SPECIAL ASSISTANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PROJECTS（SADEP）

AID EFFECTIVENESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EAST ASIA AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

SENEGAL CASE STUDY

FINAL REPORT

NOVEMBER 2007

Ahmadou Aly Mbaye

Preliminary (Please do not quote)

Table of contents I. Background...................................................................................................................................4II. The Debi-Tiguet Project (DIP) Case.............................................................................................5

II.1. Irrigation in the valley of Senegal river...............................................................................7II.1.1Characteristic of irrigation in the valley of Senegal river...........................................7II.1.2 Development policies and program in the valley.......................................................7II.1.3 Rice cultivation in the valley of Senegal river.........................................................10

II.2. Institutional and Impact Analysis of DIP...........................................................................10II.2.1 Institutional and capacity building impact of the project........................................11 II.2.2 Why is debi Tiguet Union more effective than similar Unions in the valley?.........15

II.3. Benchmarking DIP institutional design.............................................................................16II.3.1 The methodology and its main limitations...............................................................16II.3.2 A brief description of reference projects.................................................................17 II.3.3 The result of analysis................................................................................................17II.3.4 The role of donor in project outcome.......................................................................20

III. Regional Hydropower Development Project (RHDP) case........................................................20III.1.OMVS and the management of Senegal river....................................................................20III.2.Institutional linkage between OMVS, SOGEM and ESKOM...........................................24III.3.RHDP: a further description...............................................................................................28III.4.RHDP: institutional spillovers...........................................................................................30

III.4.1 Technology transfer and capacity building.............................................................30III.4.2 Financial and economic sustainability....................................................................31III.4.3 The World Bank assessment of design and implementation of RHDP...................33III.4.4 Environmental and health accomplishments...........................................................36

III.5.Observed institutional weakness........................................................................................37III.5.1Contractual issues between ESKOM and SOGEM..................................................37III.5.2 Adverse government intervention...........................................................................37III.5.3 Setting the optimal fare for energy..........................................................................39

III.6.The role of donors in the successes/failures of the project................................................40III.7.Benchmarking RHDPagainst reference project.................................................................44

III.7.1Benchmarking RHDP against the Senegalese-German Solar Energy project (SGSE)...............................................................................................................................44III.7.2 Benchmarking RHDP against electricity from thermal sources in SENELEC.......45III.7.3 Benchmarking RHDP against similar regional projects in the world.....................46

IV. Finding and recommendations....................................................................................................47Reference...........................................................................................................................................50Annexe...............................................................................................................................................52

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Geographic location of DIP.................................................................................................6Figure 2: Institutional setting of Debi-Tiguet Managing Unit...........................................................12Figure 3: Interactions in service rendering inside the Union............................................................ 13Figure 4: Interactions in service rendering inside the Union............................................................14 Figure 5: Three countries and one river.............................................................................................21Figure 6: Manantali Energy Project...................................................................................................22Figure 7: Institutional schema of Energy Project..............................................................................24Figure 8: Organigramm of SOGEM..................................................................................................27Figure 9: Manantali dam: an aerial view...........................................................................................29Figure 10: OMVS member countries quotas in total Manantali energy production.........................31

List of Table

Table 1: Donor funded projects on irrigation in the Valley: 1990-2005 (CFA millions)................... 9Table 2: Uses and resources on rice in Senegal (1995-2002) .............................................................7Table 3: Benchmarking DIP against reference projects....................................................................18Table 4: Project Financing Shares.....................................................................................................23Table 5: The costs of project activities are broken down as follows.................................................30Table 6: Losses according to the Fichtner Study...............................................................................35Table 7: Correlation between shares of Manantali project financed by France and nationality of successful tenderers...........................................................................................................................41Table 8: The amendements................................................................................................................42Table 9: Evolution of ESKOM SA bills to SENELEC.....................................................................45Table10: Evolution of GTI bills to SENELEC..................................................................................45Table11: Completed Word Bank Projects For Cross Border Energy Trading..................................46

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List of acronyms

BCI Budget Consolidé d’InvestissementBEC Bureau d’Etudes et de ContrôleCAP Project and Programme Implementation Support Unit CCCE Caisse Centrale de Coopération EconomiqueCERER Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les Energies Renouvelable CFAA Country Financial Accountability AssessmentCIDA Canadian International Development AgencyCM Council MinisterCNCAS Caisse Nationale de Crédit AgricoleCPAR Country Procurement Assessment CSS Compagnie Sucrière SénégalaiseDCEF Division of Economic and Financial Cooperation DDI Division of Debt and InvestmentDGTCP Direction General of Treasury and Public AccountingDIP Debi Irrigation Project DRC Development Cooperation ReportESP Ecole Supérieure PolytechniqueFDI Foreign Direct InvestmentFMTE Framework or Medium Term ExpenditureFNDP Fonds National de Développement PétrolierFNE Fonds National de l’Energie GDP Gross Domestic ProductHC Haut Commissariat de l’OMVSICS Industrie Chimique du SénégalIDB Islamic Development BankISRA Institut Sénégalais de Recherche AgricoleNGO Non Governemental OrganizationOMVS Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve SénégalPCRBF Projet de Coordination des Réformes Budgétaires FinancièresPDEF Programme Décennal de l’Education de la FormationPO Producer OrganizationsPPTE Pays Pauvres Très EndettésPRPF Programme de Recouvrement de Puissance et de FiabilisationPSAOP Programme des Services Agricoles et Organisations des ProducteursPTIP Programme Triennal d’Investissement PublicRENES Programme de Redéploiement Energétique du Sénégal (RENES)RHDP Regional Hydropower Development ProjectSAED Société d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve SénégalSAR Société Africaine de RaffinageSCA Stratégie de Croissance AccéléréeSENELEC Société National d’ElectricitéSNP System of PlanningSNTI Société Nationale de Tomate IndustrielleSOGED Société de Gestion et d’Exploitation du barrage de ManantaliSOGEM Société de Gestion et de l’Energie de ManantaliSONACOS Société Nationale de Commercialisation des Oléagineux du SénégalTOFE Tableau des Opérations Financières de l’EtatUEMOA West African Economical Monetary Union UNDP United Nation for Development of Population

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I. Background

This study is part of a broader assessment of aid effectiveness, using a comparative case study approach on Africa and Asia. It aims at shedding some light on the current debate on aid effectiveness in Africa, by studying project cases in Senegal. Some basic criteria were used for project selection, mainly:

- Significance of projects as regards size ; - Being in the sector of infrastructure, including irrigation ;- Being completed 5 years ago from now ;- Being funded by Japan, at least for one project cases ;- Not being a white elephant, in order for the analysis to elicit some relevant lessons.

The projects we chose for this purpose are: a) Regional Hydropower Development Project (RHDP), and b) Debi Irrigation Project (DIP). The main focus of the first project is power generation from the Senegal River, funded by the World Bank, while for the latter project it consists of irrigation in the northern part of Senegal, funded by JICA.

The overall situation of aid in Senegal is characterized by the significance of foreign bilateral and multilateral flows in Senegalese economy. Such flows make up more than 10% in GDP, and about 60 bilaterals and multilaterals are operating in Senegal, while the average for developing countries is 23 (Mavrotas and Reisen, 2007). Regarding NGOs, more than 400 of them are now operating in Senegal. Infrastructure is one the major sectors benefiting from aid, since more than 80% of total bilateral and multilateral interventions are devoted to this sector. The main objective of this study is to assess the effectiveness of these interventions, mainly in terms of capacity building, institutional design, and sustainability.

The irrigation sector and the energy sector are cases in point, since both of them are very important in Senegalese government strategies to accelerate growth and to reduce poverty. Moreover several institutional settings have been experimented to increase effectiveness in the design, implementation and management of investment projects in these areas.

Aid is a major source of funding development policies in Senegal. In 2003/2004, Senegal received $ 418 millions in aid, which made up about 8,9% of GDP. On average, the amount of aid per head was $ 48.1 in 2002/2004. Bilateral aid makes up 55.6% of total flows against 44.6% for multilateral aid. Up to 60 different bilateral and multilateral donors (excluding NGOs, private foundations and the like) are operating in Senegal, and about 750 projects are now underway. Aid is highly concentrated in Senegal though, with only four partners providing more than the half of total flows. The main objective of this study is to assess the effectiveness of these interventions, mainly in terms of capacity building, institutional design, and sustainability. The irrigation sector and the energy sector are cases in point, since both of them are very important in Senegalese government strategies to accelerate growth and to reduce poverty. Moreover several institutional settings have been experimented to increase effectiveness in the design, implementation and management of investment projects in these areas.

The methodology used in this document is inductive and seeks to generalize findings from our case studies to shed some lights on the debate on aid effectiveness. In each of the project case,

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institutional accomplishments/failures are spelled out using results from field missions and secondary documents, mainly from donor evaluation. A benchmarking exercise is also undertaken, to better assess case project outcome in terms of capacity building, institutional upgrading and economic and financial viability.

II. The Debi-Tiguet project (DIP) case

The DIP is located in the left hand side of Senegal river, at 45 km upstream. The rack is in the middle of the delta, covering an area of 500 square km. It benefits from favorable conditions regarding geography, soil quality and water availability, as compared to other racks in the delta. Two villages are involved, the Debi village and the Tiguet village, with a total population of 1622 inhabitants. DIP is entirely funded by Japan with a total budget of yen 1 596. DIP is a project for the rehabilitation of the Debi rack. The main objectives are as follows:

Increase in food self sufficiency ; Encouragement of an autonomous management of agricultural exploitations by

peasants themselves ; Improvement of hydro agricultural infrastructure in the two villages; Increase in productivity in the region, and producer income by introducing double

harvesting in the year ; Investments consist also of building a warehouse, availing tractors and trucks, and rehabilitation of the road linking the two villages. The project has also a technical assistance component, which consists of training SAED’s agents for the mastery of accounting systems adapted to this kind of projects. But also, peasants received training to have the capability of implementing techniques of double culture, and to prepare necessary document for bank loan application. The Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) was set up in 1965 to manage the irrigation perimeter of the region. This organization comprises 5 divisions and 4 delegations. DIP is under the jurisdiction BEC (Bureau d’Etudes et de Contrôle) and the Dagana delegation.

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Figure 1: Geographic location of DIP

Légende

Les parcellaires ; superficie par section villageoise 

Water terminal

Main pumping station

PartitionnerWet areas Other water source

GIE « DEBI II » ______88,44 ha Other villagers sections

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II.1. Irrigation in the valley of Senegal river

The role of agriculture is overwhelming in Senegal. More that 70% of total labor force works directly in this sector. Most of agricultural activities are heavily dependant on rainfall; while the country has direct access to two major Rivers: the Senegal river and the Gambian river. Irrigated agriculture is particularly encouraged to increase domestic food supply and to foster exports. The principal zones of irrigation are the main coast (from Dakar to Saint-Louis), the southern part of the country, and the valley of Senegal river, using notably water resources from the dams of Diama and Manantali.

II.1.1. Characteristics of irrigation in the valley of Senegal river

The valley is populated by around 3.5 millions of people, which makes up about 35% of the Senegalese population, out of which 85% live close to a basin. The economic potentialities of the valley have been recognized since the colonial era. They encompass fishing, livestock, and overwhelmingly, irrigation for agricultural purpose. The first trials on irrigation date back to year 1940, before independence in Richard Toll. But it’s only in 1965, after independence, that the government owned SAED (Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal) was set up to take in charge irrigation in the valley and to encourage food production (mainly rice cultivation) in this area. It started with managing a cultivable area of 650 hectars of land. Throughout the seventies, several irrigated areas were developped to contribute fighting drought. When the buildings of the dams in Manantali and Diama were done, agriculture using irrigation was fuelled. Nowadays, this kind of activity is the main activity in the region. Several donors are supporting it and technology is growing very fast in this area, as well as the use of high quality seeds. The array of production has also become larger, involving rice, onions, potatoes, sweet potatoes, and tomato. Approximately, 100,000 hectares of land are now being cultivated, out of which 60,000 in the rainy season and 20,000 in the dry season.

The potential for irrigation is very large in the valley, due to the very high diversity of water resources as well as high quantity stored and usable water resources. 500,000 hectars of land are potentially irrigable, and only 60,000 are now actually irrigated, which makes up only 1.6% of cultivable land, or 2.8% of cultivated land. Agriculture in the valley consists mainly of rice and vegetable. Irrigation in the area uses mainly surface water, and underground water contributes only for 10%. The techniques used are very diverse and include:

The traditional system using a watering cans ; The improved traditional system : portions of land are watered through flexible drains

plugged into the watering terminal;

The gravity system using submersion;

The gravity system using land parting ;

The sprinkling system of irrigation, which is more and more prevalent now in the valley, and which is less water consuming.

II.1.2. Development policies and programs in the valley

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It is now widely acknowledged by Senegalese authorities as well as the community of donors caring about agricultural development in Senegal, that irrigation can dramatically mitigate the very severe crisis of agriculture in Senegal. In effect, the agricultural sector is hampered by several constraints among which the following can be singled out1 :

Levels of investments are very low, hence the level of mechanization is very low, leading to very low yields ;

Rainfall follows a downward trend due to the process of desertification in the Sahel region ;

Soil degradation, water salinity, parasites attacks are additional factors coming into play;

Furthermore, the government withdrawal from this sector since the beginning of the nineties has dramatically reduced fertilizer and phytosanitary product use, besides further diminishing the mechanization of agriculture.

These constraints have very much contributed to lower the level of productivity and income in rural areas. In order to mitigate their effects, several donors have encouraged the development of irrigated productive processes in the valley. Among those, the most visible are: France, The World Bank, and Japan. Table 1 gives us some major donor projects and programs in the valley. It shows that this kind of activity is one of the most assisted in the country.

1 For a deeper analysis of the constrains on agriculture in Senegal, see Mbaye (2005).

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Table 1: Donor funded projects on irrigation in the Valley: 1990-2005 (CFA millions)

Source: SAED 2005.

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II.1.3. Rice cultivation in the valley of the Senegal river

Agricultural opportunities in the valley are very high, due to soil fertility and water availability. Several commodities are developed in this area, notably: maize, sorghum, industrial tomato, onions, sweet potatoes, groundnut, cotton, and rice. But rice cultivation is overwhelmingly the most prevalent activity in the valley. Apart from the valley, rice is also cultivated in the southern part of the country, in Casamance, which the rainiest region in the country. Also rice cultivation, using irrigation is done in Kolda; but nowhere in the country are the levels of yields and output comparable to what is observed the valley. It is the area for rice cultivation in Senegal. Rice is the basis of nutrition in Senegal and domestic production only covers less than 20% of total needs. The remainder is imported, mainly from Asia (see table 2). Table 2: Uses and resources on rice in Senegal (1995-2002)

Years 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Populations (adult equivalent)6483645 6658703 838488 7023128 7212752 7407496 7607499 7812901

Average consumption/year/capita (kg)

60 62 63 65 67 69 70 72

Total demand in rice (metric tons)

389019 410309 432765 456450 481431 507779 535569 564881

Total rice production (metric tons) 100750 96850 113100 141700 138450 124103 137124 158013

Imports (metric tons) 435500 627200 452000 535300 658070 501657 632253 709575Food assistance in rice (metric tons)

6765 4904 8238 1997 8993 6000 6000 6000

Total supply of rice (metric tons) 543015 728954 573338 678997 805513 631760 775377 873588Inventory (metric tons) 153996 318645 140573 222547 324082 123981 239808 308703

Source : SAED 2003

The major constraint for rice cultivation in Senegal is the level of certified seed utilization. Most of seeds used come from the preceding year crops. Thus they are cheaper, but also less effective than the certified ones. But thanks to donors intervention in the valley, the use of certified seeds is increasing very fast, rising for example from 634 metric tons in 1994 to 2250 metric tons in 2000, and yields have followed a similar trend. But the major challenge now is how to make domestic rice production competitive as compared to asian rice which is much cheaper even in local markets.

