UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBERAD500301

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

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FROM: confidential

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TO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 27 FEB1969. Other requests shall be referred toOffice of the Adjutant General [Army],Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY28 Feb 1981, DoDD 5200.10; OAG, D/A LTR 29APR 1981

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITYMARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies

to each page, unless otherwise marked.Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that. the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in anyway supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensingthe holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention thatmay in any way be related thereto.

- ' / C. CONFIDENTIAL

,,-. , DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY /4277 < OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

IN NRLy MwaR TO

AGA-P (M) (12 Feb 69.) FOR er-UT-684276 -Z-rbPrr-1-969-

SUBJECT: OperationalRevport . essonh Learned, ,eadquarters,. .pjedas'

apital Nilitary-Assistance Command (Pro ) 3 ding 31 Octo-

a fcctf the Nationalfthe

SEE DISTRIBUTION ... ., . . -.. . -7' 794 ,

L. .... "-:d 9,. i5 proh-iibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance

with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should

Sbe reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days

ofreceipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate

benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and

may be adapted for use in developing training material.

'BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF 1IE ARMY:

>? -.

,ncl KENNETH G. WICKRAMas, Major General, USA

The Adjutant General

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CommandantsUS Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Armor School

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Regraded unclassified when separatedfrom classified Inclosure.

,'I , [ Ci 4 . L) -CONFIDENTIAL

I

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Infantry School.

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US Army Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov)

............ .. ................. . .........................

!!

$2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYHEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES CAPITAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (PROV)APO San Francisco 96243

AVCE-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV)for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

See Distribution

1. (C) Section 1, Operationss Significant Activities0

a. General: Throughout the reporting period0 Headquarters CapitalMilitary Assistance Command (cMAc) (PROv) continued the expan!sion in per-sonnel and facilities required to better accomplish its critical role inthe defense of Saigon. A net gain of 126 perzonnei was xealized, tobring the total strength to 425 officers and EMo The awards and decora-tions program picked up momentum with a total of 51 being prooeased, in-cluding three Impact Awards to Vietnamese personnel0 Operations duringthe quarter were directed mainly at locating the elusive enemy and thenrapidly applying combat power to destroy him. Enemy caches were thesubject of intensified search operations which resulted in the discoveryof significant quantities of materiel, The CHAC Artillery section con-tinued to perfect quick reaction techniques related to the counter rocket/mortar system, and a comprehensive bridge inspection program was initiatedby the Engineer Office which resulted in a significant improvement in pro-tection. At the end of the reporting period0 two separate Infantry bri-gades, an air cavalry squadron (-) and an artillery battalion were underoperational control of Commanding General0 CMAC,

b. G-I Activities:

(1) Throughout the reporting period, the r)ACofS. G-i initiated andcompiled data for a USARV manpower survey to be conducted in November 1968.

(2) The health, morale, discipline and safety within the command re-mained excellent.

(3) The following awards and decorations were processed 2

(a) Legion of Merit

7 CONFIDENTIAL DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;INCL DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL(b) Bronze Star Medal 25

(c) Army Commendation Medal 12

(d) Air Medal 6

(e) Impact awards 3

(4) The personnel strength of Headquarters, CMAC increased during thequarter as shown:

Officer gains 44 EM gains 205Officer loses 32 EM loses 91

Net gain 12 -114

Assigned Strength 31 October 1968: Officers: 90 Enlisted: 335

c. G-2 Activities: (Ref: Maps, Special Use SE Asia 1:100,000 seriesL 607, Sheets 6230 and 6330)

(1) The G-2 Section expanded its liaison and coordination with theDistrict Intelligence Operation Coordination Centers (DIOCC) within GiaDin1 Province. Purpose was to establish more effective intelligence ex-change between HQ, CMAC, Saigon, District, and Province. The program hasmarkedly improved the overall coordination between CMAC and RVN intelli-gence gathering agencies.

(2) A comprehensive CMAC Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan wascompleted integrating all available means into a flexible, cohesive systemresponsive to the needs of the ground commander. The result has been abetter understood reconnaissance effort and greater efficiency in the em-ployment of the surveillance/reconnaissance means of the command.

(3) The enemy situation during the reporting period was character-ized by relative inactivity and dispersion into squad and platoon sizedelements. Main force and local force units generally remained outside theCMAC AO, leaving only guerrilla units within the AO. Only one significantcontact occurred during the period. On 28 September 1968, the 5th RangerGroup contacted an estimated 50 to 60 man enemy force vic XS715834, laterdetermined to be from the 6th Local Force Battalion. Results of the en-gagement were 9 EN KIA, 12 PWs. Other contacts, averaging from 6-10 perweek, consisted of individual or squad sized enemy engagements, usuallyterminating immediately after a brief exchange of fire.

(4) There were three significant rbcket attacks on Saigon during thereporting period; on 22 August, twenty two rounds of 122mm rockets werefired; on 27 August, four rounds of 107mm; on 31 October one round of 122mm,five rounds 107mm and four rounds of undetermined caliber (five rounds didnot explode(due perhaps to deterioration under extreme moist conditions),

INCL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAdditionally, a single 122mm rocKeT exphea! on Tne peiphery of Saigonon 6 September. Three rocket incidents occurred within the AO but out-side the Saigon metropolitan area. On 4 October, three 107mm rocketswere fired at the Nha Be tank farm (XS9182). On 5 September, five 122mmrockets impacted vincity XS740998.

