attacks on ghouta: analysis of alleged use of chemical weapons in syria

7/29/2019 Attacks on Ghouta: Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria

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ATTACKS ON GHOUTAAnalysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria

H U M A N

R I G H T S

W A T C H


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SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH i

AttAcks on GhoutA

AnAlysis of Alleged Use of ChemiCAl WeApons in syriA


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ii ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

Copyright 2013 Human Rights WatchAll rights reserved.Printed in the United States o AmericaISBN: 978-1-6231-30534Cover design by Raael Jimenez

Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights o people around the world.We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political reedom,to protect people rom inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring oenders to justice. Weinvestigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challengegovernments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect internationalhuman rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause

o human rights or all.

Human Rights Watch is an international organization with sta in more than 40 countries,and oces in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg,London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis,Washington DC, and Zurich.

For more inormation, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org


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SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH iii

AttAcks on GhoutAAa A U Cca Wa sa

september 2013 | isbn: 978-1-6231-30534

Maps ................................................................................................................. iv

Summary ............................................................................................................ 1

Methodology ...................................................................................................... 1

I. The August 21 Attacks on Ghouta ...................................................................... 4

Moadamiya, Western Ghouta ..........................................................................4Zamalka, Eastern Ghouta ................................................................................ 7

Death Toll ..................................................................................................... 13

II. Identcaton o the Weapons Used n the Attacks ...........................................15

III. Identcaton o the Nere Agent Used n the Attacks .................................... 16

IV. Responsblty or the August 21 Attacks........................................................ 20

Syrian Government Forces Responsibility or the Attacks ................................ 20

V. Syra and Chemcal Weapons Under Internatonal Law .....................................21


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iv ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

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!

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4th ArmouredDivision Base

Moadamiya

MarkazDarayya

Qudsiya

Mashrou3Dummar

PresidePala

MazzAi rpo

Az-Za bd an i

DarQatana

7

Projected launch zone of the 140

mm rocket identied near the

Rawda Mosque, based on a mini-

mum re range of 3.8 km and a

maximum range of 9.8 km.

Rocket impact zone

MAP OF CHEMICAL WEAPON IMPACT ZONES IN

WESTERN AND EASTERN SUBURBS OF DAMASCUS


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SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH v

!

publicanard Baseigade 104)

Zamalka

Sahnaya

Hajar

Aswad

Duma

Harasta

Ayn Tarma

Babella

Jaramana

Maliha

KafrBatna

Arbin

CentralDamascus

KafarSoussa

Jowbar

Al-K aboon

Barza

Hamish

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Quasioun

zeh

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Centre dEtudeset de RecherchesScientifiques (CERS)

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Duma

5

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7

110

M1

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Source: Esri, i-cubed, USDA, USGS, AEX, GeoEye, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, and the GIS User Community

Opposition

contested area

Opposition

contested area

Rocket imact zone

in Zamalka and

Ayn Tarma

Government military bases

Data Sources: HRW, NASA, USGS, ESRI, NGA, Wikimapia, Open Street Map, Google Earth,

and the Zamalka Local Council.


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vi ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

AynTarma

AlZiniya

Erbeen

Zamalka

Hazeh

KafarBatna

MAP OF THE MM CHEMICAL ROCKET IMPACT LOCATIONS IN

ZAMALKA NEIGHBORHOOD


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SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1

Summary

This report details two alleged chemical weapons attacks

in Syria on the opposition-controlled Damascus suburbs

o Eastern and Western Ghouta, located 16 kilometers

apart, on the morning o August 21, 2013. The attackskilled hundreds o civilians, including large numbers o

children. Human Rights Watch analyzed witness accounts

o the rocket attacks, inormation on the likely source o

the attacks, the physical remnants o the weapon systems

used, and the medical symptoms exhibited by the victims

o the attack as documented by medical sta.

Our investigation nds that the August 21 attacks were

likely chemical weapons attacks using a surace-to-sur-

ace rocket system o approximately 330mm in diam-

eterlikely Syrian-producedand a Soviet-era 140mmsurace-to-surace rocket system to deliver a nerve agent.

Evidence suggests the agent was most likely Sarin or

a similar weapons-grade nerve agent. Three local doc-

tors told Human Rights Watch that victims o the attacks

showed symptoms which are consistent with exposure to

nerve gas, including suocation; constricted, irregular,

and inrequent breathing; involuntary muscle spasms;

nausea; rothing at the mouth; fuid coming out o noses

and eyes; convulsing; dizziness; blurred vision; and red

and irritated eyes, and pin-point pupils.

The evidence concerning the type o rockets and launch-

ers used in these attacks strongly suggests that these are

weapon systems known and documented to be only in the

possession o, and used by, Syrian government armed

orces. Human Rights Watch and arms experts monitoring

the use o weaponry in Syria have not documented Syrian

opposition orces to be in the possession o the 140mm

and 330mm rockets used in the attack, or their associated

launchers.

The Syrian government has denied its responsibility orthe attack, and has blamed opposition groups, but has

presented no evidence to back up its claims. Based on the

available evidence, Human Rights Watch nds that Syrian

government orces were almost certainly responsible or

the August 21 attacks, and that a weapons-grade nerve

agent was delivered during the attack using specially de-

signed rocket delivery systems. The scale and coordinated

nature o the two attacks; against opposition-held areas;

the presence o government-controlled potential launch-

ing sites within range o the targets; the pattern o other

recent alleged chemical weapon attacks against oppo-

sition-held areas using the same 330mm rocket delivery

system; and the documented possession o the 140mmand 330mm rocket systems able to deliver chemical weap-

ons in the government arsenalall point towards Syrian

government responsibility or the attacks.

Human Rights Watch has investigated alternative claims

that opposition orces themselves were responsible or

the August 21 attacks, and has ound such claims lacking

in credibility and inconsistent with the evidence ound at

the scene. Claims that the August 21 deaths were caused

by an accidental explosion by opposition orces mishan-

dling chemical weapons in their possession are incon-sistent with large numbers o deaths at two locations 16

kilometers apart, and documentation o rocket attacks on

the sites that morning, as evidenced by witness accounts,

the damage visible on the rockets themselves, and their

impact craters.

methodology

Without physical access to Eastern and Western Ghouta,

Human Rights Watch interviewed by Skype rom August

22 to September 6 more than 10 witnesses and survivors

o the August 21 attacks, and 3 doctors who responded to

the attacks. Human Rights Watch also reviewed available

video and photo ootage rom the scene o the attacks,

including high-resolution images obtained directly rom

a source who photographed and measured the rocket

components ound in the Eastern Ghouta attack, and con-

ducted a detailed analysis o the weapon remnants cap-

tured in such ootage.