II.2. Institutional and Impact Analysis of DIP

These two projects have had important impacts on beneficiaries income. The connexion of neighboring villages to national electricity network has dramatically improved living standards in those villages. While irrigation allows for double harvest and increase level of yield and income in these regions, as well as on production diversification.

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II.2.1. Institutional and capacity building impact of the project

The villages Debi and Tiguet used to be fishing villages. Economic activities used to be rudimentary and apart from fishing, consisted of gathering and food oriented agriculture. The Djoudj basin was the first irrigation trial in this area, in 1964. It covered a surface of 80ha and doubled to 160 ha in 1966. Kuwait funded land management in these villages in 1980. A surface of 737 ha was covered under this program. The Japanese funding of the project started in 1996, but the rehabilitation of the rack started in 1992. The surface of managed land is 982 ha. Other surrounding areas are also favourable for irrigation. It is estimated that 1700 ha of irrigable land is available there for private operations. The major impression we got throughout our interview with the beneficiaries is that it dramatically improved living standards in the two villages. More importantly, it improved domestic capabilities in managing human organizations. Before the project implementation, the organizational patterns in both villages as well as surrounding ones was in under cooperatives and villages sections of such cooperatives. The management unit of the project consists of a Union2 of the producer organizations (PO) of 28 people, chosen on a parity basis, 14 from each village. The organizational char of the managing structure is as follows.

- The PO, whose presidents are automatically members of the board;- The General assembly which is composed of all the people living in the two villages,

organized in PO. It has meetings twice a year: at the beginning and at the end of the production cycle. The general assembly appoints the members of the board;

- The board consists of 26 people, chosen on a parity basis, 23 from each village. The board meets once a month to evaluate past activities and follow up on current projects. The board is directly responsible to the general assembly. The board is responsible for land distribution inside the community and is structured by commissions ;

- The board appoints the members of the managing unit of the project. The unit consists of 6 members chosen on a parity basis, 3 from each village. This managing unit meets once every 15 days and is managing the project locally. It is appointed for a 3 years lasting term.

2 The official name is :  « Union des exploitants de Débi ».

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Figure 2: Institutional setting of Debi-Tiguet Managing Unit

The various departments (commissions) of the board are managed each by a head and his second. The existing commissions are as follows :

- The commission in charge of collecting income and engaging expenses,- The commission in charge of land management,- The commission in charge of operation (seed and fertilizer distribution),- The commission in charge of equipment (tractor and truck) management;- The commission in charge of the management of rice broking machines,- The commission in charge of equipment parts management

Each commission presents a report of its activity in each meeting. Each PO is allotted a given parcel of land, assesses its needs and prepares an application for loan to CNCAS3. SAED evaluate the technical and financial feasibility of the application before giving its clearance to CNCAS for the loan to be approved. The SAED monitors loan disbursements with the POs. The loan application is personal, putting in touch each producer and CNCAS, even though the process is collective. At this stage, it is worth noting is what the POs are receiving is not cash, but instead vouchers that can be traded into seeds, fertilizes or whatever input they may need in the production process. Before granting loans, the bank asks for a deposit amounting to the fourth of the financial needs. So each PO has a deposit at the bank. The harvests are centralized to the board and each deposit is certified by a title. The board (through its commission in charge) shell the rice, sells the output, and engage the repayment to the bank according to the share of each producer and return the balance to the POs.

3 Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal. CNCAS is the bank that was set up by Senegalese authorities to fund agricultural activities. It grants loans on u subsidized basis. The rate it applies is 7.5%, while it can be double in commercial bank. The major problem this bank faces is the level of loans recovery which is very low if the take the country average. For the Debi-Tiguet project it is as high as at least 95%.

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Figure 3: Interactions in service rendering inside the Union

The services charged by the Union to producers are the following:- Irrigated water: the costs are CFA 62500 per ha,- Agricultural techniques management: CFA 19000 per ha;- Certified seeds: CFA 250 per kg ;- The trucks, 4 of 5 metric tons useful load, and 1 of 10 metric tons useful loads, are

rented to the POs. The costs charged are CFA 25000 per day; but exceptional discounts are granted for some particular activities. For example the price charged to the shelling machine is CFA 10000, and CFA 5000 for operational activities. Regarding the truck of 10 ton metric load, it is affected to fertilizer, seeds, and crops delivery, and the costs charged for these services are only CFA 5000 per day. The trucks can be rented by people outside the Union for private use. In such case, the commission in charge of its management determine on a discretionary basis, the amount to be charged;

- Rice shelling is charged at CFA 13 per kg.

All these services are also available for private operators who grow rice in the surroundings of Debi-Tiguet, but at a higher price than what the POs pay. Each commission determines its margin by comparing proceeds to costs. In recent years, costs have tended to outpace proceeds, because service fees have not been increased for 10 years except for tractor location which fees increased by CFA 1500, while the fee charged for water dropped by 5000 at the same time, and costs of shelling decreased by 1 per kg also The proceeds are used by the Union in the following ways:

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- 44% for the management of the pumping station: gasoline for draining and irrigation stations, equipments parts, maintenance (this service is performed by SAED and is charged to the Union), etc.,

- 15% of total proceeds are deposited at the bank in a savings account, in order to meet unexpected risks; but for now about ten years such risks have not yet occurred. Which brings the current amount of the deposit to CFA 147 millions.

Figure 4: Interaction in seeds production and distribution inside the Union

The cooperation with research institute is also deemed satisfactory. ISRA4 is producing our pre basic quality seeds and sells them to the Union at the price of CFA 720. Then, the Union chooses the best peasants, those who have demonstrated capabilities in respecting the technical itinerary drawn by research to duplicate them. This process results in basic quality seeds which charged at CFA 175 per kg by producing peasants to the Union. In return, The Union sells those at the price of CFA 350 after bearing the costs of wrapping, sorting out, transportation, etc.) to POs. The margin the Union is realizing out this activity is estimated at only CFA 20. The final stage is that POs further duplicate these seeds to levels R1 and R2, and distribute them to peasants for production.

4 Institut Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole

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II.2.2. Why is Debi Tiguet Union more effective than similar Unions in the Valley?

According to SAED technicians as well as community members, the main reason for the effectiveness union, lies in the type of organization that was put in place and which ensures a total ownership of the organization, dealing at the same time with land management, seed and fertilizers distribution, technology extension, loan application and reimbursement, and most of all, harvest commercialization. This latter is of utmost importance. In many neighboring villages, the producers deal with crops trading by themselves, while they don’t have neither the financial capabilities, nor the skills to properly do it. Hence they are at the mercy of intermediaries who take the spread between sale price and purchasing price, which is put at its highest. Here, all POs centralize their harvest to the board which divides it into three components: one for producer self consumption, one for loan repayment and one for sale.

Another factor for success is the level of available technology, understood both by methods of production and availability of equipment. SAED makes sure the best productive itinerary is used by peasants. As regards equipments, they are provided by JICA, mainly tractors, shelling machines, and trucks. According to many expert opinions, the level of yields in rice is among the highest in the world. Average yield is 5.8 metric tons per ha, with picks reaching 9 metric tons. The availability of tractors throughout the year is critical. In effect, CNCAS’s credit committee meets at around June; so loans are only available in July. Peasants from other unions are obliged to wait until these loans are in place to start the production process, while those from Debi-Tiguet start the field work as soon as in May. And at that time, they do not need to pay for tractor service fees. Such payment is differed until the loans are available to peasant. Thus, the production cycle and the technical itinerary are fully respected, and this ensures the higher yields referred to.

POs, accompanied by SAED technicians organize rack towers throughout the production cycle: one 15 days after sowing, another one 30 days after sowing and a last one 60 days after sowing. These are intended to evaluate the potential of each field, to identify the major problems it faces, and to accompany the owner with solution. Whenever they realize the existence of very severe deficiencies that could hamper the quality of harvest and hence the solvency of the owner, they stop all loan processes to this peasant.

The idea of the project emerged from SAED, which developed it in partnership with JICA. JICA’s principle is to work with governments, and SAED was the governmental body which served as an interlocutor to JICA for this project. The role of SAED is also critical. It monitors the production cycle, and loan processes alongside with the Union, and oversees the overall financial management of the unit. Since 2004, it has put in place managing centers of rural organizations called CGER5. These centers prepare financial statements for each peasant organization and send a copy to SAED; they review the accounts and make relevant recommendations about management to the organization. SAED reserves the rights to order additional audits if necessary. Besides, SAED appoints a permanent representative to the Union with the title of Conseiller agricole6and who is a agronomic technician. He attends all board meeting as an observer. Throughout the production cycle, he avails himself to POs for technical advices. He is permanently based in Debi-Tiguet. He starts planning for the next agricultural campaign which usually takes place in June, as soon in April, follows up tractor maintenance, assesses financial and technical needs from OPs and help them prepare loan

5 Centre de Gestion des Economies Rurales ;6 Agricultural advisor.

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application to CNCAS, finally, he double check conformity of deliveries to orders. On the technical side, he verifies that water drainage and spreading are done on time. He follows each peasant individually and provides advice on an individual and collective basis.

Training is also an important factor of success. When the Union was set up in 1996, each commissioner and deputy commissioner was ranted a training on his field of interest. Also, the peasants were trained on how to manage a rack. This training was provided by a body called ATOP7 which depends on SAED. Literacy activities were also taken in charge. Until now, at the beginning of each agricultural campaign, training on technical itinerary is organized for peasants. For more advanced training modules, SAED invites the management of the union, who when they return replicate the training received to the remainder of the group. Furthermore, the management of the Union organizers trips abroad to expose themselves to other technical experience in rice cultivation. Also, as part of the project, SAED technicians are sometimes invited to Japan for training.

JICA is directly dealing with the government via SAED and not with the POs. It uses only two funding instruments in Senegal: technical cooperation and financial cooperation. The funding of Debi-Tiguet falls under technical cooperation. Under this scheme, Japanese technicians are sent to ministries and Senegalese civil servants or technicians are sent to Japan for capacity building, and equipments are provided. Regarding financial cooperation, it is project based. The Japanese and the Senegalese government agree on the sector and the projects to be supported, and JICA intervenes accordingly. The disbursement rate of JICA is 100% since they do not give money to recipient government. They can install equipments, build classrooms, or roads, but none of these is directly managed by recipient government. The major areas of concentration of Japanese cooperation in Senegal are health, education, hydraulics, and support to productive initiative mainly in agriculture and fishing.

II.3.Benchmarking DIP institutional design

II.3.1. The methodology and its main limitations

This benchmarking exercise is to compare the accomplishments of the DIP in terms of institutional design and capacity building with some reference projects. The projects that are chosen for this purpose are: the Ndombo Thiago and the Thiagar projects. We will compare the accomplishments of DIP to those of the reference projects to determine how good are its relative performances as compared to average projects of the same nature. The exercise is likely to yield robust outcome if is proven that the reference project are not outliers from the average projects. To address this issue, we made sure, in selecting reference projects those who have more or les the same level of success than DIP. Another prospective problem is that projects are implemented in different period of time. This can influence technology based indicators such as yield and quality of seeds. But This is tempered by the fact that technology does not experience huge increase in short period of time; thus it is realistic to assume that variations in technological skills and quality of equipment are not very significant. The following are the criteria we used in the selection process of reference projects:

- The reference projects are in the same sector as DIP, all two are irrigation project in the delta of Senegal river,

7 Appui Technique aux Organisations paysannes.

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- They are financed by different donors8, the Ndombo-Thiago (1981-1986) perimeter is funded by French cooperation, while the Thiagar irrigation project (1987 – 1992) is funded by the World Bank

- They are comparable in scale to the DIP; 590 ha of land management for Ndombo-Thiago, 1270 ha for Thiagar, against 982 ha for DIP

- Information on institutional set-up and mode of implementation for both are available from secondary sources. Some basic information on institutional and developmental impacts are also available.

II.3.2. A brief description of reference projects

Ndombo and Thiago are located in the Delta of the river, south of Richard Toll. In 1981, SAED implemented 12 autonomous perimeters, divided in the subsets of 6 each, and fed in water by a pump of 45 horsepower. The total cultivable surface was 590 ha. Each perimeter was designed to cultivate rice and tomato. The Thiagar perimeter is located close to Rosso Senegal and the Senegal River. It was first managed in 1976 and rehabilitated in 1986/87. The rehabilitation concerned the management of irrigation network, the strengthening of pumping stations, and the repair of production tracks. This project was part of a bigger program which was intended to rehabilitate 7000 ha of land in the delta and to transfer them to POs.

The implementation of Ndombo-Thiago project dramatically increased the level of production and yield of beneficiary peasants. Tomato production increased from 17 metric tons in 1982 to 88 metric tons in 1990, even though it decreased in the following years. If look at rice, production rised from 174.35 in 1982 metric tons to 462 in 1989, and production diminished in subsequent years, too. Regarding yields, it increased from 3.96 in 1982 tons per ha to 5.82 in 1989 for rice in Ndombo, and 18.5 to 51 for tomato. In Thiago, the corresponding figures are 5.16 to 6.58 for rice and 17.10 to 159 for tomato. If we now turn to Thiagar, yields increased from 2.5 metric tons per ha in 1981/82 to 4.7 in 1990/91. None of these projects has a transformation component (rice breaking machines) or transportation equipments, like in DIP.

II.3.3. The results of the analysis

It is assumed that all these indicators have the same weights, thus reflecting that they are all equally important. We combine here a few quantitative indicators (the first five indicators) and many other qualitative indicators (the remainder). For each of these indicators the three projects are ranked by order of performance. That is the project that performs better for this given indicator is assigned the score 2, the following, the score 1, and the last the score 0. We then sum up all the scores to give an overall ranking of the three projects according to these criteria. Below, we give some insight on the rationale of each criterion (see table 3).

8 JICA is now funding a project in Thiago. But for the period under consideration, it was not the case.9 These figures which are published by SAED are a lot above the ones obtained by Le Gal 1991, from his surveys in the Delta.

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Table 3: Benchmarking DIP against reference projects

In order to implement this benchmarking methodology, we used the evaluation missions prepared by CCCE10 on the Ndombo- Thiago and Thiagar projects, and documents from DIP were collected from various sources: JICA, Debi Tiguet Union of producers, SAED, Ministry of agriculture, and other sources. So data for DIP are much more diversified and reliable than data form reference projects. Besides, the do allow for double checking due to sources multiplicity which is not the case for reference projects. This can dramatically entail the 10 Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique, which became Agence Française de Développement.

