spiritual

need.

Is

it

possible

not to recognizehere,

s so often

n the shrewd

nd

simple

home-truths

f

Greek

thought,

the

logical

frame-

workand substantive nticipation f the more intenseand

passionate

utterance

fthe New Testament?

Just

o, surely,

we

have

the

logical

framework

f the

story

of the

Tempta-

tion

n

the

legend

of how

Crcesusthe rich claimed

admira-

tion

from

Solon

the wise

for

the

contentsof his treasure

houses,

and how

the admiration

was refused.

We have

had

already

the

metaphor

of

the athlete

and

asceticof the spiritualife,and the metaphor f the royalty

ofreason;

have

we

not here the

third

f

the

great

metaphors

which

n

all

subsequent

ages

have appealed

to the

higher

self-consciousness

f

man? Man is born

for

freedom,

ays

Rousseau;

to

renounce

one's freedom s

to renounce

the

quality

of

humanity,

o repudiate ven

its duties.

Freedom

is to think, ays

Hegel;

he who rejectsthinking

nd

speaks

offreedomknows not what he says. To think, suppose,

is

to

break

down

barriers,

o exhibitthis

and the other

as

a unity

n

spiteof their

difference,

o let themind

feel tself

in

the world,

and remodel

the world as

an unobstructed

expression

of the

mind. This

is

why thinking

s freedom,

and

why he

nstinct f

ages has followed

ocrates n

holding

that

essentially

nd in principle

o be reasonable

is to be

free, ndbe irrationals to be a slave.

By what right,

t may

be asked

in

conclusion,

oes

Xeno-

phonor his master,

whichever

tmay have

been, couple

the

science

and method of

life withthe science

and

method of

ethical

perfection?

The answer

lies close

at hand

in the

very

meaningfor a Greek

of such

wordsas life and

good-

ness;

and we

hardlyneed Plato to

draw t

out forus,

and to

exhibitthemind as thecentre nd focusof all things, uch







Xenophon's Memorabilia

of

Socrates.

443

that

contradictions

n our environment

re also of

necessity

contradictions ithin urselves.

I suppose

t might erynaturally

e said

that

have

merely

taken

commonplaces

ut of Platonic

or

later

thought,

nd

read them

into

Xenophon by help of the

common Greek

phrases and notions

through which

Greek

Philosophy

s

intimatelyooted n the

every-day

mind and life

of Greece.

And I

submit,

f

that

were all, the

process

s

stillnot alto-

gether

without ts interest.

If

we were

reading Plutarch,

indeed, it

would be of

less importance,

ecause

then

we

should

be

dealing

with

the debris f

the

great

systems, nd

the

only

questionwould

be how much

the

Greek

anguage,

and the

popular

philosopher vailing

himself

f

it,

had

suc-

ceeded

in

preserving. But

here,

as I

understand,

we

are

before

the

great

written

ystems,

nd

things

which

became

commonplaces fterthemare of

considerable

nterest nd

valuewhenhintedbefore hemwithany degree of definite-

ness,whether wing to

Socrates

himself r to

Xenophon's

shrewdness

nd the highlevel of

Athenianculture

n

gen-

eral; or not

improbably,

n part to Socrates, and

in

part

to

that

extraordinarynspiration y which

even

average

dis-

ciples seem

to push

forward rom

he positionbequeathed

them

by their

master.

Great deas almost pply

themselves,

andvery ikelymuchofXenophon'ssuggestivenesswas due

to

a

communication f

the Socraticferment f

whichXeno-

phon himself

ould not

have told

the origin. At any rate,

I

have made

myprotest,

nd tried o

show that he Memora-

bilia

deserves

better

treatment han

of late it has received,

and

that the

connection

of virtuewith

knowledge, o far

from eing an obsolete

platitude,

means

something o which

our age is blind because thought nd knowledgehave lost

for

us

the

depth and

sting of meaningwhich

they had for

Xenophon's

Socrates.

BERNARD

BOSANQUET.

THE

UNIVERSITY OF

ST. ANDREWS,

SCOTLAND.

bernard bosanquet -- xenophon's memorabilia of socrates

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