Human Rights Watch asked Keith B. Ward, Ph.D., an ex-

pert on the detection and eects o chemical warare

agents, to review the clinical signs revealed by videos o

hospitalized victims o the attacks, the victims symptoms

described by medical workers on the scene, and the re-


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2 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

ported clinical signs and symptoms exhibited by medical

workers ater working with the victims.

Human Rights Watch also used GPS data and satellite im-

agery analysis to map the precise locations were the at-

tacks took place, and the exact positions where eight o

the 330mm rockets impacted in Eastern Ghouta.

In researching this report, Human Rights Watch also used

the extensive expertise o its Arms Division in the moni-

toring and identication o weapons, including chemical

weapons. Human Rights Watch previously issued detailed

reports and analysis on the last known chemical weapon

attacks, conducted by Saddam Husseins military in Iraq

against the Iraqi Kurds, culminating in the Halabja mas-

sacre, which killed thousands o civilians 25 years ago, on

March 16, 1998.1

In its investigation, Human Rights Watch was assisted by

arms experts including Nic Jenzen-Jones, author o The

Rogue Adventurer,2 as well as the independent investi-

gation conducted by Eliot Higgins o the Brown Moses

blog, who collected and analyzed photos and videos rom

the attacks.3

1 Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anal Campaign

Against the Kurds (Human Rights Watch, 1993), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanal/.2 Nic Jenzen-Jones, The Rogue Adventurer ( blog), http://rogueadventurer.com/ (accessed September 6, 2013).3 Brown Moses, Brown Moses (blog), ht tp://brown-moses.

blogspot.ch (accessed September 6, 2013).


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4 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

I. the auguSt 21 attackS on

ghouta

On the morning o August 21, 2013, dozens o videos be-

gan appearing on YouTube channels associated with the

Syrian opposition showing large numbers o dead people,the victims o what the opposition claimed was a chemical

weapons attack. The ootage also showed many hospital-

ized victims who seemed to be suering rom symptoms

rom such an attack. Large numbers o dead animals, in-

cluding sheep, dogs, cats, and wild birds, were also vis-

ible in the videos uploaded by the activists.

As more details became available, it became clear that the

attack had aected two separate opposition-controlled

districts in Damascus Suburbs governorate, located 16 ki-

lometers apart. According to local residents, the Zamalkaneighborhood in Eastern Ghouta was struck by rockets

at some time between 2 and 3 a.m., and the Moadamiya

neighborhood in Western Ghouta was struck by rockets at

about 5 a.m., shortly ater the completion o the Muslim

morning prayer.

Victims consistently showed symptoms including suoca-

tion; constricted, irregular, and inrequent breathing; in-

voluntary muscle spasms; nausea; rothing at the mouth;

fuid coming out o noses and eyes; convulsing; dizziness;

blurred vision; and red and irritated eyes, and pin-pointpupils. According to an expert review o the available ev-

idence, the symptoms exhibited by the victims are con-

sistent with exposure to a nerve agent such as Sarin. As

discussed in part III. below, Sarin has been used in at

least one previous chemical attack in the Syrian confict.

Moadamya, Western Ghouta

In Moadamiya in Western Ghouta, a witness who arrived

on the scene shortly ater rockets struck an apartment

building next to the Rawda Mosque, told Human RightsWatch what ollowed ater the rocket struck. His account

directly linked the rocket strike to deaths associated with

the alleged chemical attack in the area:

One rocket hit around 5 a.m. We were praying

in the mosque near the turbi area 400 meters

away [rom the strike site]. We heard the strike

and went to the site to help the wounded. We

thought it was a regular rocket but when we got

there someone was screaming Chemical! Chemi-

cal! The rocket ell in the rst foor o a our-story

apartment building. Everyone in the building died

in their sleep. It didnt cause a lot o destruction...It made an opening in the wall. Ater the person

was screaming, people covered their aces, with

shirts dunked in water. We didnt smell anything,4

but people were ainting. I covered my ace with

a shirt dunked in water and was rescuing people

and taking them to the medical centerI anyone

entered the building where the rocket ell they

would aint.5

The witness identied a rocket as the weapon he saw on

the scene ater the strike.6

He told Human Rights Watchthat in the days ollowing the strike, the United Nations

Mission to Investigate Allegations o the Use o Chemical

Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (the UN Mission) vis-

ited the site, examined the remnant, and took it with them,

presumably or urther analysis.

A second witness who works or the Moadamiya media

center told Human Rights Watch that he counted seven

rockets that ell in two areas o Moadamiya during the

early morning o August 21.7 He told Human Rights Watch

that our rockets impacted next to the Rawda Mosque,and the other three in the area between Qahweh Street

and Zeytouneh Street, which he identied as being ap-

proximately 500 meters to the east o the Rawda Mosque.

According to the witness, all o the rockets were o the

same type, identied by Human Rights Watch as a Soviet-

produced 140mm rocket (see opposite page).

4 In its pure orm, Sarin is a clear, colorless, tasteless and odorless

liquid. See Centers or Disease Control and Prevention, EmergencyPreparedness and Response: Facts about Sarin, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/acts.asp.5 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with witness in Moadamiya,August 22, 2013.6 The rocket is visible in the ollowing YouTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nymy8r0Kcag (accessed September 9, 2013).7 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with member o Moadamiya

media center, August 22, 2013.


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From a review o a video o an expended

rocket motor ound on the street next to

the Rawda Mosque in Moadamiya, Human

Rights Watch has identied one o the rock-ets ound in the Moadamiya attack as a So-

viet-era surace-to-surace 140mm rocket,

known as the M-14.8 A separate video shot

on August 27 shows UN inspectors mea-

suring and photographing this rocket mo-

tor, which conrmed the remnants length

and width correspond with the dimensions

o the Soviet 140mm rocket motor.9 The

rst video clearly shows the 10 venture (ex-

haust nozzles) and electric contact plate o

the rocket, which is a unique identicationcharacteristic o the Soviet-made 140mm rocket, as well

as the actory markings on the casing o the rocket, mak-

ing the identication denitive. The 179 actory markings

on the rocket reer to the soviet-era Factory 179 in Novo-

sibirsk, one o the largest producers o artillery and rock-

ets during the Soviet period, and a known manuacturer o

the 140mm M-14 rocket.