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benchmarking outcome for some indicators (indicators related to yields and production)11, for the other indicators, they seem quite reliable. We have skipped indicators referring to poverty incidence and severity since statistics on poverty incidence or severities which are available cannot be disaggregated for these villages. All these villages are likely to have the same basics poverty indicators, hence they cannot be discriminated according to it.

Under the expressed reservations about data reliability, DIP is performing less than the reference project as regards output level and growth and yield level and growth. That is why it has lesser scores for these indicators than reference projects. If now we turn to output diversification, we can see that reference project target at least to types of products (rice and tomato) while DIP is only about rice cultivation. So reference projects are scored higher for this indicator, too. Apart from that, DIP has much higher scores for all other indicators, except for producer involvement in the project design, for which all the projects are scored 0. In effect, evaluation for reference projects (CCCE, 1992) show that populations were not at all involved in the phase of Ndombo Thiago and Thiagar perimeter rehabilitation projects. While for DIP, the main interlocutor for JICA was the Senegalese government through SAED, even though it was assumed that peasants were strongly involved in project identification and design phases, the Pos we met with, during the field mission said they were not enough involved in these phases of the projects. Also, if we look at training, both for SAED and producers, it seemed to be appropriately taken into account, for reference projects and for DIP. That is why all three projects are equally scored for related indicators.

Indicators related to loan are a case in point, to illustrate DIP highest performances for the majority of indicators. The level of bank loan recovery is higher for DIP (more than 95%) than in reference projects. Evaluation documents indicate that loan recovery rate tended to turn lower and lower as we move forward on time for these projects. In the meantime, in DIP, a very strong organization involving SAED, the Union, and the CNCAS ensures a very high and stable rate of loan recovery. Also in DIP, we have a very deed involvement of the whole community in loan application process, even if each producer is the only responsible of his (her) own loan. This type of organization is not observed in reference projects. That is why both are scored 0 for this indicator, while DIP is scored the maximum for this indicator. The level of savings for DIP has achieved CFA 147 millions, while for most POs groups in references projects, working capital has totally faded away.

DIP also performs better for indicators related to equipment availability. For reference projects12, investments consist mainly of irrigation and drainage equipments, threshing machines, plough while for DIP, besides those, we have also tractors and trucks. These are very important in explaining DIP impressive accomplishments. DIP is thus better scored for these indicators, while reference projects are scored 0 for them. Equipment management and maintenance are better dealt with in DIP than in reference projects. The evaluation reports for the latter show a very weak peasant organization in assuring such important task. In DIP, producers have set up a very strong mechanism of equipment maintenance, and fees are levied for services rendered by such equipments, and which are intended to purchase parts when needed. Regarding irrigation and drainage equipments, the maintenance is directly done by SAED, which is contracted by peasants to perform the job when needed. Nothing like that is observed in reference projects.11 For example, Le Gal (1991) indicated reported levels of yields much lower in the order of 3.53 metric tons per ha than what is found in some evaluation documents. So indicators related to yields and production should be used with caution.12 It is worth noting that the situation dramatically changed in Thiago when the JICA availed new tractors to Thiago’s POs.

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If we now turn to overall organizational setting and its sustainability, it is the biggest accomplishments of DIP as compared to reference projects. As shown in preceding sections, the organizational setting of DIP is much stronger than in reference projects. The pattern of irrigation in Ndombo-Thiago is very much scattered: we have two main cooperatives, one for each village, and 6 POs per village. If we look at Thiagar, most POs that were constituted within the project eventually broke up. Financial statements from Thiagar were deemed unreliable. The head of the POs were deemed very authoritarian and tended to decide for the others. With these institutional weaknesses, Ndombo- Thiago started having problems at the end of the project as it appears in rice harvest, which dropped from 462 metric tons at the end of the project (1989) to only 70 metric tons the following year. In contract, for DIP, POs have taken over the management of the whole process and the managing unit is functioning autonomously with the support of SAED; and the donor has never been involved in the management of the project. So for this indicator, the DIP is scored higher than reference projects.

The overall assessment of project performance shows that DIP is scored 26 against 19 for Thiagar and 13 for Ndombo Thiago. Out of 18 indicators, DIP has higher scores for 10, similar scores for 3, and lesser scores for 5.

II.3.4. The role of donor in project outcome

In the outcome of DIP project it is very hard to single out the contribution of the Japanese donor, since Japanese funding came to consolidate previous initiatives in this area. In effect, for very long time, the valley of Senegal river has benefited from various supports from donor, designed for land management, technical assistance and capacity building, for SAED and for producers. The PSAOP (programme des services agricoles et organisations des producteurs) implemented by the World Bank is worth mentioning. This program emphasizes producers organisations in the way that is observed in Debi, in line with government withdrawal from agricultural activities in Senegal. Therefore, the accomplishment observed in Debit is a result of consolidated efforts from donors, the government and the POs, with the support of several financing schemes.

III.Regional Hydropower Development Project (RHDP)

III.1.OMVS and the management of Senegal river

Senegal river is 1800 km long and is fed by three main tributaries: Bafing, Bakoye and Falémé, all of which have their sources in Fouta Djalon (Guinea). The river crosses out Mali and stands now as the border between Senegal and Mauritania. The first studies for Senegal river management were completed in 1861 by colonial authorities. In 1934, they created the ‘Mission d’aménagement du fleuve’ which coordinated all the studies and experiments on the river, for the purpose of navigation, energy production, and irrigation. It was mostly interested in cotton production in the valley. And immediately after independence, the 4 newly independent countries (Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania), took over the project and sought ways to manage the river. In 1964, they first created OERS (Organisation des Etats Riverains du Sénégal) which had broader integration objectives. But due to political tensions

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between Senegal and Guinea13, OERS was stuck; and in 1972, it was officially dissolved and OMVS was created, with a less ambitious integration agenda. OMVS’s mandate is only limited to cooperation to manage the river resources (irrigation, hydroelectricity, and navigability) and ruled out other aspects of integration. The work to build the Manantali and Diama dams started in 1981. Manantali is designed for electricity production and irrigation, while Diama is intended to prevent water salinity stemming from Atlantic ocean flow back14

to Senegal river, and thus to avoid deterioration of the quality of land initially intended to agriculture. So the building of Diama dam allows for continued agricultural activities on 375 000 ha, out of which, 240 000 are located in Senegal. Regarding Mananatali, the installed capacity for hydroelectricity production is 200 MW, distributed according to the following quotas: 52% to Mali, 33% to Senegal, and the remainder to Mauritania. The potential production of the central is 807 GWH if we consider the hydrological situation for the period 1950 – 1994, while it is only 560 GWH if we consider the period 1972 – 1994.

Figure 5: Three countries and One River

Source : SOGEM (2007), présentation du réseau interconnecté de Manantali, Séminaire d’Information sur le projet d’Achat de Crédits de Réduction d’Emission de Gaz à effet de Serre, 03-05 Octobre 2007

13 Guinea said no to De Gaulle who launched the idea of setting up a community of France and his former colonies. This opened up the doors for independence in francophone Africa. Senghor, the Former Senegalese president was considered by progressive African leaders as the man of France.14 This flow back can affect up to 240 km of land.

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Figure 6 : Manantali Energy Project

Source : SOGEM (2007), présentation du réseau interconnecté de Manantali, Séminaire d’Information sur le projet d’Achat de Crédits de Réduction d’Emission de Gaz à effet de Serre, 03-05 Octobre 2007

Nouakchott

Premiers kWhle 15 novembre 2002

Mise sous tensionle 9 juin 2001

Manantali

Premiers kWhle 7 octobre 2001

Bamako

Premiers kWhle 19 juillet 2002Dakar

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The total costs of the two dams are E 737 millions, out of which E 145 millions for Diama, and the remainder E592, for Manantali. The French funded one third of Diama project but only 0.7% of the costs of Manantali dam. The dam in Manantali was built during the period 1982 – 1987, on Bafing tributary, at 1000 km away from the river mouth. It is a storage basin of 11 billions of impounded water, allowing for river flow stabilization at 300 cubic meters per second in Bakel. The central is different from the dam, it comprises 5 generators of a capacity of 40MWH each, which makes up the total capacity of 200MWH. The investments also include 1300 km of high voltage power for energy distribution to the three capitals. The funding of the central is broken down as follows:

Table 4: Project Financing Shares

The organization chart of OMVS is as follows: the conference of the heads of states is on the top of the organization and meets once a year. Strategic decisions about the organization are taken at this level. Then we have the council of ministers that meets twice a year and represents the first level of operationalization of the decisions of the heads of states. The following level is the High Commissioner of OMVS headquartered in Dakar, followed by operational bodies like SOGEM and SOGED. The main difference between SOGEM and SOGED, is that the former has hired a operational agent for the need of running Manantali energy, while nothing like that is observed with SOGED. OMVS has declared Senegal river international and belonging to all 4 member states; so do all equipments and dams built on the river. Several conventions were signed by governments and ratified by parliaments, to organize the legal settings of OMVS. The HC has to overlook all activities that are performed in OMVS, and to make sure they are consistent with the overall general objectives laid out by member governments, including of course electricity and irrigation, but also issues related to health, environment, and community development. An important program that is being developed aside SOGEM and SOGED is the GEEP (Gestion de l’eau et de l’environnement sur la basin du fleuve Sénégal). The HC is also developing micro projects at community level and is now working on the buiding of the road Diama - Rosso.

Doner/Lender % Share AFD 22%KFW 14%

FADES 10%UE 9%BEI 9%IDA 9%FAD 8%BID 6%

ACDI 6%BOAD 5%

SOTELMA 1%MAURITEL 1%

Interest 2%Total 100%

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III.2.Institutional linkages between OMVS, SOGEM and ESKOM

Before 1997, all OMVS activities were managed from Dakar, including water management at Diama and Hydroelectricity at Manantali. This was highly inefficient and entailed huge transaction costs, since we needed a clearance from Dakar for every routinely administrative decision. That is why donors, notably the World Bank, pushed for the creation of autonomous bodies in charge of managing the two dams: the Manantali dam and the Diama dam. OMVS council of ministers still plays a central role in the day to day operation of SOGEM. For example, it is impossible for SOGEM to set the price for electricity on its own without submitting it to the Council Minister (CM) for approval. Both the conference of the heads of states (CHS) and the CM are chaired by rotation, allowing member countries to run them alternately.

While for Manantali, resources generated by the project can meet costs incurred, for Diama, this is not the case. The only revenue SOGED can collect is on water use by farmers doing irrigated agriculture. Not only the costs of water use is subsidized below its real value, but also few of the beneficiaries are settling their bills. The biggest clients like national water distribution companies and big farmers do pay, but most users mainly small producers do not pay. So SOGED is subsidized by member states. In recent years, OMVS governments just asked SOGEM to refund the advance payments they made to this entity when it was just getting started, in order to use the money for SOGED. So SOGEM has recently given SOGED up to CFA 2 billions, which corresponds partly to this reimbursement and also advances SOGEM is giving SOGED. Furthermore, member states have asked SOGEM to assist as much as possible SOGED mainly by providing resources to meet maintenance needs in SOGED areas.

Figure 7: Institutional schema of Energy Project

Mali Mauritania Senegal

EDM-SA SENELECSOMELEC

ESKOM

OMVS

SOGEM

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SOGEM (Société de Gestion de l’Energie de Manantali) was created in 1997, and implemented in 1998. SOGEM’s mandate is only to deal with Hydroelectricity management in Manantali following the building of the dam which took place from 1982 to 1988. From 1988 to the implementation of SODEG in 1997, the management of Manantali was done by a provisional entity (Société Provisoire de Gestion du Barrage – SPGB). SOGEM was created in par with SOGED which is in charge of the management of the Diama dam. Manantali has an installed capacity of 200 MWh, which is distributed to member countries using a system of quotas. Before the implementation of the central, the objective of Manantali was only limited to irrigation

SOGEM is piloted by a general director based in Bamako (Mali). He was primarily meant to be based in Manantali (a village located at 325 kms far from the capital Bamako). But OMVS eventually decided that these companies needed to be headquartered in the capital cities to be closer to national administrations as well as donors’ headquarters in individual countries. Hence, the overall management of SOGEM is based at Bamako (the general director and the three sectoral directors, namely the director of finance, the director of administrative affairs, and the technical director), while the fields technicians are based in Manantali. The role of these field technicians is to monitor the functioning of the dam and the central, as well as to supervise the job done by the operating agent that was appointed by SOGEM (ESKOM).

ESKOM stands for Electricity Supply Commission. It is a public company that is owned 100% by the Government of South Africa, even though, it is autonomously managed. It has owned other privatized companies in neighboring countries, such as in Zambia, in Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe, etc. ESKOM Enterprises is the parent company and was set up in 1923. It was strongly restructured in 1999. It is a multinational that entirely covers South African demand in electricity as well as some neighboring countries’. ESKOM SA is a Company created according to Malian law; in which ESKOM international has 100% of total shares.

Donors accepted the arrangement consisting of leaving SOGEM headquarter in Bamako, instead of Manantali, as previously planned, in exchange of OMVS willingness to confide the operation of the facility to a private company. That is how ESKOM, was chosen, out of an international bidding process. ESKOM submits on a yearly basis a comprehensive program including hydraulics, electricity, irrigation and food production. It discusses it first with SOGEM representatives on the fields, who in turn, go to defend it to SOGEM headquarter in Bamako. Once it is approved, it becomes mandatory for both sides. Regarding electricity production, which is the main activity of ESKOM, an annual production curve is designed every year by ESKOM, and once it is approved by SOGEM, it becomes the program of the following year. In this program, it is stated how much electricity is produced every day and how it is distributed between the three national companies which are the only clients of SOGEM, namely SENELEC (Senegal), EDM (Mali), and SOMELEC (Mauritania). At the beginning of each year (in fact, this is done in October of the previous year) , these three companies express their needs as to what amount of electricity they will need to purchase for the coming year, as well as their needs in water irrigation. SOGEM matches all these and decide about the distribution of water and electricity among the three member countries. In practice, things are not that simple, since national companies, depending on the day to day demand for electricity, can ask for more than what was initially predicted for them, or take

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less. This creates serious management problem for SOGEM. To mitigate the effects of such demand reversals, SOGEM initiates meetings with national companies, every Friday to decide about output distribution on the following week, on a take-it-or-pay-it-basis. Normally energy distribution between national companies should not pose many problems since national picks in demand vary from one country to another. It is October-November for Senegal, March-April for Mali and July-August for Mauritania. Hence SOGEM can allocate energy production to national companies, according to swings in demand at national level.

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Technical department

Figure 8: organigramm of SOGEM

General director

Administration and legal department

External Expertise

Financial department

External Expertise

External Expertise

Juridique

Hydrology and Manantali

Representative

Limnology

Civil work and environment

Electr. et Telecom

Adm

Procurement and logistics

Accounting Debt management

Personal Management

AdmAdmn

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ESKOM’s responsibility is to assure maintenance of all equipments including parts replacement. Currently, an issue is being raised between ESKOM and SOGEM, about the implementation of the terms of the contracts. ESKOM representatives think that the amount the company is being paid is underestimated under the current hydrological and operational conditions of the central. So they are not in a good position to correctly undertake the maintenance activities as initially planned. This is confirmed by SOGEM. The two entities are now under deep discussions to settle this issue. Yet, the lump sum payment SOGEM is giving to ESKOM was determined through a series of negotiations between the two institutions. And, as earlier mentioned, ESKOM was selected through an international bidding process under the supervision of a consultant AFD (which was appointed by the other donors as leader for Manantali energy) hired for SOGEM. This consultant actively participated in the tendering process which eventually resulted in the choice of ESKOM.