(5) Enemy initiated incidents consisted of the following:

(a) August: Total of 112 incidents, including 16 terrorist, 79 harass-ment, and 17 miscellaneous,

(b) September: Total of 136 incidents, including 33 terrorist, 90harassement, and 13 aircraft receiving fire,

(c) October: Total of 125 incidents, including 19 terrorist, 96harassment, and 10 miscellaneous.

(6) Significant enemy losses for the period were as follows%

KIA PW Ind/Wpns Crew Served Tone of Rice zpt/dest Rkts cpt/dest 107/122

Aug 125 71 229 2 2,275 6 1

Sep 131 71 199 13 4.7 21 1

Oct 85 34 163 7 5 0 0

(7) During most of the reporting period, particulariy the latter half,intelligence reports, captured personnel, and documents indicated that theenemy was planning an offensive on Saigon. Elements of the Dong Nai Regi-ment moved south to positions north of Lai Thieu and Thu Duc Districts.Sub Region 1 elements moved closer to the CMD while SR 2 elements increasedsupply and infiltration activity, By the end of October, however, the en-emy threat lessened substantially, as the Dong Nai Regiment moved away fromCMD. In SR 4, elements of the Thu Duc Regt, which had habitually operatedin the Thu Duo District (XS9299), moved east away from CMD, Friendly opera-tions to the south of the CMAC/AC reduced the threat from that area andcaused the enemy to become increasingly dispersed. Although enemy intentionsappeared to remain concentrated on CMD, no offensive materialized by the endof October 1968.

d. Operations: (Ref: Maps, Special Use SE Asia 1:100,000 Series L 607Sheets 6230 and 6330)

(1) During the reporting period, CMAC area of operation was in,reasedtoward the southeast (western Nhon Trach (XS9584), toward the southwest intothe Pineapple area (XS6087) and into the Phu Hoa area northwest of theSaigon River (XT7907). Troop strength remained essentially the same withthe 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division replacing the 3d Bde, 25th Infantry Divi-Sion on 6 October 1968.

(2) Operations were oriented towards detailed searches of well definedareas while pushing out beyond the Capital Military District boundary to lo-cate and destroy the enemy and his caches, and to deny him staging areas fromwhich he could launch either ground, rocket, or mortar attacks on Saigon.

INCL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(3) During the early part of August in AO Knee Bend (see sketch map at

Inclosure 1), the 3d Bde, 25th Division conducted detailed search operationsalong the Hoc Mon Canal (XT6801). There were no contacts with main forceunits and only light scattered contact with local guerrilla forces. Searchoperations along the Hoc Mon Canal, however, produced significant findings inequipment and munitions,

(4) The Vinh Loc Village area (XS7195), which had been used in the pastas an enemy supply base, was targeted for intense operations, During theperiod 5-10 August, the 3d Bde, 25th Division conducted "Snatch Operations"with success, These were conducted based on sound intelligence and names ofsuspects furnished by the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Cen-ter. The operations were launched from night ambush positions in vicinityof the targeted hamlets. Several hamlets were moved into simultaneously withwell briefed teams which included both US and Vietnamese troops.

5) Surprise in cordon and search operations was achieved by air land-ing sufficient forces simultaneously around a single hamlet, Once the sealhad been placed in effect the District Headquarters was then contacted toprovide the search force. 'o move sufficient forces to conduct a surprisecordon and search just described required a minimum of 2 airmobile companies.

(6) The Pineapple area east of the Vam Co Dong River (AO Swordfish) isa known enemy base area, By aerial photo, 3700 bunkers were located in thisarea. Additionally, elements of the 6th and 308th Local Force Battalionswere believed located in AO Swordfish. Commencing the latter part of Augustand continuing to a lesser degree through October, the 199th Light Infantry?rig; >e, 22d River Assault Group, and forces from 25th ARVN Division conductedopera ions to locate and destroy the enemy and his caches in this area. Thegreatest menace to the operation were booby traps which accounted for the!,aJority of the friendly casualties. Operations in AO Swordfish were supportedby airstrikes and 8 inch artillery, resulting in many secondary explosions,Along the west bank and in the southwest corner of AO Swordfish there weresignificant findings of enemy munitions and equipment. Included in the find-ings was evidence of three hospital installations. In mid October a platoon

,'ineers joined the 199th LIB in an intensified effort to destroy bunkerse Pineapple area.

(7) In the Tan Nhut/Tan Kien area of Dinh Chanh (XS7083-7383) opera-.ons were targeted against the 6th Local Force Battalion. The 5th ARVN

Ranger Group and the 199th LID conducted operations to locate and destroythese enemy elements. Operations in the Tan Thut/Tan Kien area significantlydecreased enemy activity and resulted in findings of equipment and munitionsalong the banks of the Kinh Sang Canal (xS6984),

(8) In Mid October the 199th LID employed a new tactic termed "IMEX' (Im-lwon/Explosion). This concept permits large groups of forces to be used

-cordon and search operations. The oper-tion is conducted by emplacing a

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cordon well out from the area of prime concern, The sear-h for .e is insertedby air inside the ring. Once the search force is inserted the outer ringsweeps or squeezes in toward the center to a well defined no fire line, Whenthe no fire line has been reached, the search forte begins pushing outwara,Two such operations were conducted by the 199th LUB, one of which resulted inseven PWs.