The expended rocket motor visible in the videos repre-

sents only part o the delivery system and not the weap-

ons payload. To date, no visual evidence o any type ointact or expended 140mm rocket warhead has been iden-

tied in videos shot in the areas o the August 21 attack.

The 140mm rocket is documented in standard reerence

materials as being present in the Syrian governments

weapons arsenal. Designed in the 1950s, the Soviet Union

transerred 200 BM-14 launchers,10 the most common

launcher or 140mm rockets made by the Soviet Union, to

Syria in 1967-1969, presumably along with stockpiles o

8 The rocket is visible in the ollowing YouTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nymy8r0Kcag (accessed September 9, 2013).9 [UN examines the remains o a missile in the area o chemicalGota], August 27, 2013, video clip, YouTube, http://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=6mOLULcrcVs$ (accessed September 9, 2013).10 The BM-14 launcher is the most common or 140mm rockets

that were made by the Soviet Union. Other types o launchers exist

as does the possibility o improvising eld expedient launchers, as

Vietcong orces did during the Vietnam War.

ammunition including 140mm rockets, according to the

database on arms transers maintained by the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).11

According to a declassied US munitions catalogue12 and

standard international reerence materials published by

Janes,13 only three warheads were produced or 140mm

rockets:

M-14-OF high explosive-ragmentation;

M-14-D smoke containing white phosphorus;

A chemical warhead containing 2.2 kilograms o Sarin.

Based on witness statements describing the impact o the

rockets and the absence o rocket remnants or reported

types o injuries consistent with an attack using high

11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Trans-

ers Database, www.sipri.org/databases/armstransers. Recipient

report or Syria or the period 19502012, generated on August 27,2013.12 US Deense Intelligence Agency and US Army Intelligence Agency,

Ammunition Data and Terminal Eects Guide -- Eurasian Communist

Countries, DST-1160Z-126-92, March 5, 1992, partially declassied

and released to Human Rights Watch via FOIA request.13 Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Janes Ammuni-

tion Handbook 1997-1998 (Surrey, UK: Janes Inormation Group

Limited, 2008), pp. 544-45.

A declassed reerence drawng rom Ordata

o the Soet-produced 140mm rocket, whchcan carry a warhead contanng 2.2 kg o Sarn.


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6 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

explosive or incendiary payloads, Human Rights Watch

believes there is little possibility that the rocket could

have been carrying high explosive or incendiary pay-

loads. Given the large number o casualties, this leaves achemical agent warhead as a strong remaining possibility,

which would be consistent with the symptoms displayed

by the victims.

According to declassied reerence guides, the 140mm ar-

tillery rocket has a minimum range o 3.8 kilometers and

a maximum range o 9.8 kilometers.14 Two witnesses told

Human Rights Watch that the August 21 rocket attack on

their area came rom the direction o the Mezzeh Military

Airport and the nearby Syrian 4th Armored Division base,

which are located respectively our kilometers and veto seven kilometers rom the site o the attack, and thus

within the range o possible launching sites. The projected

14 US Deense Intelligence Agency and US Army Intelligence

Agency, Ammunition Data and Terminal Eects Guide -- Eurasian

Communist Countries, DST-1160Z-126-92, March 5, 1992, partially

declassied and released to Human Rights Watch via FOIA request.

likely launch zone or the 140mm rocket impact near the

Rawda Mosque encompasses multiple Syrian government

military bases, training acilities, surace-to-air missile

sites, the 4th Armored Division base, as well as the east-

ern section o the Mezzeh Military Airport.

Human Rights Watch has closely monitored the types o

munitions and weapons used in the Syrian confict, andhas extensively reported on unlawul use o weapons by

Syrian government orces, including heavy 240mm mor-

tars against populated areas, antipersonnel mines, indis-

criminate air-dropped bombs, at least six types o cluster

munitions, incendiary weapons against civilians, and

indiscriminate tactical ballistic missiles.15 However, the

15 See or example: Cluster Munitions: Syria Use Persists, Hu-

man Rights Watch news release, September 4, 2013, http://www.

hrw.org/news/2013/09/04/cluster-munitions-syria-use-persists;

Syria: Ballistic Missiles Killing Civilians, Many Children, HumanRights Watch news release, August 5 , 2013, http://www.hrw.org/

news/2013/08/04/syria-ballistic-missiles-killing-civilians-many-children; Human Rights Watch, Death rom the Skies, April 10, 2013,

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/04/10/death-skies; Syria: Army

Using New Type o Cluster Munition, Human Rights Watch newsrelease, January 14, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/14/

syria-army-using-new-type-cluster-munition; Syr ia: Incendiary

Weapons Used in Populated Areas, Human Rights Watch news

release, December 12, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/12/

The 140mm Soet-produced rocket motor ound at the ste o

the Moadamya alleged chemcal weapons attack. The rocket scapable o carryng a 2.2kg Sarn warhead.

Source http://www.youtube.com/watch?=nymy8r0Kcag


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attack on Moadadiya on August 21 represents the rst

known appearance o the 140mm rocket, which has not

been documented in use in the current Syrian confict. Hu-

man Rights Watch is not aware o any inormation indicat-

ing that opposition orces are in possession o the 140mm

rocket, and its associated launching system.

Zamalka, Eastern Ghouta

Human Rights Watch documented the use o apparent

surace-to-surace 330mm rockets in Zamalka, Eastern

Ghouta on August 21. We ound no evidence o any use o

the 140mm rocket system used in the Moadamiya attack

in Eastern Ghouta.

syria-incendiary-weapons-used-populated-areas; Syria: Evidence

Shows Cluster Bombs Killed Children, Human Rights Watch newsrelease, November 27, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/27/

syria-evidence-shows-cluster-bombs-killed-children-0; Friendso Syria: Push to End Indiscriminate Shelling, Human Rights

Watch news release, February 24, 2012, ht tp://www.hrw.org/

news/2012/02/24/riends-syria-push-end-indiscriminate-shelling;ICBL publicly condemns reports o Syrian orces laying mines, Hu-

man Rights Watch news release, November 2, 2011, http://www.hrw.

org/news/2011/11/02/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-syrian-orces-

laying-mines.