III.3. The RHDP: a further description

The RHDP is located at the bottom of the dam, at 78 meters away from the dam axis. The dam is located in the south western part of Mali, on Bafing tributary. The civil work for RHDP has started in 1997, 9 years after the dam building was completed. The components of the core work are described as follows:

- The central part of the work, including lot 3 (civil work), plus lot 4 (turbines and mechanical equipments) and lot 5 (alternators and electric equipments).

- The Eastern system for power transmission - The Western system of power transmission.

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Figure 9: Manantali dam: an aerial view

Source : SOGEM (2007), présentation du réseau interconnecté de Manantali, Séminaire d’Information sur le projet d’Achat de Crédits de Réduction d’Emission de Gaz à effet de Serre, 03-05 Octobre 2007

The most complicated part was lot 3, which donors included: IDA, BOAD, and IDB. Engineering surveillance and control were performed by COFITEC (which is a consortium including Coyne & Bélier, Fichtner, and Tecsult) and were financed by CIDA, KFW, and AFD). Lot 3 encompassed the following:

- Realizing building in concrete, and assembling necessary equipments for central operation,

- Restoring the hydraulic damper ,- Re-injection of part of the dam and also the central,- Providing general services to other working partners on the field, notably those

intervening in lot 4, lot 5, SOGEM, COFITEC, and other on site operators.

The RHDP was designed to build a power system from the dam, to distribute power to urban cities, notably, capital cities in Senegal, Mali and Mauritania. The reservoir of the dam is 11 300 m3. The total capacity of the equipment for power generation is 200MW, produced by 5 generators of 50 MW each. This makes up an average production of 807 GWh, under the assumption of 300m3 per second of water flow in the river. The project has 3 major components:

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1. An investment component that includes the construction of the central, the civil work that is intended to host the equipments, and a transportation system for the dispatching of high voltage power to the three capital cities. Power produced in Manantali is dispatched to the West (towards Dakar and Nouakchott) and to the East (Bamako).

2. A capacity building component, both for SOGEM and OMVS, to assist them hire a private operator, set appropriate rate for energy sales, ensure financial sustainability of operation, take account of environmental aspects, and technology transfer.

3. An environmental component, through PASIE (see below for further details).

The main objectives of the project, as laid out in the World Bank Implementation completion report involve:

a) a reduction in long term costs of electricity supply in the three countries,b) a contribution to service the debts that were contracted to fund the building of the

dam, at the beginning of the 80s,c) a contribution to increase the efficiency and the reliability of the power system in the

three countries,d) the promotion of a competitive private sector participation in project operation, and in

future generation project in the river basin, e) a support to agriculture downstream the river and a rational management of the

Manantali reservoir.

Table 4: The costs of project activities are broken down as follows:

Components Cost ($)- Power house and dam reinforcement- Western transmission line- Supervision- Institutional strengthening- Eastern transmission line- Dispatching centre

55 400 000137 700 00015 600 00037 800 00041 800 00017 200 000

III.4.RHDP: institutional spillovers

III.4.1.Technology transfer and capacity building

Technology used in the project is deemed of a very high quality; this is true in dam building as well as in central building. Optical fiber technology is used in the system of communication in place for monitoring power distribution between the three countries.

Capacity building was a very critical criterion in the process of selecting the international operator (ESKOM). SOGEM insisted that ESKOM works as much as possible with local expertise. Among ESKOM’s experts, only the General manager is an expatriate (South African), all the remainder is from local countries. The personnel come in 90% from national companies (SENELEC, EDM, and SOMELEC). Most of them had worked with private foreign firms during the phase of project construction. They so benefited from huge technological transfer from these expatriates, and have developed great capabilities in the area of the project. So they are able to ensure the maintenance operation autonomously, without any assistance from abroad. Regarding unskilled labor, ESKOM relies on local manpower in the locality of Manantali. Most of these personnel benefited from training programs and some

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of them even upgraded to become topographers or electricians. During the implementation phase of the project, local workers were initiated to central building and operation. Some of them were even sent abroad for additional training lasting up to 3 years. Until now, we are benefiting from technical assistance from expatriate mainly from South Africa, but it is still on a very timely basis; and more than 95% of the core business employees are from local countries.

Figure 10: OMVS member countries quotas in total Manantali energy production

OMVS member countries quotas in total Manantali energy production

The project also encompassed population displacement. The villagers who had lived on the project site before were asked to move to an neighboring settlement. They got compensated, and new houses were built freely for them. The technology used to build these houses are the same are the original ones, made up of banco, except that it got improved to make houses last longer. Hence while villagers needed to rebuild their houses every year, with this improved technology, they have not changed it since 1983. Other components of the projects involve treatment of the river so as to avoid exposing local population to blindness and other similar diseases. SOGEM has also built a well equipped hospital and two elementary schools, for his own personnel and also for local population. ESKOM is also organizing vaccination campaigns for the inhabitants of Manantali, very often to fight certain endemic diseases. Populations are also encouraged to set up community businesses in order to perform certain tasks for ESKOM and be paid, such as weeding and cleaning of the site. Four businesses of this kind have so far been set up, and income distributed to those by ESKOM is reaching CFA 60 millions per annum. Furthermore, local taxes are paid to local administration, for an amount of about CFA 6 millions per year.

III.4.2. Financial and economic sustainability

Various evaluations have been performed on economic and institutional sustainability of the Manantali energy project. All of them concluded on a very strong economic even though some weaknesses observed on the institutional sides could be fatal to the project continuation if not properly addressed on time.

Electricity that can be produced out of the dam could vary between 450 and 900 GWH, according to level of rainfall. The project was designed under the assumption of 807 MWH and the average level of river flow has allowed for this level of production. So variations of

ESKOM SA

MALI (EDM - SA)

15 % MAURITANIE (SOMELEC)

33 % SENEGAL (SENELEC)

52 %

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river flows are a major determinant of returns on investments. That is why in the phase of project design, donors insisted for the setting up of a fund called hydrological risk fund, which should be used to compensate years of poor rainfall. During the 80’, a feasibility study performed by Tractable compared two situations: a) implementing the Manantali energy component to satisfy energy needs for the three countries, and b) implementing instead a thermal central for the same purpose. The study concluded that the Manantali energy project would yield a rate of return of 22% for the regional interconnected network, against a rate of 17% for a network limited to Mali, for a level of river flow amounting to 804 GWH. In case such flow decreases to 540 GWH, these rates of return would decrease to 17% and 14.5%, respectively. It is worth mentioning that these estimates were done under the assumption that oil barrel would cost $20, while the cost is now close to $100. In case of observed deficit in rainfall, we will note a competition between energy production and agriculture.

The overall costs of the energy components of Manantali are E 345 millions, while the dam building costs E 590 millions. The costs of the energy component can be further broken down into the costs of equipments for electricity production and civil work (40%) , and the costs of building a huge network designed to convey electricity to capital cities (Dakar, Bamako, and Nouakchott), which make up 60% of the costs of energy component. Technology used in thermal centrals is different from the one used in hydroelectric centrals. The former entails cheaper investments and higher operational costs that the latter.

Manantali is also servicing the outstanding balance of the loans that served to fund the dam building; an activity that was funded by loan at 43.8%. The rates SOGEM is charging to national electricity companies are calculated in such way that all charges must be covered, under the assumption of a production of 804 GWH, including debt services ; and if average production drops to 546 GWH, at least first order charges must be covered by average sales. The rate we came up with at 1996 prices was CFA 24 per KWh for an average production of 804 GWh and CFA 29 in the latter case. The most pessimistic assumption sets the level of production at 430 GWh, which corresponds to level observed on average in the period 1978-1994, and the corresponding rate is CFA 32. Under this assumption, break down point would be achieved in 25 years.

In practice, energy sold by SOGEM was delivered to national electricity companies at a rate of CFA 30 in 2002 and 2003, and 32 in the following years. The recent increase in oil price has made Manantali energy profitability even greater. SENELEC estimated the costs of a KWh at CFA 68; and money saved by the same company in 2002, by purchasing 161 GWh of electricity from Manantali was estimated at CFA 6.5 billions. So Manantali was at least 38% percent cheaper for this country in 2003.Again, with the recent rise in oil price, this percentage should have expanded. The benefit for Mali is greater given the inefficiency of this countries thermal central. EDM produces energy using thermal source at a costs of CFA 105 per KWh. So for Mali, Manantali energy was in 2003 70% cheaper than energy produced from other sources; and savings made by EDM only on oil importing by substituting Manantali energy to thermal energy are CFA 12 billions, while consumption increased at the same time by 20%.

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III.4.3.The World Bank assessment of design and implementation of the RHDP

The Bank prepared mainly two evaluation reports on the project: an implementation completion report in January 2005 and a project performance assessment report in December 2006. The latter was performed by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank (IEGWB), which annually assesses 25% of the Bank’s lending operation, based on some project criteria, namely: being innovative, large, complex, and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The choice of RHDP by IEGWB shows the importance of such project in terms of policy lessons to be drawn. The scale and rating system of IEG are quite identical to those we use in this exercise as can be seen in the following box.

Box: the rating system of IEGWB The time-tested evaluation methods used by IEBWB are suited to the broad range of the World Bank’s work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEGWB evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion.

Relevance of Objectives: the extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent with the country’s current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, and Operational Policies). Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficacy: the extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or is excepted to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficiency: The extent to which project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustement operations.

Sustainability: the resilience to risk of net benefits flows aver time. Possible ratings: Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, not Evaluable.

Institutional Development Impact: the extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangement and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangement, institutional development impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. Possible rating: High, substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Outcome: The extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Bank performance: The extent to which services provided by the World Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangement for regular operation of the project).Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Overall rating

The IEG confirmed the conclusions of the implementation completion report and rated the project outcome as being satisfactory overall. It acknowledged the satisfactory completion of all core investments, albeit observed delays are stresses. It also emphasizes the involvement of

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a private operator in the project, and the initiation of health pilot programs as well as income generating activities for rural population. However, the difficulties SOGEM has in servicing the debt service associated with dam construction, are spelled out, as well as the problems it is experiencing in appropriately feeding the hydrology risk fund. The economic rate of 24 % at closing is confirmed and the evaluation also stated that if the calculations was updated taking into account today’s oil prices, that would lead to higher returns on investments. The project’s institutional development impact is also rated high by IEG evaluation report. Project sustainability is rated likely and the Bank performance is rated satisfactory, given the Bank’s ability to coordinate dialogue and collaboration among member countries, and with donors. The project also fostered regional integration between member states, by allowing them to agree to undertake joint environmental and development actions related to use of the river resources (PASIE, and the Water charter). Governments are also harmonizing their policies of infrastructure building and poverty reduction. The dual-purpose optical fiber technology that was built to link Manantali to high voltage substations, allows member countries to develop a sub regional telecommunication system, and SOGEM has already signed agreements with national telecommunication companies in this regards.

According to the World Bank Assessment, the components of the projects were strategically designed and implemented in a very satisfactory way. The effective level of the river reservoir is set at 7.9 billions m3, while the maximum capacity is 11.3 billions and the minimum 3.4 billions. Power transmission is made reliable by a system of control and monitoring that uses a modem computerized IT communication system. The environmental and health aspects of the projects are duly accounted for and overall, the quality of the project is deemed exceeding its expectations. The implementing phase showed that implementing agencies (OMVS and SOGEM) demonstrated their capacities to adopt corrective measures to complete the project.

Implementation of the physical components of the project was performed by international firms, selected through an international bidding process, and was supervised by SOGEM assisted by engineering firms financed by KFW, CIDA and AFD.

Economic and financial sustainability

Using the same methodology as the one used during the feasibility study, in the completion evaluation report, the Bank evaluation team came up withy an actual rate of return in line with what was found in the ex ante evaluation. Most of the investments realizations, benefited from change in the euro-dollar exchange rate. The analysis used two scenarios based on two output levels: a production level of 807 GWh and a production of 300 GWh. For an output of 807 GWh, the economic rate of returns is 24%, compared to the base scenario projected rate of 16% by the staff appraisal report (SAR). When we consider a level of output of 807GWh, alternating with drought conditions every five years (in which case, output falls to 300GWh), the resulting Economic Rate Return (ERR) is 21%. In the SAR, the financial rate of returns was not computed; instead, the focus was put on SOGEM’s operational viability. In order to assess the impact of tariff schedule on baseline costs, two simulations were done: a) one based on a production level of 807 GWh, and b) the other based on an output level of 438 GWh (the first year output). When the level of output of 807 GWh applies, SOGEM would meet its financial objectives. In the unlikely case of a production level of 438, its operational and financial objectives would be achieved only through the use of hydrology risk fund. This can be problematic in SOGEM’s current conditions because the fund is not properly fed, due to national electric companies’ unwillingness to settle their bills to SOGEM. Total project costs was estimated at appraisal at $445.5 millions net of taxes and duties. Given the exchange rate

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gain, the actual costs of the project is estimated at only $342.6 millions. Disbursements from IDA, reached $36.41 millions instead of the initially approved $38.7 millions.

Table 6: Losses according to the Fichtner Study

Source: World Bank (2006), Overview of Regional Energy Project and Projects Performance assessment Report for the Mali, Mauritania and Senegal Regional Hydropower Development Project (credits 2970, 2971 and 2972), report n°3814

SOGEM’s estimate of the costs of energy supply to the three capital cities for the period 2003-2030, is respectively CFA 30.20 per KWh for Mali, 32.71 for Senegal, and 33.26 for Mauritania. The average costs of supply from Manantali to all three utilities is estimated at CFA 32.05 per KWh in 2030, as compared to 30.9 in 2003. An evaluation performed in Senegal shows that for the period 2005-2015 shows that average costs of electricity is 63% lower than that of electricity from thermal source. Energy sales achieved 432.82 GWh in 2002, and 846.52 in 2003. As regards the objective of servicing the debt contracted to the dam building, the World Bank evaluation assumes that it will be met by extrapolating the current conditions of SOGEM’s operation. This contradicts the view expressed in AFD evaluation. Another objective of the project was the increase in the reliability of power systems in three countries. According to the Bank this has been achieved, since transmission losses in network is estimated by SOGEM to be only at 2.4% for 2003-2030 for supply to Senegal, 9.82 for EDM, and 11.3 for SOMELEC. The Bank finds these estimates highly credible. During the implementation phase of the project, the Bank also encouraged initiatives to increase the efficacy of power management systems in three countries. To be fair, this was understood by several stakeholders in the region, as being merely conditionalities. Following these encouragements, several attempts of reforming such systems were undertaken, including privatization of national electricity companies. At the end of the day, very few successes were noted on this side, and governments needed to buy back companies previously privatized. Until now, despite the supply of Manantali energy to three countries, power outages are still going on and national demand in power are very far to be met. The setting up of an organization in charge of operating the project facility was also a core objective of the project which is also achieved with the creation of SOGEM and ESKOM.