(9) The Dong Phu Battalion had been slipp-ng ba.k and forth aross theCMD/9th Division Boundary in southeast Binh Chan. (XS7975)o Specific opera-tions were undertaken in coordination with territorial forces from both GiaDinh and Long An Provinces, National Fiela Police were als included in theseoperations with the main objective to locate aDd eliminate the Dong Phu Bat-talion. No significant contacts were made during these operations0

(10) The 3d Bde, 82d Abn Division, almost immediately upon assuming

responsibility for their AO, began detailed searches for caches using metalrods as probes and mine detectors. The probe and the mine detector usedin combination proved highly effective in locating enemy azheso During themonth of October the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Division using these devices had signifi-cant findings,

(11) The Uaterway Denial Program was strengthened during the first week inAugust with the addition of the 51st VNN PBR (Patcbl Boat, River), Withthis addition, USN Task Group 116.4 patrolled the Nha Be River (XS9285 tothe south) while the 51st Patrolled the Dong Nai River to YSQ497. Patroleffectiveness greatly increased along these waterways.. Contingency planshave been established to seal off the major avenues of enemy withdrawal inthe event of a rocket attack.

(12) Effective 1 October, each general and special staff section of theCapital Military District (CMD) Advisory Team was placed under operationalcontrol of the correspondi:,g CMAC Staff Section. CMAC Section chiefs be-came responsible for advisory matters pertaining to their functional areas,The[purpose was to provide the optimum functional interface and rapport be-tween the complete CMAC staff and the counterpart CMD staff,

(13) Throughout the reporting period, G-3 Plans continued to supervisedevelopment of reaction/reinforcement plans for the 50 designated criticalinstallations within the Saigon area, As of 31 October, 18 of the 21 plansrequired to cover all 50 installations had CMAC final approval, The remain-ing three plans were in existence and could be effectively executed, but wereundergoing revision/correction prior to final approval,

(14) The Non-Combatant Relocation Plan continued in its development,Assembly Areas and helicopter landing zones were designated and planningand coordination were in progress for transportation (air and ground),security, communications and other appropriate tasks. During this period,the estimated number of relocatees increased from 14,000 to 18,000 persons,

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USAID is developing alert, assembly, and accountability procedu:-es whichinclude the establishment and maintenance of computerized records on allUS G,.vernment sponsored non-combatants. As of 31 October, approximately3500 names had been cataloged. The completion date is estimated for lateJanuary or early February, concurrently with the USAID alert plan,

(15) Other major plans includ, it: Lerated Pacification Program(Operation Cleanup), the Counter-O ensive Plan (OPLAN Richmond Rebel), and theEnemy Interdiction Plan (OPLAN YAL PALON). Mission statements were alsopublished for 2 OPCON l'-des.

(16) The Defoliatior rogram CMD received emphasis and has beenmoderately accelerated .even US requests for chemical defoliation weresubmitted and were awaL.ing GVN approval at the end of the reporting period.

e. G-4 Activities:

(1) On 6 October 1968, the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division became OPCONto CMAC replacing the 3d Bde, 25th Division . Efforts were made to acquireadequate facilities on Tan Son Nhut (TSN) Airbase for the Command Post andbrigade support activities. Requests were submitted to USAHAC for the 79thOrdnance De'cachiment Compound on TSN, which was ir. the process of being evac-uated. USAHAC evaluated this request along with other requests for the 79thOrd Det area, and a decision was made to allocate Camp Red Ball, a compoundlarger than the requested facility, to the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div. Camp Red3all is now occupied by the Brigade Command Post.

(2) Action was taken to acquire 5th Special Forces Camp Goodman, ad-jacent to HQ, CMAC in order to improve working conditions for CMAC person-nel. This facility would provide billeting for key personnel and noonmessing facilities. Assignment of this facility to CMAC would also pro-vide a needed motor pool and maintenance area, with orderly room and stor-age space for C14AC and HQ Co Supply. MACV at the end of the reportingperiod was studying the proposal to relocate the Command Liaison Detach-ment, 5th Special Forces Group from Camp Goodman and make it availableto the Capital Military Assistance Command.

(3) The arrangement of having the G-i, G-4, AG, 1O, Hq Comdt, HQ Coand parts of the G-2 and G-5 in the MACV Annex separated from other ele-ments of the headquarters which are in the CMD Compound was unsatisfactory.Arrangements were made to obtain Building #3, Quartermaster Advisory TeamDuilding at the C10 Compound, so that the entire CMAC headquarters could.be located in Camp Le Van Duyet. Plans to renovate newly acquired build-ings, when they are made available, have been made and a project submittedto the USAHAC Engineer. Estimated completion date and date staff sectionscan move out of the MACV Annex were not available at the end of the quarter.