Witness statements and inormation including GPS loca-

tions o rockets ound in the area provided by local activ-

ists, as well as satellite imagery locations that match thelocation in the videos, have allowed Human Rights Watch

to conrm at least our strike sites in Zamalka where at

least eight 330mm rockets struck on August 21. This is un-

likely to be a complete account o the number o rockets

used in the attack.16

Two rockets struck al-Mahariq Street, one on the

Ghazal building and the other on Mehyi al-Deen

building;

One rocket struck the Bostan neighborhood on Naheral-Tahoun street;

16 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with a member o the local

civilian council, September 4, 2013.

A Member o the UN Msson measurng and photographng the

140mm Soet rocket motor ound at the ste o the Moadamyaalleged chemcal weapons attack. T he 140mm rocket s capable

o carryng a 2.2kg Sarn warhead.

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?=6mOLULcrcVs


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8 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

Two rockets struck next to the Hamza mosque, one

just next to the mosque and the other close to the

nearby al-Kamal banquet hall;

Three rockets struck the al-Mazraat neighborhoodnext to the al-Tawq mosque and next to the elemen-

tary school.

None o the witness accounts describing the impact o the

rockets, and none o the images o the rocket remnants or

the reported injuries sustained at the scene are consis-

tent with an attack using high explosive or incendiary pay-

loads, as there are no visible traumatic injuries on any o

the victims or large impact craters visible at the scene o

the rocket impacts. High-explosive payloads would have

caused severe physical injuries to the victims and leavelarge impact craters, while incendiary weapons cause se-

vere burns on the victims, and leave behind a distinctive

burn scar where they strike. Based on the lack o evidence

o a high-explosive or incendiary attack, and symptoms o

victims that are consistent with a chemical attack, Human

Rights Watch believes that the 330mm rockets ound at

the sites were used in the alleged chemical attack.

A member o the Zamalka media center told Human Rights

Watch that he visited the scene o one strike in the al-Maz-

raat area o Zamalka just ater the attack.17 He said:

On August 21, I was in the media oce whenaround 2 to 3 a.m. my riends called to say that

rockets had hit Zamalka. When I heard that, I went

to the eld hospital in al-Mazraat neighborhood

Ater around 30 minutes rockets hit the al-Maz-

raat area. When the explosion hit I heard a very

low sound, it was like the sound o a helicopter

buzzing, and not the sound o explosion I went

outside the eld hospital and started running to-

wards the explosion site. I didnt reach the explo-

sions site because I saw injured people on the

ground and people screaming and running in alldirections I remember I went into one house and

saw a man with his wie on the ground. The house

was not destroyed. It was not where the rocket

17 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with member o media

center, September 4, 2013.

A Member o the UN nspecton team photographng a 330mm

rocket ound at the al-Maharq strke ste.Source: http://youtu.be/MmP6wPdTIUM


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ell or had an impact but they were dead on the

ground. Ater around 40 minutes rescuing people,

I started eeling my body aching. I was eeling

weak and unable to move. Then my eyes started

hurting me and headache started. There was no

smoke but there was a smell... I told my riend that

I have to go to the hospital. He put me in a car anddrove away I remember very well when we let

al-Mazraat in my riends car, I saw a dog crossing

the street. I shouted to my riend to be careul not

to hit him but beore I nished my sentence the

dog by itsel collapsed on the ground.

The same witness also conrmed to Human Rights Watch

that he had videotaped and uploaded a large number o

videos taken at the hospital o the wounded and dead.18

A second witness shared with Human Rights Watch sev-eral videos o remnants o the weapons used in the al-

Mazraat area on August 21. The videos show the same

330mm rocket type.

The member o the Zamalka media center also shared with

Human Rights Watch videos and pictures he took o rockets

in the al-Mahariq strike site aected during the August 21

attack. The remnants in these videos are also 330mm rock-

ets. On August 29 he visited the al-Mahariq strike site and

photographed a 330mm rocket he ound there and which

he believes had been used during the August 21 attack.In the proceeding days, when the UN chemical weapons

inspection team visited Zamalka, he took several videos o

other 330mm rockets ound at the al-Mahariq site, as they

were being examined by the UN weapon inspectors.

The 330mm surace-to-surace rocket that appears to be as-

sociated with the August 21 attack on Eastern Ghouta is o

a type not listed in standard, specialized, international or

declassied reerence materials. It is a rocket type that has

not been documented beore the outbreak o the current

Syrian confict, although it has been documented in a num-

18 The witness conrmed to Human Rights Watch that he video-

taped and uploaded the ollowing videos: http://youtu.be/R6na2UF-HN9Y; http://youtu.be/6qLJ3ixwvr8; http://youtu.be/xB2spW5JpI;

http://youtu.be/rldBJJecBnM; http://youtu.be/WHU-KA0iP3k; and

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WHU-KA0iP3k (accessed Sep-

tember 9, 2013).

ber o other attacks on opposition held areas in the months

prior to the Eastern Ghouta attack, including at least one at-

tack in which opposition activists claimed the government

had carried out an alleged chemical attack (see next page).

Human Rights Watch has obtained precise measurements

or the dimensions o the warhead rom a local activist inEastern Ghouta, and these measurements determine that

the estimated volume o nerve agent inside the warheads

would be approximately 50 to 60 liters, compared to 2.2

liters or the warheads designed or the 140mm rockets.

Prior to each attack, the warhead o the 330mm rocket

would have to be lled with the 50 to 60 liters o nerve

agent, a dangerous process that is normally conducted by

specialized teams wearing protective gear to prevent ex-

posure to the chemical agents. Human Rights Watch is not

aware o any inormation that the opposition orces have

ever possessed the amounts o chemical weapon agentnecessary to deploy such rockets, or that they possess the

expertise needed to ll the warheads without accidental

exposure to the deadly nerve agent.

Using the measurements and high-resolution images

provided by the Eastern Ghouta activist, Human Rights

Watch has been able to reconstruct the characteristics

o the 330mm rocket. Detailed measurements and high-

resolution photographs provided directly by an activist in

Eastern Ghouta allowed Human Rights Watch to dene the

diameter o the rocket as approximately 330mm; this is sig-nicant because these dimensions are compatible with the

Iranian-produced 333mm Falaq-2 launcher, or close copies

and derivatives thereo.19 Iran is believed to be the only

country in the world to produce rocket launchers in the

333mm category. Videos have appeared showing Syrian

orces using the Falaq-2 launching system to launch what

appears to be versions o the 330mm rockets, although the

launches seen in the video occurred during daytime and

are thus unrelated to the August 21 nighttime attack.20

19 See the brochure extract rom Irans Deense Industries Orga-

nization on the Falaq-2 launcher and its FL2-A rocket, available at:

Nic Jenzen-Jones, Alleged CW Munitions in Syria Fired From IranianFalaq-2 Type Launchers, post to T he Rogue Adventurer (blog),

August 29, 2013, http://rogueadventurer.com/2013/08/29/alleged-

cw-munitions-in-syria-red-rom-iranian-alaq-2-type-launchers/(accessed September 6, 2013).20 Nic Jenzen-Jones, Alleged CW Munitions in Syria Fired

From Iranian Falaq-2 Type Launchers, http://rogueadventurer.