National Power

Company Delivery

Point Average Losses

% of power delivered

Levelized Losses

EDMKodialani 2,24% 89,3%

2,15%Kita 2,24% 2,2%Kayes 1,13% 8,5%

SENELEC

Matam 3,13% 5,7%

6,03%Dagana 4,79% 9,6%Sakal 5,56% 31,7%

Tobène 6,85% 51,0%

SOMELEC

Kaedi N/O  

6,94%Boghe N/O  Rosso 5,37% 10,8%

Nouakchott 7,13% 89,2%

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III.4.4. Environmental and health accomplishments

In the beginning of the 80’, when the Manantali dam building started, the World Bank echoed international NGO campaign against ecological impacts of dams, and reduced considerably its intervention on dam building and focusing instead on maintenance (Le Goff et al. 2005). In the case of Manantali, the Bank was not involved in the dam building but funded partly the central building, many years after the dam building was complete. So France has been the major donor for the dam building and also intervened in central building as leading donor. In practice, the concerns the World Bank had raised about environment proved justified. With the building of both dams, we noted an increase in the cases of malaria and bilharzias (Le Goff et al. 2005), with a prevalence achieving 98% in certain villages. For example, tests that were performed in 50 elementary school classrooms in Podor (A Senegalese city located in the valley) showed that out of these, 43 classes revealed a prevalence rate of 60% and more (Ministère de la Santé du Sénégal, 1997). We also noticed a dramatic development of typha, which is a swamp reed with adverse environmental effects, and which now affects up to 100 000 ha of land.

These environmental and health issues are not the only limitations of the project. One important criticism that is made to the Manantali project is that it is only designed for cities, mainly for capital cities, and it does not address rural electrification. Also, the drinking water obtained from the dams is only intended for city consumption and does not reach villages, while almost all the adverse effects are borne by villages. To mitigate these effects, OMVS started in 1997 implementing the PASIE (Programme d’atténuation et de suivi des impacts sur l’environnement). It is an integrated program to preserve environment in the river basin. It is funded by France, AfDB, CIDA, the World Bank, and involves local NGOs in this endeavour. PASIE encompasses six components:

a) a program for mitigating the impacts of the energetic project and dam construction on environment and health,

b) a program in charge of compensating displaced people under the project,c) a multisectoral program designed to satisfy population needs in drinking water,

agriculture, and navigation,d) a program designed to implement pilot projects to fight against water borne diseases,e) a communication unit in charge of compiling data for environmental and health

monitoring,f) feasibility studies to promote rural electrification and micro projects for poverty

reduction.

The major donors for PASIE are the World Bank and AfDB; with the former which has already committed $31 millions.

The objective of implementing PASIE which was to mitigate environmental and health side effects of the project was also deemed satisfactory by the WBIEG evaluation report. A steering committee has been put in place as well as national coordinating committees and communication and coordination groups. The role of these is to carry out information and awareness activities for better population involvement in project. They have appraised damage caused to populations by the appropriation process and by the construction of substations and transmission lines? and identified income generating and health projects. In Mali, about 510 beneficiaries affected by the Western transmission line, have been compensated for an amount of about CFA 560 millions. In Senegal, compensation achieved about CFA 97 millions, and about 45 millions ouguiya in Mauritania. The optimal reservoir

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program is also completed and rated satisfactory by the Bank. A water charter has been signed by the three governments, for a rationale use of the water, while safeguarding the environment. Six pilot health project have been implemented in Senegal and Mauritania to respond to water borne diseases. This also was rated satisfactory by the Bank.

III.5. Observed institutional weaknesses

III.5.1.Contractual issues between ESKOM and SOGEM

Services ESKOM SA needs to perform for SOGEM include: electricity production, dam operation and maintenance, central operation and maintenance, power dispatching between national electricity companies, roads and site maintenance, etc. The amount ESKOM is receiving to meet its charges is fixed and is disbursed on a monthly basis, whatever the turnover ends up to be. According to the executives of this company, this fixed amount was determined based on a study completed in 1999, and which is now highly outdated. In effect, the level of energy production depends heavily on the level of rainfall. In determining the payment to ESKOM, the assumption made was based on average rainfall for the last 50 years, while meteorological conditions have considerably changed since then, according to them. According to them, the rate should be set on a daily basis depending on the level of water in the river. Besides this meteorological issue, the increase in the costs of oil in recent period has had very severe repercussion on ESKOM’s operation, without this being duly accounted for in the contract. ESKOM is also questioning the level of taxes they are paying. While they are exempted of the payment of some taxes (VAT, duty taxes on equipments and on oil related items), they are paying other kind of taxes that are inhibiting their activities. For example, they are paying the Mali income tax which is set at the rate of 0.75% levied on sales and not on profit. ESKOM complains that even in case of losses it needs to pay it. They would suggest that exemption to tax payment be generalized to all their operations since they are performing a mission of public service. They also complain that they have never received the bonus they are entitled to in case of good performance, according to the terms of the contract they signed with SOGEM. The maximum of such bonus is set at CFA 83 millions per annum. When asked about this, SOGEM replies that ESKOM has never been penalized either for not assuring maintenance activities, as also stated in the contract. The accounting and financial system ESKOM is applying is set by article 27 of the contract, so as to allow SOGEM to perform verifications at any time.

According to ESKOM, these operational problems are heavily and negatively impacting on their financial sustainability. They mention that apart from the very first year of beginning, they have always incurred losses in their operation. So they have been benefiting from subsidies from the parent company so far. These subsidies are now consolidating to CFA 1.5 billions. In order to meet these costs, ESKOM is resorting to private loans on international markets. An from now on, the parent company is no longer willing to continue subsidizing ESKOM SA.

III.5.2.Adverse government intervention

Another institutional issue facing SOGEM is the contract granted to Aggreko, a US firm specialized in energy production using thermal source. At the beginning, this company was the supplier of SENELEC. Last year, given the consolidated deficit in the three member countries and tensions all of them experienced in their respective budgets, the council of

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ministers urged SOGEM to contract Aggreko to provide 40 MW of power from thermal source, at a relatively higher cost. SOGEM was only meant to make the advance payments and should be refunded by the companies, as soon as their financial conditions would allow it. Until now, SOGEM has not been paid accordingly to this arrangement. In addition, the contract which was supposed to last only for 7 months was extended further to 10 months and is still running. To meet the costs associated with this arrangement, SOGEM applied for a loan of CFA 3 billions. Aggreko is charging a flat rate CFA 85 per kwh while SOGEM is just charging CFA 32 per kwh. SOGEM is now compelled to use its inflows to service this debt. Which further increase its treasury tensions. It is worth mentioning that OMVS decided unilaterally to choose Agrekko, and the donors seemed not to show any enthusiasm in this; and people we talked to in SOGEM seemed not to share the relevance of this choice.

Recovering payments from national companies is also a challenge SOGEM is confronted with. Total arrears they owe to SOGEM, is as high as CFA 20 billions, which makes up 16.7% of SOGEM’s total equity. The paradox is that they are purchasing electricity from SOGEM at a price at least twice smaller than from other sources, and yet, they overlook paying their bills. Normally it is inside ESKOM’s attribute to recover these debts. And all governments accept the principle that power be cut off in case of defaults in payment. In practice, SOGEM has never been able to implement this clause. It once suspended power supply to Mali and underwent very severe reaction from Malian officials. So electricity provision resumed almost right away. In order to address these highly political issues, ESKOM relies on SOGEM to be paid by national companies. Recently, it succeeded in bringing member governments to commit themselves to oblige national companies to pay their debt, and to show increased diligence in settling their bills.

Another concern, expressed by ESKOM SA is SOGEM’s involvement in ESKOM’s recruitment process. SOGEM would like to make sure that ESKOM hires people, taking account of country balance between member states. This is deemed creating some inefficiencies when a well qualified applicant cannot compete for a position because his country is “overrepresented”. The payment system of ESKOM is the same as the one used by SOGEM. All employees have a local contract, and employees’ remuneration scale is based on the one used in the highest remuneration scheme among the three national electricity companies. The calculations made are based on the payment system used by SENELEC, adjusted upward using a weighting coefficient of 1.5.

On SOGEM’s side, most of the issues raised by ESKOM are confirmed, even though they believe most of them could be avoided if ESKOM had showed more diligence in the preparation of its offer. They agree that some maintenance costs increased far beyond the predicted level. This is particularly true of the facilities based in Mauritania, mainly due to sea erosion. But this should be foreseen by ESKOM and duly accounted for in their offer. But the biggest mistake ESKOM made is about insurance. They subscribed an insurance policy in South Africa, amounting to CFA 100 millions. Then during the operation phase of the project, they realized that according to regional rules governing insurance in the sub region, it is not possible to subscribe an insurance policy from a company located outside the region. So they needed to cancel this policy and to take another one within the region. The latter policy costed to them CFA 300 millions, three times what they had budgeted for. According to SOGEM, errors like that, committed during the preparation phase are making implementation very complicated to ESKOM. This latter prepared a memorandum to lay out some proposals and revisions to the ongoing contract and the discussions are going on to figure out how deep and to what direction should these revisions happen.

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In the management of SOGEM, both donors and local governments are intervening, and it seems that both advantages and inconveniences are stemming from both sides. Donors procedures are deemed too tight and sometimes, conflicting; while governments are deemed disrupting the overall setting of SOGEM. The Agrekko arrangement is a good example of adverse effect of governments’ intervention in the program. Another example is given by the case of Bafoulabé. It is a village which is now connected to the Manantali network. The Malian government supported by other governments expressed very strong concerns about the power passing by this village without benefiting to villagers. So, it was decided by the council of ministers to connect Bafoulabé to the network, which costs to SOGEM an investment of CFA 3.3 billions. In the mean time, the monthly yield of the investment is as low as CFA 300 000. In effect, there is no firm settled in the village, only very poor households are benefiting from this connection and pay individually amounts averaging CFA 2000 per month. Hence, the return on such investment is highly uncertain and low. And it seems that is it merely a subsidy SOGEM is compelled to make to this village, instead of the Malian government. A right now, Senegal and Mauritania are seeking for the same arrangement for their respective villages of Bakel and Selibaby. That will cost at least CFA 3 billions in each case. To ensure the sustainability of Manantali operation, donors insisted for the creation of SOGEM, which was supposed to be autonomous from member governments. But in practice, this autonomy is only an ideal. Electricity is a very sensitive issue in the region, and in 1998, riots took place in Bamako, because of power outages. In the recruitment process in OMVS, SOGEM or ESKOM, regional balance is very strongly considered and member governments play a central role. First of all, applications are submitted through official channels. Then, for every opening, these OMVS controlled agencies have to make their choice out of a list of three persons submitted by member governments. We have one third of expert positions for each member country. When ESKOM SA was set up, governments insisted that they hire local experts in priority. And those who could not be hired needed to be compensated. Eventually, out of the 120 people who were working in Manantali, only 12 ended up not being confirmed.

III.5.3.Setting the optimal fare for energy

The following formula is used to compute the price of Manantali energy:

Price per KWh = 20.3 +9652/P

P refers to the level of production subject to river flow level. So for a level of output of 807 GWh, the equivalent price is CFA 32.5. But in practice, SOGEM applied a price of CFA 28.8 that is 10% lower that the optimal price set by donors. This means that SOGEM has given up in 2005, a sum of CFA 2.5 billions. According to this rate applied by SOGEM, if production drops to below 650 GWh, breakdown point is no longer achieved. Another weakness of this pricing is that it is based on very optimistic level of production (807 GWh), and does not allow for enough reserves to compensate for period of lower production. A final concern about financial sustainability is the importance of arrears national electricity companies owe to SOGEM. Owing to this debt, SOGEM has not been able so far to feed the fund for hydrologic risk, which is essential to avoid disrupting its financial position in case of decrease in rainfall. But the most important weakness of SOGEM is that it seems to lack the necessary expertise to make sound financial projections regarding sustainability and to take relevant actions accordingly.

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Overall, in the management of SOGEM, it is believed that even though government intervention could sometime be deemed detrimental to management efficiency, member governments are providing a useful input to Manantali. First of all, most loans received are made to those governments and those that are made to SOGEM are guaranteed by governments. Besides, these loans are granted under very favorable conditions because they are public. Apart from this, governments are granting other advantages such as taxes exemptions for equipments, etc. Also, SOGEM as well as its personnel, enjoy a diplomatic status in all member states; which is quite favorable. All SOGEM’s buildings and equipment are considered common assets and belong jointly to the three member states. So SOGEM is a state owned company performing a mission of public service, even though its accounting system is a private one.

III.6. The role of donors in the successes/failures of the project

The main donors of SOGEM are: the EU, the World Bank, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), KFW and CIDA. Overall, more than 10 donors are intervening in Manantali, none of them involve emerging donors. Loans are made either to member state, or upon guarantee from member states, under very favorable conditions: usually an interest rate of 2% and a high element of liberality. In principle, donors did not intervene whatsoever in the selection process of firms that built the dam and the central. But in practice, they seemed to have played a critical role in firm selection. In effect, by crossing out firm nationalities and donors’ nationalities, we find out a very high correlation between both. Table 7 shows that out of 16 projects financed by France 10 of the corresponding activities were tendered to French firms. Donors’ conditionality has been sometimes detrimental to SOGEM’s efficiency. For example, during the implementing phase of lot 3 (civil work), the Islamic Bank for Development (IBD), put in a clause in the bid stating that no firm coming from a country with ties with Israel should not compete. This led to a break down of this work, so as to single out the share that needed to be funded by the IDB loan. Eventually, no firms among those which submitted to the bid met this rejection criterion from IDB. So the lot was tendered as a single work.

Another example of donor negative involvement in the project is given by the tendering process under the same bid for lot 3. Donors, mainly the World Bank insisted that the cheapest offer be considered. And so, a Spanish firm won the bid, with a cheapest offer of CFA 25 billions. In the course of implementing the works, this firm succeeded to increase the budget of the lot to CFA 40 billions; which makes up an increase of 60%. According to discussions we had with SOGEM, and evaluation reports from donors, the building of this work was the most difficult part of the project implementation. The strategy the firm put in place to win the bid was to decrease its offer and then, by resorting to amendments to the contract, progressively compel SOGEM to increase the envelop up to this amount. Also, bilateral donors, sometimes tend to orient SOGEM to firms of their nationalities. Some donors like French used to have explicit clause of origin, stating that a French firm was to be chosen in a project funded under French resources, but such clause is now officially abandoned.

Among the ten donors intervening in OMVS, France has played a central role. The objectives of France in supporting OMVS countries (all of which turn out to be its former colonies) have

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been spelled out as being global (maintaining France political influence in the region15), specific (supporting energy and agriculture production). The objective of providing contract to French firms which used to be essential is no longer an essential one (Le Goff et al. 2005). At the beginning, France was reluctant to fund Manantali because feasibility studies they performed did not conclude to a greater costs efficiency of hydroelectricity as compared to thermal electricity, in the region. But it eventually changed its mind and funded the energy component of Manantali for E 76 millions, out of which, 91% were given as a loan, and the balance, as a grant. France has also provided technical assistance, mainly to implement PASIE, and to support the HC develop capacities in the area of integrated water management.