(4) On 6 September 1968, the Cpmmanding General, 1st Log Cmd establish-ed a revised system for reporting information on logistical problems of con-cern to major commanders. This new system provides for a semi-monthly re-port from CMAC on logistical problems considered to be critical and vitalto mission accomplishment. The Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL) is

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given immediate attention and special management, Results received throughreports by CMAC indicate it is a valuable aid,

(5) To maintain the vital radar screen around the city of Saigon. andkeep radar sets and ancillary equipment operational to the maximum degreepossible, the following actions were taken:

(a) It was requested that the 519th Signal Detachment (Radar Repair)located in Long Binh, be moved to Saigon where it would be more readilyavailable to perform maintenance on radar sets OPCON to CMAC, The requestwas approved and the 519th Signal Detachement is now located at Camp RedBall, near Tan Son Nhut AFB.

(b) Back up equipment was obtained by CMAC to be used as float itemswhen the OPCON radar sets or power supplies could not be quickly placed inoperation by a contact team. Additional float TPS-33 and 25 Radar Setswere requested from USARV.

(c) A qualified generator repairman with a basic load of generatorrepair parts is available to work on generators at any of the radar sitesOPCON to CMAC. A consolidated PLL has been developed and requisitions sub-mitted for PLL items to support generators that power the various types ofradar sets used in the CMD area.

(6) On 28 August 1968, COMUSMACV and GVN approved the CMAC plan tousa CS munitions, without prior clearance, in order to quickly supressenemy rocket and mortar fire in sensitive areas within Gia Dinh Province,All available rounds of 105mm and 4.2" CS were obtained and issued to theOPCON units. The rounds are experimental items and are not available inthe normal supply system. These rounds are retained in the CMD area ofoperation; when units are released from OPCON to this headquarters, the105mm and 4.2" CS munitions are transferred to relieving units,

f. G-5 Activities;

(1) During the quarter, procedures were established for regular pre-planned and PSYOP missions within CMAC/CMD AO, Missions were flown by the5th Special Operations Squadron (USAF) with an EM aboard from the 6th PSYOPBn Direct Support Team. Targeting included cumulative as well as currentintelligence as a basis for selection,

(a) Average number of PSYOP flights: 4 per day (11 hrs); 28 targets,

(b) Typical Schedule: 0500-1200 by U10 (average 13 targets), 2200-

0500 by 0-47 (average 15 targets),

(2) On 28 August, G-5 began maintaining a continuous 30 minute on-callcapability to provide aerial PSYOP support in the form of a special explana-tory tape in conjunction with use of CS artillery fire to suppress rocket/Mortar attacks.

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g.. Artillery:

(1) The AN/MPQ-4A radars employed by CMAC proved relatively ineffectivein locating enemy low trajectory weapons, specifically rocketsQ A modifica---ion wis performed on all radars in CMAC in October which provided for the'etection and location of low trajectory weapons using a single beam inter-cert and extrapolation techniaue. This modification should greatly enhance

,-': CrA C rocket detection capability of the radars to function in a couILter-ortar role.

(2) Evaluation of the flash base and plotting central has resulted inC onclusion that the existing system does not provide adequate coverage.urc. accurate target location or the desired degree of flexibility to

= rapidly to multiple rocket attack, Accordingly, a new flash base--m nas been designed employing 16 US observation posts instead of thent nine, two separate radio reporting nets, and two M-5 plotting boards,.: 'nd th6 base atmitiimtm" costs ihzplrsonnel and equipment, th plan

i_ 1cr establishment of one new double OP and the addition of sufficient&o.neI to five of the existing OPs to double the sector of search, This

ion provides in effect four OPs observing at the same time in each ofquadrants. To provide the flexibility necessary during multiple

_ks, a second M-5 plotting table will be used in the plotting centralPnn "dditional radio net will be employed resulting in eight OPs eachrig on separate nets to two plotting agencies. The resulting cover-

>fiom this expanded system should be adequate to insure the requireda ozimuth rays to develop an accurate intersection on enemy first

: ."aunchings,

, ngineers.

,. The replacement of the 3d Bde, 25th Div by the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Divon *, :tcber, increased the number of engineer units within the command fromone to tw. 2ompanies, since the latter unit has an organick Engineer Cnywhereas the former does not,

(2; 2ne improvement of security on the 28 critical bridges within theCNIAC AC .;oncinued to be the primary mission of the Engineer Section, Tem-porary lightin -wasA nstalled on si* bridges and improved on 13 bridges, Most,f 1- lighting was concentrated on bridge structures and approaches to deterw lerborne saboteurs. Pier protection was provided for 11 bridges, four ofwhich received only temporary concertina pier protection, Permanent protec-tion will be installed later by the RVNAF Engineers, Defensive positionswere constructed and improved at 27 bridges; this included 26 prefabricatedTmltiple occupancy bunkers and one bunker tower,

(3) A mobile repair team was forred to perform maintenance on the1 --itisy systems on the critical bridges. This team repaired generatorsaiL wiring, replaced light bulbs, installed new lights as required and-rovided emergency back up generators,

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(4) A CMAC Bridge rojectf1i-cer program was nt ed for 20 of thecritical bridges. The Project Officers served as expeditors for makingimprovements in bridge defenses. They made day and night inspections atleast weekly and kept current on the status of defenses, In conjunctionwith this program a nightly bridge inspection program was initiated inwhich representatives from US units or US Advisors inspect the same 20bridges nightly and report all deficienceB in bridge security to this head-quarters. A similar, though at present less extensive program, has beeninitiated by HQ, CMD.