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10 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA

(c)

a) Front plateof warheadand b) fuzeand explosivecharge(estimated)

e) Chemical agent warheCapacity estimated at 50with f) central tubing

g) Plug or vawith unidentfunction

c) Thick metalblast plate

650mm (Est. 1050mm length for HE variant)

22

350mm

(b)

(c)

(d)(g)

(i) Rock

(d

(c)

d) Thin, exterior wall ofwarhead, designed to peal offallowing the dispersal of thechemical agent

(f)

(h)

(e) Chemical agent

(a)

Photographs courtesy of Eliot Higgins of Brown Moses blog http://brown-moses.blogspot.ch

(a)

(c)(g)

DIAGRAM OF MM CHEMICAL ROCKET VARIANTTHIS DIAGRAM OF THE MM CHEMICAL ROCKET VARIANT IS DRAWN TO SCALE, BON INFIELD MEASUREMENTS OF SURVIVING ROCKET COMPONENTS COLLECTED FRIMPACT SITES IN THE ZAMALKA NEIGHBORHOOD OF DAMASCUS FOLLOWING THE AON THE MORNING OF AUGUST , .


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(m) Motornozzle

(k) Stabilizingfins and (l) ring

1550mm (rocket motor)

120mm

0mm length for HE variant)

330mm

(d)

(m)

(j)

(k)

(k)

(l)

(m)

ug (not present

et variant)

(h)

j) The chemical variant of the330mm rocket is identifiedwith red numbers. The highexplosive (HE) rocket variantis numbered in black

(j)

)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(g)


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The rocket is o a non-aerodynamic design and possesses

a novel spin stabilization mechanism located just above

the nozzle. The non-aerodynamic design o the rocket in-

dicates that the rocket would be relatively short ranged

and not capable o accurate targeting.

The consistency in the design o these rockets suggeststhat they were locally but industrially produced, and ap-

parently designed to be deployed with the Iranian 333mm

launchers or derivatives thereo. While Human Rights

Watch cannot establish where the rockets were manuac-

tured, their basic design and unique size matching the Ira-

nian rocket launching system suggest a Syrian industrial

origin. The production o a weapon specically designed

to deliver chemical weapons would be a violation o the

1993 Convention on Chemical Weapons, o which only ve

countries, including Syria, are not parties.

While a separate, high-explosive warhead version o the

rocket appears to exist based on attacks in other areas,

three design dierences appear to distinguish the sus-

pected chemical weapon type rom the suspected high-

explosive type: videos and photos o the weapons rom

attacks in Syria show that the chemical weapons variant

has an additional plug or aperture on the payload (used to

ll the container with chemical agent prior to ring); the

high-explosive type measures at least 400mm longer; and

the chemical weapons variant appears to be numbered in

red numbers (with one documented rocket numbered 900,suggesting a signicant number o the rockets were pro-

duced), while images o the high-explosive variant con-

sistently show that it has black numbering, perhaps or

ease o identication. All o the 330mm rocket remnants

identied by Human Rights Watch in the Eastern Ghouta

Zamalka attack are o the suspected chemical weapons

variant, with red numbering, a shorter-sized warhead, and

an additional ll plug.

Most signicantly, the design o the payload o the rock-

ets ound at the scene o the Eastern Ghouta August 21 at-tack strongly indicates that it is compatible, and perhaps

specically designed, or the delivery o chemical agents.

The payload o the rocket consists o a large, thin-walled

com/2013/08/29/alleged-cw-munitions-in-syria-red-rom-iranian-

alaq-2-type-launchers/.

container, capable o holding 50 to 60 liters o chemical

agent which is loaded into the payload via a plughole, and

a small central tube with a suspected bursting charge at

the ront, rupturing the thin-walled container and distrib-

uting the vaporized chemical agent.

The 330mm rocket has appeared in its high-explosive ormin previous attacks around Damascus. The high-explosive

version o the 330mm surace-to-surace rocket appears

to have been used in the Daraya suburb o Damascus on

January 4, 201321 and in Khalidiya, in Homs governorate,

on August 2, 2013. Opposition orces blamed both attacks

on the Syrian government, although Human Rights Watch

could not independently conrm this allegation.22

On August 5, 2013, opposition activists lmed what ap-

pears to be the remnants o the chemical weapons-carry-

ing variant (with the extra ll plug visible23

as well as thered numbering system)24 o the 330mm rocket in the `Adra

suburb o Damascus, in what they alleged was a chemi-

cal weapons attack by Syrian government orces.25 While

Human Rights Watch could not independently conrm the

allegations that Syrian government orces were respon-

sible or the August 5 `Adra attack, the videos do show

the remnants o suspected chemical weapons-delivery

variant o the 330mm rocket, as well as dead and dying

21 [Flash important one o the rockets that ell tonight aya],

January 4, 2013, video clip, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=5DznRyIQ1js(accessed September 6, 2013).22 Unidentied Rocket or Missile in Khalidiya, Homs August

2nd 2013, August 6, 2013, video clip, YouTube, http://youtu.

be/0eIrXubJAgE (accessed September 6, 2013).23 [Rocket, which was carr ying chemical materials and shows

around the dead animals afer chemical attack], August 5, 2013,video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLcqi_dE-

9SU (accessed September 6, 2013).24 Unidentied Munitions Linked To August 5th Adra ChemicalAttack, August 22, 2013, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=E0lzUvozF1c (accessed September 6, 2013).25

[Rocket, which was carr ying chemical materials and showsaround the dead animals afer chemical attack], August 5, 2013,

video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLcqi_dE9SU (accessed September 6, 2013); Brown Moses, Unidenti-

ed Munitions Linked To August 5th Adra Chemical Attack, Au-

gust 22, 2013, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0lzUvozF1c (accessed September 6, 2013); Brown Moses,

Unidentied Munition Linked To August 5th Adra Chemical Attack

[2], August 22, 2013, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=Tzhhhv3uHio (accessed September 6, 2013).