Table 7: Correlation between shares of Manantali project financed by France and nationality of successful tenderers

Nature of the bidmillions of

Euro Successful tenderers Nationality of the firm

Prime contractor (35%) 6,7 Coyne et Bellier French

Software conception and management (100%) 0,1 Ernst & young US

Technical and financial assistance to SOGEM 0,8Guérard Viala

Développement French

Technical assistance to SOGEM 0,2 Monsieur Konaté  

Preparation of a bid on optical fiber 0,03 Sogreah French

Updating of study on price setting 0,08 Coyne et Bellier FrenchSub total on prime contract and contracting authority 7,9    

Electromechanical equipments (42,5%) 28,1Norelec French Sulzer Swiss

Left bank transmission station - lot 6 B2 (49%) 15,5ABB German

Norelec French

Lot 6 BL High voltage Dagana-Sakal line (100%) 10,2 Spie Enertrans French

Lot 6 BL Kayes Matam line (12,6%) 2,5Norelec FrenchGMTH French

Dispatching (100%) 7,5 Alstom German Dam maintenance and floodgates rehabilitation (100% 1,6 Coyne et Bellier French

Sub total equipments and works 65,4    Interest 2,6    

Total 75,9    Source : Direction Générale de Coopération Internationale et du Développement (2005) : Appui de la Coopération française à l’organisation de la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal

Regarding the tendering process of lot 3, the Spanish contractor which won the bid, NESCO, did not deliver its work on time, a one year delay was noted in the building of lot 3. The five turbines which were supposed to be delivered in October 2000 and October 2001 were eventually installed in December 2002 and June 2003, but the installation was deemed satisfactory. The World Bank had insisted that the cheapest offer be considered, even though the advising engineer (COFITEC) stated in its report, about the winner of the bid (NESCO):

15 Ministère de la Coopération, 1996.

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“Regarding Fougerolle International and NESCO, the information they provided about their contractual commitments are not satisfactory. The weakness of their order book is an indicator of fragility, hence of the risk in contracting them. The other elements of their offer seem satisfactory.”

In the first bidding process, the cheapest offers were those of NESCO (CFA 28 billions), and that of Razel (CFA 28.5 billions). To maximize its chance, NESCO profited by the second bid to further reduce its offer to CFA 25 billions, and eventually raised it through several amendments to CFA 40 billions, during the implementation phase.

Table 8: The amendments

Main Contract and amendment Date Amount Fcfa Amount US $

Main Contract 09/26/1997 25 763 354 561 47 709 916 Amendment 1 06/18/ 1999 2 225 863 749 4 121 970 Amendment 2 08/31/ 2000 729 066 916 1 350 124 Amendment 3 09/13/ 2002 5 147 616 062 9 532 622

Balance 06/30/2003 1 825 737 850 3 380 996 Price revision   4 091 061 946 7 576 041 Article 52.2   699 629 056 1 295 609

interest on arrears   460 093 011 852 024 Total   40 942 423 151 75 819 302

Source: SOGEM (2004), Projet Energie Manantali, Lot 3 Génie Civil, Rapport d’achèvement, Bamako

During the implementation phase, the contactor demonstrated very grave weaknesses, and performed well below expectations, according to the assessments made by the consulting engineer SOGEM appointed for the technical audit of the civil work. Also several delays were observed during these works. Besides, the contractor lacked engineering capabilities in the area of water drainage and electricity distribution, and provided defective concrete pumps and crushing mill. There were also several cases of unannounced personnel departure, delays in getting equipment to the work and cement shortages. A first bid for lot 3 was launched in 1995 but was cancelled in 1997. A consolidated bid was again launched in the same year. But after the contract was given to NESCO, we noticed in authorizing payments from donor side. This brought the contactor to invoke article 69.4 of FIDIC’s rules which allows him to slow down works until payments were made. More importantly, the contactor had no incentive to deliver on time since most of his payments came out of services rendered to other contractors on site. This contractor compelled SOGEM to accept three amendments to the contracts; which brought civil work costs to CFA 40 billions from an initial amount of CFA 25 billions. The first amendment was signed in 1999, and was intended to harmonize civil work program with the supply of lot 4/5 (supply and installation of electromechanical component). The second amendment, was signed in 2000, and designed to change some administrative clauses, to approve new price list, and to update civil work program. The last amendment was signed in 2002, and was intended to approve additional civil work, a list of additional prices for specific items.

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The IEG report further explained the delays observed during the project implementation. Part of this delay is attributed to conflicting donor procurement procedures; this proved particularly acute when donor non objections were needed for amendments with the contractor of lot 3. The other part is attributed to member governments. According to the report, governments failed to comply with IDA’s covenants in several ways:

- An inadequate counterpart funding for SOGEM,- Lack of an accounting system for SOGEM and OMVS that is acceptable to IDA,- Lack of budget allocation that is sufficient to cover operating costs of OMVS for

1998,- The water charter that needed to be signed by May 1999 was only signed in May

2002.- Delays in having governments sign agreements on SOGEM’s performance indicators

and stating their obligations towards SOGEM, and their contributions to SOGEM’s budget until completion.

As regards conditionalities on project funding, they rather applied to member government instead of SOGEM. In exchange of funding received from donors, all member states were compelled to implement deep restructuring programs of their energy sectors. This resulted in several attempts to privatize energy supply, which most of them failed. The only conditionality that was openly made to OMVS in 1997 was the creation of SOGEM and the selection of a private operator for Manantali energy that turned out to be ESKOM. We noted some kind of coordination from donor side in the implementation phase of the central. The project construction was broken down in lots and donors committed themselves to a given lot. For lot 3, the donors were: the World Bank, BOAD, and IBD. The leader was the World Bank and its procedures of procurement applied. Concerning the electromechanical lot, the intervening donors were: AFD, KFW and CIDA, with AFD acting as leader and its procedures applied in procurements. So coordination was organized by group of donors, and according to specific lots. At the aggregate level, donors did put in place a consultative committee restricted to AFD, the World Bank and KFW, which met one a year, and with AFD acting as a leader. This level of coordination involved joint field missions to Manantali, but many separate missions were sent by donors and at this level coordination has been deemed rather weak.

Positive role of donor

Donor implication into the project has been observed in all phases. They initiated project preparation, and the Bank played a critical role in this. Besides, it introduced tariff agreement, and hydrology risk fund. The Bank also carried out an environmental assessment which resulted in the design and implementation of PASIE.

Interestingly, the IEG evaluation report compared RHDP to other regional energy projects (REP) in the developing world. Regarding outcome, it is found that RHDP falls in the middle of the group of hydropower REPs reviewed as part of this IEG assessment (see table 11). Out the 8 REPs considered, 4 were rated unsatisfactory, mainly because of high prices charged and mismatch between level of production and their respective market sizes. Another reason for poor rating is the environmental side effects of those.

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III.7. Benchmarking RHDP against reference project

Finding reference projects for RHDP is not very easy given the very specific nature of the activity, and which not yet replicated elsewhere in Senegal, for the time being. Manantali is the only source of hydroelectric energy in Senegal. Apart from this alternative sources include: solar electricity for rural areas and thermal sources of electricity. In order to benchmark Manantali against somewhat similar projects the following reference cases are considered:

- A project of rural electrification using a solar system source of energy, namely, the Senegalese-German Solar Energy project (SGSE),

- The thermal sources of electricity in SENELEC,- Hydroelectric projects in foreign countries and regions.

Each of the aforementioned projects has serious shortcomings for the purpose of benchmarking RHDP. The GSSE project is a project designed for rural areas, while RHDP is for urban areas, notably for capital cities. Besides, the amount of electricity generated by RHDP is far beyond that one generated by SGSE. Furthermore, the objectives of both are quite different. Regarding electricity produced or purchased by SELEC from thermal sources, the only comparisons it allows with RHDP, is about costs, price and reliability. It by no means allows for comparisons about institutional spillovers or sustainability. Finally, regional hydroelectric projects elsewhere in the world could be interesting as reference point for RHPD. But data, and facts related to them are very hard to gather from Senegal. We then in this latter case, rely on the comparisons that were made by the WBIEG between Manantali and other similar projects the Bank has funded elsewhere in the world.

III.7.1.Benchmarking RHPD against the Senegalese-German Solar Energy project (SGSE)

SGSE was set up in 1987, and is now piloted by the Direction of energy, with a funded from GTZ. Two photovoltaic centrals were built in collaboration with SENELEC: one in Diaoulé (in the Fatick region) in 1989, and the other in Ndiebel (the Kaolack region) in 1990. A subscription fee of CFA 2000, widely subsidized was applied to rural households. This includes connection to the network, installation of two lamps and plug. A counter was also installed in every home for metering used electricity. The applied price is progressive and set as follows: for the first consumed 40 KWh: CFA 100 (about $0.2), and above this ceiling a rate of CFA 140 is applied. The organization of the management is confided to benevolent committee of users, with a president, a vice-president, a general secretary and a treasurer. This committee collects bill payment and proceeds to maintenance. Eventually the management was transferred to SENELEC because the committee members were no longer willing to work freely for the community.

The gratuity of services performed by the committee is a major weakness of the project. Another weakness is the quantity of paid bills which is at only 70%, corresponding to very marginal amounts (less than CFA 1000 per household). In terms of capacity building component, several agents of SENELEC were sent to Germany for training in solar system source of electricity.

45

This project is hardly comparable to RHDP, in terms of magnitude, and overall contribution to national development objectives.

III.7.2.Benchmarking RHDP against electricity from thermal sources in SENELEC

SENELEC is the public monopoly that has always managed electricity production and distribution in Senegal. Electricity used by SENELEC comes from the following sources:

- SENELEC’s own electricity from thermal sources,- Electricity from GTI, a independent producer of US nationality that produces and sells

electricity from thermal source to SENELEC,- SOGEM SA that sells electricity from hydroelectric source to SENELEC.

- Some big firms like SOCOCIM, ICS and SONACOS, produce their own power.

Table 9: Evolution of ESKOM SA bills to SENELEC2003 2004 2005

Total energy purchase (MWh) 346 167 350 914 297 598Payments to ESKOM (millions XOF) 12 121 14 766 16 998

Energy unit costs (FCFA-kWh) 35,01 42,08 57,12Fixed share of payment (millions XOF 5 438 5 234 5 259

Unit costs for fixed share (FCFA/kWh 15,71 14,92 17,67Total payment (millions XOF) 18 963 21 435 23 516

Total unit costs (FCFA/kWh) 54,78 61,08 79,02Source : Commission de Régulation du Secteur de l’Electricité (2005), rapport annuel, page 65

Table 10: Evolution of GTI bills to SENELEC2003 2004 2005

Total energy purchase (MWh) 337 175 293 122 266 949

Payments to ESKOM (millions XOF) 6 311 5 492 4 960

Energy unit costs (FCFA-kWh) 18,72 18,74 18,58

Fixed share of payment (millions XOF) 3 258 3 555 3 630

Unit costs for fixed share (FCFA/kWh) 9,66 12,13 13,6

Total payment (millions XOF) 9 569 9 047 8 590

Total unit costs (FCFA/kWh) 28,38 30,86 32,18Source : Commission de Régulation du Secteur de l’Electricité (2005), rapport annuel, page 64

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GTI has signed in 1996 a contract with SENELEC according to which it supplies electricity to this public monopoly. The duration of the contract is 15 years, starting from 2000. The thermal central operated by GTI has a capacity of 53 MW. SENELEC experiences deficit in production amounting to 12.9 GWh in 2002 and which was reduced to 1.8 GWh in 2003. According to the Senegalese commission for electricity regulation (report 2005), the distribution system used by SOGEM is far more reliable to that one used by SENELEC. Equipments are deemed outdated, hence several outages are noted in the year. Tables 9 through 10 provide very good indications of SENELEC financial vulnerability, which is incomparable to what is observed with SOGEM.

III.7.3.Benchmarking RHDP against similar regional projects in the world

This exercise was performed by relying on the evaluation the WBIEG made on RHDP and comparable regional similar projects the Bank has funded elsewhere in the world. The Bank rating concluded that RHPF falls in the middle of the considered group of REP (Regional Energy Project) in the evaluation. Out of the 8 projects of this kind, the Bank rated poorly 4, and 1 of them as being highly satisfactory, namely the Brazil-Bolivia gas pipeline. Four out of these projects produce electricity at a very high cost in first years of operation. Three of them have very severe adverse effects on environment, and 4 of them involve resettlement cases that left much to be desired (see table 11).

Table 11: Completed Word Bank Projects For Cross Border Energy Trading Name of Project

Cost $ Mill

Outcome Rating

B/C or EIRR

Impact on Environment

Resettlement Owner & Operator

Nam Gum Dam (’90)

126 S 2.1 - water, + fish

- Compens. Laos

Kariba Dam (’93)

515 US 2.1 --- wildlife - Compens. Bipartite

Ruzizi II Dam 80 US 4% Not available

- Compens. Tripartite

Kuelkhani Dam

119 US 0,5 -- sediment - Compens Nepal

Morazan Dam (’89)

745 S 0,7 - water mgmt.

++ compens Honduras

Itaipu Transm.(’89)

158 S 15% Not available

Not available

Brazil

Manantali (’04)

445 S 21% ++ water mgmt.

- health Tripartite

Yacyreta Dam (’96)

8220 US 0.5 6%

+ habitat, + water

-- baseline Bipartite

Bolivia-Brazil Pipeline (’01)

2086 HS 1.6 22%

+ land use + Compens. Bipartite

Chad-Cameroon Pipe

2000 n/a Segmented

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Source: ICR or PAR (outcome rating and Internal Rate of Return with date of attribution), 1996 OED Review of Dams (Impacts/ Cost adjusted to bring resettlement to standards)

IV. Findings and recommendations

In this study, we have presented two project cases, to shed some light in the “black box” of aid to development outcome, in two different areas: irrigation (the DIP) and hydroelectricity (RHDP). Both projects have had great success, as pointed out by evaluation reports. Factors explaining such performances are varied and can be linked to:

a) For DIPo An institutional setting that gives the major role to POs themselves, and which

is functioning quite well,o Beneficiaries understand services that are provided by the project as something

that has a costs and to the continuation of which they have to contributeo A very good distribution of labor is observed between communities, SAED,

the bank (CNCAS). This ensures availability of loan on time and hence continuity in equipment services,

o Yield are high due to the level of technology and quality of supervision,o Water services are regularly paid, which contributes to assure financial

sustainability of SOGED,o Neither donors nor government are intervening in the day to day operational

activities,o A simple though effective accounting and auditing system ensures

management transparence and accountability,o Government has provided public goods such as water drainage, subsidized

loan, and technical advice. This is done in such way that financial viability is ensured, since none of these services is totally free.

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b) For RHDPo Use of technology on an international level,o Effective technology transfer to regional experts,o All components of core works implemented without delay, except for lot 3,o A sharp reduction in overall electricity costs in three member countries,o An economic rate of return at evaluation higher than the one obtained at

appraisal,o Involvement of a private operator in the management of the dam and the

central,o Design and implementation of program mitigating environmental and health

effects of the dam,o Generating spillovers to the village of Manantali, as well as villages that are

crossed out by transmission lines, in terms of income generating projects, connection to electricity and drinkable water network,

o Harnessing some other regional projects like roads connecting member countries.