(5) A project to provide permanent commercial lighting on 25 bridgeswas approved by HQ, USARV. The lighting will be contractor installed andwill illuminate piers and water approaches in addition to the roadways,

(6) Other projects throughout the quarter included construction ofradar towers, fire support bases, and revetments,

i. Signal:

(1) Communications facilities continued to expand to keep pace withthe growth of CMAC. The addition of security equipment on selected FMradio nets allowed fast, reliable and secure communications. An exampleof a newly secured- net links the ground surveillance and counter mortarradar observers with the CIHAC Fire Support Element. The initiation ofthis secure net greatly reduced the time required to transmit enemy sight-ings and bring fires to bear. This added security, plus added emphasison correct reporting procedures has done much to add to the effectivenessof the counter rocket/mortar program.

(2) The arrival of six radio teletypewriter sets, AN/GRC-142, addedto the overall- effectiveness of communications between this headquartersand its OPCON brigades. A rapid hard copy secure means was installed toprovide continuous RATT communications regardless of the location or fre-quency of displacement of a brigade headquarters,

(3) During the reporting period, work was commenced on a new fixedplant communications center which was scheduled for completion next quarterand will provide high speed, high quality traffic capabilities to higherheadquarters and entry into the world-wide network through the Phu LamDCS faciLty. In addition, slow speed service will still be availableto subordinate units that are unable to terminate high speed cirucits,USAHAC Engineer, with support of the 18th Engineer Brigade, is nearingcompletion of the facility. The Ist Signal Brigade will install thenew communications equipment as soon as it arrives from CONUS,

(4) Communications responsibilities expanded to include support toadvisory elements throughout the area of operation. Additional radio

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CONFIDENTIALnets were established to reduce the amont of Traffic passed on the Gia DinhSector net. This was accomplished by the establishment of separate nets foreach of the six sub-sectors in Gia Dinh and the establishment of an ArtilleryFire Clearance Net. Telephone service was expanded to provide an additionalmeans of communications between sector and sub-sector.

j. Information Office:

(1) The Public Information Section continued coverage of CMAC/CiUD activ-ities to the fullest extent possible. The home town news program was continuedon a limited basis commensurate with personnel resources. Liaison was main-tained with CMAC Staff Sections, OPCON unit information offices, US and ARVNNews Media, and the'Joint US PublJ6Affairs*Office.

(2) The Command Information Section continued daily publication oft.le C1AC World Report and published the Ist edition of a semi-monthly news-paper, Initial application for authorization to publish a full color maga-zine on CMAC history and activities was submitted. Command Information FactSheets have been published on a regular basis. Distribution of all commandinformation material now includes Team 100 and CAC operational control units.

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CONFIDENTIAL2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations,and Recommendations.

a. Personnel, None

b. Operations,

(1) Employment of E-8 Chemical Launcher.

(a) OBSERVATION: The E-8 launcher can be employed accurately and rapidlywith a high degree of mobility,

(b) EVALUATION: The E-8 launcher can be quickly secured to the tankxenon search light by means of the straps provided. This arrangement per-mits elevation to be applied by gun control means,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That E-8 launchers in tank units be mounted on

xenon search lights,

(2) Use of Mine Detectors,

(a) OBSERVATION: Mine detectors can greatly enhance the probabilityof discovering enemy caches.

(b) EVALUATION: Significant weapons, ammunition and equipment cacheshave been discovered through the employment of mine detectors. Several ofthe caches were located under water and probably would not have otherwisebeen discovered,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That use of mine detectors be continued with em-

phasis on new techniques in their employment,

(3) Mortar Firing Positions.

(a) OBSERVATION: Units operating in wet areas often have difficultyfinding suitable hardstand for mortars.

(b) EVALUATION: When establishing night defensive positions in bothjungle and delta areas, trees with extensive root systems will provide limiu.eahardsLand potential, By cutting these trees at ground level and using theexisting root system as a foundation, the 81mm mortar base plate will beless likely to sink into the ground during firing. Another technique usedis placement of the base plate on a salvage 2-2 ton truck tire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: These techniques be considered for inclusion in

appropriate current FM's.

(4) Use of Starlight Scope with M-60 LMG.

(a) OBSERVATION: The starlight scope rith the M-60 LMG can be an ef-fective combination.

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(b) EVALUATION: The starlight scope with observer should be positionednear the machine gun and gunner. The observer and gunner together adjustshort bursts onto the target and continue the delivery of observed fire. Al-though the starlight image is domewhat blurred by the light emitted by tracerrounds, fire can nevertheless be adjusted effectively if the ratio of tracerto ball ammunition is not too high.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the normal ratio of tracer to ball ammunition

be decreased prior to using the M-60 LMG in conjunction with the starlightscope.

(5) Radar Sightings.

(a) OBSERVATION: Radar sightings in relatively populated areas oftencannot be cleared for firing.

(b) EVALUATION: Sightings which cannot be cleared are tracked until suchtime as they can be cleared or until a definite route of movement can be deter-mined. A grid can be pre-cleared ahead of the target and artillery laid tofire a TOT Mission when the enemy enters the cleared target zone.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That procedures be established to accurately

identify and plot individual moving targets.

(6) Combined Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Detailed planning and coordination are especiallyimportant in US-ARVN operations.