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animals nearby, otherwise uninjured and showing signs o

exposure to a nerve agent.

No evidence has been produced that opposition orces arein possession o the 330mm surace-to-surace rockets

and their associated launchers. The only documented at-

tacks using this weapon system in Syria have been against

opposition-held areas and targets. The Syrian government

is known to possess the Iranian Falaq-2 333mm rocket

launching system, as several videos have emerged on so-

cial media allegedly showing Syrian government orces

ring the 330mm rockets rom truck-mounted 333mm

launchers, although no videos have emerged rom the

nighttime August 21 attack.26

26 Nic Jenzen-Jones, Alleged CW Munitions in Syria Fired

From Iranian Falaq-2 Type Launchers, http://rogueadventurer.

com/2013/08/29/alleged-cw-munitions-in-syria-red-rom-iranian-

alaq-2-type-launchers/.

Death Toll

Because the August 21 attacks took place in two separate

areas o Ghouta, and owing to the chaos resulting rom the

large number o casualties, it is dicult to establish a pre-

cise death toll. The areas aected do not have any large

hospitals, and rely on several small, badly supplied under-

ground clinics to provide medical assistance. According to

the doctors interviewed by Human Rights Watch, these

small medical clinics were overwhelmed by the number

o victims, and many o the dead were never brought to

the clinics and thus not registered. According to MdecinsSans Frontires, at least 3,600 persons were treated or

symptoms consistent with exposure to neurotoxic agents

at three hospitals it supports in the area in the rst three

hours ollowing the attacks.27

27 Mdecins Sans Frontires, Syria: Thousands Suering rom

Ths handout photo proded by Shaam News Network showsbodes o ctms o an alleged chemcal weapons attack on

Ghouta, Syra, on August 21, 2013. 2013 Assocated Press


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Human Rights Watch has collected the names o 80 in-

dividuals believed to have been killed in the August 21

strikes in Moadamiya in Western Ghouta. Two sources

told Human Rights Watch that 103 people were killed in

the Moadamiya attack.28

Because the attack on Eastern Ghouta involved a much

larger aected area, and several small clinics where vic-

tims were brought, a total death toll is more dicult to

establish. A member o the Zamalka media center, stated

during an interview with Human Rights Watch on Septem-ber 4, and in a separate interview with local journalists on

Neurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by MSF, Au-

gust 24, 2013.28 Syria: Witnesses Describe Alleged Chemical Attacks, Human

Rights Watch news release, August 21, 2013, ht tp://www.hrw.org/

news/2013/08/21/syria-witnesses-describe-alleged-chemical-attacks.

the same day, that the local council in Zamalka had regis-

tered the ull names o 734 persons who were killed during

the attack in Zamalka neighborhood.29

29 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with member o Zamalkamedia center, September 4, 2013; [Chairman o the local council in

the port Zamalka in Ghouta campaign will not die], September 3,

2013, video clip, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IT4R14

LHNZM&eature=youtu.be (accessed September 6, 2013).

Ths handout photo proded by Shaam News Network shows

bodes o a baby and two chldren, ctms o an alleged chem-cal weapons attack on Ghouta, Syra, on August 21 , 2013.

2013 Assocated Press


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II. IdentIfIcatIon of the

WeaponS uSed In the attackS

Human Rights Watch analyzed publicly posted YouTube

videos rom the attacked areas as well as higher-reso-

lution images o weapon remnants provided by a localactivist in Eastern Ghouta, and identied and analyzed

two separate surace-to-surace rocket systems that are

believed to be associated with the delivery o chemical

agents.

By directly contacting the activists who videotaped and

uploaded the videos o the attack available on YouTube,

Human Rights Watch has been able to veriy the reliability

o the videos, and conrmed that they were lmed in the

aected area. In the case o Eastern Ghouta, a local ac-

tivist provided Human Rights Watch with high-resolutionphotographs and measurements o the 330mm rocket

components. UN inspectors were also videotaped inspect-

ing some o the same rocket remnants during their on-site

visit, urther conrming that the rockets are located at the

scene o the attacks.

The rst type o rocket, ound at the site o the Eastern

Ghouta attacks, is a 330mm rocket that appears to have

a warhead designed to be loaded with and deliver a

large payload o liquid chemical agent. The second type,

ound in the Western Ghouta attack, is a Soviet-produced140mm rocket which according to reerence guides has the

ability to be armed with one o three possible warheads in-

cluding a warhead that was specically designed to carry

and deliver 2.2 kilograms o Sarin.30

Our analysis does not exclude the possibility that addi-

tional weapons delivery systems were used in the Eastern

and Western Ghouta attacks that have not yet been identi-

ed and analyzed. However, the two analyzed by Human

Rights Watch are the only known rocket systems identied

as associated with the attacks, according to local activistswho have closely inspected both the aected areas.

30 Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Janes Ammuni-

tion Handbook 1997-1998 (Surrey, UK: Janes Inormation Group

Limited, 2008), pp. 544-45.

In the hours ater the August 21 attacks, local activists

uploaded several videos o the remnants o rockets they

said were collected rom some o the sites o the attacks,

including some showing remnants apparently lmed

where they struck on the ground.31 In addition, photo-

graphs taken by local activists including some taken at

the scenes o the attack, appear to show the remnants orockets used in the attacks.32 By directly contacting the

activists responsible or uploading the videos, Human

Rights Watch has been able to obtain precise GPS loca-

tions where some rocket remnants were ound, and has

used satellite imagery to match the locations seen in other

videos to precise map locations.

Because the areas in Ghouta where the alleged chemi-

cal attacks occurred were shelled by Syrian government

orces prior to and ater August 21, it is dicult to conclu-

sively determine i the two types o rockets identied, theSoviet 140mm rocket and the 330mm rocket o unknown

origin, were the ones used in the attacks. However, local

activists say that they only ound the remnants o these

rockets in the hours ater the attacks o August 21 and not

beore.