Regarding donor involvement in the project, it has had some beneficial as well as adverse effects that can be acute, depending on the considered project.

a) For DIP :1. Japanese level of involvement in the project seems quite minimal: JICA was

involved in project identification, appraisal and provided material support in terms of equipments, as well as technical assistance

2. The project also benefited from other donor interventions like the PSAOP project of the World Bank. This project positively influenced producer organizations which turned out to be critical in the success of DIP project,

3. An important support is granted to SAED by JICA, in terms of capacity building, equipments, technology upgrading, institutional strengthening, and the like. This, too, seems to have had positive effects on DIP.

b) For RHDP :1. Donor involvement has been critical in pushing OMVS to accept the principle of

private sector implication in the project. The creation of SOGEM, and ESKOM was widely attributable to donors. And this turned out to be very critical to the success experienced by the project,

2. Donor were also involved at earlier stages of the project by providing assistance during the phase of project design, for dam building, as well as for the hydroelectric component of the project,

3. They insisted for the implementation of an accounting system and procurement rules that ensure transparence and accountability in SOGEM’s management,

4. They intervened in the design and implementation of PASIE which is a critical component of the project. The level of PASIE implementation has been deemed quite satisfactory. This entailed awareness and communication campaign to make sure the project is fully accepted by neighboring villages. Also, under this component, the adverse effects of the project on environment are properly dealt with. Besides, programs to fight water borne diseases have been implemented, as well as income generating activities for villages,

5. Donor intervention in electricity price setting to make sure costs are recovered in a sustainable manner is acknowledged. By the same token, the insisted for the

49

setting up a hydrology risk fund designed to ensure financial sustainability even in case of poor rainfall.

Regarding negative aspects of donor in projects, they were observed only in the case of RHDP. These were observed in the following cases:

a) Very poor level of coordination. Event though they appointed a leader among them for the implementation of a given lot of the project, this does not prevent them from having separate field missions, and having different procurement rules different from those of SOGEM.

b) They have been very slow (especially the World Bank), in giving their approval for needed amendments in the course of civil work for lot3. Also, delays have been noticed about disbursements during implementation phase of this lot. All this resulted in very important delays for this lot building.

c) Due to donor conflicting rules, lot 3 of civil work have been tendered in two differing phases: first in two different bids, and finally to one single bid after the formers got cancelled.

d) Due to World Bank insistence during the tendering process to tender the bid the to cheapest offer, the Spanish company NESCO won the bid while lacking basic technical and financial capacities to correctly perform the needed works. Furthermore, it compelled SOGEM to accept several amendments to the initial contract, which eventually brought the total value of the contract to CFA 40 billions instead of CFA 25 billions.

e) As part of the Manantali project financing, the World Bank urged member governments to commit themselves in reforming their energy sectors in order to privatize them. Some of these countries engaged themselves to these reforms, but most of the privatization experiences have failed and governments needed to purchase back national electricity companies. This raises the question of conditionality in aid delivery and how much it could be counterproductive.

50

Reference

1. Agence Japonaise de Coopération Internationale (JICA) , Ministère des Mines, de l’Energie et de l’Hydraulique (MMEH), Agence Sénégalaise d’Electrification Rurale (ASER) (2002) : L’Etude du Plan d’Electrification Rurale par voie Photovoltaïque en République du Sénégal, Rapport Principal, KRI International CORP.  The Intstitute of Energy Economics, JAPAN.

2. Agence Japonaise de Coopération Internationale (JICA) , Ministère des Mines, de l’Energie et de l’Hydraulique (MMEH), Agence Sénégalaise d’Electrification Rurale (ASER) (2002) : l’Etude du Plan d’Electrification rurale par voie Photovoltaïque en République du Sénégal, projet pilote, KRI International Corp. The Institute of Energy Economics, JAPAN.

3. Agence Japonaise de Coopération Internationale (JICA) , Ministère des Mines, de l’Energie et de l’Hydraulique (MMEH), Agence Sénégalaise d’Electrification Rurale (ASER) (2002) : l’Etude du Plan d’Electrification rurale par voie Photovoltaïque en République du Sénégal, plan de mise en œuvre , KRI International Corp. The Institute of Energy Economics, JAPAN.

4. Agence Japonaise de Coopération Internationale (JICA), Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) (1993) : Rapport de l’Etude du plan de base sur le Projet de réhabilitation du casier de Débi en République du Sénégal ; TAIYO Consultants.CO.LTD

5. Commission de Régulation du Secteur de l’Electricité, rapports annuel de 2002, 2003, 2004, et 2005.

6. Coyne & Bélier (2005) : Projet Energie Manantali, Rapport Final de l’ingénieur

51

7. Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (2005) : Appui de la coopération française à l’Organisation de la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal ? Evaluation conjointe et partenariale (1994-2004)

8. Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Hydraulique Rurale et de la Sécurité Alimentaire / Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal : Huitième Lettre de Mission 2006-2007-2008.

9. Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) (1997) : Société de Gestion de l’Energie de Manantali (SOGEM), Status

10. Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), Convention portant création de l’agence de gestion de l’énergie de Manantali

11. Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), Société de Gestion de l’Energie de Manantali (SOGEM), Eskom Enterprises (PTY) LTD (2001) : Contrat d’Exploitation du Barrage et des ouvrages de production et de Transport de l’Energie de Manantali, Tome 1.

12. Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), Société de Gestion de l’Energie de Manantali (SOGEM) (2004) : Projet Energie Manantali lot 3 Génie Civil , Rapport d’achèvement

13. Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), Société de Gestion de l’Energie de Manantali (SOGEM) (2007) : Séminaire d’information sur le projet d’achat de crédits de réduction d’émission de gaz à effet de serre

14. République du Mali / Ministère de l’Economie, du Plan et de l’Intégration / Cellule OMVS (2000) : Programme d’Atténuation et Suivi des Impacts sur l’Environnement du Programme de l’OMVS ; Rapport Annuel d’Activités 1999 du Comité National de Coordination du PASIE.

15. République du Sénégal / Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et de l’Hydraulique/ Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) (2004) : Mise en valeur Agricole dans la valeur du Fleuve Sénégal et les perspectives d’investissement.

16. République du Sénégal / Ministère de l’Agriculture, Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) /Direction de la Planification et du Développement Rural (1996) : Evaluation de la Production Rizicole Dans la Vallée Hivernage 95/96 : Résultat de l’Enquête auprès d’un échantillon de producteurs.

17. République du Sénégal/ Ministère de l’Agriculture (1996) : commercialisation du Paddy et du Riz : Situation et propositions, vallée du Fleuve Sénégal Campagne d’hivernage 95/96.

18. République du Sénégal/ Ministère de l’Agriculture/ Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) /Direction de la Planification et du Développement Rural (1997) : Estimation de la production de Paddy dans la vallée du Fleuve Sénégal saison chaude 1996, Etude réalisée avec l’appui de la Coopération Française (convention ASPASAS FAC86)

19. République Française/ Ministère des Relations Extérieures Coopération et Développement (1983) : Analyse Economique de la Filière Riz SAED réactualisation 82/83.

20. Sénégal-Communauté Européenne : Document de Stratégie de Coopération et Programme Indicatif pour la période 2002-2007.

21. Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) (2003) : L’expérience du Groupe Import-

52

Export Khady Sao Seck sur la Commercialisation du riz dans la vallée du Fleuve Sénégal.

22. Société Nationale d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve et des Vallées du Fleuve Sénégal (SAED) /Direction de la Planification et du Développement Rural (1997) : Etude de la salinité des sols en riziculture non drainée dans le delta du Fleuve Sénégal ; Zone du Gorom Aval, Bulletin technique n°13.

23. World Bank (1997): Regional Hydropower Development Project, Staff Appraisal Report, report N° 16083-AFR.

24. World Bank (2006): Agriculture Services and Producer Organizations Project, Implementation Completion Report, n°35062.

25. World Bank (2006): Sénégal, Développements Récents et les sources de Financement du Budget de l’Etat, Revue des Dépenses Publiques, Rapport n° 36497.

ANNEX53

Annex 1 List OF Interviewed persons 

Banque Mondiale- Mme Hawa Mbakop (Economiste)- Mme Awa Seck (chargée du secteur de l’énergie)

Direction de la Coopération Economique et Financière (DCEF) - Mr. André Ndecky (Adjoint au Directeur)- Mme Maguette Ndiaye Diop (chargée du secteur de l’Agriculture)- Mr. Mamour Ousmane Ba (Division de Commission Mixte) - Mme Aissatou Fall (chargée de la Coopération avec la Banque Mondiale)- Mr. Diatourou Ndiaye (chargé du secteur de l’énergie et des transports)

Direction de la Dette et Investissement (DDI)- Mr Balla Niasse (Chef de division de la dette publique)- Mr Bilal Dieng (Chargé des bailleurs européens)

Japon - Mr Mamadou Aliou Barry (Deputy Programm Director)- Mr Motoharu Wakabayashi (Adjoint au Representant Résident)

Agence Française de Développement (AFD)- Mr Bertrand Boisselet

Commission Européenne - Mme Maimounatou Diop (Chargé du secteur des transports et de l’assainissement).

SAED- Mr Moussa Tacko Sow

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- Mr Landing Sané- Mr Ameth Fall ( Responsable DAF) - Mr Aboubacry Sow (Direction des Infrastructures et des Aménagements

Hydrauliques) - Moussa Fofana (database manager)- Mansour Cissé (SAED advisor based in DEBI)- Natacko Mbodj (Permanent Secretary of Debi Tiguet Union)

Agence Sénégalaise d’Electrification Rurale (ASER)- Mr Cheikh Wade

Cellule Nationale de l’Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal- Mr Abdou Layat Diop- Mr Ababacar Ndao

Société de Gestion de l’Energie de Manantali (SOGEM)- Mr Cheikh Touré (Directeur Technique SOGEM-Bamako)- Mr Abdou Diémé (Directeur Technique SOGEM-Manantali)- Mr Mouhamed Kaba (Directeur Technique Eskom Energie Manantali)- Mr Moussa Niang (Directeur des Affaires Juridiques SOGEM-Bamako)- Mr Moussa Konaté (Direction des Ressources Humaines)- Mr Alpha Macky Tall ( Directeur Financier par Intérim)

Annex 2 : Indicators on DIP (1994 à 2003)

1: Population size and POs

Village Number of POs

Number of attributions

Surf.(ha)

Surf/Attri.(ha)

SV GIEDebi 3

--3

148152

282.59289.12

1.911.9

Tiguette 3 204 425.45 2.08Total 6 3 504 997.16 1.98

2: Evolution des crédits du Caisse Nationale de Crédits Agricoles du Sénégal (CNCAS)

Année Hivernage CSC Interculture

Mont (F) Surf.(ha)

Mont (F) Surf.(ha)

95/96 116695982 689.8 - - -96/97 183645000 997.16 - - 197/98 214218880 997.16 100307522 523.42 1.52

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98/99 191826652 954.04 - - 0.9599/00 212176730 997.16 84518278 358.20 1.3600/01 206947267 952.68 - - 0.9501/02 141442078 997.16 - - 102/03 207438947 997.16 - - 1

3 : Evolution de la culture du riz

(i)Superficie

(ha)Spéculation Rendement

(par ha)Production

Hivernage 95/96 689,80 Riz 5.7 3931.86Hivernage 96/97 997,16 Riz 5.77 5753.61Hivernage 97/98 997,16 Riz 5.6 5281.09CSC 98 523,42 Riz 3.33 1742.98Hivernage 98/99 957,04 Riz 5.00 4785.2Hivernage 99/00 997,16 Riz 4.81 4796.33CSC 2000 358,20 Riz 4.44 1590.4Hivernage 00/01 952,68 Riz .00 4763.4Hivernage 01/02 997,16 Riz 5.98 5963.01Hivernage 02/03 997,16 Riz 6.00 5982.96

4 : Evolution du coût hydraulique

(ii)Hivernage 95/96 Hivernage 96 à 99

Carburant/eau 13 995 12 490Entretien 30 775 22 518

DA

T

Réseaux/pistes 12 970 9 458Renouv.Ap. Hydraulique 2 010 4 455Entretien Station 4 190 5 400Amortissement Station 510 21465Total DAT 19 680 40 778

Salaire pompiste 720 675Redevance OMVS 1 300 500Frais Financiers 8 500 -Total coût hydraulique 74 970 76 961Total coût hydraulique payé 62 000 67 500

A partir de l’hivernage 1999, le montant du coût hydraulique est ramené à 62 000 FCFA.

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Annex 3: Irrigated agriculture in Senegal

1:

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2   : Redevances décidées par l’OMVS

Annex 4: Some Indicators on reference projects

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Annex 5: Note on the Desk Review of World Bank Regional Energy Projects

1. To increase the usefulness of the findings and lessons from this Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) and enhance to the world Bank’s growing number of regional energy projects (REPs), IEG conducted a desk review of other regional projects in the electricity and oil & gas subsectors, to serve as the larger context for comparative performance vis-à-vis the Senegal/Mali/Mauritania- Regional

59

Hydropower Development Project (RHDP). The desk review covered 9 projects that supported cross-border energy trade and include 7 hydropower and 2 pipeline projects (with the year of closing indicated):

Nam Gum hydropower (1972) in Laos serving and Thailand Kariba hydropower at the border of Zambia and Zimbawe serving both (1980) Ruzizi II hydropower at the Burundi-Rwanda –Zaire border serving all 3

(1989) Nangbeto in Togo serving Togo and Benin (1992) Itaipu hydropower at the Paraguay-Brazil border serving both (1984) Manantali hydropower in Mali serving Mali, Mauritania and Senegal (2004) Yacyreta hydropower at the Paraguay-Argentina border serving both (2003) Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline (2000) Chad-Cameroon petroleum pipeline (2004)

2. The overview also mentions technical assistance for establishing/improving power trade in West Africa (WAPP), South Africa (SADC), Latin America and the Greater Mekong area. Data and comments are added for two projects not intended for regional trading but that exported a fair share of their output at least in their first years of operation:

Kulekhani hydropower in Nepal (1982) Morazan (El Cajon) hydropower in Honduras (1985)

3. The World Bank’s main regional REPs are found in the hydropower and oil/gas pipeline subsectors. The experience and lessons from REPs are still relevant today. REPs have yielded sizeable benefits and the risks, while high, were well known and manageable. REPs have special characteristics: they have seldom involved more than two countries; they have relied on regional institutions to facilitate the trans-boundary studies; and they have hardly needed major reforms because they could be implemented and run by enclave multinational companies that tend to enjoy better governance and resilience than national utilities and operate with relative efficiency under their own rules.

4. Main Characteristics of REPs. The RHDP shares of the characteristics of other REPs, as follows:

REPs are high risk-high reward operations. There are many opportunities for REPs whose cost and benefit to the main stakeholders make them politically desirable to undertake. However, the same cannot necessarily be said for power interconnection projects that redistribute a tight supply.

Desirable REPs include the development of hydropower, fossil fuel production and energy transport markets. Since they involve high risks at the outset, they should avoid additional complexity, e.g., involve 3 countries or less, and stick only to the most essential policy reforms.

Other REP characteristics are discussed immediately below.

5. Rationale and scope of REPs. The REP concept usually originates from sector studies that make the case of energy market integration as well as regional approaches to tackle the complex package of policies and investments.