(b) EVALUATION: Differences in language, background and experienceincrease the possibility of misunderstanding, The assumption that bothparties understand the intricacies of pending operations can be a danger-ous one, regardless of the amount of time spent in joint planning. Co-ordination between commanders is continuous throughout the conduct of acombined operation to detect and minimize misunderstanding.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That interpreters take part in planning confer-ences, that written instructions be given whenever possible, liaison of-ficers exchanged between participating headquarters, and finally thateffective communications are prearranged and checked.

(7) Orientation of Observation Posts.

(a) OBSERVATION: Experience indicated that once a rocket flash wasdetected by a tower observer, rapid orientation of other observers couldnot be accomplished effectively utilizing the M-5 plotting board.

(b) EVALUATION: To quickly disseminate primary azimuths of observa-tion a system of prenumbered grids was initiated, One hundred and eightblocks containing four grid squares each were selected and numbered.Azimuths from each of the nine observation towers to each prenumbered

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CONFIDENTIALgrid block were derived using the M-5 pFo-tting Doar.. "ne compiledlist of azimuths were placed at all towers. Employing this system, CMACplotting central can orient observation towers simultaneously in threeseconds whereas previously it required at least 3 minutes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

(8) Command Posts.

(a) OBSERVATION: An aerial command post has limitations duringprolonged contact.

(b) EVALUATION: When two or more battalions are conducting coordinatedoperations against significant enemy strength, the establishment of a for-ward brigade CP on the ground is usually preferable to giving multibattalioncontrol to one battalion, or to using only an aerial CP.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That careful consideration be given to establish-

ment of the tactical CP prior to each operation.

(9) Use of Claymore Mines.

(a) OBSERVATION: Claymore mines can be used in ah offensive as well asdefensive role.

(b) EVALUATION: Communications wire, electrical blasting caps and radiobatteries can be employed to set claymore mines out to ranges of hundreds ofmeters. The mines are "daisy chained" through use of detonating cord tocover the target area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That ambush patrols use this extended reach whena concealed position cannot be found near the desired killing zone; thatunits consider claymore mines to provide more depth to their posiLions.

(10) Crossing-of Waterways.

(a) OBSERVATION: Traversing of waterways on foot at low tide is ex-tremely difficult.

(b) EVALUATION: Normally 12-36 inches of silt and mud are left at thebanks of canals and some streams when the water recedes. Units faced kiththis situation cut nipa palms to place on the mud to provide a walkway,When required to W~lk through mud, troops walk on the balls of their feet,lean forward, and avoid halting. The crossing site must be well secured,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

c. Training

Rocket/Mortar Defense Reaction Tests.

k rCONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(a) OBSERVATION: Rapid and accurate defection of a nosTi-e rocket/

mortar launch and quick engagement of the firing site contribute signif-

icantly to a successful rocket/mortar defense.

(b) EVALUATIONs CMAC has developed and implemented a simple test to

evaluate detection meansand reaction time, The test is initiated by fir-

ing one round (HE VT) at a predesignated precleared grid. The OP's report

their sightings to the CMAC FSE. Plotting Central at CMAC FSE plots the

reported sightings using M-5 plotting boards. As soon as a grid is develop-

ed it is forwarded to an artillery Fire Control Headquarters which directs

a fire unit to attack the target. The target is engaged with 2 rounds of

shell HC smoke, (NOTE: In response to an enemy rocket attack CS munitionsare used to supreso the enemy until HE clearance is obtained), The followingare used to judge reaction time: FSE Time - time from reported flash to de-velopment of grid and passing of information to Arty Central Headquarters; BnFDC Time - time from receipt of information at Arty Central Headquarters toreceipt at fire unit; fire unit time - time from receipt at fire unitto firing the first round. Since implementation of this test, reaction timehas been reduced and a sense of competition developed between the artilleryunits in CMAC.

(9) RECOMMENDATION: Units with a similar mission implement like teststo evaluate the proficiency of observationsmeans and firing elements.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Locating Enemy Caches,

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy often locates his caches below normalwater levels.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the natural erosion of soil, pockets are formedalong rivers and canals, particularly under the hardstand upon which housesare built, These pockets are ideal for hiding items of value to the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That searches near rivers and canals be made atlow tide and include a careful inspection of the waterts edge and the useof probing rods and mine detectors.

(2) Recording Cache Data.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy utilizes many ingenious techniques to con-

ceal his supplies from friendly searches.

(b) EVALUATION: Records of cache finds are maintained at battalionlevel and above, and are continually analyzed to detect patterns in conceal-ment, construction, marking, placement, protection, and retrieval. As aminimum, this analysis causes an AO to be more thoroughly and systematicallysearched,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That combat units maintain comprehensive data per-

, CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIALtaining to all cache sites.

(3) Evaluation of Agent Reports.

(a) OBSERVATION: A well planned agent evaluation system wIly assistgreatly in determining reliability of reports.

(b) EVALUATION: A recently begun evaluation process entails the promptsubmission by subordinate units of information which confirms or denies in-formation produced by each agent, and any additional information determiningthe agent's reliability and usefulness. Reports have already confirmed thereliability of certain agents. Some difficulty has been experienced in ob-taining data due to agents operating in more than one unit AO.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: N/A

e. Logistics: None

f. Organization: None

g. Other.

(1) Recognition of Vietnamese Effort.