In addition, none o the rocket remnants reviewed ap-

peared to contain high explosive or incendiary (fammable

substances such as white phosphorus) payloads. Accord-

ing to local activists and doctors as well as publicly avail-

able videos o the dead and wounded, none o the injuries

31 [Serious one rocket, which was carrying toxic gases that

caused the massacre in Medmah Sham] August 25, 2013, video

clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/nymy8r0Kcag, (accessed September6, 2013); [A chemical rocket that did not explode in a location that

was targeted with chemotherapy in the Eastern Ghouta], August 22,

2013, video clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/kllhsgFrgN0 (accessedSeptember 6, 2013); [Chemical rocket that landed on East Ghouta

and witness testimonies o the survivors], August 22, 2013, video

clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/Pc6xL-N65M, (accessed September 6,

2013); [The truth o what happened - an eyewitness o the massacreo the chemical in East Ghouta], August 22, 2013, video clip, You-

Tube, http://youtu.be/h2uBpDxAoJA, (accessed September 6, 2013);

[One o the rockets dropped on chemical Zamalka area and Ghouta],August 21, 2013, video clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/16qFgAM5jg

(accessed September 6, 2013).32 See: Brown Moses, August 21st Chemical Attack, gallery o

photographs, August 24, 2013, http://imgur.com/a/1nziC (collec-

tion o photographs collated by Brown Moses accessed September6, 2013);, Images o rockets which delivered poison to Damas-

cus, ITV, August 25, 2013, http://www.itv.com/news/2013-08-23/

images-o-rockets-which-delivered-poison-to-damascus/ (accessed

September 6, 2013).(ITV).


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sustained by the dead and injured rom the attacks ap-

pear to be the result o high explosive or incendiary weap-ons. In both the Eastern and Western Ghouta attacks,

witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch described

how large numbers o persons died without any type o

traumatic injury in the immediate vicinity o the strikes in-

volving the identied rockets.

III. IdentIfIcatIon of the nerve

agent uSed In the attackS

The precise identication o the specic chemical agent

used in the August 21 attack requires the collection o

samples rom weapon remnants, environmental samples,and physiological samples rom those directly or indirectly

exposed to the chemical agent. Subsequent specialized

analyses o these samples can reveal the specic agent

itsel or the reaction or degradation products character-

istic o a specic agent. The UN investigative team has

collected such samples, and will issue its ndings ater

the completion o its investigation. In the absence o such

testing, Human Rights Watch can only make a preliminary,

indirect, circumstantial identication o the chemical that

was likely used in the Ghouta attacks.

Human Rights Watch has sought technical advice rom Dr.

Keith B. Ward, a respected expert on the detection and e-

ects o chemical warare agents, who has reviewed rst-

hand and second-hand reports rom local residents, the

clinical signs and symptoms described by doctors, and

A stll mage rom a YouTube deo uploaded by opposton

actsts ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attackshows a ctm o the attack rothng rom the nose and mouth,

a medcal condton assocated wth exposure to ner e agents

such as Sarn.Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?=AqCDSq_BXKo


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the large number o videos that were taken o the victims

o the August 21 attack.

The videos showed that several o the younger victims ex-

hibited cyanosis, a bluish coloring on their ace, especially

around their eyes and mouth, which is consistent with su-

ocation or asphyxiation. The suocation was likely either

caused by excessive secretion o mucus and fuids in thelungs and air passages, or damage to the part o the ner-

vous system that supports breathing, or both. A majority

o adult victims in these videos also show signs o exces-

sive secretions o fuids or mucus rom the mouth and

nose. Several o the patients shown in the videos were ex-

periencing involuntary muscle spasms or convulsions. It is

signicant that there was no obvious indication o bodily

trauma or excessive blood loss.

These observations are consistent with reports rom wit-

nesses, doctors, and the international aid organizationMdecins Sans Frontires (MSF).33 For example, three lo-

cal doctors told Human Rights Watch that residents a-

33 Mdecins Sans Frontires, Syria: Thousands Suering rom

Neurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by MSF, Au-

gust 24, 2013, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.

cm?id=7029 (accessed September 7, 2013).

ected by the attacks consistently showed clinical signs

including suocation; constricted, irregular, and inre-quent breathing; involuntary muscle spasms; rothing at

the mouth; fuid coming out o noses and eyes; convul-

sions; red and irritated eyes and pin-point pupils (myosis).

In addition, they report that victims complained o nausea,

dizziness, and blurred vision.

The clinical signs we observed on the videos and the signs

and symptoms o the victims commonly reported by others

are not consistent with injuries due to explosive concus-

sions, ragmentation, or incendiary devices. Nor are they

consistent with exposure to chocking/pulmonary, lachry-matory, incapacitating, vesicant/blister, or asphyxiant/

blood agents. Rather they are a strong indication that the

victims were exposed to a toxic organophosphate chem-

ical agent (a nerve agent) which acts by inhibiting en-

zymes necessary to the proper unctioning o the nervous

system. This class o chemicals includes the less toxic

A stll mage rom a YouTube deo uploaded by opposton ac-

tsts ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attack showsmedcal staf attemptng to restran a ctm who appears to

be undergong asculatons (noluntary muscle spasms or

conulsons), a medcal condton assocated wth exposure tonere agents such as Sarn.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?=5SZIbBnksc


25/29


common pesticide Malathion, but the severity and extent

o the clinical signs and symptoms coupled with the largedeath toll that resulted rom the attack strongly suggests

that a much more toxic chemical warare nerve agent was

used in the attack.

Syria is believed to possess at least two nerve agents,

Sarin and VX, in signicant quantities.34 Sarin is a toxic

but non-persistent nerve agent. Exposure is usually due

to inhalation, and the agent rather quickly degrades and

disperses into atmosphere. The agent VX is both more

persistent and 5 to 10 times more toxic than Sarin. Expo-

sure and death by VX is caused by inhalation or by skin,

34 See, or example: David E. Sanger, Andrew W. Lehern, and

Rick Gladstone, With the World Watching, Syria Amassed Ner veGas, September 7, 2013, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.

com/2013/09/08/world/middleeast/with-the-world-watching-syria-

amassed-nerve-gas.html?pagewanted=all (accessed September 7,

2013).

conjunctival, and mucosal absorption. There are reports

that people were able to visit the sites o the attacks a

ew hours post attack and to handle remnants o rockets

associated with the attacks without suering signs and

symptoms o exposure to nerve agent. This suggests that

the nerve agent involved is more likely to be the less per-

sistent and less toxic agent, Sarin, rather than VX.

Thus while our ndings cannot be conclusive without lab-

oratory analyses o environmental and physiological sam-

ples, the large number o victims o the attack, the clinical

signs and symptoms that characterized both the victims

and, later, the medical workers who treated the victims,

and the act that areas near attack sites were apparently

sae to enter soon ater the attack, all strongly suggest

that the attack involved an organophosphate chemical

more toxic that the pesticide Malathion, and was most

likely a toxic but non-persistent chemical warare nerve

agent, such as Sarin, which Syria is believed to possess.