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Generally, region-wide studies have plodded along for 5 to 10 years (e.g., for power pools), and even longer the more countries are involved. In some cases, these studies have led to projects in (rarely more than) two countries and have featured multipurpose or single purpose hydropower plants and/or dedicated transmission lines; upstream oil or gas development with dedicated pipeline facilities; cross-border interconnections to enhance supply reliability, albeit more rarely. These REPs are usually justified on the basis of: (a) using a resource located at the common border of several countries; (b) enhancing the availability and low cost of energy and water by tapping a cheap resource endowment that is too big for any one country to develop, and maximizing economies of scale; and (c) promoting regional integration as an overarching political goal. What precipitates the actual REP intervention is an imminent shortage or a surge in demand, or potential problems created by sub-optimal or unilateral use of a common resource. This, and a common border resource, applies to the RHDP.

6. The quality of REP studies was generally mixed and although relevant, their impact was notable only when they fed into well-funded projects. The contrast is striking between (a) studies that led to projects and sales contracts involving 2 or 3 countries and (b) region-wide studies to foster regional power pools. For the latter, some long-awaited agreements have emerged, e.g., for the West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) and the Mekong River Basin. Even then, only the basics have addressed and a lot remains to be done to arrive at a regional pool and tangible benefits.

7. Role of the WB and Partners in REPs. The WB eschewed dam construction for Itaipu (helping with Extra High Voltage transmission only) and Manantali (transmission and generating facilities only). Lending involved the usual partners: energy ministries and national companies in each country, multilateral and bilateral donors, and commercial banks. Oil & gas projects involved major global energy investors in addition, e.g. Exxon and Chevron for the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. Donors funded a large share of the studies (often through trust funds such as the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program and the Population and Human Resource Development Fund) but only a small fraction of the physical components. Regional entities played a limited role, mostly as fraction of the physical components. Regional entities played a limited role, mostly as facilitors for studies involving more than two countries, e.g., the Greater Mekong Commission, the Comission de Integracion Electrica Regional for power trading in Latin America, and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the WAPP.

8. Project management was – and operation continues to be – vested in multinational entities when dealing with a shared resource at or near common border, e.g., dams at Ruzizi, Kariba, Manantali, Itaipu and Yacyreta. For pipelines, the segment in each country is jointly owned by global investors and a partner in that country, generally a state-owned enterprise (an exception is the YPBF, a private company holding the minority share of Chad in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline). Consultation and mutual support agreement were and still are used among co-owners, e.g., assistance by Zimbawe to Zambia and by Argentina to Paraguay for the operation and maintenance of Kariba and Yacyreta respectively.

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9. After the REPs closed, their situations have now vastly improved

with the growth in their markets and the rise in petroleum prices. One exception, however, is Yacyreta: although the last unit was commissioned in 1998, the plant operates only at 60% of capacity because the reservoir cannot be filled until resettlement difficulties have been overcome.

Annex 6: Others World Bank project’s in the valley of Senegal River

Irrigation Technical Assistance Project

Table 1: Project Timetable

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Date Planned  

Date Planned  

Date Actual

Identification Preparation -- -- 06/81Preparation -- -- 1982-1985Appraisal 06/85 -- 06/85Negociations 07/85 08/85Board Presentation 05/85 -- 10/29/85Credit Signature -- -- 12/07/85Credit effectiveness -- -- 05/01/86Completion 06/30/87 -- 12/31/88Closing 12/31/87 -- 12/31/88

Table 2: STAFF INPUTS (MAN-WEEK)

Year 86 87 88 89Quarter 4 4 1 2 3 4 1

Appraisal Estimate 3,2 4,86Actual 0,5 1,054 1,115 1,801 2,277 2,357 2,942

Actual as % of Est. 15,6 21,6

Table 3: PROJECT FINANCING

AppraisalEstimate Actual Overrun /

Underrun (%)Project Cost 15,1 13,8 91IDA Credit 4,86 2,9 60(Cancelled) - (1.96) (-)Cofinanciers CCCE/FAC 3,3 10,0 300 UNDP 0,4 0,9 225 USAID 0,1 - - Others 0,5 - -

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Table 4: MISSION DATA

Year/Month

No of Persons

Days in Field

SpecializationsRepresented/s

Performancestatus /b

RatingTrend /c

Type of problemd /d

Preparation 1 10/81 1 7 e, iPreparation 2 01/82 5 10 a, i, e, f, o i, fPreparation 3 06/82 1 1 e Preparation 4 03/84 1 2 f fPreparation 5 12/85 1 1 e, i f, iPreparation 6 02/85 2 4 e i, cPreparation 7 04/85 1 7 i i, f, cAppraisal 1 06/85 1 7 i i, f, cPost-appraisal 2 10/85 2 10 e, i i, fSupervision 1 03/87 1 7 e 1 2 i, fSupervision 2 07/88 1 6 i 2 3 i, fSpervision/Completion 3 03/99 1 5 e - - -

/a Key to specialies: a = agronomist, i = irrigation engineer, e = economist, f = financial analyst, o = operation assistant/b 1= No problems, 2= Moderate problems, 3= Serious problems/c 1= improving, 2= stationary, 3= worsening/d Problems: C= cofinancing, I= institutional, F= financial

Table 5: STAFF INPUTS (MAN-WEEK)

1975 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TotalPreparation 0,8 2,0 0,2 57,2 13,4 5,8 50,0 129,4Appraisal 4,6 7,3 11,9Negociations 5,2 5,2Supervision 7,9 1,7 4,5 5,6 19,7Other 6,6 0,1 0,1 6,8Total

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Table: Status of Covenants

Covenant Subject Deadline Status

Loan Agreement

Section 3.01 (b) Payment by Government of a total of CFAF 2,420 million to cover the public service costs through 1984-85 through 1986-87

Government still currently in arrears with SEAD

Section 3.01 (c) Reinsertion fund Fulfilled

Section 3.04(i) & (ii)

Program of disengagement of SAED from production-related activities full cost-recovery by SEAD on agreed inputs and agricultural services

01/31/86 Fulfilled 03/31

Section 3.04 (iii)

Full cost-recovery on O & M of irrigation network from farmers

01/31/86 Fulfilled

Section 3.04 (iv)

Settlement of all arrears older than 6 months to creditors.

03/31/86 Not fulfilled (But was considered fulfilled at credit effectiveness

Section 3.05 Postponement of any maintenance works on SEAD's rice mills only in conformity with results of study

Fulfilled

Section 3.06 (i)

Agreemnt of SEAD's two-year investment program every April 30.

Fulfilled with delays

Section 3.06 (iii)

Third lettre de mission to be prepared 06/30/87 Fulfilled with delays

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DEBI-LAMPSAR IRRIGATION PROJECT

Table 1: Follow-on Project

Name Irrigation Technical Assistance Project Credit Number 1632-SECredit Amount (US$ Million) 4.9Date of Board Approval 10/29/85

Table 2: Exchange Rates

Name of Currency CFA

Year:

Apparaisal Year Average 245

Intervening Year Average 327

Completion Year Average 378

Table 3: Mission data

Mission Datemo/yr

No of Persons

Mandays in field

Specialisazations Represented 2/

Performance Rating 3/ Trend 4/

Types of Problems 5/

Identification - - -Preperation 1/ - - -Pre-apparaisal août-76 6 10 a,b,e,f,g - - -Appraisal févr-77 8 18 a,b,c,d,e - - -Supervision 1 juin-78 1 5 a 1 - M

2 nov-78 1 2 a 2 2 M,O3 mars-79 2 4 a 2 1 T4 juil-79 3 12 b,c,d 2 2 F,M,O5 mars-80 2 13 c,d 2 2 F,M,O6 juil-80 3 15 b,c,d 2 2 F,M,O7 nov-80 3 11 b,c,d 2 1 F,M,O8 juil-81 1 9 d 1 1 F,O

( ) févr-82 4 17 1 19 oct-82 2 8 c,d 1 2 0

10 avr-83 1 2 d 2 2 011 nov-83 1 6 d 1 2 0( ) mars-84 1 1 1 2 012 juil-84 2 30 d,e 1 2 0

1/ Carried out under Credit 5-18-SE

2/Specialisations: a-Irrigation Engineer, b - Agriculturist, c - Financial Analyst, d- Rural Engineer, e - Agro-economist, f - Drainage Engineer g- Soil Specialist,

3/ Performance Rating : 1- Problem free or minor problems, 2- Moderate problems, 3 - Malor Problems,4/ Trend: 1- Improving , 2- Stationary , 3 – Deteriorating

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5/ Types of problems: F -Financial, M- Managerial, T- Technical, P- Political, O-other ( ) indicates supervision missions that were not included in the official numbering

Table 4:

FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86

Appraisal Estimate (US$ Million) 1.0 6.8 13.8 18.4 20.0

Actual Disbursement (US$ Million) 0.0 3.9 8.5 12.5 14.8 16.5 17.1 18.7 19.4Actual as % of

Estimate 0 57 62 68 76 83 86 94 97Date of Final Distursement October 29, 1986

Table 5: Incremental Agricultural Production

Without Project

Appraisal with Project at Maturity

Incremental Benefits with project 1/

PADDY

Lampsar Area (ha) 1,200 1,800 2,000 Yield (T/ha) 0,8 3,5 4,5 Production (T) 960 6,300 5,340 9,000 Debi Area (ha) 500 1,100 730 Yield (T/ha) 0,8 3,5 5,5 Production (T) 400 3,85 2,57 4,015Total Paddy Area (ha) 1,700 2,900 2,730 Yield (T/ha) 0,8 3,5 4,8 Production (T) 1,360 10,150 8,790 13,015

TOMATOES Area (ha) - 340 0 Yield (T/ha) - 30 0 Production (T) - 10,200

1/ 1986/1987

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Table 6: beneficiaries and Average Farm Size

Perimeter Village Section Number of Farm

Average Area per farm

Average Family Size d/

Average Area Farm Adult

(ha) (ha)

LAMPSAR a/

Lampsar 101 1,25 14,1 0,13Bifeche 44 0,96 8,2 0,18Savoigne 74 0,92 14,6 0,12Ndelle 218 1,22 14,9 0,13Keur S.Sow 301 0,69 9 0,15Tilene 181 1,39 12 0,18Diagambale 317 0,93 15,9 0,1Ndiaye 155 1,13 12,7 0,17Boundoum peul 378 0,97 10,6 0,17Ndioungue 95 1,81 13,4 0,19Roubantine 81 0,96 9,8 0,15

Sub-Total 1945 1,05 12,9DEBI b/

Debi 393 1,12 n.a. n.a.Tiguet 289 1 n.a. n.a.

Sub-TotalTotal c/ 682 1,07 n.a. n.a. a/ 1985-86b/ 1986-87c/ Using average family size at appraisal of 8 members, there are 21,000 beneficiaries. Using 1986 surveyresults from lampsar, average family size is 12,9 members, giving about 34,000 beneficiaries. d/ Family size and composition data from a 1986 survey conducted by SAED.

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Table 7: Financial Returns to paddy Production (CFA) 1/

Financial Returns per Hectare Financial Returns per Exploitation

Without Project Appraisal Forecast Actual

Appraisal Actual

Area (ha) 1 1 1 3 0,7 1,8 Paddy Production (tons) 0,800 3,500 4,500 10,500 3,150 8,100Value, Paddy 68,000 297,500 382,500 892,500 267,750 688,500Value, Hay 3,400 14,900 19,100 13,388 34,400 Gross Production Value 71,400 312,400 401,600 937,200 281,138 732,900Production Inputs 13,000 42,000 45,400 31,780 81,700Mechanical Services 21,400 21,400 14,980 38,500Water Charges 35,000 41,000 28,700 73,800 Hires Labor 39 27,3 70,2 Financial Cost 13,000 98,400 146,800 295,200 102,760 264,200

Net Production Value 58,400 214,000 254,400 642,000 178,378 458,700

Family Labor (days) 50 82,5 77 247,5 54 139Net Production Value per Manday 1,168 2,594 3,309 2,594 3,303 3,300Marketing (%) 2/ 53 33 73Marketings Value 212,800 92,863 500,200Net Cash Income 66,000 (-9,897) 236,000

Net Cash Income per Manday 857,000 (-183) 1,698   1/ Lampsar

2/ Reminder from total production after substracting autoconsumption (100kg rice *1/.65 paddy conversion * people = 2215kg/year/family). Marketing include in-kind payments for production inputs, including hired labor.

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Fourth Irrigation Project

Table 1: Project Financing (US $ Million)

source Appraisal estimate Actual /latest estimate Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total

IDA 22.48 11.12 33.60 23.37 12.45 35.82Government of Senegal 5.40   5.40 11.67 - 11.67

KFW 3.35 6.65 10.0 3.07 6.10 9.17BADEA - 4.70 4.70 - 4.71 4.71

FAC 0.21 1.09 1.30 0.41 2.14 2.55CCCE/CFD 4.48 6.13 10.61 4.79 6.56 11.35

Total 35.92 29.96 65.61 43.31 31.96 75.27

Table 2: Credit and Grant Disbursement

Estimated and Actual Cumulative DisbursementsUS$ Millions

  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996Appraisal Estimate 1.7 7.4 14.2 20.5 25.9 29.9 31.6 33.0 33.6Actual - 4.3 7.2 21.9 27.8 31.8 32.8 34.5 35.8Actualas a %of Estimate

0 58 51 107 107 106 104 105 107

Date of Final Disbursement: March 12, 1996

Remarks: the total Credit amount of SDR 26.2 million is fully disbursed. The disbursement period was extended by four months to allow for completion of works partially contracted out before the credit closing date. The higher US$ figures are due to depreciation of the US $ vis-à-vis the SDR.

Table 3: Key indicator for project Implementation

Indicators Estimated ActualI. Key Implementation indicators in SAR/MOP    

1. Rehabilitation of irrigation perimeters (ha) a. Boundoum b. Thiagar c.Dagana A & B

3,2801,1202,580

1,6001,2692,643

2. Increase in rice yields (%) 11 11 3. Increases in cropping intensity (%) 160 100 4. Area under diversified crops (ha) 540 150 5. Area under fodder trees (ha) 245 30II. Modified indicators - - 1. Major Maintenance Works (ha) - 525

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Table 4: Bank Resources-Missions

          Performance rating4/  

Stage of project cycle

Month1/

yearNumber of persons Days in field

Specialized 2/3/

staff skills represented

Implementation

status Development objectives

Types of problems5/

Preparation FAO May 1985            Pre-appraisal Feb/March 86 4 25 A,IE,EF,S - - -Appraisal June 86 5 18 A,IE,EF,TE, S - - -Supervision 1 oct.88 1 6 IE - - -

2 March 89 2 14 IE 2 1 M3 Nov.89 2 14 IE 2 1 M4 June 90 2 13 IE 3 3 F5 Feb. 91 1 6 IE 2 2 F6 Oct.91 2 6 IE 2 2 F7 April 92 1 13 IE 2 2 F8 Oct.92 1 20 IE 3 2 F9 July 93 1 14 IE, EF 2 2 F/T10 April 94 1 11 IE 2 1 F

1/ Mission End Date2/ A = Agriculturist, IE = Irrigation Engineer, EF = Economist/Financial Analyst, TE = Technical Educators, S = Sociologist3/ All Bank missions were jointly undertaken with CFD and with KFW and MCAC 4/ 1= Problem free or minor problem, 2 = Moderate problem, 3 = Major problem5/ F = Financial, M = Managerial, T = Technical

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