(a) OBSERVATION: Cooperation and coordination between ARVN, RF-PF,National Police and US forces can be improved by recognizing the Viet-namese contribution to the discovery of enemy materiel.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that when conducting operations insupport of VN forces, and/or when operations are based upon VN intelligencesources, increased rapport was esteblished by giving official credit andrecognition for all enemy materiel found or captured. In many cases thisinvolved the transfer of captured items to the VN. The US intelligenceofficer must insure that items of intelligence value are rapidly evaluatedprior to directing them towards VN channels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This evaluation be considered in revision of the

appropriate F1.

(2) Prevention of Immersion Foot.

(a) OBSERVATION: Non-stop operations in inundated areas will resultin reduced combat efficiency due to immersion foot,

(b) EVALUATION: The problem of immersion foot has been greatly reducedin some units by the prnactice of companies operating exclusively at nightand maintaining equipment and resting during the day. Tactical situationpermitting, shower shoes are worn for short periods.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units operating in severe wet conditions bepermitted whenever possible to stand down aminthuin of 3-4 hours duringdaylight hours.

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) PSYOPS Novelties. CONFIDENTIAL(a) OBSERVATION: Face to face PSYOP activity, is more credible if

pro-GVN materials are given to Viftnamese by their own countrymen.

(b) EVALUATION: To ihsure the targeu is actually reached, a USPSYOPERATOR must at all times accompany the Vietnamese team. -te mustremain unobtrusive, however, and the true purpose of his visit unknownto his counterparts. He can assume the role of gathering informationfor similar future programs, and of recording reaction & cacP u. ingof the recipients.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: PSYOPS personnel insure that all materialreaches the intended target.

(4) Searching of VN Civilians,

(a) OBSERVATION: Searching of Vietnamese suspects and detainees must'e accomplished by Vietnamese unless operational necessity dictates otherwise.

(b) EVALUATION: On a joint US-Vietnamese cordon and search in whichthere was no contact, several US enlisted men searched VN suspects. DuringThe process, some piasters fell on the floor, A US soldier put the moneyin his pocket and then turned the suspect over tD the interpreter, At thesame time he gave the money to the interpreter who returned it to thesuspect. Some VN soldiers saw the EM put the piasters in his pocket butdid not see them returned, As a result, the operation was held up for twohours until the Vietnamese commanders were satisfied that the money had notbeen stolen,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To avoid the possibility of misunderstanding unitleaders closely supervise their men to insure that current policy relevantto searching VIT nationals and their property is followed.

(5) Removal of Barbed Wire.

(a) OBSERVATION: The extensive use of barrier material in RVN sometimesrestricts civilian' movement.

(b) EVALUATION: Development of the civilia:n economy makes it desirableto remove barbed wire and other barrier material. from areas where no longerneeded, consistent with tactical necessity. This process should be continuousin order to permit maximum use of roads and fields by the friendly population,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Established tactical barriers be reviewed periodicaly

to determine their tactical usefulness.

(6) Development of PSYOP Material by Non-PSYOP-Trained Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: US personnel in other than PSYOP units prepare ma-terial for use in their operations.

C E

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(b) EVALUATION: Due to ethnic and cultural differences, communication

with Vietnamese Nationals is frequently difficult. Further, there is therask of producing material which is actually oounterproductive and/or inviolation of current JUSPAO guidance,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all material be forwarded through PSYOP

channels for screening prior to usage.

(7) Enemy Bunker Destruction.

(a) OBSERVATION: An engineer company in support of an infantry brigadeduring operations in an enemy staging area developed techniques for enemybunker destrutction,

(b) EVALUATION: During the period 4 to 20 October 1968, A Co, 31stEngineer Bn furnished technical and materiel support to the 199th LIB -in anarea 15 KM west of Saigon, Approximately 900 structures varying from eightman bunkers to one man positions and punji pits were destroyed. The bestsystem was to break the engineers into three-man demolition teams to workwith each infantry platoon. When a bunker complex was located, the infantryunit would secure the area while the demolition team(s) reduced thestructures, Tho explosives used throughout was C-4. Non-electrical primingwas used as this required less logistical effort and was more rapid toemploy. Dud artillery rounds in the area required a minimum of four poundsof C-4 to assure destruction.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That engineer technical and materiel suppor-of demolition operations be tailored to the given situation for maximumefficiency; that under less than ideal conditions, planning for destructionof duds consider the expenditure of more than normal amounts of explosives.

(8) Emergency Repair of Bridge Security Lighting,

(a) OBSERVATION: Lighting systems of critical bridges can developdeficiencies or lose power without warning.

(b) EVALUATION: To assist in eliminating the vulnerability of bridges,a mobile lighting repair team has been developed. This team, formed from andequipped by a US Army Engineer unit, has a vehicle, tools, materials, stand-by generators and communications equipment. When a lighting deficiencydevelops, the unit securing the bridge contacts the CMAC TOC, who in turncontacts the repair team. The team moves to the bridge and attempts to re-pair the deficiency. If necessary, and if possible, they utilize theirstandby generator until the power system can be repaired. Most prevalentproblems encountered thus far are with generators and burned out bulbs,

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Units with olmilar mi~sons, cgnside.the formation

of mobile lighting repair teams.

_(9) Teletype Networks.