The use o Sarin in these latest attacks would be consis-

tent with its apparent use earlier in Syria. There is labora-

tory evidence that Sarin gas has been used in previous

attacks allegedly carried out by Syrian government orces,

including an earlier attack in Ghouta. A photographer or


tsts ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attack showssheep allegedly klled durng the attack. The presence o dead

anmals, ncludng brds, dogs, cats, and lestock, s urther

edence o a chemcal attack.Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?=eF4GF1ysNm8&eat

ure=share&lst=UUdqy0MJox2GUa_9R_ILNbGQ


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Le Monde newspaper, Laurent Van der Stockt, was ex-

posed to what he believed was a chemical weapon attack

while in Jobar in April 2013.35 In laboratory tests conducted

upon his return to France, he tested positive or exposure

to Sarin. Sarin was thus a likely agent to have been used

in the Jobar attack, and is consistent with the symptoms

experienced by those exposed to the agent during the Au-

gust 21 attacks on Ghouta.36

Other samples collected by the Le Monde team rom sites

o suspected chemical attacks in the Jobar and Ghouta ar-

eas also tested positive or Sarin in June 2013.37 During the

same April trip, the Le Monde journalists also collected

21 hair, blood, urine, and clothes samples rom victims o

suspected chemical weapon attacks in Jobar and Ghouta

35 Kareem Fahim, Still More Questions Than Answers on Nerve

Gas in Syr ia, June 10, 2013, New York Times, ht tp://www.nytimes.

com/2013/06/11/world/middleeast/still-more-questions-than-an-swers-on-nerve-gas-in-syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed

September 9, 2013).36 Jean-Philippe Rmy, Des analyses conrment lampleur de

lusage de sarin en Syrie, Le Monde, June 28, 2013, http://www.

lemonde.r/proche-orient/article/2013/06/28/des-analyses-conr-ment-l-ampleur-de-l-usage-de-sarin-en-syrie_3438187_3218.html

(accessed September 6, 2013).37 Ibid.

neighborhoods o Damascus and had the samples testedby the Centre Dtudes du Bouchet, a French laboratory

specializing in the analysis o samples o nuclear, chemi-

cal, and biological agents. Thirteen o the samples tested

positive or exposure to Sarin gas, while the other sam-

ples tested inconclusive.38

38 Ibid.


tsts ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attack shows achld ctm o the attack rothng rom the mouth and cyanoss

(blush colorng o the ace, especally around the lps, caused

by sufocaton or asphyxaton due to the buld-up o mucusand luds n the lungs), a medcal condton assocated wth

exposure to nere agents such as Sarn.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?=xTKTl4-Dg


27/29


Iv. reSponSIbIlIty for theauguSt 21 attackS

Syran Goernment Forces Responsbl-ty or the Attacks

The evidence examined by Human Rights Watch strongly

suggests that the August 21 chemical weapon attacks on

Eastern and Western Ghouta were carried out by govern-

ment orces. Our basis or this nding is:

The large-scale nature o the attacks, involving at

least a dozen surace-to-surace rockets aecting

two dierent neighborhoods in Damascus country-

side situated 16 kilometers apart, and surrounded by

major Syrian government military positions.

One o the types o rockets used in the attack, the

330mm rocket system likely Syrian produced, which

appear to be have been used in a number o alleged

chemical weapon attacks, has been lmed in at least

two instances in the hands o government orces. The

second type o rocket, the Soviet-produced 140mmrocket, which can carry Sarin, is listed as a weapon

known to be in Syrian government weapon stocks.

Both rockets have never been reported to be in the

possession o the opposition. Nor is there any oot-

age or other evidence that the armed opposition has

the vehicle-mounted launchers needed to re these

rockets.

The August 21 attacks were a sophisticated military

attack, requiring large amounts o nerve agent (each

330mm warhead is estimated to contain between 50and 60 liters o agent), specialized procedures to load

the warheads with the nerve agent, and specialized

launchers to launch the rockets.

Ths handout photo proded by Shaam News Network shows ayoung ctm o an alleged chemcal weapons attack on Ghouta,

Syra, recuperatng n a hosptal on August 22, 2013.

2013 Assocated Press


28/29


v. SyrIa and chemIcal WeaponS

under InternatIonal laW

Syria is not among the 189 countries that are party to the

1993 Convention on the Prohibition o the Development,

Production, Stockpiling, and Use o Chemical Weaponsand on their Destruction.39 However, Syria is a party tothe 1925 Geneva Gas protocol, which bans the use in war

o asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and o all anal-

ogous liquids, materials or devices.40The use o chemical

weapons is also prohibited as a matter o customary inter-

national humanitarian law, or the laws o war.41

The prohibition on the use o chemical weapons applies to

all armed conficts, including so-called non-international

armed conficts such as the current ghting in Syria. The

International Criminal Tribunal or the ormer Yugoslavia,in the Tadic case, stated there undisputedly emerged a

general consensus in the international community on the

principle that the use o [chemical] weapons is also pro-

hibited in internal armed conficts.42 In 1977, during a de-

bate in the First Committee o the United Nations General

Assembly, Syria supported a complete ban on chemical

weapons.43

39 Convention on the Prohibition o the Development, Production,

Stockpiling, and Use o Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,

Paris, January 13, 1993, Doc. CD/CW/WP.400/Rev. 1, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.ns/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&docume

ntId=9D3CCA7B40638EF5C12563F6005F63C5(access September 7,

2013).40 Protocol or the Prohibition o the Use o Asphyxiating, Poison-

ous or Other Gases, and o Bacteriological Methods o Warare,Geneva (Geneva Gas Protocol), June 17, 1925, http://www.icrc.org/

applic/ihl/ihl.ns/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=5

8A096110540867AC12563CD005187B9. Syr ia ratied the Geneva GasProtocol in 1968.41 International Committee o the Red Cross, Henckaerts, Doswald-

Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2005), rule 74.42 International Criminal Court or the ormer Yugoslavia, Tadiccase, Interlocutory Appeal, October 2, 1995, sec. 120.43 Syria, Statement beore the First Committee o the UN General

Assembly, UN Doc 1/C.1/32PV.15, Sept. 30, 1977, pp. 11 and 16.


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(cover photo) Bodies of victims of a

suspected chemical attack on Ghouta,

Syria on Wednesday, August 21, 2013.

AP Photo/Shaam News Network

attacks on ghouta: analysis of alleged use of chemical weapons in syria

Documents