(a) OBSERVATION: The current teletype networks are not responsive to

17CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALthe needs of an operational headquarters

(b) EVALUATION: Common user teletype service is a necessity for anyoperational headquarters. This need was not recognized at first becauseCMAC was established as a tactical headquarters with few administrative orlogistical responsibilities. As a result, only sole-user opera .ional circuitswere established to other headquarters. CMAC has teletype service tothe ACV COC and II FFV TOC rather than to MACV and II FFV headquarters.However, the action element of higher headquarters is frequently a staffelement, rather than the operations center. Coordination of rear areasecurity measures also often requires a message capability to administrativeand logistical headquarters (such as USAHAC) in their role as securityforces, yet these headquarters are not served by the sole-user operationalteletype circuits. Since there is no theater common-user network inVietnam, satisfaction of these, as well as administrative and logisticalrequirements, require connections to the DCS major relay at Phu Lam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a theater common - user teletype networkbe designed, installed and implemented for US forces in the Republic ofVietnam, or that the world-wide teletype networks be expanded and world-wide routing indicators assigned to all operational headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls XR.L. 4LALTH

S . OTCO4/CKMD/d,Hq,DA Major, AGC

2-List of CAC OPCON Units Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:4-CG, II FFORCEV: G-3 Analysis3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC (DIST)2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT10-G-3 CMAC50-CG, USACDC, Ft Belvoir, Virginia, ATTN:

Dir of Evaluation (for information)

CONFIDENTIAL18

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H (20 Nov 68) 1st IndSUBJECTs Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV)

for Period E4iding 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) -

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 16 DEC1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the OperationalReport-Lessons Learned of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV) forthe period ending 31 October 1968, with the exceptions noted below.

3- (C) Reference para Ig (i). The modification performed on all radarE:modified the computer only, enabling it to compute the location of rocketsusing a single beam intercept. The radar capability to detect rockets andmortars has not changed. Further, this modification has done nothing toenhance the function in a countermortar role.

4. (U) Reference para 2b(5). Concur. Most units throughout III CTZ arecurrently using this technique..

5. (U) Reference para 2c. Concur. The Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command hasinitiated a similar program.

6. (U) Reference para 2g (9). Nonconcur.

a. CMAC has teletype service to II FFORCEV Headquarters Main CommunicationsCenter rather than the II FFORCEV TOC.

b. As stated in paragraph 2g (9)(b), there is no theater common-userteletype network; however, thd Army Area Communications System, operatedby 1st Signal Brigade, is the common-user network for Vietnam. CMAC hasbeen assigned a World-Wide routing indicator and is scheduled to receivea circuit into the World-Wide/Army Area Communications System.

c. In reference to paragraph 2g(9)(c), MACV has directed that effective15 October 1968, all common-user communications centers will have World-Wide

CONFIDENTIAL'7 ?t

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H (20 NOV 68) 1st Ind 16 DEC1USUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command (PROV)

for Period Ending 31 October 1968, ROS CSFOR-65 (RI)

routing indicators and that requests will be submitted by stations requiringsuch indicators.

FOR THE COMMWDERs

0, 9. FORtYILT, AGAlat AG

to

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (20 Nov 6s) 2d Ind 2 0 DEC 1968SUBJECT: Operational Report of Capital Military Assistance Command

(Prov) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Ia)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TOs Commander in Chief, United States ArVy, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learnedfor the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters,United States Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov) and concurswith the report as modified by the ist Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/

W. C. ABHTZCPT, AGC /Assistant A61tant General

GPOP-DT (20 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Capital Military Assist Comd

(Prov) for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri)-

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE C(OMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTTCPT, AGCAsst AG

22

CONFIDENTIALOPCON UNITS

199th Light Infantry Brigade (SEP)

3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division (6 October - 31 October 1968)

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (1 August - 6 October 1968)

3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry Regiment (-) w/B-1/7th Air Cavalry

attached.

5th Battalion, 16th Artillery

USAHAC (For Security Matters Only)

Inclosure 2 To CMAC ORLL, for period ending 31 Oct 68.

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA- R & D(Security claaifliction of tille. bodr of abstract and Indezxl4 Annotatlon must be entered when the overall report t'cloasn;ue d

I. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Coipetlale 8UthWj Z. REPORT SECURITY C.A§5lFICATON

S CONFIDENTIAL

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washifigton, D.C. 20310 ab. GROP 4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Hq, United States Capital MilitaryAssistance Command (Prov), Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

4 DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (7yre oe nd hwne/,e dae)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. I Aug - 31 Oct 685 AU THOR(S) (First n40, middle Initial. lalt nm.)

CO, United States Capital Military Assistance Command (Prov)

3 REPORT DATE 7a. 7TAL O. OF PACES 17b. NO. OF RE S

undated 26ec CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. ea. dR.GfNATOR'S REPORT NUMARIS)

684276b. PROJECT NO.

C. N/A 9b. OTHER REPORT NOIS) (Any other nunt.(era th-t nay be aesitedthis report)

d.

1I0. DISTRISUTION STATEMENT

1 -UPP..4NTARY NOTES l2. SPCN'ORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

Ia. ABSTRACT

D FORM4e UNCLASSIFIED

DD .A..147

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMI-TED

AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC REU ASE

UDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 ANDI NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON4 ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE,

3IMSTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE)

IJISTR!BUTION UNLIMITED,